AL QAEDA IN IRAQ: DEMOBILIZING THE THREAT

by

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# Title: Al Qaeda in Iraq: Demobilizing the Threat

**Abstract:**

The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost. To achieve US objectives in Iraq it is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadi elements as well. This thesis uses a social mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, *Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)* describing the group’s political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames and repertoires of action. The result of this analysis shows an internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-specific political or social strengths. This thesis applies this knowledge to established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort. This relational analysis views the conflict through a six dimensional framework to examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions. We then examine the current status of the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq. Trend-analysis tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern and areas of positive movement. Based on the nature of AQI and the current trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.
ABSTRACT

The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost. To achieve US objectives in Iraq it is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadist elements as well. This thesis uses a social mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) describing the group’s political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames and repertoires of action. The result of this analysis shows an internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-specific political or social strengths. This thesis applies this knowledge to established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort. This relational analysis views the conflict through a six-dimensional framework to examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions. We then examine the current status of the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq. Trend-analysis tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern and areas of positive movement. Based on the nature of AQI and the current trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION
  A. BACKGROUND AND THESIS QUESTION .......................................................... 1
  B. THESIS OVERVIEW ....................................................................................... 3

## II. AL QAEDA IN THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS ........................................ 9
  A. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ......................................... 9
  B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES ................................................. 9
     1. Middle East Regional Trends ................................................................. 9
     2. Rise of the Mukhabarat State ............................................................... 10
     3. Pressure from Puritanical Challengers ................................................. 10
     4. Al Qaeda Operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan .................. 11
     5. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait and the US Defense of Saudi Arabia .......... 12
     6. Iraq’s Defeat in Operation DESERT STORM and the Expulsion of the Palestinians ................................................................. 12
     7. Jordan - Repression, Imprisonment & Amnesty ..................................... 13
     8. Defeat of the Taliban and the Transformation of Al-Qaeda .................. 14
     9. Fractious Pre-War Conditions in Iraq .................................................... 16
    10. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Collapse of Iraqi Stability .............. 16
     11. Growth in Information Technology ...................................................... 18
        a. Propaganda Effect ............................................................................. 18
        b. Web-Enabled Decentralized Command & Control ......................... 19
        c. Online Training ............................................................................... 19
        d. Web-Based Recruiting .................................................................... 20
  C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES ........................................................................... 20
     1. A Militant Reading of the Muslim Faith ................................................. 21
     2. Resource Mobilization .......................................................................... 24
        a. Financial Resources ......................................................................... 25
        b. Recruiting and Manpower Mobilization .................................... 27
        c. Training ......................................................................................... 28
     3. Insurgent Group Organization ............................................................... 29
  D. MESSAGES, IDENTITY & FRAMES OF CONFLICT .................................. 31
     1. Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist “Clash of Civilizations” Frames ................. 34
     2. AQI’s Salafi-Jihadist Self Identification Frames .................................... 34
     3. Framing AQI’s Objectives .................................................................... 35
     4. AQI’s Frames on Democracy & Democrats ......................................... 37
     5. AQI’s Anti-Shi’a Frames ...................................................................... 38
     6. The Tawheed wal Jihad Flag .................................................................. 39
  E. ACTION REPERTOIRES .............................................................................. 40
     1. Insurgent and Terrorist Operations ..................................................... 43
a. Attacks on Coalition Forces and Western Civilians. 44
b. Attacks on Representatives of the Iraqi Government, the New Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police... 45
c. Attacks on Critical Infrastructure and the Reconstruction Effort ................................................. 46
d. Attacks on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Humanitarian Relief Organizations ........................ 46
e. Suicide (Homicide) Bombings ............................................................... 47
f. Hostage Taking and Beheadings.......................................................... 49
g. Mass-Casualty Attacks ........................................................................ 50

2. Puritanical Dress & Social Policies in Occupied Areas .... 52
3. Enmity Towards Hashemite Jordan .................................................... 52

III. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY ........................................................................ 55
A. COUNTERING AQI’S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES. 56
1. Countering AQI Political Opportunity Structures Using a Military “Clear, Hold and Develop” Strategy ............................................ 57
2. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a Political Outlet for Grievance ................................................. 67
3. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a Economic Incentives and Opportunity .............................................. 74
4. Countering Insurgent’s Use of Information Technology .... 75
B. COUNTERING AQI’S MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES .......... 76
1. Countering Militant Reading of the Islamic Faith .... 76
2. Countering AQI’s Resource Mobilization ........................................ 79
   a. Countering AQI’s International Material Support .... 81
   b. Countering AQI’s International Flow of Recruits .... 82
C. COUNTERING AQI’S FRAMES ................................................................. 88
   1. Countering AQI’s Violent Frames ........................................ 89
   2. Countering AQI’s Frames of US Imperialism .... 92
   3. Countering AQI Frames Through Positive Action .... 94
   4. Countering AQI Frames Through News and Interactive Debate ................................................................. 94
   5. Countering AQI Anti-Democracy Frames .... 95
   6. Countering AQI Frames Through Close Scrutiny of Friendly Operations ......................................................... 96
   7. Countering AQI Frames Using Nationalist Frames .... 99
D. COUNTERING AQI’S ACTION REPertoireS ............................................. 99

IV. CURRENT STATUS ................................................................................................. 101
A. CURRENT STATUS .......................................................................................... 101
   1. Current Status – Military Dimension ........................................ 101
   2. Current Status - Political Dimension ............................................. 109
   3. Current Status – Socio-Economic Dimension ......................... 112
   4. Current Status – Cultural-Ideological Dimension ..................... 118
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................... 127
A. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 127
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 128
1. Recommendations – Military ............................................................. 128
   a. Secure the Population, Systematically Extend the Control of the Government and Operate Using Minimal Military Force .................................................. 128
   b. Train and Support Iraqi Military ......................................................... 129
   c. Deny the Insurgents Secure Base Areas ........................................... 129
2. Recommendations – Political ............................................................. 130
   a. Continue Democratic Political Process to Demobilize Iraqi-Nationalist Insurgents .................................................. 130
   b. Amnesty and Reconciliation Program .............................................. 130
   c. Legitimize the Democratically-Elected Government ............................................................... 131
   d. Discredit the Salafi-Jihadist Political Platform .................................. 131
3. Recommendations – Socio-Economic .................................................. 132
   a. Provide Employment and Opportunities .......................................... 132
   b. Secure the Economic Elite .............................................................. 132
   c. Secure Oil-Revenue-Producing Assets ........................................... 133
4. Recommendations – Cultural-Ideological ............................................ 133
   a. Foster a Positive Concept of Iraqi Self-Identification .............................................................. 133
   b. Uphold High Human Rights and Rule of Law .................................. 134
   c. Apply International Law to AQI ......................................................... 134
   d. Publicize and Prosecute Terrorist Abuses ....................................... 136
   e. Engage in a Comprehensive Counter-Narrative Strategy ............... 136
5. Recommendations – International ....................................................... 139
   a. Gain Control of Iraqi Border Areas .................................................. 139
   b. Engage Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Gulf States ............................ 140
   c. Work with Allies ............................................................................ 141
6. Recommendations – Psychological ...................................................... 141
   a. Build and Visibly Demonstrate Iraqi Military Capability in Attacking Insurgent Held Areas ........................................... 141
   b. Demonstrate Independent Positive Leadership .......................... 142

LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................. 145
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................................................ 155
# LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 1. | Nationalities of the Foreign Militants in Iraq – Sept 2005 | 30 |
| Figure 2. | Zarqawi’s Original “Monotheism & Jihad” Flag | 39 |
| Figure 3. | More Recent Variations of AQI’s Flag | 39 |
| Figure 4. | Iraqi Military and Police Killed Monthly | 45 |
| Figure 5. | Killed and Wounded in Multiple-Fatality Bombings | 51 |
| Figure 6. | Failed 15 November AQI Suicide Bomber, Sajida Rishawi on Jordanian TV Showing her Explosive Vest | 53 |
| Figure 7. | Infiltration Routes From Syria | 85 |
| Figure 8. | Syrian-Iraqi Border Area NW of Tal Afar and Iraqi Border Forts | 87 |
| Figure 9. | Pew Global Attitude Survey: Is The US A Threat to Our Country? | 93 |
| Figure 10. | Perception of Who Can Improve Situation in Iraq | 104 |
| Figure 11. | Tips Received From Population | 104 |
| Figure 12. | Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents | 106 |
| Figure 13. | Attacks by Province | 106 |
| Figure 14. | Map of Provinces Where Attacks Most Common | 107 |
| Figure 15. | Popular Perception of Security | 108 |
| Figure 16. | Iraq: Economic Indicators – GDP & Per Capita GDP | 114 |
| Figure 17. | Iraq: Economic Indicators – Inflation | 115 |
| Figure 18. | Attacks on Iraqi Oil and Gas Pipelines, Facilities & Personnel | 116 |
| Figure 19. | Crude Oil Export | 116 |
| Figure 20. | Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq | 117 |
| Figure 21. | Murder Rate in Baghdad | 119 |
| Figure 22. | Total Number of Insurgents Detained of Killed | 122 |
| Figure 23. | Estimates of the Strength of the Insurgency | 122 |
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND AND THESIS QUESTION

The Iraqi insurgency is not a classic insurgency in the sense of a single coherent and systematic Maoist "people's war" in ideology and organization. Neither is it a Che Guevara-type foco war, pitting a small band of dedicated revolutionaries against a despised central government. Instead, the situation in Iraq is a collection of multiple insurgencies; a chaotically diverse threat environment, with at least 40 named insurgent groups, each with their own politico-religious ideology, constituency, and objectives. These groups include apolitical and opportunist ic criminals, former regime Ba'athists, Sunni tribalists and religiously motivated militias. While the vast majority of the insurgents are Iraqis with specific, nationally orientated goals, this study will center on a single and much smaller group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It will focus on the internationally-supported Salafi-Jihadi group Tanzim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers {also referred to as either Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia or Al Qaeda in Iraq}).

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is important to understand because they pose a unique and particularly difficult counterinsurgency challenge. While the majority of Iraqi insurgent groups are nationalist and can be potentially defeated or demobilized by a coherent political, military and economic counterinsurgency strategy, such as that outlined in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,¹ AQI draws much of its strength from a larger international Salafi-Jihadi movement, making it very resistant to the direct effects of Iraq-centric tactics. In addition, although AQI represents a very small percentage of Iraq’s insurgent population - Sunni insurgents are thought to number approximately 15,000 to 20,000 and the foreign Jihadists are estimated in the low hundreds,² to as many as 2,000³ - this


small number of dedicated Jihadist insurgents achieving a destabilizing effect disproportionate to the size of their organization. According to Army Major General Richard Zahner, the senior United States military intelligence officer in Iraq, AQI constitutes the dominant force within the insurgency and poses the greatest threat to US objectives in Iraq. In addition, instrumental cross-group cooperation allows other insurgent groups to leverage AQI’s destabilizing operations to further their nationalist goals. So long as AQI remains mobilized, stability in Iraq will be elusive.

Speaking before Congress, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the United State’s objectives for operations in Iraq and defined success in terms of the character of Iraq as “free, democratic and peaceful.” The nation would moreover abstain from certain behaviors, specifically that Iraq “will not provide aid to violent extremists; it will not plot the assassination of American presidents; it will not invade or fire missiles at its neighbors; and it will not use chemical weapons on its neighbors or its own people.” These are lofty and, perhaps, unattainable objectives. When US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in a lightning three-week invasion during the Spring of 2003, these worthy goals appeared within reach.

Unfortunately, post-conflict operations were far less well coordinated. The Iraqi governmental structure, the police, the army, and most civil services collapsed. This meant the US coalition would be required to, but was unprepared to, immediately perform critical functions of governance. Into this vacuum arose widespread lawlessness, looting, and critical infrastructure damage. This chaotic environment provided the opportunity for insurgent groups to mobilize, recruit, and conduct initial operations against the coalition and against each other.

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5 Rumsfeld, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee (23 Jun 2005), 2.
6 Rumsfeld, Testimony Before HASC (23 Jun 2005), 2.
The future of Iraq is not yet determined. There are several possible trajectories, as follows:

1) the insurgents can be defeated and the pre-war goals attained;
2) the new constitution could effectively divide the state into three individual and feuding sub-states;
3) one of the insurgent groups could emerge as a dominant group, force the coalition out, and impose its rule;
4) or, finally, the state could fail and fall into an ethno-sectarian civil war.

This final trajectory is the least desirable. It would generate uncontrollable regional instability among neighboring states who have incompatible objectives in Iraq. Civil war may lead to regional inter-state war through either direct interstate war or war-by-proxy within Iraq. Regional conflict will severely disrupt the global oil market and the international economy in general. As the leading power in a globalized system that is dependent on access to Middle Eastern oil, the United States national interest is to prevent Iraq's descent into civil war. The insurgency must be defeated or demobilized.

This thesis addresses the following questions: What is the Salafi Jihadist Al Qaeda in Iraq insurgent group? What counterinsurgency strategies hold the greatest promise of defeating or demobilizing them?

B. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis conducts a study of the Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (AKA Al Qaeda in Iraq – AQI) to establish a threat profile and then applies known counterinsurgency models to this threat profile. This relational analysis should highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to both the current and a normative counterinsurgency effort. The goal is to recommend positive strategies that may weaken the insurgency and recommend against practices that strengthen it.

Chapter II describes AQI. There are three methodologies available to analyze the origins, organization, and operations of contentious groups. These
are structural theory, rational choice theory, and social mobilization theory (SMT). Structural theory focuses on the overarching national/international structures and the ways they constrain or shape group decision-making. At the other end of the spectrum, rational choice theory theorizes group behavior as largely a product of coldly logical choices made by key individuals. Social movement theory steers a middle course and is primarily concerned with group dynamics. It addresses group interaction with individuals and how groups are influenced by and, in turn, influence the larger national/international environment.

Social movement theory provides an appropriate framework within which we can analyze how insurgent groups coalesce, mobilize, gain resources and conduct operations against a central power. This theory is informed by the interaction of four functional areas:

1. Political Opportunity: Political opportunity is the functional space opened by some act or operation. Political opportunity spaces can be deliberately created through planned political policy, social reform, or legal rulings. They can also be opened unintentionally by sudden regime change, external invasion, casualty of war, socio-economic crisis, or rising popular dissatisfaction. Political opportunities shape environmental conditions in which a group is born, develops, and matures.

2. Mobilization Structures: Mobilizing Structures provide the resources necessary to sustain the political opposition and include sources of manpower, finances, and material resources as well as an informational forum for disseminating the group’s message. Preexisting mobilizing structures include a disaffected population base, sympathetic support groups, and a convincing

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9 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 9-13.
ideology. Mobilizing structures are the engine which drives the movement in the face of opposition.

3. Frames: Frames are the “interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the “world out there”. The most effective frames concurrently persuade the heart, mind and emotions (ethos, logos and pathos) and resonate with a large constituency. Narratives are the stories that motivate the group, define what the group is, what its goals are, and why it is superior to the opposition. It provides a worthy self-identification in contrast to the unworthy opponent. Narratives provide a sense that the group’s objectives are worthy of sacrifice and the goals are attainable.

4. Repertoires of Action: Action repertoires are the patterns of violent or non-violent actions conducted in pursuit of group goals. These actions may be instrumental in materially advancing the groups interests or may be symbolic actions used to support the group frames of identity, worth and victory.

Chapter III analyzes how AQI has exploited political opportunities, leveraged its mobilizing structures, formulated its narratives and conducted actions in order to identify ways that counterinsurgency techniques can counter them and defeat or demobilize the threat. This analysis will consider processes from across the counterinsurgency spectrum. It will include the three most often applied dimensions of counterinsurgency strategy – the political, military and economic dimensions. Unfortunately, AQI is mobilized and draws support from an international Salafi-Jihadist movement. AQI’s transnational, militant, and puritanical character renders counterinsurgency efforts within these dimensions much less effective.

This does not mean that military, political and socio-economic processes do not promote a more stable state – they probably will. Conducting a parallel counterinsurgency effort against the nationalist Iraqi insurgents is critical to

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11 Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, 16.
indirectly undercutting the Salafi-Jihadists, but unfortunately, it will be problematic to demobilize this internationalized insurgency by these methods alone. A broader counterinsurgency effort is required.

This paper will also explore less-commonly addressed dimensions of counterinsurgency - the cultural-ideological, psychological and international dimensions. These less-obvious dimensions provide additional tools which can support the overarching counterinsurgency effort and may have a proportionately greater effect on defeating the Salafi-Jihadists.

This thesis will consider the applicability of historical precedents. No single counterinsurgency strategy is applicable in all cases, but by understanding the experience gained by governments faced with insurgent challenges, we gain a useful set of lessons of favorable or counter-productive responses which inform our actions. The challenge is to determine which lessons, ideas, and policies can be transferred from their original context and applied in a new situation.\(^\text{13}\)

Chapter IV will examine the current status of the insurgency as of December 2005. It will use a six dimensional framework for analysis.

Chapter V will present prioritized recommendations, and provide a projection of the expected effectiveness of these recommendations in demobilizing AQI. Finally, this chapter will highlight areas not addressed by this thesis that would benefit from additional study.

The methodology used in this thesis is a literature study which integrates social mobilization theory, counterinsurgency history, and observations of ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Social mobilization theory (SMT) provides a framework to describe and interpret the growth, development, and maturation of social movements engaged in contentious politics.\(^\text{14}\) In this thesis, SMT provides a systematic approach to describe the insurgent group AQI in contention with the coalition and Iraqi central


government. It provides insight and expected outcomes for group dynamics in an active environment containing multidimensional stimulus and feedback. Understanding the origins and nature of an insurgent group provides a valuable first step in defeating or demobilizing it.

The second area of study involves a survey of counterinsurgency literature to highlight and evaluate strategies that have the potential to defeat or demobilize the threat. A majority of insurgency-counterinsurgency literature deals with describing insurgent groups in their successful operations against repressive or post-colonial governments vice a balanced analysis of the insurgent-counterinsurgent conflict. Indeed, most political scientists know the names and deeds of Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion, T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Their writings aid the understanding of insurgent operations and objectives. Insurgency analyst and writer O’Neil treats the counterinsurgency effort not as “the other side of the coin” and co-equal to the insurgency, but as one of seven elements in his insurgency analysis framework. Few political analysts beyond specialized circles of counterinsurgency, are familiar with the contributions of Gen Sir Frank Kitson, Ramon Magsaysay, C.E Callwell, or Gen Sir Gerald Templar.

Another limitation within counterinsurgency literature is the focus on the tactical-military role in combating insurgents at the individual-to-group level of analysis. These studies use detailed case studies to delve into the causes of a specific insurgency, the government’s reactions, and the lessons derived from this particular experience. These case studies reveal useful examples of successful or failed tactics, but generally do not place their studies into a broader context or within an overarching framework of counterinsurgency at the strategic level. The government has a significant advantage in the conventional tactical environment or as C.E. Calwell is quoted, “Tactics favor the regular army while strategy favors the enemy [guerrillas].”

15 O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism, 45-66.
In this vein, the American military historically takes a very narrow view of counterinsurgency strategy. Often, rather than considering associated social, political, and economic factors, tactical military matters normally form the basis of American strategy.\textsuperscript{17} While a military-focused strategy leverages dominant US military strength, the multidimensional nature of insurgency makes it possible for the insurgents to lose every battle and still win the war.

To demobilize and defeat the insurgency in Iraq, a coordinated and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is essential. John Baylis provides a useful six-dimensional framework for categorizing the insurgent’s and the counterinsurgent’s objectives, motivations and tactics.\textsuperscript{18} While comprehensive, this approach is not entirely new. During the early 1960s, with the US facing Communist insurgencies, President Kennedy’s advisors also emphasized the need for a “combination of political, military, social, psychological and economic measures.”\textsuperscript{19} Academically speaking, the process of counterinsurgency may appear orderly and the implementation conceptually easy. In reality, it is neither. Indeed, to quote T. E. Lawrence, “Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife”\textsuperscript{20}. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency has been the most common form of warfare since World War II. This is not a mission that will go away and, according to former United States Marine Corps (USMC) General Anthony Zinni, “statebuilding, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency are not military-operations-other-than-war, they are war.”\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17} David Morgan, An Evolving View of Warfare: War and Peace in the American Military Profession, \textit{Small Wars and Insurgencies'}, Vol 16, No 2, (June 2005), 149-150.


\textsuperscript{19} Bard O'Neil, \textit{Insurgency & Terrorism} (New York, Brassey’s Inc Maxwell MacMillan Permagon Publishing Corp, 1990), 5.


II. AL QAEDA IN THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS

A. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

This section examines social mobilization as the functional interaction between Zarqawi, his followers and their environment. Although it is debatable whether this Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group constitutes a true social movement, the methodology and terminology of social mobilization theory is a useful framework to describe the group’s birth, mobilization and maturation into the organization currently operating in Iraq. It also may provide insights into means available to the US and Iraqi governments by which the insurgency can be demobilized.

Social movement theory provides a framework for analyzing how insurgent groups coalesce, mobilize, gain resources and conduct operations against a central power. This theory is informed by the interaction of four functional areas. These include political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.22 This chapter describes Al Qaeda in Iraq in these terms.

B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Political opportunity structures “shape the prospects for collective action”.23 These are unique to the national context in which they occur, and provide conditions that favor or limit social mobilization and channel resulting forms of action.24 Several conditions and actions contributed to the mobilization of a violent insurgency against the US-led coalition. While these conditions may not have made an insurgency inevitable, they conspire to make it difficult to establish a stable post-conflict environment.

1. Middle East Regional Trends

Numerous regional trends contribute to a sense of instability and conflict. These include rapidly expanding populations, uncontrolled urbanization, stagnant

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22 McAdam et al, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes.
23 McAdam et al, 3.
economic growth, lack of effective popular political influence, government repression, and the rise of religious conservatism. Together, these factors create an overall environment of dissatisfaction and discontent.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, the destabilizing tension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian refugee issues - either concentrated in UN refugee camps or scattered in more prosperous countries and the uncertainty created by the US Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) create an atmosphere of instability and conflict.

The US can moderate the effects at the periphery of these problems, but it will take concerted effort on the part of all regional governments to solve them. Thus far, the regimes involved have not demonstrated a significant commitment to doing this.

2. Rise of the Mukhabarat State

After the successive defeats in 1948, 1956 and 1967, many Middle Eastern Arab governments were overthrown by their own military or faced active internal opposition political groups. In response, these governments became increasingly more repressive in order to “coup-proof” themselves. Methods included creating competing regular army and national guard/republican guard/revolutionary guard units, stationing ultra-loyal Praetorian Guard units in the capitol, creating several competing internal security services, institutionalizing rapid turnover or placement of family-members in key government leadership positions, arresting anyone demonstrating dissatisfaction with the government, and repressing all competing political/social groups within the society. This all-inclusive repression effectively strangled any legal political opposition as a form of activism. With the playing field cleared of all challengers, the only acceptable form of social activity was Islam. The predictable result was increasingly radicalization of the opposition with an Islamic character.\textsuperscript{26}

3. Pressure from Puritanical Challengers

The 1979 Shi’a revolution in Iran and the Wahabi takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca created a significant challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudi

\textsuperscript{26} Wiktorowicz,, \textit{Islamic Activism}, 10.
royal family. Without the cushion of a healthy civil society, the al-Saud regime sought to reinforce their religious credentials in order to survive. Their goal was to appear as pious as their Sunni Wahabi or Iranian Shi’a Revolutionary challengers. This prompted the Saudi government to support puritanical Wahabi education within their own country and finance the educational export of their form of Islam throughout the region as visible evidence of their religious nature.

4. **Al Qaeda Operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan**

The 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a critical political opportunity for regional activism. The communist occupation of Muslim lands deeply offended Muslim Salafis throughout the region. Saudi Arabian Wahhabis, those who follow the teachings of 18th century Salafi theologian Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahab, believed that dying in *Jihad* against invaders would gain them entry into heaven as martyrs.27 This contentious mindset effectively mobilized support for the resistance, providing motivated young activists, finances, and military equipment. In a parallel effort, other Muslim states also exported their militant activists to Afghanistan to do their duty in what was seen as a sacred struggle.28 The conflict in Afghanistan and flow of support into Pakistan created the conditions which required an organization to organize the recruits, train and equip them and feed them into the fight against the Soviets. This effort provided the organizational birth of *al Qaeda*, the Base. One of these young activists was Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealth Saudi businessman, arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1980. Once there, he began organizing safe houses, training camps and logistic support for the Arab mujahideen traveling to Afghanistan.29 Tales of Arab mujahideen combat exploits were used as recruiting tools by the Imams of Salafi mosques who leveraged these stories to organize and provide additional recruits for the Afghanistan *Jihad*. When the Soviet forces withdrew, the tales of these Arab mujahideen grew to myth-like status.

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Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization exploited the mujahideen myth. The legacy of this resistance movement provides two essential political opportunities to the Iraqi insurgency: 1) a trained cadre of militant leaders and, 2) a perceived model of effective action that would allow a weak but pious Muslim state to resist and defeat a superpower. This perceived victory against the Soviets in Afghanistan provided an essential frame of legitimacy essential for recruiting efforts.

5. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait and the US Defense of Saudi Arabia

In August 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, he set in motion a direct competition between the US and Al Qaeda as the rightful defender of Saudi Arabia. The al-Saud chose the US as the more effective military power to defend the kingdom. In response, the US and coalition deployed some 500,000 foreign troops to the region. Bin-Laden was humiliated and enraged. This decision set al-Qaeda firmly against both the al-Saud monarchy as well as the US. From this point on, Al Qaeda framing would portray the al-Saud as corrupt rulers incapable of protecting the two holy sites (Mecca and Medina) and portrayed the US as a distant neo-colonial power propping up this unworthy regime.

After his defeat in 1991, Saddam’s persistently aggressive behavior ensured the US would maintain a sizable contingent of forces in the kingdom. The continuing US presence reinforced bin Laden’s frame of foreign occupation.

6. Iraq’s Defeat in Operation DESERT STORM and the Expulsion of the Palestinians

Prior to the war to expel Saddam’s forces from Kuwait, the Palestinians and Jordanians largely sided with Saddam against the west and against other Muslim states. This was partly due to Saddam’s contributions to Palestinian projects and partly due to disgust with the excesses of the Kuwaiti royal family. After Saddam’s staggering military defeat in 1991, both the Palestinians and Jordanians felt the ire of the US and their Muslim neighbors. Approximately 250,000 Jordanian-Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait – approximately
160,000 of these settled in the Zarqaa area\textsuperscript{30} of Jordan. This sudden influx of newly-unemployed Palestinians had a dramatically detrimental effect on society and the local economy. In particular, it strengthened the militant Salafi organizations. It heaped a large number of disaffected youth onto an already strained situation and provided a ready pool of potential recruits to the militant cause. This expulsion of Jordanians and Palestinians from Kuwait significantly radicalized the Islamist movement in Jordan.

7. Jordan - Repression, Imprisonment & Amnesty

Facing this challenge to its legitimacy and rule, the Jordanian government predictably reacted by strengthening its police functions and jailing many Islamist agitators. Like many other Arabs who had gone to Afghanistan, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi returned to his home country in the early 1990s to carry the Jihadist fire into his home state. Arrested on weapons charges, Zarqawi was convicted in 1994 and imprisoned in the Al-Sawwaqa prison where he was joined by his ideological mentor, Muhammed al-Maqdidi.

While in prison, Zarqawi distinguished himself through his physical toughness and uncompromising confrontational actions toward the guards. Within the prison, Zarqawi soon eclipsed his spiritual mentor as leader of the Jordanian Salafi-Jihadists.

Upon the death of King Hussein of Jordan in 1999, his son and the new King Abdullah, proclaimed an amnesty for many of his father’s political prisoners. Although Abdullah apparently intended the move to clean the slate and obviate grounds for violent resistance, its effect was to set loose in Jordan thousands of battle-hardened Jihadis and Salafi ideologues. Rather than wait to be rearrested, Zarqawi returned to Pakistan and then moved on to Afghanistan. There he established a training camp near Herat that operated autonomously of bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda network. Zarqawi’s focus was on training Jordanians and Palestinians for operations in Jordan to overthrow the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{30} Nimrod Raphaeli, “The Sheikh of the Slaughterers: Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi and the Al Qaeda Connection”, Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series No 231 (01 Jul 2005) 2.
8. Defeat of the Taliban and the Transformation of Al-Qaeda

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks which were determined to be the work of bin-Laden’s Al Qaeda, the US demanded Afghanistan’s Taliban regime hand bin-Laden over for justice. When the Taliban refused, they were attacked by a multi-national coalition led by the US, which leveraged the indigenous Northern Alliance as the primary ground force. Not only did this defeat scatter the remaining mujahideen, it also shattered the original loose hierarchical structure of bin-Laden’s Al Qaeda. This military defeat forced Al Qaeda to transform into a more nebulous-structured, transnational, militant ideological organization creating a “franchised terrorist organization” and a prototype of a stateless insurgent enemy.31

This transformation of al-Qaeda has become a transnational insurgency fed by regional instability and dissatisfaction. It is uneven in its appeal – its frames are compelling in some parts of the world, less elsewhere. Where Al Qaeda’s ideology resonates, and the local conditions provide sufficient political opportunities, the movement can spawn localized terrorist actions or anti-government insurgencies. Indeed, this “flattened” or franchised organizational structure uses recruitment rhetoric that emphasizes the US support for local governments and the formation of a transnational network to enable bin Laden to “reorient local resistance movements away from their local grievances in the short term so as to bring an accumulation of violence against their common enemy, the United States.”32

This transformed al-Qaeda not only catalyzes these terrorists and insurgencies, it provides a support network that continues to feed them and provide them the means to create effects well out of proportion to their numbers. The global Salafi network provides funding, manpower, equipment, and political and religious legitimacy. If the insurgency fails, the network will also provide fall-back locations where operatives can rest and regroup.


32 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (NY, Random House, 2005), 117.
For example, as the Taliban regime was crushed, Zarqawi and about 30 followers left Afghanistan and with tacit government approval, traveled through Iran to link up with an Al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar-al-Islam, in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Here, he was able to establish a new organization “Al-Tawheed wal Jihad” (Monotheism & Jihad).

After US-led forces defeated Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government, Zarqawi’s operations scored headlines while the core of al-Qaeda seemed to fade from prominence. In October 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin-Laden and in return bin Laden named Zarqawi emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. To symbolize this union, he renamed his organization Qa’dat Al-Jihad Fi Bilad Al Rifidain (al-Qaeda for Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers). “Two rivers” refers to the Tigris and Euphrates and the land is alternately referred to as Mesopotamia or Iraq. This alliance provides bin-Laden with fresh victories his organization can claim and ensures Zarqawi remains the junior partner. Zarqawi benefits by gaining access to al-Qaeda’s prestige and legitimacy and Zarqawi himself is elevated from a “field commander to a global Jihadi on par with Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden, and Zawahiri.” Materially, AQI gains access to Al Qaeda’s global operational networks, gains access to bin Laden’s sources of funding (especially form wealthy donors in Saudi Arabia), and gains access to an already mobilized pool of manpower.

Although a transformed al-Qaeda provides a ready source of funding and well-motivated recruits, it is in and of itself, insufficient to produce the insurgency we see today. Saddam Hussein’s entrenched Ba’athist regime stood in the way of any effective revolt. More immediate and localized opportunities are needed to explain the ongoing conflict in Iraq.

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34 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 258.
9. Fractious Pre-War Conditions in Iraq

Among the other factors that provide a favorable climate for al-Qaeda, Iraq is a highly divided state separated along economic, sectarian, and ethnic lines. In broadest terms, it consists of an economically poor and politically repressed Shi’a majority (~60%), a semi-autonomous Kurd and Turkomen minority in the north (~20%), and the ruling elites of the minority Sunnis (~20%). The Iraqi Ba’ath party ruled the “Republic”. However, the reality was President Saddam Hussein held all the levers of national power. “Saddam’s manipulation of Iraq’s ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions left Iraq with few cross-cutting identities” which could moderate opinion.36 Saddam’s systematic and brutal repression of any organized dissent meant there was no effective opposition movement in operation (such as Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance) to which we could turn for an immediate replacement of the existing Sunni/Ba’athist power structure. His selective support for loyal tribes and clans further fragmented society. In the post-war environment, Zarqawi was able exploit this fractured social structure and gain support from the Sunni minority to transplant his fledgling Jihadi group to resist US forces in Iraq. This divided society provides a local constituency, but also imposes limits on Zarqawi’s ability to form a movement which includes the majority of Iraqis.

10. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Collapse of Iraqi Stability

The American-led war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in many ways provided an enormous political opportunity to al-Qaeda. With Afghanistan effectively closed, the Iraq war opened a new theater of operations for Salafi-Jihadists to train and conduct operations against their “far enemy”, the United States. The collapse of stability in the transition to post-conflict (Phase-IV) operations allowed insurgent groups to take hold, grow, and mature.

The removal of Saddam Hussein from power did not create the insurgencies; the vast majority of Iraqis had no great love for their former leader. Instead, the chaotic conditions and power vacuum that replaced Saddam’s

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repressive police-state rule provided a permissive environment which enabled various factions to seek to expand their influence. In one stroke, the entire framework of political governance, security, and social services was swept away and the resulting vacuum allowed the forces of tribal or family grievance, nationalism, and religious intolerance to grow and mature into violent insurgency.

Operation Iraqi Freedom ended without surrender; no Appomattox; no Battleship Missouri. Armed Iraqi soldiers melted back to their homes and their leaders escaped. The resulting hunt for Saddam and for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) occupied the majority of the coalition resources, time, and energy. The situation deteriorated into chaos and, within this chaos, insurgent groups began to mobilize.37

The highly combat-effective, but minimalist US force structure had multiple downstream effects. Without large numbers of “boots on the ground” to ensure order, the most immediate effect was widespread looting, the removal of weapons and explosives from unsecured depots, the pilfering of critical economic infrastructure, and the loss of US psychological dominance. The Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) subsequent decision to disband the Iraqi military, de-Ba’athify the government, and the implosion of the police force left the coalition with few Iraqi allies to counter the growing lawlessness. These decisions helped to create a large number of trained, armed and unemployed young men disenfranchised and without options. It was not until nearly a full year after the war that the US began to train Iraqi security forces for counter-insurgency operations38. Predictably, when facing well-trained, well-armed insurgents, these newly-trained police and soldiers performances were “generally poor.”39

38 Anthony Cordesman & Patrick Baetjer, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft: Updated as of May 20, 2005 (provided by author), 10.
11. Growth in Information Technology

Although the Salafi-Jihadi insurgents’ religious creed may be rooted in the 7th and 8th century, they show no reluctance to use 21st century technology. Facilitating the decentralized transformation of Al Qaeda, the advancements of digital imaging/audio/video, data-compression technology, broadband internet connectivity and satellite communications have fueled a significant advance in psychological warfare, recruiting, training and command and control warfare. In the 1990’s, bin Laden used video-tapes, audio-cassettes, and faxes to disseminate his message to sympathetic media outlets40. This information-age war goes well beyond the “al-Jazeera effect”. Al-Qaeda’s “Global Islamic Media Front” is orchestrated by Salahddin II (a non-de-Guerre) declaring the “front does not belong to anyone and knows no boundaries” in creating a “media Jihad”41. The Zarqawi equivalent has been organized and orchestrated by AQI Chief of Media, Abu-Maysara Al-Iraqi.

a. Propaganda Effect

This evolving technology allows rapid dissemination of messages and narratives to a world-wide forum. Because it goes directly from source to recipient, it is changing the nature of psychological warfare. This new method of information dissemination both exploits and sidesteps the traditional media outlets. While traditional media outlets are still leveraged by insurgent groups, these technologies allow the insurgents to broadcast propaganda without government control, oversight, or alteration of the message. This rapidly expanding technology has created a “hole42” in the informational space which allows Jihadis to produce and disseminated high-quality propaganda to a world-wide audience in near-real-time giving them immediacy and credibility.

This growth of digital technology has had two opportunity effects. The first is psychological and social effect where all insurgent attacks can be


41 Habib Trabeisi, Al-Qaeda Takes Jihad to the Media Four Years After 9/11, Middle East Online, (2005-09-08 2005), 1.

42 James Russell, NPS Professor 2005, evolving theoretical concept.
immediately publicized worldwide. These videos are packaged with sensationalized political messages which become fact to many remote readers. Indeed, it appears filming attacks has become an integral part of the attacks.\footnote{Glasser & Coll, The Web as Weapon, 3.}

Secondly, by monitoring US and third-world country news, insurgents gain information “on US and Iraqi intelligence, targeting, and operational data.”\footnote{Cordesman & Baetjer, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, 24.}

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\textbf{b. Web-Enabled Decentralized Command & Control}
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Web posting and the use of seemingly ambiguous code-worded messages provide insurgent leaders the ability to transmit messages, receive status reports, and provide direction without exposing themselves to conventional targeting. This “all-channel network”\footnote{John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, “Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues” ,in Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, Robert J. Bunker ed, (NY, Routledge, 2005), vii.} broadcasts blind so it can be received by friend and foe alike, but the rapid dissemination and ability for both the sender and receiver to remain anonymous in the mass of internet “hits” strongly favors the insurgents. Terrorists also communicate directly with their fellows using the proliferation of free web-mail accounts. These services require minimal personal information, the data is rarely verified, and allows terrorists to randomly set-up and discard accounts making government tracking nearly impossible.\footnote{Ariana Cha, “From a Virtual Shadow, Messages of Terror” Washington Post, (2 Oct 2004), 2.} Finally, password-protected chat rooms provide a digital conference area terrorists can interact in relative secrecy.

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\textbf{c. Online Training}
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Digital technology is also used to disseminate information and answer questions from geographically distant allies. Online Mujahideen handbooks detail how to build and use explosives and poisons. These manuals are written in English and are provided to a world-wide audience to enable otherwise autonomous terrorists to conduct attacks with little formal training.\footnote{Trabelsi, Al-Qaeda Takes Jihad to the Media Four Years After 9/11, Middle East Online, 2005-09-08, 2.}
Alleviating the need to congregate or travel with tell-tale documents, a laptop provides access to a rapidly-growing online library which provides support on a wide variety of subjects. Topics, in multiple languages, include how to conduct a successful raid, how to shoot a US soldier, and how to navigate by the stars\textsuperscript{48}. It contains advice on how to travel to Iraq, the names of Syrian mosques to stay in, how to bribe border guards and plausible cover stories in response to questioning.\textsuperscript{49} For immediate technical assistance, there are real-time chat rooms where specific technical advice can be obtained.

\textbf{d. Web-Based Recruiting}

Some analysts have proposed that strictly web-based recruiting could produce a completely anonymous terrorist operation where the operatives themselves do not know the true identity of their partners\textsuperscript{50}. Most analysts agree that web contacts may be able to sustain a previously established close relationship, but that strictly web-based recruiting does not establish the essential links of trust required to conduct high-risk terrorist operations\textsuperscript{51}.

\textbf{C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES}

Mobilizing structures are the formal and informal vehicles through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.\textsuperscript{52} These are the material & organizational resources (cadres, finances, property, facilities, weapons, communication and war materiel) and institutional resources (public offices and political platforms) needed to propel the movement.\textsuperscript{53} In contrast to the formalized structures found in the west, the Iraq insurgents use formal and informal associational networks of personal relationships, “that characterize


\textsuperscript{49} Glasser & Coll, The Web as Weapon, 4.

\textsuperscript{50} Coll & Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations”, 2.

\textsuperscript{51} Marc Sageman, \textit{Understanding Terrorist Networks} (Philadelphia, Univ of Penn Press, 2004).

\textsuperscript{52} McAdam et al, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes, 3.

\textsuperscript{53} Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003).
much of politics, economic activity, and culture."54 Also, unlike most other nationalistic rebel groups, AQI has not adhered to the normal triad of interconnected functional areas - security/terrorism, political activism, and social welfare. Nevertheless, AQI has been able to mobilize international resources and manpower, task organize, and conduct effective operations. This lopsided approach to insurgency leaves AQI with a deficit of legitimate political and social influence which will hamstring their ability to translate anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi government attacks into longstanding political or social power. The following are significant contributing factors in mobilizing and empowering the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency in Iraq.

1. **A Militant Reading of the Muslim Faith**

Historically, religion has provided many groups with a powerful mobilizing structure. For Salafi-Jihadists, the world is “decadent, violent, oppressive, and riddled with contradictions.”55 Salafi Muslims believe the present problems in the region are a result of a gradual compromise and decadence of the faith which has taken place over the over the past 500 years. In this light, religion provides a powerful prescription. To regain lost preeminence, Muslims must return to a puritanical application of Islam.56 Salafis believe that by returning to the standards of behavior of the original followers of Mohammed, the *Salif*, Islam can regain its lost greatness. All Salafis share a common religious-political outlook but sub-groups disagree on the means to achieve their ends. Among these three differing approaches are the purists, who see religion as a deeply personal issue that requires the individual to redouble their efforts to live a pious life. Purists believe a grass-roots approach can gain Islamic ascendance where Islam transforms society and society transforms government. A second group, the Politico-Salifis work toward a top-down approach where the state is captured by politically-active Islamists who then impose Islamic reforms from above. The third type, the Salafist-Jihadists, “support the use of violence to establish Islamic

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states”. All three have the same puritanical reading of the faith; the difference only lies in its expression. At its heart, both Al Qaeda and AQI are Salafi-Jihadist organizations.

A leading Salafi ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, focused on two concepts of faith, jahiliyya and takfir, as the justification for militant Jihadi action. Jahiliyya refers to the “condition of the pre-Islamic society, combining ignorance and savagery. Jihadists view current Muslim governments as having reverted to this pre-Islamic state of jahiliyya. The extension of this idea is that governments which are Muslim in name only are unlawful; therefore, Jihad against them is lawful. The second concept, takfir, is excommunication or the declaration of a state of infidelity. Takfir is declared against someone who professes Islam, but is in fact kafir, an infidel. The Salafi-Jihadists apply these concepts in a lose and militant way. Instead of seminary training, their ideology is the product of battlefield experiences in Afghanistan and rejects the academic interpretation of the purists and political action of the politicos. In viewing less ardent Muslims, Salafi-Jihadists cite perceived anti-Islamic actions as proof of rejection of the faith. This action allows the Salafi-Jihadists to declare these less-ardent Muslims as takfir and therefore punishable by death.

Although not a religious scholar, in 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa or religious decree, stating it is a religious duty to wage Jihad to remove Western influence from all Muslim nations - especially Saudi Arabia; obliterate Israel; and overthrow Western-supported dictatorships in the region. Bin Laden has also stated all Muslims should unite to establish an Islamic state or Caliphate based on the rule of the Rashidun (the four initial “rightly guided” Caliphs).

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57 Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of a Salafi Movement, 17.
58 Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of a Salafi Movement, 3.
60 Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, 17.
61 Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, 20.
62 Blanchard, Al Qaeda, 2-5.
This Salafi-Jihadist outlook provides the insurgents legitimization and a sense of a higher calling. Zarqawi effectively employs these Jihadist message as a call to action, a political plan, and a source of social standing. He translates faith into operations to reestablish an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East. According to an intercepted letter from bin Laden’s ideological advisor, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Zarqawi, the struggle in Iraq is central to Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal. Echoing Bin Laden’s 1998 *fatwa*, Zawahiri’s letter describes a four-step process.63

1. Expel the Americans from Iraq.
2. Establish an Islamic authority or emirate in Iraq.
3. Extend the Jihad to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.
4. Clash with Israel.

According to this plan, the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency would not disband and return to peaceful pursuits after US forces depart Iraq. Instead, they would remain to consolidate their gains and then expand Jihad to neighboring states. Under this operational concept, AQI would likely threaten Hashemite Jordan, secular Ba’athist Syria and the Al Saud government in Saudi Arabia.

AQI’s ideology differs markedly from Al Qaeda’s as expressed by bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri. In comparison, Al Qaeda’s ideology is a relatively broad-based reading of the Muslim faith.64 AQI is far more militant and exclusionary. Unlike bin-Laden, Zarqawi’s AQI liberally applies the label *takfir* to all westerners, Muslims assisting the coalition forces, political opponents, and Iraqi government functionaries. They view the Iraqi Shi’a majority as heretics and justifies their being targeted. Salifists condemn democracy as anti-Islamic because it elects men into decision-making positions and places man-made law above *Sharia* or “God’s Law”. Those seeking a democratic government are denounced as blasphemers and can be targeted. The US is seen as a decadent, neo-colonial

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63 Negroponte (DNI), *Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi*.

power infecting the lands of Islam. This militant puritanical ideology is well entrenched, and, among Salafis, not open to discussion, moderation, or western influence.

In operationalizing faith into insurgency, both Sunni and Shi’a militant groups use mosques as an uncontested “religeospatial mobilizing structures” where they can organize and equip themselves. These structures provide safe havens from which the insurgents can emerge and conduct operations in the surrounding area. Insurgents play on the coalition’s reluctance to attack forces housed in mosques, respecting their Law of Armed Conflict “protected status” even when the insurgents have clearly violated the sanctity of these structures. While this practice is likely to continue, its propaganda impact can be moderated by using Muslim Iraqi forces to search and clear these structures.

2. Resource Mobilization

Any insurgency must maintain sources of income and material resources. While insurgency is less expensive than state governance, the insurgents must still provide for recruiting, training, housing, food, equipment, weapons, forged identity papers and travel documents, computers and communications gear, incidental expenses of operatives, and compensation for families of killed terrorists.

Insurgents are difficult to strangle logistically. Unless they have entered into Mao’s third (civil war) phase of revolutionary war, insurgents do not normally engage in continuous high intensity combat operations. This relieves them of most of a conventional army’s logistical requirements. For example, in Vietnam during the mid 1960s, it required between 10 days and three months to transport supplies from ports in North Vietnam to the insurgents in the south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail road complex. Approximately 20-35% of these supplies were lost to interdiction efforts, but the Viet Cong (VC) were able to maintain a steady

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66 Haugh, *Analysis of Sunni-Based Opposition in Iraq*, 5.
67 DSCINT, 1 Jun 2005, 16.
68 Ehrenfeld, *Funding Evil*, 1.
tempo of attacks on US and South Vietnamese until the VC was largely destroyed in the Tet offensive. Prior to this disastrous military defeat, the VC were not only able to survive, but maintain operational freedom of action, “initiating 88% of all combat engagements.”69

In Iraq, AQI terrorists employing small arms, IEDs, VBIEDs and suicide bombers, also require minimal logistical support to maintain operations. Prior to the OIF, Hussein’s militarized state supported a huge armed infrastructure. With the collapse of that state, “few experts, if any believe that the insurgents face any near term supply problems given the numbers of weapons looted from Iraq’s vast arms depots during and after the fighting that brought down Saddam.”70

a. Financial Resources

Just as the government cannot function without revenues and resources, neither can an insurgency. But, unlike their historical insurgencies, AQI has not cultivated a widespread support infrastructure within the Iraqi population. It has gained support from the Sunni minority of western Iraq, but this constitutes only 20% of the overall population and is concentrated in only four of the eighteen provinces.

The exact methods and sources of Zarqawi’s funding are not clear. There is only antidotal evidence that AQI insurgents continue to be well-funded71. In analyzing the resource mobilization of Palestinian terrorist groups, Hizballah and Al Qaeda, economics and narco-terrorism author, Rachel Ehrenfeld, identifies an interconnected and mutually supporting “global Islamist terror network is estimated to be in the billions of dollars.”72

The 9/11 commission found Islamic charities, “particularly from Saudi Arabia had knowingly or unwittingly played a significant role in financing al

72 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 1-2.
In particular, the Muslim World League (MWL) and the International Islamic Relied Organization (IIRO) are recognized as funding sources for terrorism. These charities operate with negligible state oversight; they present an immediate method for co-religionists to provide direct support to militants. It has only been after the 2003-2004 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia that prompted Saudi officials to crack down on other sources of terrorist funding.74

Other shadowy sources of funding for terrorists include front businesses, exploitation of unregulated commodity markets, and international trade in precious commodities (diamonds and gold). Criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, credit card fraud, counterfeiting, and sale of illegal drugs also provide a substantial source of terrorist funds. Although purportedly a religious-based organization, Al Qaeda is not above these illicit activities. US law enforcement derailed a plot to exchange a significant cache of weapons and explosives “for $25 million dollars in cash and cocaine.”75

Once the money is gathered, it becomes essential to move it to where it is needed. One method is to convert cash to money orders in sums smaller than $10,000 (transactions over $10,000 are reported to the government) and “sent home”.76 A less formal method is the use of hawala, a traditional system of money transfers without the physical movement of cash. This process is fast, discrete, and inexpensive and has been used to allow money to flow within communities poorly served by banking institutions. It allows Middle Easterners working in foreign countries to send money home to support their families without a social security number or having these funds taxed. The process is based on a level of trust and involves an international business with links in many locations where a person gives the hawaladar a sum of money in one location. The hawaladar then arranges for the same amount of money to be

73 Reuters, “US Impatient with Saudis over Charity Funds”, (23 May 2005), 1.
75 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 2.
76 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 13.
given by one of his associates to an associate of the person’s at a remote location. No money actually moves and the process is untraceable.77

While hawala has been used as a legitimate means of transferring funds, it has also been employed to support ongoing Jihadi operations78. An electronic version of hawala has grown with the expansion of e-commerce. Peer-to-peer transactions involving e-cash, electronic purses, and smart cards make it easier for money launderers to move, store, and use their funds.79

b. Recruiting and Manpower Mobilization

Like Al Qaeda’s funding sources, the process by which AQI recruits are identified, trained, and brought to Iraq is not fully understood. Al Qaeda, a more mature and well-studied organization, has employed a process-dependent path for recruiting80. In this process, tightly-knit groups of close family or long-time friends are recruited into the group by current group members. In this way, Al Qaeda members would invite friends or family to go to a training camp for initial training, vetting, and evaluation. Depending on the evaluation, they could progress to further training, be sent into Afghanistan, or return home. Because of the fear of counterintelligence penetration, there was little freelancing for recruits. Instead, recruits were drawn from networks of close family or life-long friends rather than drawn from the general Middle Eastern population. The fact that bin-Laden and multiple ruling clerics from across the Middle East have put their prestige behind the insurgency has created no lack of recruits81. There is evidence this process has continued with Zarqawi drawing recruits from his home town of Zarqaa and the nearby Al-Ruseifah Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan82. According to CIA director Porter Goss, the ongoing American

77 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 14-15.
79 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 15.
80 Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks.
occupation in Iraq helps provide motivation and recruits while DIA director Adm Jacoby cited Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan as locations of greatest anti-US resentment. After Zarqawi’s oath of loyalty to bin Laden in late 2004, AQI received a boost of legitimacy and with it came “a windfall of human, financial and logistical resources.”

Zarqawi is also very active recruiting from his European-Muslim networks. Originally, duty in Iraq was thought of as a “one-way-trip”, but now European intelligence agencies are beginning to see a rotational pattern wherein Islamic activists who have traveled to Syria and Iraq are returning home to “bolster support and encourage new recruits”. The return of Salafi-Jihadists to Europe not only raises the concern of Salafi-Jihad recruiting for service in Iraq, but also increases the fear of “franchised terrorism” within Europe itself.

There is anecdotal evidence that suicide bombers do not go through the same rigorous recruiting, training, and vetting procedures as other Al Qaeda members. These volunteers for “martyrdom operations” are often “walk-in volunteers, with little connection to terrorism or any other form of violence until just before they sign up for their missions.”

c. Training

With the loss of Afghanistan as a training locale, terror groups need new training camps to test and evaluate their recruits. Within Iraq, Zarqawi has gained a foothold in western and central Iraq and is attempting to replace Afghanistan as the effective training ground for a second generation of Jihadis. These Jihadis are thought to be more dangerous than their predecessor in they are training in a “real-world laboratory for urban combat.” On 12 Sep 2005, US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad declared foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and North Africa have been able to fly into Damascus, receive training in

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84 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 258.
86 Pape, Dying to Win, 238.
87 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 264.
Syria, and then cross the border into Iraq to kill Iraqis\textsuperscript{88}. In a poor substitution for hands-on instruction, web-based training is also available to aid franchised terrorist groups\textsuperscript{89}.

3. Insurgent Group Organization

There is little unclassified information concerning AQI’s organizational hierarchy, functional structure, number of fighters or methods of support. What is available indicates AQI is probably mainly composed of a coalition between three militant Sunni groups: Ansar al-Islam, Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah and al Tawhid wa al-Jihad. These groups are thought to maintain their separate sub-group identities, but “coordinate joint armed operations.”\textsuperscript{90} The Bookings Institution’s estimates place insurgent numbers between 700 and 2000 out of a total 15,000 to 20,000 in the overall insurgency.

While bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was composed primarily of Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and North Africa, the group Zarqawi brought with him from Afghanistan was composed mainly of Jordanians, Syrians and Palestinians\textsuperscript{91}. To replace casualties, he expanded his recruiting circles to include Iraqis, Saudis, Yemenis, and militants from the Gulf States and North Africa. Two of his chief lieutenants, Abu Maysara al-Iraqi, AQI’s Chief of the Media Wing, and Abu al-Dardaa al-Iraqi, a Baghdad military commander, are both believed to be former Iraqi army officers.\textsuperscript{92}


\textsuperscript{89} Glasser & Coll, “The Web as Weapon, 3.

\textsuperscript{90} Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, 252.

\textsuperscript{91} Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, 254.

\textsuperscript{92} Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, 254.
Although some analysts believe the various Iraq insurgency groups have remained cellular in structure because the insurgency is a fledgling movement and not yet consolidated with a unified national-level oppositional leadership, others see the loose organizational structures of the insurgents as evidence of a “net-war organization” wherein the organization is better described as linear, cellular, and internet operations. This looser form facilitates the instrumental cooperation between Shi’a militias, Sunni tribalists, former Ba’athists, and the Jihadists. This construct has some linear chains, but will have the distinctive feature of an internet-enabled “all-channel network”, where the “principle node can communicate and interact directly with all other nodes”. In net war, the structure is ad-hoc - cells can communicate, exchange information, train or equip, conduct operations, and then disperse and never work together again. This loose and flexible organization is far more difficult to analyze, making it far more survivable and able to overcome loss of individual nodes. Its operations

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93 O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.
94 Lyon, “Insurgency in Iraq, 44.
95 Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency & Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, *Special Warfare*, vol17, no.2 (Dec 04) 14.
are more autonomous, mobile, and adaptive. It will require new methods of counter-insurgency to combat these threats.

D. MESSAGES, IDENTITY & FRAMES OF CONFLICT

Framing is “shared meanings and definitions”\(^\text{97}\) as well as the process by which these shared meanings motivate people to act against an injustice and become convinced they can make a difference. They “represent schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of the experiences and events in the world out there.”\(^\text{98}\) To this end, the jihadists employ a rich collection of stories, symbols, and histories which resonate not only with the Iraqi religious community, but especially within the larger Middle East population. These frames provide the legitimacy and identity resources (moral authority and an ability to demand sacrifices from followers based on perceived primordial ties) which tend to keep a movement coherent.\(^\text{99}\) This framing provides group identification from which members draw strength and meaning, offers solutions to challenges, and provides a rationale to motivate support for collective action\(^\text{100}\). This activism leverages the symbols, language, and cultural history of their society and “successfully resonated with increasingly disillusioned populations suffering from political exclusion, economic deprivation, and a sense of growing impotence”\(^\text{101}\).

Zarqawi’s successful terror attacks will influence his Iraqi Shi’a population directly but are insufficient to publicize his narrative to an internationalist audience. AQI also frames its victories for its international constituency. To accomplish this end, Zarqawi’s propagandists turn to the internet and sympathetic media outlets to by-pass more conservative news services. In framing his message, his organization is direct, clear, and its messages contain

\(^{97}\) McAdam et al, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes, 5.

\(^{98}\) Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 15.


\(^{100}\) Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism.

\(^{101}\) Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 24.
three essential psychological warfare themes. As noted by psychological operations theoretician Dr Maurice Tugwell, these are the “Mobilizing Trinity”: 1) my cause is “good and should be promoted”; 2) the enemy “is evil to be destroyed or resisted” and 3) ultimate victory will come to the good cause. In a religious conflict, the same trinity still applies 1) “we have faith in the right cause”; 2) “The enemy are heretics, they are evil in the eyes of God; and 3) “The will of God makes Victory Inevitable.”

For Zarqawi, successful terror attacks influence the Iraqi Shi’a population directly but are insufficient to support his internationalist cause. AQI also needs to trumpet its victories to an international constituency. AQI effectively employs its media connections to release an unbroken litany of web announcements often in a standard message format. These messages are written in flowery Arabic prose, and mix Koranic verses with operational details. In addition to the three-parts described by Tugwell, AQI messages add lead-in and closing statements that give praise to God, They frame their communiqués in Salafi-Jihadist terms throughout. For example, in a short news release, Zarqawi hails a September 2005 attack that killed Iraqi National Guardsmen in Ba’qubah:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Oh God, guide our aim and keep our feet firm.

Praise be to God, Lord of all creation. Prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and upon his family and companions.

Yesterday, Saturday 20 Sha’ban 1426, corresponding to 24 September 2005, your brothers in the military wing of al-Qa’ida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers assassinated a member of the pagan [National] Guard in Ba’qubah. Praise and thanks be to God.

Your brothers in al-Qa’ida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers are ongoing in their jihad and battling God Almighty’s

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enemies until worship is solely for the sake of God. It is either victory or martyrdom.

God is great. God is great. Glory be to God, His messenger, and the mujahidin.\textsuperscript{104}

The message denounces the enemy as “pagans” and “God Almighty’s enemies”; it praises Jihadis as “your brothers” who are fighting “until worship is solely for the sake of God”; it demonstrates certain belief in victory - either in the form of a victorious attack or transcendental martyrdom. Among Salafi-Jihadists, this is a very persuasive method of communication.

The will to continue must be maintained by insurgent movements. The best way to build morale is to gain military and political victories. However, propaganda, or the power of the story, can make one appear stronger than in reality, can undermine the enemy’s popular support, and can be used to legitimize violence. In so doing, the psychological war enhances the impact of military and political efforts.\textsuperscript{105}

The psychological dimension of war reinforces identities of adherents, and battles for the minds of the unconverted. Insurgents conduct conventional and terrorist operations to create a climate of fear, chaos, and collapse. These operations are designed to degrade the morale of government, military, and civilians and incite operational paralysis. In this dimension of warfare, insurgent attacks are a vehicle to produce psychological outcomes which discredit the government. They demonstrate the impotence of the military and undermine popular confidence.\textsuperscript{106}

Beyond these framing structures and message formats, what is Zarqawi’s self-identification; what are his narratives and how do his messages influence his followers?

\textsuperscript{104} Abu-Maysarah al-Iraqi, the Media Section of Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq, Message posted on Global News Network forum (25 Sep 2005), and claimed responsibility for assassinating a National Guardsman in Ba’qubah, FBIS Report in Arabic 26 Sep 05 FOUO, 1.

\textsuperscript{105} Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 89.

1. Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist “Clash of Civilizations” Frames

AQI frames have largely grown out of preceding Al Qaeda frames. In keeping with their militant reading of the Muslim faith, the core Al Qaeda worldview posits that the decline in global Muslim stature is due to US expansion of its “veiled colonialism.” They contend that by leveraging corrupt Middle Eastern regimes as tools, the US has subjugated the region to the interests of the “Crusader-Zionist alliance”.\(^\text{107}\) Bin-Laden couches his declarations as defensive jihad, justifying counterattacks because the global Islamic umma was under attack by a foreign and decadent culture\(^\text{108}\).

2. AQI’s Salafi-Jihadist Self Identification Frames

According to a web-posting by AQI Chief of Media, Abu-Maysara Al-Iraqi, AQI is comprised of a group of Muslims who have committed themselves to keeping Allah’s orders and proscriptions and to see to it that others do so as well\(^\text{109}\). Literate but not eloquent, Zarqawi has never been characterized as a leading Islamic thinker. Instead his organization’s suicide bombings and mass-casualty attacks and not his ideas are pushing the limits of Islamic Fundamentalism. More a hardliner than even many Al Qaeda hardliners, Zarqawi is reportedly “more interested in action than in preaching and indoctrination and had an impulsiveness and recklessness that disturbed his cohorts”.\(^\text{110}\) His ideological mentor, Muhammad al-Maqdisi is a fellow Jordanian and Salafi author whose thinking and writings have been strongly influenced by ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, and Sayyid Qutb. Their relationship dates back to the 1990s when he and Zarqawi were imprisoned together in Jordan. Another former prisoner and Zarqawi’s Jordanian biographer, Fu’a Hussein, believes that “Zarqawi’s prison experience was the most significant phase in the development of his personality”, imparting a bitterness and rage against the world.\(^\text{111}\)

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\(^\text{107}\) Pape, Dying to Win, 117-118.

\(^\text{108}\) Blanchard, Al Qaeda, 2.


\(^\text{111}\) Gerges, The Far Enemy, 256.
and Zarqawi’s share a powerful “blanket takfeeri ideology which makes few compromises. These brutally uncompromising Salafi-Jihadist frames inform analysis of AQI actions.

This blanket takfeeri ideology expands the definition of takfir, to label not only Muslims working in Iraq government or working in some capacity with the coalition as heretics, apostates, or collaborators, he also applies it to Shiites, Kurds and the “silent” and “defeatist” ulama. By applying this anti-God label, the jihadists justify their targeting strategy. These frames are used to justify attacks on unprotected, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, embassies, aid-workers, and foreigners, undermines stability and reconstruction efforts and undermines government legitimacy. It also gains media attention and puts pressure on their home governments to pull personnel out of Iraq. The insurgents also make a point of kidnapping, killing, or intimidating foreign women as this practice gains an even wider media attention. These attacks are effective psychological weapons because they gain greater media coverage, intimidates civilians, demoralized the government, and alienates the West from the Islamic world to reinforce the perceived “Clash of Civilizations”\textsuperscript{112}. In most counterinsurgency efforts, government will over-react or shrink from such attacks. Either response works to the advantage of the insurgents. These frames resonate well with some fellow Salafis, but less well with Iraqi tribal Sunnis and not at all with Iraqi Shi’a & Kurds.

3. Framing AQI’s Objectives

In an Islamic web-posting, AQI has highlighted their central goals which include:

1) Renew pure monotheism which was sullied by the filth of polytheism elements

2) Wage Jihad for the sake of Allah, so that his message be supreme and in order to recapture all the lands of the Muslims from the hands of the infidels;

\textsuperscript{112} Cordesman & Baetjer, \textit{Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency}, 17.
3) Come to the aid of Muslims everywhere and reclaim the Islamic dignity which has been soiled by the foreign invaders; and

4) Re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet’s example.\(^{113}\)

These goals are similar to the seven-phase agenda set described by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein in *al-Zarqawi – al Qaeda’s Second Generation*, which involves goading the US into overreacting, consolidating the Islamic community and using Syria as a base, defeating regional Arab governments, inducing the decline of western influence in the region, and ending in “total confrontation and “definitive victory”.\(^{114}\)

AQI’s tactical-level goals in Iraq are to destabilize the country to the point where it becomes a long-term civil war and continuing anti-US insurgency. This would provide global Jihadists with an ongoing venue for training recruits. It would foster a psychological sense of chaos and cause popular defection from Iraq’s nascent political structure and probable collapse of a democratically-elected government. It would bleed US’s military forces, demoralize US domestic will to continue the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). A continuing war will be portrayed as an invasion and occupation by the US and will continue to polarize world opinion, tarnish US’s social standing, and undermine the US’s international legitimacy.

If successful in forcing the US to leave Iraq before meeting our objectives, it would be trumpeted as a repeat of their self-promoted “mujahideen defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan” with the US playing the part of the USSR. It will support the Jihadists long-term goal of resurrecting a global Caliphate by mobilizing the Muslim world against the west and specifically the “far enemy”, the United States. These frames are designed to resonate with regional Salafis who are already committed to the ideal. Although US presence is increasingly seen as having a radicalizing effect in the region, these goals are not necessarily

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shared by Salafi purists or politicos and have a distinctly negative effect on moderate Muslims, pro-Iraqi Sunnis, Kurds and the Shi’a.

4. **AQL’s Frames on Democracy & Democrats**

The US mission in Iraq involves implanting a democratic political process to draw Iraqis toward moderation and compromise. However, AQI is vehemently anti-democratic. AQI’s anti-democratic frames have roots in the writings of Sayyid Qutb who argued “the basic problem was the subordination of human beings to one another and only God could exercise sovereignty and only God knows true laws.” Democracy elevates man as a false idol and displays ignorance of God. Bin-Laden echoed these comments warning democracy is a rival religion and “anyone who participates in these elections has committed apostasy against Allah”. Politically, Al-Qaeda frames also equate democracy with neo-colonialism, a foreign concept which has no place in the Middle East and is simply a method of re-asserting control on their society “ordered by America, under their airplanes, bombs and tanks”.

In the introduction of an Al Qaeda training manual seized by Manchester police stated it this way:

> The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.

Among all the groups vying for power, AQI is an unusual case. Its puritanically-based rejectionist stance does not allow for peaceful power-sharing with the Kurds, Shi’a or more moderate Sunni. Its political goals include establishing an Islamic state based on strict interpretation of *sharia* followed by confrontation with neighboring states and the reestablishment of the Caliphate. AQI rejects the entire political process and threatens not only opposition parties,

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but also those who participate in any way.\textsuperscript{118} In a 23 January speech denouncing democracy, Zarqawi described the democratic process as the “very essence of heresy, polytheism and error” and concluding, “If a Muslim apostatizes from Islam to heresy, he should be killed”.\textsuperscript{119} This stance does not present openings for compromise or reconciliation with Iraqi society, but resonates well with Salafi-Jihadists.

5. AQI’s Anti-Shi’a Frames

In drawing from the most puritanical and exclusive reading of Salafi Sunni theology, Zarqawi has made a significant departure from the more religiously inclusive al-Qaeda script by declaring war on Shi’a Muslims\textsuperscript{120}. In referring to them as “the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy and the penetrating venom”, he declares them takfir\textsuperscript{121}. In a tape, Zarqawi re-declared the war and stated it was in response to a US/Iraqi Army offensive along the northwestern Syrian border saying AQI "has decided to launch a comprehensive war on the Shiites all over Iraq, wherever and whenever they are found. This is revenge … Take care, because we are not going to have mercy on you"\textsuperscript{122}. In the most deadly attack of the occupation, Zarqawi employed a new tactic: luring scores of Shi’a unemployed laborers to an explosive-packed van with promises of work and then blowing it up. In response, Shi’a clerics condemned the attacks, but urged restraint, not wishing to be drawn into a larger sectarian civil war\textsuperscript{123}.

\textsuperscript{120} Al Jazeera, “Al-Zarqawi Declares War in Iraqi Shi’a”, Arab World News (14 Sep 2005), 1.
6. The Tawheed wal Jihad Flag

A flag is a prominent symbol of any self-identified group. Zarqawi’s original Tawheed wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) flag consists of an overall black background with a grey globe in the lower center. The black background color represents the goal of restoring the Islamic Caliphate by way of militancy. The globe represents the global community of Muslims or Umma as well as the jihadists’ global ambitions. Superimposed over the globe is an open Koran, facing up, representing the jihadists’ foundation in Islam. Rising out of the Koran are an AK-47, a hand pointing skyward, and a black flag which are all symbols of militancy. The Arabic Script at the bottom reads "Monotheism and Jihad," the original name of Zarqawi’s group. In a newer variation, AQI’s flag is a gold or silver disk with the Shahada (profession of faith) across the top and “Monotheism and Jihad” across the bottom. In keeping with the group’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, this symbol does not indicate any nationalist goals, political affiliation, or areas for compromise.

Figure 2. Zarqawi’s Original “Monotheism & Jihad” Flag

Figure 3. More Recent Variations of AQI’s Flag

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126 Anti-Defamation League, Terrorist Organizational Symbols
E. ACTION REPERTOIRES

Action repertoires can be a form of “propaganda by deed” aimed at demonstrating the military strength and seriousness of purpose of the insurgents.” They can also “involve a combination of propaganda and practical considerations, such as killing a particularly effective police chief or government spokesman.” According to global sociology author, Enrique Pumar, “repertoires encompass action-orientated tactics actions against the regime such as strikes, insurgencies and sabotage.”

Militarily, the insurgents win by not losing. To survive against a better armed and more numerous government forces, insurgents engage in asymmetric operations which pit their limited strength against weak points in the government’s defenses. Operationally, the predominate insurgent method is to attack at a time and place of the insurgent’s choosing, using mobility, knowledge of the terrain, light weapons, and careful planning to conduct lightning-speed raids or ambushes and then quickly dispersing. Their goal is to conduct a long war of attrition to wear down the government and avoid extermination.

Insurgents are normally not based out of elaborate permanent bases, but instead vie for the control of the rural countryside or poor urban areas using the population for cover. They seldom seek pitched battles but, instead, they employ a strategy of slow attrition against the government forces while incurring minimal losses. Tactically, the favored methods are roadside bombs, sniping, squad-scale raids, and assassinations. Several researchers have noted guerrilla warfare has a Darwinian effect on insurgent groups. Through time, the

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127 Flags of the World.
130 Baylis, Revolutionary Warfare, 215.
131 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone.
government forces capture or kill less-competent guerrillas, while ones that are more proficient adapt and become more dangerous. They, in-turn, provide better training to recruits.

Not all rebel groups revolting from a central government employ the same strategy and no single strategy has universal applicability. The type employed is a result of the insurgent’s strengths, weaknesses and goals, the government’s responses and the particular circumstances of the conflict.

Bard O’Neil describes four distinct insurgent strategies. The conspiratorial strategy involves a small group of political/military elites who seek to remove the governing regime using a “swift use of force” or a coup. The Mao’s protracted popular war strategy is based on harnessing a groundswell of rural peasant discontent to oppose the government. This “people’s war” strategy involves three phases ranging from the initial organization to guerrilla warfare to civil war. The military-focus strategy “gives primacy to military action” assuming political support is sufficient or a product of military action. The Confederate States in the American Civil War and Castro in the Cuban revolution both used a military-focus strategy. O’Neil’s fourth type is exampled by Carlos Marighella’s urban warfare strategy which centers on terrorist operations in major cities to cause collapse from within. Although Al Qaeda has no formal army, O’Neil suggests Al Qaeda is using a transnational variation of the military-focus strategy with the entire world as a battlefield. Zarqawi’s strategy varies somewhat from Al Qaeda’s as well. While doctrinally, Zarqawi and bin Laden agree, Zarqawi is focused on Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, and has reportedly criticized bin Laden for “not being forceful enough to deal more violent and more painful strikes to the enemy.”

Strategically, the Salafi-Jihadists cannot defeat the US and Iraqi forces in a direct military confrontation. They have neither sufficient dedicated fighters nor a sufficiently large constituency to advance through the phases of war and bring a revolution to a successful conclusion in a conventional civil war. They could

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succeed by continuing to attrit US forces while “creating an atmosphere of intimidation, insecurity and despair” until the US loses patience and withdraws before the Iraqi military and Iraqi government have the capability to stand on their own. In that environment, exploiting their international resources, they could “seize power from a weak and demoralized regime.”

As insurgencies become increasingly successful and an increasing threat to the government, it progresses through several general stages of development. These include an incipient formation stage, an organizational stage, an irregular (terrorist or guerrilla) warfare stage, and a conventional civil war stage. In each of these stages, the insurgents conduct relatively predictable operations and targeting patterns designed to force the government to over-react and, through heavy-handed military operations, cause inevitable civilian casualties. While both the Ba’athist and Jihadist insurgents are acting to this established pattern of guerrilla warfare, the Salafi-Jihadists are also conducting an unusual pattern of exceptionally brutal terrorist attacks on the Iraqi population. In so doing, they risk not only alienating the majority of the Iraqi population, but also cause dissent within their own foreign support base.

At the tactical level, the insurgency in Iraq has adopted the general tactics expected of insurgent action. However, they have added ritualized executions and suicide bombings as unique tactics to the established insurgent action repertoire.

The insurgency in Iraq has not remained static. It has been quick to react to coalition operations and force-protection measures with a concurrent increase in sophistication and lethality of insurgent operations. The insurgents have been able to produce a steady stream of coalition casualties and maintain a constant climate of violence. While it is difficult to determine which groups are responsible for individual attacks, in general, the insurgents have learned to mount larger, explosive charges in cars to create vehicle-borne, improvised

134 Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win In Iraq”, Foreign Affairs (Sep-Oct 2005), 2.
135 Cordesman & Baetjer, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, 15.
explosive devises (VBIEDs) and have combined multiple, timed attacks to target fire and police first-responders. They now counter US electronic countermeasures by mixing IEDs with small-arms and RPG attacks. Most recently, they are employing “swarming” tactics where insurgents attack with small-arms and RPGs from multiple directions at once.\textsuperscript{136}

In summer 2005, there has been a shift in targeting from many small attacks intent on killing Iraqi officials to a small number of very effective mass-casualty attacks on the population to terrorize and grab headlines\textsuperscript{137}. AQI has specifically targeted civilians to create sectarian divides. They have mounted larger attacks to coincide with the commemoration of important dates and festivals such as Ashura.

1. \textbf{Insurgent and Terrorist Operations}

Students of insurgency have compiled a relatively complete study of the ways in which guerrillas fight. Common themes emerge from their operations used to engage a superior military force, unseat the government in power or resist foreign invaders. These themes generally include swift attacks on isolated units, remote outposts, and vulnerable lines of communications. These have been well documented in studies of the Afghan insurgents\textsuperscript{138}. These strategies commonly target the Army, security services, mid-level government functionaries, income-generating activities, and international links.

Radu believes terror is “a necessary part of any guerrilla campaign”, and that its role of “killing countless civilians as part of a massive and quite effective campaign of intimidation, population control, and recruitment.”\textsuperscript{139} Safafi-Jihadist groups reinforce their anti-coalition, anti-Iraqi government, anti-collaborator framing with brutal terrorist attacks. These attacks are designed to bolster the

\textsuperscript{136} Cordesman & Baetjer, \textit{Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency}.

\textsuperscript{137} Tod Robberson, “Iraqi Insurgency on a Deadly Comeback”, \textit{Dallas Morning News} (25 May 05) 2.

\textsuperscript{138} An excellent reference for the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets can be found in: Jalali, Ali Ahmad, Lester W, Grau, \textit{Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters}, Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft Leavenworth Kansas, MBI Pub Co, (St Paul MN, 2001).

\textsuperscript{139} Radu, “Contemporary Insurgent Warfare”, 128.
group’s hold over its population base, terrorize opponent populations, and create a general climate of chaos that discredits the government. Since Aug 2004, there have been more than 1500 attacks per month; 90% credited to Sunni groups. These have included both indiscriminant bombings which killed innocent civilians as well as targeted attacks on vulnerable coalition-member forces and intelligence assists\(^{140}\). To gain their desired effect, the killings are violent and public – often with videos posted on Islamic web sites.

There is a tension in the literature as to the value of terrorist operations in an insurgency. While Radu sees terrorism as another tactic available to the insurgents to coerce the government and influence a target population, Joes states, “Terrorism is not intrinsic to a properly waged guerrilla war, but that it is indeed antithetical to it”\(^{141}\). Conducting terrorism undercuts popular support needed to empower a viable political organization once the central government is deposed. Al-Zawahiri echoes this belief when he cautions al-Zarqawi about the “scenes of slaughtering hostages” which the Muslim populace “will never find palatable”\(^{142}\). This dependency on terrorism is a significant weakness in Zarqawi’s strategy.

a. **Attacks on Coalition Forces and Western Civilians**

While the act of insurgent attacks on US forces is not surprising, the numbers are staggering – averaging nearly 100 per day in Oct 2005\(^{143}\). According to the Brookings Institute, there have been 2,092 US military deaths between March 2003 and September 2005\(^{144}\). Insurgent attacks are not meant to defeat the coalition forces in the field. Instead, they are designed to slowly attrite coalition forces and defeat US and allied public opinion. The most effective tactic used is the improvised explosive device (IED) or the vehicle-borne

\(^{140}\) Haugh, “Analysis of Sunni-Based Opposition in Iraq”, 6.
\(^{142}\) Negroponte (DNI), *Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi*, 10.
\(^{143}\) O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.
\(^{144}\) O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*. 
improvised explosive device (VBIED). Mechanically or remotely detonated, these weapons are inexpensive, easily constructed, and a low-risk tactic which keeps US soldiers venturing outside heavily protected zones on constant guard.

b. Attacks on Representatives of the Iraqi Government, the New Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police

The murder of opposition politicians is “part and parcel of guerrilla politico-psychological warfare.” The insurgents conduct these attacks to undercut the US and Iraqi government legitimacy and hope to instill enough fear that Iraqis will not volunteer to serve in the police or army. Between June 2004 and January 2005, 1,300 Iraqi military and police have been killed in insurgent attacks. An Al Qaeda in Iraq video labeled, “The Whole Region is For Allah” posted on a militant website justifies the killing of these civilians labeling them “slaves and servants of the Crusaders.”

![Figure 4. Iraqi Military and Police Killed Monthly](image)

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145 DSCINT, 1 Jun 2005, 4.
146 Radu, “Contemporary Insurgent Warfare”, 125.
147 O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index.
149 O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index.
c. Attacks on Critical Infrastructure and the Reconstruction Effort

Sunni groups target critical infrastructure to deny the government the legitimacy of an effectively-run economy\textsuperscript{150}. Bin-Laden’s own calls for attacks on infrastructure may be a refocus away from the spectacular September 11-style attack to a more protracted attrition-style of warfare\textsuperscript{151}. Given Iraq’s oil-dependent economy, pipelines, refineries, and pumping stations are common targets. Their destruction denies the new government critical revenues. The insurgents target power, water, and sewer systems to create popular dissatisfaction with the government’s capacity to provide basic services for the population. This sows creeping dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government and the US. This disappointment is made even more bitter, given the pre-war projections of great improvements in civil services. This shift may be driven by either the desire to make the war with the US a more protracted struggle or be driven by the realization that smaller, less spectacular attacks are all that a decentralized, net-based organization is realistically capable of organizing and executing.

d. Attacks on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Humanitarian Relief Organizations

An international-coordinated and effective reconstruction and stability effort in Iraq is a significant threat to the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency. To defeat or forestall stabilization and reconstruction, all efforts that support the rebuilding of Iraq are de-facto AQI targets. In addition to attacks on contractors, oil pipelines, water & sewage plants, AQI has conducted high-profile attacks, such as the suicide car bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, bombings of the International Red Cross, and the murder of the Care International country director, Margaret Hassan. These organizations normally insist on their independence from the US military and believe their impartiality in providing aid is a source of protection. However, because of the stabilizing nature of these organizations and the complete rejection of their mission by the Salafi-Jihadist

\textsuperscript{150} Timothy Haugh, “Analysis of Sunni-Based Opposition in Iraq”, 6.

\textsuperscript{151} Blanchard, Al Qaeda, 12.
insurgents, these humanitarian organizations are conflated with the military forces by default. To mitigate the threat of insurgent attack, aid organizations have reduced their foreign staff to minimum levels within Iraq, set up operations in neighboring countries, and hired Iraqis to staff the operations within Iraq. Unfortunately, this has also mitigated their effectiveness.

e. **Suicide (Homicide) Bombings**

One of the most terrifying and effective weapons in AQI’s inventory is the suicide bomb, it has become their prime weapon.\(^{152}\) Whether undertaken by a single person wearing an explosive vest, a driver of an automobile carrying several 155mm artillery rounds wired together, or a dump-truck packed with explosives, the tactic is essentially the same: individual bombers wearing explosive underneath their clothes mingle among their targets and detonate themselves without warning. Alternately, they drive or crash into the target building and explode with the force of a focused artillery barrage. Although suicide bombing is often identified with Islamic Fundamentalism, it is actually a non-denominational military strategy used by weak, opposition groups against stronger (normally democratic) enemies as part of a larger organized campaign.\(^{153}\) Numerically, the world’s largest practitioners of suicide bombing are the Marxist/Hindu Tamil Tigers.\(^{154}\) This is a tactic where the weak can coerce the strong and the strong cannot easily adjust to protect themselves.\(^{155}\)

Suicide bombing is relatively inexpensive and requires little training. As opposed to the high-cost of complex weapons, a bomb vest is simple to construct and can be built for as little as $150.\(^{156}\) To fight a conventional war requires large formations of well-trained and well-equipped troops. In contrast, the labor requirements for a suicide bombing campaign are small. Although there are a number of people involved in constructing the bombs, choosing the


\(^{153}\) Pape, *Dying to Win*, 3-4.

\(^{154}\) Pape, *Dying to Win*, 20.

\(^{155}\) James Russell – Class presentation to NS4801-International Terrorism (Winter 2005).

targets, and motivating the individual bombers, suicide bombings only require the sacrifice of a single person to inflict catastrophic damage to a soft target. In Lebanon, Hizballah was able to motivate bombers using an intense sense of crisis convincing them this tactic would work and provide the bombers the blessings of their religious community.\footnote{Ehud Sprinzak, Rational Fanatics, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, (Sep/Oct 2000), 70.}

According to Dr Mohammed Hafez, three conditions must be met in order for adherents to embrace suicidal violence: “(1) prevailing cultural norms and mores encompass belief systems, symbolic narratives, and historical traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom; (2) legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3) groups or communities feel overwhelming threats and victimized by external enemies in the course of political conflict.”\footnote{Mohammed Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs: Strategy, Culture, and Conflict in the Making of Palestinian Suicide Terrorism}, (Kansas City, National Institute of Justice University of Missouri, October 2004).}

Although less militant Muslims, including portions of Al Qaeda itself, are appalled by “Zarqawi’s excessive sectarianism and bloodletting”,\footnote{Gerges, \textit{The Far Enemy}, 257.} within the Salafi-Jihadi community, AQI’s use of suicide bombing meets Hafez’s criteria. For example, in the words of former HAMAS leader, Abd al-Azizal-Rantisi:

\begin{quote}
The enemies of Allah and the enemies of this people are cowards. They crave life, while the Muslims crave martyrdom. The martyrdom operations that shock can ensure that horror is sowed in the [enemies] hearts and horror is one of the causes for defeat… In order to defend the homeland from the terrorist Crusader attack; there is a need for people who yearn for Paradise, and the shortest way to Paradise is death [for the sake of] Allah. Some of us should see the joyful and satisfied faces of the mothers in Iraq when they part from fruit of their loins, who go off to the realms of honor, the realms of martyrdom.\footnote{Abd al-Azizal-Rantisi, spokesman for HAMAS, quoted in Rachel Ehrenfeld, \textit{Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed – and How to Stop It} (Bonus Books, Chicago IL, 2003), xv.}
\end{quote}

These attacks produce both physically and psychologically devastating effects and constitute the insurgent’s precision-guided munitions.
AQI uses suicide bombing because it is reportedly “twelve times deadlier” than any other form of terrorism. Worldwide “3% of all terrorist incidents” were suicide bombings, but they inflicted “48% of all terrorist fatalities.”\(^{161}\) In addition to their disproportionate physical damage, death and injuries, suicide bombings demonstrate the ultimate level of commitment by the insurgents to their cause.

Car bombs are another highly effective tactic which explode with the force and effectiveness of several artillery rounds. Attacks on police and army recruiting stations, police stations, and Iraqi workers waiting outside US base entry checkpoints are favorite targets for these attacks. In some cases, bombings have been preceded with leaflets warning Iraqis to stay home. As in the case of Hezbollah, Zarqawi honors his suicide bombers by posting their names and last testimonials on to Islamic web sites.\(^{162}\)

\(\textbf{f. Hostage Taking and Beheadings}\)

Martha Crenshaw views hostage taking as a form of coercive bargaining in that “hostages represent the power to hurt in the purist form.”\(^{163}\) Taking hostages was seen as a way for terrorists to bargain with the government while negating the government’s greater strength and resources. Analysis of terrorist bargaining trends shows that for a terrorist to gain his demands, the government must find the threat of the hostage death to be less acceptable than the terrorist demands. To gain additional bargaining strength, the terrorist has “two options, to make the threat more horrible and more credible or reward government compliance.”\(^{164}\) Videotaped serial hostage beheadings takes the concepts of horrible and credible to the extreme.

Beginning with Zarqawi’s murder of American telecommunications contractor Nick Berg in May 2004, and lasting until the Battle for Fallujah in November 2004, this type of ritual execution was a popular AQI tactic. In

\(^{161}\) Pape, *Dying to Win*, 6.


creating a unique type of terrorist theater, the profile used by AQI uses different symbology than the Saudi Arabian public beheadings of criminals.

The weapon used in Saudi Arabia is a long sword and the act completed in one rapid movement. It is, by comparison, relatively humane. The sword is often used in Islamic culture and usually symbolizes power, justice, and the might of Allah. Zarqawi’s method uses a short knife similar to those used to slaughter animals and is intentionally painful. The “execution” uses ceremony to feign legitimacy.\textsuperscript{165} The executioners are clad in black; the “prisoner” is dressed in an orange jumpsuit similar to the prisoners held at Guantanamo; the “charges” are read against the accused. The objective of this ceremony is not to kill any one individual because of anything that person has done. Instead, the goal is to appall the target audience and create terror in anticipation of the act. When used against nations that bargain with terrorists, it is a very potent negotiating threat. When used against the US, it is a political statement designed to humiliate the US and demonstrate its powerlessness.\textsuperscript{166} To complete the macabre terrorist theater, the video of Mr. Berg’s death was posted to an al-Qaeda website on 12 May 2004 with the title “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Shown Slaughtering an American”\textsuperscript{167}. The US can do little to counter this tactic, but within the Muslim world, the practice has drawn sharp criticism - describing execution of hostages as un-Islamic.

g. Mass-Casualty Attacks

AQI conducts mass casualty attacks intentionally directed at civilians. As of December 2005, including OIF, approximately 30,000 civilians have been killed.\textsuperscript{168} In the provinces where they occur most often, these attacks have a deeply destabilizing effect. Through the fall of 2005, the AQI offensive of suicide attacks has been accelerating. Examples of the indiscriminant targeting

\textsuperscript{165} Radu, “Contemporary Insurgent Warfare”, 131.

\textsuperscript{166} Cha, “From a Virtual Shadow”, 2.

\textsuperscript{167} Ronald Jones, \textit{Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications}, Carlisle Papers in Strategic Security, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, (June, 2005), 7.

include a twin suicide bombing inside the Khanaqin mosque, killing 70\textsuperscript{169} and an attack on US troops who were handing out toys outside the general hospital in Mahmudiyyah, killing 31, mainly women and children.\textsuperscript{170}

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.** Killed and Wounded in Multiple-Fatality Bombings\textsuperscript{171}

In a statement posted on 18 May 2005 in an Islamist message forum, Zarqawi quoted ibn Taymiyya, stating the need to “recognize the better of two good things and the worse of two evils” and defended the killing as legitimate citing “the evil of heresy is greater than the evil of killing Muslims”\textsuperscript{172}. This hard line stance has, to some degree, backfired as in the case of Tal Afar where Al Qaeda insurgents killed 31 members of the Albu Mahal tribe in punishment for joining the Iraqi security forces. In response, Sunni tribalists have fought a simmering battle with Salafi-Jihadists for control of the region.

\textsuperscript{169} Edward Wong, “Mosque Attacks Kill 70 in Iraq; Hotel is Hit Too”, \textit{New York Times} (19 Nov 2005), 1.


\textsuperscript{171} O’Hanlon & Kamp, \textit{Iraq Index}.

\textsuperscript{172} Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Bulletin 917, \textit{Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi: Collateral Killing of Muslims is Legitimate} (7 June 2005), 3.
2. **Puritanical Dress & Social Policies in Occupied Areas**

There are numerous historical examples where “insurgency in defense of religion will be both resolute and protracted.” When AQI takes control of an area, one of the ways Zarqawi visibly lays claim is to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic code of conduct and Islamic law. This action is deeply rooted in Zarqawi’s exclusivist belief system and is a continuation of policies he employed while in the Jordanian Al-Sawwaqa prison. The goal was to set himself and his followers apart from more secular Muslims in dress and action. In practice, it took on the appearance of an Afghani prison gang wearing traditional clothing.

In Tal Afar and al-Qaim, AQI governance brought public execution of city leaders, burning stores that sold CDs, lashing men accused of drinking alcohol, and the murder and public display of an accused prostitute. A sign leading into Zarqawi-held territory read “Welcome to the Islamic Republic of Qaim” while terrified Sunni tribal residents fled the city. While this process remains true to Zarqawi’s hard-line ideology, in practice it is a counter-productive guerrilla tactic, alienating the tribal component of Iraq’s Sunni population.

3. **Enmity Towards Hashemite Jordan**

Occasionally misidentified as a Palestinian, Zarqawi is a native east-bank Jordanian who views the government of Jordan with the same enmity Bin-Laden views the al-Saud monarchy. Arrested for political agitation and arms possession, Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years in jail and confined from 1994-1999. After his release, he maintained a periodic interest in attacking the Jordanian government. His Afghanistan operations were based in a training camp near Herat and set up for the benefit of Jordanian Jihadists. He was foiled in a Millennium plot to attack hotels frequented by Jewish and Americans in

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Amman. He was implicated in the successful plot to assassinate a US diplomat attached to USAID Lawrence Foley in Oct 2002. In Apr 2004, the Jordanian government convicted Zarqawi in absentia for this crime and sentenced him to death by hanging. In Aug 2003, he successfully bombed the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad and in April 2004 unsuccessfully plotted to attack the Jordanian General Intelligence Dept HQ of the Prime Minister and the US Embassy in Amman.

On 15 November 2005, he successful orchestrated a four-suicide-bomber attack on three downtown Amman hotels, killing 37 people (although three of the four bombs detonated). To conduct the operation, Zarqawi chose four Iraqi

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177 Brisard, & Martinez, Zarqawi, 87.
nationals. For Zarqawi, hostility towards Jordan is a recurring theme, but is not the focus of his current operations.

Zarqawi’s frames and actions in Iraq appear to be sectarian-motivated operations (the majority of the dead are Shi’as and Kurds), and indicate his intent to weaken the central government and incite a religious civil war. The logic behind this strategy may be that the Sunnis are convinced they can retake the levers of power from the coalition and any elected government in place. Should a civil war break out, it is possible neighboring Sunni states would mobilize support and come to the aid of the Iraqi Sunnis in retaking the state structure and re-imposing their will. This would, of course, invite counterbalancing support from Iran thereby risking a regional war, either directly, or by proxy.

It is imperative this insurgency be defeated before the region descends into religious war. The next section discusses a social mobilization-based counterinsurgency strategy which could contribute to the defeat or demobilization of the Salafi-Jihadists insurgents and help restore stability in Iraq.

\[180\] Lyon, “Insurgency in Iraq, 45.
III. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

The Insurgency in Iraqi is a complex affair with over 40 named insurgent groups. Attacking any one group will not end the conflict. A two-track counterinsurgency strategy must address the interplay between Iraqi-born insurgents, with national-oriented goals and foreign Salafi-Jihadists, with religious-based transnational goals. The counterinsurgency strategy for defeating and demobilizing the Iraqi Sunni insurgency groups as described in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* is a reasonable approach to addressing that portion of the insurgency.\(^\text{181}\) However, this strategy does not address the threat of foreign jihadists except as a target for military action.

Given an understanding of the background and mobilizing structures of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the next step in countering the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency is to determine an effective strategy that protects against its strengths and exploits its weaknesses. This counterinsurgency effort must be composed of more than a one-dimensional military effort. Frank Kitson stated, “There can be no such thing as a purely military solution, because insurgency is not purely a military activity”\(^\text{182}\). Mao described the importance of “military, political, economic, social, psychological” elements in a guerrilla war.\(^\text{183}\) John Baylis views the military dimension as only one of six dimensions in the insurgency-counterinsurgency conflict\(^\text{184}\). He defines five other dimensions: the political, socio-economic, cultural-ideological, psychological, and international dimensions. All of these dimensions are battlegrounds in which an anti-AQI strategy needs to be coordinated and synchronized into a coherent multi-dimensional effort. Defeating AQI is neither impossible nor easy, but is a complex contest for physical, political,

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\(^{182}\) British Army Field Manual Vol V, Operations Other Than War, Counterinsurgency Operations.


economic social, psychological and international spaces. The following sections build upon the social mobilization analysis of AQI developed in the preceding chapter.

A. COUNTERING AQI'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

To counter AQI’s political opportunity structures, we can view these structures on a continuum based on their level of inertia and susceptibility to influence. At one end of the spectrum are opportunity structures that have provided an avenue to mobilize and once “turned on”, cannot be easily “turned off”. For example, historical events, such as a defeat in war or the advance of technology create opportunities, which cannot be removed. Once the event occurs, it provides a set of opportunities. To negate this event would require a new event with a new set of equal and opposite opportunity structures. While theoretically possible, in application it is much more likely that a new event would simply produce a new set of opportunities that overlay the previous ones. The rise of religious conservatism; the mujahideen victory over the Soviets; Saddam’s defeat in Desert Storm and again in OIF; the defeat of the Taliban; the transformation of Al Qaeda and the growth of information technologies all appear to be opportunity structures which do not lend themselves to direct alteration or management. For example, the Afghanis’ myth of the Soviet defeat by pious Arab mujahideen will continue to resonate although the Arabs did a minor percentage of the fighting. An immediate US military withdrawal from Iraq will not restore the Hussein-era stability, but instead overlay an additional set of political opportunity structures.

A second category of opportunity structures are those that are open to influence, but are part of a long-term process with significant inertia. Making a substantial change in these structures requires a committed effort over a protracted period. The Middle East’s trends in population growth, rapid urbanization, economic polarization, the fall in overall standard of living, accelerating urbanization and degradation of infrastructure and religious conservatism are all long-term, limited access issues which will probably require effort over a time frame measured in generations, not years. Although the
psychological effects of a US effort may indirectly help demobilize AQI, the time required to make substantial changes to these opportunity structures will probably not demobilize the current Iraq insurgency directly.

The issues of repressive regimes and lack of political representation are less fixed while the US has diplomatic initiatives with friendly regional governments to encourage this type of reform. Unfortunately, the normal reaction for a regional Mukhabarat police state faced with rising instability is not to enact sweeping political reforms. Real democratic transformation is risky for the governments in power and uncertain in its outcome.

To demobilize AQI, a parallel effort must also address the ongoing Sunni nationalist insurgency and moderate Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian political tensions. The instability created by nationalist-inspired violence creates a chaotic environment AQI can exploit for freedom of action within Iraq. By conducting a parallel effort to demobilize the Iraqi Sunni insurgency and create an inclusive political system, AQI will progressively lose its ability to exploit this environment. This counter-Sunni-insurgency is the thrust of the Bush Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.\footnote{National Security Council, \textit{National Strategy for Victory in Iraq} (November 2005), 1-2.}

1. **Countering AQI Political Opportunity Structures Using a Military “Clear, Hold and Develop” Strategy**

AQI’s greatest political opportunity space is the post-OIF lack of security. To close this opportunity space, the Sunni insurgency is the primary actor. The Sunnis are estimated to be 10-20 times larger than AQI, and presents a long-term demographic challenge. In contrast to the insurgent’s “not lose” strategy, the government must actively defeat or demobilize the insurgency to remain a viable legitimate representative of the people. This requires the government to command a viable military, target a vulnerable insurgent center of gravity, and employ that military using an appropriate military strategy.

The insurgent’s hit-&-run tactics of employing light forces, rapid movement, post attack dispersal, and the ability to melt into advantageous terrain makes counterinsurgency a difficult military problem. “To win the hearts and
minds of the people, the rule of thumb is that government needs a ten-to-one ratio of military forces to subdue guerrillas.”  

Given estimates of total insurgents between 15,000 to 20,000, this would require a force of up to 200,000. As of November 2005, there are 174,000 US and coalition troops serving in Iraq. However, dependence on foreign soldiers to fight the insurgency creates cultural-ideological issues that reinforce AQI’s frames of resisting a foreign occupation.

While foreign support and military forces are necessary to engage the insurgents, the Iraqi government needs security forces of its own to engage the insurgents without being seen as a colony of the US. As of November 2005, the Iraqi Security Forces numbered approximately 211,000 soldiers and police. However, the mere presence of Iraqi security forces does not necessarily equate to security. For example, Cuba’s president Batista fielded an army that should have overwhelmed Castro’s small band of revolutionaries. However, despite being a formidable force on paper, the Cuban army remained poorly trained and poorly motivated led by a politicized officer corps and estranged from the Cuban population due to the military’s poor human rights record. Indeed, Castro felt such distain for the Cuban army that captured troops were simply released. When pressed by Castro’s offensive in August of 1958, the army folded and in January 1959, Batista fled to the Dominican Republic.

In contrast, in an example of a successful indigenous counterinsurgency campaign, the Thai army “blanketed target areas with troops, uprooted guerrilla infrastructure, built local militia groups, sent out special units to harass guerrillas,

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and improved physical conditions in the villages."\textsuperscript{191} Instead of enemy killed or captured or temporarily terrain seized, their measure for success was “the number of surrendered enemy personnel.”\textsuperscript{192}

To create an effective security force, the coalition is recruiting and training a new Iraqi army and police force. Within the overall Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), the training mission falls under Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC) under the command of Lt Gen Martin Dempsey. The training is functionally divided between the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which trains Iraqi police, border guards and non-military security, and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which trains the Iraqi military forces.\textsuperscript{193} As of 1 June 2005, twenty-six countries are participating in this training effort.

In addition to the 28,000 troops provided by 28 countries,\textsuperscript{194} the NATO member states approved establishing a NATO training program in the fall of 2004, and in December, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was established to training Iraqi staff officers and support staff. As of November 2005, NTM-I is staffed by 165 personnel, but is expected to grow to 300 personnel in the near-term. NTM-I is providing training and technical assistance to the Iraqi security forces to include trainers, financial resources, and donations of significant quantities of equipment. To aid in developing a professional officer corps, NTM-I is aiding in developing an Iraqi Staff College to “help mold the next generation of officers.”\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{191} World Affairs, “Reflections on Counterinsurgency in Thailand” vol 146 (Winter 1984-85) 81.
Although the insurgents have attacked recruiting centers and training locations, ambushed and killed trainees in route home for post-training leave, bombed gatherings of police in Iraqi cities and assaulted army and police facilities, the number of volunteers remains strong and the level of operational army battalions and police is constantly rising\(^\text{196}\). These forces are operating in conjunction with US units closing no-go zones, progressively eliminating urban safe-havens\(^\text{197}\), and restricting the insurgent’s ability to organize, mobilize, and operate in the open.

The most effective government military strategies concentrate on depriving the insurgent’s of their vital center of gravity but, unlike a conventional war, in a counterinsurgency, the insurgent’s military center of gravity is not their scattered field forces. Instead, “the key to defeating a national insurgency is to separate it from its source of its strength: the population.”\(^\text{198}\) Specifically, the government must center its military efforts on separating the insurgents from their source of support and providing the Iraqi population security from AQI’s and Sunni insurgent attacks. Operationally, the effect the government desires is to defeat the insurgency by isolating the insurgents not necessarily by killing all the terrorists.\(^\text{199}\)

Large, conventionally organized militaries often prefer dramatic, large-scale sweeps designed to engage and defeat the insurgent’s field forces. “This strategy assumes the insurgents operate like a conventional military force, employ conventional military strategies, and pursue conventional military goals. Sweeps are appropriate against large, conventional forces, but in an insurgency, are often counter-productive. The insurgents melt away or hide within the population and do not allow themselves to be isolated and engaged. After the government secures an area, its forces often redeploy to a new area. This

\(^{198}\) Andrew Krepinevich, Are We Wining in Iraq?, testimony before HASC, 2004, 6.  
\(^{199}\) Joes, Resisting Rebellion, 105.
leaves the original area open for the insurgents to return in an unending game of hide-&-seek. While these operations will capture and kill insurgents, they will also often cause civilian casualties and destroy civilian property that creates anti-government sentiment and indifference to insurgent operations, if not outright support. The temporary presence of government forces does not provide lasting security and the net effect of these operations can strengthen the insurgents.

During the Vietnam War, US strategy focused on killing insurgents at the expense of winning hearts and minds. This “search and destroy” strategy failed.\textsuperscript{200} Through the summer of 2005, the US military in Iraq also has concentrated its effort on “hunting down and killing insurgents…to erode the enemy’s strength by killing fighters more quickly than replacements can be recruited.”\textsuperscript{201}

Historically, an effective counterinsurgency effort focuses on providing security for the population – not necessarily killing insurgents. There are two traditional methods for securing the population - resettlement and local self-defense. Resettlement, also known as “reconcentration” in some historical instances, involves moving large blocks of the population from their homes and into defended locations where the insurgents are unable to gain access to food and support from the civilians.\textsuperscript{202} This method was used effectively in the South African Boer War, in the Philippines at the turn of the century, and by the British in Malaya\textsuperscript{203}. However, forced resettlement is also very controversial and may create large-scale popular disaffection with the government, as was the case in the problematic US “strategic hamlet” program in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{204}

The local self-defense method employs local militia and rural self-defense forces to provide security to home provinces and to protect local leaders. These forces are intimately familiar with the local inhabitants, their culture, and the local

\textsuperscript{201} Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq”, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{202} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies}, 36.
\textsuperscript{203} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies}, 38, 106 & 103.
\textsuperscript{204} Joes, \textit{Resisting Rebellion}, 111.
terrain. In addition, they are very conservative in their use of firepower.\textsuperscript{205} This method has been effective in Malaya and the Philippines and in Vietnam where US Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces (PF) worked in conjunction to provide local area defense, protect government infrastructure, train additional militia, and collect intelligence. While not spectacular, these forces were highly effective. During 1967, “the number of villages under Communist control increased everywhere except where CAP/FP forces were operating.”\textsuperscript{206} However, these local forces were not able to provide for all local-level security needs. In the event of a concentrated insurgent attack, a reaction-force of regular army troops was needed to reinforce local forces.

This local defense method is at the heart of French counterinsurgency strategist Joseph-Simon Gallieni’s, “\textit{tache d’huile}” or “oil-stain” clear-and-hold strategy for reclaiming insurgent-held territory.\textsuperscript{207} In its original form, the oil-stain “involves the establishment of strong points in a region, from which forces would spread out to control the country-side”, systematically comb each square on a map grid, working from the outside-in, “until the rebel forces within are brought to close quarters and exterminated.”\textsuperscript{208} In its more modern form, forces deploy from their operating base to patrol the local area until they are as familiar with the area as the insurgents.\textsuperscript{209} The oil-stain strategy focuses on “establishing security for the population specifically for the sake of winning the hearts and minds.”\textsuperscript{210} This indirect approach cuts at the roots of the insurgent strength.\textsuperscript{211} The military provides security enabling local civic-improvement, free medical assistance, and education projects benefiting the local population.

\textsuperscript{205} Joes, \textit{Resisting Rebellion}, 113.
\textsuperscript{207} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies}, 40.
\textsuperscript{208} Tabor, \textit{War of the Flea}, (Washington, Brassey’s Inc, 2002), 61.
\textsuperscript{209} Joes, \textit{Resisting Rebellion}, 219.
\textsuperscript{210} Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq”, 4.
\textsuperscript{211} Thompson, Squaring the Error, \textit{Foreign Affairs} (Apr 1968), 451-452.
The US Army used this method successfully in 1900 in the Philippines. The army established small, largely autonomous garrisons that “lived and worked in communities.” Left to exercise their own initiative and adapt to local conditions, these squad to company-sized garrisons “tracked and eliminated insurgents, built rapport with the populace, gathered intelligence, and implemented civil works.” Garrison commanders operated as the local political authority, “approving mayors and town councils.”

Under their grass-roots security umbrella, the central government extended the reach of “rule of law”. The process was slow and methodical, but it gained the trust of the population and separated the insurgents from their center of gravity. As the oil-stain gains ground, it steadily confines the insurgents into progressively shrinking areas. It forces them to confront the government under gradually less advantageous conditions and on ground not of their own choosing.

Copying the model used in Fallujah, US & Iraqi forces have begun a systematic process of clearing towns and leaving security forces behind. In November 2005, operation Steel Curtain, a joint US Marine-Iraqi effort captured and cleared Husayba, Karabila and Obeidi and immediately set up temporary camps to begin stability operations.

Another aspect of a successful counterinsurgency strategy is strict limitation on force. The practical legacy of Great Britain’s colonial past is the British Army’s “imperial policing” outlook that employs a minimum force necessary policy. This policy, which eschews high technology and heavy, indiscriminant weapons in favor of foot patrols employing small arms, is widely seen as both morally right and operationally effective. In practice, this core principle of restraint has proven effective in countering insurgencies and gaining

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“trust and confidence”. Rather than operations focused in killing insurgents, “commanders seek ‘soft’ methods of arrest, physical isolation, or subversion”. The 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual states, “the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life”. In the 2005 version, it stresses the need to impress upon both the insurgent and the local population the need to perceive that our forces are, in the words of the 1st Marine Division Commander’s guidance during Operation Iraqi Freedom, “no better friend and no worse enemy.”

Most counterinsurgency authors agree on the central importance intelligence plays in defeating an insurgency. Armed with reliable intelligence, the more numerous and better-armed government forces can find, fix, and successfully engage the less numerous and less well-equipped insurgents. The most valuable type of intelligence for counterinsurgency operations is local-level information describing what is happening in the immediate area. This type of information is normally gained from interacting with local populace and is referred to as human intelligence (HUMINT).

US counterinsurgency expert Bruce Hoffman stated, “it is a truism of counterinsurgency that the population will give its allegiance to the side that will best protect it.” Where the government establishes enduring stability and security, it creates an environment that allows the population to conduct their lives peacefully. In a secure environment, the population can provide the government HUMINT without fear of insurgent reprisals. Direct, person-to-person contact with the population is also important. In Ireland, the British Army initially patrolled in vehicles, but was gaining little actionable intelligence. Once foot patrols were substituted for motorized patrols, “the initially poor operational

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219 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940), 1-16.
221 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Special Warfare, vol 17 no 2 (Dec 2004), 13.
intelligence began to improve.” Armed with this enhanced intelligence information, the government is able to provide enhanced security and creates opportunities for a creeping series of successive military successes. A similar lesson is being learned in Iraq. According to a Marine Captain in charge of operations in the Obeidi area, “just driving by, everybody waves, but that doesn’t do anything – they have to get out and interact with the people. It’s the only way this thing is going to get won.”

Cordon & search operations are not productive in gaining useful intelligence because when government forces move through an area, they leave no lasting presence. In fact, it is unlikely that, even if insurgents are in their village, local civilians will provide the government forces with information. This is because there are higher costs for the population if they help government forces than if they remain neutral. If they help the army, when the government forces eventually leave, the insurgents will reoccupy the town. When the insurgents return, they are ruthless in their dealings with any opposition. Conversely, if the civilians stay quiet, the insurgents will leave them alone and government forces will not hurt them. For the government to win, “it needs the positive support of the population, whereas, “the insurgents need only neutrality.” The clear and hold, oil-stain strategy provides better HUMINT than cordon and search in that, once friendly forces secure an area, military forces remain visibly in physical control for a prolonged period.

At the start of a clear and hold operation, the government should not expect an immediate outpouring of intelligence. It takes time to build trust and assure civilian population that the government forces will not leave them to the insurgents – especially if there is a history of the government clearing a town, leaving, and the insurgents moving back in to take reprisals. In addition, gaining HUMINT will often require linking economic and social benefits to civilian

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224 Christopher Ford, *Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat Insurgency*, *Parameters* (Summer 2005), 53.
cooperation. If the government conducts a clearing operation, remains in the area, and provides economic and social goods without requiring reciprocal intelligence or displays of loyalty, they contribute to the civilians becoming “free-riders” of government largesse. Without requiring some reciprocal effect, providing benefits out of hand fails to establish a "link between behavior and reward."\(^\text{225}\)

Instead, the government should drive out the insurgents and leave forces in the area to patrol, provide security, and become thoroughly familiar with the people and the terrain. The government forces should impress upon the local leaders the importance of popular cooperation to receive new schools, clinics, veterinarians, public utilities, and reconstruction projects. Where this cooperation is given, the government should freely provide social benefits in kind. Where ambushes and IED attacks continue, these social benefits should be withheld. Not only will this process directly link social goods with the desired effects, it will have the effect of pushing down the cost of reconstruction projects in secured areas that, in turn, require less security. Finally, when construction projects are awarded, the Iraqi government, not a local sheik or strongman, should provide the project to reinforce the legitimacy of the new government.\(^\text{226}\)

Because the resulting intelligence-enabled military operations are both more effective and more focused than large-unit sweeps, this process allows the military to reduce troop numbers and limit their use of firepower while gaining results. By slowly enlarging the secured area, the insurgent’s freedom of movement and ability to conduct their operations will become increasingly limited.

To facilitate a move to peaceful government, amnesty programs encourage insurgents to discontinue fighting without surrender or having to fight to the end. During the US war in Vietnam, “approximately 194,000 Viet Cong

\(^{225}\) Ford, Speak No Evil, 63.

\(^{226}\) Ford, Speak No Evil, 65.
and NVA soldiers accepted amnesty" which was a significant drain on insurgent manpower.

2. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a Political Outlet for Grievance

As with the military dimension, the greatest political opportunity open to AQI is the lack of effective security in Iraq. By engaging the Sunni insurgency in the political dimension, these insurgents can be co-opted into the political process and demobilized which will, in turn, remove support for AQI. This strategic vision is mirrored in the Bush Administration's *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* that describes political, military and economic measures to defeat and demobilize the associated Sunni insurgents.228

War can not be separated from politics. In politics, the goal for competing parties is to gain popular support. In 1964, Bernard Fall wrote, “revolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action” making it the “application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or political system.”229 Gen Sir John Templar, Commander of the successful British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya stated, “the shooting part is only 25% of the trouble, the other 75% lies in getting the people of the country behind us”230. From the insurgent’s point of view, revolutionary leader, Che Guevara wrote in *Guerrilla Warfare*, “the guerrilla fighter needs the full support of the people” and this support is “an indispensable condition”.231 Guevara also wrote, “where a government has come to power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.”232

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In Iraq, Al Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri highlighted the importance of the political dimension in a recently disclosed letter to AQI leader al-Zarqawi where he wrote: “it’s imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in government and in the Shura council." Indeed, al-Zawahiri places politics equal to the military dimension, continuing, “I urge you to direct the political action equally with the military action”.233 US commanders in Iraq have also come to the same conclusion: that there is no purely military solution to the insurgency and the only way to end the insurgency is through political compromise.234

The political plan for Iraq is to replace Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime with a stable, moderate, democratic, political structure that will “catalyze the promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East.”235 While extraordinarily ambitious, a nascent Iraqi democracy does pose a serious threat to the insurgents. The aphorism, “the ballot box is the coffin of an insurgency” may prove correct if elections provide a peaceful avenue to change and a non-violent method for the population to redress grievances.236

Building a viable democracy in Iraq is not easy; nor is the outcome assured. It is hardly the “ideal soil for growing democracy, but it is not as infertile as other places where democracy has taken root.”237 However, Iraq has several positive attributes which may assist it in the transition. It has comparable “per capita income, literacy, and urbanization to several nations which are making the transition to democracy” and of all the Arab states, it is “the best educated, most secular, and most progressive.”238

234 Tom Lasseter, Officers: Military Can’t End Insurgency, The Philadelphia Inquirer (14 Jun 05), 1.
236 Joes, Resisting Rebellion, 233-234.
237 Daniel Byman & Kenneth Pollack, “Democracy in Iraq”, Washington Quarterly, 26:3 (Summer 2003), 120.
238 Byman & Pollack, Democracy in Iraq, 124-125.
AQI’s goal of implanting a puritanical Islamic state in the Middle East by force has been tried before and does not have strong antecedents, nor do modern states run by Islamic theocracy present a widely appealing vision of the future. The Shi’a revolution in Iran in 1979 was the first Islamic major victory in modern times. However, Khomeini’s political vision and utopian dreams have failed to generate a state capable of providing real gains for its constituents or the ability to export its ideology. Most modern Iranians never lived under the Shah, but do live with “high unemployment, moral repression, and a cataleptic social order that was completely dominated by the religious hierarchy” who opposed any reform that would reduce their power.”

Likewise, modern Sunni Islamic movements have a generally poor record of political performance. The Al Qaeda of the 1980s and early 1990s was an internationally supported Salafi-Jihadist movement assisting a nationalist war to eject the Soviet Army from Afghanistan. Among Sunnis, Afghanistan was seen as the movement’s greatest triumph “before it turned into its supreme catastrophe – where the Islamist victory broke down into internal struggles for political power, perdition of the population, and the ruination of the country.”

With the Soviets expelled from Afghanistan, the Jihadi movement dispersed and many of Al Qaeda’s “Afghani” mujahideen returned to their home states to ignite the fire of political Islam against their own regimes. However, the challenges these Afghanis made to strong Mukhabarat states provides examples of the inability of Islamic insurgencies to overcome determined and repressive governments. These states, fighting for control of their homeland, proved far more durable than the Soviet's foreign occupation of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Jihadists have failed in every attempt to erect an Islamic state in the region.

In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia, an act that sparked a bloody civil war. Rallying to the call, the “Afghanis” flooded into Bosnia to assist their Bosnian Muslim brothers, but the relationship never

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really took hold. The Bosnians were secularized European Muslims driven more by nationalism than religious zeal. As would be the core in other Salafi movements, there was no Islamic intelligentsia, devout middle class, or impoverished urban poor to mobilize under Jihad’s banner. Instead, what emerged was a “democratic attitude towards religion.”

The Algerian Civil War provides an interesting example that may illuminate the study of AQI. This war pitted a military government who had deposed the secular anti-colonial Front de Liberation National (FLN) against a pair of Islamist opposition groups, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and the militant Salafi Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA). Political opposition originated because of popular disaffection with FLN’s large and corrupt socialist regime. In 1988, rising social dissatisfaction ignited widespread rioting and was suppressed by the army. Among the resulting sweep of reforms, the president brought in a new constitution and the promise of free elections.

The FIS opposition had run successfully in an initial round of voting and had consolidated anti-government support from the devout middle class and urban poor. Of the 225 seats determined, FIS won 189, and was poised to continue this trend in the January 1992 run-off elections for the remaining 205 seats. With these victories, FIS would have full control of the government and the seats necessary to change the constitution. Fearing the formation of a fundamentalist Islamic government, the military staged a coup d’état, deposed the president, and cancelled elections. During this time, the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan and Algerian Afghani were returning home. Their influence helped radicalize the opposition and the following five years saw a brutally savage civil war leaving over 100,000 dead.

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241 Kepel, Jihad, 239-241.
242 Kepel, Jihad, 251.
244 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 680.
245 Kepel, Jihad, 254.
In May 1994, FIS and GIA combined to wage a ruthless campaign of targeted killings and calculated terror supporting a precise political agenda, but the alliance between the two organizations was never a comfortable one. While FIS wanted international involvement and open dialogs with the government to facilitate elections and establish a moderate Islamic regime, GIA’s goal was “to purge the land of the ungodly.” The high-water mark came in September 1994, with the death of GIA Amir Gousami. His replacements unleashed terrorism within France that caused a violent French backlash and opened an exceptionally brutal phase of the war in Algeria. In contrast, the FIS was working international connections and political solutions to return the army to the barracks and install a moderate government. GIA reacted violently, accusing the FIS of being “betrayers of the jihad, selling the blood of its fighters to satisfy their own political ambitions”. GIA’s decent into indiscriminant violence continued into September 1997 when, during Ramadan, massacres of hundreds of civilians caused international and Algerian support to collapse. FIS declared a unilateral truce and ceasefire. The political failure of the Jihad in Algeria occurred because the Jihadis “lapsed into self-destructive terrorism” and forfeited all popular support.

In a repeat of a similar process, but on a smaller scale, Egypt faced similar challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gamma Islamiya (GI). As with Algeria’s GIA, the Egyptian GI drifted into excessive terrorism systematically targeting Egyptian intellectuals and foreign tourists. This strategy progressively undercut their popular and international support. GI’s massacre of 60 tourists at Luxor in November 1997 marked the height of the violence, after which popular support collapsed. French political scientist, Gilles Kepel, views violence as a vehicle of political influence that has proven to be “a death trap for Islamist

246 Kepel, Jihad, 266.
247 Kepel, Jihad, 268.
248 Kepel, Jihad, 255.
249 Kepel, Jihad, 276-298.
movements, precluding any capacity to hold and mobilize the range of constituencies they need to seize political power.”250

Ultimately, all Jihadist efforts to wrest power from the state have been successfully countered by political cooptation or direct confrontation. In all cases, Islamist opposition movements face a moral-political crisis. While their traditional political program focuses on government by *shaira* law and views sovereignty of the people as a form of idolatry and pre-Islamic *jahiliyya*, this approach is widely seen as hopelessly mired in the past and the “rejection of the Muslim civilization, which had room for music, philosophy, poetry and…secularity.”251 The more moderate Islamists predict a bleak future under rule by the mullahs or a Taliban-style government. Instead, they advocate a program of human rights and democracy, but this approach distances them from their roots and postures them to make common cause with secular political parties.252

There is precedence for Muslim insurgent groups transforming themselves into democratic parties. In Lebanon, the Shi’a Islamist organization, *Hizballah* “Party of God” formed in response to the 1980 Israeli invasion. It conducted a brutally effective guerrilla campaign primarily targeting the Israeli Army and Israeli’s allies, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Like AQI, Hizballah’s attacks combined guerrilla raids and ambushes with suicide bombings and suicide truck bombings. The Israelis, feeling the pressure of mounting casualties and falling domestic support for the occupation, withdrew, first into a southern Lebanon security zone. Then in May 2000, the Israelis withdrew from Lebanese territory entirely. After the Israeli withdrawal, Hizballah remained an armed militia, but faced a quandary – disband or transform.

Unlike AQI, Hizballah was not a single-dimensional military organization. In addition to their military operations, Hizballah also provided social

organizations benefiting the areas they controlled. These included building and running mosques, schools, community centers, and clinics. These social organizations helped create a peaceful constituency that opened an opportunity for Hizballah to transform a portion of its organization into a peaceful democratic political party. For these politically active Islamists, social services provide an important block of voters. To protect its power base, this otherwise radical party moderated its militant stance to protect these programs and the resulting blocks of voters from intrusion by the government. This political party has successfully competed in local and national-elections.253

Today Hizballah is a mass mobilization political party that employs a pragmatic political calculus. It has its own religious-based oppositional political party complete with campaign committees and electoral machine necessary to make a political effort successful. This fact runs in direct contravention of those who believe Islamists are incapable of democratic aspirations.254 It has competed in all Lebanese elections since 1992. It is a relatively strong political movement, faring especially well in municipal elections and translating their collaboration with the secular Shi’a Amal party and Christian parties into 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament. Hizballah’s candidates run not based on their ideological stance, but instead focus on their “honesty and seriousness in their municipal work,” emphasizing their social welfare experience and advantages to the community.255

Caution must be exercised in considering Lebanon as an example. If anything, the tribal Sunni resistance, with their longstanding ties into the community and links of patronage, are more analogous to Hizballah than is AQI. As a single-dimensional insurgent group with little political constituency and no social network to build upon, peaceful political transformation is unlikely for AQI,

However, by fostering a stable democratic political system, it is believed this non-violent competition will replace violence as a means for the Sunnis to achieve influence. In so doing, it will develop a sense of overarching Iraqi nationalism rather than sectarian or ethnic divisions.

3. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a Economic Incentives and Opportunity

As with the political and military dimensions, there is an economic dimension to the growth of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq – “a direct one-to-one relationship between deteriorating socio-economic factors and extremist recruitment is hard to make, there can be no doubt strong links exist.”\(^{256}\) Normally a prosperous state with full employment and a growing economy has little to fear from an internal insurgency. Where these factors have broken down, conflict becomes more likely. In Iraq, the growth of the Sunni insurgency has likely been fueled by prevailing economic conditions. Reintegrating insurgents into the civil economy can help demobilize and defeat the insurgency, removing their support for AQI. This strategic vision is again mirrored in the Bush Administration’s *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* that describes political, military and economic measures to defeat and demobilize the associated Sunni insurgents.\(^{257}\)

Nearly $27 billion has been allocated by the US in the past 3 years for Iraqi reconstruction. In addition, donor countries pledged an additional “$3.6 billion in grant aid and up to $13.3 billion in possible loans.” The majority of this funding is allocated for large projects conducting infrastructure reconstruction to rehabilitate the abused and war-torn oil, sanitation and electrical power systems.\(^{258}\)

The demobilization of the Iraqi Army has been a contentious issue. Some analysts observe the Iraqi Army had essentially self-demobilized at the end of the

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war. Others see the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) decision as crucial in providing a huge pool of unemployed young men into the unemployed labor market. The end of financial support for demobilized troops coincided with a significant worsening in the insurgency. Further, CPA’s blanket de-Ba’athification policies which placed restrictions on who could be employed, made these young men not only unemployed, but unemployable. There are numerous sited examples of “casual insurgents”: out-of-work Iraqis drawn to the insurgency because it pays. According to counterinsurgency writer Steven Metz, setting and exploding an IED can pay $100 to $200, killing an American can pay upwards of $1,000.259 Reintegrating former Iraqi Army soldiers into the new Iraqi Security forces can defuse these economic pressures.

At the individual level, there are opportunities to conduct an economic counterinsurgency campaign. Specifically a “job-orientated community development strategy” which focuses on supporting entrepreneurs and generating domestic employment could strengthen local development and reinforce the democratic political process. This would be a decentralized program of direct micro-credit grants that puts people ahead of projects to materially improve the local-level economy and improve buying power.260 This process could be funded by creating an “oil fund” and Iraqi Development Bank to distribute revenues.261 These initiatives hinge on ensuring rule of law and observance of property rights. They would leverage existing community development programs (CERP, LGP and OTI) already in place in Iraq.

4. Countering Insurgent’s Use of Information Technology

The US has not been effective in countering insurgent messages or gaining access to the Iraqi population’s “Circle of Influence”.262 The US Government’s efforts to hinder transmitting these messages have uncovered a


basic tension between the US Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the prohibitions on hate messages. The Patriot Act pushes the balance in toward government controls, but the issue remains contentious. Nonetheless, the US government’s ability to interdict terrorist communication is limited by the shifting technical techniques being employed as well as conventional definitions of national sovereignty. The US ability to aggressively shut down internet servers ends at the US border. Any attempt to pursue radical web services beyond this is limited by the good-graces and cooperation of allied nations.

The military and political strategies constitute the most commonly applied and well-developed approaches to counterinsurgency. However, because the AQI are militarily resilient and politically rejectionist, these counterinsurgency tools will probably not be sufficient to counter the threat. The next section will examine the mobilizing structures employed by AQI to capture the equally important, but often overlooked counterinsurgency strategies in the economic, cultural-ideological, psychological and international dimensions of the conflict.

B. COUNTERING AQI’S MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES

Mobilization structures are operational-level assets which, if undercut, would weaken its ability to conduct operations or demobilize the group.

1. Countering Militant Reading of the Islamic Faith

The Islamic Salafi doctrine is not synonymous with Jihad. Jihadis comprise a portion of Salafis and among these Jihadis (those that ascribe to Zarqawi’s blanket takfiri ideology) are an even smaller group. Within the Muslim world, there is currently a significant rift in opinion regarding Al Qaeda’s attacks on the west and AQI’s indiscriminate use of violence.

Al Qaeda’s actions have hurt their ability to win in the “War for the Muslim Minds”263 In the contrasting ideas of righteous jihad and internal cultural disintegration, fitna, Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks on civilians lost the support of not only

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the “majority of Islamists and Salifists, let alone most of the world’s Muslims.” Instead of being seen as the “umma’s blessed vanguard”, “most Muslims saw the massacre of innocents as opening the door to disorder and devastation within the house of Islam.” 264 The popular uprising of devout Muslims that was to reverse the Jihadi’s decade-long decline never happened.

The conduct of the AQI’s insurgency in Iraq also holds the prospect of cultural-ideological destruction. The bloody and indiscriminant methods used by Zarqawi’s group have split Muslim opinion. The killing of Muslims by other Muslims is repugnant to not only moderate Muslims, but also political and purist Salafis. Breaking with bin Laden’s inclusive, pan-Islamic doctrine, Zarqawi has declared war on the Shi’a. He has followed up this declaration by conducting mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks directed at Shi’a religious events and on predominantly Shi’a sectors of the country.265 This practice has sparked a debate within the Muslim community regarding mass-casualty attacks against fellow Muslims and the use of indiscriminant suicide bombing and terrorist tactics by AQI. These attacks on Iraqi Shi’a civilians, attacks on mosques, suicide bombings of markets, buses, and crowds is losing support of moderate Muslims as well as drawing the attention of the Iraqi government and the wrath of Shi’a militias. In his Jul 2005 letter to Zarqawi, Zawahiri cautioned against these internecine attacks:

many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won’t be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.266


In addition, Zarqawi’s ideological mentor, Muhammad al-Maqdisi, enraged some jihadists by publicly questioning the permissibility of some of Zarqawi’s tactics and “publicly opposed Zarqawi’s terrorism against civilians.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman Zawahiri also advised against Zarqawi’s brutal tactics against hostages and the battle taking place in the media:

Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.

I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts. We don’t need this.

Although the Iraqi Sunni insurgents were initially grateful for the support and training they gained from AQI, there is evidence AQI’s presence may be causing a rift between themselves and the Sunni population. When trained AQI members arrive in Iraq with money and equipment, locals are becoming hesitant to support them for fear of government attacks.

In addition, AQI has also taken a very hostile tack in their relations with the Sunni Iraqi constituency. Holding true to their puritanical Salafi-Jihadist credo, AQI proclaims Sharia or Islamic law in the predominantly Sunni western Iraq towns they hold. Under AQI rule, non-conforming behavior is punished harshly. Many Iraqi Sunnis object to the Taliban-like puritanical interpretation of Sharia.

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269 Negroponte (DNI), Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, 8-10.
One villager was quoted as saying, “Al Qaeda believes that anyone who doesn’t follow the Koran literally is a *kifir* (apostate) and should be killed.” This approach has alienated many Iraqi Sunni tribalists.

AQI’s international constituency is largely committed to the Salafi-Jihadist cause. Indeed, social scientists have found geographically distant or diaspora populations not only provide resources to the conflict, but are often more militant than those actively involved in fighting in the insurgency. The US is and outsider to this Muslim cultural-ideological debate, and as such, there is little direct action the US can take to influence the outcome. Incremental stabilization of Iraq can undercut the Jihadists and stem the creation of a new generation of Al Qaeda. It will also help regain lost ideological credibility in the region. Additionally, western policymakers can be aware of militant readings of the Muslim faith and take care not to needlessly reinforce their supporting frames.

2. Countering AQI’s Resource Mobilization

Historically, the government has been able to separate the insurgents from their base of popular support by addressing the material grievances of the population. Unfortunately, since AQI’s sources of support are primarily external to Iraq, an economically based counterinsurgency effort must focus on breaking these external links to choke off the insurgent’s source of funding support and create a “closed system” which includes only the government, the insurgents, and the people.

US insurgency writer Bard O’Neil divided external support into four types: Moral, Political, Material and Sanctuary. Statements of moral support help maintain a popular image of the insurgents, but by themselves provide little real value. To be operationally effective, these statements must be coupled with political support to create substantial effects. Political support includes not only statements of specific backing for the insurgent’s goals but also the sponsor

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country taking concrete international legal or diplomatic steps to assist. Material support covers a broad spectrum that includes weapons and war-making logistics; food, medical supplies, shelter and practical insurgent training. Insurgents use the sanctuary provided by neighboring sovereign countries in two ways. Where the insurgents have been denied permanent bases within the country, sanctuaries provide fallback positions and logistics centers\(^{273}\)

Concepts for countering AQI’s moral support will be covered later in this thesis in the section regarding a comprehensive counter-narrative strategy.

For the government, isolating insurgents via diplomatic means is the weakest form of action, but is also “the least likely to widen the conflict.”\(^{274}\) Diplomacy is dependent on neighboring states voluntarily aligning themselves with the US and Iraqi governments and against the insurgents.\(^{275}\) Therefore, governments normally use diplomatic efforts as part of an initial response as well as a continuing theme used in conjunction with other means.

In countering any formal international political support for AQI, the US is in a powerful position. Not only is it a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but on 08 November 2005, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the US-led multinational force in Iraq for an additional year.\(^{276}\) In contrast to AQI’s political goals, on 12 Nov 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan visited Iraq and called for a political transformation that is “inclusive, transparent, and takes into account concerns of all groups”. In response, Iraqi President al-Jaafari called for UN help in the upcoming elections in December 2005, promoting democracy and “improving the performance of the security forces”.\(^{277}\)


\(^{275}\) Joes, *Resisting Rebellion*, 20.

\(^{276}\) Edith Lederer, UN Extends Troops In Iraq for One Year, *The Washington Post* (9 Nov 2005), 1.

For its part, AQI enjoys essentially no formal international support. Not since the fall of the Taliban has a state made public pronouncements supporting Al Qaeda objectives and are willing to take international legal action on their behalf. No states formally endorse AQI goals or tactics.

a. Countering AQI’s International Material Support

While the Iraqi government is able to sustain its international support, it becomes especially important for the insurgents to obtain material support from outside sources. For the Sunni insurgent, who enjoy popular support from within Iraq, international support is necessary. Where popular support is weak or lacking, as in the case of AQI, international support is critical.278

As an initial step in cutting material support, the US State Department has placed al Qaeda in Iraq on the Foreign Terrorist List, which has immediate legal and economic ramifications. This measure freezes all identifiable assets in the US, makes it illegal for a US person to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO, and bars members of the FTO from the US279. It also encourages our international allies to take similar measures, which is essential given AQI’s international character. As of Jan 2003, an international effort has resulted in freezing “$124 million in assets located in some 600 bank accounts around the world, including $36 million in the United States alone.”280 Under the criminal aspects of this designation, since September 11, US and international governments have arrested and imprisoned numerous Al Qaeda-associated financiers. When a terrorist group is not linked to any specific state sponsor, as AQI is not, there are limits to what US legal action and US policy can do.281

US laws do not extend beyond US borders. To defeat the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency, the US must shore up its international coalition and sever

278 O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism, 111.
280 Perl, Terrorism and National Security 5.
281 Perl, Terrorism and National Security 7.
the insurgent’s international support. The US can engage in constructive diplomacy with allies and moderate Islamic states to isolate terrorists and cut off resources.\textsuperscript{282} To isolate the insurgency from its outside support, an international counterinsurgency response to these challenges is to undercut the insurgent’s international legitimacy while strangling their sources of material support. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda’s use of front companies, international banks and \textit{hawala}, renders many traditional methods of economic sanctions uncertain.\textsuperscript{283}

Many of the other forms of AQI financing are essentially criminal activities, fall under the purview of law enforcement, and are best handled by state law enforcement. Wherever possible, the US should work to gain international cooperation to legally interdict fund-raising and Jihadi recruiting activities in the origin country.\textsuperscript{284}

\textbf{b. Countering AQI’s International Flow of Recruits}

Historically, insurgents have taken advantage of remote locations, far from the center of government, to stockpile weapons, train recruits, and from which to stage operations. In his writings detailing the organization of a successful insurgency, T. E. Lawrence, “stressed the importance of secure base areas and the exploitation of space by small and highly mobile forces.”\textsuperscript{285} Secure bases proved the insurgents a place to “plan, train, rest, recuperate, marshal equipment, and organize people.”\textsuperscript{286} These locations are often poorly developed or sparsely populated areas in rough, forested or mountainous terrain with a primitive transportation network and are characterized by the absence of strong state influence.\textsuperscript{287} Deprived of these bases, the insurgents will be unable to present progressively greater challenges to the government. Areas with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{282} Perl, \textit{Terrorism and National Security} 8.
\item \textsuperscript{283} Perl, \textit{Terrorism and National Security}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{284} Paul Staniland, The Best Offense is a Fence, \textit{The Washington Quarterly} (Winter 2005-06), 34.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies}, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{286} O’Neil, \textit{Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, revised, (Dallas VA, Potomac Books, 2005), 74.
\item \textsuperscript{287} Joes, \textit{Resisting Rebellion}, 17.
\end{itemize}
underdeveloped road, rail and river transportation systems are more difficult for the government to patrol, and so favor the insurgents.

Currently, Syria is currently viewed in the same light as Cambodia was during the Vietnam conflict – a safe haven from US raids, a logistical base, and transportation conduit for the insurgent’s international support. The White House claims, “Syria is allowing its territory to be used by those who wish to carry out attacks in Iraq”\(^{288}\). Complicating the mater, Syria has become the fastest-growing tourist destination in the Middle East, hosting 3.1 million tourists in 2004.\(^ {289}\) At a minimum, Syria is allowing the passage of foreign fighters through their country and into Iraq “with either tolerance or indifference – if not active support”\(^ {290}\). On 11 May 2003, The Bush Administration imposed economic sanctions on Syria charging it had “failed to take action to halt the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.”\(^ {291}\) In Sep 2005, US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad accused Bashar Asad’s regime of allowing terrorists to travel to Syria, train in camps within Syrian territory, and enter Iraq unhindered\(^ {292}\).

Zarqawi’s war against Americans and Iraqi Shi’a has also mobilized portions of Saudi’s Salafi population who provide funds as well as a large percentage (~12%) of AQI’s suicide bombers.\(^ {293}\) For their part, Saudi Arabia insists it is supporting the war on terror and has taken “aggressive actions to prevent terrorists from crossing their borders into Iraq.”\(^ {294}\) To this end, they have arrested radical clerics who incite Saudis to go to Iraq and have spent 1.2 billion in the last two years to secure their borders.\(^ {295}\)

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\(^{290}\) Cordesman, \textit{Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency}, CSIS (Updated May 20 2005), 47.

\(^{291}\) Perl, \textit{Terrorism and National Security} 10.


\(^{293}\) O’Hanlon & Kamp, \textit{Iraq Index}.

\(^{294}\) Perl, \textit{Terrorism and National Security}, 3.

\(^{295}\) Cordesman, \textit{Iraq and Foreign Volunteers}, 7.
In Iraq, physical control of the border is critical to countering the flow of insurgents where the military isolates the insurgents by physically interdicting their sources of supplies. In this effort, geography plays a major role. The government can more easily secure isolated islands and borders which coincide with coastlines, wide rivers, impenetrable jungles, mountains, or deserts. The insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, and Tibet could all be physically isolated from their sources of support and were eventually defeated. South Vietnam and Afghanistan were more difficult to isolate. Where the insurgents have access to secure safe havens and supply routes in neighboring countries, defeating them is far more difficult.

The Syria-Iraq border is approximately 350 miles long and passed through inhospitable desert populated in the southern and central reaches by nomadic Sunni tribes who are sympathetic to the insurgency. The favored crossing through the summer of 2005 passes through Dair Al Zawr province into western Iraq. Other crossing areas are along the northern border, just south of the mountainous Kurdish areas and in the south at the Bab al-Waleed crossing station.296

Iran also has a long and relatively unguarded border with Iraq. But given Iran is a Shi’a state, and is giving support to the Shi’a political development in Iraq and Shi’a militias, it is far less attractive to AQI’s regional Salafi-Jihadist recruits.298

Perhaps the most successful example of using military means to secure desert borders is the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the 1950s.299 To limit the international over-land support for the anti-colonial insurgency, the French constructed a long series of physical barriers along the Algerian borders with both Morocco and Tunisia. To interdict the more active Tunisian frontier, the French built the “Maurice Line” along the entire length of the

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297 Data Reference - Cordesman, *Iraq and Foreign Volunteers*, 7; Map Reference – SYRIA, Political Map, 1990 Pery-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Syria Maps, U of Texas, Austin TX.


This fortified line consisted of an elaborate barrier of electrified fences and minefields backed up by military patrols, armor, and helicopters. By April 1958, when the line was completed, it successfully isolated the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) insurgents from their international support. Although the FLN made determined attempts to breach the line, “the kill-rate for infiltrators was reported to be as high as 85%.”

In facing a revolt by the *jebeli* mountain tribes of Dhofar province in the early 1970s, Sultan Qaboos of Oman enlisted British SAS support and instituted a coordinated economic and social reform plan. Militarily, the Sultan’s conventionally trained army was retrained for counterinsurgency duty. The rebels were using the mountains as a safe haven. The mountains were isolated between the government-controlled coastal plan and the desolate Rub al-Khali. The government built roads, extended lines of communications, and set up permanent bases in the mountains to project government control. Internationally, the insurgents were receiving support from across the border with Yemen. In response, the Sultan built the Hormbeam and Damavand lines to interdict insurgent support. These lines of coiled wire and minefields were backed by army patrols and airpower. These measures proved effective in isolating the insurgents from their overland support.

In the more open terrain of northwest Africa, the secessionist Front for the Liberation of the Rio del Oro and Saguia el-Hamra (Polisario) guerrillas exploited the vast expanses of desert and lack of government airpower to conduct attacks into Western Sahara in 1977 and southern Morocco in 1984. In response, the Moroccan government concentrated its security in the “useful triangle” which contained most of the population and the state’s primary natural resource (phosphates). In a strategy similar to that used by the Nationalists against Mao and by the British against the Boars, the Moroccans build a series of

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300 Beckett, *Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency*, 64.
303 O’Neil, *Insurgency & Terrorism* 2nd ed, 73.
sand, dirt, and rock walls with intermittent military outposts and sensors. These measures blunted the insurgent raids by forcing the raiders to either attack the lines or go around them making these forces easier to detect in the open terrain.304

Physically closing the Syria-Iraq border is not as outlandish as it might first appear. After years of distrustful international relations between President Hafez al-Asad and Saddam Hussein, there are a significant number of border posts, communications roads and small bases along both sides of the border. These bases could be reoccupied and border guards conduct aggressive patrolling with the support of airborne ISR aircraft and ground forces.

Figure 8. Syrian-Iraqi Border Area NW of Tal Afar and Iraqi Border Forts305

The use of airpower to control disputed lands and provide “aerial policing,” was favored for its frugal approach during the post-WW-I demobilization. Its chief proponent was Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston Churchill, who had to reduce the number of ground forces in

304 O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism 133.

305 Locations of Iraqi Border posts along Syrian-Iraqi Border captured using FalconView and displaying a1:100,000 scale Joint Operational Graphic (JOG) NJ3716 Ed 5, 14 Jan 1991 Datum WGE.
Mesopotamia from 105,000 troops to 14,000 troops. Although often referred to as a stand-alone operation by the RAF, in practice, the air-control method was a coordinated joint operation, involving considerable cooperation between the land and air assets. In its leading role, the RAF bombed targets, but also ferried troops, air-dropped supplies, and evacuated the wounded. Its chief weakness, of course, was that air control alone could not hold territory. The British eventually concluded, “troops on the ground was much more effective method of policing the recalcitrant, since aircraft could not occupy disputed ground.”

The ability to conduct “air control” over western Iraq today has been improved by advances in our technical ability to conduct surveillance of the border areas, move troops to blocking positions, accurately bomb targets, and evacuate the wounded. This process would be most effective where in insurgencies are organized more as guerrilla armies rather than small groups of terrorists. In Iraq, to secure the border regions would most likely require setting up a network of border posts and committing ground forces.

C. COUNTERING AQI’S FRAMES

Framing is about persuasion. Zarqawi’s anti-system frames highlight his goals as being at odds with essentially every aspect of US-led political reform, social integration, economic reconstruction, and globalization. In countering AQI frames, the US is engaging in the “battle of the story” using a counter-narrative strategy. In countering these AQI frames, the US is engaging in a contest for what Baylis would refer to as the cultural-ideological dimension of conflict. In this dimension, the insurgents seek to capture the moral high ground by highlighting government corruption, exploitation, torture, black-marketeering, prostitution, inequality, and contrast it to their own honesty, purity, selflessness, self-sacrifice,

306 Peter Gray, “The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing”, Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001), 133.
307 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 47.
308 Kagen, Blueprint for Iraq.
poverty and discipline\textsuperscript{309}. This dimension is primarily concerned with gaining and maintaining organizational and personal \textit{legitimacy}.

The counterinsurgency effort turns this argument on its head to show the government as a good and positive force which will bring about a bright, prosperous, future and the insurgency as backward, brutal, “evil-doers”. Where the insurgents rely on religious appeals, the government can counter by “posing alternative ideologies or, short of that, general values.”\textsuperscript{310} Given Al Qaeda’s decentralized organization, and resistance to direct military, political and economic influence, “US and allied counter-terrorism efforts might be better spent on countering the ideology that is promoted by Al Qaeda… [and] delegitimize Al Qaeda tactics”\textsuperscript{311} The purpose of the cultural-ideological struggle is to maintain morale and sense of purpose. In practice, it is fought using both propaganda as well as honest and accountable information.

1. \textbf{Countering AQI’s Violent Frames}

Al Qaeda and the Saudi \textit{ulama} or religious scholars are engaged in a heated framing battle,\textsuperscript{312} the outcome of which will determine who has the “authority to speak on behalf of religious authority. In this battle, each side is employing four basic framing strategies that demonstrate their own credibility while attacking the opponent. These strategies include: “1) vilification - demonizing competing popular intellectuals; 2) exaltation - praising in-group popular intellectuals; 3) credentialing - emphasizing the expertise of the in-group intellectuals; and 4) de-credentialing - raising questions about the expertise of rivals.” In this battle, the religiously educated \textit{ulama} consider Al Qaeda as unlettered and their pronouncements flawed. Al Qaeda portrays Saudi \textit{ulama} as “sheiks of authority and “palace lackeys” closely linked to corrupt Muslim regimes

\textsuperscript{309} Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare”, 220.
\textsuperscript{310} O’Neil, \textit{Insurgency & Terrorism}, 136.
\textsuperscript{311} Katzman, \textit{Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment}, 7.
\textsuperscript{312} Quinton Wiktorowicz, A New Approach to the Study of Islamic Activism, IIAS Newsletter #33 (Mar 2004), 1.
while exalting their own religious authorities as “honorable, independent and scientific” in their interpretation of Islam.  

Within Al Qaeda, there is a second framing struggle with non-violent Islamic fundamentalists over the permissibility of violence. The intentional attacks on Shi’a Muslims are a departure from bin Laden’s ideology of minimizing intra-Islamic differences in the interest of defeating the west. In an attempt to assert its right to sacred authority, the movement portrays scholars who support its jihad as logical, religious experts of good repute while characterizing opposing clerical popular intellectuals as emotional, corrupt, naïve, and ill-informed about politics.

From an international law and moderate world opinion standpoint, AQI’s terrorist tactic of deliberately targeting civilians is indefensible. Intentional targeting and/or lack of discrimination between combatants and civilians is a direct violation of international humanitarian law and a crime against humanity. In addition, the Iraqi Association of Muslim Scholars, an Iraqi Sunni Muslim group, condemned the targeting of civilians and indiscriminant attacks.

As discussed previously, AQI’s mass-casualty attacks have created a widening rift with the world community of Muslims. In a caution that AQI tactics are hurting Al Qaeda in the battle of the story, Zawahiri indicated to Zarqawi that Muslim support for AQI’s more extreme actions is not unconditional. For example, in the wake of the 9 November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman Jordan, Zarqawi’s group claimed the attack struck “dens of wickedness, infidelity and prostitution”. In Jordan, however, the popular reaction was immediate with

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313 Wiktorowicz, A New Approach, 1.
demonstrations in the “Arab Street” chanting “Zarqawi, burn in hell!” The United Nations and most world and regional governments uniformly condemned the act. In addition, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Authority, and Palestinian organization HAMAS also “strongly condemned” the bombings as “criminal actions targeting innocent people.” Because of its Jordanian/Palestinian roots, these events highlight a key weakness for AQI.

Other Muslim notables are denouncing AQI’s tactics. The Grand Imam of Al Azar, sheikh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi, called for an end to terrorism in Iraq and punishment for Zarqawi for killing civilians and violating Islamic principles. He called on the international community to pursue AQI as criminals and, where they are convicted of murder, sentenced to death. Members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Tanzim a-Jihad and the radical Islamic Group (IG) have all denounced Zarqawi. In an IG statement, they accused Zarqawi of trying to annihilate Shi’ia, not liberate Iraq. Even his spiritual mentor, Mohammed al-Maqdisi, has opposed Zarqawi’s targeting of civilians, stating, “violence that does not differentiate among women, children, civilians, soldiers and American troops is wrong.”

While these statements and actions undermine Zarqawi’s status as a pious Muslim vanguard, none of these pronouncements indicates any level of support for US goals or issues with AQI targeting coalition or Iraqi security forces.

Even so, for Zarqawi, this is a problem. Shocking terrorist actions are what bring him notoriety, recruits, and funding, but his targeting of civilians is also bringing him condemnation from his crucial Palestinian and Islamist Jordanian

320 Palestinian Information Center, “HAMAS Condemns Amman Bombings: Al-Zahhar Condemns Amman “Criminal” Actions Targeting Innocent People”, Reported by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), (Published 10 Nov 2005).
322 Gerges The Far Enemy, 261.
323 Gerges The Far Enemy, 261.
constituency as well as condemnation on the world stage. To some degree, he is losing the cultural-ideological battle. Should he change this targeting strategy, there would be several immediate results. AQI could redirect suicide attacks at less vulnerable military assets making his organization just one of 40 insurgent groups in Iraq. US, Iraqi, and coalition force-protection measures would be more effective in preventing him from translating his suicide bombings into an effective counter-force strategy. Since AQI’s mass-casualty attacks cause a disproportionate number of casualties, discontinuing them would produce an immediate rise in the perceived sense of security.

2. Countering AQI’s Frames of US Imperialism

It is a curious duality that American military presence in Iraq is both stabilizing and destabilizing at the same time. US military presence is stabilizing, because US forces provide security, patrol towns, and attack active insurgent safe areas. However, 2005 Pew Global Attitude surveys indicate that, between 2000 and 2003, the Muslim world’s view of the US declined steadily. Since 2003, there has been a slight rebound, but the numbers remain low. This fall in popularity is not seen as a rejection of Americans in general or a rejection of American political economic or cultural norms, but a strong reaction to US policies and military presence in the region. The presence of large numbers of US military forces is framed as an army of occupation. It acts as a lightning rod, inviting Al Qaeda Jihadis to travel to the country and join the fight. The longer US military forces remain in Iraq, the longer AQI’s occupation frame resonates, gains recruits and enables Jihadi operations.

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324 Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (NY, Random House, 2005), 245.
A long-term large US military presence in Iraq reinforces AQI’s anti-imperialism frames and fosters distrust of western forces. Al Qaeda has taken advantage of this presence to make Iraq equal with the Israeli occupied territories as the center-stage of their propaganda and recruiting efforts. The continued fighting has given the transnational Al Qaeda a “new lease on life and a second generation of recruits”. Throughout the region, the war is undercutting moderate Muslims and radicalizing public opinion.

However, both Al Qaeda and the Iraqi Sunnis are targeting the Shi’a population and Iraqi government Sunnis. This action indicates both insurgent groups want more than the just for the US to leave, it also indicates they want to destabilize a Shi’a-dominated government so that when the US does leave, radical Sunnis can reestablish control.

The US military will need to remain in Iraq not only through the December 2005 elections, but also until the Iraqi security forces can take a leading role in engaging the insurgents and holding cleared territory. This “Iraqifacation” will take time with US forces conducting joint patrols with Iraqi forces. As the Iraqis

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327 Kagen, Blueprint for Victory.
gain capability, the US should actively seek opportunities to hand over primary responsibilities while continuing to support in a less-prominent role. In T.E. Lawrence’s 15th article, he wrote:

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.\textsuperscript{328}

3. Countering AQI Frames Through Positive Action

To maintain support for the counterinsurgency effort, the government needs to implement a convincing counter-propaganda campaign. Actions speak louder than words and military victories and an appealing political agenda are essential. The military “oil-stain” strategy is a visible signal the government has moved it to stay and is willing fight to defend them. However, military actions by themselves will not mobilize the population to support the government. Follow-up actions can demonstrate the government cares about the well-being of its people. Leveraging an umbrella of security, governments who have reinforced their position by providing political rights, economic incentives, public utilities and social services have made it difficult for the insurgency to regain psychological dominance in lost territory. The projected political future must be clear; the government’s position must be appealing and the information made widely available.\textsuperscript{329}

4. Countering AQI Frames Through News and Interactive Debate

One method to promote a western point of view is to provide moderate news outlets to break the perceived monopoly the insurgents have on the “Arab street”.\textsuperscript{330} This methodology has produced \textit{Alhurra} (translated as “The Free One”) satellite TV. This station provides news, sports, travel, documentaries, fashion, cinema, and music programming.\textsuperscript{331} While the station’s charter is\textsuperscript{328} T.E Lawrence, 27 Articles \textit{The Arab Bulletin} (20 August 1917) 3.\textsuperscript{329} Beckett, \textit{Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies}, 92.\textsuperscript{330} Putnam, Information Wars, 2.\textsuperscript{331} Programming available at: www.alhurra.com.
designed to influence opinion in the Middle East, its main attraction has been its non-news programming. This is because its format is weighted heavily towards US government statements and is poorly postured to cover late-breaking stories. Recent surveys have indicated a very small percentage of viewers tuned to Alhurra as a primary source of news. Instead, the far more agile Al Jazeera, Al Manar and Al Arabiya, garnered the vast majority of Arab news viewers.\textsuperscript{332}

As opposed to a one-way monologue, another approach would be to provide qualified spokespersons to engage these established news sources to provide western insights and debate issues in a dialogue of ideas.\textsuperscript{333} This process is beginning. For example, on 09 Nov 2005, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, was interviewed on Al Jazeera’s “Today’s Encounter” show. On that program, he fielded questions on British military posture and political issues in Iraq, the impact of the Mehlas report on Syria, and other regional concerns.\textsuperscript{334} This approach leverages an existing popular framework of Middle Eastern news, and provides direct western perspective to regional concerns.

5. Countering AQI Anti-Democracy Frames

In countering AQI’s politically rejectionist frames, the government has only to point out a number of positive political factors. The expanding roles of registered voters and the increasing number of Iraqis participating in the elections. While many Sunnis may have voted in the October 2005 elections as an expression of their Iraqi-based insurgency against the government in an attempt to block acceptance of the Draft Constitution, they did vote. Whether this positive political trend will replace violence as a means of affecting political outcomes remains to be seen.


\textsuperscript{333} Baylouny, Alhurra, The Free One, 4.

6. Countering AQI Frames Through Close Scrutiny of Friendly Operations

In addition to engaging in a counter-narrative campaign focused on AQI’s violent tactics or providing positive news on Iraqi reconstruction, the US must not provide Al Qaeda ammunition with which to attack our legitimacy. Specifically, accusations of prisoner abuse by members of the US military at Abu Ghraib prison have seriously hurt the legitimacy of the US effort in the Middle East. In addition to being deeply troubling for US military members, these cases have opened an opportunity space in which the insurgents can challenge the US’s credibility as a legitimate defender of human rights. Armed with published examples, the insurgents draw parallels with the Hussein regime’s abominable history of torture and murder. This opportunity space allows the AQI to exaggerate claims and falsely accuse coalition forces of atrocities while providing them with an unearned appearance of moral legitimacy. The perception of prisoner abuse creates a detrimental effect on a local moderate population’s perception of the US forces and reduces the civilian’s willingness to cooperate. The current interrogation policy of intentional ambiguity was designed to provide interrogators with the ability to respond to “ticking time bomb” scenarios and potentially save American lives. However, numerous historical examples demonstrate that “arrest without clear cause, imprisonment without trial, torture and summary executions can produce short-term results, but undermine the government’s legitimacy and eventually lead to defeat.”

There are a number of negative mechanisms at work. From a purely practical standpoint, torture has little demonstrated value in gaining actionable intelligence, but instead produces, “unreliable results and often impede further intelligence collection.” When in pain or under great duress, a prisoner “will tell his interrogator what he thinks he wants to hear”, not necessarily what is

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335 Amos Guiora, Unholy Trinity, Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, (Case Western Reserve Law School, 2005), 20.
337 An Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Signed by 12 Senior Professional Military Leaders of the US Armed Forces.
Prisoner abuse by the French in Algeria yielded “little additional information not already being obtained through surveillance, bribery, informants and civilian cooperation”. In Malaya and Vietnam, captured Viet Cong guerrillas often changed sides when treated well - providing higher quality information. Retired FBI agent Dan Coleman, who worked counter-terrorism cases for ten years employed methodical detective work and “interrogations aimed at forging a relationship with detainees … which yielded major results.” Coleman continued, “detainees expect to be tortured and were stunned to learn they had rights under the American system. Due process made them more compliant, not less.”

Detainee abuse can also provide the local insurgency with sympathizers and recruits. According to Human Rights Watch, detainees at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mercury “typically spent three days at the base before being released or sent to Abu Ghraib. These “Persons Under Control” (PUCs) were subjected to a process locally referred to as “smoking”, an exhausting 12-24 hour softening-up process prior to interrogation. After interrogation, an estimated 50% of the detainees determined to be “not involved in the insurgency” and released. If corroborated, this type of process would expose a significant segment of the population to abuse. In other insurgencies, this type of widespread abuse only exacerbated the situation, and radicalized the entire population.

Beyond the advantage presented to the insurgents, torture presents distinct disadvantages for the US military. The perception of abuse could endanger US soldiers. If US troops are captured, they could be subjected to reciprocal treatment. This “new paradigm” threatens to remove Geneva Convention combatant status from US combat soldiers and expose them to

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338 Guiora, Unholy Trinity, 7.
340 Human Right Watch, Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, vol 17, no 3(G), (Sep 2005) 3-5.
341 Mayer, Outsourcing Terror, 10.
342 JAG Memos introduced into Congressional Record by Sen Lindsey Graham, 25 Jul 2005, Memos originated from all the Armed Services Judge Advocate General offices.
prosecution for crimes – including murder. Residual effects may also “weaken the protections afforded by the Conventions to our troops in future conflicts.”

Alleged mistreatment creates a credible political opening for AQI apologists to launch a barrage of outrageous and often absurd accusations concerning US operations and methods. The goal of these statements is to insight over-restrictive constraints on military operations by imposing “hyper-legalistic expectations of zero collateral damage.”

Government rectitude toward prisoners has several beneficial counterinsurgency effects. Prisoners can be a source of intelligence; humane treatment avoids creating new recruits for the insurgency and, where insurgents recruit by force, a policy of easy surrender. Decent treatment can deplete forces from the insurgent ranks and eases post-conflict reconciliation. Releasing well-treated prisoners also has a great propaganda value undercutting claims that prisoners will be harmed. Mao wrote that to gain valuable intelligence as well as undercut the enemy’s will to fight to the death, “the most effective propaganda directed at enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give wounded medical treatment”. The military’s role in defeating an insurgency in the cultural-ideological battle of the frames depends on their ability to maintain discipline and punish those found guilty of abusing civilians and detainees.

Framing is about persuasion and shared vision more than media specialists fight the battle of the stories. It is also fought by politicians, national policies, and by day-to-day actions by government forces and by AQI insurgents.

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345 Davida Kellogg, International Law and Terrorism, Military Review (Sep-Oct 2005), 51.

346 Joes, Resisting Rebellion, 161.

– each can make a positive or negative impression that supports or harms the operation.

7. Countering AQI Frames Using Nationalist Frames

Nationalist frames can be used to psychologically isolate AQI from the Iraqi Sunnis. In a direct counter-narrative campaign focused on the countries of origin of AQI’s foreign-born fighters and violent and indiscriminate tactics. The Iraqi government can frame AQI as foreign infiltrators and representing a foreign ideology. Zarqawi’s oath of loyalty to bin Laden and bin Laden’s appointment of Zarqawi as “emir in Iraq” can be used to highlight a Saudi, instructing a Jordanian to come to Iraq and kill Iraqis. In contrast, The government can highlight its inclusive nature, democratic processes.

D. COUNTERING AQI’S ACTION REPERTOIRES

AQI’s dependence on military action repertoires render them a one-dimensional insurgent organization focused on the military and terrorist aspects of insurgency. It has no discernable political wing, no political platform beyond religious proclamations, and has demonstrated significant hostility toward the entire process. Unlike Hizballah or HAMAS, AQI does not provide significant social benefits in areas it controls. For those tactics directed at Iraqi Government assets, AQI’s non-suicide bombing actions are typical of an insurgent organization and can be mitigated using effective military tactics and force-protection measures. IEDs & VBIEDs attacks can never be completely defeated. They can be moderated by effective force-protection measures, un-predictable patrolling and expanding areas of continuing coalition or Iraqi Army presence.

To mitigate the effect of insurgent attacks on NGOs, aid organizations have reduced their foreign staff to minimum levels within Iraq, set up operations in neighboring countries, and hired Iraqis to staff the operations within Iraq. Unfortunately, this has also reduced these organizations effectiveness.

To counter AQI’s suicide bombing tactic, checkpoints, barricades, and physical stand-off from government buildings can protect military and

348 Staniland, “The Best Offense is a Good Fence”, 34.
government facilities from car bombs. To counter individual suicide bombers, intimate knowledge of who belongs in an area and issuing ID cards can prevent bombers from gaining access to restricted areas. Unfortunately, AQI’s tactic of targeting civilian workers, restaurants, Shi’a religious observances and other soft targets are nearly impossible to defeat once set in motion.
IV. CURRENT STATUS

The most often asked questions in any war are “how are we doing?” and “are we winning?” Because of the indecisive nature of insurgency warfare, these questions are open to a number of interpretations. A number of official and unofficial data sources attempt to answer these questions regarding the conflict in Iraq. These look at a wide variety of aspects of the war to determine trends and predict outcomes. The following section will survey some of these sources to interpret progress made and suggest areas which would benefit from additional attention.

A. CURRENT STATUS

1. Current Status – Military Dimension

A variety of sources publish and regularly update status reports on Iraq’s transition. The US Department of State (DoS) publishes a “Weekly Status Report” that focuses on the “pillars of US Government policy.” The Department of Defense (DOD) provides official reports to Congress in accordance with Conference Report 109-72 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005. The Brookings Institution collects a wide array of unclassified trend data and publishes these in their weekly “Iraq Index”. In these and other studies, no one indicator provides an indisputable measure of the current status.

US Government reports define security goals for US forces as follows: “Defeat the Terrorists, Neutralize the Insurgents,” and “Transition Iraq to Security

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The Bush Administration’s *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* tracks the following security measurements:

- The quantity and quality of Iraqi units
- Number of actionable intelligence tips received from Iraqis
- Percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis alone or with minor Coalition assistance
- Number of car bombs intercepted and defused
- Offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and Coalition forces
- Number of contacts initiated by Coalition forces, as opposed to the enemy”*353*

The US strategy depends heavily on reconstituted Iraqi forces. As a measure of security self-reliance, the total number of Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces currently trained and equipped stands at approximately 211,000.*354* US and Iraqi forces have conducted offensive operations against insurgent infiltration routes in operation Steel Curtain. In a change from the previously predominant “cordon and search” to the “clear and hold” strategy, at the conclusion of this operation, local area security responsibilities will be handed off to Iraqi forces for continued control.*355*

Border security is essential to stem the flow of insurgents and resources into Iraq. As of October 2005, approximately 17,000 Border Police have been trained and equipped out of a total projected force of more than 28,300 whom the

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*354* The Iraqi security forces continue to grow in size and expand their capabilities as additional forces are trained and fielded. These forces are now beginning to assume responsibilities for independent counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with US forces. In these operations, the Iraqi forces are operating “with growing competence.” DoD, *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*, 18.


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Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC) plans to train and equip by May 2006.356

The US Marine Corps supports Iraqi border units with ten-person Border Transition Teams (BTTs). These provide specialized capabilities in logistics, communications, personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting, and equipment maintenance.357 Because the primary insurgent threat is from the Sunni insurgents and Salafi-Jihadists, the priority is completing work on forts along the Iraqi-Syrian border. To that end, the Ninewah and al-Anbar Brigades are converging towards the Euphrates River and restoring border control.358

Beyond this numerical approach to assessing security, Andrew Krepinevich, argues security strategy should “concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people.”359 The corresponding measures should examine the extent to which the population feels secure as opposed to an exclusive focus on insurgent strength, casualties, engagements, or fielded forces. There continue to be large numbers of volunteers for the Iraqi security forces, despite apparent dangers. In addition, while a February 2005 opinion poll shows widespread lack of confidence in the US military, the Iraqi security forces enjoy the confidence of the majority of Iraqi people who want their protection and view the insurgents as increasingly incapable of providing security.360

356 Border training focuses on law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons qualification, combat life-saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling. The curriculum undergoes regular modification in response to the evolving threat environment. These forces are organized into 36 battalions and will man 258 border forts around Iraq. “As of September 20, 152 forts have been completed, with a total of 250 projected to be reconstructed or renovated by November 30, 2005; all border fort construction is scheduled to be complete by January 2006.” DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 41-42.

357 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 41-42.

358 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 41-42.

359 Andrew Krepinevich, How to Win in Iraq, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005), 1.

360 O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index, 40.
A key question in an insurgency is, “do Iraqi civilians feel secure enough and confident enough in the government to provide actionable intelligence?” In another positive sign, there has been a “dramatic increase in intelligence tips received from the population. While there has been an increase in AQI activity over this same period, the number of tips is a far greater, seven-fold increase. This trend is indicative of increasing popular confidence in the government and a rejection of the insurgency.362
The number of Iraqi-born insurgents who voluntarily demobilize is a useful measure of security.\textsuperscript{363} As of November 2005, there have been press reports of Iraqi insurgent groups contacting government officials indicating their desire to join the political process.\textsuperscript{364}

Unfortunately, this measure would be less sensitive to the morale of AQI’s foreign fighters. Salafi-Jihadists have traveled to Iraq to fight. Instead of surrendering to the Iraqi government, they would likely simply return home. As of December 2005, data indicate recruiting is continuing, and the Jihadists do not appear to be demobilizing.

DoD reporting highlights the insurgent’s inability “to derail the political process or foment ethno-sectarian violence” as a key indicators of success against the insurgency.\textsuperscript{365} This is probably better depicted as a qualified success. The democratic process is continuing, but with deep sectarian divides, while sectarian violence continues to rise.

The number of daily attacks continues to rise. However, insurgent attacks are geographically clustered in the four of Iraq’s 18 provinces with large Sunni populations. The other 14 provinces have a significantly reduced level of insurgent activity. While the majority of overall insurgent attacks target coalition forces, the majority of casualties are Iraqi civilians and largely the result of AQI operations. This targeting of Shi’a civilians by the Jihadists is an effort to disrupt the political process and breed sectarian civil war. The psychological effects of these indiscriminant attacks have made AQI the “main threat to achieving Iraqi control of and responsibility for security in the provinces”.\textsuperscript{366}


\textsuperscript{364} Edward Wong, Iraqi Official Says He Received Call From Resistance Leader, New York Times (25 Nov 2005), 1.

\textsuperscript{365} DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 3.

\textsuperscript{366} DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 18.
Figure 12. Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents

Figure 13. Attacks by Province

NOTE: Numbers for June 2003 are incomplete.

367 O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.

The insurgent targeting trends are mirrored in the Iraqi population’s perception of security. Surveys of Iraqi civilians found respondents from the Kurdish north, the mid-Euphrates, and the Shi’a south indicate they “feel safe in their homes and in their region”. The vast majority of respondents from Baghdad and Mosul indicated they felt either “not very safe” or “not safe at all”.  

Figure 14. Map of Provinces Where Attacks Most Common

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Given the increasing daily attack rates, increasing civilian casualty rates, steady number of Americans and civilian killed, steady number of assessed Iraqi insurgents, and a slowly increasing number of foreign fighters, many unclassified indicators show negative trends in security.

The indicators showing a positive trend are the growth of Iraqi security forces, a decreasing number of Iraqi military and police casualties, strong Iraqi confidence in their own forces, and an increase in tips gained from the population. The change in strategy from “cordon and sweep” to “clear and hold”, is probably a positive strategic move as well.

US combat units are beginning to report operational military progress in terms of insurgents killed and captured. As a measure of either progress or success in an insurgency, this process was discredited during the Vietnam War because the insurgent forces come from a variety of sources and can be

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regenerated\textsuperscript{372}, nor does counting killed or captured Iraqis address the primary goal of population security.

Together, these measures present a mixed picture of AQI in the military dimension. Clearly, the AQI insurgency is limited in popular appeal and geographic reach. It continues to be rooted in a narrow Sunni population base and shows no trends toward becoming a truly mass movement throughout Iraq. It shows little capability to transition from the organizational and terrorist phase to a more substantial military presence. It remains a tool the Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups can leverage to create chaos and instill fear. However, AQI remains very active, dangerous, and destabilizing. Its suicide bombing tactics against soft targets are difficult to anticipate or halt. Although the increase in intelligence tips is encouraging, the effect of the oil-stain strategy has yet to be translated into lower levels of violence or greater sense of security. AQI remains engaged in Iraq training and fielding Al Qaeda associated Jihadis and destabilizing the environment. Purely military actions will be incapable of defeating or demobilizing them.

2. Current Status - Political Dimension

According to the DoS “Weekly Status Report”\textsuperscript{373} and DoD Report before Congress, the US’s politically-related goals in Iraq are: “Help Iraqis Forge National Compact for a Democratic Government” and “Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services”. The is a national compact for democratic governance and the tasks include a timetable for the electoral process, an effort to include all communities’ participation in the political process, and the international communities support for the process in action as well as rhetoric\textsuperscript{374}. The Bush Administration’s \textit{National Strategy for Victory in Iraq} states the most important metrics they track as political measurements are:

1. The political benchmarks set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and the Transitional Administrative Law

\textsuperscript{372} Bradley Graham, Enemy Body Counts Revived, \textit{The Washington Post} (24 Oct 2005), 1
\textsuperscript{373} DoS, \textit{Iraq: Weekly Status Report}.
\textsuperscript{374} DoD, \textit{Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq}, 5
2. The number of Iraqis from all areas willing to participate in the political process as evidenced by voter registration and turnout.\textsuperscript{375}

In measuring progress toward establishing viable political progress as described in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the Iraqis have successfully held elections for the Transitional National Authority (TNA) and conducted a popular referendum on the draft constitution. These events have paved the way for a December 2005 election for a constitutionally viable Iraqi government.

There are positive signs of political life. During the 30 Jan 2005 elections, Sunni voters largely boycotted the process, but the Shi’a and Kurds turned out in large numbers. The insurgent’s inability to halt the democratic process highlighted a significant insurgent weakness and produced a qualified success for the central government. After these elections, the Sunni boycott was seen as a grave error by some Sunni clerics who believe it has further limited their voice in future national elections. Since January, there has been a significant reversal of Sunni political views. In the run up to the October 2005 constitutional referendum, there was a tremendous growth in registered voters, primarily in the Sunni community.\textsuperscript{376} However, the Sunni voters were mobilized to attempt to defeat the Constitution.

Voting patterns in the October 2005 Constitutional referendum closely followed religious-ethnic lines with the Shi’a and Kurds voting “Yes” and the vast majority of Sunnis voting “No”.\textsuperscript{377} Geographically, the “Yes” votes correspond to the more stable areas experiencing moderate to low insurgent activity and majority “No” votes in Al Anbar, Salahuddin and Ninevah provinces are those which suffer the majority of insurgent violence. The constitution was ratified with a resounding majority of 78.59% of the national vote\textsuperscript{378}, but insurgent violence has continued unabated.

\textsuperscript{376} DoD, \textit{Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq}, 7.
The October election heralded an insertion of the Sunni nationalist insurgency into the governance process. Social mobilization theory holds that political inclusion and the ability to influence political outcomes will moderate extremist positions. However, democratic events in and of themselves, do not necessarily indicate a peaceful democratic competition for power. Only Sunni political activism fueled by the belief they can peacefully influence political outcomes moderate the violence. For indicators of definitive political progress, we should look for a corresponding decrease in violence, voting patterns that do not follow strict religious or ethnic lines or the formation of crosscutting political alliances promoting common-concern issues.

The UN has energetically supported the constitutional development process by providing technical assistance and assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.\(^{379}\) On 08 November 2005, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the US-led multinational force in Iraq for an additional year.\(^{380}\) On 12 Nov 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan visited Iraq and called for a political transformation that is “inclusive, transparent, and takes into account concerns of all groups”. In response, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Ja'fari called for UN help in the upcoming elections in December 2005, promoting democracy and “improving the performance of the security forces”\(^{381}\). The UN Special Envoy Ashraf Qazi “called for a transparent political process that is responsive to the aspirations of all of Iraq’s communities.”\(^{382}\)

Iraqi President Talabani has proposed a broad amnesty program to separate the Iraqi Sunnis from the foreign Jihadists and to win over Iraqis to an


\(^{380}\) Edith Lederer, UN Extends Troops In Iraq for One Year, *The Washington Post* (9 Nov 2005), 1.


\(^{382}\) UN News Service, Iraq: UN Envoy Calls for All to Vote in Upcoming Elections, *UN News Centre* (2 Dec 2005), 1.
Iraqi nationalist theme. This has resulted in some positive countermoves from the Sunni community, including clashes between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and a call by 64 Sunni clerics for Sunni Iraqis to join the security services.

Unlike the Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups, AQI’s political stance is completely rejectionist. Instead of working within the available political opportunity space, the Salafi-Jihadists not only abstained from the organized political realm, they actively reject the political opportunity space to influence the government or take political power by peaceful means. On 23 Jan 2005, Zarqawi issued a statement claiming only “Allah has the right to govern” and “democracy is contrary to Islam”. Using this logic, he declared an “all-out war on this evil principle of democracy”. The success of the Shi’a and Kurds in the elections have provided substantially more international volunteers for Zarqawi’s Salafi-Jihadist group indicating that no matter the election results, these groups will continue to violently contest the political outcome. Zarqawi’s rejectionist position of the entire democratic political process indicates the political dimension may prove ineffective in moderating or demobilizing his movement directly – by demobilizing the Iraq Sunni insurgency.

3. Current Status – Socio-Economic Dimension

There are two critical elements in the economic counterinsurgency effort. The first is the effort to undercut the insurgent’s financial resources; the second is to strengthen the government’s ability to provide stable economic conditions.

There is little hard data on Zarqawi’s international financial sources and what is available is often anecdotal in nature. Much of AQI’s funding flows outside state-controlled financial and formal banking channels. Influencing the heretofore-uncontrolled stream of money from Islamic zakat and Islamic charities

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384 Sinan Salaheddin, Sunni Clerics Urge Iraqis to Join Security Forces, AP NY (02 April 2005), 1.
remains a largely taboo subject in regional states. The popular use of *hawala* (informal money brokers), front businesses, and untraceable liquid assets has allowed financials to flow freely within the region.\(^{386}\) AQI’s suicide operations are relatively inexpensive and the available resources are probably more than sufficient to cover the meager costs of these operations.

AQI and Iraqi nationalist insurgents have been active in attacking the sources of government finances. Their attacks have had both direct and indirect effects on the Iraqi economy. The direct effects include the loss of valuable infrastructure, natural resources, and skilled human resources. The indirect effects include raising the cost of any operation in Iraq because of the pervasive need for additional security.

The DoS “Weekly Status Report” tracks economic progress indicators.\(^ {387}\) The economically related goals include: “Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services” and “Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy”. The Bush Administration’s *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* states the most important metrics they track as security measurements are as follows:

1. GDP
2. Per capita GDP
3. Inflation
4. Electricity generated and delivered
5. Barrels of oil produced and exported
6. Numbers of businesses opened\(^ {388}\)

The few macroeconomic indicators available indicate the Iraqi economy is showing signs of recovery. As under Saddam, the dominant oil sector, which accounts for over two-thirds of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), largely determines the performance of the overall Iraqi economy. By 2004, the GDP had recovered from the war, but is not expected to grow beyond approximately 3.7%.


in 2005 because of “flat oil production and exports”\textsuperscript{389} which remain below pre-war levels.\textsuperscript{390}

Inflation is in the 5-10\% range with price increases accelerating in later 2005 due to increasing demand and increasing cost of security. Brookings data indicate higher inflation rates, but show inflation decreasing in their three-year trend. Unemployment data is notoriously difficult to determine making projected trends suspect. MNF-I sources estimated it was 28\% in Jul 2004 and 21\% in October 2005.\textsuperscript{391} The Brookings Institution estimates are uniformly higher (currently 27-40\%), but also show a similar decreasing trend.\textsuperscript{392}

The exchange rate for the New Iraqi Dinar has remained stable (1455-1480/USD). In the private sector, Iraqi new business starts continue to grow rapidly due to the more than 17,000 US microfinance loans distributed in the past two years.\textsuperscript{393} December 2004 Zogby International opinion polls indicate a general economic optimism with 70\% of business owners responded as optimistic and only 10\% pessimistic regarding economic growth over the next two years. The report goes on to cite security, effective law enforcement, corruption, and education as primary concerns.\textsuperscript{394}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Population & 25.5 & 26.3 & 27.1 & 27.9 \\
\hline
Nominal GDP (in USD billion) & 20.5 & 13.6 & 25.5 & 29.3 \\
Of which non-oil GDP (%) & 32 & 32 & 33 & 37 \\
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) & -7.8 & -4.1 & 4.6 & 5.7 \\
Per Capita GDP (USD) & 802 & 518 & 942 & 1,051 \\
Consumer Price Inflation (annual average) & 19 & 34 & 32 & 20 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Iraq: Economic Indicators – GDP & Per Capita GDP\textsuperscript{21}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{389} DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{390} O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index, 25.
\textsuperscript{391} DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 11.
\textsuperscript{392} O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index, 28.
\textsuperscript{393} DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12.
\textsuperscript{395} O’Hanlon & Kamp, Iraq Index, 28.
Two economic sectors are critical: oil and power. Iraq’s aging and poorly maintained oil infrastructure, coupled with insurgent attacks, continues to limit production and export. Over time, the insurgents have shifted targeting from short-term pipeline attacks to more lasting pump station attacks making their attacks more efficient while continuing to restrict the export of oil to below pre-war levels.

To protect these vital sectors, the Iraqi government is generating Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) as a supplement to the regular Iraqi Army. Organizationally, under the Ministry of Defense and organized as light motorized infantry battalions, the first four of the units began being deployed in October 2005. Their primary missions include patrolling oil pipelines and electrical transmission lines and augmenting defenses at oil pumping stations and electrical transmission nodes. Because of this limited defensive mission, SIBs undergo less training than their infantry counterparts, allowing new SIB units to be fielded faster. A total of between 11 and 17 SIBs are planned.\textsuperscript{397}

\textsuperscript{396} O’Hanlon & Kamp, \textit{Iraq Index}, 28.
\textsuperscript{397} DoD, \textit{Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq}, 34-35.
In the electrical power sector, reconstruction problems, poor maintenance, terrorist attacks, lack of refined fuels, and an unchecked increase in demand, has outstripped the electrical sector’s ability to meet the demand.\textsuperscript{400}

\textsuperscript{398} O’Hanlon & Kamp, \textit{Iraq Index}.

\textsuperscript{399} DoS, \textit{Iraq: Weekly Status Report}.

The US objectives for integrating Iraq into the international economy and providing services are “help Iraq develop a sustainable national budget and integrate Iraq into the world economic community, help support development of a strong and viable private sector, helping Iraq develop the capacity to deliver sufficient essential services, and revitalizing and rehabilitating the Iraqi economy through promotion of economic and market-based reforms.”

In addition to ongoing US economic aid, Iraq is receiving assistance from the World Bank and IMF. Specifically IMF granted a “$436 million emergency loan to help rebuild the economy.” While the economy remains fragile, IMF expressed cautious optimism. The World Bank plans to provide $500 million in loans through the International Development Association, with an additional $500 million in loans through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, if Iraq improves its creditworthiness.

The coalition is also receiving financial support form international donor nations. The majority of international pledges for financial support for Iraq’s reconstruction were made at the Madrid donor’s conference in October 2003. At that time donor nations pledges $13 billion in grants and loans. However, as of

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403 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 10.
November 2005, these states “have only disbursed about $3 billion to the UN or World bank trust funds for Iraq.”

Amid signs of recovery, AQI and the Sunni insurgency have been able to cause significant problems in reconstructing vital sectors of the Iraqi economy. Persistent high unemployment continues to provide a pool of “casual insurgents” and fuel popular dissatisfaction. In contrast, AQI’s external sources of financial and manpower support are independent of changes in Iraq’s economy and appear to be sufficient to support continued operations. Material improvements in the Iraq economy would reduce the pool of potential Iraqi insurgents, help strengthen the Iraqi government’s ability to govern and extend rule of law, but would not affect AQI directly.

4. Current Status – Cultural-Ideological Dimension

The cultural-ideologically-related goals, according to the Department of State, are to “Help Strengthen Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights” and “Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of Insurgents”. The DoS measurements for rule of law included three discrete events - two UN declarations and an announcement of a justice integration workshop. These are positive events but provide no sense of the current status or trends through time.

The DoD report to Congress mentions concerns with law enforcement and government corruption in relation to general economic optimism and expresses the goal of “helping Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities – law enforcement, justice, and the corrections system”. The DoD report states that the current crime estimates are unreliable. The Bookings Institution references an estimated number of per-capita crime-related deaths in Baghdad. The data

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indicate a uniformly high level of violent crime for the last year that is at least an order of magnitude greater than the regional averages.  

**CRIME-RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD SINCE MAY, 2003**

![Figure 21. Murder Rate in Baghdad](image)

**NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD:** Estimates for each month are typically based on the number of bodies brought to the Baghdad morgue with mortal gunshot wounds. We recognize that our estimates could be too high as a result of the fact some of the gunshot victims could be morgue-killed intentionally by U.S. military, but also that they could be too low since many murder victims are never taken to the morgue, but buried quickly and privately and therefore never recorded in official tallies. The homicide rate is calculated based on an estimated population of 5.6 million people in Baghdad.

**NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD:** Interpol lists the following nationwide numbers per 100,000 citizens for countries in the region: Libya 2.08, Jordan 6.33, Lebanon 3.38, Saudi Arabia, 8.71. However, Interpol notes that these [nationwide] statistics cannot be used as a basis for comparison between different countries. This is partly because “police statistics reflect reported crimes, but this only represents a fraction of the real level. The volume of crimes not reported to the police may depend on the actions, policies and perceptions of the police. These can vary with time, as well as from country to country.” Because of the inherent difficulty in interpreting and comparing international murder rates, all such statistics – including those stated in the table above – should be interpreted guardedly.

Figure 21. Murder Rate in Baghdad

In other measures of “rule of law”, all Iraqi judges have been reviewed for corruption and Ba’ath party affiliations. Provincial courts are operational but results vary based on the “ability of police and prosecutors to collect evidence and prepare cases for trial.” The report describes training judicial

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407 O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.
408 O’Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.
investigators, judges, and corrections officers, and to ensure judges and witness security, has established a witness protection program and judicial security program. As a measure of system operations, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, which is responsible for trials relating to terror suspects and anti-coalition crimes, has “conducted 544 trials and handed down 522 convictions”.410

As part of a justice and reconciliation effort, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) has begun its first trial of Saddam Hussein and other top regime officials. “Under the Iraqi system, a defendant is given a separate trial for each accused crime. Saddam is therefore likely to face multiple, different trials.” 411

The goal of “strengthening public understanding of the coalition and Isolating the Insurgents” was being measured by the DoS using two discrete events, but does not track conduct trend analysis of culturally-sensitive variables to aid iterative decision-making. The DoD report does not materially address these goals.

Measuring understanding and legitimacy is a difficult task in that it is measuring the degree to which people feel affinity and confidence in the government or, conversely, in the insurgents. Zogby International opinion polls of Middle Eastern Arabs and Muslims taken during the summer of 2005 indicate a uniform decline in positive feelings for the US forces and policies in the Middle East. An interpretation of this report sites “the American presence in Iraq, its treatment of Arabs and Muslims abroad, the continued abuses the military has employed on its prisoners of war” and a hard-line stance toward Syria and Iran as sources of these opinions.”412

Other measures of legitimacy for the coalition and the Iraqi government could be the number of volunteers to hold government positions, the government’s ability to raise forces for the national army, or its ability to collect

The empirical data suggests the government has had little problem in gaining sufficient volunteers to join the army or government although this may also be a function of economic need.

Conversely, a measure of the legitimacy of the insurgency could be its ability to gain volunteers and resources. By framing the conflict effectively, AQI has used these “shared meanings and definitions”\(^{414}\) to motivate people to act and become convinced they can make a difference. Al Qaeda has created a convincing and compelling foundational myth, pitting the pious global *Umma* under attack by a foreign and decadent culture\(^{415}\). Expanding this definition, the Salafi-Takfiri insurgents label Muslims working in government or in any capacity with the coalition as collaborators or worse, *takfir* (heretics & apostates). In their mind, this anti-God label justifies Jihadist attacks and ritualistically brutal murder. These attacks further serve as effective psychological weapons as they gain substantial media coverage, confirm the West’s alienation from the Islamic world, and reinforce the perceived “Clash of Civilizations”\(^{416}\).

Unclassified data gathered by the Brookings Institution show both the Jihadi and Sunni insurgencies have been able to continue operations in the face of government military, political, and economic action. Although not an exact tally, nor a reliable, stand-alone measure of success, these estimates show a significant number of insurgents have been captured or killed. At the same time, the Brookings Institution data show a steady growth trend in the manpower strength of both insurgencies.


\(^{414}\) McAdam et al., “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by McAdam, et al, 1-20. New York: Cambridge University Press, (1996), 5


\(^{416}\) Anthony Cordesman & Patrick Baetjer, *Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft: (Updated as of May 20, 2005 - provided by author), 17.
Figure 22. Total Number of Insurgents Detained of Killed

Figure 23. Estimates of the Strength of the Insurgency

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417 O'Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*.
418 O'Hanlon & Kamp, *Iraq Index*. 
What these trends do show is, in the face of significant counterinsurgency operations, the insurgency has maintained its legitimacy and ability to attract recruits, both from within Iraq and from a regional Salafi-Jihadist manpower pool. In addition, the growth in the number of foreign fighters indicates the continuing porous nature of the borders.

The insurgents are gaining influence by repeating reference to published instances of American prisoner abuse. This message has gained credence even though, for the past 50 years, the US has been a central pillar upholding the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). The US is a signatory of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Victims of War (more commonly referred to as the Geneva Conventions), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The US military has a standing DOD prohibition on torture and cruel treatment of prisoners which is enshrined in the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation. However, recent interpretations of the US position have created ambiguities indicating the operations in Afghanistan represent a “new paradigm that renders obsolete Geneva’s protections.”

Recently, there have been challenges to the laws of armed conflict indicating these longstanding rules may not apply to American interrogation of foreigners held outside of the US. According to Capt Ian Fishback, detainee abuses have taken place because of the lack of “clear, consistent, lawful treatment of detainees, and confusion over standards.” These ambiguities have opened an opportunity for AQI to frame the US in strongly negative terms.

In contrast to US missteps, AQI insurgents conduct has been brutally indiscriminantal by design. In contrast to Mao’s People’s War approach, this has done little to characterize AQI as self-sacrificing friends of the people. Their

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419 An Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Signed by 12 Senior professional military leaders of the US Armed Forces.


hostage-taking and broadcast beheadings have revealed them to be a particularly malevolent group. Their indiscriminate attacks on unarmed Shi’a civilians and their defense of their atrocities as an acceptable cost of driving out the Americans, has brought them little popular support.

A successful counterinsurgency campaign makes the population, “see the insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws.” One of the government’s more adept cultural/psychological operations is to broadcast confessions by captured insurgents. The prime-time television program, “Terrorism in the Hands of Justice,” features captured insurgents confessing their acts of terrorism against the Iraqi people. This highly popular program has been effective in deflating the stature of the insurgents by showing them to be small, mean, greedy creatures worthy only of contempt.

In the battle of the narrative, Al Qaeda and its Iraqi franchise, the attacks of 11 Sep 2001, the insurgency in Iraq are part of a historiography which can be traced from the Crusades and original articles of Muslim faith regarding the conduct of Jihad. These Salafi frames include narratives that depict themselves as just and holy warriors upholding the faith. To counter AQI, the US needs to defeat not just their military operations; the US narrative must defeat the AQI narrative. The US has not done particularly well in the battle of the narrative. Aggressive political statements and unilateral actions have created international anxiety regarding the future use of America’s newfound predominance. The Middle East’s recent experience with colonialism colors their view of an extended US presence and makes them cautious of US motives.

Overall, the reconstruction and counter insurgency effort in Iraq have yielded mixed results. While there are signs of progress all the dimensions of

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conflict, there are also significant setbacks and insurgent strengths which require attention. The following section will address some of these areas which could benefit from additional attention.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The war in Iraq is neither won nor lost. Implementing a coordinated multidimensional strategy presents a strong counter to AQI's political opportunities, mobilizing structures frames and action repertoires.

The internationally-supported, ideologically-committed Salafi-Jihadist group Al Qaeda in Iraq is a numerically minor organization but is important to understand because they pose a unique and particularly difficult counterinsurgency challenge. Because AQI draws much of its motivation and resources from a larger international Salafi-Jihadi movement, it is resistant to the direct effects of an Iraq-centric counterinsurgency strategy as outlined in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. In addition, other Sunni-nationalist insurgent groups engage in instrumental, cross-group cooperation in order to leverage AQI’s destabilizing operations for their own purposes. Defeating or demobilizing AQI is essential to stabilizing Iraq.

This thesis drew upon social mobilization theory to investigate the nature of this group in order to determine what counterinsurgency strategies hold the greatest promise of defeating or demobilizing them. Zarqawi’s AQI is a militant insurgent group with few political or social strengths. Its’ opportunity structures are both international and Iraq-specific. The rise and subsequent decentralization of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was one of the most significant enabling conditions; instability in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the other. AQI draws strength from mobilizing structures that include a militant reading of the Islamic faith, which commands the faithful to fulfill their duty to conduct Jihad against foreign invaders and an ability, partly through pre-existing Al Qaeda networks, to draw on international sources of manpower and financial resources. AQI is sophisticated and consistent in its use of anti-system frames, which reject western and democratic influences. AQI depicts itself as an organization focused on Jihad in order to materially weaken the United States and punish takfir.
apostate groups. In the short term, AQI is focused on continuing the fight to drive the US out of the Middle East, preventing Iraq from becoming a Shi’a-dominated state and, in the long-term, restoring the caliphate. A mix of guerrilla tactics and terrorist methods comprise AQI’s action repertoire. They break with the norms of insurgency in their widespread use of suicide bombings that target Shi’a civilians to create indiscriminate mass-casualty events and their practice of videotaping hostage beheadings.

The US-led effort has also yielded mixed results. To counter AQI, the US should use a multi-dimensional approach which negates its political opportunity structures, undercuts its’ mobilizing structures, creates dissonance in its frames, and protects against its actions. The following measures are needed against AQI.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on the nature of the insurgency and a survey of counterinsurgency methods which could be translated into the Iraqi effort.

1. Recommendations – Military

The insurgency in Iraq emerged under conditions of instability after OIF. To regain stability, it is necessary to address the Iraqi Sunni insurgency as well as AQI. Training and fielding a US-supported Iraqi army is critical to the ‘Clear, Hold and Build” approach in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. However, the military, political, and economic methods described in that strategy alone will be much less effective in demobilizing AQI.

a. Secure the Population, Systematically Extend the Control of the Government and Operate Using Minimal Military Force

The traditional “American Way of War” stresses firepower, communications, and maneuver to close with, decisively engage and swiftly defeat an opposing conventional force. A strategy focused on engaging insurgents using large military sweeps without a concurrent plan for population security is often unsuccessful and counterproductive. Counterinsurgency
“requires an almost diametrically opposite approach: patience, circumspection, and the strict limitation on violence”.425

In conjunction with political, economic, and social programs, protecting the population from insurgent occupation or attacks should form the basis of US and Iraqi government strategy. A local defense strategy should work well against AQI insurgents operating in Sunni-tribal areas because AQI operates in small terrorist cells, not large guerrilla formations capable of overwhelming US and Iraqi defenders. In addition, AQI cells are composed of puritanical foreigners who have made little attempt to generate popular good will within the Iraqi population. Local tribal Iraqis have little attachment to these foreigners, creating a situation an adapted “oil stain” strategy would be effective for the newly trained Iraqi army or local militia forces to ferret out those among the population who are out of place.

b. Train and Support Iraqi Military

The US is training Iraqi Security forces and they are beginning to take on a more significant portion of the security load. US direct involvement in combat operations should begin to drop off as the Iraqis assume this more prominent role. To ensure these Iraqi forces remain more capable than their opponents, small US military advisory and support teams should be embedded in lower-level Iraqi field forces to provide coordination, communications, ISR and fire support. This natural evolution of the mission from large formations to small teams will allow US field forces to shrink, our logistics requirements to transfer to the Iraqis. and the reduction of the overall US military footprint in Iraq.

c. Deny the Insurgents Secure Base Areas

The insurgents have been able to operate far more freely in the west and central, Sunni-dominated provinces. Specifically Al Anbar province, with its predominantly Sunni population, sparse desert landscape, and proximity to the Syrian and Saudi Arabian borders offers favorable conditions for insurgent secure-basing. While the oil stain strategy should comprise the main military effort, where insurgent bases are identified, active counterinsurgent operations

425 Joes, Resisting Rebellion, 6.
should be used to keep the pressure on insurgent safe areas. Once completed, these operations should not leave the area for the insurgents return. An expanding presence of US and Iraqi forces should assume security duties in captured areas.

2. Recommendations – Political

a. Continue Democratic Political Process to Demobilize Iraqi-Nationalist Insurgents

A common theme among social mobilization authors is effective political voice and the ability to influence political outcomes that has a moderating effect on popular discontent. To isolate and deprive the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency of indigenous support, the Sunnis must have access to real political power. A political solution and not a purely military one is the key in Iraq. To this end, the Iraqi government must continue to hold constitutionally regulated free and fair elections to keep this political opportunity space open.

b. Amnesty and Reconciliation Program

To facilitate a move to peaceful government, governments have used amnesty programs to demobilize the insurgency without having to either surrender or to “fight to the end”. Iraqi President Talabani has proposed a broad amnesty program to separate the Iraqi Sunnis from the foreign Jihadists and to win over Iraqis to an Iraqi nationalist theme. This has resulted in some positive signs from the Sunni community, including clashes between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and a call by 64 Sunni clerics for Sunni Iraqis to join the security services. To reduce the probability of returning to the insurgency, vetted amnesty-takers must have the means of making a living. Allowing former soldiers who are not charged with capital crimes should be encouraged to join the Iraqi Army. This would have broad beneficial effects of giving amnesty-takers

426 Joes, Resisting Rebellion, 245.
427 Tom Lasseter, Officers: Military Can't End Insurgency, Philadelphia Inquirer (14 Jun 2005), 1.
429 Sinan Salaheddin, Sunni Clerics Urge Iraqis to Join Security Forces, AP NY (02 April 2005), 1.
a stake in the government, reducing the insurgency’s pool of possible recruits, increasing the level of trained soldiers, and putting more people back to work thereby reducing unemployment.

In the same vein, the Iraqi government should scale back their de-Ba’athification process and allow vetted former administrators back into the government. This could again be successful in countering the Sunni insurgency by giving them a stake in the government. Since AQI consists of foreigners who have come to Iraq specifically to fight Americans, this program could have only the indirect effect of reducing the number of Iraqi insurgent allies available to AQI, but would put the foreigners at odds with Sunni Iraqi nationalists and discredit AQI themes of fighting imperialism.

c. **Legitimize the Democratically-Elected Government**

There is no guarantee the democratically elected government will hold all US interests sacred. If the legally elected government demands concessions from the US, the US leadership should consider these demands in light of their beneficial and legitimizing effect for the new government. By yielding to Iraqi demands on issues that the US would prefer not to, the new Iraqi government will gain the legitimacy as a provider of public goods. In the long run, it may be in the US’s best interest to incrementally make concessions to the new government. This would have the beneficial effects of incrementally legitimizing the government, incrementally building capacity in the government to administer internal functions, and allowing the US to incrementally disengage from running Iraqi governmental institutions.

d. **Discredit the Salafi-Jihadist Political Platform**

Discrediting the Salafi political platform may prove relatively easy as the foreign-born insurgents display poor political instincts. By highlighting the fact the AQI has not presented a recognized political leader, does not possess a political organization or a widely appealing vision for Iraq, they demonstrate their unsuitability to govern. The government should highlight AQI attacks on Iraqis as an attack on the nation by fanatical external belligerents. Recalling the dubious benefits of Afghanistan under Taliban rule may help to provide an apt, if
apocalyptic, illustration of the Salafi-Jihadist insurgent’s vision of the post victory future.

3. **Recommendations – Socio-Economic**

An economy in wartime is a fragile asset. Since AQI insurgents are receiving outside aid and do not have significant costs to sustain their operation, they do not need to control the economy to win in this dimension. To hurt the government, they only have to be able to continually disrupt the economy’s smooth running.

AQI is dependent on resources from outside Iraq, making them economically vulnerable as well, especially if US can cut off AQI’s international sources of finance and close Iraq’s border to separate AQI from its supporters abroad.

**a. Provide Employment and Opportunities**

In disbanding the Iraqi Army and conducting an aggressive de-Ba’athification program, the CPA created a huge pool of unemployed and disaffected young men. By sourcing micro-loans and providing jobs, the US can provide an alternative occupation for would-be insurgents. Employment also provides self-esteem by allowing an unemployed population to peacefully provide for their families.

**b. Secure the Economic Elite**

The insurgents also have targeted Iraq’s educated professionals and intelligentsia by killing university professors, researchers, students, journalists, physicians, and administrators, thus depriving the state of a skilled populace and weakening the economy. These attacks create a chaotic atmosphere which dissuaded international financial investment necessary for real reconstruction of the vital oil sector of the Iraqi economy.

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430 Cordesman & Baejter, 2005, 17.
c. Secure Oil-Revenue-Producing Assets

The insurgents regularly attack oil facilities to reduce oil exports from which the government gains revenue and limits the economic power the government can wield. The insurgents also target electric power, water, and other critical infrastructure, which not only offsets the positive effects of US aid, but creates popular discontent due to the lack of reliable services and anger against the coalition and Iraqi government. This money will be wasted if the reconstructed infrastructure is not secured. Training and deployment of the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) should be continued.

4. Recommendations - Cultural-Ideological

AQI’s cadres of foreign fighters are vulnerable on the cultural ideological dimension. AQI’s religiously uncompromising occupation methods, denouncement of the concept of democratic self-rule, and mass-casualty attacks against fellow Muslims threaten to alienate them from their Sunni base of local support. If the current trend towards abuse and isolation continues, Sunni tribalists may turn on the Jihadists and support Iraqi government efforts to drive them out of Iraq.

a. Foster a Positive Concept of Iraqi Self-Identification

The Iraqi governmental leaders must build bridges into all moderate religious communities. One way would be to take council with the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars and Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Sistani. The goal of the Iraqi government must be to foster a sense of Iraqi self-identification, vice sectarian, tribal or regional group identities.

Iraqis are critical to defeating the foreign-born Salafi-Jihadist insurgency. The government must build the idea of a popular, viable Iraq and this common-ground is essential to defusing a possible sectarian civil war. This idea will find support from the moderates. So insistent is Grand Ayatollah Sistani on his Shi’a followers keep the peace, he issued a fatwa against using the terms “Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd” in favor of the word “Iraqi”431. The central government

should also adopt a similar process to unite the country rather than emphasizing sectarian divides. The only credible sources for these claims are the Iraqi government and security services. Any claims by the US administration or coalition forces would result in the message appearing disingenuous.

b. **Uphold High Human Rights and Rule of Law**

Publicized abuse at Abu Gharib and elsewhere are deadly to winning the battle of the story. In a legislative branch effort to provide clear guidance, Sen John McCain (R-AZ) introduced amendment #1977 to the 2006 Military Appropriations Bill which would: (1) establish the Army Field Manual as the uniform standard for the interrogation of Department of Defense detainees and, (2) prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in the detention of the US government.

In confronting the AQI and Sunni insurgency on the cultural-ideological battlefield, Sen McCain’s legislation is a positive strategic move. It provides soldiers with unambiguous standards of internationally accepted norms of behavior; it provides their commanders clear standards by which they can maintain discipline; it reinforces the US Armed Forces’ honorable culture and self image, it undercuts insurgent claims of torture and eases population fears of indiscriminant abuse by coalition armed forces caused by the insurgent’s exaggerated claims.

c. **Apply International Law to AQI**

This approach recognizes military action and the international law system are mutually reinforcing vice mutually exclusive. The US should support a comprehensive program using international law, specifically the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), to conduct cultural-ideological operations against terrorist organizations whose primary weapons are contrary to these conventions. This process exploits the US’s own superior claim to legitimacy on the

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433 Paul Pillar, Perceptions of Terrorism: Continuity and Change, in Boyne, German and Pilar, Law Vs War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism, Conference Report, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (July 2005), 8.
international and legal stage and allows the US to seize the moral “high ground” and “unmask terror warfare as inherently in contravention of the spirit of the Geneva Convention.”

A weakness in the current approach is the Geneva Conventions currently only apply to signatory nations, which opens a legal loophole allowing non-signatory nations and non-state organizations to hold themselves above the law. As with the Law of the Sea, the UN should apply the Geneva Convention’s international standards of conduct on state and non-state actors alike and deal with terrorists in the same vein as pirates. The UN should establish an international court to adjudicate terrorist cases. In this way, LOAC would apply to non-signatories and non-state terrorist organizations. It would require all states and organizations to ensure their operations target only military personnel and facilities and make every effort to “minimize loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.” As a second step, it would toughen standards by explicitly stating sanctions for those states or organizations found in grave breach of the Geneva Convention. It would place terrorism as a form of warfare on trial and render politically, economically, religiously, or ethnically-motivated arguments for terrorism invalid. Finally, it would require states to “take positive action to prevent or curtail the grievous harm deliberately done to civilians.” Where states or organizations fail to comply, civilized states of the world would have legitimate legal recourse to impose sanctions or punitive measures.

The effect on US operations would be minimal - the US will continue to fight wars in compliance within the provisions of the LOAC. This involves training officers, soldiers, contractors, and embedded media associated with US operations in their role, responsibility, and consequences with respect to LOAC. The end-result will be to put terrorist organization’s primary tactics on trial and subject their methods and justifications to close public scrutiny.

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436 Kellogg, International Law and Terrorism, 54.
d. Publicize and Prosecute Terrorist Abuses

The popular TV show, Terrorists in the Hands of Justice may be effective in publicizing terrorist abuses, but it sidesteps legal issues by showing accused terrorists, many with obvious bruises and without representation responding to off-camera questions. A better approach would show these terrorists being tried in an Iraqi government court with the facts of the case clearly revealed consistent with due process.

e. Engage in a Comprehensive Counter-Narrative Strategy

(1). Engage AQI’s Narratives - The US should coordinate a comprehensive counter-narrative operation. The first prong should be directed at the Islamic moderates and intellectuals. In this strategy, each of AQI’s points of ideology would be dissected and refuted by a qualified and respected Muslim spokesman. AQI’s goals and methods should be shown to be detrimental to the interests of the educated class. The second prong should counter AQI’s religious messages directed at the urban poor. Here, respected regional, religious, moderates must be convinced to speak out. Their statements should not be in direct support of the US as this would immediately discredit them in the eyes of their fellows, but should focus on the indefensible abuses of the insurgents and self-destructive nature of violent political Islam. They should couch their arguments in familiar articles of faith and demonstrate AQI are disingenuous hypocrites who violate the most sacred norms of the faith.437 Finally, there are former terrorists currently in custody who have renounced violence and actively assisted counterterrorism efforts. These people could provide compelling, first-person, narratives and are able to address and defuse issues current and would-be jihadists they engage in violent action.438

The Iraqi message to its people should be AQI is destroying Iraq’s economy, killing its people, and does not have a positive political/economic/social capacity beyond the negative effects of Jihad. It should portray the Iraqi


government as legitimate and working to protect Iraqis from this threat and the
government will prevail and Iraq will be better off when the Jihadists are gone.

(2) Gain Closure on the War - To gain closure on Hussein’s regime and promote the legitimacy of the new government, the abuses and mass-murders that took place during Hussein’s rule need to be examined in a court of law and, if found guilty, Saddam and his ranking subordinates held accountable. The forum must be an Iraqi court and result in Iraqi justice. A public trial and formal assignment of blame will help undercut Ba’athist nationalism and indirectly undercut the Salafi-Jihadist insurgents. In court, Saddam has been alternately defiant - aggressively berating the court and subdued - responding quietly, after careful thought. For this trial to achieve its goals of justice and reconciliation, Saddam’s trial must be conducted with fastidious legal procedure. It must highlight the blatant misrule by Saddam and his subordinates and remove any legitimacy or sense of innate superiority from the Sunni Ba’athis currently engaged in the insurgency.

(3) Engage AQI’s Anti-Colonial Frames - Popular views of the US presence in Iraq today are colored by Iraqi and regional experience with colonial occupation and exploitation. The US has alternately been accused of invading Iraq as part of a general war on Muslims, as a way to assist Israeli regional domination, or as a grab for Iraq’s proven oil reserves. These prevalent narratives make the population resentful of US presence and distrustful of US long-term intentions. Ultimately, they create uncertainty in the future and strengthen the factional militias and the insurgency.

Declaring a chronologically-driven timetable for withdrawal would be a strategic mistake. Setting arbitrary dates for withdrawal would embolden the insurgents to persist until the Americans leave, undercut the fledgling political process, and would negate any cooperation from the population in security-building efforts. Beyond the immediate possibility of leaving Iraq politically shattered, militarily weak, economically disabled, socially divided and on the

439 John Burns, Iraqi Court Releases Video of a Much Subdued Hussein (13 Jun 2005), 1.
verge of civil war, departure would present the Salafi-Jihadists a propaganda windfall and initiate a series of cascading negative effects. With a declared withdrawal date, Al Qaeda could expand their self-promoting narrative of defeating the Soviets and allow them to also claim to have defeated the US. This narrative would enhance Al Qaeda’s international appeal for new recruits and resource providers, ultimately raising the risk of further international terrorism. It would leave Iraq a weak state, unable to control its internal territory and supply Al Qaeda a training venue and “haven for terrorists.” Overall, withdrawing from Iraq without explicitly meeting stability objectives would constitute a major defeat in the Global War on Terror.

In contrast, an internationally acceptable, jointly agreed upon, conditions-based withdrawal plan would serve as a touchstone for US policy-makers, military planners, international supporters, Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people. The plan should describe the desired endstates in terms of mutually acceptable levels of security, political self-governance, economic prosperity, and social stability. Working toward a common set of goals would allow Iraqi leaders to discredit the insurgent attacks as anti-Iraqi and the reason for continued US military presence in Iraq. Within Iraq, there is cross-cutting support for this type of disengagement. During a November meeting of the Arab league in Cairo, a joint statement by Arab Shiite, Arab Sunni and Kurdish political leaders agreed on mutually acceptable constitutional amendments, mandated no specific withdrawal timetable, and couched their arguments in the language of compromise. The closing statement did call for “milestones,” but not specific dates for withdrawal.

Public discussions between US and Iraqi political leaders should set the agenda and the results made transparent to both populations. International facilitators, such as the UN, World Bank, Arab League and NATO,

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should be included in the discussions to reinforce international legitimacy and undercut Al Qaeda’s negative messages. In practice, the UN should host a stability conference and follow up status meetings with full participation from all legitimate Iraqi political parties, regional neighbors, and internationally supportive nations. Instead of a fighting withdrawal, this process would initiate a peaceful and purposeful US military disengagement. Finally, declaring the conditions for success and withdrawal would demonstrate goodwill as well as our ultimate intention to restore Iraq to a fully functional independent member in the community of nations.

(4). Engage Middle Eastern Opinions Through Existing Media:
The US should engage Al Qaeda’s message in a forum which will reach the most Muslims. Rather than ceding the existing informational space to extremists, moderate American Muslim spokesmen should present US views and engage in debates on Al Jazeera, Al Manar and Al Arabiya.443 Here they could contest the Salafi-Jihadist’s vision of the future and project one not based on conflict. They could highlight Al Qaeda’s negative message and lack of coherent political and economic capacity.

5. Recommendations – International

In presaging the US experience in Iraq, Machiavelli stated “there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you”444. Indeed, US policies with respect to the Gulf monarchies, Egypt, and Israel have served to strengthen Al Qaeda’s regional appeal. The current US activist role has many governments nervous regarding future US intentions.

a. Gain Control of Iraqi Border Areas

AQI draws a significant percentage of its resources from outside Iraq making the mission of isolating the battlefield central to defeating the insurgency. Currently, AQI insurgents are able to cross into Iraq relatively freely. This allows them access to their vital, external sources of financial resources and manpower. Cutting this link will be decisive in defeating the AQI threat.


An initial effort should be to make common cause with Iraq’s neighbors. The US should first realize that, with large and restive young populations, none of the neighboring states has a great interest in seeing US-style democracy grow in Iraq. But neither do they gain if Iraq disintegrates into sectarian civil war or becomes a Salafi-Jihadist Islamic state. Using these visions of a possible Middle Eastern future may allow US diplomats to privately engage Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The goal of these negotiations would be for these states to quietly strengthen their own borders with Iraq and systematically make insurgent transit through their countries more difficult.

The US should reengage with Syria to influence Syria’s perceived support of the insurgents. The Syrians insist they are doing all they can and the current hard-line method may have diminished the flow of Jihadists. The administration should move beyond “axis of evil” ideology and engage President Asad as a rational political actor. US rhetoric, policies, and actions should focus on altering Asad’s pragmatic political calculations in order to make future US friendship more valuable than continuing terrorist support.

Along the physical border, there is a newly constructed earthen berm to delineate the national boundary. At a minimum, the US and Iraqi security forces need to physically gain control of the border areas and road networks leading into Iraq. Training border security forces and refurbishing border forts is an essential first step. Establishing coordinated working procedures for air surveillance and close air support will be essential for these small, scattered, units to effectively coordinate with each other and provide an effective defense in depth. Should the security provided by mobile border police forces prove too porous, a more robust defended physical barrier with intrusion sensors, roving patrols, air patrols, and spaced garrison blockhouses, such as the French-Algerian “Maurice Line,” may become necessary.

b. Engage Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Gulf States

As a neighbor and the world’s largest Salafi state, Saudi Arabia is a critical international actor in mobilizing or demobilizing the Iraqi insurgency. By empowering Sunni insurgency groups, the Saudis risk an Iraqi sectarian civil war
and possibly a larger regional war. Instead of inflaming the situation, the Saudis and other Sunni Gulf states need to be engaged in stabilizing Iraq, reducing the rhetoric of Jihad, and interdicting the flow of militants and money into Iraq.

Just like Syria, Saudi’s border with Iraq is also long and porous. It was not until al-Qaeda began attacks on the Saudi government and Saudi economic targets that the Saudi government demonstrated any inclination towards assisting in a greater war on terror. The Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Turki al-Faisal, is not entirely behind the US effort in Iraq, having “described the US invasion of Iraq as a colonial war” and Arab press continues to refer to the insurgents as “resistance fighters”.445

For its part, the new Iraqi government needs to reassure the traditional Sunni states Iraq will not become a revolutionary Shi’a satellite of Iran and the oil-based economy of Iraq will be a responsible member of OPEC.

c. Work with Allies

The US needs to shore-up international support and gain legitimacy for the effort to build a stable post-war Iraq. European allies are critical in this effort. The decision to go to war was contentious, but should be put into the past. The US should mend political fences with the French, German, and Russian governments and offer economic incentives by encouraging foreign private companies to participate in rebuilding post-war Iraq.

6. Recommendations – Psychological

a. Build and Visibly Demonstrate Iraqi Military Capability in Attacking Insurgent Held Areas

The US military has won every major battle in which it has fought, but because the Iraqi security environment is dominated by US forces, it reinforces Al Qaeda’s US occupation frame. This situation also provides the insurgents fuel for propaganda in the form of civilian casualties, collateral damage, and damage to religious structures. Only a viable Iraqi police force and Iraqi Army can bring legitimate security and restore law and order. Public

demonstrations of Iraqi forces clearing Sunni tribal areas of AQI insurgents, such as at Tal Afar, should be a model of US/Iraqi combined operations. In the wake of these operations and as Iraqi forces become available, they should be assigned garrison duties protecting captured areas.

b. Demonstrate Independent Positive Leadership

The Iraqi Government must project determined, confident leadership and present its populace a credible face of governance. It can do this by being present at the site of military victories as was Prime Minister Ja'fari’s 12 Sep tour of the battlefield at Tal Afar. President Talabani should be seen meeting with the heads of friendly regional governments, working within regional forums such as the Arab League, OPEC and the World Bank, and appearing as an accepted leader when speaking at the UN. These ceremonies lend credibility to the fledgling government as an independent institution and not as the insurgents claim, a tool of the US. government. Leaders should also be seen as pious Muslims and not live ostentatiously or break moderate Muslim codes of behavior.

The US and Iraqi government have limited time. Historical baggage of western occupation and colonial exploitation limit the duration that external military presence that will be tolerated. Examples of prisoner abuse undermine US claims to legitimacy as a powerful defender of human rights.

Iraq is the focal point for US foreign policy in the Middle East, and for Al Qaeda’s transnational strategy. The diametric opposition of these interests ensures that the situation in Iraq will remain dynamic for the near term. As the Sunni insurgency is demobilized, it is likely AQI will redouble their efforts to ignite an Iraqi civil war. Therefore, strictly tracking the number of attacks will probably be a poor indicator of AQI's status. Instead, the number of insurgents crossing into Iraq, their level of financing, and the ability for AQI to find support within the Iraqi population will become critical.

Iraq’s neighboring states of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey all have stakes in Iraq’s stability as well as its form of government. Should Iraq
descend into civil war, the conflict could spread into a larger proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that would have significantly greater consequences. Internationally, Iraq's long-term stability is critical to maintaining a smooth flow of oil on which the world economy depends. It is therefore vital to stabilize Iraq, defeat the Sunni insurgents, and demobilize the Salafi-Jihadists.

The insurgency in Iraq is a complex problem that hinges on military, political, economic, sociological and international factors. To defeat the insurgency, the US and Iraqi governments must address both the indigenous and foreign elements as separate, but related issues. To determine the efficacy of our operations, effects-based analysis requires collection and analysis of trend data on population security, political voting patterns, and economic recovery. This data will enable decision makers to better judge the progress toward meeting general stability goals.

This thesis is based on unclassified data regarding AQI’s organization, resources, and operations. As more detailed information becomes available, or the environment in Iraq changes, the counterinsurgency strategy presented here should be reviewed and recommendations altered accordingly.
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