ARMIES IN TRANSITION
Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies

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### Army in Transition. Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies

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The world has been stunned since 1989 by the speed with which the countries of Eastern Europe abandoned four decades of Marxist-Leninist rule and cast their lot with Western-style democracy and capitalism. Although the most casual observer is well aware that the process of transition is a delicate one, economic and ethnic issues have overshadowed the daunting political challenges faced by the new democratic regimes, not the least of which, considering Eastern European history, is the possibility of military intervention in government. Only Samuel Huntington, in *The Third Wave,* has given any significant attention to the question of civil-military relations in emerging democracies.¹

The purpose of this study is to consider whether Eastern European countries can learn any lessons on civilian control of the armed forces from the record of Spain, a country that has successfully undergone the democratic transition. The study will specifically compare Spain with Poland, the Eastern European country whose history is perhaps most characterized by military involvement in government.

The first task is to establish a framework for analyzing civilian control of the military. This framework will then be used to determine whether the Spanish and Polish cases are indeed comparable. If they are, we shall look at the Spanish experience and use that experience to derive lessons for the reform of
civil-military relations in Poland. Finally, we shall take advantage of the opportunity to consider whether Huntington's guidelines on transforming civil-military relations are adequate to explain the Spanish success and guide the Polish future.

Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Framework

In The Man on Horseback, Samuel Finer developed a model to explain why militaries intervene in politics, based on combinations of disposition and opportunity. A crucial third element missing from Finer's model is ability to intervene successfully.

The Disposition to Intervene. For a military to have the disposition to intervene in politics, two conditions are necessary. First, the motives for intervention must outweigh those against it. Second, the armed forces must have the will (or "mood") to act. The motives inhibiting military intervention include professionalism, acceptance of the principle of civilian supremacy, and fear of unintended consequences. Those encouraging intervention are the concept that the army is the personification of the nation with a manifest destiny to be its savior, the perceived need to defend a national interest through intervention, and the perceived need to defend a sectional interest shared by the officers who organize and lead the intervention.²

The first motive discouraging intervention is professionalism. According to Huntington's classic 1957 work The Soldier and the State, a professional military is distinguished by three essential characteristics. First, it possesses expertise in the management of violence. The acquisition of this expertise
requires full-time study and practice over an extended period. Second, it recognizes a responsibility to use its skills according to a set of professional values for the security of society as a whole, not for personal or organizational gain. Third, members of the professional military are a corporate body with a "sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen."³

In principle, the professional military is so exclusively concerned with its special role in defending the nation against external enemies and so cognizant that is has no expertise in other areas that it becomes a neutral, sterile tool of the state rather than a domestic political asset.⁴ History shows, however, that professionalism is not enough. Many military forces that were highly "professional" by the criteria outlined above have intervened in politics. The weakness of Huntington's reliance on professionalism alone is that professional officers by definition see protection of the interests of the nation-state as among their highest values.⁵ It is not difficult to conceive of situations in which the officer corps may see the national interest as conflicting with the decisions of the duly constituted civilian authorities. These situations frequently arise in a "praetorian" polity, a concept we shall consider in a moment.

The necessary complement to professionalism is explicit acceptance by the armed forces of the principle of civilian supremacy. Professional officers must see themselves as servants
of the constitutional government in power, not merely of some abstract conception of the state or nation. ⑥

A final motive inhibiting intervention is the officer corps's fear of the unintended consequences of intervention: erosion of the army's ability to meet external threats, loss of internal cohesion, civilian retaliation should intervention fail, and public backlash against either the intervention itself or the lack of progress in solving problems once the military is in power. ⑦

One motive that encourages military intervention is a belief among soldiers of many armies (and often among the publics they serve) that the armed forces are the true manifestation of the nation and that it is the soldier's destiny to be the savior of his country. Closely related to this romantic vision of the soldier is the concept that there exists a true, identifiable national interest that is above group interests and partisan politics. Where either of these views prevails, even professional soldiers who consider themselves strictly apolitical may be tempted to intervene against the constitutional government in the higher name of the nation. ⑧

Soldiers may also intervene on behalf of more selfish sectional interests, such as the interests of a dominant social class or region from which the officer corps may be drawn, the interests of the armed forces as an organization, or the selfish personal interests of one or more officers. ⑨ It is this type of intervention that a professional ethic is most likely to discourage.
The other half of the disposition to intervene is "mood." A military's mood to intervene is largely a function of frustration, either with the country's role and image in the world, with the inability of national institutions to deal with political, social, and economic problems, or with the military's own role in society. Whatever its source, frustration leads to anger among military officers, who then psychologically shift the focus of this frustration to civilian leaders. Combined with a balance of motives in favor of intervention, the armed forces then have a disposition to intervene. The conditions inspiring frustration in the military are often the result of socio-political praetorianism.

The Opportunity to Intervene. For successful intervention to occur, disposition must be accompanied by opportunity, which is created by the weakness or ineffectiveness of civilian political institutions, the situation Huntington calls "praetorianism." As has already been mentioned, the concept of praetorianism also comes into play with regard to the disposition to intervene. In a praetorian polity, social forces operate directly in the political arena rather than through agreed, legitimate political structures. There are no commonly accepted rules of the game, so each group uses whatever means it has available to bend the system to its own ends.

Consequently, the praetorian state is characterized by political corruption, politically motivated strikes and demonstrations, and military coups. In short, praetorianism is not so
much a characteristic of the armed forces as of the polity itself; "countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations." 12

The Ability to Intervene. Finer assumes that armies have inherent political advantages, such as cohesion, prestige, and overwhelming relative power, that enable them to intervene successfully in political affairs. However, not all armies possess these characteristics. Military forces are often neither cohesive nor prestigious, nor do they always enjoy a monopoly of arms.

It is by weakening the military's cohesion, prestige, and relative power that many governments have sought to keep the military out of politics, particularly militaries that do not accept the legitimacy of the political system. Huntington calls measures of this kind "subjective controls." Cohesion can be undermined by penetrating military organizations with political personnel. The effectiveness and prestige of the armed forces can be reduced by constraining budgets and by hostile public relations campaigns. The armed forces' monopoly of violence can be broken by establishing other well-armed institutions outside the military's control. 13

The Framework Applied: Spain and Poland in Historical Perspective

Spain and Poland have each been governed twice in this century by military regimes. Generals Miguel Primo de Rivera in
1923-1930 and Francisco Franco Bahamonde in 1936-1975 both established direct military rule in Spain, while interwar Poland was governed more or less directly by military governments under Marshal Jozef Pilsudski and his successors from 1926 until the German invasion of 1939. Most recently, General Wojciech Jaruzelski brought the Polish People's Army to power in 1981 and kept it in effective control until 1990.

Thus there is a prima facie similarity between the two countries' experiences. The question is whether this similarity is real or merely superficial. The answer can be found by examining with respect to each military seven elements suggested by the Finer-Huntington theoretical framework: (1) the military's degree of expertise; (2) its understanding of its social responsibility; (3) the degree and type of its corporate cohesion; (4) its acceptance of the concept of civil supremacy; (5) how governments use the armed forces in society; (6) socio-political praetorianism; and (7) measures of subjective control.

**Military Expertise.** The Spanish and Polish armies share the distinction of having missed the late-nineteenth-century trend toward military professionalism that occurred throughout most of Europe.

The Spanish Army's failure to develop was ironic, since it had led the world in military innovation during the Renaissance. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, internal discord and a focus on political involvement led to a stagnation of professional thinking. In the twentieth century, the lack of
a plausible threat to national security and the loss of the empire left the Spanish Army with no incentive to develop war-fighting expertise. Even under Franco's four decades of military rule, little was done to promote professional attitudes. Politically reliable but otherwise unqualified officers were retained in service. Professionalism was impeded by seniority promotion, the lack of a serious system of military education, and the part-time nature of a Spanish military career.\textsuperscript{14}

The history of the Polish Army is, of course, quite different, since the Polish Army only came into official existence with the reestablishment of Poland as an independent state after World War I. Nevertheless, for this very reason Poland also missed the trend toward professionalization. While other European armies were modernizing, Poland was carrying out popular national resistance to imperial powers and thereby developing an ethos that was contrary to the modern idea of restricting the military sphere to professional soldiers.\textsuperscript{15}

Still, the Polish Army of 1918 began with a solid professional nucleus of officers with prior service in the armies of the three partitioning powers. About a fifth of the officer corps, however, was drawn from former members of the Polish Legion, a volunteer body that had fought against Russia as part of the Austro-Hungarian forces, of which Jozef Pilsudski had been the best-known leader. The Legionnaires were mostly civilians with no prior military training or experience and, on the whole, little formal education. Ex-Legionnaires, with their romantic
vision of Polish tradition and their consequent attachment to gallant but outmoded military doctrines, were the ones who came to shape the attitudes of the force after Pilsudski's 1926 coup. Furthermore, as in Spain, the focus of the officer corps came to be almost exclusively on maximizing domestic political advantage. Thus Polish officers gave little attention to the problem of defending the country against obvious foreign threats, with well-known results.¹⁶

The Polish People's Army (PPA) established by the communist government after World War II was not lineally related to the interwar army yet resembled it in some respects. Just as the interwar army came to be dominated by the political activists who comprised the Polish Legion, the PPA was dominated by political activists who had served in the Soviet-sponsored 1st and 2nd Polish Armies of World War II. Although some of these Party members had seen combat in the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, they were still amateur soldiers much like those who had come out of the Polish Legions 20 years before.¹⁷

By the early 1970s, the situations in the two countries were beginning to diverge. In Spain, pro-reform factions were quashed by hard-line Francoists, who remained strong enough to block professional modernization and even gain the dismissal of a Chief of the Armed Forces High General Staff for proposing to establish a unified defense ministry.¹⁸ By contrast, Polish military expertise developed markedly after 1956. The officer corps became considerably better educated than in previous years (and
than its Spanish counterpart). Polish officers served under a merit promotion system that apparently valued military skills over ideological enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{19}

But the Polish People's Army still worked under a number of constraints on professional development. The military education curriculum was devoted disproportionately to Marxist-Leninist political studies at the expense of military subjects.\textsuperscript{20} Perhaps more importantly, the politically imposed dependence on Soviet strategy, organization, and doctrine gave Polish officers little incentive to think out such issues for themselves. Where military officers did advocate original military programs (such as the "defense of national territory" concept) or questioned the validity of Soviet doctrinal principles, they met stiff resistance from Party officials if not dismissal from the service.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Social Responsibility.} The Spanish and Polish militaries shared much the same view of the social responsibility of the armed forces. In both countries, the military was expected (and expected itself) to serve society as a whole rather than just one faction or social group. But in neither case did this sense of social responsibility translate into loyalty to the political leadership of the state. Instead, the military was seen as occupying a special, heroic role in the society.

In Spain, this conception of the military was given constitutional status in the Franco period, when article 4 of the Law on the Principles of the National Movement described the armed
forces as "the expression of the heroic virtues of [the Spanish] people." Similarly, there was a "long-standing tradition in Poland that the regular armed forces are the guardians of Polish society" and Polish national values. The Polish armed forces' view of their own status was expressed by the military newspaper Polska Zbrojna shortly before Pilsudski's coup: "The only solid and decisive deed--the only deed strong and creative in the reborn Polish state--has been, is and will remain forever the creation of the Polish Army." [emphasis added]

This tradition had a strong influence on the PPA, which, following in the footsteps of its interwar predecessor, saw itself primarily as the guardian of national rather than Party values. This attitude could be seen clearly in the conduct of the PPA leadership after it took power under Jaruzelski in 1981. Rather than trying to revive the fortunes of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), Jaruzelski and his colleagues set up a new national front that focused on reviving traditional Polish nationalism.

Corporateness. Both the Spanish and Polish armies were plagued by internal divisions in the early years of their reestablishment following the winning of national independence. The Spanish officer corps of the Bourbon Restoration, following the ouster of the French, was split between officers of the old prewar army and those who had led guerrilla units in the National War of Independence. Similarly, as suggested above, the Polish Army after World War I was divided between the regular officers of the old
partitioning powers and the volunteer officers of the wartime Polish Legions.

The Spanish Army was forced to overcome its divisions by the turn of the century after three civil wars and countless coups, pronunciamientos, and conspiracies threatened to tear it apart.* Unity in the Polish Army's was achieved somewhat more quickly as the various factions were obliged to pull together in the 1921 Polish-Soviet War. This unity unraveled afterward but was reimposed after Pilsudski's 1926 coup, when many former imperial officers were replaced in key positions by ex-Legionnaires. Between 1923 and 1932, the proportion of ex-Legionnaires among Polish general officers grew from 10.4 percent to 72.9 percent.26

Just as the newly formed Polish Army had been fragmented after World War I, so the newly formed Polish People's Army was fragmented after World War II. The main line of fissure was between political and line officers. This division led to a revolt by line officers at the 9th Party Congress in 1971, when they succeeded in ousting almost all political officers from key Party posts throughout the armed forces. The interwar history of cross-factional purges recurred as well, however, when Jaruzelski, following the pattern set by Pilsudski in 1926, purged some 13,000 officers from the PZPR during the martial law

* A pronunciamiento is a venerable Spanish institution in which a military commander issues a proclamation denouncing some government policy (or the government itself), expecting by the implied threat of force that the government will back down or be dismissed by the crown.
period. Most of the victims had been involved in the 1971 revolt. 27

The Spanish and Polish armies thus became cohesive corporate bodies. In the Spanish case this corporateness failed to produce the results predicted by Huntington's model. On the contrary, the Spanish Army's autonomy only aggravated its existing tendency toward praetorian behavior. 28 The reason was the extraordinary isolation of the army from civil society. For example, the officer corps became both self-recruiting (in the early 1970s, more than two-thirds of newly commissioned officers were sons of officers or NCOs) and endogamous, with most officers selecting brides from among the daughters of other officers. As a result of its isolation, the military's understanding of duty, morality, and religion remained frozen in the 1930s while the values of Spanish civilians evolved to resemble those of other Western Europeans. 29

Although the Polish Army was never as inbred as the Spanish, in Poland as in Spain there was a tendency for the military to be set apart from society. This was true even under the communist regime, in which officers enjoyed the special privileges of PZPR members that were not available to the public at large. Career officers had little contact with civilians, especially in their professional lives. Furthermore, as in Spain, if not to the same degree, young men from military families were more likely than others to pursue careers in the armed forces. 30 The net result
in Poland as in Spain was a certain isolation from the social and political currents at work in civil society.

Unlike the government of predemocratic Spain, the PZPR attempted on ideological grounds to prevent the development of an autonomous military sphere of activity. Notwithstanding the Party's concerns, however, the events of 1956, when Soviet officers were removed from direct command of Polish forces and Polish soldiers reasserted their traditional role as defenders of the nation rather than the state, led to a degree of military autonomy within the framework of overall Party and Warsaw Pact control. This modest assertion of military autonomy continued over the years. For instance, in 1972 the PZPR was forced by senior military members of the Party to limit "self-criticism" within the armed forces to matters of personal conduct, to the exclusion of military questions.

The Concept of Civil Supremacy. Far from accepting the principle of civilian supremacy, the Spanish Army set itself up after the National War of Independence as the final arbiter of political disputes. The officer corps was arguing by the mid-1800s that it was the only national institution in Spain, and by the end of the century was beginning to believe that the army was the full equal of the civil government, not its servant—a belief encouraged by King Alfonso XIII. This attitude toward civilian authority and the place of the military in society prevailed until after the death of Franco, notwithstanding a brief experiment with civilian control under the Second Republic. Most
Spanish governments did not even pretend to believe in civilian control of the military. The lack of a concept of civilian supremacy extended so far that the armed forces under Franco did not have to obtain political approval of the defense budget, which was set by law and subject to mandatory annual increases.  

The interwar Polish Army had much the same disdain for civil supremacy, and like its Spanish counterpart became the ultimate arbiter of policy. Its attitude toward civil authority was implicit in the terms under which Pilsudski as provisional head of state created the new Polish Army on January 7, 1921. Pilsudski's decree established a chain of command that had the Minister of Military Affairs (a member of the civilian government) under the effective supervision of the designated wartime military commander-in-chief, a uniformed officer. The Military Council, which occupied the topmost tier of the command structure, was completely independent of the Sejm, Prime Minister, and Cabinet, contrary to the Constitution adopted two months later. Even after enactment of the Constitution, Pilsudski successfully blocked as "immoral" all efforts to modify the military's virtual independence of elective authority.

Since World War II, the Polish People's Army's understanding of civil supremacy has been hampered by the vagueness of the 1952 Constitution on who has supreme command. Only the constitutionally mandated "leading role" of the Polish United Workers' Party was not subject to confusion.

With respect to
state (as opposed to Party) organs, the Council of State had power under article 30 to make military appointments with approval of the Sejm. On the other hand, article 41 charged the Council of Ministers with exercising "general guidance as to the defense capacity of the country and the organization of the Armed Forces." Various laws assigned further responsibilities to the Prime Minister, the National Defense Council, and the Minister of National Defense, but nowhere was a supreme commander specified. And as in Franco's Spain, the armed forces received no guidance from the civil government through the budget process, since Polish defense spending decisions were worked out through Soviet military and political channels rather than directly between Polish military and civilian authorities. 40

The Use of Soldiers in Government. Spanish and Polish governments have long undermined the development of apolitical military professionalism by decisions that embroiled the armed forces in domestic political issues. Indeed, social and political missions have been at least as important as military missions in shaping national military traditions in both countries. 41

The most obvious way a government can involve the armed forces in politics is to use their combat capabilities to suppress dissent. A more subtle but equally corrosive practice is using soldiers' administrative abilities in the civil government and economy of the country. Both practices can be found to varying degrees in Spanish and Polish history.
The Spanish armed forces were routinely used for well over a hundred years (and not only under military dictatorships) to maintain public order and quell political dissent. Until the post-Franco democratic reforms, regular Spanish Army officers commanded police and security organizations such as the powerful Guardia Civil. In fact, until recent years, the Spanish Army made no serious pretense of having an external defense mission. Troops were deployed to minimize reaction time to urban areas, not to the borders or strategic areas. The twelve captains-general (i.e., military district commanders) functioned as military governors, exercising parallel authority with civil governors and supervising the military courts that tried political cases involving civilian defendants.

In Poland, the military role in suppressing dissent was never so routine or pervasive. Still, military force was used against Poland's civilian population on more than one occasion. Before World War II, the army was deeply involved on the orders of civilian governments in pacifying Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities in the east and forcibly suppressing demonstrations in Cracow in November 1923. In the communist period, the authorities normally relied on police organizations rather than the regular armed forces to maintain internal order, especially after soldiers refused to shoot at strikers in Poznan in 1956. Nevertheless, there were some exceptions, as when troops fired on a group of strikers leaving the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk in 1970 and in the use of the Army Security Service (WSW) against "sub-
versives" and "speculators" in the civilian sector. Furthermore, as in Spain, it was military rather than civilian prosecutors who were responsible for investigating civilians accused of certain crimes against national security, such as espionage.

As noted, however, involvement of the regular Polish armed forces in domestic repression was unusual. Even under martial law, the direct enforcement of decrees was left primarily to Ministry of Internal Affairs forces. Thus, in contrast to the Spanish Army and the interwar Polish Army, the Polish People's Army's tools of violence were always primarily oriented toward external missions rather than toward suppression of internal dissent.

The use of military personnel for civil administrative functions, on the other hand, reveals considerable similarity between the two countries. In Spain, both Primo de Rivera and Franco, of course, made widespread use of officers either to supervise civilian bureaucrats or actually to head civilian government agencies. In addition, some 1,000 serving officers sat in the Cortes at one time or another in the three decades before Franco's death.

Military officers were coopted into the Polish ruling elite from the very birth of the republic, but the dominant role of soldiers and ex-soldiers really began with the 1926 coup and continued to grow throughout the 1920s and '30s. The practice of military involvement in national administration carried over to the PPA. By the early 1970s, officers (especially
political officers) were being increasingly assigned to full-time civilian posts. In addition, the hierarchy of regional and local defense committees, each assisted by a regional military staff, gave the army a means of keeping tabs on political developments in the countryside.\textsuperscript{52} And, as in Spain, serving officers sat as deputies in the Sejm and as members of the PZPR Central Committee.

"During the upheavals of 1980-81, the military was able to draw upon this rich tradition of social and political influence and once again played a decisive role in Polish political history."\textsuperscript{53} When Jaruzelski became Prime Minister in February 1981 and First Secretary of the PZPR in October 1981, he immediately began moving military officers into such key positions as Minister of Internal Affairs and Central Committee Secretary for Cadres. Under martial law, some 2,000 military commissars were placed throughout the administration as agents of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON). The officer corps remained heavily involved in the civilian administration even after martial law ended in 1983.\textsuperscript{54}

Socio-Political Praetorianism. Spain and Poland have both suffered from classic praetorian social and political tendencies for many years. At the basic level, both societies manifest a profound distrust of political processes. Moreover, there has typically been no consensus on the rules of the game, so rival factions have tried to twist the fundamental structures of government to suit their partisan ends. As a result, political
structures, to the extent they existed, have generally lacked legitimacy. The lack of legitimacy led in turn to the recurrent inability of governments to deal with social and economic problems facing the countries. 55

The belief that government is too important to be entrusted to politicians is well rooted in both Spain and Poland. After at least four civil wars in the space of a century, many Spaniards came to put a high value on national unity and order, leading them to be disdainful if not fearful of turbulent partisan politics. 56 Their preference was for technocratic competence over democratic responsiveness. The same sentiments were typical of much of Polish society during the interwar years. 57

Pilsudski himself believed that the state should be above all classes, interests, and politics, that everything was a matter of good administration. Thus, when he seized power in 1926, the cabinet he had the Sejm install represented none of the major political parties and was heavily dominated by non-partisan technocrats. 58

Each imposition of military rule in both Spain and Poland has been preceded by the disorder, unrest, and governmental ineffectiveness typical of praetorian societies. Primo de Rivera seized power when neither the King nor Parliament would accept responsibility for addressing the pressing problems that were causing deep social unrest. 59 Likewise, Franco's intervention in 1936 was preceded by a Catalan separatist revolt, miners'
uprisings in Asturias, and the creation of armed party militias on both left and right. 60

Interwar Poland suffered from the same kind of cleavages and factional attempts to twist the constitutional system to partisan ends. As a result, Poland was ruled by 13 different cabinets in the space of less than eight years--11 of which endured less than 12 months--before Pilsudski marched on Warsaw in May 1926. 61

The lack of legitimate political structures continued to contribute to praetorianism after World War II. The PZPR's close affiliation with a foreign power made it difficult to build legitimacy in such a nationalistic country as Poland, particularly since the PZPR's foreign patron was one of Poland's ancestral enemies. 62 The PZPR's sole claim to legitimacy was its status as supposed leader of the working class, a claim that was exposed as unjustified by the overwhelming popularity of Solidarity in the 1970s and '80s. 63 By the time Jaruzelski intervened in 1981, it was obvious that the Party was incapable of dealing with the deteriorating situation. 64

Subjective Control. "Subjective control" of the military has enjoyed currency at various times in both Spain and Poland. The Spanish Second Republic and, more subtly, the Franco regime used subjective controls with sharply contrasting effectiveness. Under the Second Republic, the armed forces were drastically reduced in size. The privileges of officers were restricted and the civilian government intervened in the personnel system by promoting committed republicans to senior positions. The armed
forces' monopoly of power was broken by the establishment of the independent Armed Guard as a counterbalance to the army-officered Civil Guard.65

Franco's subjective control measures were more effective. He divided command of the military among three service ministries in lieu of the single ministry of defense that had fought the Civil War and had the regional captains-general report directly to him rather than through the Army Ministry. Fragmented command made it more difficult for potential rivals to challenge the generalissimo's authority.66 Franco also played the military off against the Falangist party, using the rivalry between the two as an excuse to rid himself of possible challengers.67

The Polish Republic of 1918-1939 had few effective controls of any kind, whether objective or subjective. Perhaps learning from the interwar example but more likely as a result of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Polish People's Republic (PPR) successfully employed subjective controls for more than thirty years. The principal measure was the penetration of the military by political officers under the control of the PZPR's Central Committee. Party committees and youth organizations and the military justice system reinforced political officers' efforts.68 The PPR also divided the tools of violence between the regular armed forces and an assortment of paramilitary "militia" organizations and other security forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Reform of the Spanish Armed Forces

Despite the fact that he left it poorly equipped and grossly underpaid, Franco was confident that the armed forces would guarantee the survival of his regime after his death, and early indications were that he was right. From several episodes in which the army leadership attempted to exercise its clout on non-defense issues, all political parties realized that it was necessary to do something to confine the armed forces to their proper national defense role. 69

Although the effort to bring the military under effective civilian control accelerated following the failure of the coup attempt of February 23, 1981 (known as 23-F), and the election of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) the following year, the general direction of reform was consistent enough that it is convenient to consider it by functional area rather than chronologically.

Huntington has suggested five aspects of military affairs on which newly democratic governments must act to solidify civilian control of the armed forces: professionalism, mission, leadership and organization (including constitutional and legal status), size and equipment, and institutional reputation and morale. 70 We shall consider the steps taken by successive Spanish democratic governments in each of these areas.

Professionalism. The PSOE government has conscientiously sought to professionalize the Spanish armed forces, especially the army, through a combination of means. The command structure has been
streamlined and manpower management practices have been modernized to enhance the role of merit in promotions. Serra's changes, especially requiring adherence to time-in-service limits and end-strength quotas in each grade, opened up promotions for qualified officers and generated savings that were applied to improved pay and equipment.  

Further improvements in professionalism are promised by the Military Function Law of 1990. This law modifies and strengthens the merit-promotion system and gives the Minister of Defense greater authority over the selection of general and flag officers. It also limits total service to 32 years, sets a maximum retirement age of 55, and establishes a new system of professional military education to be integrated with the civilian education system for recognition of degrees and certificates.  

The successive governments of Adolfo Suárez, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, and Felipe González recognized that organizational reforms must be accompanied by positive incentives for professionalism. Under Franco, neither allies nor enemies were available to cajole or threaten the Spanish officer corps into creative professional thought. Spain's entry into NATO was intended in part to fill both these voids—to expose Spanish officers to professional stimulation from contact with allied forces and to provide an enemy and a mission as incentives for professional development. Since the Spanish Army first exercised with the U.S. Army in 1979, military contacts with NATO allies have made major contributions to Spanish professionalism.
Mission. The democratic governments that succeeded Franco have taken major strides toward getting the armed forces out of civilian political life. A significant break with the past was the reform of the Code of Military Justice enacted in October 1980, which ended the military's de facto powers of censorship and control of dissent that had been in place for 70 years. The new legal code was considered to be "the legal foundation for the assertion of civil supremacy." 74

However, before the door could be closed on a military role in the civil society, Spain first had to go through the coup attempt of February 23, 1981, and the courts-martial, appellate process, and public debate that followed it. In this experience, the old guard made its last serious effort to defend the nineteenth century doctrine that internal enemies such as liberalism were the greatest threat to the country. 75 A new military penal code enacted in the wake of the coup attempt sought to solidify the military's withdrawal from politics by giving the civil courts jurisdiction to try cases of military rebellion against the constitution. The same law also limited the use of "obedience to orders" as a legal defense, an important step in curbing military action against the constitution. 76 Membership in NATO and the perception of a common Soviet threat to the Atlantic Community that came with it were also of major importance in helping operational effectiveness take precedence over traditional political concerns in Spanish military thinking and policies. 77
Leadership and Organization. The new Spanish Constitution adopted on December 29, 1978, made major changes in the armed forces' relationship to civil authority. It specifically placed them subordinate to rather than parallel with the civilian government and enjoined them to defend the "constitutional order" as well as Spain's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Article 97 put elective politicians into the chain of command by providing that "the Government [i.e., the cabinet] directs . . . civil and military administration and the defense of the State." The Organic Law of Defense further strengthened the command authority of the democratic government by giving the President of the Government (i.e., Prime Minister) personal responsibility for command and control of under the supreme command of the King.

Based on these laws, successive governments of both the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) and the PSOE took steps to reorganize the defense establishment to solidify civilian supremacy, at first tentatively but later with greater confidence. A unified Ministry of Defense was created in 1977, headed first by a uniformed officer but taken over in 1981 by Spain's first civilian Minister of Defense, Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún of the UCD. Serious reorganization of national command arrangements got under way after the PSOE came to power in 1982 and installed Narcís Serra as the second civilian Minister of Defense.

As a result of these changes in command structures, the minister's office over a period of about six years from 1982 to
1988 gained undisputed control of the day-to-day workings of the armed forces. For example, Serra overturned the practice of maintaining separate political-administrative and military chains of command, with the latter circumventing the civil government and running straight to the King. In its place, he created a single chain of command running from the King through the President of the Government, Minister of Defense, and Chief of the Defense General Staff (JEMAD) to the services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) as a group were taken out of the chain of command and made a purely advisory body.  

Serra also took firm control of the budget process. Previously, the JUJEM had simply given each service a third of the budget with full leeway to spend its resources as it saw fit. Serra established a system of program budgeting, within which the JUJEM retained a major role but was forced to set program priorities across services for ministerial review.  

The Ministry of Defense itself was structured into three major blocks, each answering to the minister. The first, headed by the JEMAD, handles purely military issues such as operational effectiveness and joint planning and doctrine. The Secretary of State for Defense (a civilian), heading another block, is responsible for management, finance, procurement, and infrastructure, while the third block under the Under Secretary of Defense (another civilian) develops and supervises personnel policy and management as well as education and training programs. The net result of Serra's reorganizations has been to increase
military professionalism within the peculiarly military sphere by reducing the role of military officers in policy-making while increasing their responsibilities for supervising military operations. 82

Size and Equipment. As mentioned above, part of Serra's plan for the reform of the armed forces was a comprehensive Land Army Modernization Plan (META) to enhance the army's war-fighting capability. This plan included drastic cuts in the size of the officer corps, and reducing the number of regional captaincies-general (and eventually abolishing them altogether) in favor of a modern maneuver-type force structure. Similar reforms were made in the navy and air force as well. The savings from these cuts were applied to modernizing the combat equipment of the armed forces. The end result was a smaller but much more combat effective Spanish military.

Since the late 1970s, the active strength of the Spanish armed forces has been reduced some 17 percent to about 250,000, with more cuts to come in compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. In the army, however, the smaller force is now organized into five modern divisions with organic reconnaissance, artillery, engineers, signals, logistics, and nuclear-biological-chemical defense capabilities. Since Franco's death, the army has bought nearly 1,000 Spanish-built BMR-600 series armored fighting vehicles, Milan and HOT antitank missiles, Roland and Skyguard-Aspide air defense missiles, and a much expanded aviation capability, including its first battalion of
attack helicopters. In addition, funding has been approved for the replacement of the army's entire main battle tank inventory, although selection of a tank has been delayed by program cancellations in the countries producing the candidate tanks.\textsuperscript{83}

Entering the post-Franco period, the navy may have been even more antiquated than the army. While it was of impressive size with 26 major surface combatants, all but five of these were of World War II vintage or older. The navy's counterpart to META is the Plan del Alta Mar (High Seas Plan). Under this plan, the Armada has fielded its first-ever naval battle group, built around the new aircraft carrier \textit{Principe de Asturias}. Two squadrons of AV-8S Matadors (Harriers) have been purchased as the mainstay of the carrier air wing and programs are in place to have fifteen modern frigates in the force by 2002--nine of which will be less than five years old at that time. In addition, the entire mine warfare force is being replaced, while SH-3 Sea King helicopters in combination with the air force's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft provide a vastly improved antisubmarine and sea control capability.\textsuperscript{84}

The air force was the most modern of the three services in 1975, with a force built around U.S.-made F-4s and F-5s and French-made Mirage IIIIs and F-1s. In 1983, a major step was taken with the purchase of 72 EF-18 aircraft, all of which have now been delivered. In addition, the Spanish air force is developing an indigenous AX attack fighter and is planning to buy
the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) to fill the air superiority role when and if it is produced. 85

Institutional Reputation and Morale. Throughout the post-Franco period, political leaders (especially those from the PSOE) have been at pains to demonstrate that they are not anti-military and to respect the honor and prestige of the armed forces. No government has discriminated on political grounds in appointments and promotions except for insistence on support for military reform in the topmost positions and there have been no ideological purges. 86 This government campaign to maintain and enhance respect for the military, combined with the obvious improvements in capabilities and the military's acceptance (grudging though it was at times) of its role in democracy, has greatly enhanced the prestige of the armed forces in Spanish society. 87

The role of the crown should not be underestimated in this regard. King Juan Carlos is personally close to the armed forces and enjoys legitimacy among monarchists, as the heir of a two-century-old dynasty, among Falangists as Franco's chosen successor, and among liberals as the constitutional supreme commander. 88 Furthermore, his popularity as a public figure combined with his visible role as titular commander of the armed forces—presiding over academy graduations, visiting troops in the field, awarding decorations, and so on—has allowed him to convey an element of his personal prestige to the armed forces.
Polish Prospects: Can Spain Be a Model?

In summary, as Kenneth Maxwell recently pointed out, "in Spain the process of establishing civilian control of the armed forces, despite the coup attempt of 1981 (and perhaps in some ways because of it), has been surprisingly rapid and successful." The question is whether this success can be transplanted to Poland. To parallel our discussion of the Spanish case, we shall examine the same five areas of military reform.

Professionalism. If there was one thing all factions in Poland agreed on when the communist government finally fell, it was that the armed forces should be "depoliticized." Even the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, the new democratic disguise of the PZPR, came out in favor of depoliticization. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on what depoliticization means or why it is desirable. The PZPR seemed to see "depoliticization" as a way of keeping anticommunist party organizations from reorienting the political views of military personnel. Career officers saw it as meaning that the military would be left purely to its own devices without political oversight, a view that may inadvertently have been reinforced by Lech Walesa himself when he said that military issues should be left to the handling of professional soldiers. The officer corps also feared that allowing soldiers to belong to multiple parties instead of insisting on unity under a single party would be divisive and subversive of discipline. The diversity of the interpretations of apoliticism as well as the universal appeal of the
concept can be seen in the fact that very existence of the thoroughly political military caucus in the Sejm, mentioned above, was justified by its founder on the grounds that soldiers had to be "apolitical."93

Most democratic leaders seemed to understand the concept as we would in the West, that the uniformed armed forces, as an institution, would take no positions on non-military issues and that military personnel would refrain from public political statements. However, it is obvious that they need to do a better job explaining what "apolitical" means in reference to military forces. One obvious step would be to exclude active duty military personnel from sitting in parliament, following the Spanish example.94 Another would be to increase the exposure of Polish officers to Western forces through professional military education at the staff colleges and war colleges of NATO countries. The United States has started making funding available for such purposes through the International Military Education and Training Program, but the quantities are clearly inadequate. A Polish investment in meeting the costs of sending additional officers to the West would be money well spent.

Despite the misunderstandings over what it means, steps have been taken toward "depoliticization." Career military personnel are now forbidden to belong to political organizations of any type and conscripts must suspend their memberships for the duration of their service.95 In addition, the ability of the military justice system to exert ideological control over the armed
forces has been broken by the subjection of military prosecutors to the Minister of Justice for legal policy matters.\footnote{96} The Main Political Administration (MPA), by which the PZPR kept ideological tabs on the armed forces, has been dismantled and replaced by an Education Service.

While many, especially in Solidarity, doubted the efficacy of some of these reforms (especially in early 1990 when the new Education Corps was commanded and almost completely staffed by PZPR loyalists from the old MPA),\footnote{97} some of the doubts seem to have been overcome by the progress made by the two civilian deputy ministers of defense over the course of that summer. By August 1990, 80 percent of the officers in senior posts of what was by then called the Education Service were line officers who had come from command of various units, and plans were for 60 percent of the Education Service staff to be civilian.\footnote{98}

Along with the dismantling of the MPA and the establishment of an Education Service in the armed forces, the new regime has put an emphasis on military training and education that should contribute significantly to the further development of the professional military ethic postulated by Huntington. The old Felix Dzierzynski Military-Political Academy, where political officers were trained, has been merged with the General Staff Academy to form a new National Defense Academy. The new academy's course will focus on tactics and operational art with a small admixture of social sciences in a two-year program for company-grade officers, leading to a master's degree.\footnote{99}
Mission. With the end of the Jaruzelski presidency, many of the old-line communist political officers he placed in positions of civil administration have been removed. Furthermore, the gradual shift to a free market economy has begun eliminating some of the positions to which officers were assigned under the old regime. The military justice system has lost its jurisdiction over civilians accused of security-related crimes and has been placed under the supervision of the Cabinet through the Minister of Justice, reducing the armed forces ability to supervise the political lives of Polish citizens.100

However, the military is far from completely out of civilian politics. For example, not only were eight active-duty officers members of the Sejm, there was actually a Military Deputies Club, or caucus, formed to speak out on economic and defense issues (although its founder insisted it would not take a position on "political" questions).101 The presence of serving officers in the national legislature can only impede the development of military expertise and embroil the armed forces in non-military issues.

One advantage Poland has over Spain in the transformation of civil-military relations is that Spain had to join NATO to give its soldiers a credible external threat against which to orient themselves. Such an artificial step is not necessary for Poland. Poles have always perceived clear threats from both Germany and Russia, no matter how unrealistic those perceptions may be under present circumstances. In addition, Poles foresee possible
future disputes with Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, although they admit none of those are pressing at the moment. These threats give the Polish officer corps clear incentives for doctrinal thought and a reason to concentrate on military rather than political concerns.

The United States and the other NATO countries can assist the process of keeping Polish officers focused on military issues by establishing bilateral and multilateral consultative mechanisms to exchange ideas. Combined exercises would reinforce this process. Ultimately, allowing Poland to join NATO would help further solidify the Polish armed forces existing tendency to place external threats to security ahead of internal ones.

Leadership and Organization. Despite the changes of the last three years, Poland continues to function under the communist-imposed 1952 Constitution, subject only to the amendments necessary to reflect the abandonment of communist ideology and the creation under Jaruzelski of a unitary Presidency in lieu of a Council of State. Consequently, the post-communist Polish armed forces continue to labor under most of the same Constitutional defects as the PPA, most notably the Constitution's vagueness as to who is in charge. The President has inherited the Council of State's prerogatives on appointments; the Council of Ministers (i.e., Cabinet) retains the task of "exercising general guidance."

By tradition going back to Pilsudski, the Minister of National Defense/Commander-in-Chief has been the effective
commander of the armed forces. Under the communist government, 
PZPR discipline and control--not to mention a substantial Soviet 
military presence--ensured that the incumbent of that position 
followed established policy. Nevertheless, the Constitution did 
not require the armed forces to answer to anyone outside the 
military itself (since the Minister was always a serving officer) 
on operational matters.

This is a defect the Poles must remedy in the Constitution 
now being drafted. The Spanish example, which in its basics is 
derived from the British, could serve as a model if Polish 
constitutional arrangements turn out to resemble those of most 
European democracies: an essentially symbolic chief of state 
holding supreme command, beneath whom actual policy and command 
decisions are made by the prime minister and cabinet for trans- 
mision through the defense minister to the uniformed military. 
However, it looks unlikely that the standard prime-ministerial 
system will be adopted in Poland. Instead traditional Franco- 
philia seems to be leading Poland, as it did between the wars, to 
emulate French governmental structures. Between the wars, this 
was the Third Republic, with its weak president and strong 
National Assembly; now it is the Fifth Republic, with its mixed 
presidential-prime ministerial structure.

Such a mixed system does not present a problem for France, 
in part because there was no doubt when the Fifth Republic was 
formed that Charles de Gaulle as President would be in full
command of the armed forces. This is less clear in Poland. Constitutional deliberations have been plagued almost since the beginning by power struggles between the legislative and executive branches.

Until the newly elected Sejm thwarted President Lech Walesa's proposals for a new government last fall and forced him to accept a Prime Minister of the legislature's choosing, the President seemed to be in the stronger position. Walesa's legitimacy when he came to power in early 1991 was unchallengeable in view of his personal history and the scale of the popular mandate for his presidency. Since taking office he has taken steps to solidify his control of national defense policy at the expense of the cabinet by appointing an old Solidarity colleague from the Gdansk shipyard, Jacek Merkel, as Minister of State for National Security and Defense within the office of the President. In addition, Walesa has proposed the establishment of a National Security Council, with representation from both the Presidency and the Council of Ministers, but under the Presidency's control.

However these relations sort themselves out, it is vital for the new Constitution to specify them. As things now stand, it is not clear whether ultimate military decisions are made by the President, the NSC, the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers collectively, or the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the new Constitution should include two key provisions contained in Spain's 1978 charter: (1) the armed forces must follow the
lawful orders of whichever political body is charged with supreme command; and (2) the armed forces mission is to uphold the Constitution itself as well as the "sovereignty and independence of the Polish Nation."\textsuperscript{105}

These provisions are essential to overcoming the traditional Polish military notion that the armed forces are responsible to some higher power than the duly constituted government of the country. This concept has already been manifested in the revised loyalty oath adopted in June 1988, before the fall of the Jaruzelski government, when the phrase "allegiance to the country" was substituted for "allegiance to the government."\textsuperscript{106} Likewise, when he took over as Minister of National Defense in July 1990, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk promised that "the Polish Army will fulfill its constitutional duty of safeguarding the sovereign existence and security of the Polish Republic;" he said nothing about safeguarding its constitutional democracy.\textsuperscript{107} While the PPA's taking the view that the army does not serve the state was a useful way to weaken the PZPR's ability to suppress the Polish people under communism, maintaining that tradition under a democratic government is a formula for Pilsudski redux.

The sequence of changes within the defense hierarchy of Poland has thus far been somewhat similar to that in Spain. Democratically elected governments in both countries began their reforms by appointing reform-minded military officers as defense ministers. In Poland's case this was Admiral Kolodziejczyk. This interim step was followed by the appointment of each coun-
try's first civilian defense minister. In Spain, the transition occurred over a period of nearly six years. In Poland it took less than two, as on December 23, 1991, Jan Parys, a forty-one year-old doctor of sociology who had previously helped dismantle the central planning system and negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, assumed the helm.

Parys faces a formidable task in taking control of a military establishment that has traditionally relished autonomy from civilian influence. The line officers of the Polish armed forces may well feel that they just got out from under one unnatural situation—the supervision of the PZPR apparatus—only to be saddled now with yet another form of civilian interference. On the other hand, Parys does not go into a ministry that is completely unaccustomed to a civilian presence. In April 1990, two civilian deputy ministers of defense were appointed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's Solidarity government, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Both took active roles in the formulation of defense policy and the reform of the military until Parys fired them on February 10 and 11, 1991, respectively.

Parys's transition may also have been aided by Kolodziejczyk's having addressed the question of a civilian minister head on in a newspaper interview just a few days before the October elections. Anticipating his impending replacement by a civilian minister, the admiral conceded that many Polish soldiers believe that military doctrine and policy should be the exclusive preserve of professional soldiers. Kolodziejczyk
denied that this was so, arguing that such a belief was unhealthy
and showed a failure to understand that defense was inextricably
linked to politics and economics. Yet despite
Kolodziejczyk's apparent support for the principle of civilian
control, and in contravention of both a law requiring six months
notice of forced retirement and a commitment by Walesa to keep
the admiral on as inspector general (i.e., commander-in-chief),
Parys dismissed him shortly after taking office.

In any case Kolodziejczyk, Komorowski, and Onyszkiewicz laid
considerable groundwork for the first civilian minister. Much
remains to be done, however. It may be in this area, as well as
in that of constitutional status of the armed forces, that the
Spanish model is most applicable to the Polish situation. Parys
must first establish his personal command authority by obtaining
explicit support of President Walesa and legal sanction from the
Sejm placing him squarely in the operational chain of command.
Only then should he begin the process of organizing the ministry
to ensure civilian control.

Parys should follow in Narcis Serra's footsteps in estab-
lishing political control over the budget and acquisition pro-
cesses. This means putting civilian assistants in charge of
those areas. He should also seek direct authority over general-
officer selections and assignments without cutting the uniformed
military out of the promotion process. Serra's system of having
the minister make selections based on recommendations of a
uniformed selection board is the best approach to this. It gives
the minister control over senior positions without creating an appearance of excessive political meddling and favoritism--one of the things that got Benazir Bhutto in trouble in Pakistan.

Finally, Parys and his civilian assistants should undertake with the uniformed military a review of Polish defense strategy, doctrine, and requirements. This review would then form the basis for a system of budgeting to enable Parys to deal more effectively with the rest of the Cabinet and the Sejm. First, however, Parys will need to staff the ministry with civilian officials qualified to pursue this effort. So far, he has placed new civilian appointees in the education and training department, where Romuald Szeremietiew (leader of a right wing fringe party who failed to win election to the Sejm last year) replaced Komorowski, and in personnel, where a civilian military historian named Janusz Wojsz replaced a brigadier general. A defense ministry spokesman said on February 18 that these appointments will be the first of a series that will result in a majority of major ministry offices' being headed by civilians.111

The Spanish experience shows that if a civilian minister can persuade the uniformed military he is fundamentally on their side, he will be able to impose reforms that will effectively confine the armed forces to the proper military sphere. Unfortunately, the abrupt dismissal of Admiral Kolodziejczyk is likely to undermine Parys's initial credibility with the armed forces. While it was probably a mistake for Walesa to promise to keep the
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admiral on after his term as minister, breaking the promise was almost certainly a bigger mistake.

**Size and Equipment.** As the Spanish did before them, Polish political leaders hope to modernize and streamline the Polish forces by reducing and combining organizations, merging schools, and improving training. Programs to that end were put forth by the PZPR Minister of National Defense, General Florian Siwicki, in January 1989.\textsuperscript{112} By early 1991, active military strength had been cut by about 25 percent to 305,000, with a further reduction of about 50,000 to 70,000 in the works.\textsuperscript{113}

On their face, these changes seem to mirror those imposed by the González government in Spain. However, such cuts may have a much less salutary effect on the attitudes and morale of Polish officers than they did on Spanish. In Spain, it was rather clear that reductions in personnel were aimed at opening up promotions for younger officers and generating savings to fund procurement of modern weaponry. Certainly, Poland's forces have the same need for modern equipment that Spain's do; the Poles' needs are, if anything, more pressing if one compares likely threats to the security of the two nations. However, unlike the Spanish governments of the 1970s and '80s, the Polish government of the 1990s lacks the resources for adequate modernization.\textsuperscript{114}

Thus the net military effectiveness of the Polish armed forces will almost certainly decline throughout the 1990s, in contrast to that of the Spanish armed forces during the 1980s. Polish military leaders have warned on several occasions that the
scope of the cuts proposed were endangering the vital interests of the nation. The new government, in its State of the Nation report issued February 10, 1992, seemed to recognize this danger, citing a reduction of the defense budget by 56 percent since 1988, the virtual cessation of new procurements, training curtailments, and budget-driven delays in relocating troops to Poland's eastern frontier, among other problems. The political effect of this deterioration of the Polish armed forces is difficult to predict. Clearly the nation's security has been put at risk to some degree, but whether these reductions under way will lead to subjective control of the armed forces or perhaps provide motivation for eventual military intervention in government remains to be seen.

Institutional Reputation and Morale. In the first two years since the collapse of Polish communism, democratic leaders have followed much the same pattern as their Spanish counterparts in the respect they have expressed for the military. The two civilian deputy ministers of defense appointed in April 1990 have gone out of their way to reassure the professional military of their intentions. One of them, Bronislaw Komorowski, said shortly after taking office that he considered his role to support the interests of the armed forces, although he was careful to point out that those interests included the institution of "profound internal changes." Komorowski also emphasized the need to eliminate the military's bunker mentality by improving public attitudes and lifting direct political pressure
on the armed forces. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki consistently emphasized that changes in the military were not motivated by hostility to the armed forces.\textsuperscript{117} In one encouraging development, as in democratic Spain and contrary to historic Polish practice, the new government generally refrained from conducting massive ideological purges of the officer corps, although selected senior officers with close ties to the old regime have been dismissed or urged to retire.\textsuperscript{118}

Another parallel with Spain is less reassuring, namely the hesitancy with which civilian leaders have asserted their authority. Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk urged when he took over as Minister of National Defense in July 1990 that military reform proceed slowly. The military, he said, is a conservative institution and change must be evolutionary.\textsuperscript{119} The civilian governments seem to have taken this advice to heart and have proceeded quite cautiously in implementing reform. If the Spanish case is applicable, Polish officers may well interpret this hesitancy as weakness and indecision.

It goes without saying, however, that the new civilian defense minister, Jan Parys, must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of senior officers about the security of the country and the welfare of the men. So far Polish democratic leaders have understood the hazards of making the armed forces feel they are under attack, driving them even deeper into a bunker mentality than they already are, but Parys will face special suspicion as
the first civilian ever to head the Polish military establishment.

**Civil-Military Relations and the Primacy of Politics**

This comparison of the military reform process in Spain and Poland indicates that Huntington's five aspects of civil-military relations in new democracies are a useful way of looking at the problem. They are not, however, sufficient to explain the full scope of the transition process. The shortcoming of his approach is that Huntington treats civilian control of the military as one of what he calls "transition problems," that is, problems that stem from the regime change itself, as opposed to "contextual problems" that stem from the nature, culture, and history of the society undergoing the transition, i.e., problems that "were in some degree endemic to the country, whatever its form of government."\(^{120}\)

While it may be useful in general to distinguish between these two types of problems, grouping civil-military relations in the former category--at least in the case of Spain and Poland--betrays a misunderstanding of the origins of military political involvement in the two countries. Huntington analyzes the problem in Poland and other communist countries as one that arose from communist party control of the military and in Spain as the military's having been "politicized by [a] personal dictator."\(^{121}\) Yet, as we saw when we looked into the similarities between the Spanish and Polish armed forces, in both countries deep military involvement in politics predates by decades the
advent of the Franco and PZPR regimes. A complete understanding of the success of the transformation of Spanish civil-military relations as well as an assessment of the prospects for Polish efforts requires consideration of what is happening in each country's political culture and life as well as what is happening to the internal administration of the armed forces.

The Transformation of the Spanish Political System. Three differences in the character of democratic politics in Spain in the post-Franco period compared to the Second Republic have had substantial effects on the role of the military in the Spanish polity. First, civilian governments gradually gained confidence that they could not only govern but keep the armed forces under control. Second, the Spanish political culture came to accept pluralist values. Third, as a consequence of the second change, the political system lost much of the praetorian character that had marked it for over a century.

The crisis of Spanish civil-military relations in the post-Franco period came on February 23, 1981, when troops of the Guardia Civil under army Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina seized the Cortes as part of a plot orchestrated by Lieutenant General Jaime Miláns del Bosch. The coup, often referred to as "23-F," collapsed when the King personally called on the army to support the constitutional government. Although the coup was a fiasco, it led many observers to question whether relatively gradual reforms, which had been pursued because of fear of a military backlash, had been the right approach. Boyd and Boyden
argue that Spanish officers read conciliatory tactics as a sign of indecision and weakness. Ultimately, the same conclusion was reached by political leaders, "that only a firm hand and the confident assertion of civil supremacy would curb the praetorian tendencies of the armed forces."122

Thanks to 23-F, civil supremacy became a leading theme of the 1982 parliamentary elections. When the PSOE not only won the election but did so with a convincing majority, "the national will, which the Spanish armed forces had always claimed to embody, was unmistakable."123 Despite considerable military pressure, the PSOE government of Felipe González steadfastly refused to consider either pardon or amnesty for the 23-F conspirators, many of whose sentences had been stiffened following the prior government's appeal of the court-martial verdicts to the Supreme Court.

Surprisingly, post-Franco Spain has been marked by popular acceptance of the concept of pluralism. No longer does every faction feel the need to impose its own view on the rest of the country. This change has allowed Spaniards to abandon their traditional concern for strict conformity imposed from Madrid, which in turn means that the government's priorities for use of the military no longer have to be oriented toward control of the population.124

Perhaps because of this increase in public tolerance of diversity, Spain seems to have been remarkably successful in shedding the burden of its praetorian past. Both the UCD and
POSOE showed themselves early on to be serious majoritarian parties. Rather than following the classic praetorian pattern of playing to narrow interests and extreme political positions, both leading parties played to the center. As a result, they inflicted crushing defeats on their respective rivals to the left (Communists and Popular Socialists) and right (Popular Alliance). This inclination toward majoritarianism was reinforced by electoral rules that intentionally over-represented large parties to prevent the fragmentation that had plagued the Second Republic.\textsuperscript{125} The break with praetorianism is also indicated by the post-Vatican II willingness of the Roman Catholic Church to refrain from involvement in political affairs and the fact that most labor strikes since Franco's death have been economically rather than politically motivated.\textsuperscript{126} In other words, non-political groups are allowing politics to be conducted by institutions intended for that purpose.

Polish Politics: Transformation or Return to the '20s?. The relative strength of the Polish presidency vis-a-vis the legislature served until the October 1991 parliamentary elections to highlight the continuing weakness of other elements of the Polish political structure.\textsuperscript{127} The post-election tribulations over the formation of a government indicate that even the President is not as strong as he once was and typify the country's inability thus far to work out the procedural and power relationships between executive and legislature. As in the 1920s, we are seeing the fragmentation of Polish political life. The Manichean
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confrontation of Solidarity versus the PZPR has given way to a Weimaresque cacophony of nearly 30 parties with parliamentary representation, six with more than 40 seats.

This multiplication of parties, in sharp contrast to the Spanish experience, practically begs for praetorian political behavior. The inability to form broad majoritarian parties, as occurred in Spain, makes it necessary to govern by broad, unwieldy coalitions. Not only does this make it more difficult for political leaders to address tough issues, it gives inordinate power to the smaller (and therefore by definition less representative) parties whose votes are needed to maintain the government in power. Thus politicians may find themselves playing to the extremes of Polish political life rather than to the center. The drafters of electoral laws once the new Constitution is adopted should look closely at the rules used by Spain as well as other Western European countries to encourage majoritarian behavior by political parties.

Another issue, perhaps more vexatious, in developing the kind of healthy political systems in Eastern Europe that can exert effective objective control over the military is the widespread popular aversion to politics and political parties.128 "Antipolitics" has a long pedigree in Poland, as we have seen in considering the Pilsudski period. This heritage is represented today, for instance, in the comments of one member of the Senate's Constitutional Commission, who was quoted as advocating a strong Presidency like that of France, but one that
would be above parties and politics. The military newspaper Polska Zbrojna has repeatedly showed the same distrust of partisan politics (as well as the misunderstanding of apoliticism discussed above) in interviews with then-Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Deputy Minister of Defense Onyszkiewicz: how can the military be apolitical if the minister and deputy ministers are members of a political party? The new Minister of National Defense, Jan Parys, seems to be equally confused on this issue, having cited the need for a "completely apolitical" ministry as justification for dismissing the previous government's two deputy ministers. No less a figure than Lech Walesa is now finding himself criticized for what common Poles consider unseemly partisan behavior.

The tradition that the armed forces need not serve the state but only the nation seems to derive in some degree from this cultural preference for technocracy over democracy. Because of this attitude, most public figures advocate loyalty to the nation and to historic Polish military traditions to replace loyalty to a single political party. This has been a dominant theme of Polish military reform, support for which has been expressed publicly by President Lech Walesa, successive prime ministers, then-Minister of National Defense Kolodziejczyk, and his civilian deputy ministers. But these leaders, especially the democratic politicians, seem not to have considered that Polish military traditions have historically been almost completely
antithetical to both party-based parliamentary democracy and
civilian control of the armed forces.

It is difficult to say how Poland's cultural distrust of
politics can be overcome. It is probably a matter of success
breeding success; if democratic government can succeed in solving
some of the problems confronting the Polish polity, people may
gradually abandon their traditional preference for administrative
competence over democratic openness and their historic distrust
of politicians. Yet Spain's apparent abandonment of the same
antipolitical attitude occurred very quickly, by the time of the
1978 elections before any democratic government even had a chance
to take office, let alone succeed in solving problems.

In conclusion, Spain seems to have left behind very much the
same kinds of socio-political as well as military praetorianism
that threaten democratic stability in Eastern Europe in the 1990s
as they did in the 1920s. It is true that the Spanish transition
occurred in a time of economic growth, which made dealing with
the problems of democratic transition much easier. Nevertheless,
Poland cannot evade the importance of breaking with its praetori-
an past. Doing so may be crucial to preventing another episode
in which the Polish Army, looking to its finest traditions, once
more steps in to save the Polish nation--this time at the cost of
representative democracy.
NOTES

2. Finer 20-52, 64.
3. Huntington, Soldier and State 8-16.
5. Huntington, Soldier and State 65.
7. Finer 26-27.
8. Finer 28-34.
10. Finer 54-63.
11. Finer 64-66.
13. Huntington, Soldier and State 81-82.
14. Aguilar 55; Medhurst 50; Bañón 243. By the end of the Franco era, military salaries had fallen so far behind the cost of living that officers were encouraged to take part-time civilian jobs to eke out their incomes.
17. Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 107.
25. Remington 89.
26. Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 56.
28. Boyd 94.
30. Walendowski 46; Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 136.
32. Herspring, "Technology" 132.
33. Payne 17.
34. Shubert 530-32.
35. Boyd 96-98.
36. Korbonski 182.


41. Bowers 431.
42. Medhurst 5.
43. Boyd 97; Medhurst 48; Bañón 242. The twelve captaincies-general of the Franco period were established shortly after the Bourbons came to the Spanish throne in the eighteenth century as a way of rationalizing administration. The position of regional captain-general (usually held by a lieutenant general) should not be confused with the rank of captain-general, equivalent to the U.S. grade of (four-star) general. King Juan Carlos is now the only officer of four-star rank.

44. Korbonski 183; Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 36-37, 66-67.
45. Johnson 19.
46. Malcher 162-63. The Gdansk incident only confirmed the determination of Polish military leaders not to allow the armed forces to be used for suppression of the domestic population in the future. Herspring, "Soviets and Warsaw Pact" 140.

47. Sabbat-Swldlicka, "Changes" 22.


50. Payne 205; Gilmour 33.

51. Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 57; Korbonski 173-75, 180; Bowers 431.

52. Malcher, xvi, 13, 19, 83, 87.


54. Remington 87, 95; Malcher 193; Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 153-158, 175; Herspring, "Soviets and Warsaw Pact" 143.

55. Medhurst 6-7; Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 31.

56. Medhurst 9; Gilmour 16-17.


58. Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 52, 63.

59. Payne 187-88; Medhurst 5.

60. Medhurst 19.

61. Wiatr, Soldier and Nation 32-34.

62. It is difficult to conceive how any Polish regime could expect legitimacy when it wrote subjugation to Russia into its very Constitution (article 6).

63. Remington 80, 85.

64. Remington 87; Danopoulos, "Military Dictatorships" 8.

65. Medhurst 18.

66. Medhurst 77.

67. Medhurst 64-65.

68. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Changes" 22.
69. Aguilar 49-50; Boyd 95, 102-03; Preston 97; Shubert 533.

70. Huntington, Third Wave 243-51. What I have called "institutional reputation and morale," Huntington calls "status." I have changed the term to avoid confusion with the armed forces' legal status, which is part of Huntington's "leadership and organization" category.

71. Boyd 118.

72. DIA, Reform of the Spanish Military 2-5. All citations from classified documents are from unclassified paragraphs.

73. Aguilar 51; Ruiz 93; Bañón 238.

74. Boyd 107.

75. Bañón 240.

76. Boyd 119.

77. Aguilar 51; Ruiz 93; Bañón 238.

78. Spain, Constitution (29 Dec 1978), art. 8.

79. Boyd 118; Marquina 43.

80. Marquina 43.

81. Viñas 175-76.

82. Viñas 175-76; Marquina 61.

83. Military Balance 71-73; Taibo 55; Keegan 645, 648; Stenhouse 395.


86. Aguilar 54-55; Shubert 529.

87. Bañón 259.

88. Shubert 537.

89. Maxwell, "Introduction" 9.


92. See comments of Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, then commander of the Polish Navy and later the first post-communist Minister of National Defense, in *Dziennik Bałtycki* 17 Nov 1989: 3 (FBIS-EEU 4 Jan 1990: 72-73).


94. The 1978 Spanish Constitution, article 70, prohibits professional military personnel and active-duty members of the armed forces, security corps, and police from sitting in the Cortes. The U.S. Constitution has a parallel provision in article I, section 6, clause 2: "no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

95. Orenstein 65.

96. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Changes" 22.


100. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Changes" 23.


102. Orenstein 68; DIA, [CLASSIFIED Title] 2.

103. Weydenthal 9.

104. Vinton, "Walesa Presidency" 11, 16.

105. Poland, Constitution (22 Jul 1952), art. 10.

106. Orenstein 65.


111. Vinton, "Shake-Up;" "High Ranking Officers."

112. Orenstein 66.


115. "Impoverished Military."

116. Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations" 20, argues that the reductions being imposed by the Polish government are so severe that, combined with the dismantling of the unifying PZPR structure, they will so weaken intra-military cohesion as to emasculate the armed forces as a potential political force.


125. Gilmour 172, 186.

126. Boetsch 144, 155; Prevost 135.


128. Nelson 141.


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