GOLDWATER-NICHOLS REVISITED: A PROPOSAL FOR MEANINGFUL DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

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# Goldwater-Nichols Revisited: A Proposal for Meaningful Defense Reorganization

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Introduction

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) is frequently praised by civilian national security specialists and military leaders as correcting the organizational and structural deficiencies stemming from the National Security Act of 1947. Critics charge that prior to Goldwater-Nichols the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were unable to adequately fulfill their responsibility to provide pragmatic and timely unified military advice to the President, National Security Council, and/or Secretary of Defense—collectively referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). This caused the NCA to rely on civilian staffs for advice that should have been provided by professional military officers. Those calling for defense reform cited the conflict of interest inherent in the dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs. Furthermore, they charged that the Service Chiefs did not have sufficient time to perform both roles; i.e., head of their Service and member of the JCS.1

Goldwater-Nichols made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) the principal military advisor to the NCA. No longer was the CJCS required to formally ask for, and receive, input from the Service Chiefs before answering a question posed by the NCA. Additionally, this major defense reorganization empowered the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands (CinCs) and instituted a formalized joint officer personnel policy law (Title IV). The Joint Staff was enlarged and strengthened to support the expanded role of the Chairman and the CinCs. Incentives were legislated to force the Services to assign quality officers to joint duty assignments.

To the disappointment of those supporting radical reform, Goldwater-Nichols did not end dual hatting, create a General Staff, and abolish the JCS. For traditionalists, reform cost the Service Chiefs and Staffs their preeminent role in defense policy formulation. They argue that Goldwater-Nichols reforms, and the leadership style and political power of General Colin Powell, have "caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate entity to be eclipsed by a new, all-powerful chairman."2

Both critics and supporters give Goldwater-Nichols credit for improving the operational synergy of the JCS and NCA. The success of Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm all support claims that the quality of joint operations has
improved. Disagreement arises when the two sides review how the law has affected defense resourcing. The recent *Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* report ("Roles and Missions Report")—required every three years by Goldwater-Nichols—is cited as corroborating the arguments of those that insist the 1986 legislation did not improve the quality of resource advice provided the NCA.

The end of the Cold War and concern over the national debt support a significant downsizing of the military. Conversely, regional instability prompted by heightened nationalism, an increase in non-traditional missions for the military, and the potential resurgence of communist factions in Russia argue for maintaining a mobile, lethal, and well-trained force. This smaller military must be capable of projecting power worldwide to protect vital US interests or to participate in peacekeeping and peace-making operations. Finally, it is imperative that the CJCS and JCS maintain credibility with the first President since Franklin D. Roosevelt not to have served in the military and with a Congress which includes over 100 new members.

Widespread bipartisan criticism of the "Roles and Missions Report" focuses on several issues. First, is resource advice formulated by the JCS discredited because of the perceived conflict of interests between Title X and joint responsibilities? Second, did Goldwater-Nichols succeed in creating a joint culture capable of competing with Service cultures that promote Service parochialism? And finally, can the Joint Staff take the lead from the Service Staffs in tackling difficult resource and force structure issues? If the answer to any of these questions is no, the NCA will question the credibility of JCS advice and rely on civilian experts to provide advice which should come from military leaders.3

This study argues that the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act did not go far enough in its reform of the JCS and Joint Staff. Indeed, there is a growing perception "that the Joint Chiefs took a pass on their own opportunity to restructure the Services for a new era."4 As long as the Service Chiefs are dual-hatted—no matter how valid their advice—JCS recommendations concerning resource issues will be characterized as being geared to the lowest common level of assent. This study argues that the JCS should be abolished and replaced by a council of military and civilian leaders similar in nature to what General Edward C. Meyer proposed in 1982.5 Further, this study
takes exception with Goldwater-Nichols' attempt to legislate joint culture through the Title IV Joint Officer management policies and contends that the only way to create a joint culture capable of competing with the individual Service cultures is by replacing the Joint Staff with a General Staff.

**History of the JCS and Reform Attempts**

One of the great lessons of World War II was that joint warfare had forever replaced single Service operations. In 1942, President Roosevelt informally established the JCS. When the war ended a debate ensued on how to best organize the postwar military. "The Army favored, but the Navy opposed, a highly integrated system." Those who feared that formalizing the JCS organization would lead to Service unification warned that if a military officer and his staff sat atop this establishment, civilian control would be threatened.

The National Security Act of 1947 terminated reorganization proposals that had as their centerpiece Service unification and institutionalized Roosevelt's informal JCS organization—albeit in a weaker form. General Meyer summarized the 1947 legislation this way:

> The act formally established the JCS as a council of advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense on military policy, organization, strategy and plans. At the same time, members of that council, the Service Chiefs, were told to retain their departmental responsibilities to organize, equip, and train their forces.

General Meyer is describing the congressionally-mandated conflict of interest known as dual-hatting. This arrangement, along with a small, weak, and transient Joint Staff were the most often cited deficiencies targeted by successive reform efforts over the thirty-five years following its creation in 1947.

Civilian and military leaders that included President Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, and General Maxwell Taylor were quick to go on record with criticisms of the JCS. President Eisenhower appointed the Rockefeller Committee to study defense reorganization. In 1957, their report cited the "excessive workload... difficult mix of functions and loyalties" and blamed "the system and not the members" for the poor quality of advice they (the JCS) provided to the NCA.
Not even Eisenhower, the quintessential military and civilian leader, could force reform. It took unsuccessful wars (Korea and Vietnam), an aborted hostage rescue attempt (Desert I), and criticism from a serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prompt the first major defense reorganization since 1947. When the House began defense reorganization hearings in 1982, the US was well into the largest and most expensive peacetime defense build-up in the history of the republic.

From Jones and Meyer to Goldwater-Nichols

General David C. Jones was Chief of Staff of the Air Force for four years and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an additional four years. Three months before retiring he published proposals for JCS reform in an article entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." As a minimum, Jones called for strengthening the role of the Chairman, limiting Service Staff involvement in the joint process, and broadening the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. Jones' reorganization plan was moderate but significant given he was still in uniform and serving as CJCS.

One month later, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, supported and expanded Jones' call for reform. Meyer's more radical proposals included abolishing the JCS and replacing it with a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC). The NMAC would be composed of a senior flag officer from each Service and one civilian, and would be chaired by the CJCS. Members of this Council would be distinguished active or retired four star flag officers serving their terminal assignment.

Meyer thought it imperative to end dual-hatting and to free the Service Chiefs to focus more clearly on their Title X responsibilities. The composition of the NMAC preserved the preeminent role of military leaders when formulating advice for the NCA. NMAC members were not dependent on, and would never return to, their Service. This stipulation preserved military participation on the Council while eliminating—as much as possible—the perceived conflict of interest inherent in dual-hatting. Meyer wrote that "individual members would be sought who had particular expertise in areas of special importance to the joint arena; e.g., strategic nuclear policy; unconventional as well as conventional warfare; and command, control, and communications."
Under Meyer's proposal the OSD Staff would relinquish the leading role in policy and program development, but would assume a major role in policy and program implementation, which is more consistent with its wartime role. Meyer explained:

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, this body of military advisors (the NMAC) would examine military alternatives and recommend strategic scenarios to govern how the military departments are to organize, equip, and prepare their forces for war. Service Secretaries would lose some voice in policy formulation, but have a stronger position in developing current and future force capabilities. CinCs would present the needs of their command in a continuous dialogue with the NMAC, which would be more capable of initiating change. Additionally, Meyer believed this arrangement would allow the CinCs to exercise considerable influence on near-term programs.

Jones' and Meyer's proposals prompted the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC) to open hearings in April 1982, entitled "Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Countless civilian and military witnesses testified before the committee in a period spanning four years and three Congresses (97th, 98th, and 99th). The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began parallel hearings in 1985.

Reviewing the testimony reveals that Service affiliation was the most reliable predictor of support for reform. Not unlike the debate over unification after World War II, Army witnesses were more likely to be advocates of reform than representatives from the Navy. The testimony of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer—although extreme—is representative of the Navy's position:

I cannot help but note that, just as surely as the swallows return to Capistrano, the studies and recommendations concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff crop up at periodic intervals ... This makes about as much sense as reorganizing Congress or the Supreme Court to stop disagreements ... Everyone fancies himself a field marshal.

The Reagan Administration and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger supported maintenance of the status quo. Independent reports commissioned to study defense organization were almost unanimous in their call for JCS reform. The
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report in February 1985 that nearly mirrored Jones' proposals.¹⁵

In addition to supporting JCS reform, the CSIS report specified that roles and missions among the Services were both under funded (e.g., strategic sealift and airlift) and inefficient (e.g., close air support and tactical airlift). The working group avoided recommending shifts in roles and missions for two reasons. First, it was their judgment that roles and missions problems were the result of a weak JCS. They hoped that if their recommendations on JCS organization were adopted, the Chairman, Joint Staff, and CinCs "would be in a position to review and act on the roles and missions issues." Second, the working group wanted to avoid the "intense political controversy that such proposals inevitably generate."¹⁶

Publication of the CSIS report and hearings in the Senate increased the momentum for reform in the face of continued Administration opposition and Jones' and Meyer's retirement. In the House, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO.) introduced H.R. 2314 which paralleled Meyer's proposal. Rep. Skelton's Senior Defense Staff Member and drafter of the legislation, Archie D. Barrett, stated:

"General Meyer's proposal for JCS reform was very similar to recommendations made by General Maxwell Taylor. In fact, Rep. Skelton sent me to Taylor's apartment to get his thoughts before drafting the legislation (H.R. 2314). Skelton believed in H.R. 2314. Its introduction was a clear signal to the military that Congress was serious about reform."¹⁷

In the SASC, a staff study was published in October 1985 examining problems with DOD organizational structure and decision making procedures. Prepared under the direction of James R. Locher III, this study recommended reform of the magnitude found in the Skelton sponsored bill.¹⁸

The introduction of H.R. 2314 and the SASC Study were clear signals of the inevitability of some type of JCS reform. The Services mobilized their considerable political power in an effort to minimize the change. Their strategy included restating an old and powerful argument from the postwar unification debates. Specifically, military witnesses testified that strengthening the position of the Chairman would somehow threaten civilian control of the military—the "man on a white horse" argument.
Most civilian witnesses discounted this concern. The argument of John Kester, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, is representative. He said that "the idea of saying we have to play off the individual Services against each other to maintain civilian control, I think, is not a good idea and, if it ever was a good idea, it certainly is an outdated one."19 Outdated or not, it proved to be a very effective tactic for the Services to limit the magnitude of change enacted.

The result of the debate was Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The main provisions of this legislation, important for this study, are:

- (Title I) Revises and clarifies DOD operational chain of command and JCS functions and responsibilities . . . to provide for more efficient use of defense resources.

- (Title II) Assigns to the Chairman of the JCS the role of chief military adviser, including responsibilities currently assigned to the JCS collectively, establishes the position of Vice Chairman, and revises Joint Staff duties and selection procedures.

- (Title IV) Establishes a joint officer specialty occupational category and personnel policies to provide incentives to attract officers to joint duty assignments.20

The legislation did not abolish the JCS, create a National Military Advisory Council or a General Staff, or end dual-hatting. Goldwater-Nichols did make the CJCS the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Title I strengthened the CinCs and their role as commander of all the forces—regardless of the Service—assigned to their command. And finally, Title IV attempted to empower the Joint Staff and Headquarters Staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands through provisions intended to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint duty.

Comparing the Environments that Generate Defense Reform

Since World War II there have been several attempts to bring about defense reorganization, however, only two were successful. This section will briefly describe the political, economic, and military environments that supported successful defense reforms. Finally, today's environment will be discussed in greater detail to determine whether—if required—additional reform would be possible.
1947 Army-Navy Compromise Plan

In January 1947, the Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman) fell short of what many predicted would be Service integration following World War II. The US military mobilized from little more than a cadre force in the inter-war years to the largest and most powerful military machine in the history of the world. It experienced operational success in every theater. However, there were many who argued that inter-theater, intra-theater, and intra-Service disputes had prolonged the war and cost lives (e.g., Nimitz vs. MacArthur, Pacific vs. Europe, and Navy vs. Army). The most crucial military lesson learned was the prominence of joint operations. It was Eisenhower who said "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever" and that the Army-Navy Compromise Plan was the embodiment of "service systems of an era that is no more."21

After World War II, the United States was forced to abandon isolationism and assume a role as one of the world's two superpowers. Concurrently, the military "melted down" from wartime force structure levels and conversion preoccupied most defense industries. And finally, there was considerable pressure to cut the defense budget to fund civilian programs neglected during the war. The result was an increasing reliance on cheaper strategic nuclear weapons as opposed to conventional forces.

The 1947 Army-Navy Compromise Plan created little more than a loose confederation among the Services. Rather than integrate, the Air Force became a separate Service which further complicated attempts to institutionalize joint warfare. The 1947 legislation was amended in 1949, 1953, and 1958 to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense and increase the size of his staff. Between 1958 and Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the only significant change was in 1978 when the Commandant of the Marine Corps was made a full member of the JCS. The pressure to preserve Service autonomy squelched all attempts at reform before Jones and Meyer published their proposals.22

Goldwater-Nichols

Throughout the four years of hearings leading to Goldwater-Nichols, operational failures in Vietnam, Desert I, and to some extent Grenada, were seen as supporting
reform. While the US "won" in Grenada, there were serious concerns about the lack of progress made in the execution of joint operations. Inadequate joint doctrine, equipment interface problems, and a greater number of casualties than expected caused many within the military to question the effectiveness of joint operations.

The Services added force structure—the 600 ship Navy—and their roles and missions became less clearly defined. The Marine Corps, for example, felt threatened when the Army added five light infantry divisions to its force structure. The build-up and increased reliance on high technology weaponry caused a boom in defense industries. However, a growing deficit and defense procurement scandals, such as $640 toilet seats, prompted many to caution that the defense budget was out of control. In this atmosphere, and over a four year period, Goldwater-Nichols was introduced, debated, and passed.

Listening to military leaders today, it's hard to believe they ever opposed JCS reorganization. Privately they might voice concern with certain specifics of the legislation; however, publicly they proclaim Goldwater-Nichols a success. When the issue of further reform is raised, they point with pride at recent operational successes and state "if it's not broken, don't fix it." Joint operational successes in Panama, the Persian Gulf (traditional), and Somalia (non-traditional) support their argument that our military works and jointness has improved.

Post-Cold War Period

The end of the Cold War resulted in freedom for Eastern European states and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War world—void of bipolar competition—is initially more unstable. Nationalism and ethnic conflict is on the rise. Peace-keeping, peace-making, and humanitarian relief are the most likely missions in the post-Cold War world. In the 1993 "Roles and Missions Report," the Chairman validated these missions by assigning an expanded US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) the functional responsibility of "undertaking principal responsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose."23

All agree that the force must, and should, get smaller. For over two years the Services have been downsizing to meet "Base Force" levels by 1995—recommended
by the CJCS and adopted by the Bush Administration. Reaching "Base Force" levels required cutting six of eighteen active Army Divisions. Additional budget savings proposed by the Clinton Administration will mean more trimming.

Recent reports indicate the Clinton budget will require $128 billion in cuts over the next five years. The Administration is conducting a "bottom-up review" to identify specific force structure reductions to meet this target. The Defense Budget Project recently released a report recommending even greater reductions. This independent research organization proposes:

- cutting the size of the armed forces to 1.2 million uniformed personnel by 1997, 200,000 fewer than Aspin's plan—and 400,000 fewer than what the Bush administration had planned... This report was prepared under the supervision of Gordon Adams, who since has left this non-profit organization to accept a top-level position in Clinton's OMB.24

Whether it's "Base Force," $128 billion over five years, or something in-between, this downsizing promises to rival defense reductions made after World War II.

Many defense industries have begun the difficult and many times impossible process of conversion to non-defense work. The Clinton Administration recently proposed a $22 billion federal program to help individuals and locales make this transition. Communities and companies remaining in, or depending on, the defense business are experiencing severe cutbacks or uncertainty over the future.

Deficit reduction became a cause célèbre when Ross Perot entered the 1992 Presidential campaign and made it the keystone of his economic program. Recent studies conclude that the American public is willing to pay higher taxes and slice spending to cut the budget deficit. Furthermore, they see national defense as a non-domestic item that merits deep cuts. Polls indicate 63 percent of the public wants to cut the national defense budget by 17 percent.25 Cuts of this magnitude are greater than even those proposed in President Clinton's budget.

This brief discussion demonstrates that even though the military has enjoyed operational successes since the 1986 JCS reorganization—not unlike 1947—other important indicators have created a difficult environment for defense planners. Figure 1 (page 11) compares the environment for reform in 1947, 1986, and 1993. Although it fell short of Service integration, the 1947 defense reorganization was
radical when compared to Goldwater-Nichols. The preceding discussion and Figure 1
demonstrate that the environment today more closely resembles 1947 than 1986.
This kind of environment puts tremendous pressure on the military leadership to
"address difficult questions being asked by Congress and the American people about
their Armed Forces."26 If the President, the Congress, and voters perceive that the
CJCS is unable to provide those explanations, they will go elsewhere for answers.

Figure 1: Environment For Reform (Economic, Military, Joint).

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↑ = increasing/growing/considered adequate
↓ = decreasing/shrinking/considered inadequate

Few, if any, senior military leaders advocate additional JCS reform because they
think Goldwater-Nichols fixed what needed to be fixed. In a 1993 letter to the
author, the CJCS stated: "I am confident that without the power of legislation
(Goldwater-Nichols), we would not have seen the progress made over the last 6 years.
Military advice is no longer discredited."27

Nevertheless, Goldwater-Nichols—like the 1947 legislation establishing the JCS—
was a compromise. Both stopped short of instituting major proposals made by many
military and civilian leaders. Before considering whether further reforms are needed,
this study will review and evaluate the changes Goldwater-Nichols made.

What Goldwater-Nichols Changed

Archie Barrett has been a HASC Professional Staff Member for over a decade.
He is recognized as one of a handful of principal architects who designed Goldwater-
Nichols. When asked to rate the effectiveness of the 1986 law, he evaluates each Title
separately. He rated those changes directed at improving operational matters "most
effective." Barrett stated, "the CinCs have been given command of all the forces,
regardless of Service, assigned to their command... The quality of operational plans is greatly improved."28 Barrett is not alone in this appraisal. When asked to comment on the effectiveness of the 1986 reorganization, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, emphasized successful operational employments of US forces as proof that Goldwater-Nichols is a success.29 It's hard not to argue that changes were for the better when comparing the performance of the US forces in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort to Vietnam, Desert I, and Grenada.

The legislation specifically prohibits the CJCS from exercising "military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces;"30 i.e., he was not inserted in the chain of command between the President and the CinCs. Nevertheless, two features of Goldwater-Nichols have enabled the Chairman to assert considerable authority in operational matters.

The law specifically designates the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the NCA. He is encouraged—but not required—to seek the advice of the Service Chiefs and the CinCs. If the Chiefs are not unanimous in their opinion, "the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter" (emphasis added).31 Furthermore, the President may—as Reagan and Bush did—"direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."32

All the civilian experts and military leaders interviewed for this study were convinced that the position of the Chairman is strengthened by Goldwater-Nichols. None, however, could state with certainty whether the legislation has improved the quality of advice provided the NCA. Although, the general consensus is it has. Barrett said he "would be surprised if advice is not better—at least in the area of operation." He was certain "Goldwater-Nichols accomplished the goal of ensuring advice is provided faster, quicker."33

Testifying before the HASC in 1982, John Kester pointed out that the JCS "frequently arrive with their advice after the train has left the station. Events in the
real world do not wait for the present JCS system which is four layers of staffing to reach a compromise acceptable to each of the four Services."34 Barrett pointed out that because the Chairman has more autonomy, he no longer has to take the time to gather input from the Services and develop a corporate position.

While Barrett credits defense reorganization and the Chairman for recent operational improvements, he is unsure whether these advancements are the result of structural changes or the persona of General Colin Powell. He stated that not since General Maxwell Taylor has there been a more powerful and highly regarded Chairman.35

The military leaders interviewed were generally in agreement with Barrett. They are justifiably proud of General Powell, the performance of the military since Goldwater-Nichols, and the progress their Services have made in the development and prosecution of joint doctrine and operations. Nevertheless, some voiced concern that power may have shifted too far in the direction of the Chairman and the Joint Staff.

Goldwater-Nichols increased the size of the Joint Staff, gave it much more autonomy and enhanced responsibility. However, the legislation specifies that "the Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority."36 One senior officer complained about the "Imperial Joint Staff" and the direct access the CinCs have to the NCA, Congress, and the Chairman without going through Service leadership and the Service staffs. He sensed that there was growing resistance from Service Staffs to the extended power of the Joint Staff and the CinCs, yet he discounted it as a "natural resistance to change."37

Resource Advice

Barrett was much less sanguine when evaluating those portions of the legislation that were designed to improve resource allocation advice.

My biggest disappointment is the Chairman’s failure to be more involved in resource allocation. Resource allocation is what the Services do 90 percent of the time. We expected the Joint Staff to put together resource requirements from the CinCs and compare that list against the Service POMs. The Chairman does not have the power to modify Service POMs, however, he can use his
position to recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense. That has not happened. It is the name of the game in peacetime. I think it is time we went to a single Joint POM. 38

General Meyer's 1982 proposal for reorganization was based in part on the inability of the JCS to accomplish a horizontal, rather than vertical, examination of resource issues: "Simply put, the basic issue of aligning Service programming and expenditures to the requirements of unified command planning has been inadequately treated." 39

In a recent interview, General Meyer used reports that the Air Force would recommend a delay in C-17 procurement to satisfy a portion of its most recent budget cut as proof that Goldwater-Nichols did not go far enough. 40 He believes a recommendation to delay or scale back this program should not be the Air Force's alone. Meyer points out that the C-17 project began over ten years ago when he was Army Chief of Staff. "The C-17 is being developed by, not for, the Air Force." 41

General McPeak both supported and broadened the point made by General Meyer when he said:

There may be a conflict in programmatic issues. Today the Services rely on each other. If the Navy cuts increased sealift out of their budget, I have a problem because I can't get everything the Air Force needs to the war. The Air Force relies on sealift to move much of its equipment. If I give up on the C-17, the Army has a problem. I could get along without the C-17, but the Army can't. 42

Lieutenant General Eh/ert, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, US Marine Corps, voiced concern about the expanded role the CinCs and their staffs are playing—contrasted to a reduced role for the Service staffs—in POM formulation. "I worry that when you serve on a CinC's staff you don't have a long-range view—you are more concerned about short-term, day-to-day problems that can quickly become a crisis." 43 General McPeak voiced similar concerns when he said: "It's not clear that operational POM input from the CinCs is working ... some joint headquarters are thinly veiled Service headquarters." 44

Although central to the argument of those advocating JCS reform in 1986, Goldwater-Nichols did not end dual-hatting. The Service Chiefs maintained Title X responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping their Service and their position as "military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary
of Defense." As previously mentioned, the law specifies that the Chairman shall, as he considers it appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the Service Chiefs and CinCs. It further specifies that Service Chiefs may submit to the Chairman "advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to" the NCA. Title II requires the Chiefs—individually or collectively—to provide advice "on a particular matter" when asked by the NCA.45

**The Roles and Missions Review**

Bipartisan criticism of the recent "Roles and Missions Report" supports the concerns of Barrett and Meyer. Although this report met the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that a roles and missions review be accomplished every three years, it was Senator Nunn who called for "a no-holds-barred, everything on the table review" aimed at cutting the "tremendous redundancy and duplication" in the military.46 After being briefed on the "Roles and Missions Report," Rep. Floyd D. Spence (R-SC), ranking Republican on the HASC, warned that the Services "may have missed a chance to direct their own fate . . . efforts to further reduce defense spending may lead to a politically driven outcome that neither the military nor the nation can afford."47 Even William J. Perry, Aspin's Deputy Secretary of Defense, said the report "was a good plan as far as it went, but it didn't go very far."48

If the Chairman, the CinCs, and the Joint Staff gained power as the result of Goldwater-Nichols, critics charge it came at the expense of the Service Chiefs and their staffs. The 1986 legislation redistributed a finite amount of power to influence defense policy decisions. The two Service Chiefs interviewed for this report were split over the question of their impact on defense policy since Goldwater-Nichols. General McPeak said, "The Service Chiefs are cut out of the process now. We are not present when the Chairman gives advice to the Secretary of Defense. General Powell asks us for our input and we give it to him—he looks for consensus."49

General Sullivan disagrees, saying the Chiefs are part of the process. "We meet and talk about the issues and provide our opinion to the Chairman." Sullivan specifically cited the 1993 "Roles and Missions Report" as proof that the system does not necessarily result in consensus on tough issues. "I think it is a good report. It
asked the right questions and I think the product is about right. Tough calls were made—especially for the Army."50

Testifying before the HASC, Hon. Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, characterized the JCS as a system with men of "high caliber" that works "poorly" because of systemic and institutional problems associated with dual-hatting. Komer provided the following specifics:

The system is simply out of balance between service interests and joint interests. Because of the way it is set up there is a basic, built-in conflict of interest between the role of JCS members and the role of service chiefs. Indeed, it was deliberately designed that way to protect parochial service interests even at the expense of the joint interests of the Nation, the President, the Congress, and the Department of Defense.

Komer went on to reinforce General Meyer's argument against dual-hatting:

I think the second major institutional failing is that no one man, I don't care how competent he is, can possibly perform adequately two full-time jobs. Naturally, as I believe most of the present Chiefs testified before you, the first role takes precedence. That means the second role, the role of providing joint advice, inevitably suffers.51

These arguments are central to those who criticize the 1993 "Roles and Missions Report." When made they provoke a similar reaction from military leaders today as in 1982. General Powell states in his memorandum forwarding the "Roles and Missions Report" to the Secretary of Defense: "Although I have consulted with the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders in its development, this report presents my views and is not a consensus document."52 He reiterated in a letter that "I can assure you that the Roles and Missions Report contains a number of recommendations that were not agreed upon by all the Services or by all the CINCs. I bear full responsibility for what is in the report and it is not intended to be a consensus document."53

Comments made by General Sullivan support the Chairman. General Sullivan and LTG Ehlert both cited the recommendation to designate US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) the unified command and joint headquarters for CONUS-based forces as a decision that proves the report is not a consensus document. If implemented, Forces Command (FORSCOM), the specified command responsible for all Army forces stationed in the United States, will relinquish its responsibilities to USLANTCOM. The
Chiarellli

report sums up this recommendation by saying: "While the Services would retain their Title X responsibilities, the training and deploying of CONUS-based forces as a joint team would be a new mission for this expanded CINC. Unification of the Armed Forces, which began in 1947, would at last be complete."54

Critics of the "Roles and Mission Report"—both before and after it was released—use the question "Why four Air Forces?" as the centerpiece of their argument claiming inefficiencies and duplication in the military. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has made the point that "aviation issues dominated the most recent roles and missions review" and "this caused him to be both more involved in the debate and more often in disagreement with the other Service Chiefs."55

General McPeak also insisted that "it is the Chairman's report—not anyone else's." Still, he seemed to break with the Chairman, General Sullivan, and other military leaders when he called it a "consensus report" and "at best tinkering at the margins." McPeak predicted that "since there is a new administration with a new set of assumptions, we—or someone—will soon be preparing a new report. I'm afraid the military may not take the lead in the next review," he warned.56 When compared to any of the other Services, the Air Force had more to win or lose. The report looked at the possible consolidation of space and strategic commands, several air power issues (e.g., continental air defense, theater air interdiction, and close air support), aircraft requirements, and theater air defense. All are Title X functions the Air Force would like to maintain, assume, or take the lead on. Recommendations perceived as "consensus building" by General McPeak were undoubtedly viewed by the Chairman as what is needed "to maintain the maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces."57

The issue isn't whether there is going to be dissension when the JCS formulates resource advice; it is whether those disagreements translate into predictable advice owing to an inherent conflict of interest. If predictable—or perceived as being predictable—the utility of the advice to the civilian leadership in the NCA is diminished. Predictability was the issue in 1982 when Komer said, "The systemic inadequacies of the present system means [sic] that the civilian masters of the JCS are unable to get from it the kind of military inputs they really need and want."58
The current debate over the Chairman's Roles and Mission Report is proof that, at a minimum, Goldwater-Nichols did not erase the perception that the Chiefs cannot overcome parochialism when asked to provide resource advice. Now that the Chairman is the principle military advisor to the NCA, the issue of Service parochialism is only important if it causes the civilian leadership to question the resource advice given by the Chairman. Recently, when asked to evaluate whether General Powell's report should be interpreted as "stiffing" his call for a review of roles and missions, Nunn responded:

No, I don't think the problem is Colin Powell. I think there are two Colin Powell reports. Phase one report really was what I think he believed and phase two was what he compromised in order to get it through the chiefs. So it's not a matter of one individual of Colin Powell [sic]. It's got to be every member of the chiefs (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{59}

**The Joint Staff**

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the Joint Staff worked for both the Chairman and the Service Chiefs. The Services assigned some able officers and others less so. It was not an elite organization and very few officers desired a single assignment on the Chairman's Staff—let alone more than one. The system was characterized as stifling initiative because Joint Staff officers were totally dependent on their own Services for assignment and promotion. Komer called the joint staff "a secretariat for reconciling Service views."\textsuperscript{60}

Title IV instituted the "Joint Specialty Officer" (JSO) designation and several other provisions in an attempt to fix the Joint Staff and, over time, to create a joint culture. The prerequisites for JSO designation are graduation from a joint professional military education school (e.g., The National War College) and completion of a full tour in a joint duty assignment.\textsuperscript{61} Implementing legislation specified and approved a limited number of positions for designation as joint duty assignments. Additionally, Goldwater-Nichols implemented two other provisions supporters considered essential to improving the Joint Staff:

1. ... officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments are expected as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category.
2. An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment. 62

General Powell gives Title IV credit for helping to make the Joint Staff "one of the best military staffs in the world." He considers joint education and assignment as instrumental in improving the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff. Further, he states, "the authority given to the Chairman to review promotion lists from a joint perspective has paid enormous dividends in enhancing jointness. I am confident that without the power of legislation, we would not have seen the progress made over the past 6 years." 63

Everyone interviewed for this study agrees with General Powell on this issue and is convinced that Title IV provisions have improved both the quality of the officers serving on the Joint Staff and their work. General Ehlert's comments were representative: "We [the Marine Corps] used to send officers who were retiring to work on the Joint Staff—not since Goldwater-Nichols. Now we send our sharpest folks and so do the other Services." 64 Nevertheless, the provision requiring completion of a joint duty assignment before promotion to flag officer will—if not amended—soon cause some potentially serious problems for all the Services.

Congress enacted a number of temporary exemptions and waivers for use during the transition period prior to full implementation of Title IV. The two most important transitional waivers, "joint equivalency" and "serving-in," expire on 1 January 1994. Without these waivers "the current trend suggests that in 1994, nearly one-half of those selected for brigadier general will not be qualified to serve in an Army position in their initial tour as a general officer. Instead, they must serve an initial two year joint tour." 65 This is not just an Army problem. In fact, the Army is in the middle of the pack when compared to the other Services. The only way to promote these officers will be to request a "Good of the Service" (GOS) waiver from the Secretary of Defense. If approved, the law requires that the officer's first assignment as a general be a two year joint tour. Unless Service cultures change, these officers will most likely fall behind joint qualified contemporaries who go to Service-specific operational assignments (e.g., Assistant Division Commander).
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the portion of the population given credit for JSO qualification includes officers exempted from joint duty based on "scientific/technical" waivers which do not expire (e.g., civil engineers, chemical, military police, and public affairs officers). Therefore, a large majority of those requiring a GOS waiver will be warfighters, i.e., combat arms officers, pilots, and naval line officers.

In 1994, the Army projects 17 officers selected for general will require a GOS waiver with only 11 joint duty positions available for slating. This could mean in the worst case that the Army—and undoubtedly the other Services—will be forced to promote less qualified officers to flag rank. Thus, Joint tour completion, not performance, could become the critical discriminator for promotion to flag officer. Army personnel managers predict that long term solutions implemented this year will not fix the problem until after the turn of the century.

Until recently, the Services put this problem in the "too hard to solve box." Realization that the waivers would soon end prompted serious analysis to measure the full effect of Title IV provisions. This analysis showed that in order to reduce the number of GOS waivers requested in the out years, officers selected "below the zone" for major must be immediately slated into joint assignments. A finite number of joint positions, the reality that some young superstars will fall from grace during follow-on assignments, and Service requirements for this same talented group of officer on Service Staffs or in combat units, makes even this solution problematic. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict which officers will be best qualified to be generals or admirals ten years hence.

In Addition, there are non-joint jobs (e.g., operations billets) within each Service culture that are considered critical assignments for those who aspire to be flag officers. To date, the Services seem unwilling to fill these jobs with "second stringers" and force those with general officer potential into joint positions. Every military leader interviewed for this study complained that Title IV requirements were particularly difficult for his Service. All of their arguments are convincing.

Supporters can claim Title IV provisions have corrected serious defects in the Joint Staff system. All agree that high quality officers are being assigned to joint
billets and the quality of Joint Staff work has improved dramatically. If the intent of
the legislation was to force officers to think joint duty is important, Goldwater-Nichols
is an unqualified success. For those who doubt Congressional intent, it will be made
perfectly clear when transitional waivers expire. Many who thought they were
competitive for promotion to flag rank may be passed over because they did not
complete a joint assignment. When interviewed, Barrett left the impression that
Congress would not be receptive to extending or renewing the transitional waivers. 68

Nevertheless, there are concerns that Title IV may not be the best way to create
a legitimate joint culture if that is the intent as many argue. The group of officers
that Title IV targets—warfighters—have a natural aversion to serving on any staff.
Nevertheless, a tour on a Service Staff is informally considered a prerequisite for
anyone with high aspirations. Exposure to Service leadership can keep or help make
these officers competitive for higher level command or selection to flag rank. The
framers of Goldwater-Nichols were not willing to establish a General Staff with
promotion authority; they chose instead to use Title IV incentives to stop high quality
pilots, combat arms, and line officers from avoiding joint duty. They wanted to create
an environment where duty on the Joint Staff would be seen as analogous to duty on
a Service Staff.

Title IV did not create a joint culture capable of attracting the military's best
qualified officers to joint duty assignments. The finest officers don't compete for joint
duty assignments; they go because the law requires them to. Once they finish their
qualifying tour, they go back to their Service and the job that will keep them
competitive for promotion. Furthermore, they generally believe that if they support
jointness to the detriment of their Service when in a joint billet, they won't get that
all important, follow-on Service job.

During the Vietnam War, Congress accused the military of promoting the
practice of "ticket punching." Officers were charged with carefully managing their
careers so they served only in assignments that supported promotion without
considering the needs of the Service. Once assigned, they stayed only long enough to
get their ticket punched before moving to the next carefully selected position.
Congress cited Vietnam assignment policies as institutionalized "ticket punching."
Service in joint assignments should not be something officers are forced to do. If joint operations are the future, as senior military leaders since Eisenhower have said, joint duty should on its own merit attract the best and the brightest in the military. It is ironic that Congress has mandated "ticket punching" on the grounds that it is necessary to strengthen the Joint Staff.

Goldwater-Nichols is analogous to the Articles of the Confederation—each was better than what it replaced, however, each failed to endow the new organization it created with the authority needed to unify the parts. The Articles of the Confederation created a weak national government where citizens of the individual states invested legitimacy in their state first and Washington second. Goldwater-Nichols failed to go far enough in empowering the Chairman, the JCS, and the Joint Staff. The successor to Goldwater-Nichols must not legislate joint culture; it must ensure jointness is legitimate.

The value of this analogy ends here. The sole purpose of the Services is to provide for the National Defense of the United States. They are not individuals or minorities that must be provided Constitutional protection. Funding, organization, and integration decisions must be made based on what is best for national defense, not on what is acceptable to each Service. As a result of my study, I believe that we must move beyond Goldwater-Nichols so that critical defense decisions made in the post-Cold War period support building the best military for the future.

Meaningful JCS Reform

The environment for reform today is similar to conditions after World War II (see Figure 1). In 1947, the free world was challenged by a new threat; the country was forced to make choices between defense and spending cuts; the US military was the best and largest in the world; and many communities were in the midst of transitioning from a wartime to peacetime economy. Today, the world is increasingly unstable, the country is struggling to cut a $4 trillion dollar national debt; the US military is the only force in the world capable of quickly projecting power; and communities are again trying to cope with the downsizing of many defense industries.

Previous attempts to reform the defense establishment were designed to give credibility to the military advice produced by the system. Goldwater-Nichols
specifically states, "it is the intent of Congress . . . to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." The 1986 legislation was intended to answer critics' charges that military advice—particularly when it involved allocation of resources—is ignored because it is thought to be the product of a committee. Making the Chairman the principle advisor to the NCA has not altered the perception that the "JCS system sacrifices the influences of the uniformed military as a whole in order to protect the interests of the separate military services."70

Meaningful reform must end dual-hatting. Asking a Service Chief, who is required by law to organize, train, and equip his force, to put on his joint hat and to cut a program or personnel he deemed necessary when wearing his Service hat is unrealistic. Even when the Chiefs provide truly joint resource advice, the political leadership will often discount their recommendation. Dual hatting is analogous to President Clinton remaining Governor Clinton after moving into the oval office. If he continued to wear both hats, Americans would undoubtedly question any decision he made that looked like he was supporting interests in Arkansas.

**National Military Advisory Council (NMAC)**

General Meyer's proposal and bills introduced in the House and Senate in 1985 recommended abolishing the JCS and replacing it with a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC). Meyer believes Goldwater-Nichols did little to change the conditions that prompted his proposals. In fact Meyer believes the creation of a NMAC is even more relevant today.

In 1982 it was difficult for me to find the time to wear both hats. The Cold War and a bipolar world was less complicated than a world where the United States is the only superpower and there are many "hot spots." The bipolar world provided a framework with which to quickly and accurately evaluate conflicts and their impact on US vital interests. Minus that framework, this process is much more complicated and time consuming for the JCS and the National Command Authority. This problem is exacerbated by the time and effort required to downsize the armed forces. Expert military advice is more critical because fewer members of Congress, the President and his advisors, served in the military.71

The Council would be made up of a distinguished four star flag officer from each Service (not the current Service Chief), picked from the retired list or serving their
final assignment before retirement. General Meyer did not discuss the specific qualifications for Council membership. Possible prerequisites include Service as a CinC or on the Joint Staff. Former Service Chiefs also seem particularly well qualified for the Council. However, their membership could prompt accusations of parochialism—charges that the NMAC is nothing more than a repackaged JCS.

In 1982, General Meyer included a civilian State Department representative as a full NMAC member. Today, he would expand what has become known as an inter-agency approach and add a second civilian, an economist. This emphasis on economics supports Secretary of Defense Aspin's view that the poor performance of the US economy is one of the four principle threats facing the nation. General Meyer is a trained economist, however, he feels few senior officers are schooled in economics to the degree required for high level defense decision making. In addition, civilian representation facilitates the inter-agency perspective and coordination required for many of today's non-traditional missions.

The NMAC would allow the Chiefs to totally focus on Title X responsibilities—organizing, training, and equipping their individual Services. They and their staffs could propose and lobby for initiatives designed to support the national military strategy. The NMAC, with input from the CinCs, would evaluate the proposal, prioritize it along with other defense initiatives, and formulate the final resource advice to the NCA. General Meyer added that "a recommendation from the NMAC would add credibility to the Chiefs' program or proposal."74

The major advantages of the NMAC over the current JCS system are threefold. First, the make-up of the Council is intended to end the perception that joint advice—especially resource advice—is invariably tempered by Service parochialism and ignores economic realities. Second, the NMAC maintains military expertise in the body charged with recommending cross-Service operational resource advice to the CJCS and civilian decision makers. And finally, the NMAC establishes a full time Council whose members can focus on the formation, implementation, and resourcing of a viable national military strategy designed to protect US interests in the post-Cold War world.
General Staff

Goldwater-Nichols establishes joint officer management policies designed to attract and force high quality officers to the Joint Staff. Title IV was a compromise between the military and supporters of a General Staff. The principal argument against a General Staff has always been that it would threaten civilian control of the military. The German experience—especially Nazi Germany—was consistently raised as an example of a General Staff gone amuck. In the four years of Goldwater-Nichols hearings, successive historians pointed out that the Germans never had a General Staff. They emphasized that civilian control of the military is such a strong, consistent, and essential element of our culture, it would not be threatened if the United States moved to a General Staff.

Goldwater-Nichols attempts to create a joint culture capable of competing with established Service cultures without establishing a General Staff. There are indications that Title IV has failed in its attempt to legislate legitimacy.

First, the Services have had difficulty promoting JSOs "at a rate not less than the rate for all officers of the same armed force in the same rate and competitive category." Furthermore, a more meaningful measure, given the intent of attracting the Services' best officers to joint duty, is what percentage of officers promoted below the zone (e.g. ahead of their contemporaries) are JSO qualified. In Army year groups 1971-76 there are 291 officers who have been promoted below the zone. Of those officers only 49, or 17 percent, are joint qualified. In year group 1971, the primary year group for the 1995 Brigadier General board and the first to be constrained by the 1994 expiration of waivers, there have been 20 officers promoted below the zone. Today, only 4 (20 percent) are joint qualified and, thus, would not require a GOS Waiver. Figure 2 (page 26) demonstrates that the Services have made little progress getting officers joint qualified before they are promoted to flag rank. To date, experience indicates that Title IV without transitional waivers is unworkable.

Second, Title IV did nothing to change the perception that officers serving on the Joint Staff who put jointness ahead of Service interests run the risk of Service retribution. Senior leaders have denied this is the case and they may be right. Nevertheless, as long as this perception is widely held there will be an inherent bias
in Joint Staff products. This is analogous to members of the President's staff who were born and live in Virginia feeling "we are first Virginians, and second, citizens of the republic."

Third, the requirement to be JSO qualified before promotion to flag rank smacks of "ticket punching." If there is a shortage of joint billets when compared to the size of the officer population competitive for promotion to general officer, competition for those slots once transitional waivers expire could create a new generation of sycophants like the fictitious Courtney Massingale. This prerequisite has improved the quality of officer serving on the Joint Staff. However, these same officers must return to their Service for the jobs and exposure required to stay competitive for senior leadership roles. You can't move to the top of the Joint Staff—or any Service—by remaining on the Joint Staff.

The NMAC should be supported by a General Staff which is independent of all the Services. It must be responsible for managing personnel and assignments and be given the authority to evaluate performance and promote General Staff officers. This would allow the General Staff to attract the best and the brightest officers from all the Services to a career path offering upward mobility (i.e., promotions) and positions of responsibility comparable to the Services.

General Meyer did not propose a General Staff and he is unsure whether he would support it today. In 1982, he feared it would be viewed as creating a more powerful Chairman than politically acceptable. Today, he agrees that Title IV is not working as intended. Nevertheless, he is concerned that a General Staff would be manned by officers who, over time, would lose their warfighting skills. This same objection was voiced during the Goldwater-Nichols hearings. Figure 3 (page 27)
shows the changes in institutional roles if the NMAC and General Staff replaced the JCS and the Joint Staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Goldwater-Nichols</th>
<th>NMAC/General Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCA (President and NSC)</td>
<td>- Expect credible Joint operational advice.</td>
<td>- Expect credible military operational and resource advice.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rely on other than military advice when making resource decisions.</td>
<td>- Perception of Service conflict of interest diminished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>- Receives military advice from many sources.</td>
<td>- Confident that CJCS/NMAC will provide credible resource advice.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Growing reliance on OSD staff for policy and program initiatives.</td>
<td>- Relies on CJCS/NMAC for policy and program initiatives; relies on OSD Staff for program implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Relinquishes leading role in policy and program development, assumes major role in policy and program implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>- Influence policy/strategy.</td>
<td>- Civilian oversight of Service Headquarters focused on Title X responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>- Primary advisor to the NCA, quality staff provided by the Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Advisory Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Gives credible, uninhibited joint advice to CJCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Time to evaluate threats to US interests and efficacy of &quot;non-traditional&quot; missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint/General Staff</td>
<td>- Quality staff, dependent on parent Service for promotion and career enhancing jobs.</td>
<td>- Separate/parallel career path, personnel and promotion system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Chiefs</td>
<td>- Dual-Hatted.</td>
<td>- Prior Service experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Can make end run to Congress if in disagreement with CJCS.</td>
<td>- Separate and legitimate Joint culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Staffs</td>
<td>- Preeminent staff for Service resource issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCs</td>
<td>- Major voice in recommending resources to support operational plans.</td>
<td>- Advocate for Service interests in keeping with Title X.</td>
</tr>
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The process the Services used to establish the Acquisition Corps is a good, albeit incomplete, model for creating a General Staff. Officers could volunteer or be requisitioned at different stages in their career. Some after successful Lieutenant Colonel/Commander level command, others after Colonel/Captain level command, and
a few after selection to flag rank. There would be two separate tracks: A Service track and a General Staff track. General Staff officers would be sent back to the field periodically for a Service sabbatical designed to ameliorate the ivory tower syndrome and to regain operational currency. Further, Service officers could be sent to the General Staff to provide a field perspective and to receive a General Staff orientation.

CinCs and Deputy CinCs could be a mixture of Service and General Staff flag officers. If the CinC is a General Staff officer, his deputy would come from the Service track. A portion of the unified commands would be designated as General Staff commands, with the others remaining as Service command billets. The command of Army divisions and corps—and comparable commands in the Navy, Marines, and Air Force—would be filled by flag officers from the Service track. However, General Staff flag officers could be kept Service current, by assigning them as deputy or assistant commanders (e.g., Assistant Division Commander Maneuver or Support). Service Chiefs would be chosen from officers who remained in the Service track, the CJCS (a former CinC) from the General Staff.

Given that the General Staff would take the lead in resource issues, it would be most likely larger than the Joint Staff. If the joint career track does not attract the number and quality of officers required, the General Staff must have access to personnel records and the authority to requisition qualified candidates from the Services.

Why The Military Must Lead This Reform

Congress has been and will remain a major obstacle to JCS reform since it may have the most to lose. Testifying before the HASC in 1982, John Kester said:

The attitude of the Congress towards the JCS has been essentially opportunistic. When it has appeared that there might be profit in it, members of Congress occasionally have tried to play off the chiefs against their civilian superiors, though usually without much success. As a whole, the Congress has appeared happy to have the JCS remain a weak, compromise organization.

Kester's observations remain valid today. While Goldwater-Nichols made the Chairman and the Joint Staff stronger, most would agree that the JCS was weakened. Therefore, will the pressure to reduce the deficit and maintain an adequate defense
allow the Congress to support the kind of defense reorganization proposed by this study?

There is recent precedent for Congress relinquishing power to an institution like the NMAC. To de-politicize the process of base closing, an essential element of downsizing and cutting the defense budget, Congress created the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991 (PL 101-510). Congress ceded authority to a commission because experience showed it needed to "shield members from the anguish—and the political hazards—of picking which bases to close." The NMAC would not have the autonomy of the Base Closing Commission. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for partisan political attacks to discredit advice formulated by a Council of distinguished military and civilian leaders. The politics of individual resource issues could require that a select group of members criticize advice formulated by the NMAC. However, for any single issue a majority of Congress could hide behind the prestige of the Council when making difficult resource decisions.

Conceivably, the most prominent hurdle to meaningful reform, at least for the next four years, is Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. Investigative reporter Bob Woodward said this about Aspin:

For years, Aspin has said it is necessary to ask three questions about any major political fight in Washington, no matter how important or fleeting. Those three questions are, according to Aspin: One, what is the fight really about? Two, who will win and who will lose? Three, what are the true implications. If the JCS were abolished and the advice provided by the NMAC gained credibility, the OSD staff would be the bigger losers.

Aspin came to the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—"the father of Pentagon systems analysis process that has already played a significant role in Aspin's development and is likely to play a large and controversial role in his time as Pentagon chief." If a General Staff were established, it ultimately would take the lead in defense policy and program development and the OSD Staff would be relegated to just a major role in implementation. It is doubtful that Aspin will be the instigator of any reform that would cause this kind of realignment. If defense
reorganization is going to happen today, the leadership of the active duty military—like Jones and Meyer in 1982—will have to take the lead.

**Conclusion**

Goldwater-Nichols made the Chairman the principle advisor to the NCA and strengthened the Joint Staff. Nevertheless, the negative reaction to the Chairman's "Roles and Missions Report" indicates that his advice is being discredited by the perception that the JCS is incapable of making difficult resource choices.

The challenges of the post-Cold War period require replacing the JCS with an independent NMAC and the Joint Staff with a General Staff. Ending dual-hatting would allow the Service Chiefs to focus on their Title X responsibilities where they should be parochial. As a full time Council, the NMAC would be capable of evaluating non-traditional threats to US interests and providing credible, uninhibited joint advice to the CJCS. Title IV provisions have improved both the quality of the officers and the product associated with the Joint Staff. Nevertheless, they have failed to create a joint culture capable of competing with the predominant Service cultures. Establishing a General Staff would create a separate career path and a credible joint culture.

Neither Congress nor the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense is likely to initiate reform. Instead, they have announced that they will conduct their own examination of roles and missions. Secretary of Defense Aspin will direct a "bottom up review" and Senator Nunn indicated that "it's going to be the Congress and the President that are going to have to take a look at" roles and missions. If the Armed Forces are to serve the nation effectively in confronting the challenges which lie ahead, the military must take the lead in advocating reforms which eliminate the perception that no ideas get very far that do not have the backing of each of the military Services. The world continues to change. The time has come for the US military to do the same.
ENDNOTES


3 Many say this was the case when the "whiz kids"—and Les Aspin was one—ran the Pentagon under Robert S. McNamara.


7 Meyer, 84.

8 Meyer, 83.

9 Jones, 62-72.

10 Meyer, 89.

11 Meyer, 89.

12 Meyer, 89.

13 Meyer, 87.


15 Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI.), Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA.) Alice Rivlin, William Perry and R. James Woolsey—all prominent in the Clinton Administration—were members of the CSIS study group that wrote the report.


18 Locher is currently the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations for Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

19 HASC Hearings 1982, 541.


21 HASC Hearings 1982, 538.

22 Jones, 64-65.

23 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Services (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 February 1993) xi-xii.


26 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions, x.


30 Goldwater-Nichols, Title II, Sec. 152, para. (c).

31 Goldwater-Nichols, Title II, Sec. 151, para. (d).

32 Goldwater-Nichols, Title II, Sec. 163, para. (c).

34 HASC Hearings 1982, 508.


36 Goldwater-Nichols, Title II, Sec. 155, para. (e).


39 Meyer, 86.


42 McPeak, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

43 Ehlert, personal interview, 16 March 1993.

44 McPeak, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

45 Goldwater-Nichols, Title II, Sec. 151, para. (a)-(e).


49 McPeak, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

50 Sullivan, personal interview, 12 March 1993.

51 HASC Hearings 1982, 548.


53 Powell, letter to the author, 10 March 1993.
54 Besides FORSCOM, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic will merge under this single CinC. It is also interesting to note that General Powell was FORSCOM Commander before becoming CJCS. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Services: xii.

55 McPeak, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

56 McPeak, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

57 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum, 10 February 1993.

58 HASC Hearings 1982, 549.

59 Interview with Senator Sam Nunn, Meet the Press, NBC, WRC, Washington DC, 21 March 1993.

60 HASC Hearings 1982, 552.

61 Goldwater-Nichols, Title IV, Sec. 661, para. (c).

62 Goldwater-Nichols, Title IV, Sec. 662, para. (a), (3) and Sec. 404, para. (e).

63 Powell, letter to the author, 10 March 1993.

64 Ehlert, personal interview, 16 March 1993.

65 Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel (DCSPER), Briefing Packet, subj. "General Officer Joint Duty Qualification," undated.

66 DCSPER Briefing Packet, undated.

67 Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) said the Navy would ask that the "nuclear exemption" be continued. General McPeak thought there were conflicts between keeping pilots operationally proficient and meeting Title IV requirements. And finally, General Sullivan hinted that he would ask Congress to extend the deadline for existing waivers. Personal interviews.


69 Goldwater-Nichols, Title IV, Sec. 3. Policy.

70 HASC Hearings 1982, 500.


Goldwater-Nichols, Title IV, Sec. 662, para. (a), (3).

DCSPER Briefing Packet, undated.

The source of the Figure 2 (below) is DCSPER Briefing Packet, undated.

Courtney Massingale is the Army careerist in Anton Meyer's great novel Once An Eagle.


Figure 3 is patterned after a chart entitled "Institutional Roles Under Three Options," in General Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS-How Much Reform Is Needed?," Armed Forces Journal International April 1982: 87.

HASC Hearings 1982, 523.


Aspin address, 25 March 1993

Nunn, Meet the Press, 21 March 1993.