IRAQ: A Long-Term Project

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AND
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Seminar J
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“It is possible to get Iraq right and get the rest of the world wrong.” – Bill Keller 1

INTRODUCTION

Policy with regard to Iraq must take into account three levels of strategy:

(1) Achieving policy objectives by means short of war;
(2) Advancing policy objectives through war;
(3) Achieving objectives by various means incorporating the post-war policies.

These options cannot be considered in isolation for they are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlapping and complementary. The U.S. must be prepared to back up diplomacy with a credible threat of force. Conversely, as Clausewitz noted, “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” 2 And after the war, one must have a strategy to manage the peace.

In the early stages of developing strategies, U.S. strategists must think ahead up through the possibility that war cannot be avoided, as well as how the U.S. intends to achieve its objectives in the post-war period. Regardless of the strategies ultimately adopted and employed, the U.S. should not lose sight of its national interests and key goals regarding Iraq:

1. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
2. Long-term regional stability
3. Economic stability

Among the key issues that U.S. policy makers must consider is whether any of these goals can be achieved as long as the current regime remains in power in Iraq. Therefore, regime change may become an unavoidable prerequisite – or consequence of U.S. policies.
The Bush Administration must also pay serious attention to a fourth and much broader goal: cultivating international support for U.S. policies among international organizations, foreign governments and foreign publics. These are largely the roles of “traditional diplomacy” and “public diplomacy”. Policies and actions that are perceived as hegemonic and ignore the local context will ultimately undermine the key objectives. Equally important, the U.S. must effectively counter Iraqi disinformation while revealing the true nature of the Iraqi regime.

As events unfold, the Administration must be flexible in its approach, modifying strategies to fit emerging situations and applying the instruments of national power in the most effective way. The first part of this strategy will focus on common considerations among the approaches. Latter sections will deal with the three levels of strategy.

ASSESSING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT:

Before attempting to develop any strategy, one must be sure to understand the enemy, his Centers of Gravity (strengths and weaknesses), as well as one’s own.

Centers of Gravity: Iraq:

Regime survival is the key center of gravity from which all others flow. Saddam Hussein has staffed his government and security forces and has created his power base from family, clan, Ba’th Party, Sunni Muslims; others he has co-opted through divide-and-conquer strategies; those groups’ allegiances to Hussein are based upon the privileges they enjoy (e.g., his inner circle of security forces, the Special Republican Guards and the Republican Guards), the guilt they share in the brutality of the regime, and fear of that brutality. The overlapping nature of the security
forces, which monitor each other and Iraqi society, further enforces that allegiance. Many of these individuals and groups will be resistant or reluctant to abandon support of Hussein. Some will be convinced that the costs of defection will be outweighed by the risk of war with the U.S. Still others will be all too glad for the opportunity to shed their obligations to a ruthless dictator.

Repression, without regard for human rights, is used routinely as a tool of state security against political opponents, religious minorities and their families. Kurds and Shi’ites in the northern and southern “no-fly zones,” respectively have vested security interests in opposing the Iraqi regime, as do those suffering in central Iraq, creating centers of gravity which may be exploited. However, mass media and communications in Iraq are tightly controlled. Disinformation and anti-American propaganda is spoon-fed to Iraqi citizens by the government. Thus, it is difficult to gauge how Iraqis within Iraq would react to foreign intervention. One must assume they would be wary at best. Therefore, intensive information campaigns would be necessary to effectively exploit Hussein’s mistreatment of his own citizens and engender Iraqi support for U.S. and coalition policies and actions.

This need to recast U.S., UN and coalition policy in a more positive light applies not only to audiences in Iraq, but those in the region and throughout the world. Saddam Hussein has effectively tapped into widespread anti-Americanism and Zionism by cleverly casting himself as a defender of Islam and the Arab world. A strong network of U.S. allies in the region will be necessary to maintain the lines of communication and supply for any future military operations.

Literally, the oil that greases the Iraqi war machine is… the oil! Oil revenues from black market sales outside the Oil for Food Program, finance the regime’s conventional military, weapons of
mass destruction programs and the lavish personal lifestyles of the privileged elites. While there are political reasons for not cracking down on oil smuggled through Turkey and Jordan, U.S. strategy must address this critical center of gravity if it is to seriously address the development and production of the most serious and immediate concern: weapons of mass destruction.

It is a matter of record that the Iraqi regime has developed – and used – weapons of mass destruction (WMD), notably chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and subsequently to suppress Kurds in northern Iraq. Weapons inspectors confirmed their existence in the mid-1990s as well. “Since … 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program (and that) according to the CIA, “how quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.” Therefore the potential threat is real. It is not clear that the threat is imminent. This is an important factor as the U.S. considers the timing of its strategies.

**Centers of Gravity: U.S.**

Ever since Vietnam, Americans’ support for war and an extended military presence in far-flung corners of the world has been questioned. This same concern has already begun to play out regarding Iraq. The lack of any link between al Qaeda and Iraq, concerns about “going it alone,” and a desire to let UN inspectors have a good look around further strengthen the case of those who advocate caution.

On the other side, strong believers in U.S. technological superiority, military might & moral conviction ooze with confidence (or perhaps overconfidence) regarding the prosecution and
outcome of forceful action against Iraq. However, terrorists have seen that the U.S. can be attacked on its own soil. As it considers battling Saddam Hussein on the ground in Iraq, the Administration must be aware of the increased threat of terrorism at home at the same time it faces serious issues and multiple commitments, both at home and abroad: Homeland Defense, Korea’s nuclear program, Persian Gulf, transnational issues (narcotics, WMD, terrorism).

Globalization cuts both ways, and the U.S. must realize that it cannot go it along in Iraq. Yet the difficulties of building and holding together a coalition against Iraq have been evident since the end of the Gulf War. Based upon previous experience, Saddam Hussein is likely to attack this center of gravity by cooperating just enough to wear down the coalition.

One of the most critical U.S. centers of gravity remains is American policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. While the U.S. sees no practical link between that issue and Iraq, many Arabs and Muslims do. For example, there is a widespread belief among Arabs and Muslims that Israel controls U.S. policy in the Middle East. U.S. actions and reluctance to publicly pressure Israel often seem to reinforce that impression. Saddam Hussein has effectively portrayed himself as a defender of Islam against the infidels: the U.S. and Israel. Support of allies in the region is critical for both ongoing efforts to monitor Iraq’s activities and points from which to stage possible military activities.

**GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS:**

- Regime security is Saddam Hussein’s priority.
- Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons and is pursuing nuclear weapons.
• Iraq will not use Chemical Weapons (CW) or Biological Weapons (BW) against U.S. territory, but might use them against invading coalition forces if they threatened the regime or launch attacks against Israel or Arab neighbors to change the focus of the war. While Iraq is less likely to provide WMD to terrorists who would attack U.S. interests, the possibility must be considered.

• Hussein views Bush as intractable on regime change, so he will methodically attempt to drive a wedge between coalition members and the more accommodating international community by demonstrating just enough cooperation to build international pressure for a lifting of the sanctions and break apart any coalitions.

*****MEANS SHORT OF WAR*****

“Intelligence means knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us … the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policy makers.” -- Sherman Kent

Effective strategy requires a clear understanding of the enemy. The Chinese military strategist “Sun Tzu believed that … war was to be preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win” and that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Before we can proceed to advanced stages of strategy, we must begin to undercut the Iraqi regime’s centers of gravity. Of particular concern are the popular support Saddam Hussein enjoys among ordinary Arabs and Muslims throughout the region and the anti-Americanism he feeds with his propaganda. These two factors, if not addressed, will hamper the ability of the U.S. to carry out its strategy.
Reliable and credible intelligence is another essential component for developing sound strategies. However, information on Iraqi military strengths (both conventional and WMD) and understanding of the closed Iraqi society are lacking, indications that the foundation for implementation of a successful military strategy is not yet firm. Therefore, the U.S. must pursue better intelligence on Iraq.

**STRATEGIES & TACTICS**

_The following activities should be taken concurrently. Many of them will continue should it be necessary to advance to subsequent levels of action incorporating war and post-war strategies._

(1) **COVERT ACTION (CA):**

The U.S. needs to begin now to identify and cultivate links to potential supporters and allies within the indigenous Iraqi population. External opposition groups cannot give policy makers an accurate picture of the situation on the ground in Iraq. The emergence of a returning expatriate leadership will be construed as a U.S.-imposed government.

U.S. intelligence agencies must engage in intelligence gathering within Iraq, most likely through intermediaries, in order to probe weaknesses of the regime and its security apparatus, as well as to plant seeds of division. A key aspect of such a strategy would be to develop and strengthen contacts with local tribal leaders in both “no-fly zones” to increase pressure on the regime’s flanks. Those contacts should then be used to develop contacts within central Iraq. Tribal leaders throughout the country may be receptive to offers of money and or eventual development assistance.
But money alone does not buy loyalty. Strategists must help to develop local administrative infrastructure in the North and South, to outflank the regime and demonstrate U.S. commitment to those groups. Then follow through on those commitments. The U.S. probably needs to reestablish credibility with the Shi’ites in the South who were essentially abandoned by the U.S. after the Gulf War.

The Administration should refrain from providing lethal assistance or undertaking covert actions designed to assassinate Saddam Hussein or to foment a coup. The concentric rings of security around the Iraqi president make such efforts risky and unlikely to succeed. Exposure of such plots would put both the U.S. and the local contacts in difficult and dangerous positions. Rather, the purpose of CA would be to develop a fertile and receptive climate for possible military action later, such as “intelligence, sabotage, information warfare, secure communications and liaison work. The CIA can help prepare the battlefield, ease U.S. military operations, disrupt Iraqi defensive efforts, and lay the foundation for a new government in Iraq.”

(2) ENGAGEMENT

The United States must proactively engage in two-way dialogue and diplomacy in the Middle East and the Muslim world. Even though U.S. diplomats have rarely enjoyed any access to Iraqi society, the total absence of an “on-the-ground” presence handicaps our ability to make contact with either influential elites or potential dissidents. We should not make that mistake among Iraq’s neighbors.

(a) With the United Nations: By the very nature of their role, U.N. inspectors will provide essential (even if incomplete) information and insights on the status of Iraq’s WMD programs.
Furthermore, determined efforts at collaboration with the U.N. offers the Bush Administration an opportunity to undermine the pervasive perception that the U.S. acts only unilaterally in its own interests. For example, be flexible on language of the new UN resolution on Iraq: drop “material breach,” in favor of “Past violations of UNSC Resolutions raise grave concerns over the status of Iraq’s WMD programs, requiring a robust inspections program and strict adherence to existing UN resolutions on Iraq.” The U.S. must continue to make the case that, if the U.N. seeks to be a credible organization, it must strictly enforce its own resolutions and international laws!

The current timetable, from approval of the new resolution to the inspection team’s first detailed report, is about four months. Therefore, the Administration should intensify its diplomatic efforts and continue to forward deploy military material until full, verifiable inspections have determined that no WMD programs exist. If and when it is confirmed that Iraq is in violation of UNSC resolutions, the Administration should accelerate troop deployments.

The Administration should also begin planning how WMD would be destroyed if discovered in Iraq so that removal or disarming of weapons can proceed immediately upon discovery.

(b) Diplomatic efforts in the region:

Since 1990 virtually all of our diplomatic exchanges and contact with the Iraqi people have been transmitted indirectly through intermediaries and international media. This is unfortunate. The Bush Administration should not make that mistake with other nations in the region, where independent polls by Zogby International indicated virtually no support for U.S. policy towards Arab nations and Palestinians among those surveyed in the eight countries polled. The U.S. must begin to reverse the surging tide of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and counter disinformation through a robust, diplomatic re-engagement. Saddam Hussein is gradually gaining
inroads diplomatically with Arab leaders (e.g., rejoining the Arab League in 2000) and gaining public support among Arabs and Muslims in the region. The dearth of references by President Bush to diplomacy and public diplomacy raise serious concerns among both allies and enemies regarding U.S. unilateralism, while his repeated references to “military” and “war” further raise tensions.

U.S. diplomacy must be take the long-term view. Our influence and popularity declined over a long period of time. Some of the solutions to our problems in the region cannot be solved at the barrel of a gun. Increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and staff deployed in the region and training them in language and culture will help recreate the binds of friendship and understanding that are critical to restarting a dialogue. One way to address the current shortfall in qualified officers is to create and deploy a “Foreign Service Reserve Officers Corps” of retired FSOs to address the current gap. The real effectiveness in diplomacy is the ability to bridge “the last three feet” that separates us from others. 10

Appointment of a senior Arabic-speaking American diplomat, as Special Envoy for Iraq, resident in the region would demonstrate a preference for a diplomatic solution in accordance with U.N. resolutions, and a desire to engage in direct and open dialogue throughout the region. It would also hopefully open the door for American diplomats to visit central Iraq beyond Baghdad, with international journalists in tow, including Middle Eastern journalists.

As noted already, no widespread support for U.S. policy can be achieved without progress on the Middle East Peace Process. We need to renew our calls for an end to the provocative Israeli settlements in the West Bank, while condemning the violence on both sides.
(c) Public Diplomacy:
In order to counter Iraqi disinformation in Iraq and the region, we must make a serious short- and long-term efforts to positively affect foreign public opinion, especially among those disenfranchised populations who susceptible to extremist rhetoric and terrorists. One way to accomplish this goal, the U.S. must intensify radio and satellite TV broadcasting into Iraq and throughout the region and continue to arrange media opportunities with Senior Department officials, especially Arabic media.

Information campaigns must, at a minimum,

  o Highlight the atrocities of the Iraqi regime;
  o Pressure U.N. member states to enforce UNSC resolutions on Iraq; and
  o Clarify U.S. views of Islam.

A dramatic increase in funding for exchange, education, and youth programs would provide alternatives to the extremism of “madrasses” which are distorting the teachings of Islam for political reasons.

Therefore, our interactions with the populace should seek new ways to clarify our intentions – and all of our subsequent actions must reinforce those intentions to bring peace, stability and improved living conditions in Iraq.

(d) Foreign Aid:
In order to counter the claim that U.N. sanctions cause humanitarian suffering in Iraq, the U.S. should make a unilateral offer to provide a significant amount of food and medicines to Iraq apart from the OFP. We should begin stockpiling food and medicines at the borders and develop a plan
for a “pipeline” to replace them as they draw down. Since the Government of Iraq is unlikely to allow USG personnel in-country to carry out distribution, we should work out a plan to allow international non-governmental organizations to handle it, while ensuring that the origin of the aid is clear. The State Department should be prepared to highlight to the world that we stand ready to deliver, and note any instance in which Iraq is dragging its feet or diverting aid to the elite, at the expense of innocent civilian lives. International journalists, including those from the Arab world, should be invited to follow the program. Such aid, clearly identified with the USG, would enable us to both address the nutrition needs of Iraqis and deflect criticism of our position on sanctions by demonstrating that, while the U.S. is committed to help those who are starving, Saddam is diverting oil profits to weapons and personal enrichment. The Southern “no-fly zone” would be a good test case for aid delivery – as well as being provocative to the Iraqi regime in Baghdad. Delivery of food and medicines to the South provides the U.S. both humanitarian and public relations opportunities to demonstrate U.S. material support to Muslim populations, and to highlight the regime’s cruel treatment of its Muslim children in the South.

The Administration must also begin planning now for development assistance in a possible post-war scenario.

(e) Adherence to core US values:

One area where the U.S. has lost much credibility has been our contradictory support to authoritarian regimes and oligarchies while we extol the virtues of democracy to the general public. We must take the long view of our national interests over the perceived short-term benefits. For example, “The end of the Cold War has not brought about substantive changes in Washington’s Middle East policy, which is still preoccupied with stability and with security and
economic relationships, rather than with issues of democracy and human rights.” Our “friends” in the region must begin to see the light as well. Their – and our – shortsightedness on this point is only creating a greater crisis for the future, as the Zogby surveys already indicate.

*************** WAR*************

We advance the clock now to April of 2003. Compromise language of a new UNSC Resolution on UN inspections passed in November 2002 resulted in a somewhat vague compromise, calling for restraint of military action pending the first formal report of the Weapons Inspectors. The U.S. interprets that to mean “any report, interim or scheduled,” while France and Russia assert that it refers to the first report required at the 90-day mark of inspections. There is already strong and credible evidence of ongoing WMD programs (BW, CW and nuclear), and despite obvious, significant obstruction and interference in the inspections by Iraq, France and Russia are still reluctant to authorize the use of force.

“It is the inadequacy of all the other options toward Iraq that leads us to the last resort of a full-scale invasion… to smash the Iraqi armed forces, depose Saddam’s regime and rid the country of weapons of mass destruction.”

War should not be the first option in Iraq; however Saddam Hussein’s defiance of the UNSC and his international obligations, and the destabilizing threat he poses to the region – and the world – are clear indications that it may not be possible to achieve the stated objectives through the more pacific and diplomatic means. If war is undertaken, it must be consistent with the political objectives (stated in the introduction). To this point, efforts have been directed at weakening the
Iraq Strategy

Iraqi dictator’s influence and centers of gravity. The failure of diplomatic measures, international pressure and limited military interventions to effect changes in the attitude and actions of the Iraqi leadership should prompt the U.S. at this point to seriously consider whether regional security is possible without a commitment to regime change in Iraq.

Additional Assumptions:

If attacked, Hussein will commence with a defensive, conventional war to defend Iraqi territory and the regime; however he is unpredictable, so we need to be mindful of a range of actions he might take, especially if cornered or sensing the end of his regime. (e.g., possible use of WMD vs. coalition forces, Israel or neighbors who have abetted the coalition forces.) The U.S. will look for a gradual build up and a quick military campaign. Regardless, Iraq will exaggerate civilian casualties – and blame them on the U.S.-led coalition.

If the situation deteriorates for Hussein, he may attack on Israel with missile-borne weapons (conventional or WMD) or by terrorist infiltration (by either Iraqis or third parties). The U.S. should cooperate with Israel on security issues to prevent such attacks and, in the event one does occur, ensure that Israel is not drawn into a war. Middle East allies will be undertaking considerable political risks to support coalition efforts against Iraq. Saddam’s efforts to change the focus of the war to the Israeli-Palestinian problem would undermine their ability to support coalition efforts.

Long-term success of the strategy contemplates a broad, U.S.-led coalition, which will provide international legitimacy, as well as spread the costs and assets needed to conduct such a campaign.
Saddam Hussein may be willing to cede control of large parts of the southern Shi’ite-dominated “No Fly” zone in order to maintain control over the central, largely Sunni part of Iraq.

Due to weather, it may be less desirable to attack now (April) than during the November 2003 – March 2004 time frame. If attack is postponed, the coalition should use that time to prepare, and provide an opportunity to let the earlier “short of war” measures take root and begin to erode support for Hussein’s regime.

**Military objectives (Iraq)**

1. Hold on to the Central provinces of Iraq, the oilfields, palaces and WMD. These are the bases and tools of the Iraqi regime.

2. Adopt a defensive posture, hope for stalemate in a conventional war, while injecting enough pain to break the will of the coalition members and the U.S. public. Hussein will count on history repeating itself and attempt to “wait out” the coalition.

**Military Objectives (U.S.)**

1. Offensive war. Quick, overwhelming force, capture/removal Saddam and his lieutenants if possible. The Powell/Weinberger Doctrine will be employed to minimize effectiveness of any Iraqi resistance.

2. Minimize the risk of (but plan on ways to avoid or face) WMD on the battlefield.

3. Disarm Iraq.

4. Maintain an international coalition.

5. Minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. Establish good civil-military relations.

6. Convince Israel to stay out of the war, and to not retaliate if Iraq strikes Israeli targets.
STRATEGIES:

Attacking Iraq’s Centers of Gravity

“The keys to a successful invasion would be speed, momentum and initiative,” incorporating infantry, armor, artillery and air strikes to eliminate Iraqi air defenses in order to enable close air support to ground troops. Many of the strategies developed under the section “Measures Short of War” should be actively continued and enhanced to support the following military actions.

Military Actions:

If Saddam Hussein is in fact obsessed with regime survival, he will not waste his resources on areas of marginal interest. Therefore, we should move troops North from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and secure large portions of the Southern “no-fly zone.” Previous covert activities should have paved the way for collaboration between local, civilian populations and U.S. and/or coalition forces.

A robust and overwhelming show of troop strength will be an intimidating factor over the Iraqis. Quick and efficient military strikes should be used to weaken the strength and resolve of the elite Republican Guard units and provide close air support for ground troops. Air strikes to destroy artillery, radar and air bases and defenses. Regular forces should crumble more easily.

Activate emergency food and medicine supply to occupied areas from stockpiles and “pipeline” developed in the non-war strategy. Follow up as soon as possible with development assistance to rebuild, replant and get the economy moving.
Target likely WMD sites. The U.N inspections will have hopefully given us clues as to sites, either at sites they accessed, or sites where access was denied. Also target the presidential palaces, as symbolic of Hussein’s power base and as possible WMD facilities. Public diplomacy efforts could be enhanced by disseminating images of the interiors of the palaces, demonstrating the opulence of the regime’s lifestyle at the expense of starving women and children. Urban warfare will probably be unavoidable, especially in Baghdad, with closer media scrutiny than in less-accessible, non-urban areas.

Occupy the oilfields to rob the regime of the resources and revenues they generate. Disrupt smuggling operations (but be prepared to subsidize oil shipments to Jordan and other neighbors to lessen the economic impact).

Saddam Hussein’s use of CW or BW strikes would be an indication that he sees the end of the road, as it would be a clear admission of his WMD programs. As was demonstrated on 9-11, WMD attacks would likely engender worldwide sympathy for the victims of terrorism, condemnation of Iraq, and greater support for the international coalition to depose the Iraqi regime by use overwhelming force. Deployment of US troops should have been accompanied by all necessary countermeasures. The U.S. should be developing plans to capitalize on any such act to broaden the coalition and seek unconditional international support for regime change. Use of WMD against Iraq should be resisted strenuously as it would cede the moral high ground and thereby undermine the coalition’s justification for regime change.
SILVER BULLET

How does our strategy change in the unlikely event that forces within Iraq depose Saddam Hussein? “Given the weakness and disorganization of the ostensibly democratic Iraqi opposition, the most likely successor would be another strongman emerging from the existing political milieu and sharing its fundamentally hostile orientation.” Therefore, regime change may delay or modify the strategy, but will probably not derail it.

------------------------- POST WAR -------------------------

“Removing Saddam is no panacea. There is no escaping the U.S. role as a guarantor of Gulf security.”

Additional Assumptions:

The U.S. must remain engaged in a post-war Iraq for a long time, hopefully with considerable financial and security support from a broad coalition. There are few leaders inside Iraq who could lead the country post-Saddam. “Victory” (if defined in terms of regime change) followed by a quick U.S. withdrawal would create a power vacuum and conditions similar to Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew. Therefore, before choosing the military options of war, the Administration should consider the level of commitment of Congress and the American people to a long-term U.S. military occupation, and determine how to share the burden, perhaps as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission.
The Administration should harbor no illusions of “Jeffersonian Democracy” in Iraq. The internal opposition has been crushed, and Saddam’s policies have exacerbated the ethnic, tribal and religious tensions. Furthermore, Iraq’s neighbors will not necessarily wish to see a pluralistic, democratic society or a “shining city upon the hill” to give their own subjects ideas of political freedom. Nonetheless, a post-Saddam Iraq offers a unique opportunity to create a stable and prosperous Iraq and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the values we so often promote, but somewhat less often actively support, based upon a loose Federalism (North, Central, South) and territorial integrity of the current borders of Iraq.

If such a strategy is to succeed, all vestiges of Saddam Hussein’s patronage system and institutions of state security must be purged and rebuilt from the ground up. Hussein’s minions will continue insurgency against occupation forces. Their attacks and the casualties they inflict will increase pressure on the Bush Administration to disengage.

The leaders of the expatriate movement outside of Iraq may not have the moral weight of legitimacy to gain popular support within Iraq. Designation and Installation of a U.S.-picked successor to Saddam Hussein will undermine that government’s legitimacy.

Finally, we must be prepared, both physically and psychologically, to expect increased terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and sites around the world.

**Post War Objectives:**

The U.S. cannot hope to declare a military victory and depart Iraq. First among the post war objectives must be the dismantling of the institutions of state security while ensuring order and
security. This is a long term commitment, which includes the establishment of a viable interim administration, and institutions of government, while maintaining the territorial integrity of present-day Iraq. The Turks are vehemently opposed to an independent Kurdistan, although that region already enjoys great autonomy under the protection of forces enforcing the northern no-fly zone. Obviously in the post-war period, the coalition will have to provide security throughout Iraq.

****** CONCLUSIONS ******

It is possible to undertake measures short of war, both unilateral and multilateral in order to achieve some U.S. objectives in Iraq. These measures are also intended to both strengthen international coalitions, and to weaken the Iraqi regime to make it more vulnerable to military action and war, if those levels of intervention become necessary.

However, there may be no alternative to deposing Saddam Hussein in order to ensure long-term regional security. But regime change in Iraq should not be viewed as an event, but rather the beginning of a long process. Achieving objectives will require a tremendous commitment of resources, involving military measures to oust Saddam Hussein and ensuring a stable post-Saddam Iraq.

U.S. intervention and long term commitment are necessary components of an effective strategy. However, this commitment comes with significant risks, not only in Iraq, but also worldwide as terrorists and extremists attempt to exact revenge for U.S. actions.
Our efforts may enjoy greater legitimacy if we undertake action as part of a coalition to oust Saddam Hussein, and with participation of a broad-based coalition to re-make Iraq into a prosperous and peaceful nation.

Another key component of the Administration’s strategy must be to engage diplomatically and proactively throughout the world, with an emphasis on public diplomacy activities and covert action (particularly active measures and re-establishing on the ground assets. These types of engagement have been gutted during the past decade, and the effects are being felt particularly strongly in the Middle East, where anti-Americanism is on the rise. The U.S. can only combat these negative sentiments if our motives and our values are understood – and we understand them.

We can still win the war in Iraq and lose the rest of the world.
End Notes


3 Traditional diplomacy” being relations between governments, while “Public Diplomacy” reaches out directly to foreign publics.

4 “These violations, which have been committed by Iraqi military, intelligence and security personnel, have included "disappearances" of thousands of people, the extensive use of the death penalty, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary arrests, long-term detention without charge or trial, grossly unfair and secret trials, systematic torture of suspected political opponents, judicial punishments constituting torture or cruel, inhuman punishments, prisoners of conscience, and forcible expulsions.” Amnesty International Press Release, “Iraq : Release of political prisoners welcomed but much remains to be done,” News Service No. 187, October 21, 2002, at website: http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/MDE140172002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\IRAQ.


Based upon evidence presented by United Nations (UN) inspectors operating under a UN mandate following the 1991-1992 Gulf War alongside International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors concluded, “Iraq systematically concealed its nuclear weapons program and deceived inspectors who were attempting to uncover and destroy that capability.”

The inspectors also confirmed that Iraq attempted to conceal its chemical weapons (CW) program (Bailey, p. 35) and admitted having a program to develop an offensive biological weapons (BW) program (Bailey, p. 53). Furthermore, because of the Iraqis’ failure to cooperate, inspectors were never able to verify with any degree of certainty the extent of any of Iraq’s WMD programs. The expulsion of inspectors in 1998 has further undermined verification efforts; however, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contends that Iraq has continued its WMD programs in defiance of UNSC resolutions. )


7 Griffith, Samuel B., “Sun Tzu on War,” Introduction to Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 39 & 77, respectively.


10 Between the mid-1980s and the end of the 1990s, the U.S. overall foreign affairs budget declined by more than 50% in real terms, which translates into fewer people and programs on the ground, in favor of “new technologies.” Staffing in Embassies in the Middle East declined by 50%. Yet today we must face terrorists and despots who are at times more effective than we in using technology to their advantage, and individuals whose ignorance about the U.S. is in part compounded by never having met an American. And our own ignorance is based upon not really knowing or understanding them.


12 Pollack, p. 335.

13 Pollack, p. 341.
