IS THERE A NEW PEER COMPETITOR IN YOUR FUTURE?
How Will You Know?  What Should You Do About It?

Core Course 5 Essay

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See report
Nearly 50 years of Cold War experience has made the United States proficient at building coalitions to contain or defeat explicit military threats. We did it in Europe with NATO, prepared to fight a major war against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. We did it on an ad hoc basis in the Persian Gulf five years ago, putting together a multinational coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. We still do in Northeast Asia, with forces on the territories of two bilateral security partners, Japan and South Korea, to defend the latter against North Korea.

In the future, even with the Cold War over, these strategic needs will remain. The Soviet Union is gone, but Russia may fail to grope its way to democracy, and re-emerge eventually as a power with goals inhumal to ours. North Korea may collapse, and the Korean Peninsula be reunited peacefully under Seoul, but China is gathering strength, and shaking the status quo from the Taiwan Straits to the South China Sea. Iraq’s and Iran’s intentions remain of concern in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In these regions of established interest, though, the elements of U.S.-led containment strategies remain intact, anchored by presences of approximately 100,000 forward-deployed U.S. forces apiece in Europe and Northeast Asia. The U.S. strategic planning system, which has evolved in response to the threats to U.S. interests in these regions, is mindful of potential dangers ahead, and well-prepared to cope with them, year-to-year, as far as bureaucratic vision and the FYDP stretch. And the problems posed for U.S. strategy by our existing and potential adversaries in these regions are largely ones of adjustment in our current coalition arrangements and contingency planning.

What the U.S. strategic planning system is less prepared to do is identify, and take steps to counter well in advance, the protracted emergence of less familiar threats elsewhere, posed by new peer competitors in significant ways unlike those we have successfully faced in the past.

India, in South Asia, as an illustrative possibility. U.S. interests in South Asia today are less defined than in the Cold War. Then, our relationship with Pakistan strained already cool relations with an India advocating Nonalignment, a policy which irritated U.S. Cold War sensibilities, and warm relations with the Soviet Union, which Delhi took as a model for India’s economic development.

With the Cold War over, the region is now a theme park for functionalists. No nation there is regarded as an adversary. South Asian threats to U.S. interests are perceived to be nuclear proliferation,
arms buildups, radical Islamic influence, terrorism, and drug trafficking. U.S. strategic thinking about the region today is almost entirely in terms of the India-Pakistan confrontation, and its implications for nuclear proliferation. Both countries have vigorous nuclear programs — India exploded a nuclear device as long ago as 1974. It and Pakistan have amassed the material for a significant number of weapons, and are acquiring modern delivery means to target each other.  

U.S. security policy toward the region aims at impeding these developments and, secondarily, other transnational threats. Overall, the attention that South Asia gets in U.S. national security strategy, compared to other regions, is quite limited. It gets even less in our national military strategy, with our only "stationed forces" in the region prepositioned Army and Marine Corps equipment on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia (U.K.) — placed there with CENTCOM contingencies in mind. As one veteran observer of U.S.-Indian relations, during and after the Cold War, has pointed out, "we seemed uncertain — some would say uninterested in — how to fit India into the post-Cold War framework. It was almost as if the United States did not know what to make of India."  

ARE THERE LONG-TERM INDICATORS OF INDIA'S EMERGENCE AS A PEER COMPETITOR? Militating against an adversarial outcome is the fact that India and the United States are becoming more important economically to each other, with India's rising middle class estimated at perhaps as high as 200 million people today.  

Also on the negative side, seemingly, is that India is expected to be the world's most populous country in 20 years, growing from its present <1 billion to >1.4 billion people. The burden that this huge increase in a relatively short period of time will place upon resources, the environment, and the ability of government to administer effectively, will be heavy. But it also needs to be remembered that under these conditions, democracy in India, a country with a history of turbulence and political violence, aggravated by ethnic and religious divisions, may undergo serious challenges.  

And even a democratic India may grow more insistent upon the role of local hegemon, and see itself as on the way to becoming a Great Power. This is a possibility difficult for Westerners to grasp. Americans think of India as a Third World nation, but the timeless images of teeming poverty, unfamiliar religious practices, and "medieval" social customs and caste structure obscure the fact that India is becom-
ing determinedly modern in certain areas which will count heavily as elements of national power in the 21st Century. India is well endowed with the intellectual tradition, educational resources, technical skills, and mastery of the English language to do so. And with its economy on the upswing from the low point of five years ago, India is increasingly able to invest.

The question is, whether over the next 20 years India will choose to invest in butter, to lift living standards, or in guns — technological and military means of becoming a Great Power, perhaps to pursue the redistribution of wealth between the world’s North and South which India has long called for. If India chooses to move in the latter direction, it is already well advanced in certain promising areas of 21st Century national power. In addition to the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles already mentioned, India is also creating, among other indicators of future power:

- the world’s second Silicon Valley, making itself one of the foremost centers for software design in the world. India expects to be a major player in the information revolution — perhaps "the software equivalent of Taiwan" in the near future, in one Indian cybernetician’s words.

- a space program demonstrating that "India has advanced to the front rank of the world’s space nations." Within a few years, India will be independent of outside assistance in designing and placing communications, surveillance, and earth resources satellites in orbit. India already makes extensive use of satellite-broadcast television and radio to communicate with its people, and appears determined not to be bypassed in the communications revolution.

- large general purpose military forces, perhaps pushed farther in the direction of power projection. While Pakistan is India’s most pressing security problem, it also sees interests in the wider Indian Ocean area which have prompted it to acquire two aircraft carriers so far, and a number of Russian and German submarines.

One other factor to watch out for when speculating about India’s future capabilities: if Russia pulls itself together, we may see, in any renewed U.S.-Russian rivalry for influence in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Russia and India forming a new partnership akin to their old, with Russia providing the advanced weaponry needed to support Indian ambitions. The basis for such a partnership could be a mutual desire for redistribution of wealth, or mutual rejection of Western values, or mutual concern about China. In any event, if India is in the market for aircraft, submarines, and the like, Russia will almost certainly be selling.

WOULD THIS MAKE INDIA A SUPERPOWER LIKE THE UNITED STATES? Not in the sense that the Soviet Union was. India has too far to go, and is saddled with some burdens and attributes retarding progress. In some measures of power, the existing gap between the United States and India may actually grow.
But India may not need to match us in all dimensions of national power in order to compete in a strategic sense, any more than the Soviet Union needed, say, equivalent per capita income for its people. If a revolution in military affairs is taking place here through such things as precision strike, information supremacy, and space, for example, India will be able to counter U.S. advantages without possessing an equality of capability. Perhaps U.S. precision strikes will be rendered less meaningful by low-tech redundancy made possible by India's enormous population, and by U.S. unwillingness to slaughter huge numbers of 'natives' in full view of Indian television satellite-uplinked to CNN here at home. U.S. information dominance can be attacked by India's competence in cybernetics and software design, especially if Delhi chooses -- has already chosen? -- to make information warfare an Indian "Manhattan Project" over a long period of time. U.S. advantages in space systems may be offset by India's ambitious program. Our general purpose forces may be second to none, but they are far away.

WHAT WOULD AN INDIAN PEER-COMPETITOR STRATEGY BE? India's South Asian neighbors already resent its hegemonic behavior -- dominating the affairs of some, occasionally intervening militarily on the territories of others, and disparaging the South Asia Regional Council (SARC) as a forum for dealing with issues and softening India's behavior. Its acquisition of weapons with reach well beyond its immediate neighbors, like aircraft carriers and the 1500 mi. range ballistic missile India is developing, causes unease in Indonesia and Australia. Twenty years will not be nearly enough for India to rival the United States globally, but it may be enough for India to advance an ambitious agenda nonetheless. It will not possess nuclear forces comparable to ours, but may possess enough to intimidate others, and deter us from interfering. It will not master the technologies of the 21st Century as well as we, but may make sufficient progress to degrade our comparative advantages. It may not be able to project forces against COXUS, but it will not care to do so, and it enjoys enough distance from U.S. military bases to make it an effort for us to bring force to bear there. And its huge population, in a culture where life is plentiful, and therefore all too cheap, is likely to make India far less sensitive to high casualties than Americans are.

This suggests peer-competition on the margin, with military power combining low-tech quantity with high-tech quality in selected areas of high leverage:

- Ballistic missiles and land-based air to enhance India's position in a region remote from
bases of U.S. military power, yet through whose waters must pass Persian Gulf oil on its way to Europe and Japan

- selected military means to neutralize countervailing capabilities, like the submarines India has been buying -- quiet, very hard to detect, and lethal

- actualization of the point made by a former Indian chief of staff after the Gulf War. never fight the United States without possessing nuclear weapons of your own. India is unlikely to need assured destruction capability against U.S. cities to deter some U.S. responses to Indian actions on the other side of the globe

- and cyberwar, space, low-intensity, and unconventional military applications to neutralize our advantages, exploit our vulnerabilities, and erode our will and that of our allies

IS A CULTURAL DISCONNECT AT FAULT? There is little argument that India's economy has begun to turn around, since abandoning the command-economy model, and to register rapid growth. There is no argument that Indian scientific capabilities are making impressive strides in nuclear energy, ballistic missiles, space, cybernetics, communications, and similar areas. There is little question that India wants large general purpose forces as well, including a blue-water navy. And while it is often mentioned that India and the United States are both democracies, it is also true that their values and goals are very different. And yet India is seldom mentioned as a possible peer competitor in the years ahead.

Perhaps this is because of a cultural blindspot. The U.S. strategic planning system is not designed to identify and factor in the differences that culture makes in strategic thinking, our own and others'. Yet culture does make a difference. Nations prepare for and wage war in ways which embody their social and political development, which in turn reflects their economic nature as well. If it is true that nations fight the same way they make money, for instance, it comes no surprise that the U.S. approach to war has traditionally stressed our material superiority, the expenditure of hardware instead of people, the importance of technology and leverage, and the drive to win rather than be satisfied by limited goals.

It should also come as no surprise that we can be surprised by developments. U.S. businesses, the biggest and best of them, have often suffered strategic surprise in their own marketplaces, due to complacency, poor intelligence, a focus on short-term earnings and share price, and lack of appreciation for the harbingers and agents of change. Periodically, for these reasons, they lose some ability to compete. Think of business-superpower examples like the U.S. automobile industry, not recognizing the threat posed by Japan's until its hold on its own domestic market was jeopardized. Or IBM not recognizing in
the end of the 1970s how the computer market was changing, from hardware- to software-dominance, and, within hardware, from mainframes to PCs and workstations. Or perhaps most analogous of all for a sole superpower’ like the United States, the U.S. Postal Service not recognizing the threat posed, even in its legislatively protected market, by upstart niche competitors like UPS and FedEx, and new technologies like fax and e-mail.

The U.S. strategic planning system, emphasizing the current and short-term over the long-term, is likely to overlook unsuspected future peer competitors taking markedly different approaches to security, strategy and war. If India also makes war the way it makes money (the way it did before Nehru, when India ceased making money, but is beginning to again), through entrepreneurship not all that many steps removed from the ever-present bazaar, we may see a different approach to strategy—one emphasizing starting the bidding high, and ending up at the conclusion of strategic transactions at outcomes far lower, but ones which are still profitable because of (a) design content which appears striking to others because it is exotically unfamiliar, (b) cheap mass labor, (c) getting by with materials lesser in quality than parties of the second part suspected, or would use themselves, (d) manipulation of the purchasers’ perceptions, emotions, and thought processes, and (e) making one’s self scarce afterwards.

What will be different in the future is new value-added content from “third-wave” technologies, which offer India the opportunity to progress from a ‘first-wave’ preindustrial society to a ‘third-wave’ status without first having to fully develop and experience the ‘second-wave’ industrial status Nehru was pursuing unsuccessfully through socialist industrialization. India has traditionally used mass units of low-tech input to amass satisfactory overall gains, and may continue to do so. But India is also acquiring the high-leverage skills to get more out of mass low-tech inputs, and to compete against others’ comparative advantages in high-tech areas. How this may be applied to India’s national security and military strategy will bear close attention in the years and decades ahead.

HOW TO COPE WITH THE EMERGENCE OF NEW COMPETITORS? Given current trends, the United States is anticipating the need to concern itself in the early 21st Century with multithreat threats, with impressive capabilities-based threats to U.S. presence and operations in theaters of interest to us; with the need to able to operate across the CBR spectrum in all these theaters, and with less assurance about our
Allies, due to the end of the monolithic threat which characterized the Cold War

South Asia and India fall within PACOM’s area of responsibility, but for some perfectly good reasons they receive far less attention than security issues elsewhere. PACOM’s sense of enduring U.S. strategic objectives in its area of responsibility are:

- maintaining U.S. influence in the region,
- promoting regional environment of trust, cooperation, and stability,
- denying hegemonic control of the region,
- guaranteeing lines of communications,
- deterring armed conflict in the region, and
- enhancing interoperability

These are, each and every one of them, applicable to South Asia, except perhaps the last, since we have no particular allies or friends there today with which to enhance interoperability. But PACOM’s attention is more on East Asia than South Asia; more on “cooperative engagement” in the present than on identifying new potential adversaries in the future, more on the possibility of war soon (in Korea, or perhaps between China and Taiwan) than on strategic competition elsewhere over the long haul; and on Crisis Action Planning rather than Deliberate Planning — especially for presently nonexistent threats.

Deliberate Planning, and Adaptive Planning Options, may or may not cope well with these features reasonably well, but it is even less clear that our strategic planning system can a good job of dealing with the emergence of peer-competitors whose strategic thinking may prompt them to pursue courses of action and goals that seem unrealistic or even irrational to us.¹⁵

Can U.S. strategic planning become more innovative in this area? Sometimes it seems as if innovation can only occur in military affairs when there has been either a budgetary calamity or a resounding defeat; that in the absence of either — when victory encourages complacency, or when the budget cuts are sufficiently small or protracted that force posture is subjected only to incremental cuts — opportunities to synergize through new combinations of technology and doctrine may be lost, or the impending emergence of new and novel threats overlooked. Conscious today of “revolutions in military affairs,” the “quantum-leap” area where technology and doctrine intersect, the United States is trying to incorporate innovation of this kind into its planning, and may succeed. But we may remain less capable of identifying the protracted emergence of new peer competitors with approaches to strategy and war
We have done it before, and perhaps need to study in greater detail how The U.S. Navy found itself starved for funds in the early 1920s, and limited in numbers of capital ships by naval disarmament agreements. It began to redefine the future of naval warfare (after having played a very limited role in World War I), and also the future threat. It began to develop naval aviation as a new striking element, and aircraft carriers as a new platform to exert U.S. naval presence in peacetime and conduct operations at sea in wartime. In conjunction with the Marine Corps, it began to develop new concepts of amphibious warfare. It identified Japan as its most likely adversary in the future—before it emerged aggressively with Manchuria's takeover in 1931—and began developing Japanese-language capability in the Office of Naval Intelligence and creating listening posts in the Far East for Sigint and codebreaking. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Naval War College pursued an extensive series of wargames against Japan, with the lessons learned folded into our evolving ORANGE warplans for use against Japan.

All this did not come about purely by insight and foresight. To some extent, the Navy, to protect itself as an institution, fastened upon Japan as a reasonably likely future threat which would give meaning to the kind of warfare the Navy practiced. It built up a perception of the threat that supported the Navy's institutional interests long-term. It experimented with and designed new capabilities (fleet and supporting) to engage and defeat that kind of threat. And when the reality of a Japanese threat to U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific Ocean began to emerge in the 1930s, the Navy's shipbuilding budget was gradually restored, and it began to create the additional new force structure it would need. By the time the United States entered World War II in 1941, it had a core of naval air and amphibious capabilities well suited for war against Japan.

Nor was this a simple and single-minded undertaking. It was difficult intrinsically, due to conflicting doctrinal views within the Navy itself (the aircraft carrier vs battleship debate was only resolved after Pearl Harbor, where the Japanese succeeded in sinking or putting most of the latter out of action), and conflicting views nationally regarding the U.S. national interest, the relative priority to give Europe as opposed to Asia, the best national security strategy to pursue, and the resources to be allocated to it. This was an era in which European events continued to hold national attention, in which we increasingly came to Great Britain's aid there, in which the U.S. Army also underwent changes in technology and
DOCTRINE, and in which the Air Corps competing strategic claims were advanced

SO WHAT SHOULD WE DO? India has both Great Power and International Altruist personalities. While it asserts its primacy within South Asia, and appears to be reaching for political and even military power beyond it, it also has a record as an UN-oriented state given to multilateral conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The advantages of constructive relations with an India emerging from centuries of backwardness suggests that, before deciding that India will be an adversary one day, we try to make a friend of it. Despite differences, there are still reasons why India and the United States, with the Cold War over, and India now opening up as a market economy, may find mutual advantage in each other. As we have no shortage of adversaries, sound national security strategy dictates that the attempt be made.17

But the possibility of failure must be acknowledged. Analysts of India's strategic culture, looking at its religious and philosophical behest for men to live righteously, and strong belief in its own spiritual and intellectual superiority, discuss how these attributes translate into cultural arrogance as a pronounced element of its approach to the world.18 An India offered greater responsibility may still use its enhanced position and power in ways that harm U.S. interests. Such an India could, even more than before,

- actively present an alternative to international alignment with the U.S. and the West,
- champion the South's grievances and demands, both real and fancied,
- play power politics to dominate South Asia and the entire Indian Ocean littoral,
- undermine balance of power politics elsewhere in the world, and
- use its military power for its own aggrandizement while preaching nonmilitary solutions elsewhere by powers such as ourselves.

Should this India emerge, it should be possible for the United States to put together and lead a multinational containment policy toward India. Our partners could be not only Pakistan and other South Asian nations resisting Indian hegemony, but others beyond the region, such as major oil producers in the Persian Gulf, and Asian-Pacific states like Indonesia, Australia, and Japan. China as well might find it expedient to cooperate, though its own hegemonic behavior in East Asia and its illicit nuclear relationship to Pakistan are problems. Such containment could cause friction between the United States and Russia, but Russia might find a powerful and aggressive India not to its liking, if it began to meddle in Central Asia, the 'near beyond' once Soviet territory, and still regarded by Moscow as within Russia's
Even if Pakistan continues to be troublesome for the United States, it can remain a major element of a U.S. balance-of-power approach to India's containment, since in 20 years it will be the third largest country in the world, if not nearly as blessed as India with natural advantages permitting and encouraging economic growth and modernity. It should also not be difficult to exploit Indian internal divisions to weaken its will and capabilities, for the fault lines are many between its Hindus and Moslems, between its government and the restless Sikhs (who constitute a disproportionately large part of India's military caste).

Finally (to relate U.S. national security objectives to accomplishable military goals), we will need to overcome the present lack of a meaningful military presence in the region, such as we have in other regions of importance to us. But during the next ten years, while we explore a constructive relationship with India, the Korean situation will surely be resolved one way or another — hopefully in a peaceful manner. When that occurs, we can probably afford to shift some of our military power in East Asia elsewhere, and in fact we may have to. Of the considerable air, naval, and amphibious forces we presently have in Japan, then, it may prove wise to relocate them to western Australia, from whence they can maintain a stronger and more visible presence in the Indian Ocean area, in conjunction with existing arrangements like our access agreement with strategically located Singapore and our exercise programs with Thailand and Persian Gulf states.

By the end of the next twenty years, the United States should either make a friend of India, or have brought into being the elements of a containment policy to protect our own and our allies' interests. To fail to do the latter in the absence of the former could impose considerably higher costs upon us, and upon our interests from Europe to Japan.
FOOTNOTES

1 In the words of former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chauncey Freeman, quoted by Colonel Jason Greer USA, one of his South Asia country directors at the Department of Defense, February 8, 1996.


4 Contrast, for example, the gloomy status report in a work published only a few years ago, Robert L Hargrave, Jr., and Stanley A. Krehmke's *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 5th ed., 1993, pp. 385-89 ("The Politics of Economic Management"), and the current, and still-rising, annual growth rate of 5% in 1994, after the privatization push toward a market economy got underway (see the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's *World Factbook* 1995). With a growing gap between the incomes and living standards of India's expanding middle class and its several hundred million living in poverty, in an economic sense India may be becoming several societies, with resulting political fragmentation, and polarization along caste and ethnic lines as well. See Kenneth J Cooper, "India's New Economy: Does the Voter Care?", *Washington Post*, April 24, 1996, pp. A23, 27.

5 Shamim Zvonko Mohamed, interview with the author, February 26, 1996.


7 An interesting new challenge to the conventional thinking about the RMA, and what it may mean to be a strategic peer competitor of the U.S. in the years ahead, is "Peer Competitors, the RMA, and New Concepts" by Colonel Richard Szafranski, USAF, in the *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1996, pp. 112-19. Szafranski makes the point that "Goliath was scanning the horizon for Goliath and erred when he did not see a peer in young David." In most measures of national power taken seriously by Americans, except for population (of which India has too much, rather than not enough), India today is a David.

8 Something which would be within India's economic means, its capability to keep secret, and culturally appealing to it, according to Brig Gen Ikbar Singh (Indian Army, ret.), in a lecture at the National War College, March 5, 1996.

9 See Amb. Howard B. Schaffer, "South Asia After the Cold War," a talk at a joint conference between the National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies and Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., December 7-8, 1995, for an up-to-date look at South Asia's security politics.

10 And not alone in China, at which India's IRBM program is probably principally directed.

11 And India is no doubt smart enough to try to avoid an Indian Ocean battle of Midway, especially since it is learning from its two aircraft carriers that it takes time and considerable application to learn how to operate them effectively -- But 20 years to learn is more than the U.S. Navy had, from its first experimental aircraft carrier in the mid-1920s, the USS *Langley*, to the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

12 As Vice Admiral Arthur K Cebrowski, USN, suggested in a lecture on information warfare at the National War College on April 16, 1996.

13 And perhaps our desire to turn former adversaries into versions of ourselves.

14 Also, as an historical footnote, India had over a century's experience of being the prize in the Great Game played in Asia between England and Russia, and learned, at the very least, that Great Powers can be played off against each other, and that its own internal divisions allowed outsiders to manipulate Indians.
This seems more an epistemological problem than an intelligence (in the military sense) issue, but some U.S. intelligence experience is pertinent. Even in a region of considerable interest to us as Asia, and by a potential adversary which less than 40 years before had sunk a Russian Fleet, there was an inability on the part of American decisionmakers in 1941 to accept that the U.S. might be attacked by Japan, see David Kahn, *The United States Views Germany and Japan,* in *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars,* edited by Ernest R. May (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1984, pp. 476-501. The belief was general that Japan would not attack the United States, because of U.S. material superiority, he says (p. 497), "and it was from within this framework that they scrutinized the latest details of the intelligence picture."

Japan (as Ruth Benedict explained in her classic of strategic cultural anthropology, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946), decided to go to war against the U.S. even though it was aware of its great material superiority. The Japanese believed strongly in their own national and martial spirit, and were convinced that they would enable Japan to prevail over a U.S. that was materially rich but morally decadent and spiritually weak. Japan was a highly hierarchical society, and, having reached the pinnacle of hierarchy, had come to believe that it had the duty and mission to eliminate disorder in the rest of Asia and establish hierarchy there, expelling Western presence. Of course, if the U.S. erred in its reading of Japan, so did the Japanese in their reading of the United States. Having acted on the assumption that the U.S. would accept an attack on Pearl Harbor as the opening of a limited war which the U.S. would eventually accept losing, they discovered that American temperament was very different than expected, and American martial ardor virtually unlimited once passions were aroused.


While the U.S. and India have had a difficult relationship for many years, there are factors which are grounds for improved relations now. The U.S. and India are both democracies, and despite different cultures, and different views on many subjects, have some important political values in common. They also have in common strong attitudes toward a similar colonial past, both the positive features it left — the English language, certain similar traditions of political and administrative culture — and negative experiences, resulting in the common view that colonialism is exploitative. And then, India, like the U.S., is a diverse society struggling to preserve social cohesion. Some of the reasons for India's success parallel our own: the image of a national identity despite diversity, historical experiences like British rule and the struggle for independence, participatory democracy, and educational thrusts aimed at creating a national consciousness. And, like the U.S., in India a large military establishment is the servant, not the master, of policy. And now India is creating a burgeoning middle class, a vigorous business climate (with contract law prevalent, whose lack seriously impedes U.S. commerce in Russia and China), and rapidly-growing U.S.-Indian trade. There is a great deal of business that the two countries can do with each other, creating political constituencies in favor of good relations in both countries.

To make an attempt to create a constructive relationship with India, the United States should emphasize non-military instruments of national security policy in the decade ahead. At the heart of our approach should be the economic dimension, cultivated to the extent possible in the new trade and investment environment. The U.S. should also seek ways to make the political values held in common by the two countries the basis for international cooperation, including development of meaningful consultative organs promoting economic and political progress in the entire region. The U.S. should seek to mediate where possible between India and Pakistan in order to reduce the likelihood of war, now that the strains between Washington and Islamabad make the U.S. more or less equidistant between the two contending states. The U.S. should also consider supporting India's claim to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, since there is some justice in India's complaint that the world's South, with a majority of the world's peoples, and the source of great instability, conflict, and suffering in the world, is grievously underrepresented there.

Singh, op. cit.