STABILITY OPERATIONS: A CORE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY?

WENDELA C. MOORE

COURSE 5605
DOING MILITARY STRATEGY
PROFESSORS
DR. ILANA KASS
COL. JACK LEONARD

ADVISOR
DR. JANET E. BRESLIN-SMITH
### Stability Operations: A Core Warfighting Capability?

#### Abstract

see report

#### Subject Terms

The original document contains color images.

#### Security Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STABILITY OPERATIONS: A CORE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY?

Our job is fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Plain and simple.
General Henry Shelton, Chairman CJCS, 2000

We’re a military organization; we don’t have any experience running cities...
Unidentified U.S. Army colonel in Iraq

Si vis pacem, para pacem.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and the ensuing wave of state failures, military and civilian leaders and experts have debated who should carry out the tasks necessary to end conflicts and restore stability to war-ravaged populations. Many analysts argue that stabilization and the transition to “nation-building” are a job for civilians. Given the lack of alternative candidates for the job, however, stability operations are likely to remain a military responsibility for the time being. Nevertheless, many U.S. military strategists, both civilian and military, now appear to see stability operations not as the future of the U.S. military, but as an inconvenient bump in the road from the Cold War military to a future, “transformed” global force.

This approach could prove dangerous and self-defeating. A growing performance gap between unrivalled combat prowess and ad hoc, reluctant stability operations will ultimately foil our efforts to translate military dominance into greater national security. If that happens, military transformation will prove to have been a waste of time and resources.

This essay argues that it is imperative for civilian and military leaders to broaden their traditional combat-centered outlook and make a permanent, robust stability operations capability a core transformation goal. The first part will review the debate during the 1990s over the role of stability operations as the military adjusted to post-Cold War conflicts. The second part will address the range of challenges involved in

---


developing a strong stability operations capability and some suggested solutions, and argue that changes in outlook, training, force structure, and resource allocation can resolve these problems and achieve a robust, permanent peace operations capability.

II. The Continuing Debate: Are Stability Operations Still Important?

In the 1990s, the progressive breakdown of states from Somalia to Bosnia suggested to most observers that the U.S. military was facing a future composed primarily of “peace operations” rather than conventional warfare. Many military officers and civilian pundits alike were appalled at the prospect. They claimed that continual deployment of U.S. combat forces in the “dangerous diversions” of peace enforcement and nation-building (or as some put it, babysitting) in failed states would blunt readiness and dull the “warrior ethos” vital to the military’s core mission.

Proliferating terminology clouded the debate. While formal peacekeeping is a well-defined (albeit minor) military activity, the actions defined by various experts and Department of Defense Joint Publications as “intervention,” “strategic peacekeeping,” “peace building,” “peace support,” “peace enforcement,” “nation building,” and now “stability operations” fall along a hazy continuum. All, at some level, involve restoring basic security and services to civilians.

To compound the confusion, many of these tasks are included in the “civil affairs” mission when the U.S. engages in conventional interstate conflicts. Although some issues, such as the need to maintain impartiality, are specific to peace operations, the core tasks involved in peace operations and the post-conflict civil affairs mission are essentially the same, and both are necessary to end conflicts successfully. This essay therefore treats stability operations and civil affairs missions as part of a single broad capability.

Leaving definitional difficulties aside, it is clear that the multilateral peace operations of the Clinton era posed serious budgetary, training, and readiness challenges. In response, civilian and military leaders took steps to integrate peace operations more

---

5 Civil affairs objectives include, among others, “Assist or supervise the stabilization or establishment of civil administration in friendly, neutral, or hostile territory…provide those resources necessary to meet essential civil-military requirements. (Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, p. 101)
effectively into military capabilities, although *ad hoc* deployment and funding decisions continued to strain Defense Department resources. The Administration released Presidential Decision Directive 56, which laid out more systematic guidance for planning and decisionmaking on peace operations.\(^6\) Responding to complaints that peace enforcement was at odds with military doctrine, the Pentagon dutifully delineated a separate doctrine for peace operations, elaborated in the *Joint Publication on Military Operations Other Than War*. Training also developed rapidly; one out of five rotations through the Joint National Training Center focused on peace operations in the late 1990s, and staff colleges focused heavily on this area.\(^7\) In the mid-1990s, some members of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces argued that peace operations should be recognized as a core mission of the Armed Forces.\(^8\) In the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, Secretary Cohen predicted that peace operations would be the military’s most frequent challenge in the next decade.\(^9\)

*Are Stability Operations Still Relevant?*

The debate over peace operations receded, however, as the deployments of the 1990s wound down. By the end of 2002, there were fewer than 10,000 U.S. soldiers deployed in peace operations\(^10\), and policymakers began to concentrate on honing our already unmatched combat capabilities through transformation. The current national strategy, as defined by the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, does not even mention peace operations (now renamed stability operations), although they presumably fit under the catchall discussion of “complex contingency.” As the military mantra shifts from “shape, respond, and prepare …” to “assure, dissuade, deter, defeat…” and our

---


\(^8\) As delineated in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Antonia Chayes and George T. Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington: NDU Press, 1995), p. 10.) The 2002 version of this directive remains ambiguous on the subject; the Army is to prepare forces for “war and military operations short of war” but its primary function is defined as organizing, training and equipping forces “for combat operations on land.” On the other hand, stability operations are not explicitly defined as collateral missions, as is interdiction.

\(^9\) Quoted in Rose, p. 141.

\(^10\) Not counting Afghanistan.
political emphasis shifts away from Wilsonian multilateralism, peace operations appear increasingly vestigial to current military concerns.

Yet de-emphasizing stability operations hardly seems prudent in the current global context. Before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, most participants in the debate assumed that involvement in peace operations and “nation building” was primarily a moral choice; the sufferings of peoples in failed states did not directly impinge on U.S. vital interests. Today, conventional wisdom, as reflected in the National Security Strategy, suggests that terrorist-harboring failed states as well as rogue states pose direct threats to U.S. security. As one out of every seven countries qualifies as a failed state, by one estimate,\(^{11}\) demand for U.S. intervention as part of the Global War on Terrorism is likely to remain brisk.

By the same token, future wars are less likely than ever to end neatly through a negotiated ceasefire with an existing state. Most will probably be “civil-military missions”\(^{12}\) in which civil authority collapses at the end of the battle and swift, effective stability operations/civil affairs capabilities will be essential to terminating the conflict and fulfilling the overall mission. To cite one timely example, the 2001 QDR classifies the ability to achieve regime change through military means as a defense priority. Combat operations can obviously achieve regime destruction; effective stability operations or the civil affairs equivalent are essential to reduce the chances that the next regime will also be hostile.

**II. Achieving Effective Stability Operations Capability: Challenges and Solutions**

If stability operations are to become a true core military mission, civilian and military leaders must once again address the problems that arose in the 1990s. Perhaps the most important challenge is the lingering view in large parts of the U.S. civilian and military establishment that post-combat transition and stability operations are a departure from fundamental missions and values of the U.S. military, or in any case an unworthy use of highly technically trained combat forces. While all officers do not share this view, and it has no deep roots in U.S. history, discomfort with the military role in stability operations will take time and leadership to overcome.

---

On a more practical level, it also became apparent in the 1990s that stability operations pose significant challenges in the areas of resource allocation, training and readiness, force planning, and force structure.\(^\text{13}\) The *ad hoc* approach to peace operations in the 1990s was clearly an aggravating factor, but a higher profile for stability operations would inevitably entail some tradeoffs that would affect combat missions.

**The Philosophical Challenge: Does Using Warfighters in Stability Operations Erode the “Warrior Ethos”?**

While many military leaders, especially those with first-hand experience in peace operations\(^\text{14}\), accept the idea of a core role for stability operations, it remains anathema to many others. Stability operations seem to pose a troubling challenge to the identity and self-image of many U.S. warfighters.

As General Shelton declared in 2000, “The fundamental purpose of America’s Armed Forces is to fight and win wars. Plain and simple….”\(^\text{15}\) Others have elaborated on this theme: “One must consider the cost of using a warfighting organization in a benevolent role. Combat forces are just that. Commanders concentrate most of [their] efforts toward instilling an offensive spirit in their soldiers…. ”\(^\text{16}\) Discussions of the issue frequently cite Huntington’s description of military officers as self-perceived “managers of violence.”\(^\text{17}\)

The idea that U.S. soldiers will lose their offensive edge if they engage in peace operations appears debatable in an age when information-based warfare may increasingly require the ability to make complex judgments rather than a “fighting spirit.”\(^\text{18}\) Moreover,

\(^{13}\) One issue hotly debated in the 1990s seems to have been laid to rest; few analysts argue that “casualty aversion” on the part of the public and policymakers is still a severe constraint on U.S. intervention.


\(^{15}\) Shelton, p. 195.

\(^{16}\) Major Christa Applegate, quoted in Nagl and Young, p. 9.


\(^{18}\) In fact, in the 1990s morale and re-enlistments were reportedly higher among soldiers on peace enforcement deployments than in other units. (Roan, p. 27).
it is a peculiarly American concern that even our close allies, the British, do not share.\textsuperscript{19} This may be because stability operations do not seem to fit well into the powerful tradition of the “American way of war”\textsuperscript{20}, with its emphasis on technical capability, overwhelming logistical edge, and “war of annihilation.” Peace and civil affairs operations, even in conventional interstate wars, are unlikely ever to meet the standard of “clearly defined mission, decisive force, and exit strategy” with which many U.S. military leaders are still most comfortable.\textsuperscript{21}

Even so, history does not support the notion that stability operations are alien to actual (as opposed to idealized) U.S. military tradition. William Odom points out that since its founding in 1775, the U.S. Army has spent vastly more time engaged in what it now calls OOTW [operations other than war] than in what it calls war. For decades it struggled to keep peace in the American West between encroaching settlers and Indian tribes. Most of the four decades of U.S. occupation of the Philippines qualify as OOTW. Nicaragua and Haiti in the 1920s and 1930s saw the U.S. Marines involved in similar OOTW. After World War II, when the army for the first time maintained large forces during peacetime, it also ran military governments in Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{22}

As late as the Second World War, one War Department official stated that “...the outstanding lesson gained from American experiences...is that the prime direction and administration of military government belongs wholly to the military command.”\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, the idea that the job of the military is to fight, not to administer, remains strong.

\textit{Can Stability Operations Be Part of Transformation?}

The increasing focus on military transformation may further strengthen this institutional bias. Technically, stability operations are part of the transformation picture;

\textsuperscript{20} See Russell Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}. (Bloomington; Indian University Press, 1973) xvii-xxiii and passim.
\textsuperscript{21} Adam Siegel, for example, quotes Richard Holbrooke complaining about this mindset in Bosnia. (p. 113).
\textsuperscript{23} Colonel E.S. Greenbaum, quoted in Muller, p. 86. The current (2002) version of \textit{Defense Directive 5100.1} also lists military government as a primary mission for the Army and a collateral mission for the Marines.
Joint Vision 2020 explicitly lists stability operations as part of the spectrum included in the objective of “Full Spectrum Dominance.” Like all other activities on the spectrum, stability operations can clearly benefit from better logistics, situational awareness, and decisionmaking. But stability and civil affairs operations tend to be personnel-intensive, relatively low-tech, slow, and subject to politically restrictive rules of engagement. They also tend to rely more heavily on old-fashioned human intelligence than on sophisticated network-centric systems. As a core mission, they fit uneasily into the transformation vision of an agile, lethal, and precise force prevailing through high tempo, technically-based information dominance, and massed effects. The temptation, reinforced by the traditional technological bent of the U.S. military, will be to continue to make high-intensity combat operations the highest priority.

**The Practical Challenges: Budget, Training, and Readiness**

On a more mundane level, preparing for stability operations clearly requires allocation of resources away from other priorities. In the past, Pentagon officials generally saw participation in peace operations as a “budget buster” that drained readiness funds through repeated, unpredictable deployments. The problem lay less with the nature of the operations, however, than with the budget arrangements that funded them. Because of Congressional resistance to funding multilateral peace operations up front, the services had to pay for deployments in the mid-1990s “out of hide” by tapping Operations and Maintenance accounts, hoping that a later supplemental appropriations would make up the shortfall.

This funding method created an artificial conflict between peace operations and combat readiness and exacerbated concerns that peace operations were inimical to the basic military mission.\(^{24}\) Institution of a contingency fund and better planning and budgeting in the late 1990s reportedly went a long way to alleviating the problem.\(^{25}\)

Although frequent deployments for stability operations will continue to disrupt budget planning, the problem should not be overstated. For example, by one estimate,

---

\(^{24}\) Chayes, p. 12.

\(^{25}\) Roan, p. 12.
U.S. deployment in Bosnia from 1991-2000 cost about $15 billion – considerably less than 27 days of high-intensity conflict in Iraq.26

Training is another area of potential conflict. In a force dependent on intensive training for high-tempo combat performance, stability operations, and training for stability operations, clearly represent an opportunity cost. Despite David Grange’s optimistic assessment that “readiness...is enhanced”27 during peace-support operations, most observers conclude that combat units in peace operations tend to lose ground in combat skills such as gunnery and maneuvering.28 But this problem should also not be overstated. One report contends that 90 percent of peacekeeping training is applicable to general combat activity.29 There are compensating factors, as well. Some senior military leaders have characterized stability operations as a “leadership laboratory,”30 where soldiers, especially unit leaders, learn self-discipline, initiative, decisionmaking ability, leadership, unit cohesion, and endurance – all skills readily applicable to the transformed force of the future.31

Readiness issues, like budget issues, arose in the 1990s from ad hoc management practices that led to overuse of experienced units32. A higher priority for peace operations, including training of larger numbers of soldiers and the deployment of larger contingents,33 would ease these problems.

III. Solutions

Military analysts have proposed a number of ways to deal with stability operations, including finding another U.S. agency or country to take on the job, or building a limited, specialized unit within the military to handle stability operations. In the long term, the

---

26 Mallaby, p. 9.
28 Jack Spencer, “Perils of Peacekeeping,” Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine, March 2001, p. 22. Spencer charges that “...an armored division deployed to Bosnia, for instance, needs approximately a year to regain its former level of readiness....”
29 Nagl and Young, p. 7.
30 Roan, p. 78.
33 Manwaring, p. 33.
most practical solution is likely to be a single, more versatile force with broader training and a beefed-up civil affairs capability in the active duty force.

**Can Someone Else Do It?**

Some military and civilian analysts have sought to resolve the perceived conflict between stability operations and the military’s core warfighting mission by assigning the task to U.S. civilian agencies, multinational organizations, or our allies. Rachel Bronson, for example, suggests that the State Department should devote more attention and resources to its civilian policing program, CIVPOL, which is currently run by a contractor, and take on Justice Department training of foreign police.\(^{34}\) Other commentators have suggested more generally that State should run the non-combat parts of any stability operation.\(^{35}\) This argument, however, founders on the realities of resource allocation in the U.S. government.

Stability operations require extensive logistical support to move and administer personnel and equipment. Only the Department of Defense has the existing resources and planning capacity to conduct large-scale, complex operations overseas, whether those missions are defined as “primary” or “collateral.” It is true that State has a reserve of language-trained, culturally experienced officers. However, as one of the smallest Cabinet agencies with few program funds and little support in Congress, State is not likely to gain the permanent staffing and logistical capabilities to take over these functions in the foreseeable future. The Department of Justice and other domestic agencies are even less likely to turn away from newly-acquired homeland security responsibilities to build up institutional capabilities in peace operations that are remote from their core domestic mission.

David Grange and others have suggested that another solution might be to develop a division of labor in which various allies take on most of the elements of stability operations, leaving the U.S. military to concentrate on supporting the “upfront portion” or hostile phase of stability operations.\(^{36}\) Participation of German and other


\(^{35}\) This is a recurring theme in off-the-record National War College discussions, for example.

\(^{36}\) Grange, p. 33.
NATO forces in stability operations in Afghanistan is a potential model, although the ugly split in the transatlantic alliance over Iraq suggests that we cannot assume that allies will always participate in U.S.-led interventions.37 Moreover, the nature of stability operations, at least in the early stages, suggests that a relatively seamless transition from battle to post-conflict security, even before the fighting is over, is critical to setting the tone for relations with local civilians. Several experts have discussed the problem of the “security gap”: prolonged looting and anarchy during the interval before civilian policing starts can alienate the civilian population and work against our larger political goals.38

Spinning off post-combat follow-up not only to another force but also to another country greatly decreases prospects for an effective transition. The inescapable conclusion is that we need to be able to do the whole job ourselves if necessary.

A Two-Tier Force?

Experts wrestling with the debate about military roles and missions have proposed several organizational arrangements to address these issues, generally by attempting to fence off and limit resources allocated to stability operations. In 1998, Don Snider proposed a division-size Army Constabulary Force of 15,000 with logistics support from existing active and reserve units, so that “all other Army capabilities would be [used] exclusively for experimentation and training globally in warfighting roles.”39

In a variation on this theme, Michael Green calls for a Joint Peacekeeping Directorate (J-9) commanding a Joint Task Force – Peacekeeping, again about division size, with a flag officer drawn from one of the services’ law enforcement specialties and a separate appropriation from Congress. Green argues that such a force is necessary to enable “both peacekeepers and combat forces to focus on their primary, very distinct,

37 Even before Iraq, this idea was starting to look shaky. Rachel Bronson observes that “…European leaders have grown increasingly concerned by the perception that the United States seems to think it can engage in conventional battles alone and leave Europe to sort out the mess. As Dominique Moisi, a prominent French analyst, put it, Europeans do not want to become ‘the cleaning lady of American intervention.’…” (Bronson, p. 3.)
38 Observers note that this is a perennial problem across a range of interventions, citing widespread looting after U.S. intervention in Panama, and arson by departing Serbs in Bosnia; looting in Baghdad appears to be another example. Muller notes that lack of effective control could also be construed as a violation of Hague Convention obligations to protect cultural institutions and private property (p. 89).
missions….”\textsuperscript{40} (Both Green and Snider note that one useful function of this modest dedicated force would be to deter politicians from readily deploying larger combat forces in multilateral peace and stability operations.) Donald Rose describes another plan, in which the Army would divide into two corps, one for high-intensity warfare and one for OOTW that would “emphasize manpower over technology and… judgment over firepower….”\textsuperscript{41}

There are problems with this approach, however. Ralph Peters argues that a “two-tier” military would not cost any less, and that a U.S. stability force with no combat strength would generally be ineffective.\textsuperscript{42} Many senior military officers agree.\textsuperscript{43} Rose further argues that a specialized unit could not become proficient in all the skills required for peace operations. Given the dynamics of defense budgeting and continuing political (and Congressional) suspicion of peace operations, such a force would probably always be first in line for budget cuts, forcing political leaders to fall back on the old \textit{ad hoc} methods for significant deployments.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, the two-tier approach may well be too cumbersome to work as the boundaries between war and peace become more fluid. The British model—a single, more versatile force with both combat and stability operations training—is more likely to be able to establish timely rapport with the population as combat winds down, especially if it includes civil affairs units arriving with – and not long after – the combat troops.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{Changing the Force Structure}

Modest changes in force structure, without setting up new dedicated forces, may be the most practical and flexible approach to improving our stability operations

\textsuperscript{40} Michael Green, “Keeping the Peace Jointly,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1999, p. 89. Green uses the term “peacekeeping” here to refer to the broader range of “peace operations, humanitarian assistance and contingency tasking”.

\textsuperscript{41} Rose, p. 154 (One would hope that judgment would matter in the high-intensity force as well…)


\textsuperscript{43} Roan, p. 24-27.

\textsuperscript{44} Donald Rose has a persuasive organizational explanation for why this is likely: “…If the Army prepares for war, and therefore conducts peace operations suboptimally, it assumes one kind of risk, usually political. If it prepares for peace operations and then cannot fight a war, it assumes a greater risk. In addition, combat capabilities given up now might take years to rebuild, whereas ad hoc responses to peace operations requirements have proved sufficiently effective, if not ideal.” (Rose, p. 155)

\textsuperscript{45} Frankel, p. A30
capabilities. Reservists currently make up 50% of total U.S. military personnel but 97% of all civil affairs forces, 100% of all water supply battalions, 81% of psyops forces, 85% of medical brigades, and two-thirds of MPs. Current problems with the reserve structure, such as mobilization delays and repeated mobilizations of certain units, are likely to be especially acute in the area of peace operations. Developing strong core capabilities in these areas will require the services to move many of these skills back into the active-duty forces. That may require raising end strength, moving other brigades or divisions back into the reserves, or forgoing new technologies.

IV. Conclusion
Despite the current emphasis on combat capabilities, in the long term the ideal of an exclusively warfighting role for the military seems untenable. While the Clinton-era arguments for broad use of the military for humanitarian intervention no longer have a receptive audience in the Administration, those who want to maintain unchallenged U.S. dominance (including so-called neo-imperialists) now argue that the U.S. military needs strong civil administration skills if we are to succeed in rearranging the global political status quo for our own benefit.

Expecting the same forces to do both high-intensity warfighting and stability operations requires a grinding shift of mental gears for individual warfighters. But the nature of modern conflict – and the political objectives we choose to pursue through force – require warfighters to be ready to make that shift. The postwar situation in Iraq is a case in point; while the Army reportedly deployed an entire civil affairs brigade, the media report that Marine sergeants are interviewing prospective police officers and serving as village mayors. If warfighters are increasingly likely to wind up doing these jobs, they need the training and resources to do them well.

47 Shanker, p. 3. Both of these possibilities have been raised in discussion over a draft report by ASD for Reserve Affairs Thomas Hall.
49 Periscope, 3/12/03
In 1999, Ralph Peters wrote acidly that “…we prepare for our ideal missions, while the real missions must be improvised at great expense….”\textsuperscript{50} That criticism is still applicable. From the moment the fighting ends, and even before, restoring basic security and institutions for civilian populations caught up in conflict is the real mission, whether we call it peace operations, civil affairs, peace building, or nation building. Seamless conflict termination is as critical to the political success of a military operation as a seamless combat operation is to military victory. It deserves the same priority.

\textsuperscript{50} Ralph Peters, “Heavy Peace,” Parameters, Spring 1999, p. 74
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bacevich, Andrew. “We Have the Power. Now, How Do We Use It?” Washington Post, April 20, 2003 p. B3


*Quadrennial Defense Review Report,* September 30, 2001 (Department of Defense)


