FORCE WITHOUT WAR...JOINT CIVILIAN—MILITARY COORDINATION
KEY TO FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS

FUNDAMENTALS OF STATECRAFT
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Dr. Ronald Tammen

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# Force Without War....Joint Civilian-Military Coordination Key to Foreign Policy Success

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"Diplomacy without power usually fails"¹ Anthony Lake

"Military Power should be used only when there is a clear cut military objective"² Colin Powell

INTRODUCTION

Clearly a major strength of our nation's power base is the armed forces. The best trained, equipped, and most lethal military force in the world. This superiority combined with the will to use power forms the basis for a very credible, potent, reliable, and historically effective statecraft instrument.

The focus of this essay is threefold: first to provide a brief description of the various aspects of the military instrument for the strategist to consider. For example: strengths, weaknesses, benefits, costs and political conditions for effective use. Second, to examine the senior civilian-military coordination process when military forces are considered for use in support of diplomatic objectives. Specifically, discuss the context of the friction and some ideas or recommendations to reduce tension...setting the conditions for a greater cooperative and integrated approach. Finally, to propose a structured model for the civilian-military decisionmakers to use...the military Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability (SFA) model. This model is "a way" to facilitate unity of effort during the conceptual and planning

¹James A Nathan, "Force, Statecraft, and American Foreign Policy", Polity, Winter 1995, 256
²Nathan, 244.
phases as well as unity of execution.

For the purpose of this essay we will be refer to this instrument as simply...force without war. The definition follows:

"a political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more of the components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence".3

In other words... "to deter the target state from doing something undesirable or to compel the target state to take some action to do or stop something".4

GUIDELINES FOR THE STRATEGIST... A DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY

The appeal to use the military force instrument is at the core of its strengths... visible, powerful, responsive, and an effective diplomatic measure to regain the initiative at the negotiation table.

In fact, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan conducted an extremely comprehensive scientific research of 215 case studies from the period 1946 to 1975... incidents involving a political use of the military. Their hypothesis— discrete uses of the

military is often an effective way of achieving near-term policy objectives. Their conclusion— the military use as a political instrument assisted in achieving a favorable outcome in the near term (6 months or less) in 156 of the 215 case studies...73% effectiveness rate.  

Like any instrument... the use of military force is not without weaknesses or risks. Translating political objectives into military objectives is a very complex process. Political constraints and limitations such as politically agreed upon Rules of Engagement (ROE) can hamstring the effective use of force. A restrictive ROE is a form of re-tooling the military instrument from relatively blunt force to a surgical force. Indeed very difficult to achieve especially, during changing political conditions as witnessed in Somalia. Moreover the opponent’s military center of gravity may not be the U.S. military objective. Force protection measures, small unit discipline are particularly critical for success in these low intensity conflicts.

Another weakness is once we’ve committed forces...we are committed! The associated risk is clear, the opponent may not react as we had predicted...we miscalculated! What then? Whether value system or cultural differences...cause him to not react at all, our “signal” was transmitted but not received as intended, or

5 Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 23-57, 86-108
perhaps the intent is to call our bluff. A decision point is forced. Either do nothing and/or withdraw the force or commit additional forces and escalate. The first option tarnishes foreign policy credibility and the second option increases the potential for greater casualties.  

Some of the conditions for effective use of force without war are: our opponent has to believe he is against a superior force, there is a sense of urgency for him to react, and he has the sense he does not have control of the situation. All of these conditions within the context of a shared value system...he will react rationally.  

Domestic conditions for effective use include: public and congressional support, and additional resources($$$) allocated to the military. In addition, the political objectives for the military force are feasible and integrated with other appropriate statecraft instruments. Historically, the military is most effective when the political objective is “to maintain the authority of a regime, reinforce rather than modify, the behavior of a target state...a change of behavior on the part of the target state, only rarely were these outcomes achieved” when force without war was used.

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6 Dr Ronald Tammen, Class Lecture notes, National War College, 11 Sep 98  
8 Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 523-524.
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION... SOME FRICTION INDUCERS

The brief summary of strengths, weaknesses, political conditions and associated risks and costs serves as a backdrop for the examination of the senior civil-military coordination process (see Enclosure 1). This diagram shows the major domestic as well as international coordination requirements for both the civilian and military leaders. The caveat is of course... any initial operational security requirements must be enforced with the appropriate level of coordination.

The two quotes at the beginning of this essay formed the basis for my interest in the civilian-military process. One quote attributed to a civilian diplomat and the other to diplomat with a highly distinguished military record. This sample size of only two serves the purpose of reflecting the "natural rub" or friction between the civilian and military leadership when considering prudent political use of the military. Moreover, the need to protect the armed forces from potentially becoming the diplomat's 911... statecraft instrument of choice. An alternative perspective is the military has yet to adapt to the post cold-war period. Where most likely missions as a political instrument will consist of low intensity conflicts such as demonstrations,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations versus being structured and trained for the most dangerous mission... a major conventional war. Especially in a resourced constrained environment in which the military budget does not always include contingency operations monies. The challenge is to find the force balance which adequately prepares for and has the capability to respond to both type of conflicts, indeed a tough nut to crack.

Today, the country continues to adapt to an uncertain post Cold War international environment. A public divided, some desire the country to remain the world leader and champion of democratic values whereas others would prefer to turn inward and focus on our own challenges. The isolationists normally oppose any armed forces committed abroad when no vital national interests are at stake. This friction exists in the very fabric of our society and is at the heart of the dilemma... when and where to use military force as a political instrument.

**A PROPOSED COORDINATION MODEL... A FRICTION REDUCER**

Clearly, the United States constitution in no uncertain terms subordinates the military to civilian control. The armed forces obey the lawful orders of their civilian superiors. In return the military requires and should insist upon a clear and concise mission statement, intent, guidance, resources allocated,
public support, and termination criteria. The most critical time of the coordination process is at the very beginning...during the conceptual phase. The military uses the Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability model in operationally as well as tactically. This model is recommended as a checklist or tool for the strategic civilian-military coordination (see enclosure 2). In this essay Suitability is defined as: does the course of action accomplish the mission. Feasibility is a check to ensure there is adequate time, space, and means to accomplish the mission. Finally a source of civil-military friction as well the toughest one to quantify...acceptability. Given the course of action is suitable and feasible, are the potential costs (i.e. casualties, reputation, prestige; or risks of the operation...acceptable. The model outlines some of the major political deliverables to the military such as clear and quantifiable political mission statement, concept of the operation, resources, limitations and constraints, an acceptable threshold for casualties and potential termination criteria.

On the other hand, the military leadership has a responsibility to communicate significant aspects of their proposed plan such as: a recommended force package, a course of action, timeline, threat analysis, risks, and predicted costs or causalities...to name a few deliverables.
Closing

Force without war can indeed be a viable statecraft instrument for the strategist. Absolutely critical to using power with diplomacy is close coordination and integrated effort between our senior civilian and military leaders. The Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability model is a means to reduce any friction, preclude misunderstanding, make tough choices easier, and think through potential branches and sequels. The overall intent is clearly the increased opportunity of a successful foreign policy outcome in an uncertain international environment. A win-win outcome for both institutions.

Neither Anthony Lake nor Colin Powell are wrong in their beliefs... in fact both are right! Together, they project the absolute necessity of cooperative civilian-military coordination. Candid, frank input from our military is a must as we continue to adapt to international change and uncertainty. The military needs to continue to educate their civilian superiors on optimal force options. In turn, the foreign policy strategist must link achievable military objectives in support of political objectives. Setting the condition for success. James S. Nathan sums up this very tough and complex statecraft balancing act... the use of force without war, the power instrument, in conjunction with diplomacy
to achieve foreign policy objectives.

"Without a credible capability to use moderate force, fate rather than statecraft determines the future...Over-reliance on multinational-or even unilatera] force-to enforce peace can detract from conventional diplomacy; but an absence of the ability to call upon force neuters diplomacy in a world that still knows no central organizing principles...an unwillingness to validate threats with the use of force when called for, undermines alliances, weakens prior commitments, and empowers rogue states and terrorists. If we denude ourselves of our options pertaining to force, we leave ourselves too open to chance and initiative of others."9

9 Nathan, 259.
### THE SUITABILITY, FEASIBILITY, ACCEPTABILITY MODEL

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**ENCLOSURE 2**
BIBLIOGRAPHY


