A SHEEP IN WOLF’S CLOTHING?

The May 1997 National Security Strategy

Cheryl McCarthy/Class of 1998

Course 5601

Seminar H

FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER

Dr Richard Melanson

FACULTY ADVISOR

David Cohen
**A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing? The May 1997 National Security Strategy**

**Abstract**

See report

**Security Classification**

- **Report**: Unclassified
- **Abstract**: Unclassified
- **This Page**: Unclassified

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

- Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

---

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
A public document such as the National Security Strategy, particularly during an
interregnum, severely mutes controversial issues, structures content to appeal to the
broadest possible audience, and chooses semantics based on “universal” values. The
Strategy has left me with a vague disquiet which ultimately coalesces around two
leitmotifs. One is the blurring of the distinction between domestic policy and foreign
policy and the other is disguising a symmetrical approach behind asymmetrical rhetoric.
As a result of the interaction of the two leitmotifs, I find the Strategy flawed in identifying
transnational threats which are of vital or even major interest and in choosing appropriate
instruments of statecraft.

A Domestic or Foreign Policy Strategy? Asymmetry or a symmetry?

The Clinton administration’s intentional blurring of distinctions between domestic policy
and foreign policy continues a post-World War II trend of conceptually identifying
national interests in domestic or public interest terms (within territorial boundaries as
opposed to the well-being of American citizens and enterprises operating outside
territorial boundaries, a more traditional definition of national interest). In the absence of
a single clear external threat, Americans are largely focusing their attention on domestic
concerns. Faced with this relative disinterest toward foreign policy on the part of the
public whose interests national security strategists are organizing to defend, it is a
pragmatic, logical and eminently politically acceptable tactic to garner support by casting

1 Donald E Neuchterlein, “National Interest as a Basis for Foreign Policy Formulation,” excerpts from
Chapter 1 in America Overcommitted United States National Interests in the 1980s, (Lexington, KY
University Press of Kentucky, 1985), page 6 (Reprint)
national and strategic interests in public interest terms. Theoretically, integrating the two facets should strengthen a strategy's ability to minimize both cost and risk.

Unfortunately, theories are not laws. In the May 1997 National Security Strategy, the analysis and practice of integrating public interest and strategic concerns lead to two very negative consequences which mutually reinforce each other in undermining the very intent of the strategy. The first of these is a mismatch of statecraft instruments to threats. The second is a misreading of the intensity of the threat from a national security policy perspective, i.e., is the threat is vital, major or peripheral.

The Strategy clearly wants to project a cost-averse, asymmetrical approach. By identifying a relatively few threats and referring to balancing the budget, the Strategy attempts to present itself along traditional criteria for asymmetric realism. Arguably, though, the Strategy presents a plethora of threats, a richness compounded by the lack of clear criteria to determine the critical threshold for a country or area's inclusion within the threat's parameters. This can and often does lead to proliferation rather than constraint. This broadening rather than narrowing of involvement is aggravated by the pandering to a domestic-focused audience, leading the analysis, as presented, to mask the level of threat and our ability to do something about it.

Transnational Threats
I would like to examine the two leitmotifs against the canvas of three specific transnational threats identified in the Strategy—terrorism, drugs and organized crime. As a basis for analysis, I applied Neuchterlein's matrix for differentiating between intensity of threat and criteria for discriminating between vital and major priorities.

### Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>X 1, 2</td>
<td>10, 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-Being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Order</td>
<td>X 6, 12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
<td>X 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Drugs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X 10, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-Being</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9, 2</td>
<td>X 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Order</td>
<td>12,11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>X 8, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
<td>10, 2</td>
<td>X 16,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Organized Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>9, 10</td>
<td>X 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-Being</td>
<td>X 3, 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Order</td>
<td>X 8, 7, 5, 6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
<td>X 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 *ibid*, pp 8, 14-28. 1 Proximity of danger, 2 nature of threat, 3 economic stake, 4 sentimental attachment, 5 type of government & human rights, 6 effect on balance of power, 7 national prestige at stake, 8 support of allies, 9 economic costs of hostility, 10 estimated casualties, 11 risk of protracted conflict, 12 risk of enlarged conflict, 13 cost of defeat/stalemate, 14 risk of public opposition, 15 risk of UN opposition, & 16 risk of Congressional opposition.
To occupy the central place they do in the Strategy, a matrix of these transnational threats should show a majority of “X”s, at a minimum, in the Major column, if not a preponderance in the Vital column. Using domestic interests as the primary filter, drugs and possibly organized crime might generate such a matrix. I am less convinced that the general public would see terrorism, other than the home grown variety (a la Veigh), as falling into the Vital or Major columns. From a national security perspective, however, terrorism (a la World Trade Center or Pan Am 103) could easily have a preponderance in the Vital or Major column.

Developing subsequent plans after using Neuchterlein’s matrix to determine the intensity of the threat and then comparing the results against potential statecraft instruments affects choices among the instruments. A domestic filter when developing a strategy for dealing with the drug problem pushes the strategist toward a supply-side solution involving compellence at a high cost (throwing good money after an irrational objective squanders limited foreign aid³, greater involvement of higher numbers of military as well as civilian personnel), prestige, support of allies, enlargement of conflict (there are a lot more countries involved in the drug trade since the U.S. intensified its interdiction efforts aimed at entry), potential casualties (DEA officers, coast guard and other military personnel, police), and maintenance of the status quo. A foreign policy-oriented national security filter, such as in my version of the matrices, indicates that drugs in an asymmetrical

⁴ Coca substitution is an economically irrational response on the part of Latin American growers Without elevated levels of costly coercion complemented by a strong subsidy program—be it US foreign aid directly to farmers or budget support to their governments for the subsidies, a crop substitution program will not work.
strategic approach are a Peripheral interest at best—the supply-side approach makes the costs questionable against other competing national security interests. While reducing the cost of confronting the threat through a demand-side approach might bring a greater consonance between the domestic and foreign policy filters, no administration has seriously embraced such an approach which would involve a lot more public diplomacy (education, media approaches, structural societal change) within the U.S. and less of all other instruments externally. With little evidence that the failures of current instruments will change, I question whether this threat should be in the Strategy at all. Without the blurring of the domestic and foreign policy distinctions, I’m not sure that it would have been included.

My matrices of the other two transnational threats came out rating them as at least Major threats. My primary filter, however, was a foreign policy national interest one rather than a domestic one. Criteria such as balance of power, types of government, national prestige, support of allies, economic costs, risks of enlargement of conflicts were more central to my analysis than they would have been with a more domestic filter. Where the criterion fit both public interest and national interest filters, the intensity of the threats was significantly lower using the public interest filter.

The more serious issue in examining terrorism and organized crime is the degree to which the camouflaged symmetrical approach results in misallocated resources through choosing less than optimal statecraft instruments, increases either risks, costs or both, and masks our ability, for cost and other reasons, to have any success. We have, for instance, largely
but not wholly isolated Libya, yet been unable to extradite the alleged Pan Am bombers

Success? Failure? If it had been an Air France flight between Dakar and Paris, would an integrated domestic/foreign policy approach have resulted in terrorism being of such strategic interest? I would argue from a domestic perspective—no, from a national interest view—yes, but with caveats that we can do little unless we start addressing the political and equity issues that nourish the current generation of terrorists

Organized crime as a transnational threat also evolves differently if either strict asymmetrical criteria are applied in choosing instruments and resource levels or a narrower national interest filter is used. A public interest filter appears to focus the Strategy on organized crime which affects our commercial and financial interests and the use of more purely economic statecraft instruments. A narrower national interest filter would probably look at organized crime which affects the comity within multipolar blocs or along Huntington's fault lines. The implications for choice of statecraft instruments are different as are the objectives which would be sought.

In summary, the interaction of the two leitmotifs—the blurring of distinctions between domestic (public interest) and foreign (national security) policy and a camouflaged symmetrical approach—raise questions in my mind as to whether several of the identified threats would be as central to the Strategy if a narrower filter and stricter application of asymmetry were applied. I think not. Nor do I think that the statecraft instruments would be the same or applied in the same way or degree. I think the cost of the strategy would also be very different, with a better balance between cost and risk.