GOLDWATER-NICHOLS:
THE NEED FOR DEBATE

Core Course III Essay

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# Goldwater-Nichols: The Need for Debate

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GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: THE NEED FOR DEBATE

INTRODUCTION

On 1 October, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, otherwise known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It was the culmination of a four-year debate, from the disclosure of significant problems with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system by then-chairman General David Jones, USAF, to the final conference bill that became law. Throughout the process, the Navy Department (Navy and Marines), under the leadership of Secretary John Lehman, led the effort to defeat the bill. Though the Navy has come onboard with Goldwater-Nichols faster and to a greater extent than any of the other services, many of the arguments articulated by Lehman and his cohorts remain of concern. They have not been satisfactorily answered, and bear detailed analysis and debate.

Based on numerous interviews with key officials, this essay reviews the inside politics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, then summarizes the Navy's arguments against it. A brief assessment is then provided to look at Navy's arguments in light of the efforts of the defense organization to implement the main provisions of the act. Finally, some concluding remarks outline serious questions about the course we are on in defense organization, and the implications of that course for the country. Constrained in both space and time, the purpose of this paper is limited to an outline of the events, and to the encouragement of a frank, open and rigorous debate on the direction we are headed. Complacency is to be avoided; intelligent discourse, sometimes critical, sometimes not, is to be welcomed as a strengthening and constructive element. If that discourse is ever strangled because of dogmatism, rigidity, or centralization, then great concern will be fitting, but, perhaps, also too late.

THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

The bill signed into law in 1986 was really the continuation of a process that had begun at least as early as 1942, and, as some argue, as early as the Progressive Era at the turn of this century. Throughout this century, as America has found itself increasingly drawn into the world's affairs, the need for greater sophistication and efficiency in its
defense organization has become apparent. This change in our geostrategic situation has been complemented by dramatic improvements in the technology of war. These improvements have tended to blur the line separating land from naval warfare, and have placed a premium not just on joint operations in time of war but, more importantly, on thorough and sophisticated joint plans in preparation for war.5

The 1980s round of this centralizing trend was generated by several factors. First, the military was generally seen as having lost its ability to fight and win wars. Vietnam was the biggest example, but there were several others as well.6 Second, the dramatic build-up of American military power that accompanied President Reagan into office in 1981 contributed to an startling growth in the country's budget deficit. This in turn called into question America's military strategy and convinced many of the need to allocate resources more efficiently. Third, and related to this second factor, was a series of procurement scandals that suggested that the taxpayer's money was not being wisely spent. Finally, for the first time since the National Security Act of 1947, serving uniformed officers spoke out in public against the system that was created by that act.

This final factor was the immediate catalyst for change. In an article published in the March, 1982 edition of Armed Forces Journal International, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General David C. Jones, USAF, argued that the system was broken, and provided only watered down advice that was seldom timely.7 The Chairman, he argued, lacked sufficient authority to overcome service parochialism, and therefore each piece of advice coming from the JCS represented a consensus, and hence lowest-common-denominator, result. Jones' comments were all the more galvanizing because he was at the time still serving as CJCS—it was the first time such a high ranking officer had broke ranks with the military and spoken out. Jones' article was followed in April, 1982 by a similar, though more radical call for reform by Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer, USA.8

The military, active duty and retired, closed ranks against the rogue officers and uniformly denounced their comments. While General Jones was generally seen as a "...disgruntled Chairman venting his spleen," General Meyer could not be so easily dismissed.9 Nevertheless, in hearings conducted by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Subcommittee on Investigations in 1982, the testimony by military officers
counseled against reform, and in some cases reacted with venomous opposition to any suggestion that the system was broken. The Marines, who led the opposition within the Navy Department, started off the debate with arguments that had been used since 1947. In his testimony on 28 April, 1982, Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow, USMC argued that the proposed reforms promised institution of a general staff system that was essentially un-American, that would develop plans both rigid and unrelated to reality, and that would threaten civilian control of the military.

The result of the 1982 hearings was H.R. 6954, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982." The bill passed easily in the House, but ran into stiff opposition in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), where it died a death of neglect, thus setting the pattern for reform legislation in Congress for the next four years. Nevertheless, the floodgates had been opened, spawning a series of bills from Representatives White, Nichols, Skelton and Casey. These were eventually combined to form the final House bill, H.R. 3622 "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985" which passed in November, 1985.

On the Senate side, things got moving in 1983 when SASC staff director Jim McGovern, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, arranged a meeting between retired Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak and SASC chairman John Tower (R-Texas). Krulak had written his own study of defense reorganization which basically recommended a return to the organization used during World War II, and argued for eliminating the CJCS position and the operational role of the Secretary of Defense. Tower, a staunch navy supporter and opponent of reorganization, found Krulak's ideas interesting, and directed McGovern to commence a study into reorganization. The intent of this study, in both Tower's and McGovern's minds, was to illustrate that tinkering with the existing system was unwarranted, and that the proposals by both Generals Jones and Meyer were unsound. Their point man was staffer Jim Locher, who had over ten years experience working in OSD. Locher's study quickly began to suggest that, contrary to what Tower and McGovern had hoped, reform was needed. Tower opposed the turn which Locher's study had taken, and it was not until Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) became SASC chairman in 1985 that the study was completed.
Goldwater was personally convinced of the need for reform, and moved Locher out from under staff director McGovern who was seen as obstructing the study. Goldwater also enlisted Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) as co-sponsor of the reform initiative in the SASC. Locher's staff study, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, was completed in October, 1985. An exhaustive exploration of the issue of defense reform, it provided the departure point for the reform debate in the Senate. It was here in the Senate that the critical battle was fought, and the study gave the needed structure for that battle.

In February and March, 1986, the SASC proceeded to mark-up its bill and hear testimony. The resulting Senate bill was passed on 7 May, 1986. In the House, meanwhile, Aspin and key staffers had spent the months of December and January adding more meat to the House bill, especially in the area of officer management provisions. It was Aspin's intent to enter into conference with the SASC with a bill that included many of the provisions of the Senate version. The result of their efforts was H.R. 4370, which was used in the Conference Committee with the SASC. The House-Senate conference reported out on 12 September, 1986, and President Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols Act into law on 1 October.

The Act had several far reaching provisions that have dramatically shifted the balance of power in the Department of Defense. First, it greatly strengthened the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, making him the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. Secondly it created the position of Vice Chairman, thus ending the practice of rotating service chiefs through the CICS position in the Chairman's absence. Third, it greatly increased the power and authority of the CINCs over the forces under their command. The CINCs were given the responsibility and authority for their commands, and were provided an input into the resource allocation debate through the Chairman. The services lost all remaining operational authority over their forces. Fourth, the Joint Staff was shifted under the Chairman's direction rather than under the Joint Chiefs as a committee. Finally, the act mandated officer assignment policies designed to improve the quality of officers serving on the joint staffs, including the institution of the Joint Officer career specialty, and the prerequisite of joint duty for selection to flag rank.
The full implications of the act have not manifested themselves as of yet, and may not for some time. If Congress and the military are to identify problems with Goldwater-Nichols early enough to act on them, then a careful assessment of the impact of the act’s provisions on American military culture is needed. Looking at the Navy Department’s objections to the act provides some insight into possible weak spots in, and unintended consequences of the legislation. Navy led the opposition, and many of its concerns have not been adequately addressed in any rigorous manner. We turn now to a brief overview of Navy’s arguments.

**NAVY’S ARGUMENTS**

Although all of the services, the service secretaries, the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense were opposed to the reorganization, it was Navy, under the leadership of secretary John Lehman, that led the charge. In a variety of fora, Lehman and the Navy Department got the word out on the danger of the proposed legislation. Though he did not enter the fray until mid-1984, Lehman came in with all guns blazing. In the main, his arguments reflected those made by the Navy and Marines consistently since 1947. Lehman himself was genuinely opposed to the reforms since, in the zero-sum power game of the Department of Defense (DOD), any strengthening of the joint structure would be done at the expense of the services. Specifically, he perceived early on that the proposed legislation would rob the service secretaries of much of their authority, which in fact has proven to be the case.

In addition, one of Lehman’s principal advisors was retired Marine Brigadier General John D. Hittle. Hittle had worked with General Krulak on the Marine opposition to the National Security Act of 1947. He had written extensively on the dangers of unification in the 1950s, and had been one of the main architects of the Navy-Marine position on the National Security Act of 1958. Hittle was committed to the preservation of the Marine Corps and the autonomy of the services in the defense organization. Hittle, while perhaps not the originator of many of the Navy arguments of the previous forty years, was certainly their most consistent and eloquent spokesman.
There were four principal arguments offered by Navy in opposition to the proposed reforms. First, and deemed most effective by Jim Locher, was the idea that over-centralization would create an enormous bureaucracy that would stifle initiative and imagination and would tend to erode accountability. Second, forcing top officers to spend up to five years of their careers in education and staff duty assignments threatened to create a staff mentality and to denigrate the operational expertise upon which solid planning and military execution must rely. Third, by providing in the strengthened Chairman a single primary source of military advice, the diversity of opinion that was a hallmark of the military's success in World War II would be lost. Fourth, by empowering the Chairman to the degree proposed, civilian control of the military was threatened.

Other arguments included the idea that our strategic situation was unique in history. We faced a much more diverse threat, one that was both continental and maritime. As such, previous models (the German, Soviet, and Israeli were the most often cited) were of little value in suggesting the direction of any reforms. With the diversity of threat we faced, why was the military being forced into greater centralization, especially when business was finding out the benefits of decentralization? This was one of Secretary Lehman's favorite arguments, though it failed to make a significant impact on the debate. Additionally, some former officers testified that a distinction had to be made between operational and budgetary advice in assessing how "broken" the system was. Admiral Holloway suggested that operational advice had always been timely and sound, while advice concerning budgetary issues was usually (and properly) slower, representing more of a consensus result. A final argument offered by Navy was the danger of a man on a white horse. Though this one was perhaps the least effective, it represented an appeal to the American public, and has not yet fully disappeared from the debate even today.

As in 1947 and 1958, Navy's arguments failed to convince Congress of the strength of their case, and the 1986 act was passed. However, just as in the previous cases, Navy's opposition to further centralization partially succeeded in softening the blow on the military. It was due in no small part to the Navy arguments, as voiced by those in the Secretariat, the Chief of Naval Operations staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, myriad retired officers, and a corps of academicians, that the final version of the bill more closely resembled the more moderate proposals than those suggesting the creation of a national
general staff. Again, while the other services opposed what was perceived as meddling of outsiders in their business, it was Navy that felt the greatest injury to her service culture, one based on autonomy and independence.

**Assessment**

Space prohibits a thorough assessment of the issues discussed above. By way of this assessment, however, I hope to touch on some of the key concerns and issues that arise from consideration of defense organization. In the main, it is still too early to appreciate the impact of Goldwater-Nichols on American security. Many of the changes will require at least a generation to implement. Unfortunately, it will be too late at that point to turn back. Below, I suggest some areas that require additional debate if we are to be assured that the course laid out in 1986 is in fact in the nation's interest. The issues at hand are of the greatest importance to the continued vitality of the Republic.

Besides the length of time it will take for some of the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols to be implemented and internalized, those changes are only one of the transitions through which the American military is now passing. Others include ongoing changes in the art and science of war as technology continues its inexorable march, changes in the power structure of the world in the wake of the collapse of communism, and finally, changes in the geostrategic circumstances of the United States. These transitions are layered upon one another, thus preventing isolated assessments of the impact of any single one on the American military.

Likewise, the outstanding service of General Colin L. Powell, as yet the only Chairman to serve entirely under Goldwater-Nichols, will tend to skew any assessment. He was a unique chairman, and likely would have done well with or without the 1986 legislation. His truly joint perspective, his political savvy and his ability to forge coalitions within the bureaucracy were unsurpassed. As SASC staffer Jim Locher suggests, it is not often that your principal military advisor is also your principal policy advisor and your principal political advisor.

With those caveats in mind, how does Goldwater-Nichols look in light of Navy's opposing arguments? First, I think it fair to state that the CINCs have found it much easier to accomplish their mission under the new system. The service staffs are finding it near
impossible to interfere with operations, and often require CINC endorsement on policy and procurement issues as well. The impact of CINC involvement in the procurement process, however, may have tipped the balance too far to the joint side. Rightly concerned with current operations, CINCs are more likely to ask for the tank of today rather than to invest in the tank of tomorrow. This has not yet been borne out by any rigorous analysis, and is a worthwhile topic for additional research.\(^\text{35}\)

Secondly, while it remains too early to tell for sure, there is, or should be, great concern over the personnel policies mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. The Navy and Marines have long argued that the Title IV policies of the act risk sacrificing operational expertise in favor of staff expertise. A recent study has indicated that this situation will also present itself to the Army.\(^\text{36}\) The danger of creating a staff mentality in the top officers of our military is complemented by increasing size of the joint bureaucracy. In one officer's opinion, many of the problems that used to beset the old JCS organization are now beginning to appear in the Joint Staff. As it grows to meet steadily increasing demands on its action officers, the risk of stifling initiative and flexibility will also grow. The Joint Staff is evolving under the impact of Goldwater-Nichols, perhaps in ways unintended by Congress and its supporters. Because of the new power of the Joint Staff, the shift in balance from operational to staff brought on by the 1986 act portends serious challenges to the effectiveness of the American military a generation from now.\(^\text{37}\) Again, much more study of this aspect is required.

Finally, has diversity of opinion suffered under the new organization? Moreover, will the atrophy of diversity erode the effectiveness of civilian control over the military? Again, General Powell was a special chairman, one who, it would seem, allowed full expression of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be heard. Yet, only one opinion comes from the uniformed military. While the chiefs are authorized to seek audience with the Defense Secretary if they feel that a recommended course of action is against their judgment, none has yet done so. Does this mean that suddenly the four services are in constant agreement? Or does it mean that alternative opinions are not being presented to civilian authorities—authorities increasingly unlikely to have military experience of their own? Though legislative authority exists to go above the chairman's head, a service chief does so at great risk—because of the chairman's new power. Christopher Yuknis has
determined through extensive interviews with both service and joint staffers that with the greatly increased loading on the Joint Staff, a growing tendency to bypass service coordination in staffing actions risks ignoring relevant service concerns and failure to achieve the consensus needed to effectively implement decisions. As time passes, a critical eye will have to be focused on this balance of power. German failure in two world wars can in part be linked to a monolithic general staff that failed to provide for serious debate and alternative perspectives. In our complex geostrategic situation, we are even less likely to weather a similar mistake.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion has suggested some potential areas of concern with the implementation and impact of Goldwater-Nichols. There is much time that must pass by before the full impact of the law can be assessed. There is also much study and analysis that remains to be done. Many questions remain unanswered.

First of all, several questions arise with respect to the personnel policies implemented with Goldwater-Nichols: What will be the long term impact of the creation of a joint culture? Is this where we Americans want to take our military? Does "jointness," as understood today, represent the most effective balance of power within the defense organization to meet the challenges of the future? Or is it merely a necessary adjustment to the geostrategic circumstances of the past fifty years--circumstances that no longer pertain?

Secondly, what is the logical extension of the trend begun at the start of this century; a trend that has led through the various national security acts since 1947? Are we headed toward a full, joint general staff system? Is this where we want to go? Is such a system appropriate in the emerging security world of uncertainty and diversity?

Finally, what is the proper balance of jointness? Is it needed at the headquarters level to encourage it at the operational level? Or is it really only needed at the operational and tactical levels? How has the recent change in our geostrategic situation effected the necessary balance between jointness and service uniqueness? Can we afford to erode service culture by creation of joint culture? What is the cost to the future defense of our country? And, what is the long term impact of greater CINC involvement in the resource
allocation arena--they have a shorter perspective than the services. Are we focusing too much on today and too little on tomorrow?

I have somewhat laboriously ticked off some of the many questions that came to mind in the course of researching this essay in order to provide a foundation for future research. I have also included an extensive bibliography to aid in that further study. It is important to pursue this matter--of critical importance to the effectiveness of our military, and in many respects, to the domestic security of the nation. In the time of change that is only beginning, people will increasingly look to the military to solve problems, often of a non-military nature. The danger is that with a single source of military advice and with an increasingly staff and politically-oriented military bureaucracy, the traditional values of service to the country and Constitution may become distorted. Reflecting an old navy argument, Charles Dunlap suggests in his essay *The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012* that further centralization and unification is to be approached with the greatest of care:

"Resist the unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also because unification would be inimical to the 'checks and balances' that underpin democratic government. Slow the pace of fiscally driven consolidation so that the effect on less quantifiable aspects of military effectiveness can be scrutinized." 39

If the military and the American people sit back and assume that what is done is done, and that defense organization is no longer worthy of attention and effort, then we run the risk of developing a strong military for the wrong reasons, crafted with the wrong policies, and manned by people with the wrong skills and experience. Too much is changing--our country, our world, and the art of war--to allow of complacency in this respect. It is encouraging to see the seeds of that very necessary debate in the new publication *Joint Force Quarterly*. With its section on "Out of Joint," it provides the forum for serious, but constructive questioning of the mantra of jointness.

Goldwater-Nichols was an attempt by Congress to jump start reform within DOD. It did much that needed doing, and insofar as it did, the nation has benefited. Yet, it should not be allowed to rest on its laurels. Vigilance and debate are required. The diversity of opinion that forms the sinews of this democracy must be brought to bear on the issue of defense organization as we approach the 21st century. It is primarily the military that must lead in this, but it is also an issue for the whole country.
NOTES

1 The author is greatly indebted to numerous interviewees who gave willingly of their time despite the short notice and their busy schedules. In particular, the author wishes to thank Mr. James R. Locher, Ill, Mr. Seth Cropsey, Mr. Frank E. Jordan, Ill, Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), Capt. Robert B. O'Donnell, USN, senior staffers of the House of Representatives, and various senior military officers who wish to remain anonymous. Their perspectives shed new light on the Goldwater-Nichols debate and suggest the richness of the topic for further analysis.

Interview with senior House staffer, 8 December, 1993.

3 Much of this section is based on the personal interviews listed above. Much has been written on the subject, and excellent analyses of the very extensive process abound. What is new here is the “inside” story on the motivations of the participants, and the genesis of the bill.

4 As a consequence of our entry into World War II and our cooperation with the British, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized in 1942. This was an informal arrangement designed to improve coordination of effort and allocation of resources in the two-front war. It was also designed to face the British joint system with equal weight and expertise. See Allan R. Millett, “The Organizational Impact of Military Success and Failure: An Historical Perspective,” in The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Critical Analysis, (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986), p. 9. In the essay, Millett argues that the increasing centralization of defense in 1947, 1958 and 1986 was part of a culture that grew out of the Progressive Era and which increasingly saw government as the solver of the nation’s problems.

5 Seth Cropsey argues that jointness at the tactical/operational level has always been recognized as a necessity. While this is true, the need for deeper cooperation in the face of the factors discussed here cannot be denied. There is in fact something new at work here. Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 1 (Summer, 1993), p. 74.


9 “No one concerned with the military was likely to dismiss his opinions outright.” William J. Crowe, Adm., USN (Ret.), with David Chanoff, The Line of Fire, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 146-147.

10 For example, Admiral Moorer, former CNO and CJCS testified that “If all of the things set forth as being wrong with the organization and procedure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in fact wrong, as stated, then indeed it is a wonder that the system works at all.” U.S. House of Representatives, "Statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy (Retired), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (22 April, 1982)," in Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, (Washington D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 156.

11 Barrow testified that “The proposal set forth by General Jones would not only not improve the Joint Chiefs of Staff effectiveness, it would do serious harm to the system.” U.S. House of Representatives.

His successor, General P.X. Kelley, gave an even more venomous testimony in front of the SASC on 5 December, 1985. Taking his prepared testimony and literally throwing it aside, he delivered a highly emotional condemnation of reform proposals and outsider meddling in military affairs. In the words of Jim Locher, Kelley self-destructed, and was "torn apart" by Senators Nunn and Cohen. Interview, 10 December, 1993. Though his testimony did little damage to Secretary Lehman, it did not help the cause of defeating the proposed reform legislation.

12 Contained in Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

13 A key author of these bills was Dr. Archie Barrett, whose expertise stemmed from extensive research into defense organization in the early 1980s. His goal was to institute change in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but change less dramatic than even General Jones suggested. Had the military accepted the bill in 1982, it would have been far less intrusive than that passed in 1986. Interview with senior House staffer, 8 December, 1993. Jim Locher echoes this opinion, and maintains that had DOD come out in favor of the reforms suggested in 1982, it would have taken the wind out the reformers' sails (interview, 10 December, 1993). This was beyond Secretary of Defense Weinberger's ability—he just could not accept any Congressional meddling in his affairs. On Weinberger's obstinacy, see Crowe, Line of Fire, p. 157.

14 The following discussion is based on an interview with Mr. James R. Locher, III, on 10 December, 1993.


16 Locher interview, 10 December, 1993.

17 The report was published as a staff report, not a committee report because of opposition within the SASC. The year-long effort by Goldwater and Nunn to build support within the SASC was a necessary prerequisite to passage of the legislation. That support was greatly enhanced by the bipartisan leadership of Goldwater and Nunn. But, even then, the initial votes were very close. The process was one of the rare occasions where the activity of Congress was truly deliberative. Exhaustive hearings were conducted, and many of the committee members were present throughout. Several, including Phil Gramm (R-Texas), were swung over to the reform side based on the testimony and debate, despite severe pressure from the administration. Locher interview, 10 December, 1993.

18 Contrary to popular opinion (for example, see Adm Crowe's book The Line of Fire, p. 147), Mr. Locher maintains that Goldwater, not Nunn, was the energy and the inspiration behind the Senate's efforts to craft reform legislation. Nunn was brought in by Goldwater, not the other way around. It was to be Goldwater's final act in the Senate, and he tenaciously pursued that objective during his last two years in office. Interview, 10 December, 1993.


20 The House regularly passed reform bills from 1982 onward with large majorities (H.R. 3622 passed by a vote of 383-27). The Senate was key to turning these efforts into law.

21 To keep things moving along, Goldwater closed down the SASC for business until the reform act was finished. This prevented what he feared would be "death by amendment" as opponents, principally Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) sought to wrap the legislation in an endless loop of debate. Locher interview, 10 December, 1993.

22 According to one House staffer, it was Aspin who drove the House reform effort through Nichols. Interview, 8 December, 1993.
nH.R. 4370, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." In general, the House version was less dramatic than the Senate's. Lt Craig Failer, USN, reports that on the House side, Barret's intent was to "thread the needle" between the radical reform proposals such as Locher's Defense Organization: The Need for Change which would be rejected out of hand by the military, and the superficial changes he thought could come from within DOD. Craig S. Faller, "The Navy and Jointness: No Longer Reluctant Partners?" Masters Thesis, (Monterey, Ca.: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Dec, 1991), p. 62. On the Senate side, Locher and Goldwater had a specific (and very closely held) strategy to start way out with a radical proposal (his study certainly did that), and then allow the debate to move the final result more in line with what General Jones had recommended. Interview, 10 December, 1993. By and large, both individuals met their objectives.

The following letters to Senator Goldwater summarize the opinions of the Defense Department leaders:

It is worth noting here that while the Navy has traditionally been labeled as unsupportive of further centralization in DOD, it was the Marines in this case that actually led for the services. The Hittle-Lehman, and Cropsey-Lehman axes were key to the Navy's arguments. The CNO's staff was largely in the background throughout the debate. Lehman let it be known that this was his, and, preoccupied with the Maritime Strategy and not on the best of terms with Lehman, Admiral Watkins, the CNO, stayed out of the way.


In his 1982 testimony, General Barrow quoted Winston Churchill to sum up this argument: "Any clever person can make plans for winning a war if he doesn't have to carry them out." p. 196.

Subsequent to the passage of the act, and with the emergence of Colin Powell as an extremely effective and powerful Chairman, even Les Aspin expressed concerns with the power that had been given to the unified military at the expense of the civilian leadership. House staffer interview, 8 December, 1993.

Israel was too small, the Soviet Union almost exclusively a continental power, and Germany a single-threat country. The most favored model was the German General Staff, but, while this system yielded unprecedented operational successes, its strategic effectiveness in two world wars was unsatisfactory. Jeffrey Record, "Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and the German Model," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 2-8.

31 Cited in Seth Cropsey, "One Officer at the Top?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1985, p. 83.


33 Interview with Capt. Peter Swartz, USN (Ret.), 9 December, 1993. See also Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness," p. 73.

34 Locher interview, 10 December, 1993.

35 A transition not mentioned above that impacts this aspect of procurement is the increasing centralization of R&D and program development in OSD. Between Goldwater-Nichols and the creation of the USD for Acquisitions, service staff utility continues to diminish.


37 "Will the opinions [future military leaders] give under the most demanding circumstances to a President who has no military experience be as operationally informed..." Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness," p. 77.

38 Yulmis, "The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment," p. 93. An excellent essay. He also argues that the threat to diversity is real, and is ameliorated only to the extent that the Secretary of Defense (now weakened by Goldwater-Nichols) and the National Security Advisor actively seek out opinions from the services around the Chairman. See his conclusions, pp. 98-99.

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NAVAL CULTURE


HISTORICAL FOUNDATION


ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE


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