UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO CHAD:

Qadhafi-Bashing?

The National Security Policy Process
Writing Requirement

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United States Assistance to CHAD: Qadhafi-Bashing?

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Bob Woodward's book, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*, provides a unique perspective on the power play between personalities in Washington and offers some interesting insights into the foreign policy decision-making process within the Reagan Administration. Not only does this book detail events surrounding the Iran-Contra affair, but it also purports to reveal why the United States decided to support Chad's President Habre in his fight against Libya. If Mr. Casey did in fact share the secrets documented in the *Veil*, one could conclude that "Qadhafi-bashing" was the major driving motive behind the Administration's assistance to Chad.

In chapter four, Mr. Woodward revealed that the idea to increase military aid to President Habre originated in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Soon after William Casey took office as President Reagan's Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), he received a classified national intelligence estimate outlining potential Libyan activities for the coming year. This twelve-page document concluded that some of Libya's regional foes, including President Sadat of Egypt, were focusing their military resources on quietly bleeding Qadhafi at his most vulnerable point--his overextension in Chad.¹

"The message" wrote Bob Woodward, "was that the Chad adventure was the Achille's heel for Qadhafi, and the implied course to thwart Qadhafi in Chad appealed to Casey's strategic sense. Casey wasn't going to have the CIA sit on its hands with such an opportunity available." Woodward goes on to say, "Soon within Haig's new State Department and Casey's new CIA, a proposal for covert support to Habre was drawn up. It was called the 'second track' as distinguished from the normal 'first track' of standard open diplomacy and aid. Haig's stated purpose was to 'bloody Qadhafi's nose' and to 'increase the flow of pine boxes to Libya.' Casey pushed the policy..., and soon the President signed a formal intelligence order, called a 'finding,' releasing several million dollars of covert support for Habre."²

But was the decision to support Habre simply a case of the DCI setting the bureaucracy in motion to bash Qadhafi, or were there other factors which influenced the decision to actively support Chad's fight against Libya? This paper will analyze empirical research findings to determine what factors motivated the decision, and will substantiate or reject Mr. Woodward's assertion that U.S. activity in Chad was simply a case of Qadhafi-bashing.
Methodology

Hypotheses to be Tested

After evaluating the many motivations which could have influenced the U.S. decision to support President Habre, I selected five of the most plausible factors for analysis. Using each of the five factors as independent variables, I formed a primary hypothesis and four alternative hypotheses to be tested.

The main hypothesis and central theme of this paper resulted from Bob Woodward's assertion that Qadhafi-bashing was the prime motivation for supporting Chad. In proper testing format, the primary hypothesis became:

If Reagan's advisors saw an opportunity to exploit Qadhafi's overextension in Chad and "bloody his nose" for political gain, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

The four alternative hypotheses to be tested were as follows:

1. If Reagan's advisors saw an opportunity to reduce Qadhafi's role in international terrorism by keeping him busy in his own backyard, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

2. If Reagan's advisors believed the United States should protect its access to potential uranium deposits in the Aozou Strip in northern Chad, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

3. If Reagan's advisors desired to exchange U.S. support for French efforts in Chad for French support for U.S. issues in Europe, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

4. If Reagan's advisors believed that Chad was a key "African domino" in the U.S. effort to curb Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Method of Analysis

First, I gathered information on the decision to support Habre's government from a questionnaire survey, personal and telephone interviews with officials familiar with Chad, and library research. I then used this information to prove or refute each individual hypothesis. After isolating the motivation behind the U.S. decision to support Chad, I used the Graham Allison paradigms to categorize and explain the decision-making process. Finally, I analyzed the process with a critical eye looking for potential problem areas.
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**Historical Background**

To understand the motivations behind U.S. assistance to Chad, one must be familiar with Chad's history and the complex regional politics. The strife which characterized the 1980s was merely an extension of the bitter regional and ethnic discords which have plagued this impoverished country since before its independence from France. The narrow scope of this paper doesn't permit a comprehensive review of Chad's history; however, I have outlined (at Appendix A) some of the historical highlights germane to the President Reagan's decision to support Chad's fight against Libya. Maps of Chad are located at Appendix B.

**Hypothesis Testing**

Data collected from responses to the questionnaire (Appendix C) is presented in Appendices D and E. I used this information, in addition to personal and telephonic interviews with individuals from DoD, State, NSC, DIA, and CIA, to test the validity of the primary and alternative hypotheses. I have outlined some of the statistical limitations of my survey at Appendix F.

**Alternative Hypotheses**

Respondents rated the motivations in ascending order of importance to the United States as follows: access to uranium, the French connection, to reduce terrorism, and most important, to keep Chad from falling under Libyan (and possible Soviet) influence. (See Appendix E, Figure 2)

**Hypothesis 1:** If Reagan's advisors believed the United States should protect its access to potential uranium deposits in the Aozou Strip in northern Chad, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Research data confirms that access to uranium deposits was probably not a significant motivating factor in the decision-making process. There had been a glut of uranium on world commercial markets since environmental and technical issues slowed the growth of the nuclear power industry in the 1970s. Reports do substantiate claims of uranium ore deposits in the Aozou Strip, but there is little reason to believe extraction would be economically feasible. Even the French, with their extensive nuclear power production program, didn't need
Chadian uranium. France already imported enough of this mineral from Chad's neighbor, Niger, where yellowcake mines had been operational for years. This hypothesis is rejected because the United States didn't have a requirement for Chadian uranium, and therefore could not have rationally justified support for Habre's government as a quid pro quo for access to the Aozou Strip.

Hypothesis 2: If Reagan's advisors desired to exchange U.S. support for French efforts in Chad for French support for U.S. issues in Europe, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Media sources and information gained through personal interviews confirmed that the United States and France were clearly at odds on many policy and operational issues involving support to Chad. This dates back to 1983 when U.S. policy makers wanted the French to do more to help Chad.

On 6 August 1983, the Washington Post reported that "U.S. officials were saying privately that the socialist government of President Francois Mitterand must do more to convince Qadhafi of the West's resolve to keep him out of Chad." By 13 August headlines in the Post stated, "U.S., France Face Widening Rift Over Policies in Chad." The article went on to say that "the Reagan Administration has grown impatient with France's refusal so far to send fighter aircraft and combat troops into battle to crush rebel forces." This tracks closely with comments received during interviews--the United States was not supporting Chad to gain favor with France and was even willing to jeopardize existing diplomatic relations to pressure the French into doing more in Chad than they desired. This hypothesis is rejected because evidence clearly shows that the atmosphere between American officials and the French ranged from frustration to open hostility.

Hypothesis 3: If Reagan's advisors saw an opportunity to reduce Qadhafi's role in international terrorism by keeping him busy in his own backyard, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

This hypothesis is a little harder to prove conclusively one way or the other. There were many rumors in unclassified sources linking Qadhafi to terrorist activities in Ireland, Middle East (especially Lebanon), and Europe. Abu Nidal, the infamous master terrorist, was allegedly financed and directed by Qadhafi himself. In addition, press reports had linked Libya with PLO terrorist activities and the Red Brigade in Italy. To many Americans, Qadhafi
was the epitome of anti-Americanism and Libya was the epicenter of terrorist activity. The obvious answer to international terrorism then was to rid the world of Qadhafi or keep him so busy in his own backyard that he would have neither the time nor the resources to target Americans.

Discussing this hypothesis with knowledgeable individuals led me to the following conclusions. Libya did sponsor international terrorism in a more overt manner than Syria or Iran, and therefore was widely recognized as a symbol of terrorist activity. Qadhafi had challenged the United States militarily in the Gulf of Sidra and politically in international fora such as the United Nations and the OAU. Surveys conducted on tourist travel trends showed Qadhafi and the terrorist threat were scaring Americans so badly they were afraid to visit Europe and the Middle East. Libya had confronted a superpower and had won—an embarrassing situation the Reagan Administration desperately wanted to rectify.

It’s therefore likely that the desire to reduce terrorism was a significant motive for confronting Qadhafi, but it’s more difficult to prove that U.S. officials decided to use Chad as the means to this end. The U.S. decision to support Chad wasn’t like the U.S. decision to bomb Tripoli. Most officials agreed that the April 1986 raid was a direct response to Libyan terrorism. After the bombing, statistics tracking international terrorism confirmed a definite drop in terrorist incidences linked to Qadhafi. This type of hard evidence is not available in Chad’s case. U.S. leaders did not publicly link their support for Chad with Qadhafi’s role in terrorism. In addition, there’s no direct correlation between U.S. efforts in Chad and Libyan-backed terrorism.

Qadhafi’s role in international terrorism was probably the number one reason for his negative image in America, but testimony doesn’t show this was the primary motivation for U.S. support to Habre. According to Part II of the questionnaire (Appendix E, Figure 2), curbing terrorism was ranked second out of the five possible motivations for supporting Chad’s military efforts against Libya. While the evidence confirms that U.S. leaders had a strong desire to curb terrorism, it does not prove conclusively that assisting Habre would accomplish this objective. This hypothesis, therefore, is accepted only as a contributing factor in the decision-making process.
Hypothesis 4: If Reagan's advisors believed that Chad was a key "African domino" in the U.S. effort to curb Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Before examining this hypothesis from the U.S. national perspective, a look at French views may be helpful. On 14 August 1983, the Washington Post relayed that "the government of French President Francois Mitterand seems exasperated by what it perceives as Washington's obsession that Qadhafi is acting as a Soviet surrogate bent on seizing Chad as a crucial domino in the East-West struggle." The French clearly didn't believe the domino theory was applicable to the Libya-Chad scenario.

Libya's ability to form lasting alliances was dubious. Qadhafi had signed formal military or economic pacts with Morocco, Algeria, Syria, and Chad, but all of these alliances failed. Nevertheless, the questionnaire and personal interviews clearly demonstrated (Appendix E, Figure 2) that most U.S. officials perceived Qadhafi as a threat to Western democratic ideals and believed the United States was morally right to have intervened in Chad to stop Tripoli's adventurism. This attitude was especially prevalent among the desk officers at the State Department and the Pentagon who implemented U.S. policy in Chad.

As with the previous hypothesis on terrorism, it's hard to distinguish whether the domino theory was the main reason to help Chad or just an excuse to strike Qadhafi. The difficulty is accentuated when trying to separate the real motivating factors from U.S. rhetoric to rationalize or justify its actions.

History points out that the United States hasn't shown much concern about territorial boundary disputes or adventurism in Africa. In the 1980s, the United States didn't become actively involved in the Somali-Ethiopian struggle over the Ogaden region, the Palisario conflict in the Western Sahara, nor the South African occupation of Namibia. When it did take an active role, the U.S. government usually did so to protect its national interests (e.g., access privileges) or to counter Soviet gains. In Chad's case, the United States had few, if any, national interests in the country and little strategic interest.

It's interesting to note that the majority of individuals interviewed began by asserting that U.S. policy was designed to keep Chad from falling under Libyan (or possibly Soviet) domination. When challenged on this belief, many
conceded that Libyan irredentism was probably not part of a strategic game of dominoes set up by Libyan and Soviet planners. While impossible to prove conclusively, my research indicates that policy makers believed containing Qadhafi was more important than propping up a potential African domino. This hypothesis is accepted, but again only as a supporting motivation.

Primary Hypothesis

The analysis of alternative hypotheses has shown that the uranium issue and the French connection were not significant motivations. The terrorism argument and the domino theory, on the other hand, may have been contributing factors in the U.S. decision to support Chad. Now for the primary hypothesis.

Hypothesis: If Reagan's advisors saw an opportunity to exploit Qadhafi's overextension in Chad and 'bloody his nose' for political gain, then they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Discussions with mid- and senior-level officials in the State Department and DoD revealed that many agreed with the national intelligence estimate which indicated Libya's intervention in Chad was overextending Qadhafi's forces and exacerbating an already complex logistics situation. Recognizing these problems, U.S. officials were ready to give Habre the additional "straw" he needed to break Qadhafi's back. Annoyed by Qadhafi's terrorist activities and freedom of navigation challenges, the U.S. government was glad to punish Libya without appearing like an international bully. Chad offered the United States a low-cost way to smack Qadhafi while remaining conveniently on the sidelines.

The questionnaire revealed that most respondents believed the "individual factor" (psychological predisposition or personal prejudices) was a key factor in the decision to support Chad (Appendix E). Interviews with key decision makers and observers confirmed this notion—many opined that U.S. policy would have been much different had Reagan not been the president, Casey not been the DCI, and Ambassador Bishop not been the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Personal and professional dislike for Qadhafi among U.S. officials, coupled with the prevalent perception that the United States had been ridiculed by Libya, set the stage for "Qadhafi-bashing." Chad provided both the excuse and
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the vehicle. The primary hypothesis is therefore accepted—Reagan's advisors saw an opportunity to exploit Qadhafi's overextension in Chad and to "bloody his nose," so they decided to actively support Chad's fight against Libya.

Modeling

Graham Allison Models

Professor Graham Allison, in his book *Essence of Decision*, traces the decision-making deliberations surrounding the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and proposes three conceptual frameworks to explain decision-making processes: the "Rational Actor Paradigm" (Model I), "Organizational Process Paradigm" (Model II), and the "Governmental Politics Paradigm" (Model III). While these models don't explain every decision, they offer a good structure for analysis. A brief synopsis of Professor Allison's paradigms is attached at Appendix G.

Selection of a Decision-making Model

Applying Dr. Allison's criteria and explanations, I analyzed the research data to determine which model most closely fit the decision-making process. Data gathered from questionnaires and personal interviews painted a confusing picture of contradictions until I separated the decisions into two categories: 1.) policy decisions made to initiate or expand assistance to Habre and 2.) operational decisions designed to implement the policy. In this context, the high-level policy decisions to support Habre were congruent with those expected in the Governmental Politics Paradigm. Implementation and policy decisions made at lower bureaucratic levels showed evidence of a rational evaluation of options and cost-benefit analyses characteristic of the Rational Actor Model.

A closer look at U.S. involvement in Chad shows that the individual personalities of high-level decision makers played a major role in the process, which is typical of the Model III decision-making process. As discovered in the hypothesis testing exercise, William Casey's eagerness to bash Qadhafi was a primary factor in the decision to support Habre. It appears his personal agenda and perception of President Reagan's foreign policy direction pushed the
CIA into a more active role in covert operations in Third World countries—the larger operations seem to have included Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua.\(^{19}\)

Within the State Department, the situation was much the same. Interviews indicate that former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, James Bishop, had responsibility for policy toward Africa (south of the Sahara) and was therefore a key player in the decision to assist Chad. His dominant personality overcame organizational biases within the State Department bureaus.

The Near East Asia (NEA) Bureau tended to view confrontations in globalist terms because of the East-West overtones in its regional conflicts. The Africa Bureau, which usually dealt with low intensity conflicts and civil wars, was more likely to take a regionalist and detached view toward conflicts. Since Libya was in the NEA Bureau and Chad fell under the Africa Bureau, one might have expected the NEA Bureau to dominate State’s Qadhafi-bashing efforts.

Interestingly, this was not the case. Ambassador Bishop’s professional dislike for Qadhafi seemed to be a motivating factor in his personal interest in Chad. Several respondents explained that while ambassador to Niger in the late 1970s, Mr. Bishop was frustrated and irritated by Qadhafi’s wanton incursions into Niger. Given the chance to turn the tables on Qadhafi, Ambassador Bishop enlisted the Africa Bureau to drum up U.S. support for Habre.

Finally, decision makers used creative means to finance operations in Chad. When planners determined that Congress had not allocated sufficient security assistance funds to Chad, policy makers decided to support operations using the emergency drawdown authorization of Section 506(a) in the Foreign Assistance Act rather than asking Congress for additional moneys (Appendix H). U.S. officials later used this "emergency" funding method to finance a military offensive by Habre’s troops. This innovative financing method was judged to be legal by government lawyers, and is mentioned only to show a willingness to work around standard procedures to get the job done—another trait of the Bureaucratic Paradigm. See Appendix I for a more detailed explanation of the 506(a) authorizations to Chad.

While the Bureaucratic Paradigm (Model III) best explains high-level policy formulation, the Rational Actor Paradigm (Model I) best describes the policy
implementation decision-making process. Discussions with State and DoD desk officers made it clear that their decisions were more in line with Model I. These individuals were pleased to see Africa get the spotlight and some extra funding consideration, but they were wary of the long-term and strategic pitfalls associated with a heavy commitment to the Chadian government.

Conclusion

A detailed examination of U.S. activities in Chad uncovers what could be interpreted as William Casey's fingerprints. Sources in the State and Defense Departments confirm that Chad would have received little more than desk officer attention had Chadians not been killing Libyans. Just as in the case of the Mujahadin, Contras, and UNITA, Habre's followers fit neatly into the mold of pro-West underdogs fighting an anti-U.S. aggressor. This may sound a lot like conservative political rhetoric, but many of the people interviewed echoed these same anti-communist and anti-Qadhafi themes which were central to the Reagan Doctrine. The decision to support Chad, however, wasn't without risks.

Because of the covert nature of the operation, much of the discussion on Chad was conducted in compartmentalized channels--except when more open communication was required to gather information or implement policy. One individual, who had been a senior official in the American Embassy in N'Djamena in 1983, stated that the embassy had been caught by surprise when informed about the abrupt decision to support Habre. He confirmed that the State Department would have normally consulted with its in-country staff before making such a politically sensitive decision, but this case was not "normal." Pentagon officials also confirmed the secrecy which shrouded most deliberations and the limited flow of information between agencies. It's quite conceivable that many policy decisions were made quickly, at a very high level, and by only a few players.

I believe this compartmentalization caused a widespread confusion about U.S. objectives in Chad. If the goal of American support to Habre was to bash Qadhafi, then decision makers should have clearly articulated this policy to appropriate governmental agencies. State Department and Congress may have worked together better to allocate more than just the $5 million Chad received
in the U.S. security assistance budget for 1987. Pentagon officials may have supported the drawdown from their stocks more readily if they had understood the reasons behind the 506(a) authorizations. Finally, there might have been less consternation around Washington on why a relatively insignificant country was getting such a large share of U.S. foreign attention and financial aid. 21

Interviews with mid-level officials in the Department of Defense indicate that military planners were essentially cut out of the operational loop, except when they were needed to resolve a logistics support problem. This not only caused turf battles, but ultimately put long-range strategic concerns at risk.

Because individuals focused on a military victory against Libya were making decisions, U.S. relations with France regarding Chad insidiously became myopic. The United States began to apply increasing amounts of pressure on the French to do more militarily in Chad until French Foreign Minister Cheysson was forced to resign his post over this issue. 22 Bilateral relations between the U.S. and French reached a new low as officials from both countries disagreed over future actions in Chad. Eventually, diplomatic pressure from the United States and neighboring Francophone countries pushed France toward increased commitment, but this was achieved at a significant strategic risk. 23 It's surprising that U.S. officials were willing to jeopardize French strategic cooperation at the zenith of the cold war just to get more support for Habre's war against Libya.

Model III accurately describes the way many high-level decisions are made in Washington, and this process is generally efficient and satisfactory. There are, unfortunately, more chances for plans to go awry as the organizational system of checks and balances is by-passed. Policy isn't the product of rational evaluation of options or long-range objectives, it's just ideas of an official who has the power and position to turn concepts into directives. As long as political and moral instincts of our decision makers are sound, the system works well. But history reminds us that situations often degenerate quickly when personal agendas overwhelm U.S. strategic objectives.

U.S. efforts in Chad were rewarded with overwhelming success when Habre's troops soundly defeated Qadhafi's forces. The policy to humiliate Qadhafi worked just fine, but the decision-making process didn't function quite as well. While I believe the Model III decisions in this case were made with good
intentions, many were shortsighted. Relations with the French, security assistance to long-time African allies, and intra-agency cooperation in Washington were sacrificed to a degree so we could "bloody Qadhafi's nose." How could the national decision-making apparatus become so short-sighted? I believe part of the answer lies in presidential leadership.

According to the authors Crabb and Mulcahy, President Reagan is to blame for our confused and unfocused foreign policy, for it is the presidential obligation to create and control the decision-making system. To quote U.S. News and World Report, "The problem posed by the lack of machinery to coordinate foreign policy effectively is compounded by the persistent failure to spell out a coherent international strategy."

While there is overwhelming documentation to confirm President Reagan's strong dislike for Qadhafi, I didn't find any evidence of direct presidential involvement in the decision to support Chad except to sign the 506(a) findings. Statistics gathered from the questionnaire (Appendix E, Figure 1) rated the president's involvement a distant fourth behind the CIA, State, and the NSC.

To control decision-making in the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm, the president must be ultimately responsible for making and communicating foreign policy. An international strategy cloaked in secrecy is bound to cause confusion and may even be misguided. Additionally, a private foreign policy is likely to raise suspicions that the United States simply reacts to daily crises instead of charting a long-range course.

President Clinton would be wise to learn from our Chad experience. First, he should strive to provide direct leadership in foreign policy decisions. Secondly, he should communicate international strategy clearly both in Washington and overseas. Finally, his administration should consider adopting a policy of long-term building rather than short-term bashing.
ENDNOTES

5 Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 88.
8 Alex Rondos, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Chad," Current History, May 1985, p. 22; and Rondos, "Why Chad?" CSIS Africa Notes, p. 1.
15 According to Mr Rondos, Libya was not a Soviet surrogate for all the arms it received from the former Soviet Union were paid for with hard cash. Additionally, Moscow did not overtly endorse any of Qadhafi’s ventures into sub-Saharan Africa. Rondos, "Why Chad?" CSIS Africa Notes, p. 9.

17 This was also the Reagan Administration's policy. "Situation in Chad," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Volume 19, Number 32, 15 August 1983, p. 1107.


20 Perceived contradictions in U.S. policy were not only present in the American Embassy. At the same time the United States was giving $12 million the OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad, the Reagan Administration was secretly funding Habre's troops with $10 million in military assistance. See Rondos, "Why Chad?" *CSIS Africa Notes,* p. 8.


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APPENDIX A

Historical Background

The following synopsis provides a limited historical perspective necessary to understanding President Reagan's decision to support Chad. (Maps of Chad are located at Appendix B.)

Chadian-Libyan Conflict

Tripoli's interest in Chadian territory--especially the northern regions of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti (BET)--began shortly after Libya gained its independence from Britain in 1951. The conflict remained on the verbal level until the late 1960s when Libya began supporting the rebel Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) with military hardware. To dissuade Qadhafi from getting involved in Francophone Africa, French Premier Pompidou delivered more than 100 Mirage fighter aircraft to Libya in 1970. This payoff didn't work and soon Tripoli had stepped up its aid to the FROLINAT.

Believing that the Aozou Strip belonged to Libya, Qadhafi took his first conspicuous step into Chad when Libyan troops occupied the Aozou Strip in 1972 and began distributing identification cards to local inhabitants. The Libyan Ministers Council approved formal annexation of the Aozou Strip in August 1975.

By February 1978, the situation for Chad's government was grim. Libyan troops and FROLINAT rebels had captured the northern towns of Bardai and Zouar and were moving south to attack the administrative centers of Faya-Largeau and


2 In the 19th century, his Qadhadfa ancestors had been forced from their traditional homeland and had found refuge in northern Chad--reinforcing Qadhafi's conviction that this region did actually belong to Libya. For his 1972 activities in Chad, refer to Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 38.
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Fada. In desperation, Chad’s President Malloum turned to the United Nations for help, but the FROLINAT refused to consider UN cease-fire talks.³

For the next two years, Chad was scene of a violent civil war that eventually devastated N’Djamena, Chad’s capital city. Two FROLINAT factions, one led by Goukouni and the other by Habre, engaged each other after completely overwhelming Malloum’s government forces. The bloody fighting finally ended in October 1980 when 10,000 Libyan troops entered Chad to support Goukouni.⁴ Pressured by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Qadhafi returned his forces to the Aozou Strip in late 1981.⁵ Within months Habre managed to regroup his troops, overthrow Goukouni, and establish a new government which was not to be threatened until early 1983 when Qadhafi returned to the battle.

U.S. Involvement in Chad

Ronald Reagan’s election coincided with American frustration over President Carter’s ambivalent foreign policy in many parts of the world. The globalist view of international problems became vogue as the pendulum of public opinion swung back from Carter’s emphasis on human rights issues to conservative themes reflected in the Reagan Doctrine. The United States became increasingly involved in countries where it had no major national interest, but where strategic objectives were at stake—Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and Chad.⁶

Soon after his inauguration, President Reagan’s new administration began to speak out against Libya. By August 1981, the United States and Libya were engaged in a war of wills over the definition of territorial waters.⁷ This

³ Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 44.
⁴ Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 17.
⁵ Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 18.
confrontation culminated in a skirmish over the Gulf of Sidra where U.S. Navy F-14 fighters shot down two Libyan Su-22 aircraft.

The United States involvement in Chad began in the autumn of 1981 when it donated $12 million to support the OAU peace-keeping force established to encourage Libyan disengagement.\(^8\) The United States significantly increased economic assistance to Chad in 1982; however, it was not until summer 1983 that the United States began supporting Chad in earnest.

In June 1983, Goukouni led his rebel troops in a successful attack against Faya-Largeau. With Habre on the defensive, the United States responded with a $10 million military aid package which, when combined with French, Egyptian, Sudanese, and Zairian assistance, enabled government forces to recapture Faya-Largeau and regain the military momentum in the north.

On 3 August 1983 the Washington Post revealed that the United States was sending Red-eye and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Chad along with three U.S. instructors.\(^9\) This assistance was in response to bombing raids on the Chadian town of Faya-Largeau by Libyan MiG-23 aircraft.\(^10\) On 4 August 1983 President Reagan authorized $15 million in emergency military aid to Chad and sent two airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to Sudan with an eight F-15 fighter escort to monitor Libyan activities in the area.\(^11\) Three weeks later these aircraft were withdrawn from Khartoum following a

\(^8\) Kelley, A State in Disarray, p. 120.


misunderstanding between the American and French officials.  

The fighting turned sporadic and soon a stalemate existed between French-support forces of Hissene Habre and Goukouni's Libyan-backed troops along the 16th parallel, now named the "red line." This deadlock continued until September 1984 when the French and Libyans signed a mutual troop withdrawal. France removed its combat forces by 10 November 1984 as scheduled; however, Qadhafi merely moved his forces out of towns into a less visible posture.  

Despite proof of Libya's violation of the agreement and continued occupation of northern Chad, France kept its forces out of the area until February 1986 when Goukouni's forces crossed south of the "red line."

Now threatened, the French deployed combat aircraft to Chad and increased their military support to Habre's troops. The United States likewise sent $10 million in military assistance including two C-130 transport aircraft, over one hundred trucks and armored cars, medical supplies, uniforms, small arms, and ammunition.  

Fighting increased as French Jaguar fighters bombed Ouadi Doum and a Libyan Tu-22 retaliated with a high-altitude bomb run on N'Djamena airport. Following the attack on Chad's capital city, the United States

\[-----------------------------12\]


provided the French and Chadians with approximately $25 million worth of surface-to-air missiles and early warning radar equipment.

In June 1986 reports surfaced that the Goukouni coalition was breaking apart and by August fighting had erupted at Fada between the two principal elements of his rebel forces. A few weeks later, Goukouni was shot in the stomach as he was arrested by Qadhafi's military police in Libya. Sensing the confusion within rebel ranks, some of Goukouni's troops defected to Habre and by December 1986 Habre was ready to launch a major offensive to retake northern Chad.

On 2 January 1987 government forces attacked the town of Fada and by evening Libyan forces had withdrawn in disarray. Qadhafi brought in massive reinforcements and began an intense bombing campaign south of the 16th parallel, but Habre's troops were not deterred. Chadian forces continued their push northward, capturing the towns of Ouadi Doum (Libya's principal airfield in Chad), Faya Largeau, and a host of smaller population centers. With Libya now on the run, Habre charged into the BET region to capture the Libyan strongholds of Aozou, Zouar, and Bardai on 28 August 1987. Habre's forces clearly won this round of the Chad-Libyan bout.

APPENDIX C

Questionnaire

Agency where you work (affiliation):

Issue: In 1982, the Reagan Administration decided to support Chad's President Habre in his fight against Qadhafi's military forces who were operating in northern Chad. U.S. involvement in Chad increased significantly in 1986 when Habre's troops mounted a military offensive to drive Libyan forces occupying major Chadian towns north of the 16th parallel.

Objective: Based on responses to this questionnaire, in-depth interviews, and direct research, I will write a paper (a course requirement for my studies at the National War College) which analyzes the U.S. decision to support Chad's fight against Libya. This report will attempt to determine: 1) who made the decision, 2) how and why the decision was made, and 3) if the decision produced the intended results. I will also try to draw some related conclusions about the decision making process in the Reagan Administration using Chad as a case study.

Approach: I plan to test five hypotheses using Graham Allison's decision making models. Briefly, these hypotheses will examine the decision to support Chad in the context of 1) Qadhafi-bashing, 2) reducing international terrorism by keeping Qadhafi busy in his own backyard, 3) maintaining access to strategic minerals, 4) exchanging U.S. assistance in Chad for French support elsewhere, and 5) curbing Libyan (and indirectly Soviet) influence in Africa.

Instructions: Please answer questions with as much detail as memory or time will allow. Return questionnaires to Lt Col Scott Gration at:

7728 Silver Sage Court  National War College
Springfield, VA 22153  Committee Two, Rm 159
(703) 455-6515  (202) 475-1997

Your cooperation and timely response will be greatly appreciated because I must complete the research phase by 4 Dec 92 to allow myself enough time to compile the data and write the report.

Sincerely,
PART I

The Rational Actor Paradigm

1. Who or what agency was the rational decision maker (if agency, specify the bureaucratic level where the decision was made to support Chad's President Habre in his fight against Libya)?

2. What were U.S. policy goals in supporting Chad's fight against Libya (rank in order)?
   a.
   b.
   c.
   d.
   e.

3. What alternative courses of action were considered prior to sending military assistance?
   a.
   b.
   c.

4. What were the perceived benefits and costs associated with these alternatives (in terms of U.S. strategic goals and short/long-term objectives in Chad)?
   a.
   b.
   c.

5. Were U.S. policy goals met in Chad? If not, why not?
**Organizational Process Model**

1. Did decisions of government leaders trigger organizational routines (previously established procedures, options limited to existing capabilities)?

2. Were decisions made by a constellation of loosely allied, quasi-independent organizations (including State, DoD, NSC, and CIA) or did one organization have primary responsibility for orchestrating the entire operation?

3. Was the problem cut up and parceled out to various organizations (i.e., diplomacy to State Dept, military aspects to DoD, covert operations and intelligence to CIA)?

4. Was organizational parochialism a factor in:
   a. Selective filtering of information to support preconceived agency position?
   b. Recruitment of personnel to work the issue?

5. Did operational goals emerge as a set of constraint defining acceptable performance (i.e., was organizational health put above overall policy objectives, was organization unwilling to give up its assets or share of the pie)?

6. Was there bargaining and posturing between organizations?

7. Did response to Chadian situation appear to be precisely coordinated and rehearsed?
Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Paradigm

1. Was decision to support Habre the result of compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence?

2. Could the decision-making process be characterized by a sequence of moves (like a chess game) with bargaining among players?

3. Whose interests and action had an important effect on governmental decision to support Chad?

4. Were individual or agency interests at stake in supporting Chad?

5. Were decisions rushed by political or operational deadlines or perceived requirements for urgent action?

6. Did any agency or individual use power (bargaining advantage, control of information, personal powers of persuasion) to exercise influence over decision to support Chad?

7. Did rules, constitutional restrictions, and/or congressional legislation define course of action that was taken (i.e., 506a)?

8. Was politics a major factor in the decision to support Chad?

9. Was there an effort to "keep options open" or was there a conscious fight based on ideology of issues at stake?
10. Were there subchannels for action and information that competed for power and influence (State Dept, DoD, intelligence service)?

11. Did politically attuned individuals (political appointees) or bureaucratic careerists have the dominant role in decision to support Chad?

**Hypothesis Related Analysis**

1. How did U.S. get involved in Chad in the first place (i.e., historical ties, through the French, directly, covertly)?

2. What role did the following individuals/agencies/groups have in the decision to support President Habre’s fight against Qadhafi?
   a. President Reagan:
   b. White House/NSC:
   c. State Dept:
   d. Defense Dept:
   e. CIA:
   f. Congress:
   g. Private Interest Groups:

3. What is your opinion about the following statements.
   a. Reagan’s advisors decided to support Chad’s fight against Libya to punish Qadhafi or “bloody his nose.”
b. Reagan's advisors decided to support Chad's fight against Libya to reduce Qaddafi's activity in international terrorism by keeping him busy in his own backyard.

c. Reagan's advisors decided to support Chad's fight against Libya to preserve U.S. access to potential uranium deposits in the Aozou Strip in northern Chad.

d. Reagan's advisors decided to support Chad's fight against Libya as part of a deal to gain French support for U.S. issues in NATO.

e. Reagan's advisors decided to support Chad's fight against Libya to prevent Chad from falling under Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence.

Domestic Politics Theory

1. Were Chadian victories over Libyans a factor in domestic politics (presidential approval ratings, campaign issues, news broadcasts, editorials)?

2. Would U.S. support for Chad have been a factor in domestic politics if the Libyans had won decisive victories over Chadian forces?

3. How did the United States finance its military support for Chad?

   a. Describe efforts to increase Congressional allocation to Chad in Security Assistance Budget.
b. As you understand Section 506a of the Arms Export Control Act, was the
drawdown of service stocks to support Chad authorized (e.g., did
Habre's efforts against Libyan forces constituted an "emergency")?

c. Did the Reagan Administration use 506a authority as a convenient means
to fund U.S. efforts without going through Congressional channels?

d. Do you believe that it was legal to use residual 506a authority
(authorized in 1983) to fund military assistance to Chad in 1986?

e. Were funds diverted from other African countries who were under Brook
Amendment restrictions?

4. What has been the role of the media regarding Chadian conflict?

a. Was there an anti-Qadhafi tone in the media reporting?

b. Was reporting slanted to sway public support for or against U.S.
policy?

5. How was the U.S. involvement in Chad been received by:

a. U.S. Congress?

b. U.S. Military?

c. U.S. Public?

d. U.S. Allies?

e. Other African States?
Terrorism Theory

1. Did Qadhafi's role in international terrorism decrease after Libyan military forces became actively involved/engaged in Chad?

Strategic Mineral Theory

1. To what extent was access to potential strategic minerals in the Aozou Strip a factor in the decision to support Chad (no factor, minor consideration, key element)?

2. Was Qadhafi interested in the mineral deposits in the Aozou Strip?

French Connection Theory

1. Describe our relationship with the French concerning U.S. role in supporting Chad's President Habre (circumvent French totally, hold diplomatic discussions to coordinate policy, conduct jointly coordinated operations, sharing financial costs).

2. What was the effect of U.S. involvement on Chad's fight with Libya?

3. Was there been any evidence of increased French support for the United States (on NATO issues, in Persian Gulf, in arms control negotiations) after the U.S. Government began supporting Chad?

African "Domino" Theory

1. Why was Qadhafi fighting in Chad?

2. Was Qadhafi interested in a Libyan union with Chad as he had previously tried with Syria, Algeria, and Morocco?
PART II

1. Rank the following individuals/agencies/groups in order of their involvement in the decision to support President Habre’s fight against Qadhafi (#1 having most involvement and #6 having least).

   ____ a. President Reagan
   ____ b. White House/NSC
   ____ c. State Dept
   ____ d. Defense Dept
   ____ e. Congress
   ____ f. Private Interest Groups

2. Rank order the following statements on why you believe Reagan’s advisors decided to support Chad’s fight against Libya.

   ____ a. To punish Qadhafi or "bloody his nose."
   ____ b. To reduce Qadhafi’s activity in international terrorism by keeping him busy in his own backyard.
   ____ c. Preserve U.S. access to potential uranium deposits in the Aozou Strip in northern Chad.
   ____ d. As part of a deal to gain French support for U.S. issues in NATO.
   ____ e. To prevent Chad from falling under Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence.

3. Rank in order of importance (#1 being highest) the influence each factor had on the decision to support Chad.

   ____ a. External Factor (French political pressure, Chad’s request for assistance, Libya’s invasion of northern Chad)
   ____ b. Societal Factor (domestic public opinion against Qadhafi, mass media reporting, lobbying efforts by special interest groups)
   ____ c. Governmental Factor (bureaucratic/organizational policy making where decisions are made at lower levels in the system and are simply approved at high level)
   ____ d. Role Factor (as "leader of the free world," U.S. was expected to help Chad against Libya’s irredentist aggression)
   ____ e. Individual Factor (President Reagan’s personal dislike of Qadhafi influenced his action, psychological predisposition or personal prejudices of U.S. leaders were a key factor in the decision)
4. Rank the following statements in order (#1 being the statement which best describes the decision making process to support Chad).

   a. "It just happened" (U.S. got into Chad by default—not a conscious decision by policy makers one way or the other)
   b. "Let it happen" (French and Chadian leaders encouraged U.S. to get involved, and momentum eventually pushed policy makers in that direction)
   c. "Make it happen" (U.S. policy makers decided to help Chad and put agencies in motion to implement this decision)

5. Rank order the following statements (#1 being most correct).

   a. U.S. policy in Chad had a positive effect on public perception of the Reagan Administration (domestic politics).
   b. U.S. policy in Chad had no real influence on domestic politics.
   c. U.S. policy in Chad was counterproductive in terms of domestic politics and hurt Reagan’s standing in public opinion polls.

6. Rank order the following statements (#1 being most correct).

   a. U.S. policy in Chad improved U.S. ratings in world opinion.
   b. U.S. policy and involvement in Chad was insignificant and had little or no impact on foreign perceptions of the United States.
   c. U.S. policy in Chad was internationally offensive and ultimately weakened U.S. standing in world opinion.

7. Which statement is most accurate.

   U.S. planners resorted to the use of 506a drawdown authority to fund military support for Chad because:

   a. The conflict in Chad presented a clear-cut emergency which precluded use of normal funding procedures.
   b. They believed Congress would oppose increased security assistance funding for Chad (506a authority allowed them to circumvented the "system").

8. Was the Reagan Administration decision to support Chad a/an:

   a. Rational decision based on clear objectives.
   b. Organizational decision made by bureaucratic careerists.
   c. Political decision.
APPENDIX D

Synthesis of Part I Responses

The questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first part, consisting of essay type responses, was designed to elicit information which could be used to classify the decision-making process with respect to the Allison models. The following outline presents data gathered from Part I of the questionnaire and from personal interviews.

The Rational Actor Paradigm

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Government Action as Choice

While there was evidence to show that officials tasked to implement the policy carefully planned their actions to maximize operational effectiveness, I found little information to indicate the decision to support Chad was framed in the context of long-range U.S. strategic goals. Few of those interviewed could recall any formal cost-benefit analysis or risk assessment at the high-level decision making process.

It is difficult to believe that the United States would have jeopardized its diplomatic relationship with France over a minor regional issue if long-range strategic consequences in Europe (i.e., nuclear weapon agreements) had been fully considered.

II. Organizing Concepts

A. National Actor

It appears that several agencies were involved in the decision to support Chad—primarily CIA, State Department, and the National Security Council.

B. The Problem

Libya sent military forces into Chad and took over the major towns north of the 16th parallel. Chadian forces mounted an offensive to recapture this region and control the territory within its internationally recognized borders.

C. Static Selection

The Reagan Administration decided to support President Habre and the Chadian military effort against Libya.
D. Action as Rational Choice

1. Goals and Objectives
   - Stop Libyan aggression into Chad
   - Punish Qadhafi for openly challenging the United States
   - Provide internal stability and promote long-term political and economic development

2. Options (alternative courses of action)
   - Political pressure was put on Qadhafi through the UN and OAU prior to sending military assistance to Chad
   - The first U.S. assistance package was primarily economic aid

3. Consequences (perceived benefits and costs)
   - Triumph of diplomacy
   - Few million dollars to Habre was a cheap way to hurt Qadhafi
   - Supporting Habre was less controversial with Congress, public, Africans, and Europeans than openly confronting Qadhafi

4. Choice
   It is very difficult to determine if decision makers chose their courses of action based on value-maximizing or consideration of the consequences in terms of goals and objectives.

Conclusion: Operational decisions made to implement U.S. policy in Chad appear to have followed Model I. The high-level executive decisions to begin supporting Chad don't conform to the Rational Actor Paradigm.

Organizational Process Model

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Organizational Output

The decisions of government leaders triggered organizational routines, but only in the implementation phase.

Behavior was generally not determined by previously established procedures as was seen in the innovative and imaginative use of various existing authorities and funding mechanisms.

Organizational outputs didn't place narrow decision-making constraints on leaders, in fact officials exercised a wide range of bureaucratic options out of the standard operating procedures (e.g., 506(a) funding option).
II. Organizing Concepts

A. Organizational Actors

Decisions were not made by a constellation of loosely allied organizations, but seemed to be made by a select number of individuals at CIA, State Department, and NSC.

Defense Department orchestrated military support effort (implementation phase).

B. Factored Problems and Fractionated Power

U.S. policy toward Chad was not made by quasi-independent organizations, although various issues were addressed by appropriate agencies (i.e., diplomacy by State Department, military aspects by DoD, covert operations and intelligence by CIA).

State Department seemed to have primary responsibility for the overall effort. CIA managed the covert support to Habre.

C. Parochial Priorities and Perceptions

Organizational parochialism did not appear to be a factor on agencies basically agreed on objectives and strategy.

D. Action as Organizational Output

Organizational health was not an issue in the overall policy objectives, but did become a factor as the U.S. military was forced to give up their combat reserves to support Chad under 506(a).

Conclusion: While some organizational routines were exercised, the majority of decisions didn't follow the Organizational Process Model.

Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Paradigm

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Government Action as Political Resultant

The decision to support Habre appears to have originated at a high level in Reagan's Administration either at CIA or State Department.

The decision-making process seemed to be characterized by a sequence of moves (like a chess game) with bargaining among players.

II. Organizing Concepts

A. Who plays and why?

CIA had an interest in supporting Habre as this fit with Casey's charter of fighting communists and supporting freedom fighters.
State Department was showing support for African countries fearful of Libya's military power and irredentist claims.

Department of Defense had no real interest in Chad.

B. Influence of various players

Individuals at State and CIA used powers of persuasion to convince the President to authorize more 506(a) funding even when military experts testified that no emergency existed for Habre and Chad was in fact preparing to launch a military offensive.

Channels known for producing action were tasked with Chad related decisions.

Much information was compartmentalized and many subchannels existed for action and flow of information.

It appears that politically attuned individuals (administration political appointees) had the dominant role in decision to support Chad.

Conclusion: The decision to support Chad's fight against Libya and later innovative schemes to finance the effort fit best into the Bureaucratic Paradigm (Model III).
APPENDIX E

Statistical Results from Part II Responses

The questionnaire (Appendix C) was divided into two sections. The second part, consisting of statements to be rank ordered, was intended to produce data which could easily be analyzed statistically. Referring to Figures 1-4 below, the weighted average responses were calculated by adding the respective numerical rankings (i.e., 1 through 5) together, then dividing by the number of respondents. The following conclusions were drawn from the analysis of the responses of twenty-two individuals who completed the second part of the questionnaire.

1. Rank the following individuals/agencies/groups in order of their involvement in the decision to support President Habre's fight against Qadhafi (#7 having most involvement and #1 having least)?

(a) President Reagan (4.32)
(b) White House/NSC (5.18)
(c) State Dept (5.59)
(d) Defense Dept (3.95)
(e) Congress (1.77)
(f) Private Interest Groups (1.36)
(g) Mr. Casey/CIA (5.82)

2. Rank order the following statements on why you believe Reagan's advisors decided to support Chad's fight against Libya.

(a) To punish Qadhafi or "bloody his nose." (3.71)
(b) To reduce Qadhafi's activity in international terrorism by keeping him busy in his own backyard. (3.75)
(c) Preserve U.S. access to potential uranium deposits in the Aozou Strip in northern Chad. (1.00)
(d) As part of a deal to gain French support for U.S. issues in NATO. (1.40)
(e) To prevent Chad from falling under Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence. (4.43)
3. Rank in order of importance (#5 being highest) the influence each factor had on the decision to support Chad.

(3.57) a. External Factor (French political pressure, Chad's request for assistance, Libya's invasion of northern Chad)

(2.12) b. Societal Factor (domestic public opinion against Qadhafi, mass media reporting, lobbying efforts by special interest groups)

(2.57) c. Governmental Factor (bureaucratic/organizational policy making where decisions are made at lower levels in the system and are simply approved at high level)

(3.14) d. Role Factor (as "leader of the free world," U.S. was expected to help Chad against Libya's irredentist aggression)

(4.00) e. Individual Factor (President Reagan's personal dislike of Qadhafi influenced his action, psychological predisposition or personal prejudices of U.S. leaders were a key factor in the decision)

4. Rank the following statements in order (#3 being the statement which best describes the decision making process to support Chad).

(1.30) a. "It just happened" (U.S. got into Chad by default--not a conscious decision by policy makers one way or the other)

(2.00) b. "Let it happen" (French and Chadian leaders encouraged U.S. to get involved, and momentum eventually pushed policy makers in that direction)

(2.75) c. "Make it happen" (U.S. policy makers decided to help Chad and put agencies in motion to implement this decision)

5. Rank order the following statements (#3 being most correct)

(2.37) a. U.S. policy in Chad had a positive effect on public perception of the Reagan Administration (domestic politics).

(2.70) b. U.S. policy in Chad had no real influence on domestic politics.

(1.00) c. U.S. policy in Chad was counterproductive in terms of domestic politics and hurt Reagan's standing in public opinion polls.

6. Rank order the following statements (#3 being most correct)

(2.62) a. U.S. policy in Chad improved U.S. ratings in world opinion.
(2.50) b. U.S. policy and involvement in Chad was insignificant and had little or no impact on foreign perceptions of the U.S.

(1.00) c. U.S. policy in Chad was internationally offensive and weakened U.S. standing in world opinion.

7. Which statement is most accurate.

U.S. planners resorted to the use of 506a drawdown authority to fund military support for Chad because:

(1.72) a. The conflict in Chad presented a clear-cut emergency that precluded use of normal funding procedures.

(1.33) b. They believed Congress would oppose increased security assistance funding for Chad (506a allowed them to circumvented the "system").

8. Was the Reagan Administration decision to support Chad a/an:

(2.14) a. Rational decision based on clear objectives.

(1.80) b. Organizational decision made by bureaucratic careerists.

(2.83) c. Political decision.
Analysis of the Data

1. Referring to the weighted averages shown in Figure 1 below, respondents believed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, and the National Security Council (NSC) were all deeply involved in the decision to support President Habre’s fight against Qadhafi. One third (32 percent) of those completing the questionnaire believed the State Department was most involved in the decision-making process, but the CIA was ranked as the most involved when statistically ranked based on the overall weighted average. Since the numbers are so close, one could conclude that all three of these organizations were deeply involved in the decision-making process. The President and the Department of Defense (DoD) were perceived as being somewhat less involved, and the Congress and private interest groups were almost out of the picture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Decision Maker</th>
<th>Weighted Average (out of 7)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Department</td>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Interest Groups</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

2. Data presented in Figure 2 below indicated the main reason for supporting Habre was to prevent Chad from falling under Libyan (and possibly Soviet) influence. Reducing international terrorism by preoccupying Libya in its own backyard and Qadhafi-bashing were secondary and tertiary motivations respectively. It’s interesting to note that information gathered from personal interviews indicated that the "African domino" theory was administration rhetoric (some respondents may have been spouting "party line"). Several officials added they believed the United States wanted to destabilize Qadhafi’s power base and maybe foment a coup d’etat in Libya. Access to uranium and the French connection were not perceived as significant factors in the decision.
3. Interestingly, most believed the psychological predisposition or personal prejudice of U.S. government leaders was a key factor in the decision to support Chad (Figure 3). External factors, such as Chadian requests for assistance or the Libyan invasion of northern Chad, were ranked as the second most important factor and the role factor (the United States, as "leader of the free world," was expected to defend Chad against Libyan aggression) was listed third. Societal and governmental factors were considered to be less influential in the decision-making process, although one third of the respondents ranked societal factors (e.g., domestic public opinion against Qadhafi) as their second choice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influential Factors</th>
<th>Weighted Average (out of 5)</th>
<th>Choice 1st</th>
<th>Choice 2nd</th>
<th>Choice 3rd</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Factor</td>
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<td>25%</td>
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<td>External Factor</td>
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<td>25%</td>
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<td>Role Factor</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Factor</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Factor</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
4. The consensus (89 percent of the responses) was that U.S. policy makers took the initiative in Chad with an attitude of "make it happen" as opposed to a "let it happen" or "it just happened."

5. In terms of approval ratings, 70 percent stated that U.S. policy has had no real impact on domestic politics (question 5), but 66 percent of the respondents believed the U.S. involvement in Chad has improved U.S. standing in world opinion (question 6).

6. Most individuals viewed the Reagan Administration's decision to support Chad as political. This may have been because the word "political" has several meanings and many connotations--few related to Graham Allison's definition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Decision</th>
<th>Weighted Average (out of 3)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
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<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Figure 4
APPENDIX F

Validity of the Evidence

The questionnaire used to solicit data for model and statistical analysis (Appendix C) had some inherent problems. First, to allow adequate response time, I distributed the form before completing my library research and personal interviews. The questionnaire, therefore, did not address some pertinent issues which surfaced in later research. Secondly, it was difficult to separate first-hand knowledge from speculation. Ideally, more weight should have been given to responses from the "heavies," to prevent the statistical analysis from being skewed by those individuals who were drawing on their perceptions rather than hands-on experience. Finally, the small sample size made it difficult to draw statistically valid conclusions. The statistical results gleaned from the questionnaire were therefore useful only as a starting point for investigation, but not as conclusive evidence.
Professor Graham Allison, in his book *Essence of Decision*, traces the decision-making deliberations surrounding the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and proposes three conceptual frameworks to explain decision-making processes. These models are referred to as "The Rational Actor Paradigm" (Model I), "Organizational Process Paradigm" (Model II), and the "Governmental Politics Paradigm" (Model III). While these models may not explain every decision, they do offer a good starting point for analysis of the Reagan Administration’s decision to support Chad in its fight against Libya. A brief review of Professor Allison’s paradigms may be useful to understanding how these models apply to the Chadian situation.

The first paradigm, called the Rational Actor Model, attempts to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments.\(^1\) This model assumes foreign policy and international relations are a result of rational behavior that reflects a purpose or intention. It therefore follows that if one can determine the government’s goal or the national objective, then the decision-making process can be logically explained. This frame of reference is so fundamental to analysis of foreign policy that it has often been called the "classical" model.

The Organizational Process Model seeks to explain decisions less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.\(^2\) Although decisions made using the Rational Actor Model will probably produce consistently better results, this reasoned decision-making approach is not always feasible when dealing with Washington’s complex problems. In many instances, the complicated and entangled nature of international issues exceed the physical and psychological

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capabilities of our leaders. Because of these human limitations, what begins as an effort to produce rational action is often simplified by extracting and dealing with only the main features of the problem. 3 Five methods are used by decision makers to reduce problems to a more manageable form. These include 1) dividing problems into quasi-independent parts and dealing with the parts individually, 2) satisficing or finding a course of action that is "good enough," rather than the best, 3) limiting search for alternative options to an obvious few, 4) avoiding decisions that speculate on an uncertain future, and 5) developing repertoires of action programs to cover the wide range of recurring situations. The organizational process model, therefore, explains problem-solving under conditions of bounded rationality. 4

Model III explains decision-making, not as rational behavior or organizational output, but as a result of bargaining games by many actors who are interested in advancing their own goals. As Professor Allison noted, these players: 1) do not focus on a single strategy issue, but keep abreast of many diverse intra-national problems; 2) do not act according to a consistent set of strategic objectives, but rather to various concepts of national, organizational, and personal goals; and 3) do not make decisions by a single, rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is the essence of politics. 5 This model is most difficult to prove analytically, yet I believe it most clearly describes the decision-making process often observed at the highest levels of government--particularly those made to support the Reagan Doctrine.

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3 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 71.
4 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 71.
5 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 144.
APPENDIX H

Section 506(a) of 1961 Foreign Assistance Act

Sec. 506(a). Special Authority.—(a) If the President determines and reports to the Congress in accordance with section 152 of this Act that—

(1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international organization; and

(2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other law except this section;

he may direct, for the purposes of this part, the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training of an aggregate value of not to exceed $75,000,000 in any fiscal year.¹³¹

(b)(1) The authority contained in this section shall be effective for any such emergency only upon prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of each House of Congress.

(b)(2) The President shall keep the Congress fully and currently informed of all defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this section.

(b)(c) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation fund, or account for defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this section.

Section 506(a) Authorizations to Chad

Section 506(a) authorizes the President to take equipment from existing DoD service stocks to assist a foreign country facing an unforeseen emergency. This special drawdown authority can be used once the President determines an emergency situation exists and time precludes use of normal channels outlined in the Arms Export Control Act. The 506(a) option is attractive because it doesn't effect the security assistance budget or national debt directly, and is convenient for it requires less paperwork. In Chad's case, required equipment was simply taken from U.S. military stockpiles and sent directly to N'Djamena.

Special funding authority of 506(a) was used several times to support Chad. In August 1983, President Reagan authorized $25 million after Libya invaded Chad. When Libyan-backed rebels attacked Habre's forces in March 1986, $10 million more in 506(a) was authorized. Seven months later the President signed the final authorization which gave Chad another $15 million.1

The November 1986 506(a) authorization again demonstrated the innovative financing. When rumors of a split between rebel and Libyan leaders surfaced, policy makers decided to exploit this situation. Over a weekend, State and DoD officials committed the $5 million available from the Congressional security assistance allocation to empty the Chad-designated coffers and to pave the way for a 506(a) action. With Habre on the verge of launching a military offensive against the rebel held town of Fada, officials drafted a finding for President Reagan's signature to authorized a drawdown based on this "emergency" in Chad. Other creative accounting practices enabled U.S. officials to use residual 506(a) authority to fund efforts in Chad until the new drawdowns were approved. It appears that the unspent portions of the 506(a) drawdowns approved in August 1983 and March 1986 to help Habre to overcome bona fide emergency situations, were used by State and Pentagon officials to fund programs in 1987. Remember, government lawyers judged all this to be legal.