THESIS

PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICE IN AN INTER-AGENCY ENVIRONMENT

by

Clifford A. Nancarrow

September 2005

Thesis Advisor: Terry C. Pierce
Second Reader: Paul N. Stockton

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
This thesis evaluates, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, training and assignment policy alternatives for expediting the development and deployment of military officers to fill billets requiring inter-agency expertise. Using United States Northern Command as a case study, it examines these policy alternatives and proposes Joint Mission Essential Tasks that might form the basis for required training and education. It proposes the establishment of a Homeland Defense College and suggests that military officers be awarded credit for joint tours through service with non-DOD agencies. The thesis argues that uniformed service resistance to expanded DOD/inter-agency engagement should be anticipated. Mitigating measures are suggested based extensively upon a conceptual framework for successful military innovation developed by Terry C. Pierce.
PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICE IN AN INTER-AGENCY ENVIRONMENT

Clifford A. Nancarrow
Civilian, GS-14, USNORTHCOM
B.A., Stanford University, 1973
M.B.A., Cornell University, 1981

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2005

Author: Clifford A. Nancarrow

Approved by: CAPT Terry C. Pierce, USN (Ret); PhD
Thesis Advisor

Paul N. Stockton, PhD
Second Reader

Douglas Porch, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

This thesis evaluates, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, training and assignment policy alternatives for expediting the development and deployment of military officers to fill billets requiring inter-agency expertise. Using United States Northern Command as a case study, it examines these policy alternatives and proposes Joint Mission Essential Tasks that might form the basis for required training and education. It proposes the establishment of a Homeland Defense College and suggests that military officers be awarded credit for joint tours through service with non-DOD agencies. The thesis argues that uniformed service resistance to expanded DOD/inter-agency engagement should be anticipated. Mitigating measures are suggested based extensively upon a conceptual framework for successful military innovation developed by Terry C. Pierce.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
   A. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................1
   B. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................2
   C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................5
   D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ................................................................5
   E. METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES .......................................................6

II. ISSUES IN DEPTH .....................................................................................................9

III. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION ...........................................................................23

IV. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: A FURTHER ASSESSMENT ....................................31

V. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS .................................................................37

VI. EVALUATING JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS .......................................51

VII. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION .........................................63

VIII. ASSIGNMENT CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................73

IX. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................81

APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................87
   A. SURVEY METHODOLOGY .......................................................................87
   B. SURVEY RESULTS ......................................................................................88

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................91

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................99
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>EXPANDED NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBIRF</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIE</td>
<td>Collaborative Information Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Consequence Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMEFIL</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, Economics, Finance, Information, Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>Democratic National Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLD</td>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSOC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Inter-Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSC</td>
<td>Joint Communications Support Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDAL</td>
<td>Joint Distribution Assignment List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Inter-agency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMET</td>
<td>Joint Mission Essential Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMETL</td>
<td>Joint Mission Essential Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPME</td>
<td>Joint Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Specialty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTTP</td>
<td>Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Lead Federal Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Measures of Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSE</td>
<td>National Special Security Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Office of Domestic Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On the Job Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>Office of Primary Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDD</td>
<td>Radiological Dispersal Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Republican National Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJFHQ-N</td>
<td>Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJFHQ-NCR</td>
<td>Standing Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCL</td>
<td>Target Capabilities List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJT</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJTTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSS</td>
<td>United States Secret Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>Universal Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTL</td>
<td>Universal Task List</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Richard George Nancarrow
July 17, 1925 – July 9, 2005
Seaman First Class, USN-I
United States Navy SEABEES
October 21, 1943 – April 1, 1946

“Can Do”

Thanks, Dad.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM

Military personnel assigned to Homeland Defense (HLD) positions lack the training and experience to serve collaboratively and effectively in unfamiliar roles alongside their inter-agency counter-parts. This is a critical deficiency in our HLD effort to counter terrorism. Moreover, defeating the asymmetric threats that characterize the current strategic environment is a mission that is likely to extend for a generation or more.\(^1\) Because time is of the essence, the problem of staffing HLD and Homeland Security (HLS) billets with properly trained men and women must be immediately addressed.

Certain puzzles quickly emerge in confronting this basic problem. For example, what distinctive core tasks must Department of Defense (DOD) personnel operating in an inter-agency environment actually perform? How might these tasks be formally identified in the manner of a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)? Ancillary problems emerge as well. For instance: agencies other than DOD lack military staff representation. Without the opportunity to mix routinely in the workplace, DOD and inter-agency personnel assigned critical HLD/HLS roles are likely to remain professional strangers to one another. Additionally, viable career paths for DOD personnel assigned to HLD/HLS billets have yet to be charted. As a result, front running military officers are likely to avoid postings outside of established career patterns, such as HLD assignments, even if this work is of vital importance.

In addressing these questions, significant opportunities exist to restructure the manner in which DOD personnel and their inter-agency partners operate with one another. One method might be to revise the training curricula and student population of professional military schools. Another might be to designate officers who serve successfully in junior level inter-agency assignments as “inter-agency sub-specialists.” These officers would become eligible for follow-on inter-agency assignments at the

leadership level. A particularly attractive solution might be to accredit assignments in inter-agency billets as fulfilling an officer’s joint tour obligation.

This thesis will evaluate, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, policy alternatives for expediting the development and deployment of military officers in sufficient quantity to fill billets requiring inter-agency expertise. Using United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as a case study, it will examine these policy alternatives and propose Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) by employing a conceptual framework developed by Terry C. Pierce. His work on the distinction between “disruptive” and “sustaining” forms of military innovation is particularly applicable to the development of responses to radically altered strategic environments.2 Emerging asymmetric threats constitute the core of the current strategic environment faced by the United States. Effectively countering these threats calls for unprecedented levels of DOD and inter-agency cooperation.

B. DISCUSSION

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, it was frequently observed that “everything had changed, and the world would never be the same.”3 This would appear to be essentially true. Attacks of a similar nature by transnational terrorists have subsequently occurred in many nations. The United States military has confronted terrorists and their sponsors abroad by force of arms. With respect to homeland defense, however, it is less clear that the unique tasks that must be collaboratively performed by military and inter-agency personnel have been fully identified. Also, the associated changes in personnel training and assignment needed to perform these tasks have yet to be defined and implemented.

Prior to 9/11, DOD’s mission emphasis was focused almost exclusively abroad. Nation state foes were to be engaged and defeated on or above distant battlefields or in a blue water ocean environment. The missions of HLD, HLS, and defense support of civil

---


authorities (DSCA)\textsuperscript{4} were generally assigned as no more than collateral duties for local military commanders. This was due in large measure to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which limits the employment of federal troops in law enforcement roles. Additionally “regular” active duty forces could focus their full attention on preparing to defeat down range enemies as the National Guard was on point for responding to local emergencies. Culturally, the status and promotion opportunities accorded “real” war-fighters, as differentiated from those personnel assigned to hurricane clean-up duties, meant that serious and sustained interaction with non-DOD agencies was almost unthinkable.

Post- 9/11, HLD/HLS and DSCA have emerged from the collateral duty shadows and now stand front and center. USNORTHCOM has been established as the DOD focal point for undertaking these important but previously under valued missions. Successful mission accomplishment will necessitate the swift and coordinated application of traditional DOD capabilities in conjunction with the specialized expertise of other departments and agencies. USNORTHCOM has established a strong Inter-Agency (IA) Directorate to give the Commander ready access to the resources of non-DOD agencies. Arguably, however, drawing new branches on the command’s organizational chart and adding names to the slots created will not guarantee success.

Based on the author’s three years of service as a Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer, observation of USNORTHCOM’s involvement in exercise play and real world operations, and on a review of certain lessons learned/after action reports, this thesis suggests that it will not be enough to simply assign DOD personnel to desks alongside of their inter-agency partners expecting them to a) figure out what needs to be done and b) how to do it. To ensure mission accomplishment, changes will need to be made in the current level of task identification, training, and education of those responsible for HLD and HLS missions at USNORTHCOM and throughout DOD and the inter-agency community. Cross pollination in the assignment of DOD personnel to

agencies outside of DOD, and vice versa, as has occurred at NASA for example,⁵ would appear to increase visibility and familiarity where little existed previously. It would also facilitate the establishment of important relational networks among personnel at operational and leadership levels.

Changes of this magnitude that literally reweaves the organizational fabric of DOD and non-DOD agencies, requires innovation across a broad policy front that rises to the level of “disruptive.”⁶ New composite DOD and inter-agency forces need to be created altogether. These forces might be characterized as tartan rather than purple, which is the designated color of inter-service jointness. In a tartan organization, the individual colors of the component service threads remain perfectly distinguishable and new threads of inter-agency organizations are woven into the pattern. Tartan is emblematic of cultural integration, not cultural amalgamation, and is indicative of a proud warrior tradition.

Tartan organizations are conceptually “disruptive” in that they incorporate “novel linkages among components”⁷ that can result in “improved performance along a warfighting trajectory that … has not been valued.”⁸ HLD/HLS and DSCA missions comprise a warfighting trajectory that has not historically been valued by DOD. Since 9/11, however, these missions have become a prominent feature of the strategic landscape. DOD can no longer afford to overlook or ignore the value that can be added by inter-agency components in fulfilling these missions.

Pierce cites the examples of armored warfare and carrier warfare where, as forms of military innovation, the British essentially “missed twice.”⁹ As a newly organized command, USNORTHCOM has been presented with a unique opportunity to undertake a “disruptive” approach to planning and executing its assigned missions. As Pierce points out, however, “disruptive” and “sustaining” innovation must be managed differently.¹⁰

⁶ Pierce, 1.
⁷ Pierce, 25.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Pierce, 32-38; 3.
¹⁰ Pierce, 19.
By virtue of their own experience and by the press of competing operational and administrative demands, military commanders are susceptible to employing proven management techniques in directing all of their command’s endeavors. The result is that “sustaining” innovations are consciously or unconsciously nurtured and “disruptive” innovations – the type that have been demonstrated to win wars - are similarly suppressed or ignored. Were this to occur at USNORTHCOM, a singular opportunity for creating the type of organization where disruptive innovation is embraced would have been forever missed to the possible detriment of the nation’s defense.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What are the core tasks required to successfully accomplish DOD/Inter-agency HLD and HLS missions?
- Could the Goldwater-Nichols Act serve as a basis for developing and implementing policy responses to derivative questions related to:
  - What education and training is required for credentialing military officers to serve effectively in an inter-agency environment and how should it be delivered?
  - What will motivate front-running officers to compete for opportunities to serve in inter-agency billets? How can their career advancement be assured?
  - How will predictable service resistance to expanded inter-agency engagement be overcome?

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The United States military has embarked upon a once in a generation strategic repositioning of forces and a redefinition of roles and missions intended to confront evolving strategic as well as trans-national asymmetric terrorist threats. 11 The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has directed transformation as a governing principle for all DOD...

operations in his *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 2003. These initiatives call for a realignment of major troop formations and for the deployment of technologically advanced combat and support systems. Transformation will also require a reexamination of the skills and experience military personnel will need for effective performance of duty within their particular service and in joint and inter-agency assignments. Identifying the tasks that will need to be performed is critical to the success of these transformational initiatives. As recently described by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, it is clear that warriors with expanded skills will be needed for the kind of conflict in which the United States is currently engaged.

The task of closing seams between DOD and inter-agency partners that could be exploited by potential adversaries will require unprecedented synchronization of intellect and effort on the part of military and civilian leadership. This, in turn, will require a coherent and intentional approach to task identification, training, and qualification similar to that currently required for joint service assignments. Understanding these requirements and devising the necessary policies to implement corrective action is paramount. From the perspective of the overall homeland defense effort, no other actions may be of greater importance.

### E. METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES

This thesis will evaluate tasks that might comprise a draft JMETL for DOD/inter-agency billets through the use of a survey administered to USNORTHCOM personnel who have deployed to various National Special Security Events alongside inter-agency counterparts. It will also draw on preliminary analyses of proposed JMETs performed at USNORTHCOM and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

In the manner of a case study, this thesis will also briefly compare the historical context in which the Goldwater-Nichols Act was originally drafted and enacted with the current DOD/inter-agency operational and transformational environment. Assessments of the Act’s effectiveness will be examined. Various service policies and directives

---


implementing the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will be reviewed to determine if there is a suitable template that can be readily modified and adapted to the DOD/inter-agency situation. In addition to the survey mentioned previously, specific resources to be employed include published analyses, DOD instructions, articles and studies describing current transformational initiatives, and unpublished USNORTHCOM National Special Security Events post-deployment after action reports.
II. ISSUES IN DEPTH

Arguably, “business as usual” for the US military should have ended with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Absent a well defined and clearly articulated threat on the scale of the Soviet Union, the decade from 1991 to 2001 was characterized by calls for peace dividends and searches for revised defense strategies, reexaminations of traditional weapons systems, and consolidation of military bases at home and abroad. Little transformational change among the services actually occurred. DOD response to the one significant effort at reform, passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, was largely one of reluctant acknowledgement rather than active embrace. The act’s provisions could be said to have been met with a uniquely military reaction - a dismissive “noted” as contrasted with an enthusiastic “aye aye.”

President George H.W. Bush introduced a comprehensive new National Security Strategy for defense transformation in 1990. This was followed by various plans and agendas advanced by the component services that, subsequent to their roll-out, generally languished in the twilight realm of perpetual staffing. DOD continued as a world unto itself. Only the most minimal consideration was given to DOD’s potential roles requiring comprehensive and sustained engagement with other agencies of the federal government. The Coast Guard and the National Guard were barely on the screen as elements of national power. Professional development paths for military personnel were stable, assignments predictable, and the distinction between “career enhancing” and “career limiting” broadly if informally understood. To the extent innovation was occurring within

---


15 Ibid., 410.

DOD at all, it was the type described by Pierce as “sustaining innovation” – that is incremental transformation possibly “result[ing] in … improved performance along a trajectory that has traditionally been valued.”17

This stable environment was shattered on the morning of 9/11/2001 by the terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and on the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Without diminishing the magnitude of the loss of life and the scope of the horror visited upon surviving families and loved ones, the shudder felt throughout the Pentagon was symbolic as well as tangible. The impetus for radical change in DOD’s relationship with its inter-agency partners had arrived at 0937 that morning in the form of a commercial jet liner smashing into the southwest E-ring. DOD suddenly found itself confronted by the necessity of charting a path characterized by Pierce as “disruptive innovation… requir[ing] new skills and routines.”18 Pointing to an example provided by another authority on the innovation process, Barry Posen, Pierce observes “When threats to security are high, however, so are the incentives to achieve a disruptive innovation”19 and notes that at this point “civilian leaders may directly intervene to impose and audit disruptive innovation.”20

On the morning of 9/11/2001, the threats to the nation’s security increased dramatically and direct civilian intervention in spurring DOD transformation became an imperative. To successfully counter asymmetric terrorist threats and to effectively mitigate the consequences of any follow-on attacks, it was suddenly clear that DOD would need to undertake swiftly the steps necessary to plan and conduct a broad scope of operations with its inter-agency partners on a near continuous basis.

To execute these unanticipated missions DOD will need to provide a steady flow of military officers to serve in DOD and inter-agency billets (jobs) at both the junior and senior officer level. These officers should be equipped to succeed in the performance of duties that, in many respects, differ from those encountered in a service specific or joint environment. While junior officers might reasonably be expected to require and

17 Pierce, 25.
18 Ibid., 25.
19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid.
accomplish a certain amount of on the job training when first posted to billets requiring inter-agency involvement, senior officers (O-5 and above) will need to be ready to assume positions of leadership on arrival at the newly established USNORTHCOM and at other joint commands with HLD and HLS responsibilities. These leadership positions will demand the immediate application of skills mastered in previous assignments as well as those unique to the inter-agency arena. At a minimum, these officers will need to have a working knowledge of the legal authorities and constraints that impact DOD operations in support of civil authorities, they must have a detailed grasp of the roles and missions assigned to their inter-agency counterparts, they should have operational experience in serving alongside of these agencies and organizations, and they should have a demonstrated grasp of the cultural differences likely to impinge on the planning and conduct of HLD and HLS operations. Obtaining these skills will require focused training.

For the requisite training to occur, a distinct set of HLD/HLS Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) needs to be formally identified, collated, and forwarded to the Joint Staff for review and approval. When completed, the JMET List (JMETL) will constitute the criteria for introducing or revising curriculum elements included in the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system and may be recommended for inclusion in service specific entry-level training programs. Concurrently, billet descriptions for existing and planned billets must be revised to incorporate these newly delineated skills. Each of the services will need to create and fund their proportionate share of these billets. Further, they will need to modify their professional skills tracking systems to enable the identification of men and women whose training and experience satisfy the JMET requirements. Finally, career paths and duty rotations will need to be mapped out in a manner that ensures officers who perform successfully in these billets stand with or ahead of their peers when competing for advancement.

Synchronizing all of these disparate elements is a task of enormous complexity made even more difficult by the current absence of a centralized DOD champion
ordesignated Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). Each of the services has been left to “fit” these modifications into its established training and personnel systems. These systems are frequently perceived to be entrenched bureaucracies characterized by opaque and rigid procedures. They are commonly held to adopt and implement change at no better than a glacial pace. The policies guiding these bureaucracies prescribe career paths developed to fit Cold War requirements and the earliest ventures into the “new” era of joint service. Of even greater concern is that the agencies now comprising the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are clearly focusing all of their energy on completing the largest reorganization of the federal government in its history. It is difficult to imagine that the concept of incorporating DOD personnel into the heart of these agencies’ operations is receiving front-burner attention.

As for state and local law enforcement and emergency response organizations, their priorities are largely focused on writing grants to obtain their sought after shares of windfall federal funding for the acquisition of capital equipment and for the design and execution of HLD/HLS exercises. Who can blame them? Lost in this scramble is an intentional effort on the part of DOD or DHS to specify and convey to these grant writers the types of assistance and the types of professional skills that military personnel might contribute to the resolution of a crisis. In a developing emergency, when first responders at the state and local level have exhausted the response resources available to them, DOD is the provider of last resort. DOD also offers unique capabilities that may be required, often on short notice, at the scene of a crisis. It will be imperative for DOD to have planned for these contingencies and to have coordinated these plans with the first responder community.

Similarly, if a collaborative effort is required to deter, prevent, or defeat a terrorist threat, it may well be a member of local law enforcement or an analyst in a state emergency operations or threat evaluation center who provides the last element of

---

21 U.S. Department of Defense, *2004 DOD Training Transformation Implementation Plan—Appendix IT, AP1-123*, (Washington, D.C., 2004). (The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Personnel has only recently been tasked to tackle the training aspect, with preliminary deliverables scheduled for the Fall of 2005. Final outputs are due in the Fall of 2007).

information necessary for DOD forces to act. DOD might also enlist the specialized assistance of other federal departments and agencies in disrupting or averting the event entirely – possibly abroad or at great distance from the locale generating the intelligence. In these circumstances, time is a critical variable. Speed of response is at the heart of the 9/11 Commission’s call for a unity of effort and the creation of a culture based not on a “need to know” but rather on a “need to share.” When a crisis is developing, DOD is likely to be the pivot agency for a coordinated response. Planning now is essential. Also, civilian intervention in the form of legislative initiatives almost certainly will be required to overcome the spirit of resistance to expeditious change that can be anticipated from the various service components.

The US has sophisticated technology, armies of law enforcement personnel, and a motivated professional military available to deter and defeat the terrorist threat. Nevertheless, these capabilities have, to date, been inadequately marshaled and coordinated. These capabilities remain incompletely focused despite much activity and the expenditure of significant effort and treasure. DOD has had experience over the years assisting civilian agencies, particularly the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Forest Service, in providing relief from natural disasters and in fighting wild land fires. These relationships, however, do not extend to the federal agencies whose principal missions relate to law enforcement. These agencies tend to be wary of their counterparts in camouflage.

Unfortunately, the HLD mission, that is close-in defense of the approaches to the North American continent and Caribbean Islands, is unlike any civil support assignment. Al Qaeda is neither a hurricane nor an invasion of bark beetles. Successfully countering the terrorist threat to the US homeland will require a transformation in organizational alignment among DOD and its partner agencies. This would be consistent with the larger DOD transformation objectives set forth by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but will

---


involve an enormous amount of intellectual heavy lifting, sophisticated relationship building, and sheer perseverance in overcoming entrenched bureaucratic inertia.

The task of synchronizing and leveraging the disparate elements and unique attributes of each agency involved in sustaining an anti-terror fight of perhaps generations’ duration is enormously complex. In the case of HLD and HLS, the existing components are not the familiar armor and air power linked by the German armed forces in the manner of Blitzkrieg, but are instead, active duty forces, National Guard troops and law enforcement personnel at the local, state and federal levels. Though attributable to many factors, in the twelve years since the first World Trade Center terrorist attack killed and injured significant numbers of Americans on US soil, these vital linkages have not been fully established.

Statutory barriers, most notably the Posse Comitatus Act, restrict the employment of active duty military forces in performing many anti-terror missions. Of perhaps greater significance, however, are inter-service and inter-agency cultural barriers that, arguably, will only be overcome through deliberate action at the leadership level. If the full spectrum of national power is to be brought to bear in confronting the terrorist threat, these barriers will need to be demolished or circumvented. This array of power includes the components of Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, Economics, Finance, Information, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) power. Only the “M,” lies entirely within the historical operational realm of DOD. The other elements are the purview of agencies with whom DOD must learn to partner.

DOD, however, is likely to look askance at any initiative advanced as a revolutionary “answer” to the task of planning and executing sophisticated and unfamiliar operations against an adaptive foe. Possibly involving unprecedented combinations of active duty military forces, inter-agency partners, and state and local first responders, this new way of waging war is likely to be met with skepticism and passive or active resistance. As reported by Pierce, Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Elmo Zumwalt

25 Pierce, 16.
26 The 9/11 Commission Report, 341 and following.
27 Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.
largely failed in his “Project 60” transformational initiative by employing a top down implementation strategy in which the Navy’s leaders were asked, implored, and directed to accept the elements of the CNO’s plan to confront the emerging Soviet blue water threat on the basis of the plan’s revolutionary attributes.28

Within most organizations and particularly DOD, “new” and “better” are concepts not generally received with much enthusiasm. The harbingers of change are frequently checked into the boards by their peers - or worse - as an example to others with the temerity to challenge the established order or strategic view. This would seem to be true even if there appears to be wide spread recognition in both lay and professional circles that a sea-change has occurred in the strategic environment. For example, following the successful terrorist attacks on the twin towers of New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11/2001, a common theme was “everything has changed.”29 It would seem, then, that new ways of organizing to confront an adversary prepared to engage in asymmetric warfare on a global scale would not only be accepted but actively sought, explored, and evaluated by those charged with responsibility for the nation’s defense. In the case of DOD, however, the adaptation and change assimilation process has, instead, been slow.

USNORTHCOM formed in 2002, represents a civilian directed response to the perceived shortcomings of the geographically and functionally distributed military command arrangement in place on 9/11. At that time, responsibility for the ground defense of the United States was assigned to the First and Fifth US Armies. Air defense responsibilities were assigned to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD, the combined US and Canadian command that remains collocated with but separate from USNORTHCOM). Maritime defense responsibility was assigned to the US Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. USNORTHCOM, unlike any predecessor organization, is solely responsible for all DOD operations associated with the HLD and HLS missions within its AOR. It is further distinguished from its Regional Combatant Command counter-parts by a numerically robust inter-agency directorate aligned with the

28 Pierce, 160.
traditional directorates of Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, etc. Additionally, USNORTHCOM features a Standing Joint Force Headquarters element as prescribed in the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance that is capable of deploying on short notice to form the command and control nucleus for a Joint Task Force.\(^{30}\)

Apart from its subordinate commands, Joint Task Force – Civil Support, JTF-North, JTF-Alaska, and Standing Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region, USNORTHCOM is assigned no traditionally constituted standing forces per se. That is, the Commander, USNORTHCOM, does not maintain daily operational control over significant numbers of fighter planes, destroyers, or armored cavalry units. As emerging situations dictate, the USNORTHCOM commander draws forces of appropriate composition and quantity on a request basis from US Joint Forces Command via a SECDEF approved Request for Forces (RFF).

In lieu of these assigned forces, USNORTHCOM’s main battery is intended to be an operationally focused Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) comprised of people and technology. When fully mature, the CIE will provide USNORTHCOM with continuous access to and interaction with subject matter experts internal and external to the command. These knowledge warriors will offer various headquarters teams and working groups expert perspective on potential adversaries and their core systems. Extending beyond the scope of intelligence fusion organizations, the USNORTHCOM CIE is intended to facilitate the efforts of the staff in the swift conversion of classified and open source information into actions across the DIMEFIL spectrum.

The members of this CIE will be linked by secure collaborative planning tools, as well as by more conventional classified and unclassified e-mail systems and telephone. The technology employed enhances decision-making speed and the completion of staff actions. It includes secure voice over internet as well as the capability to remotely view power point presentations and to work efficiently on a global basis in plan development mark-up sessions.

The key benefit of the CIE, however, is not the technology but the people. The members of the CIE will include personnel with specialized expertise. The CIE roster is

established on a pre-crisis basis but can be tailored to emerging events. It includes but is not limited to representatives from USNORTHCOM subordinate and component commands, law enforcement agencies, counter terrorist centers, USCG, Treasury, Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies on an as required basis. The CIE is rounded out by the participation of representatives from designated academic Centers of Excellence sponsored by DOD and DHS. As an example, the University of Southern California has received a DHS grant to lead a consortium of colleges and universities in establishing the Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events.31

The involvement of CIE subject matter experts from the academic arena, national labs, and industry, will add an invaluable non-military dimension to the analytical work performed by the USNORTHCOM staff. The CIE provides a point of entry into the inter-agency environment for the accomplishment of both USNORTHCOM’s HLD and HLS missions. The distinction between the two missions is important. For USNORTHCOM “Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal organizations. DOD and [US]NORTHCOM's HLS roles include homeland defense and civil support.”32

USNORTHCOM’s inter-agency, operations and plans directorates must, on a daily basis, focus on its civil support/HLS mission. In this arena, as examples, USNORTHCOM coordinates DOD’s response to natural disasters and augments state and local security forces in support of National Special Security Events such as the national political conventions. These inescapable tasks demand significant attention and consume immense amounts of energy. The staff’s access to the CIE enables vital and comprehensive pre-crisis HLD planning to continue concurrently on an uninterrupted basis.

Proficiency in the employment of this transformational CIE main battery by military officers posted to USNORTHCOM and their ability to leverage the full capabilities of inter-agency partners on short notice has been assumed in the military services’ assignment processes. Most officers arrive at USNORTHCOM directly from a field assignment with their sending service or perhaps from a tour on the Joint Staff. However, virtually none have had any focused training or direct interaction with non-military elements of the CIE. Members of the National Guard on active duty would clearly represent an exception, but generally, the sending services have not structured assignments to provide officers with these types of interactions. They have not, historically, been motivated to do so.

What accounts for DOD’s reluctance to engage with inter-agency partners? James Q. Wilson has postulated that “Organizations will accept (or at least not bitterly resist) inventions that facilitate the performance of existing tasks in a way consistent with existing managerial arrangements [emphasis added]”33 The DOD inter-agency organizational construct established at USNORTHCOM is intended to serve as a new managerial arrangement to enable the performance of existing tasks more rapidly while taking on new tasks associated with emerging threats. Thus, according to Wilson, the stage has been set for organizational rejection. In that USNORTHCOM itself is a new organization within DOD, certain of these objections may be more readily overcome than at the more established Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) where the need for dynamic inter-agency engagement is only now beginning to be recognized. Wilson observes that “the longer an agency exists the more likely that its core tasks [and corresponding organizational forms] will be defined in ways that …. maximize the costs of changing them.”34

USNORTHCOM has demonstrated some recent successes through engagement with inter-agency partners in conjunction with operations remote from its headquarters. Members of the staff have deployed in support of the 2004 G-8 Summit, the Democratic National Convention, the Republican National Convention, and the 2005 Presidential


34 Wilson, 232.
In each of these events, the United States Secret Service has served as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). Support to the LFA was provided by multiple federal agencies as well as by state and local law enforcement and emergency planning and response organizations. Operations were conducted out of a designated Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) – not a military headquarters.

The NSSE military presence in each instance took an unprecedented form. At the two conventions, the senior military officer in command of the DOD Joint Task Force (JTF) was a State National Guard General Officer in command of both National Guard forces and active duty forces. This “double-hatted” command and control arrangement enabled the JTF commander to report to his state governor for the law enforcement role his forces might have been called on to play. It also enabled him to report to Commander USNORTHCOM in fulfilling DOD’s role of defense support to civil authorities. The arrangement was unprecedented. It vested in one commander the authorities of USC Title 32 which governs the operations of National Guard forces and USC Title 10 which governs, and limits, the operations of active duty forces in their civil support role.35

In Massachusetts and New York, the JTF commander’s deputy, or second in command, was an active duty Navy Captain from USNORTHCOM– the deputy director of the embedded Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N). USNORTHCOM provided additional active duty forces to augment the JTF headquarters team – communications specialists, intelligence personnel, operations’ watch standers, medical planners, and force protection experts. These personnel were self-sustaining. They did not represent a drain on the energies or resources of the LFA. They also came equipped at the G-8 and the DNC with a sophisticated communications van that added specialized secure voice and secure teleconferencing capability that would have otherwise been unavailable to on-scene decision makers. The command and control arrangement and the close alliance with inter-agency partners in conducting these operations constituted a new form of warfighting capability. The novel linkage of forces represented a coordinated effort to deter and defend against a terrorist attack through a display of force and a well prepared state guard and active duty units. The SJFHQ-N detachment that deployed to the NSSEs

---

35 USC Title 10, Section 375.
served as a small unit of the type described by Wilson, created specifically to take on new tasks.36 In this role, particularly, “small” is good as DOD is frequently perceived by state and local first responders as being “too big” and “too much,” as well as “too take charge” and, generally, “too late” to be of much help. As one of “his” staff directorates, SJFHQ-N is capable of being deployed directly by the USNORTHCOM commander who would otherwise need a SECDEF approved RFF to provide augmentation personnel. The implication is that USNORTHCOM can respond quickly and with capability. Speed is good. It is at the heart of the broader DOD transformation initiative, “a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on … information technologies.”37

Though it is unlikely that events will occur on a repeat basis in any one state, the professional relationships forged with the personnel from the Secret Service, FEMA, USCG, FBI, and other federal agencies involved with these types of events contributes to a valuable sense of operational continuity among the inter-agency partners. The members of the USNORTHCOM deployable detachment can begin to anticipate the moves of their inter-agency partners and can become more familiar with their operational and professional cultures. Providing direct and immediate support to inter-agency partners on a regular basis constitutes new core tasks for DOD, a hallmark of genuine innovation.38 Putting the same team in the field for multiple events enables the methods for accomplishing these tasks to be better refined, cultural impediments overcome, and the speed of response enhanced.

Acting in concert with inter-agency partners to fulfill HLD missions, USNORTHCOM can devise and suggest to SECDEF, alternative courses of action involving the application of diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, information, law enforcement (DIMEFIL) elements of national power. The employment of national power extends well beyond the application of military force. Employing a football analogy, an offensive lineman does not have to “pancake” block his opponent on

---

36 Wilson, 231.
38 Wilson, 224.
every play. He may simply influence the defender away from the hole the running back will be cutting through. In confronting the adaptive and elusive terrorists, DOD must be able to not only deliver a crushing kinetic blow (or pancake block equivalent) when required, but must also be able to deter attacks through collaborative interaction with inter-agency partners.

This represents a new way of fighting with which DOD commands are neither familiar nor enthusiastic. It further represents the particular characteristic of disruptive innovation that Pierce describes as “the exploration of new linkages among components and the assimilation of new knowledge.”

Resistance to the concept by both DOD and inter-agency organizations is predictable, as has been demonstrated by Wilson. From the inter-agency perspective, the suspicion with which a perceived monolithic and gorilla-sized DOD is viewed is likely to be overcome only incrementally and intentionally. Whittling away at these perceptions will require the best efforts of military officers who are trained to the task. These officers must bring to the table not only their service specific expertise and an understanding of joint planning processes, but also an appreciation for, if not experience with, the capabilities of their inter-agency partners. “Old knowledge” needs to be “rooted out” and “new knowledge created”. Absent civilian intervention in this transformation process of the type represented by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is not clear that the creation of new knowledge will occur.

---

39 Pierce, 30.
40 Pierce, paraphrased, 30.
III. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION

How reluctant is the military to embrace and implement comprehensive organizational change, even in the face of incontrovertible evidence that the strategic landscape has shifted? The history of efforts to create a joint staff and to effect a consistently joint approach to the planning and conduct of military operations serves as a useful case study for addressing this question.

The successful prosecution of World War II was followed immediately thereafter by a dramatic realignment of the international strategic balance on the scale of a major tectonic event. While the threat posed by the rise of the Soviet Union was real enough, the implications of incorporating nuclear weapons into the war fighting equation was not fully understood by either the military or the civilian leadership. The impact of this new technology complicated the analysis of the types and numbers of military formations that might be required in future conflicts, should they occur.

Following World War II, relations between the services were strained. Clashes over future roles and missions were made more animated by differing perceptions of the contribution made by each to winning the war just ended. Key issues in the debate surrounding the National Security Act of 1947 included the power and status of the service secretaries with respect to a single Secretary of Defense, the power and status of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the uniformed service chiefs, access to the president, size and authority of a joint staff, and, finally and unsurprisingly, control of the military’s various budgets.

Passage of the 1947 Act left important issues unaddressed. For instance, in deference to the continuing clout of the individual services, no provision was made for a chairman of the new joint staff. Rather, the service chiefs (excluding the Commandant of the Marine Corps) were expected to convene in a collegial manner to formulate common plans and policies. The arrangement proved untenable. It is also interesting that under the

---

42 Ibid., 16-17.
provisions of this act, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, found himself with only the “power to persuade”, not to direct, the activities of those departments he was statutorily charged with coordinating.\(^{43}\) In an eerie and unfortunate historical echo, this administratively impossible arrangement would manifest itself again in the course of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security as Director and then Secretary Thomas Ridge struggled over the first 18 months of his tenure to marshal the resources of multiple departments and agencies in a coordinated anti-terror campaign.

The National Security Act was amended in 1949, strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense,\(^{44}\) and again in 1953 and 1958. The sought after breakthroughs in fostering a joint approach to defense planning and execution failed to materialize, however. Neither did the envisioned budgetary savings. What is clear, however, as evidenced by the continuing frontal and rear guard actions waged by the services against these legislative initiatives, is that absent the impetus provided by the civilian leadership, the services would not, of themselves, have moved closer to embracing one another let alone a shared approach to undertaking common endeavors.

The civilian catalyst role in bringing about military change is a featured element of Barry Posen’s arguments with respect to military innovation.\(^{45}\) As Pierce notes, however, reform is not the same as innovation and organizational reformation alone is seldom enough to produce the types of disruptive innovation that leads to gaining a decisive advantage over a determined adversary.\(^{46}\) But civilian imposed reform is a factor, and when confronted by persistent military intransigence, may be the only tool available to effect transformation.

Ultimately, the test of either reform or innovation comes down to a matter of performance. Frustrated by service performance in the 1950’s, civilian leadership continued to impose legislative reform on the Department of Defense.\(^{47}\) It was substandard performance on the battlefield in the early 1980’s that finally opened the

\(^{43}\) Lederman, 16-17.
\(^{44}\) Lederman, 19.
\(^{45}\) quoted in Pierce, 9.
\(^{46}\) Pierce, 38.
\(^{47}\) Lederman, 20.
door for landmark and perhaps permanent legislative change, enacted over the strenuous objections of the services, that may presage the attainment of the type of innovation that linking DOD and its inter-agency partners represents.

As recounted by James R. Locher, III, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 culminated four years of intense close-quarters political combat in which an entrenched Pentagon bureaucracy battled the United States Congress over the issue of expanded jointness among the disparate military services.\textsuperscript{48} This battle was preceded by years of bureaucratic skirmishing and maneuvering between elected officials and the nation’s most senior uniformed officers. Outright political conflict was precipitated by several instances of the military’s failure to respond in a fully satisfactory manner to newly emerging threats. DOD’s performance was attributed to flawed organizational alignments rather than to either will or skill on the part of those who were sent “in harm’s way.” The legislative history of Goldwater-Nichols and its impact on military effectiveness merits closer scrutiny as the threats the nation faces continue to evolve. Specifically, it would appear as if amending Goldwater-Nichols might provide the stimulus needed for DOD to actively embrace its expanded involvement with inter-agency partners. It might also accelerate the pace of training officers for assignment to billets leading to enhanced performance of DOD’s HLD/HLS missions.

Locher notes that the principal catalysts for the Goldwater-Nichols legislation were a) the painful examination of lessons learned following three military actions in which preparedness and inter-service cooperation fell well short of the desired and expected mark; and b) the willingness on the part of Joint Chiefs Chairman, General David C. Jones, USAF, to break with his fellow service chiefs in calling for radical organizational change in 1982.\textsuperscript{49}

These actions commenced with Operation Eagle Claw, mounted in April, 1980 to rescue the hostages seized by Iran at the US Embassy six months previously. This mission was aborted and the “Desert One” rendezvous point by which the mission is colloquially remembered littered with the burnt out remains of six helicopters and a C-
Eight servicemen were killed. The 52 hostages remained in captivity for another nine months. Mission failure was attributed to a combination of a non-functional joint planning process, an absence of joint doctrine and cross-service experience, and an array of incompatible equipment.50

A core issue as well, was the lack of preparation on the part of DOD to anticipate and develop plans to counter an insurgent threat or to collaborate effectively with the State Department and CIA in evaluating the specific situation in Iran as it was unfolding. A similar lack of situational awareness and preparedness became suddenly and dramatically apparent when another Islamic asymmetric terrorist operation was launched in the form of a suicide truck bomb against the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, on Sunday morning, October 23, 1983. In this attack, 241 servicemen perished.51

Ironically, as the smoke was curling above the ruined barracks and the ongoing rescue and recovery activities, final planning was underway at the Pentagon for the execution of Operation Urgent Fury. This was the joint mission to rescue 600 American medical students thought to be imperiled and at risk of capture in the midst of a developing partisan military conflict on the Caribbean Island of Grenada. The cobbled together nature of this operation, the late addition of forces to the basic plan,52 a compartmentalized communications plan,53 and the multiple reported instances of interoperability failures among command and control arrangements and equipment have become the stuff of military legend.54 As in the two previous missions, the cost of an ad hoc approach to joint operations was measured in lost lives and hospital beds populated by the wounded.

The memory of these marred missions provided the impetus needed to push the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the legislative top. The services had resisted organizational realignment and reform for decades. Locher exhaustively catalogues the

50 Locher, 46-47.
51 Locher, 127.
52 Ibid., 307.
54 Locher, 311.
instances of push back, foot dragging and, had it occurred at a more junior level, insubordination, dating to the Truman and Eisenhower years.\textsuperscript{55}

What were the Act’s principal provisions and what impact have they had in subsequent years? A National Defense University summary states, “Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders.”\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to these fundamental organizational changes that have material ramifications for the overall planning and conduct of the nation’s military operations, Goldwater-Nichols addressed the matter of officer training and assignment. This is a critical lever to ensure implementation of the Act’s other provisions as it translates the theoretical and conceptual into the personal. Officers who aspire to promotion and to the assumption of increased responsibility within the defense hierarchy - in senior DOD positions and in private sector roles as highly compensated executives following retirement, jobs typically open only to those who have served at the flag and general officer level – must now get their joint ticket punched. Specifically Title IV, Section 404 states: “An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.”\textsuperscript{57} This provision may be waived on only the most limited basis and, should a waiver be authorized, “the Secretary shall provide that the first duty assignment as a general or flag officer of an officer for whom the waiver is granted shall be in a joint duty assignment.”\textsuperscript{58}

Of critical importance is the element of this provision that waivers may only be granted by senior members of the office of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically excluded from the exercise of this authority are the uniformed service chiefs and service

\textsuperscript{55} Locher, 265-267.


\textsuperscript{57} Goldwater-Nichols Act Section 404.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
Secretaries who might be inclined to cite the needs of their particular service component as a rational reason for circumventing the joint service requirement. In a follow-on article to his book, Locher reports, “The services resisted [the creation of] a joint officer personnel system since they knew that loss of absolute control of officer promotions and assignments would weaken their domination of the Pentagon. Congress was equally determined since it had concluded ‘The current system results in incentives to protect service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be punished, and service promoters are likely to be rewarded’.”\(^{59}\)

This service centric perspective appears to be little changed with respect to inter-service cooperation and coordination in the joint arena. In a 2002 survey, the GAO found that, “When we asked officers to provide their opinion regarding the greatest disincentive to serving in a joint duty position, officers in all of the services cited the time they spent in a joint position that took them away from their service.”\(^{60}\) It is arguable that this perspective would almost certainly apply if assignments to inter-agency elements were to be folded into the military career path mix.

Part of the problem is that service men and women must first be expert in their own professional arts. This is non-negotiable and, in most respects, laudable. The nation is not well served if military professionals are unable to employ their sensor and weapon systems in an unconditionally effective and lethal manner when called upon to do so. In honing these skills, officers invest countless hours in intensive training and in operational environments where counting on their fellow service members and those above and below them in the chain of command becomes literally instinctive. This unshakable trust and confidence in those sharing the same burden is a good and natural outcome. The flip side of service centric camaraderie, however, is the innate suspicion of those whose backgrounds and experiences are different. Through the experience of joint service alongside men and women from the different branches, some of these prejudices can be

---


\(^{60}\) United States General Accounting Office, “Report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach is Needed.” GAO-03-238 (Washington, D.C., December 2002), 49.
overcome and operational trust established. It is plausible that this experience could be replicated in an inter-agency environment.

Of greater concern is the tendency for service specific allegiances to warfighting methods and practices to obscure evolving and mounting threats that may appear to fall into another service’s “lane.” Collectively, as each service focuses on its own operational sphere and its geo-spatial area of responsibility – air, sea, land, space – a common operational picture of the enemy or potential enemies fails to emerge. Thus, the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the USS COLE and the Khobar Towers dormitories are destroyed by Islamic terrorists engaging in a form of asymmetric warfare whose salient feature is the suicide attack. Successfully combating a terrorist adversary who has been at war with us for the better part of two decades requires alliances that extend beyond the joint world to the inter-agency arena. The indicators and warnings of an impending terrorist attack on the US Homeland might come from the national intelligence community with which DOD is familiar. These warnings might also be developed through law enforcement channels, state department sources, or border and customs activities.

If terrorist elements with global reach constitute the new enemy, then the uniformed services need to ensure that their best people are engaged in the fight, serving seamlessly alongside their inter-agency counterparts who will be Shouldering a critical share of the burden. In a strictly military context, the early experience with assignments to the joint staff suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. Again, this is attributable to the tendency of the various services to protect and promote “their own.” Locher cites ADM William Crowe, USN, who served both as a Unified Commander (USPACOM), and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Crowe believed that joint work suffered from poor officer management: ‘I was likewise convinced that the quality of officers detailed [assigned by their services] to the Joint Staff could use substantial upgrading. It was unusual to find the most highly regarded officers laboring in the Joint Staff vineyard; many considered a tour there as a hurdle on the career path.’” Subsequent to the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, this trend was reversed. By December of 2002,

61 Locher, Victory on the Potomac, 209.
the GAO found that “Most officers (70 percent) responded that a joint duty assignment was beneficial to their career to a moderate or very great extent.”62

If the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff has improved (largely through the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Title IV provisions), what about the other aspects of the Act? How effective have they been in achieving the desired effects of increased inter-service cooperation?

---

62 GAO-03-238, 49.
IV. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: A FURTHER ASSESSMENT

Goldwater-Nichols was enacted to overcome intractable service resistance to adopting a joint approach for the planning and conduct of military operations. Further legislative action may be required to motivate the services to embrace inter-agency operations in a robust and unqualified manner. The truth of the matter, however, is that Goldwater-Nichols remains very much a work in progress nearly nineteen years subsequent to being signed into law without fanfare by President Reagan on October 1, 1986. Following four years of legislative in-fighting, the services had expressed no interest in participating in a White House or Pentagon bill signing ceremony.63 The lack of enthusiasm with which this legislation was greeted has continued. Despite ongoing service resistance, made possible by leaving actual implementation to each of the service components, limited progress has been made in developing joint professional competency among a growing number of military officers.

The GAO provided a report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives in 2002. Key findings of this report cited in the executive summary included (underscores added):

Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers through education by establishing a two-phased joint education program, but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions had completed both phases of the program.

Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.

Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in fiscal year

63 Locher, Victory on the Potomac, 433.
2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will also have to complete DOD’s joint education program or otherwise meet the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124 officers promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements. DOD has promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers. However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels and Navy captains.64

Given the elapsed time from the date of Goldwater-Nichols enactment, GAO has taken a generous, non-accusatory line with respect to service non-compliance. As an example, the report’s executive summary merely observes, “The services vary in the emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs.”65 The report notes that DOD has frequently sought legislative relief from the act’s provisions66 and has even failed to adopt a comprehensive, strategic approach to identifying the number of joint specialty officers it needs.67

Absent this fundamental consolidated guidance that must emanate from the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, in fairness, are without a target for the number of officers that each will need to provide to fill out their fair share of joint billets. On the other hand, the requirement for every officer selected for promotion to flag or general officer level to have served successfully in a joint billet ought to serve as a well understood point of departure for service manpower planning.

Monitoring the number of the billets authorized for flag and general officers is a task to which the services devote special and focused attention. This level of attention apparently does extend to tracking the most rudimentary data associated with compliance with Goldwater-Nichols mandates. It is almost inconceivable, that in a data inundated era characterized by almost slavish devotion to the establishment of a wide variety of performance metrics, GAO would find that “DOD has not been tracking certain data

64 GAO 03-238, executive summary page 1.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 1.
67 Ibid., 3.
consistently to measure its progress in meeting the act’s joint officer development objectives. For example, the four services have not kept historical data on the number of joint positions that are filled with joint specialty officers and joint specialty officer nominees. Without these data, DOD cannot assess the degree to which it is properly targeting its joint education programs.”68 This almost certainly represents non-compliance with legislative intent through passive neglect. It does not bode well for an extension of the joint concept into the inter-agency sector.

Given the evolving nature of a threat to the nation’s security whose defeat will require the closest collaboration between DOD and inter-agency actors, this recalcitrant, waiver-dotted approach to joint interoperability will need to be abandoned or overcome. The services have, unfortunately, compiled a deplorable record of seizing the initiative to organize in a manner best suited to leverage the unique capabilities of each in a synergistic and cost effective manner. Further civilian intervention in the form of legislative action will likely be required to bring about change.

This transformation may also require a form of “disguising” suggested by Pierce.69 In this instance, the “disguise” would consist of altering in a seemingly evolutionary manner what is already familiar to the services without asking them to do more. Disguise might be affected, for instance, by adding significant inter-agency content to the joint professional military education (JPME) curriculum and by adding inter-agency billets to the Joint Distribution Assignment List (JDAL) in which an officer could receive credit for completion of his or her joint service obligation. Additional requirements would not be levied on the individual services to provide officers for duty outside of their service specific career paths. Anticipating service push-back is critical, because history has demonstrated that it will come. So rather than “more,” the operative words need to be “instead of”. Given that the services are unhappy with the joint service obligation anyway, substitution of inter-agency duty should not be received as any more onerous.

68 GAO 03-238, 3.
69 Pierce, 189.
Two actions would seem to be necessary to begin this process. One would be to amend the relevant provisions of Goldwater-Nichols Title IV Sections 401-404 and the associated sections of US Code Title 10, extending the joint concept to include a new joint/inter-agency construct. The other would be to implement the following GAO recommendations incorporated in its 2002 report, which are specific to the joint world but clearly applicable to an expanded inter-agency conceptualization as well.

These unambiguous and uncomplicated recommendations include: “the Secretary of Defense [should] direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals. At a minimum, this plan should (1) identify the number of joint specialty officers needed, (2) include provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who are serving in joint organizations, and (3) be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track progress made against the plan.” A coordinated, consolidated strategic plan with the unqualified backing of the Secretary of Defense is critical to moving forward by compelling the involvement of the services. Development and promulgation of such a plan would seem unequivocally consistent with other SECDEF transformational initiatives and directives.

But SECDEF direction alone may not be enough. Sadly, the civilian intervention cited by Barry Posen as the only reason military organizations innovate would appear to be applicable in the instance of expanding formal and sustained DOD engagement with its inter-agency counterparts if this final excerpt from the GAO study is any indicator (underscores added):

We requested written comments from the Department of Defense, but none were provided. However, the Office of the Vice Director, Joint Staff, did provide us with DOD’s oral comments in which DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that it develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals.

---

70 GAO-03-238, 31.
71 United States, Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance.
72 Barry Posen quoted in Pierce, 9.
Moreover, DOD questioned whether there is a valid requirement for critical billets within joint organizations. DOD believes that the essential factors that should be considered to identify those officers who best meet the needs of a joint organization are service competencies and expertise in a military occupational skill. It stated that joint qualifications should be viewed as one of many attributes that can be used.73

It does not appear as if the need for specialized skills applicable to the joint, let alone inter-agency environment is intuitive on its face. In a spirit more gracious than most might muster, GAO responded to this lack of courtesy and excuse-making by stating only that “we do not believe the act’s provisions prohibit DOD from developing a strategic plan to achieve its goals.”74

Policy revision and legislative amendment aside, an underlying change in the military’s view of its inter-agency partners will be necessary. This constitutes a cultural change that may best be likened to a corporate merger. The literature would suggest that cultural change in organizations occurs only in a deliberate manner. Deliberate as in “slow” and deliberate as in “intentional”. A recent study by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds suggests that military officers, while almost uniformly enthusiastic about the prospects that technological advancements may have on the battlefield of the future, are never the less skeptical of the advantages believed to accrue from more generalized “transformational” initiatives.75

In an era of potential terror attacks on the US Homeland, the type of transformation needed to counter the threat requires broader engagement with inter-agency partners. Mahnken and FitzSimonds place much stock in the role of senior military officers in overcoming this ambivalence.76 This is consistent with the view expressed in a GAO study that identifies the two principal drivers of successful cultural change: “Top management must be totally committed to the change in both words and actions, and organizations must provide training that promotes and develops skills related

73 GAO-03-238, 31-33.
74 GAO-03-238, 31.
76 Ibid., 114.
to their desired values and beliefs.”

If, however, the senior leaders who must serve as change advocates within DOD have historically tended to undermine rather than promote change initiatives, then training and education must be called on to play an expanded role. Implementation of a coherent JPME training and education curriculum, derived from an analysis of mission essential tasks which span the entire DOD/inter-agency spectrum will be critical to achieving current transformational objectives.

---

V. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS

As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the future of the US military is required to be joint. DOD understands this mandate. “Jointness will be central to the successful execution of future missions required of the U.S. Armed Forces and joint doctrine will assume increasing importance to the conduct of assigned missions. Consequently, if our armed forces are going to fight jointly, they must train jointly.”

Devising a career progression that incorporates service in the joint arena and establishing training pipelines for officers assigned to joint billets has been reasonably well established by the various service components. What has not occurred is doctrinal recognition that the interface between DOD and the various inter-agency organizations now comprising the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the reorganized Intelligence Community has conferred an important new obligation on DOD. DOD must train and prepare its most promising personnel for successful service alongside their counterparts in these various agencies. New training and assignment systems are required.

The building blocks of developing such systems are the Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs). The array of JMETs provides a comprehensive picture of the priority tasks a commander must perform to accomplish a particular mission. Taken together, the tasks associated with all of the commander’s missions constitute a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). The JMETL becomes the benchmark against which training requirements are established, and more importantly, funded. Professional skill sets derived from the JMETL can be generated on the basis of having completed the associated training. Officers who possess these skill sets can then be expected to serve successfully in task specific billets as these billets are established.

JMETs are derived principally from military plans and orders and are revised as the plans are updated on a periodic basis. The development, revision, adoption, publication and implementation of JMETs typically lag the plan revision cycle. In the case of USNORTHCOM, charged with responsibility for HLD and HLS missions on

---

behalf of DOD, the core plans from which JMETs are typically derived have yet to be approved in final form at the SECDEF level. Though the development of draft JMETs has been proceeding on a basis concurrent with plan development, it is arguably almost certain that it will be many months before a final JMETL for USNORTHCOM will be approved and implemented. Identifying the HLD and HLS support tasks that officers must successfully perform with their inter-agency counterparts will need to proceed on an interim basis prior to incorporation in the USNORTHCOM JMETL.

The identification of JMETs begins with the missions assigned to a military commander. Through the process of mission analysis, plans and orders are developed in accordance with and in the format prescribed by joint doctrine to accomplish these missions. Standardized JMET elements are drawn from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) that “provides an ordered listing of tasks describing the Armed Force's ability to perform activities or processes that joint force commanders require to execute their assigned missions.” Since the UJTL is founded on joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP), it provides a common language to describe the warfighting requirements of joint force commanders.

The UJTL is organized on the basis of four conceptual levels of war – Strategic National (SN), Strategic Theater (ST), Operational (OP), and Tactical (TA). In practice, tasks are identified by these two letter designators. As described by the JMETL Handbook, “each prescribed task is further defined by a hierarchy of subordinate tasks”…each assigned a unique reference number. These tasks are then combined in a manner to comprise a working list of JMETs. Applying this procedure to USNORTHCOM, we find that USNORTHCOM’s mission is: “homeland defense and civil support, specifically [to]:

---


82 Ibid., 4.

83 Ibid.
• Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and
• As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.

U.S. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President.”

As this new command was first included in the Unified Command Plan in 2002, joint doctrine has yet to provide specific guidance on how USNORTHCOM’s assigned missions are to be carried out in conjunction with inter-agency partners. The UJTL, which generally contemplates the operations of “pure” military forces, has not yet been tailored to reflect the type of hybrid organizational constructs that arise from the ongoing interaction of DOD forces and inter-agency personnel at USNORTHCOM.

The JMETL Development Handbook does illustrate JMETs associated with the DOD conduct of humanitarian assistance missions abroad. For the purposes of illustration, this mission type might serve as a surrogate for identifying the JMETs associated with a DOD mission conducted in response to a domestic natural disaster or terrorist attack. This is a type mission that USNORTHCOM might be called on to perform.

Continuing the illustration, whether abroad or at home, mission tasking would be initiated by the Secretary of Defense and further assigned for accomplishment to a Joint Task Force Commander. Key elements of the underlying Concepts of Operations for both types of events would likely be very similar: Assist local authorities in providing security, assist in combating disease, and provide [and distribute] relief supplies.

87 Ibid.
In each instance, the mission commander would flesh out the plan detail by referring to the UJTL and identifying the essential joint mission tasks. The domestic environment would be characterized by the presence of a variety of first responders. Those on scene might include personnel from local fire and law enforcement, state National Guard and emergency preparedness organizations, FEMA, and various Non-Government and private relief organizations. In this example, a JMET might, therefore, be crafted as a modification, incorporating inter-agency specific content, of the operational level task OP 5.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Operational Forces along the lines of OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations.88

The “direct/coordinate” distinction is important. Military officers are trained to exercise initiative and assume command in dynamic operational environments. In a civil support engagement they are precluded in many instances by law and almost always by protocol from assuming command of anything or anybody. These constraints dictate that military officers deployed to these types of situations must be conversant by virtue of their training with the legal limits imposed on their involvement. They must also be familiar with the roles and missions of their inter-agency partners. Most importantly, they must be effective in providing support to the personnel of agencies and organizations who may approach their duties differently than other DOD personnel steeped in a joint military culture.

At more senior levels, frequently far from the front lines of the HLD/HLS “fight,” military officers who are accustomed to written and unwritten rules and roles that accord decision making deference to rank and theater experience, may find interaction with their inter-agency counterparts to be exceedingly difficult. The planning processes that they encounter are likely to be less well-defined, decision points and decision makers more difficult to identify, and the pace of operations significantly different from that experienced in either a service component or joint headquarters. It is imperative, then, that prior to being offered a senior leadership (O-6 and above) assignment in the HLD/HLS arena, officers must have developed specialized inter-agency expertise at the

---

junior officer level commensurate with the service specific experience required for advancement within their own service. The military has established well understood career paths for officers with differing designators or occupational specialties. In the DOD/inter-agency arena, these paths have yet to be created.

For these paths to emerge, a serious effort must be mounted to identify the JMETs that will form the basis for the training that will be required. USNORTHCOM is the logical choice to serve as Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this initiative. At present, the effort is being undertaken in conjunction with the development of the command’s initial Concept of Operations Plan 2002, currently awaiting SECDEF approval. This CONOPS has been difficult to develop partly due to the absence of well defined operational linkages that USNORTHCOM must establish with its inter-agency partners.

Final approval of the CONOPS will provide a baseline for determining those essential tasks that military officers will need to perform not only at USNORTHCOM but anywhere DOD personnel may be assigned as action officers or as liaison officers with inter-agency organizations. This includes, for example, the agencies comprising DHS, federal law enforcement agencies not included in DHS, and state or major metropolitan emergency operations centers. Additionally, the long term assignment of properly trained active duty military personnel to the headquarters and rapid deployment elements of state National Guard forces would appear to add significant value in expediting timely response and in fostering closer coordination between these forces in the event of a contingency.

To date, National Guard forces have served effectively in an active duty status at USNORTHCOM - the Chief of Staff position is programmed for a National Guard Major General on active duty orders - but the type of advances in information and culture sharing that could be realized by a regular cross pollination of active duty officers serving on an extended basis with National Guard units has not occurred. The genuinely radical concept, a form of disruptive innovation, would be for these types of assignments to be designated as joint billets, conceivably filled by officers from any of the service branches. To be successful in these types of assignments, active duty and National Guard officers
will need to complete similar training, derived from a common JMETL that incorporates an inter-agency perspective.

Digging deeply into the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) from which the JMETs are derived would suggest that there are gaps in the master list where the new missions assigned to USNORTHCOM have not been contemplated. The UJTL is largely DOD centric and only cursory consideration is given to inter-agency missions. A point of departure for closing these gaps would appear to be in the realm of those tasks listed in the Strategic National (SN) series summarized here: 89

| SN 8.2 PROVIDE DOD/GOVERNMENT-WIDE SUPPORT  |
| SN 8.2.1 SUPPORT DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES      |
| SN 8.2.2 SUPPORT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES   |
| SN 8.2.3 SUPPORT EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS FROM THEATERS |
| SN 8.2.4 ASSIST CIVIL DEFENSE                 |
| SN 8.3 COORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS |
| SN 8.3.1 COORDINATE AND CONTROL POLICY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS |
| SN 8.3.2 CONDUCT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS |
| SN 8.3.3 ESTABLISH INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION STRUCTURES |
| SN 8.3.4 COORDINATE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM) IN THE INTER-AGENCY ARENA (SEE: SN 9.2.2) |
| SN 8.3.5 COORDINATE DOD/GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) |

These generic tasks must be converted to USNORTHCOM specific JMETs, performance metrics established, CJCS approval obtained, and training designed and delivered. UJTL entries directed at facilitating DOD interaction with inter-agency organizations beyond USNORTHCOM will have to be developed from a standing start perhaps by using USNORTHCOM experience and JMET development efforts as a guide.

Integrating DOD specific and inter-agency tasks might begin by integrating tasks incorporated in the DOD UJTL with those included in the DHS Office for Domestic

89 CJCSM 3500.04C, 1 July 2002 UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL).
Preparedness (ODP) Universal Task List (UTL)\textsuperscript{90} and Target Capabilities Lists (TCL).\textsuperscript{91} These documents are now under “spiral” or iterative development by ODP. The process is moving quickly. ODP disseminated Version 2.1 of the UTL in April of 2005, superseding Version 2.0 published in December of 2004. The newer version scraps the initial tiered approach that had mirrored DOD’s four levels of war hierarchy employed in the formulation of the UTL as described earlier. The tasks comprising the current version of ODP’s UTL are segregated into four principal mission categories instead: Prevent, Protect, Respond and Recover.\textsuperscript{92} This format aligns well and naturally with USNORTHCOM’s missions to Deter, Prevent, Defeat, and Mitigate [the effects of] terrorist attacks.

The overall purpose of the ODP UTL is to produce enhanced preparedness by providing a rational approach to task identification and training across the inter-agency spectrum. The initial objective was to develop a minimum number of credible scenarios that covered the range of response requirements. While it is unlikely that any of these specific scenarios would unfold as described, in theory, a nation prepared for these scenarios would be prepared for almost all likely eventualities.

It was important for DHS to get a planning concept on the street quickly even though follow on refinement would be required. The spiral development aspect of the two UTL versions is readily apparent. Version 2.0 was designed to “provide a comprehensive menu of tasks that [could] be performed in the major events illustrated by the National Planning Scenarios.”\textsuperscript{93} Thirteen of the 15 scenarios involve other than natural


\textsuperscript{92} U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, \textit{TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST (Draft): 1.1}.

occurrences. Version 2.0 “sort[ed] tasks by scenario, mission, function, and level of
government that generally perform[ed] the task.”94 Version 2.1 is described as follows:

Development of the UTL started with 15 scenarios developed by a federal
inter-agency group for the Homeland Security Council. Analysts and
subject matter experts reviewed each scenario and developed a list of tasks
that are required to effectively prevent and respond to the incident. These
task lists were vetted through federal, state, and local officials and
practitioners.95

The UTL emanates from the National Preparedness mission that is designed to
“prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from domestic terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies.” 96 It is specifically not oriented toward DOD’s HLD
mission of Deterring, Preventing, and Defeating adversaries approaching the homeland
from abroad. While the UTL is clearly not intended to be prescriptive with respect to who
should take on specific tasks nor how these tasks should be accomplished, a close reading
suggests that DOD is well suited to undertake a number of them. As one example, the
UTL task Pre A: Detect Threats, Pre.A.1: Direct Intelligence Activities (Function 1),97 is
clearly in DOD’s lane as a supporting element to DHS and its intelligence operations.
This may become even more so as the new Director of National Intelligence commences
his oversight duties in regard to the US national intelligence community.

UTL tasks are directly related to the ODP Target Capabilities List (TCL).
“Critical tasks are synonymous with ‘mission-essential tasks... the TCL, identifies the
capabilities to perform the critical tasks...A capability provides a means to achieve a
measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more critical task(s), under
specified conditions and performance standards.”98 Further, “the TCL is designed to
assist jurisdictions and agencies in understanding and defining their respective roles in a

94 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Capabilities Based Planning Overview, 1-5.
95 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness UNIVERSAL TASK
LIST: 2.1, 1.
96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness UNIVERSAL TASK
LIST: 2.0, iii.
97 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness UNIVERSAL TASK
LIST: 2.1, 21.
major event, the capabilities required to perform a specified set of tasks, and where to obtain additional resources if needed.”

The DHS and DOD task list formats are very similar. As JMETs are derived from the UJTL and represent a greater level of specificity, the TCL gives similarly detailed expression to the critical tasks identified by the UTL. As an example, the UTL Prevent Task Pre A: Detect Threats, is amplified in the TCL by three Target Capabilities: Information Collection and Threat Recognition, Intelligence Fusion and Analysis, and Information Sharing and Collaboration.

Each Target Capability, in turn, consists of the following succinctly stated and discrete components:

- Capability Description
- Outcome
- ESF Annex Cross-Reference
- UTL Taxonomy Location
- Capability and Performance Measures
- Capability Elements consisting of
  - Personnel
  - Planning
  - Organization and Leadership
  - Equipment and Systems
  - Training and Exercise Requirements
  - Linked Capabilities
  - Event Conditions and References.

The DHS Target Capabilities Lists are remarkably well developed and coherently aligned with the Universal Task Lists. These lists are immediately available for integration with DOD UJTLs/JMETLs. For instance, as JMETs are developed to reflect

---

100 Ibid., 21.
an expanded scope of inter-agency operations, a starting point might be the UTL Prevent Mission (4.0 series). These tasks include:

4A: Detect Threats  
4A.1 Direct Intelligence Activities  
4A.2 Manage Data Collection  
4A.3 Process Data Into Intelligence  
4A.4 Analyze Intelligence  
4A.5 Disseminate Threat Information

4C: Eliminate Threats  
4C.2 Seize Materials  
4C.3 Defeat Weapons  
4C.4 Disrupt Sources of Support

Item 4C.4 is an example of an action where close DOD collaboration with other inter-agency partners could prove particularly effective. Important roles could be played by DOD in terms of launching a direct military attack on terrorist facilitators, or by the Department of State (DOS) in terms of applying diplomatic pressure on state terror sponsors, or by the Department of Treasury in terms of seizing or freezing terrorist financial assets. The nature of the current asymmetric threat faced by the US dictates a collaborative and innovative approach to confronting the adversary and the full employment of all elements of national power. DOD needs to adapt to this new defense reality and develop the capabilities necessary to support the efforts of other departments and agencies in fullest measure.

DOD, arguably, has roles to play in other DHS defined missions as well. The UTL Protect (5.0) mission, for example, includes subsets 5A Assess Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 5B Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, and 5C Mitigate Risks to the Public. Specific DOD roles can be readily identified in conjunction with:

5A.1 Identify Assets  
5A.2 Assess Vulnerabilities  
5B.1 Implement Protection Measures

---

5B.2 Protect Assets and Property
5C.2 Provide Public Safety

This particular UTL mission offers some robust opportunities for DOD involvement. DOD is already actively involved in Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments and in the development and maintenance of Critical Infrastructure databases. Other examples from the detailed task level of the UTL Protect mission include “develop partnerships for physical infrastructure protection and contingency planning, [and] implement deterrence and defense protection measures.” Another is “plan and prepare for pandemic influenza.” This mission would presumably extend to other catastrophic outbreaks of disease whether naturally occurring or terrorist induced.

DOD has a longstanding association with missions now termed Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). These are classic but collateral involvements with tasks involving natural disaster response – hurricanes, floods, wild land fires, and earthquakes. The emergence of a potentially devastating terrorist threat has elevated the importance of these response missions. These missions must be addressed in DOD planning and preparation and addressed in the formulation of JMETs. Natural points of entry for DOD in the UTL Respond (6.0) Mission category include:

6A: Assess Incident
  6A.1 Investigate Incident
  6A.2 Assess Hazards and Consequences
6B: Minimize Incident
  6B.1 Manage Incident
  6B.2 Respond to Hazard
  6B.3 Implement protective Actions
  6B.4 Conduct Search and Rescue
6C: Care for the Public
  6C.1 Provide Medical Care
  6C.2 Distribute Prophylaxis
  6C.3 Provide Mass Care
  6C.4 Manage Facilities

103 Ibid., 44-55.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
DOD has historically designated specific military units to undertake a number of these missions. For instance USNORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force – Civil Support is organized to conduct operations in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high Explosive (CBRNE) attacks. Additionally, the United States Marine Corps maintains the only standing Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a company sized unit garrisoned at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, MD.

More generalized DOD civil support roles not involving CBRNE events have traditionally been played by National Guard forces deployed on state or federal active duty orders. Converting previously specialized mission sets like CBRNE response to core competencies for all DOD elements including the National Guard provides an opportunity for force transformation. This transformation is driven not by service choice but by the evolving nature of the threat to the US Homeland. Adequate threat response may require the rapid deployment of a ready force for an extended period in support of a lead federal agency or state and local first responders. Expanding the capabilities of all DOD units would increase the likelihood that missions of this type could be successfully accomplished. The creation and deployment of the National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams represents a good first step.

DOD is likely to have only the most minimal role in the UTL Recover (7.0) mission, described in the National Response Plan as “The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans and the reconstitution of government operations and services through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance programs.”106 While the potential exists for DOD involvement in the reconstitution of government mission, perhaps through the establishment and maintenance of secure communication systems or the provision of site security, the development of specific JMETs associated with this mission might be held in abeyance pending the incorporation of higher priority UTL specified tasks as outlined above into the DOD UJTL/JMET mix.

Creating an integrated list of UTL and UJTL tasks to guide DOD mission definition and development in an environment of expanded and continuous interaction with inter-agency partners demands thoughtful evaluation. The task also demands the presence of an implementation champion. Pierce would suggest that there are two factors related to disruptive innovation that would be helpful in achieving these objectives. First is the creation of a small group focused exclusively (or almost so) on developing and introducing innovative practices. Second the group’s practices should be portrayed as evolutionary rather than revolutionary - as an extension of current missions rather than as the adoption of an entirely new way of conducting military operations. Such an organization exists and is actively involved with developing JMETs at USNORTHCOM - Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N).

As described previously, SJFHQ-N is a small cadre of seasoned military and civilian personnel possessing a wide variety of specialized skills. Established at the specific direction of the Secretary of Defense, SJFHQ-N is a self contained and self-sustaining organization. While certain of its analysis, planning and operating activities parallel those of other USNORTHCOM staff directorates, SJFHQ-N is distinguished by the undivided attention it devotes to the Commander’s highest priority mission or focus area. SJFHQ-N is equipped for rapid deployment should the need arise. It has demonstrated this capability in support of the 2004 G-8 Summit, the Reagan funeral, the national political conventions and the 2005 presidential inauguration as well as in certain operational environments associated with heightened threat levels.

SJFHQ-N’s mission statement reads: “The mission of SJFHQ-N is to maintain situational understanding of the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to enable rapid transition to a contingency response posture, and when directed, rapidly deploy a joint command and control element to support homeland defense and civil support operations in order to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate crises in the USNORTHCOM AOR." Led by an Air Force Brigadier General, SJFHQ-N is

107 Pierce, 113.
109 Unpublished USNORTHCOM policy document.
comprised of 64 personnel: 39 military, 22 federal civil service (GS), and 3 contractors. SJFHQ-N is purple or joint in the sense that all services are represented in the directorate’s manning document. As a new organization for a new era, it is also tartan, or inter-agency oriented, with permanently assigned personnel experienced in National Guard, USCG, local law enforcement, and other federal inter-agency operations.

Given SJFHQ-N’s staff composition and the operational experience of its members alongside inter-agency partners, SJFHQ-N personnel are well positioned to evaluate proposed JMETs that are applicable not only to USNORTHCOM but to all of DOD. These JMETs might be relevant to the training of all military officers selected for assignment to DOD units with significant inter-agency roles and missions. The ensuing chapter will explore the roles of USNORTHCOM and SJFHQ-N in assessing the applicability of certain proposed JMETs to DOD/inter-agency operations and will further evaluate these preliminary findings.
VI. EVALUATING JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS

By virtue of its operational experience gained in support of National Special Security Events and by its assigned mission set involving close coordination with inter-agency partners, USNORTHCOM generally and SJFHQ-N specifically, are well suited to serve as the test platform for the evaluation of inter-agency oriented Universal Joint Tasks and Joint Mission Essential Tasks (UJTs/JMETs) applicable to all of DOD.

In and of itself, USNORTHCOM represents a new organizational form, an example of a sustaining innovation. Prior to 9/11/2001, DOD responsibilities for HLD/HLS had been widely decentralized among several entities which complicated the overall command and control posture at the height of the crisis and resulted in degraded unity of effort. USNORTHCOM commenced operations on 01 October, 2002, and attained full operational capability on September 11, 2003. In conjunction with the newly created Department of Homeland Security, USNORTHCOM is charged with responsibility for implementing actions to achieve the objectives set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security: “To prevent terrorist attacks within the United states; [to] reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and [to] minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”

Not everyone is thrilled to have DOD as a partner. The Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission is one that DOD has always approached as a collateral and generally uninteresting element of its overall mission set. Arguably, fighting wildfires and cleaning up after hurricanes is not as glamorous as fighting the nation’s armed enemies. For warriors, DSCA operations have been neither professionally stimulating nor career enhancing. The GAO noted as recently as 2003, that “When performing domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills through practice in normal training. Domestic missions to date have required only basic military skills and thus offered limited training value, which can have an adverse affect

on unit readiness.” It is axiomatic that unit commanders whose units maintain high levels of readiness tend to be promoted.

DOD’s grudging acceptance of DSCA missions is indicated by the fact that it “has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally remains organized, trained and equipped to fight military adversaries overseas.” This view, coupled with the inter-agencies’ reluctant acceptance of their oversized cousin’s slow and frequently overbearing response to calls for assistance, as exemplified by the Los Angeles Riots in 1992, suggests that the ready and effective inter-agency collaboration envisioned by Congress has often resembled a romance among porcupines. As further evidenced in the security preparations for the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, the command and control issue of “who’s in charge?” is frequently a sticking point.

USNORTHCOM has been experimenting with organizational alignments and technological innovations to facilitate arriving sooner at the site of an emerging incident with better situational understanding and with properly tailored forces. The intent is to swiftly accomplish assigned missions with minimal adverse impact on local communities and on the sensibilities of other responding agencies. With attractive targets for terrorist attacks in every geographic sector, USNORTHCOM has set a priority for deploying an advance command and control element to events and locations where DOD forces have been requested or may be required on short notice. Specific examples include designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs), adverse weather emergency operations and consequence management centers, and potentially lucrative sites for terror attacks – major sporting venues, urban centers and transportation hubs.


112 Ibid.


The general USNORTHCOM concept is to have DOD liaison officers and mid-level decision makers in place for the purpose of establishing working relationships with local inter-agency representatives and first responders ahead of a potential request for DOD assistance. Once on scene, DOD will clearly remain in support of a designated lead federal agency, but will commence parallel pre-crisis planning based upon a boots on the ground view of a situation as it develops. This approach should shorten the response time should DOD assistance be requested. The transition from state and local first responders having a situation under control to requiring a material helping hand from DOD can occur swiftly. It may best be characterized by the baseball analogy of infielders and outfielders converging on a softly hit pop fly – an “I’ve got it, I’ve got it.....you take it” ball. Essentially, bad things can happen fast.

As discussed, USNORTHCOM’s approach to anticipating these types of situations has been to establish a rapidly deployable command element, SJFHQ-N. This staff directorate is trained and equipped to provide interoperable communications support and a robust command and control “reach-back” capability to the USNORTHCOM headquarters. SJFHQ-N is “standing” in the sense that its personnel are not drawn from other staff directorates on a collateral duty, as needed, basis but are, instead, permanently assigned.\(^\text{115}\) SJFHQ-N is intended to move out on short notice to provide an immediate DOD presence at the site of a disaster or in advance of a potential crisis that might call for the mobilization of a more robust Joint Task Force (JTF). The concept is for the SJFHQ-N advance element to travel to the designated site, marry up with its van based communications suite, and commence full scope operations without assistance from other units or inter-agency partners.

To recap, three events in the summer of 2004 provided opportunities to test this operational concept – the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Republican National Convention (RNC) in New York City. At each of these NSSE’s, SJFHQ-N personnel provided direct support to the United States Secret Service (USSS) in its capacity as the lead federal

agency, as well as to state and local first responders. Each event enabled SJFHQ-N to evaluate the connectivity and sustainability of its communications systems and to assess the requirements for operator training, equipment maintenance, and crew support in an inter-agency environment. These events served as mini-case studies for identifying and validating proposed USNORTHCOM UJT/JMETs.

The field experiences at the G-8 tended to corroborate previous exercise and real-world operational findings. These would suggest that improvements in technological capability frequently outpace operator training and the development of procedures for informed systems’ employment. For example, the SJFHQ-N Communications Officer’s after-action report noted that bringing the communications van’s equipment on-line was degraded in that, “JCSC [Joint Communication Support Center] staffs assigned to operate the van were not familiar with the equipment onboard.” Even if the equipment itself had been fully functioning, the task of seamlessly incorporating the van into the G-8 operation would have encountered challenges associated with “the planning phases to develop communication plans, [and] frequency plans as required for each deployment.” This shortcoming is directly associated with certain Universal Joint Tasks such as SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process, ST 5.1 Operate and Manage Theater C4I Environment, and OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information.

The G-8 experience demonstrated that to realize the transformational benefits of a standing fly-away force, assigned crews would need to be self-sufficient from a habitability stand-point and would need to be conversant not only with the technical aspects of their equipment but also with the types of operations likely to be encountered. They would need to be cross-trained and familiar with their mission, the commander’s expectations, and the specific tasks to be performed. Further, they would need to be fully prepared in accordance with UJT such as SN8.3 Coordinate Military Activities within the Inter-agency process.

117 Ibid.
Certain changes to the SJFHQ-N concept of operations were implemented for the Democratic National Convention (DNC). At the DNC, SJFHQ-N personnel and their communications van were collocated with the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) – this was not designated as a military type “Command Center” - in Cambridge, across the river from the convention’s main site. SJFHQ-N’s principal role was to serve as an unclassified and secure communications hub in support of the JTF Commander who maintained his own headquarters in Milford, MA. The SJFHQ-N liaison officers worked out of the headquarters complex and the MACC while their communications van was staffed with two officers from the USNORTHCOM Operations (J-3) directorate and a qualified JCSC systems technician.

As at the G-8, the JTF Commander was a Massachusetts National Guard Brigadier General who was granted special presidential authority to concurrently command both National Guard and Regular Active Duty forces in support of the US Secret Service. As an example of the type of unique capability that DOD can offer its inter-agency partners, SJFHQ-N’s van provided the JTF Commander with a sophisticated communications suite that would not have been available to him in his National Guard capacity alone. The van served as a key link for secure and non-secure voice communications among the various inter-agency participants including DOD, FBI and USSS. Overall system connectivity was superior to that experienced at the G-8. This improvement would appear to be attributable largely to better preparation, timely development and circulation of a comprehensive communications plan, and the availability of technicians more thoroughly familiar with the initiation and operation of the van’s installed equipment.

The command and control arrangement specially authorized by the President for trial at the G-8 and exercised for only the second time at the DNC is an example of the type of inter-agency cooperation reflected in UJT 8.3.3 Establish Inter-agency Cooperation Structures. The concurrent command arrangement could be construed as conceptually disruptive. It offers the real possibility for DOD to establish the type of

---

relationships with state and local first responders that are perceived at the local level as genuinely adding value. Now, when requested, DOD forces are prepared to arrive in a timely and predictable manner, with equipment designed to serve state and local personnel, and with the potential conflict between National Guard and active duty commanders as to “who’s in charge?” already resolved.

At the RNC, SJFHQ-N personnel were staged at the Seventh Regiment Armory on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. The command arrangement was similar to that employed at the DNC. A New York Army National Guard Colonel was assigned under special presidential authority as the JTF Commander in command of both National Guard and active duty forces. His deputy was the same SJFHQ-N active duty US Navy Captain who had performed these duties at the DNC. Additional SJFHQ-N support was provided by 18 other military and civilian personnel serving in the JTF’s personnel, intelligence, and operations directorates as well as in the MACC. Communications and Public Affairs support was provided by staff from other USNORTHCOM directorates. Lessons learned again underscored the importance of advance planning with inter-agency partners and synchronization of communications arrangements at the unclassified level to permit full information sharing between DOD and inter-agency participants. These lessons are applicable to all of DOD and will need to be translated into UJT/JMETs.

The critical importance of establishing standardized JMETS was highlighted by an After Action comment provided by a USAF O-5: “Personnel assigned to the various Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) were not properly trained on procedures they needed to perform in support of Lead Federal Agencies or the JTF-HQ… During the RNC, multiple instances of personnel deferring requests for information to personnel not on duty hindered support to Lead Federal Agencies and/or JTF Assigned Organizations. Many personnel were unaware of their specific duty requirements and responsibilities.”

The same officer, recognizing the impact of cultural differences between DOD elements and inter-agency partners, observed: “JTFs must bear in mind that means and

---

ways in which the military expresses information do not translate well to civilian agencies. The CCIR [Commander’s Critical Information Requirements] issue attempting to quantify police commitment of forces and reserves is one example. Because the CCIR as phrased had no meaning to NYPD, the CCIR was unanswerable hence useless until modified.”

His recommended solution is straightforward enough but has yet to be codified in UJT/JMET form: “JTF and NC staffs must be alert for communications failures caused by institutional cultural differences and willing to modify our intended message when such disconnects are identified.” This would seem to fall within the scope of SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process. It is axiomatic that effective information management begins with speaking the same operational language.

The twenty-three SJFHQ-N personnel who deployed in support of the Presidential Inauguration in January, 2005 experimented with yet another form of command relationships. While the USSS served again as the Lead Federal Agency, local DOD command was exercised by Commander, Standing Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, a designated USNORTHCOM subordinate command. Naming SJFHQ-NCR as the on scene commander reduced certain operational complexities. Conducting support operations in the heart of the nation’s capital, however, opened the door to significant coordination obligations with other federal agencies and with a plethora of first responder organizations representing adjacent and frequently overlapping jurisdictions. Key lessons learned were not dissimilar to those recorded following the DNC and RNC and represented instances where a full operational understanding of UJTs SN 8.2 Provide DOD/Government Wide Support and SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies could only be considered as essential to successful mission accomplishment.

These recent SJFHQ-N deployments in support of high visibility inter-agency operations have provided an opportunity for the participants to identify and evaluate potential UJT/JMETS in a field setting. To take full advantage of the perspective and

---

121 Ibid.
experience gained by those assigned to these operations, SJFHQ-N personnel who deployed from the USNORTHCOM headquarters in support of the G-8, DNC, RNC, and 2005 Presidential Inauguration were surveyed in conjunction with this thesis. The respondents comprised a group with broadly based, current and relevant experience in serving shoulder to shoulder alongside of their inter-agency counterparts. The survey form employed and the data collected appears as Appendix I.

The survey results suggest that the UJT/JMETs comprising the SN 8.2 Provide DOD/Government Wide Support and SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Inter-agency Process series are of significant importance to USNORTHCOM and to the effective conduct of DOD/inter-agency operations. The results also suggest that the delivery of training in these essential tasks is lagging.

The notable exception to the importance of the tasks comprising the survey set was SN 8.2.3 Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters. This task is traditionally identified with Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) – the management of refugees fleeing the scene of hostilities. It would not be hard to envision, however, that this task might be of great importance were a terrorist attack involving employment of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) to occur in a major metropolitan location.

This observation would seem to be corroborated by the high value those surveyed placed on task SN 8.3.4 Coordinate Consequence Management (CM) in the Inter-agency Arena in terms of its importance to USNORTHCOM. A perceived lack of formal training in this task, however, was only partially offset by previous on the job training (OJT) and by specific pre-deployment training. On balance, it appears as if a greater emphasis on pre-deployment training in all of the tasks comprising the survey would be beneficial. It is important to note that with respect to all of the tasks

---

122 Appendix. Score of 9.1 out of 10.
123 Appendix. Score of 3.7 out of 10.
124 Appendix. Score of 4.6.
125 Appendix. Score of 3.6 out of 10.
126 Appendix. Scores related to the adequacy of this training ranged from a low of .7 to a high of 4.7 out of 10.
evaluated, formal training of the type that would be incorporated in future Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curricula, has not yet been delivered.\textsuperscript{127}

Survey results would indicate that the respondents viewed the survey task set as being of greater importance to USNORTHCOM’s HLS mission than to its HLD mission. The only average score to rank higher for HLD than HLS was recorded for task SN 8.2.1 Support DOD and Joint Agencies. The critical importance of communications to effective mission performance in either the HLD or HLS sphere was highlighted by the scores awarded to SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process.\textsuperscript{128} Unsurprisingly, the overall importance of information management to successful inter-agency engagement was reflected in the responses provided when participants were asked to evaluate the tasks they had actually performed in the context of “Value of this UJT/JMET to effective inter-agency operations.”\textsuperscript{129} This score, the highest recorded, is consistent with the types of comments included in the various NSSE after action reviews reported earlier and represents the view of personnel serving in operational roles – not merely those associated with technical communications support.

The importance of these tasks to actually accomplishing missions in a field environment where DOD personnel operate alongside of their inter-agency counterparts on a 24/7 basis cannot be overemphasized. Two questions asked respondents to evaluate the survey task set in the context of an operational setting: “Importance [of a particular task] to the accomplishment of this [NSSE] mission” and “Importance to performance of my duties while deployed.” When compared with the responses to the question “Importance to [the] performance of my duties while at HQ”, the scores assigned to every task but one, SN 8.3.1 Coordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations, outpaced the scores assigned to duties performed in the headquarters environment. This suggests that personnel called on to fulfill DOD roles in an inter-agency environment recognize that the identification of unique skills required for the performance of specific

\textsuperscript{127} Appendix. reflected in task by task scores ranging from 2.0 to 5.2 out of 10.

\textsuperscript{128} Appendix. Scores of 8.3 and 8.7 out of 10 awarded with respect to HLD and HLS, respectively.

\textsuperscript{129} Appendix. Score of 9.1 out of 10.
operational tasks is imperative, while policy development and headquarters staffing responsibilities draw on more generalized skills and experience.

Discerning the importance of these skills and valuing them institutionally are two different matters. It is interesting to note, and consistent with expectations, that in the case of every task included in the survey, respondents recorded higher scores in response to the questions “Value of this UJT/JMET to USNORTHCOM” and “Value of this UJT/JMET to effective inter-agency operations” than to the question “Value of this UJT/JMET to my own service component (USA, USN) etc.” The lowest scores in response to the service component question were reported by a USN O-5 and a USAF O-5, both of whom are dependent for continued promotion on the view that the senior members of their selection boards might hold regarding the relative importance of inter-agency involvement. This result is telling and speaks volumes as to the importance of providing career protection for officers called to serve in an inter-agency environment. It suggests, for example, that legislative top cover in the form of an amendment to Goldwater-Nichols extending the act’s provisions to encompass service with inter-agency organizations may more than be in order.

The USNORTHCOM “battlefield” extends from the nation’s heartland to the most remote terrorist camp and therefore requires the active integration of non-DOD inter-agency players in ways and to an extent not common to the other Regional Combatant Commands. Joint Publication 3-0 states: “Combatant commanders [all of them – author’s addition] and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations in a variety of circumstances. The intrinsic nature of inter-agency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques.”130

In a Joint Publication 3.0 comparative table that describes the differences between 20th and 21st Century Characteristics of US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution, the characteristic of Inter-agency “Coordination” is superceded by Integrated Agency “Actions” and Strategic Deterrence as Homeland Defense is replaced by proactive/preemptive Homeland Security.\textsuperscript{131} The intent is to “secure [the] US homeland and key strategic nodes, to reduce the effectiveness of enemy asymmetric approaches while maintaining relentless, forward operational pressure to preempt enemy efforts.”\textsuperscript{132} Accomplishing this mission will require the development of sound doctrine, the training and assignment of well-qualified personnel, and the deployment of new supporting technologies. Properly crafted JMETs derived from relevant UJTs will form the principal building blocks for all of these efforts, but training will always remain in the forefront.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{132} Joint Publication 3.0, 13.
VII. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

The type of training that offers an opportunity to effect broadly based and long-lasting cultural change and assimilation among people of differing organizations will need to find its way into the curricula of the schools offering Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). JPME specified by Goldwater-Nichols at Section 401 is structured, within the five identified levels of professional military education, in two principal phases, JPME Phase I and JPME Phase II. To be designated as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) an officer must complete both phases and successfully complete a 24 month tour of duty in a designated joint billet as included in the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). This is a rigorous requirement. The demands of mastering the professional skills required by his or her service component and serving in positions of increasing responsibility to prepare for command assignments compete for every hour of the military officer’s attention. Finding the time for officers to complete the JPME coursework and finding the opportunities for meaningful service within the JDAL are challenging enough. Getting the curriculum content right to prepare officers for effective service in complex joint and inter-agency environments is daunting.

The most recent Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s Instruction governing the delivery of professional military education reflects the evolving priorities of the 2004 National Military Strategy.133 This instruction incorporates new JPME standards intended to span all five levels of the professional military education continuum. The first of the standards asserts: “JPME curricula should prepare graduates to operate in a joint, inter-agency and multinational environment…”134 Specific instruction in inter-agency concepts, however, does not appear as a Joint Emphasis curriculum requirement until JPME Phase II.135 (The curriculum structure contemplates delivery of this content at intermediate or senior level service schools offering JPME Phase I and II). Learning Area 1 at the intermediate level is intended to ensure that students “Comprehend how the US

134 Ibid., E-1.
military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, inter-agency and multinational operations.” 136 At the senior level, the focus of Learning Area 2 is to “analyze how the inter-agency’s structure and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power;” 137 while Learning Area 4 emphasizes “apprais[ing] processes for coordinating US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with inter-agency and non-governmental organizations to include homeland security and defense.” 138

While the formal designation of content related to inter-agency roles in the HLD/HLS environment represents a breakthrough of sorts, it never the less indicates that full scope inter-agency integration as a service way of life has yet to be entirely embraced. JPME is still DOD, albeit, joint-DOD, centric, in compliance with the strict statutory requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. This, in turn, suggests a need to expand the provisions of the Act to directly address inter-agency engagement as an integral aspect of joint operations - to make the services tartan instead of purple.

Prior guidance suggests that inter-agency familiarization has a place in all professional military education levels. The Joint Training Plan stipulates that “Commanders will train the way they intend to fight.” 139 It acknowledges as well that “Inherent to military operations is the need to work with other US Government (USG) agencies or other nations’ governments, as well as with Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO), and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO). Joint training and exercise programs should maximize interaction with the organizations and people likely to be involved in assigned mission(s) across the range of military operations. Commanders should emphasize and develop individual as well as collective skills.” 140

A draft revision of the Joint Training Plan, dated July 31, 2004, goes further, “The spectrum of conflict in which US forces may be employed spans the full range of military

---

136 CJCSI 1800.1B, E-C-1.
137 Ibid., E-D-2.
138 Ibid.
140 Ibid., B-7.
operations. Most of these operations will include multinational partners and nearly all will be conducted in a joint environment and include inter-agency coordination. Our goal must be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, our friends, and our interests.”

To accomplish this goal, the draft plan asserts, “Everyone required to conduct military operations will be trained, under realistic conditions and to exacting standards, prior to execution of those operations. People selected for joint assignments will be trained prior to reaching their duty location.”

So the stage would seem to be set with direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and policy guidance issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the service components to move out and execute their orders in a coordinated manner. Well, not exactly. One of the constraints is that even though the curriculum to be delivered is joint, each of the services has retained its own venue for delivering JPME and its own personnel assignment mechanisms for selecting and assigning officers to this training. All US War Colleges, selected foreign war colleges, and selected fellowship programs award completion of JPME Phase I in conjunction with their in-residence programs as does the Naval Post-Graduate School.

A concerted effort has been made to deliver this curriculum via online distance learning programs as well. This pedagogical method alleviates to some degree, the problems associated with officers needing to carve out of their service specific training and operations regimens the time to devote to an in residence program. Of course, the time has to come from somewhere, generally from the officers’ personal schedules and after-hours or off-duty time. JPME Phase II opportunities are even fewer and the providers limited to a handful of outlets – principally the National War College and the Joint Forces Staff College. Curriculum development, refinement and expansion in the area of inter-agency competencies appear to be lagging at each venue.

In conjunction with the FY 2005 Defense authorization Act, the House of Representatives attempted to incorporate language requiring the standardization of the

---

142 Ibid.
JPME curriculum across the providing venues. “The House version of the authorization bill would [have] established a chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code consolidating laws affecting joint professional military education. It also would [have] prescribed 16 subject areas that must be covered as part of training for officers in the armed services, to include national military strategy, strategic planning and joint and combined operations, integrated employment of land, sea and air forces; contingency planning; joint logistics; command and control of combat operations; joint intelligence; joint requirements development; and military history. House lawmakers also wanted future leaders to have greater awareness of cultures in countries where U.S. forces may deploy.”

143 The measure, hotly contested by DOD, was not incorporated in the final bill.

Missing from even the most recent JPME guidance is any suggestion of the disruptive type of innovation that would seem to be required to refocus DOD on combating non-traditional foes in collaboration with its inter-agency partners. The Chairman of the Joint Staff’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy represents valuable but evolutionary change along a continuum; not a radical rethinking of education and training requirements demanded by a new threat and response environment. As an example, the involvement of civilian students is generally permitted rather than directed. The instruction states: “The Services and [National Defense University] may include civilian students in their programs. Civilian students should have appropriate academic and professional backgrounds. Participation by both DOD and non-DOD civilian students is desired, with focus of non-DOD students on perspectives of the inter-agency.”

144 It is not clear that these types of students have been or will be actively recruited which would seem to diminish the impact of the otherwise laudatory efforts to build the JPME curricula around a seminar style of education that fosters the development of long lasting interpersonal relationships as well as the rich exchange of diverse professional views. Recognizing the value of this instructional method in advancing the agenda of building a joint force - “Small group learning should be the

143 Inside The Pentagon, 2 September 2004, 1.
144 CJCSI 1800.1B, 30 August 2004, B-1.
principal resident education methodology”\textsuperscript{145} - the concept could be readily expanded to
the include reduction of cultural barriers among DOD and inter-agency partners by
altering the mix of DOD and inter-agency civilian students. The involvement of civilian
students is more extensively contemplated at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
but one new initiative stands out that genuinely represents a bold and intentional
approach to bridging the DOD-inter-agency gap. It currently falls outside of the JPME
constellation but offers a template that could be applied to a JPME setting.

Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Domestic
Preparedness, the Naval Post Graduate School has implemented a distance-learning
curriculum for DOD and Inter-agency personnel. Students who successfully complete
this rigorous 18-month program earn a Master of Arts degree in Homeland Security - the
first of its kind. When operating at capacity, the program is expected to graduate
approximately 120 students per year. By carefully controlling admissions, the school has
ensured that the preponderance of students is drawn from the ranks of first responders,
state and local emergency managers, and non-DOD federal agencies. DOD
representation, both uniformed and civilian, is generally no more than 10% - 15% of each
class.

While sustaining this innovation is critical, moving to the disruptive level of effort
would involve a radical change in the program’s scope and orientation. The current
program might become an adjunct to a 9-month in residence curriculum modeled after
those in place at the nation’s war colleges. The disruptive aspect of such a program would
be that the student population would be tailored to reflect a DOD/Inter-agency mix of
approximately 1/3 – 2/3 with a throughput matching that of any of the other senior
schools. Establishing this new school – the Homeland Defense College - under the
auspices of Commander, USNORTHCOM, on site at the USNORTHCOM headquarters
complex, would ensure a steady infusion of national leadership level speakers as well as
daily access to ongoing HLD/HLS operations. There would be regular opportunities for
students representing a wide variety of agencies and organizational tiers in the HLD/HLS
effort to study and work alongside one another, building relationships and breaking down

\textsuperscript{145} CJCSI 1800.1B, 30 August 2004, B-4.
cultural barriers that have impeded collaborative efforts to date. Furthermore, the school would offer the Commander a ready source of think tank resources and would serve as a forum for discussion and evaluation of emerging HLD/HLS concepts. The Homeland Defense College would serve as an on-site Center of Excellence, a full member of the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) that is vital to successful prosecution of the war on terror.

Others have proposed similar arrangements. One proposal calls for the establishment of a National Homeland Security University sponsored by DHS.146 Another study, jointly sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and Commander, US Joint Forces Command, promotes the consolidation of inter-agency training and education, naturally enough, at NDU.147 The proposed curriculum for this program would nominally consist of four courses – JIACG 101, Military 101, IA 101, and Command Specific Considerations.148 Additionally, in May of 2005, Representative Curt Weldon, R-Pa., the vice chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee and member of the Armed Services Committee added language to the fiscal 2006 defense authorization bill (HR 1815) to “express the Sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security should establish” the National College of Homeland Security at NDU. Funding was not provided.149 The director of NDU’s Institute for Homeland Security Studies has recently weighed in on this topic as follows: “Stephen M. Duncan, a former assistant secretary of Defense who served as drug czar under President George H.W. Bush … [stated] the college’s mission, is to ‘create the leaders in homeland security for the future. We’re not talking about educating first responders. … There are graduate colleges all over the country that can do that.’ Duncan said the college would offer graduate-level degree programs for senior-

---


148 Ibid.

level staff at DHS and related agencies. Courses would also be open to state and local emergency management officials and corporate vice presidents. Unlike nine-month NDU programs geared to military officers, Duncan said the homeland curriculum would consist of short courses, Web-based instruction and night and weekend programs.\textsuperscript{150}

These proposals while generally meritorious, represent sustaining initiatives in that they would essentially graft an inter-agency component onto traditionally formatted training programs or would create a stand alone Homeland Security University that might attract DHS staff but would appear to be out of DOD’s lane. Excluding first responders would be a mistake of the highest order. Absent their active participation, many of the opportunities for breaking down cultural barriers between DOD and inter-agency partners would be missed. This policy, once it became widely known, would exacerbate the mistrust of DOD as a “know it all, when we want your opinion we’ll give it to you,” kind of outfit.

The disruptive aspect of a USNORTHCOM chartered college dedicated to providing the highest quality education to DOD and non-DOD personnel in the fields of HLD/HLS cannot be minimized. It would represent DOD moving deliberately and forcefully “beyond joint” for the specific purpose of mobilizing and leveraging all aspects of national power in fulfillment of its mission to Deter, Prevent, and Defeat current and potential adversaries by any available means. Establishment of this school would represent the combining of familiar elements of national power in new ways that have not been previously envisioned or valued.\textsuperscript{151} By being DOD chartered and sponsored, DOD personnel could participate without jeopardizing their standing within their own service communities. This is essential to turning the corner on the development of a cadre of officers who can move effortlessly in and out of joint, inter-agency, and service specific environments.

Developing a fresh curriculum focused on tested JMETs derived from both the DHS Universal Task List (UTL) and the DOD Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and emphasizing a case study, practicum based approach to instruction would enable a new

\textsuperscript{150} Madigan.

\textsuperscript{151} Pierce, 23 -24.
Homeland Defense College to break with traditional, DOD-centric stove-piped courses of study. It would extend the concept of joint to the next higher or integrated level. One particular benefit of this approach would be that perceived deficiencies in the current JPME II curriculum could be addressed. In a December 2002 report, the GAO noted, "About 24 percent of the officers who had completed the second phase [of JPME] responded that attending the second phase was important to a little or no extent. In focus group discussions, these officers said that the program is too long, redundant with the first phase of joint education, and of little added value."152 Only “Eleven per cent responded that attending the second phase was important to a very great extent.”153 This is a sobering commentary with ramifications for the Chairman’s policy that contemplates introducing substantive inter-agency content at the JPME II level.154

A Homeland Defense College might adopt a different approach. Rather than merely adding additional inter-agency content to the existing JPME Phase II Learning Areas, this curriculum should be overhauled from top to bottom with special consideration given to the unique inter-agency/DOD composition of the student body. DOD wide, modifying the entire JPME concept by reworking Phase II entirely, would represent a form of disruptive innovation and would produce a more logical and more highly valued career progression for military officers.

To overcome service component resistance by invoking a form of disguise,155 JPME Phase I would remain essentially unchanged (though the inter-agency themes cited in JPME Standard I would be introduced) and would follow initial tours of duty and the completion of essential service specific professional qualifications. JPME Phase II, rather than replicating Phase I, would expand the officer’s portfolio of essential skills through immersion level exposure to inter-agency concepts and interaction with inter-agency counterparts. At this career juncture, student participants from both the DOD and inter-agency worlds would have established themselves as valued “players” in their respective agencies and organizations. The resultant classroom and seminar interaction would

152 GAO 03-238, 12.
153 Ibid.
154 CJCSI 1800.1B.
155 Pierce, 127.
consequently be more frank and of greater scope and depth. The goal of fostering more effective working relationships between DOD and non-DOD leaders would be achieved through the establishment of informal inter-personal networks forged in study groups and through the completion of assigned projects. JPME Phase II would be conducted at the graduate level of study. By eliminating redundancies and by interjecting a robust opportunity for interaction with “rising stars” from the inter-agency world, the entire endeavor might even be greeted with greater enthusiasm by the sending services.

It would seem, at least, to go a long way toward achieving the transformation objectives established by Secretary Rumsfeld. It would also help to realize the Secretary’s vision of a force equipped and genuinely committed to “transforming the way the Department integrates military power with other instruments of national power [that] will help ensure that when we employ military power, we do so in the most effective way possible. Integration of national power is especially critical for overcoming terrorists or other unconventional adversaries that cannot be defeated by military means alone. Enhanced coordination among agencies and across all levels of government (federal, state and local) will promote increased cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct seamless operations.”

JPME has proven to be a vital cornerstone in reshaping the US military force. Originally envisioned by President Eisenhower in the years following World War II, it has provided a common intellectual basis for the planning and conduct of operations that are truly joint. More importantly it has provided an opportunity for officers to overcome service-specific cultural obstacles by exchanging views and interacting with one another in an academic environment where lives are not on the line. In short, it has prepared them for effective service with one another in the joint arena. This success story needs to be replicated and expanded to include active engagement with personnel slated for positions of increasing responsibility with their non-DOD organizations. Ronald R. Krebs, in his thoughtful piece “A School for the Nation” observes that inter-personal contact in a


military setting alone is insufficient for fostering cultural assimilation.\textsuperscript{158} However, inviting similarly motivated students from different agencies and differing response tiers to study together in a specialized Homeland Defense College as a pre-cursor to serving together in the field would seem a perfect method for enhancing the effectiveness of all parties in better fulfilling their HLD/HLS responsibilities. The scope of the educational requirements for military officers specified in Title 10, USC, chapter 38, section 663 should be expanded to include an inter-agency component. Doing so would open the door to better preparing military officers for effective service in an inter-agency environment.

VIII. ASSIGNMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Completion of the academic portion of JPME is a necessary but insufficient element of an officer’s joint professional development. In addition to fulfilling specified curriculum requirements, officers must complete a tour of duty with a joint command in order to qualify for designation as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). As reported by the GAO, this is a demanding obligation that not all officers believe to be helpful in advancing their careers (underscore added):

Overall, officers told us that they viewed their assignment to a joint position as a positive experience and that their services also saw joint assignments as valuable career moves. Moreover, 51 percent of the officers surveyed responded that an assignment to a joint position is a defined aspect of their career path. … However, many officers also told us that they were reluctant to seek the joint specialty designation. Their concern was that they would be flagged as joint specialty officers and, accordingly, be reassigned to subsequent tours of duty within joint organizations. They were concerned about the need to balance the requirements of already crowded service career paths and the expectation to serve in joint organizations. Their ultimate concern was that multiple joint assignments would take them away from service assignments for too great a period and that this time away could adversely affect their career progression and promotion potential. The officers responded that the joint specialty officer designation was not really important for the rank and file—but really only important for those who were going to be admirals and generals. In other words, these officers believed that the need to meet service expectations seemed to override any advantages that the joint specialty officer designation might provide.\(^{159}\)

Pierce observes that senior military leaders modulate the pace and duration of innovation through the control of promotion policies.\(^{160}\) This powerful mechanism has the overall impact of dramatically curtailing the introduction of ideas that stray very far from accepted norms, and acts as a real brake on those who would venture far from their service fold. It was exactly this phenomenon that precipitated Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols. Absent the legislative mandate requiring service in the joint arena as a pre-

\(^{159}\) GAO 03-238, 27.

\(^{160}\) Pierce, 9.
condition for promotion to the flag and general officer ranks, the services could still maintain an absolute lock on the hearts and minds of officers who were wholly dependent on maintaining the good will of their seniors in fulfilling their service specific duties and responsibilities. Goldwater-Nichols of course did little to break the absolute power of the promotion boards in determining who would be deemed “best qualified” to carry forward the mantle of the various services as the next generation of senior leadership. The Act did preclude the adverse non-consideration of candidates who had ventured into the purple world.

In a post-joint environment, the next disruptive innovation in the assignment and promotion of officers would be to extend the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols to specifically authorize the awarding of joint tour credit for the completion of service with inter-agency components. Among these, for example, would be the National Guard, DHS, US Coast Guard, TSA, FAA, FEMA, FBI, Treasury and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This would require the identification of appropriate billets beyond the liaison officer role at each of these agencies and an expansion of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The services would continue to screen officers for assignment out of their service lanes as is currently done for joint assignments. The services would also monitor career progression and the timetables under which an officer must fulfill the requirements for appointment to a command billet.

The disruptive aspect of this proposal would be that an officer might be posted to USCG or to the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) as opposed to a joint command or organization such as USPACOM, or the Joint Staff and still receive credit for having served in a meaningful position outside of his or her own service. This is the essence of the new joint – tartan rather than purple. But the point would be the same – to broaden that officer’s professional perspective, to break down cultural barriers on a reciprocal basis, to foster the development of common plans for countering the enemy, and to conduct consistently successful HLD/HLS missions. It would mean aligning the total DOD/inter-agency force for the purpose of countering emerging threats in a manner not previously contemplated. This assignment would not be in addition to the requirement for completion of a joint service tour of duty. It would be in lieu of – on an
equivalent quality of assignment basis. There is a precedent for this type of assignment in that the law currently authorizes the Secretary of Defense to award joint credit to officers serving in “defense agencies and….certain joint force headquarters staffs.”

Modifying the assignment process requires the identification and establishment of billets in which military officers might serve in a meaningful manner with non-DOD agencies. Instead of the Joint Service Billets prescribed by the JDAL, these inter-agency jobs could be designated as joint-equivalent Integrated Service Billets. The first of these billets might best be instituted in the Intelligence, Operations, Planning, and Communications sections of the receiving agencies – the DOD equivalent of J2, J3, J5 and J6. These are the staff sections where the duties performed most closely parallel those common to the uniformed services and where the officers assigned would be most likely to add the greatest value.

Additionally, the assignment of DOD personnel to these types of roles would have the greatest chance of overcoming service resistance. It would be an extension of the “disguising” function proposed by Pierce. No one would be actually fooled of course, but the service objections that could be expected to arise might never the less be blunted by representing an assignment of this nature as remaining in consonance with “normal” service career progression. The services are already on the hook to “give up” an officer to the purple world for a joint tour. Aligning non-DOD duties with the type of responsibilities already evaluated by the services as acceptable when fulfilled at a joint or combined command would serve to minimize sending service opposition.

To accomplish the goal of better integrating DOD and non-DOD personnel, however, it would be important for these jobs to be fully operational rather than liaison in nature. Liaison officers (LNOs) are typically posted in the manner of ambassadors dispatched to a distant land. They wind up in the professionally awkward position of attempting to serve two masters – their sending organization and the agency to which they have been assigned. Put another way, the principle of a single chain of command is effectively violated as LNOs are not fully answerable to the one putting a roof over their

---

161 GAO 03-238, 6.
162 Pierce, 127.
head, but rather have allegiances elsewhere. In theory, information will flow unencumbered between the organizations but it takes extraordinary levels of professionalism for this to occur.

LNOs serve as valuable conduits for the exchange of information, but they are not decision makers. They are typically not empowered to speak officially, absent consultation and direct authorization, on behalf of their sending organization. Thus, planning efforts are not always expedited by their presence. The principal value added by LNOs lies in their contribution to an environment where dialogue can more readily occur. They also serve to cut through layers of bureaucracy to find the right action officer at their sending service when needed. In an inter-agency environment, LNOs would serve as interpreters of DOD culture and would bring to the table perspective and knowledge of DOD unique capabilities. While this contribution can be exceedingly valuable, breaking down cultural barriers requires that these personnel be perceived by their inter-agency counterparts as fully functioning players, not as emissaries.

Lacking inter-agency specific training, military officers can, however, bring other valuable skills to an inter-agency assignment. Specifically, the uniformed officers would offer, on arrival, a wealth of experience in planning and conducting complex and multifaceted military operations. DHS for instance has yet to develop a planning capability as extensive as that found on a routine basis among DOD plans directorates. Adopting a common approach to planning has been mentioned as a necessity in USNORTHCOM after action reports from a number of National Special Security Events.163

DOD personnel assigned to non-DOD agencies and organizations would also add value through their familiarity with sophisticated communications systems and with procedures for interpreting and handling classified intelligence information. The receiving agency would be augmented by personnel who arrive with background checks complete and security clearances authorized. The capacity of the receiving agency to access classified information through secure channels would be immediately enhanced.

Additionally, officers assigned to the receiving agency’s communications section would provide significant insight into the availability and capability of military communications systems. This would increase the likelihood of establishing fully interoperable clear and secure communications networks among agencies and organizations tasked with conducting a particular HLD/HLS operation. These are the types of tasks that enhance not only an agency’s capabilities, but also the officer’s professional development in a manner that would be valued by his/her sending service. It would be consistent with the types of service currently rendered in the course of a joint assignment or perhaps even an exchange assignment as is common among the Navy and the USCG.

Certain assignments would appear to be natural for fitting military officers into inter-agency jobs. Fixed-wing flight qualified Air Force, Navy and Marine officers, for example, should be able to readily find a home with FAA or TSA. Helicopter pilots from the various services would add value on arrival with Customs and Border Patrol teams who operate these aircraft in a variety of law enforcement and drug interdiction roles. Military police officers, while formally trained in skills not required of their federal law enforcement agency counterparts, would be the rational choice for assignment to FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), and possibly Secret Service.

Of greatest value in facilitating increased cooperation with other than active duty DOD elements, however, would be to augment the number of permanent active duty military billets embedded with state National Guard organizations. Even though the Army and Air National Guard functionality is virtually indistinguishable from that of their active duty counterparts, the governing statutory authorities contained in USC Title 10 and Title 32 are different. Additionally, the battle rhythm driven by the schedules of part-time personnel demands a unique approach to the planning and conduct of many types of military missions.

Again, the purpose of these assignments would be to cross-pollinate DOD and inter-agency personnel and practices. A desired outcome of this effort would be the development of a substantial cadre of officers who are as familiar with the roles, missions, and operational practices of partnering organizations as they are those of their
own sending service. Having been immersed in these organizations, performing duties beyond those of liaison officer or observer, the officers, in theory, would be equipped for future service at more senior levels with “bi-lingual” or “multi-cultural” skills and with established credentials and a network of valuable professional relationships.

Upon completion of an inter-agency tour, the officer would receive a skill coding similar to the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation. The Navy, citing “the need for the development of a cadre of naval officers educated or experienced in the theories, principles, processes, and techniques for countering terrorist strategies,” 164 has recently expanded its list of approved subspecialty codes to include a Homeland Defense and Security category. 165 Establishing a subspecialty code – as differentiated from a principal warfare specialty, e.g. Surface Warfare, Aviation Warfare, Submarine Warfare, is an essential pre-cursor to assigning naval officers to HLD/HLS billets. It is this assignment following the completion of education and training where the lessons learned in the classroom are reinforced and made a permanent part of the officer’s professional skill portfolio.

Designation as a HLD/HLS sub-specialist upon completion of a tour of duty in the field would, in the Navy’s case, be concurrent with designation as a Joint or Inter-agency Service Officer. For the Navy, this important education, designation, assignment link has been strengthened by the Naval Postgraduate School’s efforts at pioneering a Master’s level curriculum in Homeland Defense and Security at the behest of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Domestic Preparedness. 166

The other services will need to implement the means of tracking officers who have completed HLD/HLS training and assignments in accordance with their own personnel and training methods. All of the services will then need to take active measures to ensure that officers completing qualifications in this new sub-specialty are protected as they compete for promotion. Pierce observes that securing the future of officers who

---


165 U.S. Navy Manpower Analysis Center Memorandum to Navy Officer Occupational Classification System (NOOSC) Executive Committee SER 12/577 of 22 July 2004, unpublished.

166 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N3/5) letter of 03 February 2004.
endeavor to break trail for new approaches to doing DOD business – as in fostering real collaboration among DOD and its inter-agency partners - is a critical aspect of successful disruptive innovation.167

Absent the affirmative top cover provided by influential senior service leaders, those who would first accept and, hopefully, seek tours of duty with inter-agency organizations, could be left with few opportunities for meaningful follow-on assignments. The services over the years have proven literally ruthless in punishing professionally those who would stray far from traditionally accepted career development and advancement norms. Pierce cites examples of the US Marine Corps purging officers who had dared to become open advocates of General Gray’s maneuver warfare concepts.168 He also cites examples of the US Navy showing the door to those officers who had supported Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Elmo Zumwalt’s, transformational initiatives implemented in the post-Viet Nam era.169

It is unlikely that providing top cover for officers who put their careers on the line to further DOD and inter-agency cooperation can be entrusted to the services themselves. Crushing or marginalizing innovators, even those acting to advance the nation’s interests, is apparently not a uniquely American trait as Pierce notes in citing examples from both the Japanese and British militaries.170 Similar cases are undoubtedly to be found among almost all other forms of endeavor. The difference is that in commerce, for example, innovators who disrupt corporate leadership’s sense of order are often pushed out the door only to become fabulously wealthy entrepreneurs. In the closed system of the military however, there are few roads to redemption once one has been cast into the outer darkness of a job at a steel desk in a remote corner of the service’s empire.

This unlovely attribute of military culture is why Congressional action is required to ensure that closer DOD and inter-agency collaboration is both implemented and sustained. Goldwater-Nichols included specific provisions to protect officers assigned to joint duty by stipulating that officers designated as Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) must

167 Pierce, 161.
168 Ibid., 98.
169 Ibid., 161.
170 Ibid., 143; 50.
be promoted at a pace equivalent to peers who continued to occupy positions with their service components. Amending Goldwater-Nichols to provide joint duty credit for service with partnering agencies will require additional language to ensure that officers filling these important assignments are not professionally handicapped (or tacitly terminated) by doing so.

---

171 Title 10 USC, Sections 662, 665.
IX. CONCLUSION

DOD is faced with the challenge of transforming itself to confront an adaptive trans-national terrorist threat while preserving the skills, capabilities and technological advantages it currently enjoys over potential nation-state adversaries. In confronting this challenge, DOD must swiftly improve its HLD/HLS capabilities. It must join with its inter-agency partners in applying the full spectrum of national power to deter, prevent and defeat terrorist attacks. The scope and magnitude of this effort demand genuine innovation, not marginal improvement. The effort demands disruptive innovation represented by the unprecedented integration of DOD and inter-agency organizations. As Pierce and others have demonstrated, however, it should be expected that innovation on this scale is likely to be resisted by the military service components.

Integrating DOD with non-DOD agencies is a task similar to integrating the various services in a joint manner. This process, too, was actively and passively resisted by the service chiefs. Their recalcitrance was finally overcome with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The specific provisions of Goldwater-Nichols included both incentives and penalties intended to expedite adoption of the organizational reforms necessary to transform the separate services into a joint force. The legislation explicitly required the implementation of a comprehensive training and education program intended to facilitate the reduction of inter-service cultural barriers.

In the 19 years subsequent to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the military has made incremental progress in becoming more joint. Applying the criteria introduced by Pierce, however, this progress represents sustaining, evolutionary change along an established and expected transformational trajectory.\(^{172}\) The effort to become more joint has consisted largely of better integrating existing military components outfitted with technologically improved equipment. Today the joint world remains exclusively a military construct. Disruptive innovation of the type envisioned by Pierce will occur when inter-agency partners are grafted into the military’s family of arms.

\(^{172}\) Pierce, 25; 30.
Several actions might expedite the process of enhancing and expediting collaboration among DOD and non-DOD agencies. The best opportunities for swiftly altering the DOD/inter-agency landscape appear to lie in amending the Goldwater-Nichols Act, extending its provisions to include the inter-agency sector. Broadening the scope of Goldwater-Nichols in this manner would provide the impetus for disruptive innovation in the training, education and assignment of military officers, better equipping them for effective service in an inter-agency environment.

Seemingly the most important attribute of a legislative initiative would be to provide officers with career protection for venturing into the inter-agency arena. If officers could earn what is now known as joint duty credit through service with inter-agency organizations, they would expand their knowledge and experience base without being perceived by their own service as having strayed too far off a “normal” career path. Goldwater-Nichols currently stipulates that officers must have purple experience to be eligible for promotion to flag or general officer rank. Selection boards controlled by the separate services have come to expect, over the past 19 years, that the officers best qualified for promotion will have served successfully in a purple assignment. Expanding the list of qualifying billets to include inter-agency opportunities, tartan jobs, would appear a logical next step. As discussed, Pierce has demonstrated that providing officers with career top cover is essential to fostering the type of environment in which disruptive innovation can occur.\(^{173}\) A new legislative mandate would serve as this type of shield.

For these types of assignments to be possible, the services and their inter-agency counterparts will need to define and create qualifying inter-agency billets. Again, a statutory mandate may well be required to start the services down this path. There are currently many impediments to be overcome, not the least of which are budgetary obstacles. As an example, as recently as 27 July, 2005, SECDEF’s Executive Secretary addressed a memorandum to the Secretaries of the various military departments, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to their deputies stating: “As a general policy, only details [assignments] outside of the Department [of Defense] on a reimbursable basis will be approved. Exceptions to this policy will be made only in the most

\(^{173}\) Pierce, 162.
compelling circumstances when the department, component or agency head has certified that the net benefit of the detail accrues to the Department of Defense.”174 This memorandum would suggest that there is a more than a little way to go in viewing day to day DOD involvement with inter-agency organizations as the usual and customary way of “providing for the common defense.”175

Getting to a point where fully integrated DOD/inter-agency operations are perceived as the norm will require a significant revamping of the DOD training and education pipeline. Merely assigning officers to inter-agency billets, expecting them to report for duty, sit down alongside their non-DOD counterparts and commence operations different from what they have experienced in their ships, squadrons and battalions is not a plan for success. Again, expanding the scope of Goldwater-Nichols would seem to offer a plausible way ahead as this act already addresses important aspects of training and education. Goldwater-Nichols might be amended to prescribe that the current JPME curricula be expanded to incorporate substantive inter-agency content. This content, in turn, would be derived from integrating DOD/inter-agency specific tasks currently reflected in the DOD UJTL, and the DHS UTL and TCL. In the course of exhaustively examining and combining the existing elements of these task lists, new, hybrid tasks might also be identified.

USNORTHCOM has commenced the process of developing for Joint Staff approval, a JMETL that incorporates HLD and HLS specific tasks. The importance of these tasks has been validated by members of SJFHQ-N who have participated with their inter-agency counterparts in support of multiple NSSEs. Fully realizing and leveraging the operational capabilities of non-DOD partners requires that non-DOD tasks, as reflected in the DHS UTL and TCL be woven into the fabric of the proposed USNORTHCOM JMETL. SJFHQ-N represents a form of small innovation group that Pierce has demonstrated is essential to fostering disruptive innovation.176 Commander, USNORTHCOM might exploit this organization in its frequent deployments to further

---

175 U.S. Constitution, preamble.
176 Pierce, 30.
test and evaluate new DOD/inter-agency concepts of the type that was represented by appointing a National Guard JTF commander to command both National Guard and active duty forces in support of National Special Security Events (NSSEs).

The benefit of DOD and inter-agency personnel serving together in an operational setting was also demonstrated at the NSSEs. These missions provided opportunities for DOD and non-DOD personnel to become better acquainted with one another’s terminology, operational doctrine and style, and organizational culture. It is not difficult to imagine how the assimilation and integration process might be enhanced if a robust cadre of DOD and inter-agency personnel could study together prior to reporting for duty at their respective organizations. Expanding the JPME curriculum to include significant inter-agency content and offering the program to both DOD and non-DOD personnel at a newly created Homeland Defense College sponsored and administered by USNORTHCOM would represent a breakthrough in conceptualizing a wholly new approach to the nation’s defense.

The limited numbers of personnel studying together in the master’s degree level program currently being pioneered at the Naval Post Graduate School will not produce the critical mass of men and women needed to transform DOD and inter-agency organizations. Expanding such programs on a USNORTHCOM sponsored Homeland Defense College campus would offer the additional benefit of providing the USNORTHCOM Commander with a readily accessible “lab” and think-tank to explore new HLD/HLS concepts. With a curriculum extending well beyond that associated with certificate programs, this college might also serve to identify promising candidates for additional study and service in DOD and inter-agency venues at the PhD level.

Pierce has persuasively demonstrated that disruptive innovation is most likely to occur when it is disguised. Disguising the elements of innovation and transformation associated with seamlessly integrating DOD and non-DOD personnel in the performance of new HLD/HLS missions may take several forms. First, to overcome service resistance, this integration process will probably have to be civilian directed in the form of an amendment to Goldwater-Nichols, expanding the concept of joint to inter-agency, purple to tartan. This would not be a disguise per se but an inescapable imperative that senior
leadership could invoke while implementing aspects of DOD/inter-agency change. Flag and general officers need career top cover too. A broadened statute would provide these officers with the means for conveying the message “Get in step, people. We’ve got to do this.”

Another form of disguise might be employed by designating the first DOD personnel to occupy inter-agency billets as Liaison Officers. As discussed, this arrangement would be sub-optimal in terms of immediate operational effectiveness, but might lead to greater acceptance by avoiding the appearance of DOD personnel making decisions that were “out of their lane” or “above their pay grade.” In the training and education realm, a disguise might be crafted by taking the interim step of sponsoring a rigorous but part-time Homeland Defense course of study leading to a degree at a college or university in the vicinity of USNORTHCOM. Breaking ground on a new bricks and mortar institution could occur later.

Finally, USNORTHCOM might establish an Experimentation and Transformation Directorate (J9). In conjunction with the Training and Education Directorate (J7), J9 could explore transformational training, education and assignment initiatives in an experimental capacity that is not perceived as an immediate threat to the other staff directorates. As mentioned earlier, SJFHQ-N might serve as an operational test bed for these proposed initiatives.

This thesis has examined certain aspects of DOD transformation associated with new HLD/HLS missions. Areas for additional research include devising the Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) needed to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes in the training, education and assignment of military officers if these changes were to be implemented. As frequently cited, the GAO has provided periodic assessments to the Congress on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols in making the services more joint or purple. Similar studies will need to be undertaken to determine if the services and their interagency counterparts have effectively become more tartan.

Transforming DOD in a manner that embraces full partnership with non-DOD agencies in conducting HLD/HLS missions is a vital but daunting undertaking. Persuading the component services to wholeheartedly initiate the type of transformational
measures called for in SECDEF guidance and demanded by a radically altered strategic environment is essential to advancing the nation’s security interests. It is arguably more than a little unlikely that this will occur, however, without external impetus. Pierce has, in a comprehensive manner, shown that Presidents and service chiefs have been thwarted over the years in imposing their transformational views on military senior leaders.\textsuperscript{177} As Pierce notes, the types of changes required on a disruptive scale to effectively accomplish new HLD/HLS missions must be introduced and managed differently than the sustaining types of evolutionary military change that service chiefs expect and prefer.\textsuperscript{178}

Altering the statutory context as was done to finally propel the services in the direction of joint planning and operations appears to offer the best hope for timely adoption and execution of the policies needed to bring about full DOD and inter-agency engagement. Amending Goldwater-Nichols to specifically address DOD/inter-agency involvement across the spectrum of the training, education and assignment of military officers would provide a valuable and necessary framework in which disruptive innovators could continue to operate.

The 9/11 Commission, in the section of its report entitled “Reflecting on a Generational Challenge,” notes that as of the summer of 2004, “three years after 9/11, Americans are still thinking and talking about how to protect our nation in this new era.”\textsuperscript{179} It is incumbent on all of those serving in DOD/inter-agency roles to take the measures necessary to ensure that the challenge posed by the Commission may be interpreted as pertaining to a generation and not for a generation. We will have failed if these three years become another thirty.

\textsuperscript{177} Pierce, 3; 162.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{179} 9/11 Commission Report, 361.
APPENDIX

A. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Survey forms were distributed to 25 military and civilian personnel assigned to USNORTHCOM’S Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N), each of whom had participated in one or more of operational deployments in support of National Special Security Events (NSSE). Of these, two had participated in all four NSSEs, three more had participated in three events, and five personnel had participated in at least two. Thus, the survey population comprised a group with broadly based, current and relevant experience in serving shoulder to shoulder alongside of their interagency counterparts.

Strategic National Universal Joint Tasks (UJT) were selected to form the basis of the survey as they most closely represent the scope of the content that would need to be incorporated in Joint professional Military Education (JPME) curricula and mastered by officers assigned to billets in an inter-agency environment. The goal, as well, was to keep the survey oriented toward concepts rather than chores. Even though the survey participants were functioning at an operational level, they were representing the on-scene presence of the USNORTHCOM Commander whose focus is strategic. By extension, the USNORTHCOM strategic perspective serves to mirror the broadest view of all DOD responsibilities in the HLD/HLS arena.

The survey was also designed to elicit participant views as to the importance of inter-agency specific training, the amount provided via alternative training and education methods prior to deployment, and the general value of inter-agency involvement to the member’s sending service or organization. Finally, the survey sought to obtain insight into the types of vital skills and capabilities, needed by DOD personnel, but not addressed by the existing compilation of Strategic National Tasks.

Of the 25 surveys distributed, fourteen were returned, thirteen of which were useable. The fourteenth was sufficiently incomplete – questions left unanswered in a sporadic manner – as to distort or complicate the interpretation of the other data. Those responding represented a good cross-section of civil service and military ranks and service affiliations.
None of the NSSEs was represented by fewer than four respondents. That is, among the respondents four had participated in the G-8 summit, four in the DNC, six in the RNC, and eleven in the 2005 Inauguration. Among the original fourteen respondents, two had participated in all four events, two had participated in three events, three in two events, and seven in a single event. The unused survey was provided by one of the seven participants in a single event.

B. SURVEY RESULTS

The results of this survey appear in the accompanying Table: Survey Form and Tabulated Results.
Survey Summary
5/6/2005

Purpose/Approach: In the interests of brevity I am using Strategic National (SN) level tasks as a surrogate SET for the more detailed Theater (ST) and Operational (OP) tasks that are actually performed in a field setting. The purpose is to assess relative values associated with the task type. For example ST 8.5 Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities would be captured under SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies. OP 5.7.2 Determine National Agency Capabilities and Limitations would be reflected in SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process.

Mission: G-8, DNC, Inauguration
Rank/Service: 0-3/USAF, GS-12 etc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions:</th>
<th>UJT/JMET</th>
<th>Source from Below</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Importance to successful accomplishment of this mission</td>
<td>SN 8.2</td>
<td>SN 8.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Importance to performance of my duties while deployed</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Importance to performance of my duties while at HQ</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Extent of formal training in this UJT/JMET</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Extent to which this UJT/JMET addressed in pre-deployment training</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Overall importance of this UJT/JMET to Homeland Defense missions</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Overall importance of this UJT/JMET to Homeland Security missions</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Value of this UJT/JMET to my own service component (USA, USN etc)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Value of this UJT/JMET to USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Value of this UJT/JMET to effective interagency operations</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Degree to which overarching LUs below represent complete self/family of tasks necessary for effective DoD and Interagency mission execution</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Comments re: what might be missing or needed would be appreciated | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX |

Rating Scale:
To a Very Great Extent: Example of critical importance, of exceptional value, unsuppassed
To None Extent: Example nonexistent, of no value, adverse impact

STRATEGIC NATIONAL TASKS FROM UJT LIST (I will correlate to Theater (ST) and Operational (OP) Tasks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task #</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.2</td>
<td>PROVIDE DOD/GOVERNMENT-WIDE SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.2.1</td>
<td>SUPPORT DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.2.2</td>
<td>SUPPORT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.2.3</td>
<td>SUPPORT EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS FROM THEATERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.2.4</td>
<td>ASSIST CIVIL DEFENSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3</td>
<td>COORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3.1</td>
<td>COORDINATE AND CONTROL POLICY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3.2</td>
<td>CONDUCT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3.3</td>
<td>ESTABLISH INTERAGENCY COOPERATION STRUCTURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3.4</td>
<td>COORDINATE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM) IN THE INTERAGENCY AREA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 8.3.5</td>
<td>COORDINATE DOD/GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
LIST OF REFERENCES


Inside The Pentagon, 2 September 2004.


95


U.S. Navy Bureau of Naval Personnel Newsletter

U.S. Navy Bureau of Naval Personnel Newsletter, PERS 45J,


U.S. Northern Command Home Page.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

3. CAPT Terry C. Pierce, USN (Ret)  
   Monument, Colorado

4. Paul Stockton, Director  
   Center for Homeland Defense and Security  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

4. Ted Lewis, Academic Associate  
   Center for Homeland Defense and Security  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

5. Prof. Rudy Darken  
   Center for Homeland Defense and Security  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

6. David O’Keeffe, Chief Operations Officer  
   Center for Homeland Defense and Security  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

7. Chris Bellavita,  
   Director of Programs  
   Center for Homeland Defense and Security  
   Salt Lake City, Utah

8. Bill Kelley  
   Office for Domestic Preparedness  
   Department of Homeland Security  
   Washington, DC
9. Bill Pelfrey  
Office for Domestic Preparedness  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC