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Check Your Privacy Rights at the Front Gate: Consensual Sodomy

Regulation in Today's Military Following United States v. Marcum

Captain Erik C. Coyne*

I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Marcum,1 the latest judicial interpretation of the military's sodomy statute,2 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces3 created a delicate balance between

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1. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).


3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is the military's highest appellate court, one level below the United States Supreme Court, and it has jurisdiction over servicemembers throughout the world. CLERK OF THE COURT, THE...
servicemembers' privacy rights and Congress' right to regulate the military. While limiting the Supreme Court's privacy protections articulated in Lawrence v. Texas in the military context, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces created a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 1, available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/CAAFBooklet.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2005). The court was established as an Article I court by Congress. Id. Its judges serve fifteen year terms and are civilians. Id. at 8. To emphasize the civilian makeup of the court, Congress expressly stated that retired military members were to be excluded from appointment to the court. Id. Additionally, prior to 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces was known as the Court of Military Appeals. Id. at 3. For clarity, this comment uses the name Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for all cases decided by the court.

4. See infra Part V.C.

5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Texas' sodomy statute which prohibited same-sex sodomy on the grounds the law violated the due process clause).
situation in which military members are required to apply a multi-part test to determine if their conduct is protected. The resulting environment is one in which servicemembers may not be precisely sure whether their private, consensual, sexual conduct is proscribed. Upon closer examination, however, one need only look to the legitimacy of the underlying relationship - in the eyes of the military - to determine whether the sexual conduct will be criminal and prosecutable.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice codifies the military's sodomy statute in Article 125. It states:

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the


7. See infra Part V.A.

8. See infra Part V.C.

offense.

(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v. Marcum has changed the scope, meaning, and understanding of Article 125 by creating a multi-part test to analyze sodomy cases. In creating the test, the court has followed the less than clear guidance of the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision and created a constitutional, albeit cumbersome, standard for those in the military.

This comment will analyze the scope of the constitutional right to privacy as it is applied in the military context and explore the limits of the military's sodomy statute in light of the new test (hereinafter called the "Marcum Test"). This comment will first address the history of sodomy statutes. Then, it will parse the Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v.


11. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 205.

12. See infra Part V.C.

13. See infra Part IV.D.
Texas, the liberty right it created, and how the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v. Marcum interprets that right in a military setting. Next, this comment will evaluate the constitutionality of the Marcum Test in the military and how the Marcum decision applies to military personnel today. Finally, this comment will suggest alternatives to criminally charging servicemembers for engaging in consensual sodomy.

II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SODOMY STATUTES

A. Origins of Statutes Proscribing Sodomy

The origin of sodomy laws in society stems from biblical interpretations of the Old Testament in Genesis 19:4-11. Based


4. But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and
on the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, early Church teachings focused on God's vengeance upon the two cities for wide-spread homosexual activities. It was also taught that these "'offences against nature'" were the cause of a number of old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the house; 5. and they called to Lot, "Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, that we may know them." 6. Lot went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, 7. and said, "I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8. Behold, I have two daughters who have not known man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof." 9. But they said, "Stand back!" And they said, "This fellow came to sojourn, and he would play the judge! Now we will deal worse with you than with them." Then they pressed hard against the man Lot, and drew near to break the door. 10. But the men put forth their hands and brought Lot into the house to them, and shut the door. 11. And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door of the house, both small and great, so that they wearied themselves groping for the door. Genesis 19:4-11 (King James).

15. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 43; see also THE PURSUIT OF SODOMY: MALE HOMOSEXUALITY IN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE 242, 246 (Kent Gerard & Gert Hekma eds., 1988) (discussing the historical view of sodomites pre-1730 in the Netherlands).
natural disasters and other catastrophes. Additionally, church leaders argued that God had given humans the ability to engage in sexual relations for the sole purpose of procreation.

To protect themselves from these curses and to promote procreativity, societies, through both civil and Church law,


17. Richard Green, Sodomy Laws 35 (from The Handbook of Forensic Sexology, James J. Krivacska & John Money, eds.); see also James A. Button et al., Private Lives, Public Conflicts 179 (CQ Press 1997) (describing religious values as "procreatively-focused sexuality"); Paul R. Abramson et al., Sexual Rights in America: The Ninth Amendment and the Pursuit of Happiness 75 (New York Univ. Press, 2003) (pointing out that an argument could be made that the purpose of sex is to procreate, but concluding that the argument is "silliness, plain and simple").
outlawed sodomy. The crime was often described as, "that detestable and abominable crime (among Christians not to be named) . . . ." This view of sodomy carried into England and

18. McNeil, supra note 14, at 43. Of interest, McNeil discusses the possible mistranslation of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. Id. He lays out an argument, made by some biblical scholars, that the ultimate sin of "inhospitality" is what delivered God's wrath and not sexual deviancy. Id. at 50. If true, McNeil opines that this would be one of history's greatest ironies. Id.

19. Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 51 (1836); see also Richard A. Posner & Katherine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws 65 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1996) (stating that early laws containing the language "'crime against nature,' were limited to anal intercourse"). Today, however, this definition has been commonly expanded to include fellatio, cunnilingus and bestiality. Id.; see also B. Anthony Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex Crimes 1-5 (Matthew Bender 1977).
eventually flowed to America.\textsuperscript{21}

Before Henry VIII’s Reformation Acts criminalized sodomy in 1533, sodomy had only been considered a sin against the church.\textsuperscript{22}

After 1533, however, sodomy, or "buggery" as it was often called, could, for the first time, be punished in civil courts.\textsuperscript{23}

This new crime was a felony and its offenders faced death and, interestingly, loss of property.\textsuperscript{24} There was no exception

\textsuperscript{20.} GREEN, \textit{supra} note 16, at 37; see also POSNER, \textit{supra} note 19, at 65.

\textsuperscript{21.} JONATHAN NED KATZ, \textit{THE AGE OF SODOMITICAL SIN}, 1607-1740, 43 (from \textit{Reclaiming Sodom}, Jonathan Goldberg, ed.); see also POSNER, \textit{supra} note 18, at 65.

\textsuperscript{22.} KATZ, \textit{supra} note 20, at 46-47; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003); POSNER, \textit{supra} note 18, at 65.

\textsuperscript{23.} KATZ, \textit{supra} note 20, at 43; see also POSNER, \textit{supra} note 18, at 65; LESLIE J. MORAN, \textit{THE HOMOSEXUAL(ITY) OF LAW} 23 (Routledge 1996).

\textsuperscript{24.} KATZ, \textit{supra} note 21, at 43; see also PETER ROOK & ROBERT WARD, \textit{ROOK & WARD ON SEXUAL OFFENCES} 125 (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
for clergy who were usually only subjected to punishment by the church.\textsuperscript{25} This is important because it demonstrates, for the first time, a shift in power from the church to the state and exposes possible ulterior motives of the Reformation Parliament and Henry VIII.\textsuperscript{26}

B. Sodomy Statutes Cross the Atlantic

As early as 1641, throughout colonial America, sodomy was a crime that was punishable by death.\textsuperscript{27} The Massachusetts Bay code of 1641 made “man lying with man as with a woman” punishable by

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\textit{25. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also Rook, supra note 23, at 125.}
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\textit{26. Katz, supra note 20, at 47. While not further explored in this comment, Katz implies Henry VIII’s motives were more about separating England from Roman Catholic rule by the Pope than his concern about sodomy. Id. at 46-47. In 1536, relying on this new law, Henry VIII charged a number of Catholic monks with this crime and was able to confiscate their monasteries’ land and redistribute it. Id.}
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\textit{27. Katz, supra note 20, at 47.}
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death. 28 Even heterosexual sodomy was condemned. 29 The New Haven Law of 1656 "provided death for male-female anal intercourse, incitement to masturbation, and undefined acts of women 'against nature.'" 30 In the agrarian colonies, procreation was not just God's will, it was viewed as a form of survival. 31 Therefore the consequences of non-reproductive sexual acts were seen as an

28. Id. It seems ironic that one of the first regions to have an anti-homosexual statute would also be home to one of the first states to permit same-sex marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

29. KATZ, supra note 20, at 48.

30. Id. This phrasing is generally understood to mean women performing oral sex on men. See DONALD E.J. MACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW 196-97 (The Free Press, 1977) (stating that apparently this did not deter men and women from engaging in these acts).

31. KATZ, supra note 20, at 44-45. A community required procreation to ensure it would have adequate labor. Id.
economic threat to society.  

At the time the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, sodomy was illegal in all thirteen original states.  

By 1868, thirty-two of thirty-seven states had criminalized sodomy.  

In 1961 every state criminalized sodomy, until Illinois became the first state to repeal its consensual sodomy statute by virtue of adopting the Model Penal Code, which advocated for repealing sodomy laws.

32. Id. at 45. See also Abramson, supra note 16, at 75.

33. Green, supra note 16, at 38; See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 n.5 (1986) (listing states criminalizing sodomy). At least one of the founding fathers was aware of the criminalization of sodomy. Green, supra note 16, at 38. Thomas Jefferson apparently did not object to it being a crime, but did advocate repealing the death penalty for sodomy, preferring instead castration for sodomy offenders. Id. In 1800, Jefferson’s Virginia replaced its death penalty for sodomy with a sentence of one to ten years in prison. Id.

By 1986, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in *Bowers v. Hardwick*, almost half of all states and Washington, D.C., still criminalized consensual sodomy. Although the laws were largely ignored and not enforced in most jurisdictions, prosecutions for consensual sodomy still occurred, albeit rarely.

In *Bowers v. Hardwick*, the Supreme Court held there was no


36. See *Bowers*, 478 U.S. at 186 (oral arguments heard March 31, 1986); *see also infra* text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing *Bowers*).


38. *Bowers*, 478 U.S. at 198 (J. Powell, concurring); *see also Posner*, *supra* note 18, at 66 (citing the *Bowers* case); *Sex, Morality, and the Law* 32 (Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997) (stating that it took ten hours for a prosecutor to ultimately decide not to prosecute Hardwick, during which time Hardwick and his partner were in jail).
fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.\textsuperscript{39} It found that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,"\textsuperscript{40} and it cited a history of sodomy laws in this country dating back to 1791.\textsuperscript{41} The Georgia statute at issue, which outlawed sodomy, regardless of whether heterosexual or homosexual, was validated.\textsuperscript{42}

By the time the Court heard arguments in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas},\textsuperscript{43} in 2003, the number of states outlawing consensual sodomy had decreased by nearly half since \textit{Bowers} in the United States,\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[39.] \textit{Bowers}, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
  \item[40.] Id. at 192.
  \item[41.] Id. at 192-93.
  \item[42.] Id. at 188. Georgia Code Ann. \$ 16-6-2 (1984) stated:
    
    "(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another . . . ."
  \item[44.] \textit{Lawrence}, 539 U.S. at 573 (decreasing from twenty-five
by virtue of the Court's holding in Lawrence, consensual, noncommercial sodomy between adults is no longer a crime in any state. Surprisingly, however, there remains one last jurisdiction in America that still has a consensual sodomy statute: the United States military.

C. Sodomy Statutes in the United States Military

The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") was signed into law on May 5, 1950, and the original sodomy statute articulated therein has remained virtually unchanged for nearly 55 years. The UCMJ is rooted in military history and has its base in the

states in 1986 to thirteen by 2003).

45. Id. at 578.
46. Id.
47. 10 U.S.C. § 925; see also Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206.
49. Compare Pub. L. 81-506 ("Any person subject to this code . . .") with 10 U.S.C. § 925 ("Any person subject to this chapter . . .").
Articles of War of 1775 which traces its lineage to the British Articles of War of 1757. Although the British Articles of War of 1757 did expressly proscribe sodomy, calling it an "unnatural and detestable sin," with a sentence of death, the United States military, prior to 1920, had no express sodomy statute. Pre-1920, the crime was charged under Article 96 - the general article or "catch-all." After 1920, however, a prohibition on

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52. See Articles for the Government of the Royal Navy § 29 (1757) "29. If any person in the fleet shall commit the unnatural and detestable sin of buggery and sodomy with man or beast, he shall be punished with death by the sentence of a court martial." Id.

53. Id.


55. Id.

56. Articles of War 1916, Article 96, General Article:

Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
sodomy was added as a specific statute in the Articles of War and was later codified in the UCMJ.\textsuperscript{57} In 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces clearly articulated the scope of order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to military law may be guilty, are to be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.

See also Manual for Courts Martial, Department of the Army 286 (Gov't Printing Office 1916). Sodomy is specifically referred to under the "Crimes or Offenses not Capital" section and to be charged under the general article, Article 96. Id. The proof required was the same as that for "Assault to Commit any Felony" from Article 93. Id. at 252, 286.

Article 125:

By its terms, Article 125 prohibits every kind of unnatural carnal intercourse, whether accomplished by force or fraud, or with consent. Similarly, the article does not distinguish between an act committed in the privacy of one's home, with no person present other than the sexual partner . . . 58

This prohibition against private, consensual sodomy would eventually set the military apart from the rest of American jurisdictions. 59

III. CONSENSUAL SODOMY STATUTES IN AMERICA AFTER LAWRENCE v. TEXAS 60

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas expressly overturned its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld states’ sodomy statutes. 61 Two men, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, were convicted of violating the Texas sodomy statute after the police entered their apartment on a supposed weapons disturbance complaint and discovered the pair “engaging


59. See infra Part III.

60. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

61. Id. at 578.
in a sexual act." The case made its way through the Texas appellate process with courts relying on the Supreme Court's, then authoritative, holding from Bowers.

In Lawrence, the Supreme Court determined that Texas's interest in proscribing the type of consensual, private conduct prohibited by the statute was neither "legitimate [n]or urgent." Relying on history, the Court noted that provisions outlawing sodomy were rarely enforced "against consenting adults acting in private." Additionally, the Court pointed out that even after Bowers, some states had chosen to abolish sodomy statutes. The Court therefore overruled Bowers, calling the


63. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 359-62 (Tex. App. 2000); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-64.

64. Id. at 577.

65. Id. at 569.

66. Id. at 570; see also supra note 44.
holding "not correct when it was decided, and . . . not correct today,"67 and extended a liberty interest to private, consensual sexual conduct.68

Although the Supreme Court expressly overruled its Bowers decision in Lawrence, the implications of the Lawrence decision have been the subject of much debate.69 For example, as Justice

67. Id. at 578.

68. Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare not Speak its Name, 117 HARVARD L. REV. 1893, 1936-37 (2004).

69. See e.g., Blazier, supra note 43, at 21, 25 (noting the court’s implication that any victimless conduct which occurs in private in one’s own home may now be legal); Nan D. Hunter, Colloquim: The Boundaries of Liberty after Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1532-33 (2004) (discussing three types of "antigay" legislation that appellate courts upheld even after Lawrence to demonstrate the possible limits of Lawrence); Hassel, supra note 60,
O'Connor would point out in her concurrence, the Texas statute, unlike the Georgia statute, only outlawed same sex sodomy.\textsuperscript{70} This may leave open a question in the future as to whether a statute forbidding sodomy could be applied equally to all, as the military's sodomy statute is, and not just between those of the same sex.\textsuperscript{71}

Adding to the Lawrence debate is the fact the Court, in coming to its conclusion, did not expressly articulate which

\textsuperscript{70} Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563; \textsc{Tex. Penal Code} Ann. \S 21.06(a) (2003) stated: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."

\textsuperscript{71} Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J. concurring); but see Blazier, supra note 43, at 30 (arguing equal protection is not a valid basis on which to uphold a gender-neutral sodomy statute).
constitutional standard of review it applied. Justice Scalia, in his dissent to Lawrence, characterized it as an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review." Professor Laurence Tribe, however, argues that the standard of review used was not "mysterious." He states that based on the analytical path the court followed, covering Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v.

72. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see also Colin Callahan & Amelia Kauffman, Constitutional Law Chapter: Equal Protection, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 17, 19-28 (2004). The three levels of review generally used by the Court are rational basis, heightened scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Id. at 22. The higher the level of scrutiny, the more difficult it becomes for legislation to survive judicial review. Id. at 21. For example, classifying something as a fundamental right will require strict scrutiny of any statute that infringes upon the fundamental right. Id. at 19.

73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

74. Tribe, supra note 68, at 1916-17.

75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Wade,\textsuperscript{76} the standard used was "obvious."\textsuperscript{77} He, by implication, claims the standard was some sort of heightened scrutiny because the Court methodically cited the history of personal rights cases and stated that, "'protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.'"\textsuperscript{78}

Regardless, the majority based its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and provided some privacy protections for adults engaging in consensual sodomy.\textsuperscript{79}

The Court's constitutional protection of consensual sodomy, however, was not limitless, certain parameters applied:

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.\textsuperscript{80}

These limits would later become the cornerstone of the Court

\textsuperscript{76} 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

\textsuperscript{77} Tribe, supra note 68, at 1917.

\textsuperscript{78} Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565).

\textsuperscript{79} Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 578.
of Appeals of the Armed Forces' development of the Marcum Test.  

IV. HOW THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES INTERPRETS

ARTICLE 125 TODAY: UNITED STATES v. MARCUM

While Lawrence seemed to provide a far-reaching umbrella of privacy protections, the question of how those rights would be interpreted in a military setting remained unresolved until the appeal of Air Force Technical Sergeant (E-6) Eric Marcum in 2003. Marcum was the supervising noncommissioned officer of a flight of intelligence linguists. He developed a variety of close relationships with his male subordinates and, allegedly, had “sexual encounters” with six of them. He was charged with violating UCMJ Articles 92, 125, and 134, and was ultimately found guilty at court-martial of violating all three articles

81. See infra Part IV.D.

82. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

83. Id. at 198.

84. Id. at 200.

85. Id.
and also Article 128.86

Of importance to this comment, the court-martial found that one of Marcum's violations of Article 125 was for consensual sodomy and not the non-consensual sodomy that had been charged.87 It was this conviction for consensual sodomy which formed one of the bases for Marcum's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.88

86. Appellant's Supplemental Brief (p. 2) (charging Marcum with one count of Article 92, failure to obey order or regulation by providing alcohol to persons under 21, three counts of Article 125, sodomy without consent, and five counts of Article 134, general article to include indecent acts and also convicting him of Article 128 for assault).

87. Appellant's Supplemental Brief (p. 2).

88. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 199-200. Marcum was originally sentenced on May 24, 2000 and none of his subsequent appeals included the consensual sodomy charge, however, his appeal was pending when Lawrence was decided and he was ultimately granted a review of this issue as well.

A. The Relationship and Act at Issue

This particular conviction stemmed from Marcum’s relationship with Senior Airman (E-4) Robert Harrison, one of Marcum’s subordinates. Following a night of drinking, Harrison returned with Marcum to Marcum’s apartment, where, before going to bed, Harrison took off all of his clothing with the exception of his boxer shorts and T-shirt. He then went to sleep on Marcum’s couch and at some point during the night he awoke to the


89. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200; Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (p. 4)

90. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200.

91. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (p. 4) (testimony of Harrison).
I looked down and I was trying to keep my eyes closed because I felt something strange and I didn’t know exactly what was going on but I opened my eyes just enough to see Sergeant’s head over my crotch and I felt his mouth on my penis. 92

Of importance to the appellate court, Harrison testified that although he said nothing at the time and simply rolled over, the encounter made him “scared, angry, and uncomfortable” and he confronted Marcum about the incident to ensure, “this sort of thing doesn’t ever happen again.” 93

Highlighting the apparent consensual nature of their relationship, on cross-examination Harrison admitted that he continued to go out drinking with Marcum, would spend the night at Marcum’s apartment, sent Marcum gifts from his travels, and even told Marcum that “he [Harrison] loved him [Marcum].” 94 For his part, Marcum admitted only to “kissing [Harrison’s] penis twice.” 95 Additionally, both men testified that they had had a

92. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (p. 5).
93. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 201.
94. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (p. 6); Marcum, 60 M.J. at 201.
95. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200.
previous encounter in which Harrison had apparently lain down on top of Marcum and was "moving his pelvis area against [Marcum's] butt . . . [Harrison] had an erection . . . ."96

The court-martial jury, a panel of officer and enlisted members, found Marcum innocent on the forcible sodomy charge, "but guilty of non-forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125."97 Thus, in light of the Lawrence ruling, the door was opened for an appellate challenge of Marcum's conviction.98

B. Standard of Review

From the onset of its consideration of Marcum's appeal, the Court relied on its previous holding from United States v. Scoby99 in asserting that "Article 125 forbids sodomy whether it is consensual or forcible, heterosexual or homosexual, public or private."100 The court then considered whether Article 125

96. Id. at 201.

97. Id.

98. Id. at 199-200.


100. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202.
remained constitutional after Lawrence.101 Because the case presented a constitutional question, the court reviewed this case de novo.102 Following an in-depth review of Lawrence, the Marcum court was persuaded that the Supreme Court did not rely on any particular method of traditional constitutional analysis.103 The court was particularly focused on the limits articulated by the Lawrence Court stating, "The Supreme Court did not expressly state whether or not this text represented an exhaustive or illustrative list of exceptions to the liberty interest identified . . . ."104

In deciding which standard of review to use, the court acknowledged the use of "either the rational basis test or strict scrutiny might well prove dispositive of a facial

101. Id. at 202-07.

102. Id. at 202-03 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)).

103. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 204.

104. Id. at 203.
challenge to Article 125."\textsuperscript{105} However, the court was compelled by neither and opted for a case by case analysis instead of reviewing the statute on its face.\textsuperscript{106} This analysis, the Marcum court argued, required a constitutional review based on the Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{107}

Further, the court noted the Lawrence court failed to articulate the privacy interest at issue in the case as a fundamental right.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, the court would not take it upon itself to impute a fundamental right to members of the military where the Supreme Court had not even extended it in a civilian context.

\textsuperscript{105} Id. at 204; see also supra note 70 (discussing the different standards of review).

\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 205. Relying on the Supreme Court’s distaste for broad, facial challenges the court cites Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), in which the Supreme Court notes it “especially . . . discourages” facial challenges.

\textsuperscript{107} Id. at 206.

\textsuperscript{108} Id.
context.109

C. Lawrence in the Military Environment

The court concluded that Lawrence applied in the military
context; however, it refused to adopt the decision's
implications for the military.110 The court determined that the
application of Lawrence required a different standard for
servicemembers than it would for civilians.111 Focusing on
various cases where the court has upheld servicemembers'
rights,112 the court stated it had routinely extended the

109. Id. A possible inference to be drawn from this is that
regardless of the issue, rights in a military context must
somehow always be more constricted than in a civilian
context.

110. Id. at 206.

111. Id. at 205.

112. Id. (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(military regulation prohibiting wear of religious
headgear does not violate first amendment, superceded by
in certain circumstances); U.S. v. Mitchell, 39 M.J. 131
protections of the Bill of Rights to the military, "except in cases where the express terms of the Constitution make such application inapposite."\textsuperscript{113} The court explained that "[t]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society,"\textsuperscript{114} and therefore, "it is clear that servicemembers, as a general matter, do not share the same autonomy as civilians."\textsuperscript{115}

In this context, the court cites First and Fourth Amendment cases where the protected liberty interest in a civilian context does not withstand similar inquiry in a military context because of unique military requirements inherent in providing the United

\footnotesize{(C.A.A.F. 1994) (upholding annual evaluation requirement of military judges as within the fifth amendment)).}

113. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 205.

114. \textit{Id.} (citing Parker v. Levy 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (finding neither Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer, nor Article 134, general article, void for vagueness or overbroad)).

115. \textit{Id.} at 206.
States' national defense. 116 Thus, based on its previous preference for a case-by-case test and by extending the Lawrence analysis to the military environment, the court determined the appropriate challenge for Article 125 sodomy cases is to be limited to the facts of each case that served as the basis for conviction. 117 It then laid out a three part test to determine whether a constitutionally protected zone of privacy exists in each case. 118

D. The Court's New Rule: The Multi-part Marcum Test

To analyze Article 125 consensual sodomy cases, the court stated one must take a two-step approach. 119 First, a court must analyze whether an accused's sexual conduct was within Lawrence's protections and second, if not within Lawrence's protections, the court must determine if the accused's sexual

116. Id. at 205-06 (citing U.S. v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570 (C.M.A. 1972) (First Amendment); U.S. v. McCarthy, 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993) (Fourth Amendment)).

117. Id. at 206.

118. Id.

119. Id. at 208.
conduct was of the type proscribed by Article 125. To analyze this first part, the court developed a novel three prong test to apply in military cases:

First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of committing of a nature to bring it within the liberty interest identified by the Supreme Court? Second, did the conduct encompass any behavior or factors identified by the Supreme Court as outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third, are there additional factors relevant solely in the military environment that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest?

Although the Marcum court did not break each part of the test into individual elements, clearly each part is comprised of its own requirements. An evaluation of the components of the test will aid one in applying a discrete set of facts to the Marcum Test. This new three-prong Marcum Test will determine if

120. Id. This comment focuses on analyzing the first part of the analysis. In the second part, whether the behavior actually violated Article 125, i.e. was the sexual act sodomy, will necessarily be determined during an analysis of the first part.

121. Id. at 206-07.

122. Id.

123. This analysis of the Marcum Test is applied to various
Lawrence's liberty interest applies in a military setting to the conduct in question, and, thus, whether the conduct will be protected. The first prong enunciates which conduct comes within the scope of Lawrence's protection while the last two prongs describe exceptions which may give otherwise protected conduct, unprotected status.

In the first prong, whether the conduct is within the scope of Lawrence, there are four requirements, which, if all are satisfied, allows the analysis to proceed to the next prong of the Marcum Test. Here, the court states the ultimate question to ask is, "did the [accused's] conduct involve private, consensual sexual activity between adults?" Thus, the four requirements that must be satisfied in this first step of the factual scenarios later in the comment. See discussion infra Parts IV.E, F & V.C.

124. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206-07.
125. Id.
126. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206-07.
127. Id. at 207.
Marcum Test are:  

a. Was the conduct sexual activity?  
b. Was the conduct private, as opposed to in public?  
c. Was the conduct consensual?  
d. Was the conduct between adults?  

Again, if all four of these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the analysis proceeds to the next prong of the Marcum Test. If at least one question is answered in the affirmative, then the analysis proceeds to the next prong of the Marcum Test.  

128. \textit{Id.}  
129. Although the court articulates this question as "sexual activity," in context, the court was referring to sodomy. \textit{See id.}  
130. The court gave some guidance on its interpretation of consent and children in a post-Marcum case. Discussing other issues, the court stated that while, "a child under the age of 16 may factually consent to certain sexual activity, this Court has never recognized the ability of a child to legally consent to sexual intercourse or sodomy." United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 220 (C.A.A.F. 2004).  
131. \textit{Id.}
negative, then the analysis is complete as the conduct falls outside the protective shield of Lawrence, and therefore is prosecutable.\textsuperscript{132}

The second prong of the test enunciates the first set of exceptions to Lawrence's protection.\textsuperscript{133} It asks whether, satisfying the first prong notwithstanding, the conduct nonetheless fall outside the scope of Lawrence by virtue of any of the exceptions enunciated in Lawrence.\textsuperscript{134} If any of these exceptions are found, i.e., any of the below questions are answered in the affirmative, the conduct would not be protected.

Here there appear to be four exceptions.\textsuperscript{135}

a. Did the conduct involve prostitution?\textsuperscript{136}

b. Did the conduct involve persons who might be injured or coerced?\textsuperscript{137}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{132} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{133} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{134} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{135} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{136} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\end{flushleft}
c. Did the conduct involve persons who were situated in relationships where consent might not be easily refused?\textsuperscript{138}

d. Did the conduct involve other circumstances that would tend to put the conduct outside the scope of \textit{Lawrence}?\textsuperscript{139}

In its holding the court explained this prong of the Marcum Test with some unnecessary steps. For example, the court asked whether the conduct involved minors or was in public.\textsuperscript{140} This is duplicative; if either of these were true, the analysis presumably would not proceed beyond the first part of the Marcum Test which requires the conduct to be private and between adults.\textsuperscript{141}

Additionally, the injury or coercion to which the \textit{Lawrence} court refers is unclear,\textsuperscript{142} although one could, presumably, get

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{See supra} Part IV.D.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{Lawrence}, 539 U.S. at 578. While it is unclear what type of injury either the \textit{Lawrence} Court or the \textit{Marcum} court was referring to, as is demonstrated below, physical
to this step of the analysis if the accused had taken advantage of an incompetent adult. In a situation like that, while the sexual contact may have been technically "consented to" and was in private, an incompetent adult could be unknowingly, and even willingly, injured. The state, it would seem, would have a legitimate interest in a case like that.

As for the second half of the second exception, coercion, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has previously stated that a "coercive atmosphere . . . includes, for example, threats to injuries could be conceptualized. While physical injuries would potentially result from a rape, that scenario would be dealt with in the first prong of the Marcum Test and therefore not survive to be analyzed in the second prong. Additionally, any type of scenario involving emotional injury would likely involve some sort of doctor-patient, senior-subordinate, or adult-child relationship which would be analyzed using other prongs or exceptions rather than under this exception.
injure others or statements that resistance would be futile"\(^{143}\) and that "consent induced by ... coercion is equivalent to physical force."\(^{144}\) By applying these definitions, the logical inference is that behavior compelled by force would not be consensual. Thus, this exception is also unnecessary as the Marcum Test’s first prong, specifically the requirement that the conduct be consensual, would again be dispositive.\(^{145}\)

The third exception in this second prong of the Marcum Test, involving the ability to easily refuse consent, is important in the military context because of the military’s hierarchical nature.\(^{146}\) As the court points out, “the nuance of military life

\(^{143}\) United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, Part IV para. 45.c.(1)(b)).

\(^{144}\) Id. (quoting United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9-10 (C.M.A. 1991)).

\(^{145}\) See supra Part IV.D.1.

is significant." The Air Force's regulation governing unprofessional relationships further articulates the importance of the policy maintaining professional relationships in the military context:

"The nature of the military mission requires absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of professional relationships in the military more critical than in civilian organizations."

Indeed, this part of the test is where the Marcum court would eventually find that Marcum's conduct, involving a senior-subordinate relationship, was an exception to the reach of Lawrence's protections.

As to the final exception in this prong of the test, other organizations and chain of command structure within the Air Force.

147. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 207.


149. See supra Part IV.E.
circumstances placing the conduct outside Lawrence’s protections, the Marcum court left open the range of conduct which might be encompassed. The court noted the Supreme Court had failed to express whether the Lawrence exceptions it articulated were inclusive, thus the court was likewise unwilling to limit itself. Therefore, when analyzing conduct that does not seem to fit into any of the previous exceptions, one must ensure that the conduct might not somehow fit under this “other circumstances” exception, assuming that the conduct would not be considered a military-unique factor encompassed by the final part of the test.

In sum, in the second prong of the Marcum Test there are four exceptions to Lawrence’s protections which would bring one’s conduct outside of Constitutional protections: prostitution, likelihood of injury, inability to refuse consent and the catch-

150. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 207 (using the language “for instance” to describe examples of conduct).

151. Id. See also supra note 78 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions to the protections of Lawrence).

152. See id.
all, other circumstances. While seemingly limited to these four exceptions, their application to a wide variety of fact patterns, especially in a hierarchical organization, seems limitless.

The final prong of the Marcum Test is, in essence, a military specific catch-all; it asks whether any military-unique factors would be exceptions to the applicability of Lawrence? 153

This prong will likely have broad application in light of the Supreme Court’s, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’, view that “[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.” 154

Although this prong was not analyzed by the Marcum court, 155

153. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 207.


it will likely be used in future cases. Indeed, in the only
other case in which the court has applied the Marcum Test,
United States v. Stirewalt,156 this part was used when none of
the previous parts of the test applied.157 In Stirewalt,
Stirewalt performed sodomy on a superior officer, who presumably
could have easily refused consent.158 The court relied on this
last prong to place Stirewalt’s behavior outside of Lawrence’s
protections, because none of the previous prongs were
applicable.159 This final prong, because of its open-endedness,
may cause the most confusion about what conduct is protected
within the military context. It is conceivable, albeit
unlikely, that virtually all military sodomy convictions with
even the slightest military nexus could stand based upon this
prong alone.

To understand how the court will likely use the overall
Marcum Test, this comment will now explore the only two cases

156. 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
157. See infra Part IV.F.
158. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 303-04.
159. Id.
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has decided using the
Stirewalt. ¹⁶⁰

E. The Marcum Test as Applied to Technical Sergeant Marcum

The court found that Marcum's conduct fell outside the
protections of Lawrence, and thus, Marcum's conviction for
consensual sodomy stood.¹⁶¹ In arriving at this determination
the court found that the first prong of the Marcum Test, whether
the conduct was between consenting adults in private, was
satisfied by virtue of the court-martial finding of consensual
sodomy.¹⁶² The court "assume[d] without deciding" that these two
adults' conduct was consensual and in private.¹⁶³

The court took a more in depth view of the second prong of
the Marcum Test,¹⁶⁴ whether the conduct fell outside the scope of
Lawrence by virtue of any of the exceptions enunciated in

¹⁶⁰. See infra Part IV.E-F.

¹⁶¹. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208.

¹⁶². Id. at 207.

¹⁶³. Id. at 208.

¹⁶⁴. Id. at 207-208.
Lawrence, and concluded Harrison "was a person 'who might be coerced.'" In so doing, the court primarily focused on one exception in the second prong, namely whether the conduct involved persons who were in relationships where consent might not be easily refused. Eventually, it was this element that would prove to be insurmountable for Marcum.

The conclusion here seems inevitable. Marcum was two grades senior to Harrison; he was his direct supervisor and a noncommissioned officer as well. The court stated that not only was this conduct a violation of Article 125, it also fell under Article 92, in that the unprofessional relationship was a failure to obey a regulation, specifically Air Force Instruction 36-2909, which forbids relationships "when they detract from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably create the appearance of, favoritism, misuse of office or position, or

165. *Id.*; see also supra Part IV.E.

166. *Marcum*, 60 M.J. at 207-08.

167. *Id.* at 208.

168. *Id.* at 207.
the abandonment of organizational goals for personal interests."\textsuperscript{169}

Having disposed of the case on the second prong of the Marcum Test, the court did not analyze the third prong of the test\textsuperscript{170} and allowed Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy to stand.\textsuperscript{171} However, a little more than a month after deciding Marcum, the court did analyze the third prong of its test in United States v. Stirewalt.\textsuperscript{172}

F. The Marcum Test Applied in United States v. Stirewalt

Health Services Technician Second Class Darrell Stirewalt (E-5) was convicted, after two trials, of one count of consensual sodomy, under Article 125, UCMJ.\textsuperscript{173} In his first trial,


\textsuperscript{170} Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208.

\textsuperscript{171} Id.

\textsuperscript{172} 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

\textsuperscript{173} Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 303.
Stirewalt was convicted of forcible sodomy of a superior officer; however, on appeal he won a retrial based upon an evidentiary issue. At his retrial Stirewalt entered a guilty


175. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 298-99. See United States v. Stirewalt, 57 M.J. 582, 587-90 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (finding that Military Rule of Evidence 412, the rape shield law, only shields victims of nonconsensual sexual misconduct). Stirewalt successfully argued that a former roommate of the alleged victim, who was allowed to testify regarding a previous consensual adulterous affair with Stirewalt, should have been able to be cross-examined regarding a different consensual sexual relationship she had had with another enlisted man and the punishment she (the former roommate) had received. Id. at 587. As a result, Stirewalt argued he was not able to establish a defense that the victim in his case knew the repercussions of her actions and was only accusing him to protect her career. Id. at 588. This finding by the Coast Guard
plea to one count of consensual sodomy under Article 125.\textsuperscript{176}

The court, for the first time after Marcum, employed its own Marcum Test analysis to the facts in Stirewalt.\textsuperscript{177} As to prong one, whether the sexual conduct was between consenting adults in private, and prong two, whether the conduct fell under any of the Lawrence exceptions, the court "assume[d] without deciding," that the conduct was within the scope of Lawrence.\textsuperscript{178}

Based on its ruling here and in Marcum the court seems

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Court of Criminal Appeals was later further explained by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 218-21 (2004). It stated, ". . . [Military Rule of Evidence] 412 hinges on whether the subject of the proferred (sic) evidence was a victim of the alleged sexual misconduct and not on whether the alleged sexual misconduct was consensual or nonconsensual." Id. at 220.}
\end{flushright}

176. \textit{Id.} at 303.

177. \textit{Id.} at 304. The court referred to its test as a "tripartite framework." \textit{Id.}

178. \textit{Id.}
unlikely to analyze prong one of the test if a court-martial concludes a member is guilty of consensual sodomy.\textsuperscript{179}

Additionally, where, as in Stirewalt, the accused is subordinate to the alleged victim, it is unlikely the court will find a situation where consent could be coerced or not easily refused by an alleged victim who is senior in rank.\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, the

\textsuperscript{179} Marcum, 60 M.J. at 207; Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304.

\textsuperscript{180} Compare Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208 (subordinate "victim") with Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304 (superior officer "victim").

The court assumes prong two is satisfied in Stirewalt where the alleged victim is senior to the accused, however in Marcum the accused was senior to the alleged victim, thereby warranting an analysis under prong two of the Marcum Test. \textit{Id.} But see United States v. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App., March 30, 2005) (finding that a senior-subordinate consensual heterosexual sexual relationship, with a subordinate "victim," warranted analysis under the third prong, other military unique factors, and not the second prong, inability to
court was left with only one option and decided this case based on the third prong of the Marcum Test, whether any military-unique factors affect the reach of Lawrence.\textsuperscript{181}

Noting that the relationship in question was between an officer, who happened to be Stirewalt's department head, and a subordinate enlisted crew member,\textsuperscript{182} the court quoted from the Coast Guard's Personnel Manual:

Romantic relationships between members are unacceptable when:

(1) Members have a supervisor and subordinate relationship . . . , or

(2) Members are assigned to the same small shore unit . . . , or . . .

(3) . . . cutter\textsuperscript{183} . . .

easily refuse consent, as was the case with a similar (albeit homosexual) fact pattern in Marcum).

181. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304.

182. Id.

183. A cutter is a "small, lightly armed motorboat used by the Coast Guard." \textit{The American Heritage Dictionary} 358 (2d coll. ed. 1991).
This policy applies regardless of rank, grade, or position. 184

In light of the Coast Guard’s military-unique regulations and "the clear military interests of discipline and order that they reflect," the court placed Stirewalt’s conduct outside of the protection of Lawrence. 185 Further, the court specifically stated that the fact the subordinate Stirewalt was charged did not "alter the nature of the liberty interest at stake." 186 For the second time in as many opportunities the court affirmed a service member’s court-martial conviction of consensual sodomy. 187

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES’ NEW STANDARD, ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY AND APPLICABILITY TODAY

Even before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence in 2003, 188 servicemembers’ have been attacking the constitutionality of

184. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304. (quoting Coast Guard Personnel Manual, para. 8.H.2.f (change 26, 1988)).

185. Id.

186. Id.

187. Id.

188. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
Article 125 on two fronts: it violates their right to privacy\textsuperscript{189} and is void for vagueness.\textsuperscript{190} As was previously discussed, the

\textsuperscript{189} See supra Part IV. See e.g., United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (sodomy with spouse, in private, not protected privacy right when "not in furtherance of the marriage"); United States v. Thompson, 47 M.J. 378 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (husband had no right to privacy guarantee with his wife when sodomy occurred while he was beating her); United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that consensual heterosexual fellatio is not protected by a right to privacy under the constitution); United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978) (no right to privacy protection when sex acts occurred in semi-private living quarters).

\textsuperscript{190} See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 30 M.J. 53 (C.M.A. 1990) (finding that a charge of aggravated assault was not void for vagueness in light of the defendant being warned he could be criminally liable for any acts of sodomy);

United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978) (holding
Marcum and Stirewalt rulings have quashed, for now, the latest attacks on the military's sodomy statute under right to privacy principles enunciated in Lawrence. Yet, in deflecting the right to privacy attack, the court may have left itself susceptible to an attack based on the void for vagueness principle when it created the three-prong Marcum Test.

A. Void for Vagueness

The Supreme Court's standard for void for vagueness doctrine has been oft cited:

The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'

In United States v. Scoby the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the proscriptions of the military's sodomy statute is understood by the average person.

191. See supra Part IV.E-F.

192. See infra Part V.A.

193. See supra Part IV.D.


195. 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978).
Forces specifically analyzed the phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" for vagueness. In Scoby, the court reviewed holdings from various state courts, which were mixed, and determined the proper backdrop to analyze the vagueness claim was the Due Process Clause. The court, quoting the Supreme Court, stated, "[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden." With this standard,

196. See Scoby, 5 M.J. at 161.

197. See id. at 161-62. Alaska, Ohio, and Florida had ruled that definitions similar to the one used here were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 161. While New Jersey, Nevada, Michigan, Missouri, Indiana, Maine, Oklahoma, New Mexico and the United States Supreme Court, in Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1975), did not view "crimes against nature," or like definitions, as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 161; State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 394 (1973).

198. See id. at 162.

199. Id. (quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1975)).
the court reviewed the history of the phrase "crimes against
nature" and opined, as did the Supreme Court, that anyone who
wanted to know what particular acts would fit under this
language could have easily determined them. Against this
finding, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces easily
determined the phrase was defined well enough so that the
average service member would understand what it means, and
therefore, the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague.

200. Id. "The phrase has been in use among English-speaking
people for many centuries." Id.

201. Scoby, 5 M.J. at 162. Interestingly the court did not
define the specific acts which might define this phrase,
stating that "some esoteric acts may not easily be
identifiable as within or without the scope of Article
125," however it did quote the United States Supreme Court
citing the Missouri Supreme Court, which stated that the
phrase, "embraced sodomy, bestiality, buggery, fellatio,
and cunnilingus within its terms." Id. (quoting Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1975)).

202. Id. at 163.
In another case, *United States v. Johnson*, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found a charge for aggravated assault was not void for vagueness when the underlying act was consensual sodomy.\(^{203}\) In *Johnson*, however, the service member was given specific warnings that, due to his HIV positive status and the harm that could befall others if he were to engage in sodomy, he could be held criminally liable.\(^{204}\)

With the court’s creation of the Marcum Test, one could surmise the court changed what was once, arguably, an understandable statute into one that the service member of "ordinary intelligence"\(^{205}\) might not understand.\(^{206}\) Courts, 


\(^{204}\) *Id.*

\(^{205}\) *Scoby*, 5 M.J. at 163.

\(^{206}\) As this is a new holding by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, very little commentary exists on the matter. In determining research topics for this comment, nearly every judge advocate general the author spoke with recommended analyzing Marcum because it was a recent
however, attempt to avoid constitutional concerns when they create limiting tests;\textsuperscript{207} therefore, it would seem, the \textit{Marcum} Test would have to be interpreted in lock-step with \textit{Lawrence}.

Thus, one could argue that for servicemembers, just like civilians, consensual, non-economic, private sodomy between adults should be not be outlawed.\textsuperscript{208} This argument fails, holding and raised a number of questions. Thus, if a judge advocate general needs to spend time and analyze the implications of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' ruling in \textit{Marcum}, it may be unlikely that average servicemembers will reasonably understand their behavior may be proscribed. (Telephone and e-mail conversations between the author and judge advocates general).

\textsuperscript{207} "If a reasonable limiting construction 'has been or could be placed on the challenged statute' to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44).

however, because constitutional rights in the military setting are not interpreted equally to those in the civilian world.\textsuperscript{209}

B. Constitutional Rights as Applied to Military Members

While the Supreme Court has said, "[m]en and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military service,"\textsuperscript{210} the Court has also noted that military life is not the same as civilian life\textsuperscript{211} and therefore, due process rights might be less in the military sphere.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{209} See infra Part V.B.

\textsuperscript{210} Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding appointments of military judges within the scope of both the Article II Appointments Clause and the Fifth Amendment).

\textsuperscript{211} Marcum, 60 M.J. at 202 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).

\textsuperscript{212} Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (determining that Congress's requiring men, and not women, to register for the draft did not violate the men's Due Process rights partly because of combat restrictions placed on women);
The Marcum court itself proclaimed that, "an understanding of military culture and mission cautions against sweeping constitutional pronouncements that may not account for the nuance of military life."\(^{213}\) The court also remarked, however, that the Lawrence Court had failed to limit the liberty interest it sought to protect to only civilians, thus implicitly granting the rights to military personnel.\(^{214}\)

Yet, in the military context, "judicial deference . . . 'is at its apogee' when reviewing congressional decision-making in th[e] [due process] area."\(^{215}\) Therefore, while the rights

\begin{itemize}
  \item Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206.
  \item Id.
  \item Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (holding that military judges were sufficiently insulated from command
\end{itemize}
articulated in Lawrence would apply to military members,
Congress enjoys latitude in regulating those rights.\(^{216}\)

Against this backdrop, the Marcum court faced the difficult
task of balancing servicemembers' constitutional rights against
Congress's Article I right to regulate the military.\(^{217}\) The
result was the compromise Marcum Test,\(^{218}\) whereby the court has

\[\text{influence to satisfy due process requirements} \] (quoting
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).

\(^{216}\) See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (finding that
differences between military and civilian life warrants
applying different constitutional standards when reviewing
constitutional questions arising in the military context);
see also James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community:
Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 177 (1974). Although 30 years old,
this article provides an in-depth discussion of
constitutional rights as they apply in the military
context. See id.


\(^{218}\) See supra Part IV.D.
left Congress's law in place, while simultaneously expanding the
rights of most, but not all, servicemembers to fit the scope
Lawrence. 219

C. What Conduct is Now (Im)permissible in the Military
Environment?

There are few foreseeable circumstances which would warrant
prosecuting private, consensual sodomy between adults. 220 For
now, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has found two
situations that merit prosecution. 221 First, Marcum made clear
that the existence of a senior-subordinate relationship between
the parties fails the second part of the Marcum Test if the
person charged is the senior person, regardless if consensual
homosexual or heterosexual conduct. 222 Second, based on

219. See supra Part III.

220. See Posner, supra note 18, at 65.

221. See supra Part IV.E-F.

222. See supra Part IV.E.; but see supra note 178 (discussing
the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeal's use of the Marcum
Test's third prong to uphold the conviction of the senior
officer in a senior-subordinate relationship).
Stirewalt, a senior-subordinate relationship can fail the third part of the Marcum Test if the person performing the act is the subordinate person, regardless if consensual homosexual or heterosexual conduct.223

What these two holdings have in common is that the underlying relationship which formed the basis for the sexual contact was in itself impermissible in the military setting.224 Thus, for

223. See supra Part IV.F.

224. See supra Part IV.E.-F.; see also United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (A. Ct. Crim. App., Nov. 30, 2004) (mem.). This was the first case to be decided by a lower military appeals court since the Marcum ruling took effect. The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, applying the Marcum Test, overturned an unmarried, male soldier’s heterosexual consensual sodomy charge with a female civilian where there was no military nexus. Id. This case further supports the relationship analysis because the relationship here was not proscribed (male military member and adult female civilian) by military regulations or the UCMJ. Id. See also United States v.
servicemembers trying to determine if their conduct is proscribed or not, the ultimate question should be whether the underlying relationship is prohibited, either by regulation or the UCMJ. In fact, the government in Marcum focused on the unprofessional relationship cases that have been applied to

male military officer with unmarried female enlisted military member based on third prong of Marcum Test, unique military factors). These cases further support the relationship analysis. In all, the relationships were proscribed by Article 134, the general article, as adultery. See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL IV-97 (2002 Edition).

In fact, all servicemembers were also convicted for adultery. Myers, 2005 CCA LEXIS 44; Avery, 2005 CCA LEXIS 59; Bart, 61 M.J. 578; Christian, 61 M.J. 560; Gamez, 2005 LEXIS 109. In Gamez, however, Gamez’s adultery charge was conditionally dismissed on appeal. Gamez, 2005 LEXIS 109. This does not change the relationship based analysis because Gamez’s conviction for fraternization with an enlisted female member was allowed to stand. Id.
heterosexual sodomy.\textsuperscript{225}

Based on this permitted/not-permitted relationship analysis, the Marcum court's implication that it was not considering the impact of the holding on the military's homosexual policy becomes somewhat clearer.\textsuperscript{226} In summing up the Marcum Test, the court stated that it need not determine what constitutional impact the military's homosexual policy would have on the sodomy statute.\textsuperscript{227} Until the court completely works through the Marcum

\textsuperscript{225} See Appellee's Supplemental Brief Marcum (p. 10-11)

\textsuperscript{226} Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208.

\textsuperscript{227} Id. 10 U.S.C. § 654 is the "Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces" and is commonly referred to as the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
Test in a situation that would otherwise be protected but for its homosexual nature, this issue will not be resolved. Nevertheless, the implication, which is consistent with a relationship-based analysis, is that even if an accused satisfies the first two prongs of the Marcum Test, he or she may still not overcome the conviction by virtue of the impermissibility of the homosexual relationship and the "unique conditions of military service," thus failing to satisfy the third prong.228

Therefore, a consensual, non-commercial heterosexual relationship between adults, whether military-military or civilian-military, that does not violate any of the military's unprofessional relationship regulations229 or other laws, would

228. 10 U.S.C. § 654(8)(A) (2004). See also discussion supra Part IV.F. Stirewalt's consensual, heterosexual sodomy charge was also analyzed, and upheld, on the basis of military unique factors, namely an impermissible senior-subordinate relationship.

229. See infra Part VI.A.
be permissible.\textsuperscript{230} The same homosexual relationship, however, by
virtue of 10 U.S.C. § 654 would likely not be protected.

VI. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CHARGING CONSENSUAL SODOMY

If the relationship-based analysis continues to be followed
by the military courts of appeals\textsuperscript{231} then actually charging
sodomy as a crime would not only be unnecessary because the
underlying relationship will be prosecutable, it may also be
multiplicious.\textsuperscript{232}

A. Use of Alternate Punitive Articles of the UCMJ

Based on the relationship analysis, a number of alternatives
are available to military prosecutors to punish military members
engaged in impermissible relationships, regardless whether any
sexual contact has occurred.\textsuperscript{233} In its supplemental brief, to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{230} See Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (overturning consensual sodomy
charge between military member and civilian where
underlying relationship was permissible).
\item \textsuperscript{231} See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{232} See supra note 212 (charging servicemembers with
relationship-based crime as well as consensual sodomy).
\item \textsuperscript{233} See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
support the legitimacy of the sodomy statute, the government cited a number of cases that were disposed of with other than Article 125 convictions. Even the Marcum court pointed out that the conduct Marcum was convicted of, Article 125, consensual sodomy, could have been charged under Article 92, for violating a regulation, because Marcum was in violation of the

234. See Appellee’s Supplemental Brief Marcum (p. 10-11)


Air Force's unprofessional relationships regulation.\textsuperscript{236}

Thus, consensual sodomy cases that come under the umbrella of "unprofessional relationships" can be charged under Article 92, for failure to follow a regulation,\textsuperscript{237} Article 133, for

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\textbf{237.} See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV-23 (2002), Article 92:
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
Failure to obey order or regulation.
\end{flushleft}

Any person subject to this chapter who--

\begin{enumerate}
\item violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
\item having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
\item is derelict in the performance of his duties;
\end{enumerate}

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
conduct unbecoming an officer,238 or Article 134, the general article, which is also the article adultery is charged with.239

Additionally, consensual homosexual sodomy cases can be handled administratively under 10 U.S.C. § 654, the military's homosexual policy, with, for example, an administrative discharge.240 The policy covers, in detail, Congress’s belief

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238. See Manual for Courts-Martial IV-93 (2002), Article 133:

Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.


General article.

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.

that "there is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces," the distinct differences between civilian and military life, the steps to be taken to separate servicemembers if they meet certain homosexual "qualifiers," and some of the rights of those targeted by the statute.

The sodomy statute is thus duplicative as applied to homosexuals, if the government's purpose is to separate those who have, or would, engage in consensual homosexual conduct.

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(instructing commanders on the process for administratively separating homosexual servicemembers).


243. Author's quote, but see 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b)(1) - (3).

244. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (d).

245. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief Marcum (pp. 6-7); see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 221, at 219-20 (requiring a commander to initiate administrative discharge proceedings and only allowing an Under Other than Honorable Condition discharge if certain circumstances exists, such as force, sex with a minor, in
10 U.S.C. § 654 clearly covers the breadth of homosexual conduct, even covering non-acts, as the statute covers those who say they are homosexual without ever having committed a homosexual act.\textsuperscript{246}

Therefore, based solely on the government’s interest to separate homosexuals from military service, the sodomy statute adds only a criminal conviction\textsuperscript{247} which, when taken in conjunction with the administrative discharge that 10 U.S.C. § 654 requires, does nothing more than provide a newly separated homosexual service member with a federal conviction with which to re-start his or her life.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{246} See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b)(2) (requiring only a finding that a servicemember “intends to engage in homosexual acts”).

\textsuperscript{247} 10 U.S.C. § 925 (b) (“punished as a court-martial may direct”).

\textsuperscript{248} 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b). The statute requires that a service member “shall be separated from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.” Id. Based on principles of statutory construction, this
Charging Article 125, consensual sodomy, in almost every instance, becomes duplicative at the least, and multiplicious at most. Further, it leaves a case vulnerable to a constitutionally grounded appellate review if a conviction is awarded based on a consensual sodomy charge.249

B. Multiplicity

Multiplicity is based upon the Fifth Amendment principle “against double jeopardy [which] provides that an accused cannot be convicted of both an offense and a lesser-included offense.”250 To raise a claim of multiplicity, an accused must raise the issue at trial or the issue will only be reviewed by

implies an administrative discharge, not a court martial, because when a court martial is preferred the statute will articulate that. See e.g., supra note 230; see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 219 (Walter S. King & Bradley L. Knox, eds., 2002) (emphasizing that a commander is required to begin separation processing when the commander has found the service member violated 10 U.S.C. §654).

249. See supra Part IV.D. & V.B.

an appellate court for plain error. The idea that two charges are "factually the same" is a basic premise of a multiplicity claim. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has stated,

[An] Appellant may show plain error and overcome [waiver] by showing that the specifications are facially duplicative, that is, factually the same. The test to determine whether an offense is factually the same as another offense, and therefore lesser-included to that offense, is the "elements" test. Under this test, the court considers whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Rather than adopting a literal application of the elements test, this Court [has] stated that resolution of lesser-included claims can only be resolved by lining up elements realistically and determining whether each element of the supposed lesser offense is rationally derivative of one or more elements of the other offense--and vice versa. Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense is a matter of law that this Court will consider de novo.

Post-Marcum this test was employed by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether adultery, consensual

251. Id.

252. Id.

sodomy, and a fraternization charge were multiplicitous.\textsuperscript{254} Ultimately, in that case the court determined that the fraternization and consensual sodomy charges were not multiplicitous, while the adultery and fraternization were.\textsuperscript{255} Interestingly, the court was persuaded by the factual distinction of "sexual intercourse" versus "fellatio," thus, it determined that the fraternization and sodomy charges were not "factually the same."\textsuperscript{256}

Yet, the crucial fact now required to uphold consensual sodomy charges is the unauthorized relationship in conjunction with the sodomy.\textsuperscript{257} The unauthorized relationship is a necessary predicate to determining the constitutionality of the consensual sodomy charge.\textsuperscript{258} If, as the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals argues, the sodomy charge is distinct from the


\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{See supra} Part IV.D.

\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Id}.
fraternization charge simply upon the basis of "fellatio" versus "sexual intercourse" then the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces would have had no need to create the three-pronged Marcum Test.\textsuperscript{259} However, often it is the "sexual intercourse" which fulfills the predicate requirement (unauthorized relationship) that satisfies the third-prong of the Marcum Test.\textsuperscript{260} A consensual sodomy charge necessarily requires another relationship-based charge, such as adultery or fraternization.\textsuperscript{261} Therefore the consensual sodomy and the relationship-based offense are necessarily "factually the same,"\textsuperscript{262} and thus, charging both would be multiplicitious.

\textbf{VII. CONCLUSION}

The newly created Marcum Test is constitutional and, for most military members, expands their right to engage in private

\textsuperscript{259} See text accompanying supra note 254.

\textsuperscript{260} See supra note 220.

\textsuperscript{261} See supra Part IV.D.

sexual conduct.263 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' rulings in Marcum and Stirewalt imply that the nature of the relationship between two people will form the basis for determining whether their conduct falls under the Lawrence protections.264 Appellate courts will uphold consensual sodomy convictions when the underlying relationship is unauthorized, while the converse will be true as well.265

The implications this may have on homosexual conduct has yet to be seen.266 If the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces continues to follow this relationship-based path, then it would seem consensual homosexual sodomy would be proscribed and within the government's right to prosecute.267

263. See supra Part V.C.

264. See supra Part IV.F-G.

265. See supra Part IV.E-G and text accompanying note 206.

266. See supra Part V.C.

267. See supra Part V.C. The military's homosexual policy is being challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Cook v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-12546 GAO (D. Mass.
Military prosecutors, however, have at their disposal a number of other punitive and administrative articles of the UCMJ with which to punish those who violate military relationship regulations.\textsuperscript{268} To survive the Marcum Test, these relationship convictions would be prerequisite to any consensual sodomy conviction.\textsuperscript{269} Therefore, simply adding a consensual sodomy charge to the relationship charge is multiplicitious and not necessary within the military environment to punish the service

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{268} See supra Part VI.A.

\textsuperscript{269} See supra Part V.C.
member(s) involved. See supra Part VI.D. See also John Files, Pentagon Considers Changing the Legal Definition of Sodomy, N.Y. Times, April 21, 2005, at A1. This article discusses a memorandum sent from the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to Congress calling for the end of the military's proscription of consensual sodomy. Id. The memorandum calls for a change in the law to only outlaw sodomy "with a person under age 16 or acts 'committed by force.'" Id.