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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

RESTRUCTURING THE UNITED STATES NAVY CHAPLAIN CORPS

by

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September 2005

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Restructuring the United States Navy Chaplain Corps

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The Department of Defense has scarce resources and must continually make decisions on what new programs to fund and what obsolete/unnecessary programs to eliminate or modify. With regard to manpower issues, there are many jobs within the military that could be outsourced or restructured for a financial savings without a reduction in quality. One of these potential jobs is that of the U.S. Navy chaplain. This paper investigates (1) whether or not this function must necessarily be performed by a commissioned officer and (2) whether a substantial savings could be realized to the United States taxpayer without sacrificing any of the rights of religious freedom.

Overall, an argument is made for the divestiture of permanent shipboard and most shore-based chaplains. This is done on the basis of economic savings (potentially $69 million/year) and the lack of a demonstrated necessity for religious representation in areas which provide sufficient opportunities for worship. Outsourcing is presented as another avenue to obtain financial savings (potentially $37.5 million/year) due to the demonstrated lack of difference between the duties of military chaplains and civilian clergy. However, outsourcing is shown to be an inferior approach. Additionally, the logic behind the preservation of the Chaplain Corps is explored.
RESTRICTURING THE UNITED STATES NAVY CHAPLAIN CORPS

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ABSTRACT

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selflessly shared his expertise in sailing these waters, and allowed me to take the helm through much of the trip. He always ensured that my compass was calibrated, and never let me stray far off course. His kind, encouraging words empowered me to continue sailing, even when dark clouds rolled in and the morning skies had been red. This project exists because of his willingness to lead as a mentor, a guide, and a friend. I am unreservedly indebted to his wisdom, and I can only hope that I was as worthy an apprentice as he was a master.

At the end of the day, I am certain to have forgotten someone, and if that someone is reading this, then I offer special thanks to you. The fatigue from the trip is already wearing off as I prepare for a period of dry dock maintenance. My family and I will enjoy our brief respite for now while we regale each other with tall tales from the distant lands to which we have most recently traveled. Perhaps we will journey together again soon. Then again, perhaps we will not.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense (DOD) has scarce resources and must continually make decisions on what new programs to fund and what obsolete/unnecessary programs to eliminate or modify. Specifically, with regard to manpower issues, there are many jobs within the military that could be outsourced or restructured for a financial savings without a reduction in quality. One of these potential jobs is that of the U.S. Navy chaplain. The U.S. Navy maintains a Chaplain Corps for the purposes of ministering to service members and providing for their individual spiritual needs. Navy chaplains ensure that all service members are afforded the opportunity to freely exercise their religious beliefs. However, this paper investigates (1) whether or not this function must necessarily be performed by a commissioned officer and (2) whether a substantial savings could be realized to the United States taxpayer without sacrificing any of the rights of religious freedom.

1. The Underlying Issues

Primarily, this analysis is performed in the interests of economic efficiency. This conceivably biases the reader into thinking that the decision to outsource or restructure the chaplains is one of a mostly quantitative nature. However, there are a number of relevant qualitative reasons for undertaking this analysis. The dollar figures, while important, are not the only issue. There are highly contentious issues involved such as the interpretation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the ramifications of pluralistic ministry, and the potential effects of subjecting a service-oriented community to the pressures of careerism. Outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps would have consequences related to these issues.

a. The First Amendment

Theoretically, military chaplains exist to support the free exercise clause in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” This is suggested in numerous directives governing religious ministry in the military. The
Secretary of Defense (in DOD Directive 1304.19), the Secretary of the Navy (in SECNAV Instruction 1730.7B), and the Chief of Naval Operations (in OPNAV Instruction 1730.1D) all state that chaplains provide for the “free exercise of religion” for all Department of the Navy members, their families, and other authorized personnel.\(^1\) Chaplains with whom the author spoke all cite the First Amendment in justifying the existence of a Chaplain Corps. The logic seems to be that the military is a unique environment in which the United States government is potentially subjecting its military members to circumstances that could prohibit their access to religious outlets. Therefore, the government provides its service members with military chaplains to provide for the free exercise of religion. Without the establishment of a Chaplain Corps, the government could be accused of denying military members their Constitutional entitlements.

The particulars of prohibiting free exercise are the controversial aspect of the clause. Is the government necessarily prohibiting sailors from free exercise by sending them on an extended deployment? Does the length of the deployment matter (e.g. less than a week underway without religious representation is satisfactory)? In today’s “All Volunteer Force,” where potential service members have a choice about whether or not to join the military, does this clause still justify a Chaplain Corps? For shore-based service members, is this clause in jeopardy of being violated by not providing a military chaplain if the civilian sector contains adequate religious facilities? It is the author’s view that the DOD’s interpretation of the First Amendment is flawed. There may be instances where the government is sending a service member into an environment devoid of the opportunity to freely exercise (e.g. combat), but it is doubtful that this applies to all forms of duty that a service member may encounter. It is also uncertain that a military chaplain is the most efficient way to provide for this service.

\(\textbf{b. Pluralism}\)

Another issue is the dilemma of pluralism. The diversity of faith groups within the United States military dictates the need for chaplains who are able to adequately respond to a wide variety of religious needs. A ship comprised of 350 sailors

\(^1\) These directives in their entirety may be found online. The DOD Directive may be found at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d130419x.htm> (accessed 25 August 2005), and the Navy Instructions may be found at <http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/dirindex.html> (accessed 25 August 2005).
may only have one chaplain onboard to minister to the multitude of represented faiths. Pluralism is the government solution to this predicament. It is not a religion; rather, it is the environment in which military chaplains must operate. It is often touted as the essence of uniqueness that requires the specific brand of military clergy to support this diverse atmosphere. Pluralism requires that chaplains are tolerant and respectful of all recognized religions, regardless of ideological differences. As one chaplain whom the author interviewed stated, “I do not have to endorse the pluralistic environment, but I must be able to function within it.” Military chaplains are not required to hold services for all religions; they are charged with assisting and facilitating the free expression of all service members’ religious beliefs. If a military chaplain cannot personally fulfill a service member’s needs, then that chaplain will find someone who can.

Pluralism comes with its own baggage, however. As a corollary to the first issue, chaplains must walk a fine line between sharing their own brand of faith and violating the “establishment” portion of the First Amendment. Certain faiths eschew pluralism, viewing it as a false religion. This presents an ethical dilemma for a chaplain who subscribes to one of these faith groups. This problem surfaced during the spring of 2005 at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. There were charges of evangelical military preachers forcing their religious views onto uninterested cadets. The Department of the Air Force completed a formal investigation and found no “overt religious discrimination, but a failure to fully accommodate all members’ needs and a lack of awareness over where the line is drawn between permissible and impermissible expression of beliefs.”

Excluding clergy who will not submit to a pluralistic environment is not sufficient. Ironically, to exclude these religious representatives from the process would also be a failure to accommodate.

Pluralism is not only the environment in which the military operates; it is the environment in which the United States of America operates. As people continue to broaden and expand their religious views, the military will have to continue to accommodate and support these views. At some point, the question must be asked, “How

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much religious care and feeding must the United States government give to its military members?” It would be extremely cost prohibitive and impractical to provide religious representation for every faith. To the DOD’s credit, the resolution to create a chaplaincy able to deal with a pluralistic environment is commendable. However, it is the author’s view that pluralism creates situations that should be avoided if possible. An outsourced or restructured Chaplain Corps is one possible way of avoiding some of these concerns.

**c. Careerism and Bureaucracy**

The calling to the profession of chaplains is centered on service to people. It is normally viewed as a selfless mission that is characterized by the subordination of personal desires in order to focus on the needs of the people for whom they serve. However, creating commissioned officers out of members of the cloth creates a potential conflict of interests. As commissioned officers, military chaplains undergo the same types of promotion cycles as all officers. This adds an interesting area of concern for a military chaplain. Promotion is based on many factors such as diversity of duty stations, fitness reports from Commanding Officers, and relative standing among peers, to name a few. The allure of personal advancement is human nature. It is reasonable to suppose that a military chaplain could focus on promotion at the expense of ministry.³

Additionally, this type of thinking creates bureaucracy as the career needs of the group of chaplains must be protected. The management of this religious diversity has created large support systems to maintain a steady supply of chaplains. There are training commands, recruiting stations, and administrative bodies. Building a community of chaplains creates interesting relationships between the U.S. government and its nation’s churches. For the U.S. government to avoid becoming entangled in the “establishment” clause, private brokers have emerged to act as middlemen, screening and referring candidates to the individual military branches for consideration as future chaplains.⁴ Bureaucracies are created to manage more bureaucracies. The Office of the

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³ There are currently outstanding lawsuits brought against the United States Navy by a group of disgruntled Navy chaplains who claim that they were discriminated against on their promotion boards. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia’s opinion granting class action to these lawsuits can be found at <http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/2002/Urbina/00-566d.pdf> (accessed 26 August 2005).

⁴ An example of these brokers is the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces (NCAMF). Their website can be found at <http://www.ncmaf.org/> (accessed 26 August 2005).
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness maintains an Armed Forces Chaplains Board, which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all service chaplaincies. Each branch of the military has its own Chaplain Corps, along with its own facility to train them. The government, to accommodate its service members’ religious needs, has created a sizeable annual expenditure for the U.S. taxpayers. Outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps could mitigate many of these outlays.

B. SCOPE

This paper addresses a concentrated portion of the issue. While there is a Chaplain Corps in each major branch of the United States military, this thesis investigates only the Department of the Navy’s community of chaplains. This community is further divided by the type of duty performed.

1. Shore Duty, Sea Duty, and Combat Duty

Within the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps’ list of possible duty stations, there are three broad options. Option one is to be stationed at a shore-based activity without the normal obligation to leave for deployments and exercises. These duty stations are Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard bases worldwide, military service academies, and various administrative positions. Option two is to be stationed onboard a United States Ship (USS) as a permanent member of the crew, or to be stationed at a squadron that oversees many ships or aircraft. These duty stations usually require chaplains to leave their homeport for extended deployments and exercises. Option three is to be embedded with a Marine Corps force for ground combat duty.

For the purposes of this study, chaplains involved in ground combat duty will not be included. Sending troops into combat is a unique situation in which it would be difficult to argue for the removal of chaplains. It is doubtful that civilian clergy would wish to perform these duties, and the monetary incentives required to attract contracted chaplains for combat would probably negate any financial savings. Additionally, this is one situation in which the author would agree that the government is subjecting its military members to an environment devoid of the ability to exercise religious freedom.
In addition to these reasons, this decision is based on a number of relevant documents. Therefore, the chaplains being analyzed in this paper are the shore-based and shipboard chaplains within the Department of the Navy.

C. OBJECTIVES

Overall, an argument is made for the restructuring of the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps. This is done on the basis of economic savings and the lack of a demonstrated necessity for religious representation in areas which provide sufficient opportunities for worship. Outsourcing is presented as another avenue to obtain financial savings due to the demonstrated lack of difference between the duties of military chaplains and civilian clergy. However, outsourcing is shown to be an inferior approach. There is also additional information exploring the logic behind the preservation of a Chaplain Corps.

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II offers some historical insight on both the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps and outsourcing in general. In addition, the Lay Leader Program and a guideline to the manpower coding scheme used for Navy chaplains is included in this chapter. Chapter III discusses the requirements, training, and duties of Navy chaplains and civilian clergy. These religious leaders are then contrasted with one another in order to establish their differences. Chapter IV outlines a cost effectiveness analysis comparing Navy chaplains to civilian clergy. Additionally, an explanation of the difficulty in quantifying benefits is included in this chapter. Chapter V estimates the financial gains associated with outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps. The problems of outsourcing are addressed in this chapter. Chapter VI discusses the obstacles to change, and investigates the rationale behind the Chaplain Corps’ efforts at creating value for themselves in the 21st century Navy. Chapter VII completes the thesis with the conclusions of the study and gives recommendations for further research.

5 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 protect the status of military chaplains during armed conflict. The U.S. government has decided that this protection could be in jeopardy if civilian clergy are used. For a formal statement of this policy see the Navy’s Strategic Sourcing Branch Fiscal Year 2004 IG&CA Manpower Mix Criteria document, Attachment 1.1.4 of Enclosure (3) Military Medical and Chaplain Services for Prisoners of War, which can be found online at <http://strategicsourcing.navy.mil/StrategicSourcing.cfm?doc=25> (accessed 26 August 2005).
II. THE U.S. NAVY CHAPLAIN CORPS / OUTSOURCING 101

A. HISTORY

Chaplains in the United States Navy date back to November, 1775, when the second article of U.S. Navy Regulations was implemented. It stated that “the Commanders of the ships of the Thirteen United Colonies are to take care that divine services be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon be preached on board on Sundays.” Over the years, the status of the Chaplain Corps has evolved, and it has grown into an agency with its own buildings, staff, and annual budget. In 1906, the Secretary of the Navy formally established the Chaplain Corps by enacting standards for consideration as a chaplain, creating an infrastructure for the training of a military chaplain, and appointing a Chief of Chaplains to oversee this new agency’s administration. The most recent compilation of the rules and regulations governing the Chaplain Corps is Naval Warfare Publication 1-05, *Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy*, dated August of 2003. This publication outlines the entire structure and organization of administering religious programs within the Navy.

The Chaplain Corps has turned into a bureaucracy with such varied titles as Staff Chaplain, Fleet Chaplain, Regional Chaplain, Supervisory Chaplain, Coordinating Chaplain, and simply Chaplain. As of 05 July 2005, there were 903 Active Duty Navy chaplains. These chaplains serve the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard at all of their shore establishments, aboard a select group of ships, and in the field with forward deployed units. Their primary function is to provide for the free exercise of religion for all members and families of these three services. Roughly one third, or almost 300, of these chaplains are operational,

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7 This authorization for this is contained in Title 10, Section 5142 of the United States Code.

meaning they are attached to a ship or unit that leaves the country for duty overseas or in hostile areas. The other two thirds, or about 600 chaplains, serve on Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Bases around the world, and do not normally deploy or enter hostile areas. These chaplains serve in a supporting capacity. As alluded to in Chapter I, there is a convenient way to differentiate between these types of chaplains. Operational chaplains are on “sea duty” (to include those in combat situations) and supporting chaplains are on “shore duty.” It is notable that the distribution of sea versus shore chaplains is heavily weighted in favor of shore billets. Most of these shore billets are in populated areas with sufficient civilian religious resources within a reasonable distance.

As of March 2000, over 70 individual faith groups were represented in the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps. The corps currently divides its members into four distinct faith groupings: Roman Catholic, Liturgical Protestant, Non-liturgical Protestant, and Special Worship Consideration.\(^9\) Liturgical refers to the existence of a set group of rituals or formal ceremonies inherent in the worship practices of these faiths. These are faiths such as Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Episcopalian, or Orthodox. Non-liturgical faiths do not have these rituals. These are faiths such as Southern Baptist, Pentecostal, Church of the Nazarene, Church of Christ, or Evangelicals. Special Worship faiths refer to any non-Christian faith group, such as Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu. The Navy does not keep readily accessible records on specific denominations of individual chaplains.

1. The Lay Leader Program

Chaplains often enlist the help of interested sailors to be “lay leaders” when there is a demonstrated need for the facilitation of religious services which cannot be delivered by the chaplain. Various classes of Naval ships do not have embarked chaplains. Out of 286 deployable battle force ships, only 61 of these ships have chaplains attached as permanent crew members.\(^10\) Almost 80 percent of Naval ships are without a permanent chaplain, and these ships often have lay leaders to handle the religious needs of the crew.

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These lay leaders undergo a process of selection and qualification that is particular to each individual command and religious affiliation. There is no standardized training for lay leaders. It is up to the command or staff chaplains to qualify individual lay leaders.\textsuperscript{11} Lay leaders are not required to possess any formal religious training prior to consideration. They need only demonstrate “volunteerism, high moral character, motivation, and religious interest.”\textsuperscript{12}

Although lay leaders are not designed to replace chaplains, they are used in ways that allow service members to feel that their religious needs are being considered. With the proper qualifications being met, lay leaders may perform certain religious services in times of necessity. This raises the question of whether or not chaplains onboard Navy ships are essential. If a properly trained and qualified lay leader can administer religious services in times of necessity, then it would seem reasonable to use this option during the underway periods of any Navy ship. Additionally, the Navy does not seem to place a premium on shipboard chaplains, as only 21 percent of Navy ships have a permanent chaplain attached.

\textbf{B. OMB OUTSOURCING POLICY}

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the department within the Executive branch of government that oversees the preparation and administration of the federal budget. In addition, it routinely evaluates all federal programs and policies with regard to effectiveness and fiscal efficiency. Per its Mission Statement, one of its primary goals is to “reduce any unnecessary burdens on the public.”\textsuperscript{13}

OMB issues periodic literature called “Circulars,” which provide guidance and instruction to various federal agencies in the matters of financial management and procurement. Circular A-76, “Performance of Commercial Activities,” has been continuously updated since its initial version in 1966. The most recent update occurred

\textsuperscript{11} The Navy instruction authorizing lay leaders is MILPERSMAN 1730-010 and can be accessed online at <http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/milpers/1730-010.htm> (accessed 18 August 2005).

\textsuperscript{12} MILPERSMAN 1730-010, Section 7a.

in May of 2003. This document directs all federal agencies to scrutinize the functions they perform and classify them as “either commercial or inherently governmental.” The original intent of A-76 was to prevent the United States government from infringing upon the livelihood of the commercial sector. It provided a means to keep big government from monopolizing certain jobs and functions that could be done privately. Additionally, this good-faith initiative provided taxpayers with a demonstrated policy statement in support of responsible spending of public monies. Circular A-76 helped to give birth to the phenomenon that has come to be known as “outsourcing.” To a businessman, outsourcing usually refers to a transfer of company jobs to a less costly labor force. To the federal government, outsourcing refers to a transfer of federal jobs to a civilian entity in the commercial sector.

A-76 gives guidance for the specific procedures federal agencies must follow in order to outsource their jobs. Agencies such as the Department of the Navy are required to inventory their jobs annually and submit a report classifying the jobs as inherently governmental or commercial. This inventory is often a subjective assessment by a member of the chosen agency who is designated as the Competitive Sourcing Official. Inherently governmental jobs are those that are “intimately related to the public interest” (the interests of National Security are often invoked here). These jobs are mandated to be performed by government personnel. If a job can be demonstrated to be classified as commercial, then the arduous process of competition begins. The job must be advertised to the public, a series of bids must be submitted by interested parties, a comprehensive cost comparison must be performed, and a contract is then awarded. Another option is divestiture, which is ceasing to perform the job at all. The whole process is designed to ensure that the American taxpayer is receiving the maximum value for his tax dollars by subjecting inherently commercial jobs to market forces.

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C. STRATEGIC SOURCING AND THE CODING OF NAVY CHAPLAINS

As stated, one of the major issues surrounding the outsourcing of any federal job is its classification as inherently governmental or commercial. Within the Department of the Navy’s N1 (Manpower and Personnel) Directorate is a Strategic Sourcing branch that oversees all aspects of the outsourcing of Navy jobs. This branch issues annual guidance for this classification, using criteria derived from the OMB Circular A-76.17

Navy manpower is coded by the type of work being done. The 2004 Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity (IG & CA) Inventory Guidance is the most recent document detailing the procedures and codes utilized during this process of job scrutiny.18 Jobs are given “Manpower Mix Criteria” codes which serve as designations separating the inherently governmental jobs from the potentially commercial ones. The information in Table 1 was taken from the Strategic Sourcing website, and contains the alphabetic codes and their general meanings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
<th>IG or CA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Military Operations</td>
<td>Inherently Governmental</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Exemption for Military Support Elements in Operating Forces</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Exemption for Civilian Support Elements in Operating Forces</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Exemption for Military and Civilian Wartime Designations (Dual Status)</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Civilian Authority Direction and Control</td>
<td>Inherently Governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Military Unique Knowledge and Skills</td>
<td>Inherently Governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Exemption for Esprit de Corps and Military Support</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Exemption for Continuity of Infrastructure Operations</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Military Augmentation of the Infrastructure During War</td>
<td>Inherently Governmental</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Exemption for Civilian and Military Rotation</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Exemption for Civilian and Military Career Progression</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>Exempted by Law, Executive Order, Treaty, or International Agreement</td>
<td>Commercial but Exempt</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Exempted by DOD Management Decision</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>Pending Restructuring of Commercial Activities</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Alternative Candidates to A-76</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Manpower Mix Criteria Codes.


As shown in Table 1, codes A, E, F, and I are inherently governmental and cannot be considered for outsourcing or divestiture. Code A is related to the command and execution of combat operations; code E is related to civilian oversight mandated by the U.S. Code, such as the Secretary of the Navy; code F is related to jobs that require specific military training; code I is related to the Selected Reserve forces. There are chaplains in the Department of the Navy within each of these codes.

All other codes are considered commercial. However, many of these remaining codes are not eligible for competition under A-76 because they are considered “military essential” or “civilian essential” (i.e. they must be performed by a federal employee). There are numerous reasons why a commercially coded job would not be eligible for competition within the commercial sector. Codes B and C refer to supporting operations that are not normally involved in hostilities but have the potential to be involved; code D refers to jobs that are commercial in peacetime but become inherently governmental in wartime; code G refers to jobs that affect the morale of the force; code H refers to jobs that are needed for continuity of operations during a crisis due to some specialized training; codes J and K refer to career management and detailing issues associated with tour length and occupational progression; code L refers to jobs that are mandated by documents such as the U.S. Code or an international agreement; code M is an inclusive code that allows the DOD to protect jobs that they deem essential but are not covered by the other codes. There are chaplains in each of these codes except for C, H, J, and M.

Only three codes are considered commercial and subject to divestiture or private sector performance. Code P refers to jobs that have a deferment from being reviewed pending the outcome of a restructuring decision; code R refers to jobs that are subject to the competitive processes outlined in A-76; code X normally refers to divestiture. There are a small number of chaplains in each of these codes.
1. **Code G**

The bulk of Navy chaplains, over 50 percent, are considered code G.\(^\text{19}\) This is the code that refers to morale and esprit de corps. The following excerpts are from Enclosure (3), Section 2.3 of the IG & CA document. They are the Navy’s description of jobs that require this code:

> These exemptions are for functions that can be performed by DoD civilians or, in some cases, the private sector but without the same effect—i.e., military performance of these activities carries special meaning for military personnel, their families, and the public. This manpower is military essential and exempt from private sector performance because civilian and contract personnel cannot serve as military role models or be used as effectively to project a *military* presence or image or authentically demonstrate *military* expertise to the public.

The decision not to outsource or divest chaplains under code G is based on the premise that a civilian chaplain would lack some intrinsic value not present without a military commission. The Navy believes that a civilian chaplain would not have the same effect, and there would be a loss of unit cohesion if this job were to be lost to the private sector. Military presence and military expertise are theoretically required for the proper execution of a chaplain’s duties. It is significant to note that the only mention of chaplains under this code within the IG & CA document refers to chaplains at military service academies. It has somehow grown to include most chaplains at most shore establishments.

Military chaplains who exist under code G are considered militarily essential and exempt from comparison with civilian counterparts. This is a hurdle that must be overcome in order to evaluate the potential cost savings to the taxpayer, which is the fundamental objective of A-76. The premise of code G for military chaplains is noble, and the intent is to ensure the best possible support for U.S. service members. However, it is difficult for the author to understand how military expertise is required for effective performance of a chaplain’s duties. This is the subject of further investigation in Chapter III.

\(^{19}\text{This percentage calculated from information furnished to the author by the Strategic Sourcing Branch (N124) of the Total Force Programming and Manpower Division (OPNAV N12) of the Navy.}\)
III. WHAT MAKES A MILITARY CHAPLAIN?

A. THE NATURE OF THE JOB

The duties of Navy chaplains are numerous and varied. The wide range of a chaplain’s responsibilities requires a great deal of training and education. One of the most relevant issues in this research is whether or not a chaplain’s job must necessarily be performed by a commissioned officer. This chapter analyzes the process of becoming a military chaplain in an attempt to identify the differences between military chaplains and civilian clergy. Additionally, the duties of a military chaplain are examined to distinguish them from duties that a civilian chaplain could perform. As previously mentioned, the duties of a “battlefield” chaplain are not considered in this analysis, for reasons already discussed. The focus of this analysis is on shipboard and shore-based chaplains.

1. Requirements for Entry

The requirements for becoming a U.S. Navy chaplain are almost identical to the requirements for becoming a regular commissioned officer in any of the other officer communities. Prospective candidates must be within certain age parameters, pass a physical health assessment, and have an undergraduate degree from an accredited institution of learning. Additionally, candidates must have the following:

- At least 72 hours of graduate level work with at least 36 of those hours in a field of theological or related studies. This requirement may be fulfilled with a Master of Divinity (M.Div.) degree from an accredited institution.
- An ecclesiastical endorsement from a legitimate faith group recognized by the Department of Defense.
- At least 2 years of ministry experience.

There is also a program which allows theology students to join before they are ordained in a particular faith group. They then complete their residency in the service.

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20 These requirements may be found online at the Navy’s recruiting website, <http://www.navy.com/officer/clergy> (accessed 10 August 2005), or online at the Naval Chaplains School website, <https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm> (accessed 10 August 2005).

21 The particulars of the Chaplain Candidate Program Officer (CCPO) Program may be found at the Naval Chaplains School website, <https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm> (accessed 10 August 2005).
of the military and apply for the title of “Chaplain.” This postgraduate education and extra experience entitles chaplains to begin military service at a paygrade higher than that obtained by a typical newly commissioned officer, most often O2 or O3 rather than the usual O1.\footnote{The current pay chart for all military members can be found at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s website, \url{http://www.dod.mil/dfas-money/milpay/pay/paytable2005-rev1.pdf} (accessed 10 August 2005).}

2. Training Pipeline

Once the basic entry requirements are met, candidates attend a series of training courses designed to indoctrinate new chaplains into a military environment. There are four basic courses, which are administered at the Naval Education and Training Command in Newport, Rhode Island\footnote{Further information on these courses can be found at the Naval Chaplains School website, \url{https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm} (accessed 10 August 2005).}:

- **Naval Chaplain Basic Course (NCBT)** is a six-week long course of instruction which familiarizes new chaplains with military customs and procedures. They learn to wear a uniform properly, identify rank structure, and begin the process of integrating into military culture. This provides a basis of knowledge for chaplains in their role as junior officers.

- **Division Officer Capstone (DOC)** is a one-week long course of instruction that provides leadership and management training. The focus of this course is on fleet management practices and is intended to prepare chaplains for Division Officer responsibilities.

- **Amphibious/Expeditionary Course (AMEX)** is a nine-day long course of instruction designed to acquaint chaplains with the roles and responsibilities of working with expeditionary forces such as the Marine Corps.

- **Tools, Empowerment, and Ministry Skills Course (TEAMS)** is a two-week long course of instruction that provides chaplains with the knowledge and skills to successfully administer a Command Religious Program upon transfer to their next duty station. It is designed to reduce the learning curve, and help new chaplains begin their ministry immediately.

These combined courses take roughly two and one half months to complete before new chaplains are assigned to their first tour of duty on a ship or at a military base. Ten weeks of training are what separate civilian clergy from newly commissioned military chaplains.
3. Religious Duties

The May 2003 OPNAV Instruction 1730.1D, Religious Ministry in the Navy, provides guidance for the administration of a religious program at an individual command.\(^{24}\) This instruction assigns chaplains to a Religious Ministry Team (RMT), which consists of a group of personnel responsible for delivering religious services. There are six specific tasks allocated to chaplains and their assistants:

- **Command Advisory** is a task which addresses the responsibility to advise and counsel the commanding officer on all matters of a religious nature. This includes issues of discrimination, ethical matters, and command morale. Additionally, in an operational context, a chaplain would be a key advisor on foreign cultural issues related to religion.

- **Religious Ministry and Accommodation** is a task which addresses the responsibility to provide for the free exercise of religious services. This includes understanding the specific religious needs of the command, and then scheduling worship services to meet these needs. These are the tasks most readily identified with any chaplain: conducting mass, burial services, weddings, baptisms, etc. Additionally, this task directs chaplains to establish a Lay Leader program when necessary.

- **Outreach** is a task which addresses the coordination of humanitarian and spiritual growth activities among service members, within defined geographic areas, and in conjunction with other RMTs. This task deals with the organization of various retreats for service members and their families. The Chaplains Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO), which is a series of spiritual retreats, is a function of this task.

- **Pastoral Care** is a task which refers to the counseling and care of individual service members and their families. This task encompasses hospital visits, crisis intervention, and spiritual mentoring. Additionally, this task directs chaplains to deal with applications for conscientious objector status.

- **Training and Education** is a task which assigns chaplains to conduct training in matters of ethics, values, morals, and character development. This task also includes discussions of suicide prevention, domestic abuse, drug use, and other related issues. Also, the oversight of traditional study of scripture is incorporated into this task.

- **Supervisory and Management** is a task which addresses the managerial aspects of running a Command Religious Program. It deals with the supervision of religious personnel, budgeting for resources, and contracting for needed religious services when necessary.

\(^{24}\) This instruction can be viewed online at the Navy Electronic Directives System website, [http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/1730_1d.pdf](http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/1730_1d.pdf) (accessed 10 August 2005).
B. THE DUTIES OF CIVILIAN CLERGY

It is difficult to establish a standardized set of religious duties for civilian clergy due to the enormous diversity in faiths. However, there are many resources from which to draw a reasonable approximation. The Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) issues a biennial publication, the *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, which contains information on hundreds of careers within the United States.²⁵ Within the 2004-2005 edition of this handbook is a designation for “Clergy.” The following quote is taken from the section entitled “Nature of the Work”:

Clergy are religious and spiritual leaders and teachers…They organize and lead regular religious services and officiate at special ceremonies… They may lead worshippers in prayer, administer the sacraments, deliver sermons…organize, supervise, and lead religious education programs…visit the sick or bereaved to provide comfort…counsel persons who are seeking religious or moral guidance…oversee the management of buildings, order supplies, contract for services and repairs, and supervise the work of staff and volunteers. Clergy also work with committees and officials, elected by the congregation, who guide the management of the congregation’s finances and real estate.²⁶

C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A “CIVILIAN CHAPLAIN”

There does not appear to be much difference between the duties of military chaplains and civilian clergy. Both have the requisite training to be a legitimate member of a faith group, as the Navy requires this training prior to commissioning. Although the aforementioned ten weeks of basic training is probably necessary for an introduction to the military, the real indoctrination happens at the duty station to which a new chaplain is assigned. This type of indoctrination would happen whether or not the chaplain had been commissioned. Experience as a teacher does not differentiate between military and civilian. A civilian chaplain would receive the same skills and abilities that “on the job” training provides as would a military chaplain with ten weeks of experience.

With the exception of Command Advisory, both military chaplains and civilian clergy provide for five of the six tasks that the Department of the Navy has deemed to be

essential for chaplains. The fulfillment of the Command Advisory task by civilian chaplains requires an understanding of the religious nature surrounding the area of operations, and it is not unreasonable to assume that a civilian chaplain could fulfill this task upon request. Moreover, the military portion of the Command Advisory task seems to be most necessary for chaplains embedded with a Marine force in a foreign country, and these chaplains are not being considered for restructuring in this study. Neither shipboard chaplains nor chaplains attached to shore commands would need to fulfill this task in ways different from a civilian chaplain. With regard to all tasks, military knowledge would be helpful, but is not required for effectiveness.

Chaplains with whom the author has discussed this tend to disagree with the author’s evaluation above. They contend that the uniform conveys a sense of community that would be lost if a service member did not feel that chaplains could empathize with the military lifestyle. They site many examples. They hold that there must be military chaplains at the service academies and boot camps in order to convey a sense of total immersion into the military lifestyle. Military chaplains are supposedly essential at all hospitals to ensure that the sick and wounded service members and their families feel as if the military “family” is truly taking care of them physically and spiritually. When a service member dies, it is allegedly more appropriate to have a military chaplain approach the next of kin to deliver the bad news. The existence of the civil-military gap27 is invoked and military chaplains are purported to provide a bridge across this gap, being able to understand the viewpoints of each side. A chaplain is deemed essential to assist in the transition from civilian life to military life, and if the chaplain has not made that transition, then that chaplain is less effective.

In this author’s view, however, the real difference between military chaplains and civilian clergy is the demographic makeup of their congregations. However, military members are human beings with human problems and issues. They suffer hardship, have domestic troubles, sometimes travel away from loved ones, deal with difficult coworkers, 

27 The civil-military gap is a difference in ideological thinking between military members and civilians, and has been the subject of study since the Vietnam War era. A thorough account of this alleged gap may be found at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies website, <http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/> (accessed 10 August 2005).
lose family and friends, etc. With the exception of perhaps combat, troubles do not 
discriminate between members of the military and the civilian population. To argue that 
military chaplains are essential by virtue of their membership in the military is to deny 
the humanity of the military community. Superior to membership in any organization is 
the ability to relate on a human level, an ability that all clergy possess in varying degrees. 
The argument should be based on economic grounds surrounding the value (or lack of 
value) of a civilian chaplain in a military setting. There does not appear to be a sufficient 
difference in benefits to offset the potentially significant savings in costs. These benefits 
and costs are the subject of the next chapter.
IV. BENEFITS AND COSTS

A. BENEFITS

Classic Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) states the importance of quantifying the individual costs and individual benefits for a measurable comparison. If the net benefit (total benefits minus total costs) is positive, then that proposal is generally viewed as a worthwhile venture (in economic terms). Conversely, if the net benefit is negative, then the proposal in question is probably not worth undertaking. The difficulty with this approach, in this instance, is in accurately measuring the benefits of a purely military or civilian chaplaincy. In order to properly compare dollar amounts, the benefits must be quantifiable in dollars. However, it is difficult to quantify how much it means to a service member to have a military chaplain onboard before he launches a lethal Tomahawk missile into a populated area. It is equally difficult to quantify the preference a service member may have in talking to a civilian chaplain who is not part of the chain of command. On a larger and more relevant scale, the benefit accrued to the individual taxpayer is nearly impossible to quantify; there are as many calculations as there are faith groups. These types of benefits are highly subjective in nature and could range from a few dollars to an infinite amount of money.28

This difficulty in quantifying benefits is not completely problematic because the intent of outsourcing or restructuring is not to rid the entire U.S. Navy of religious representation. The intent is to gain the most value. Therefore, it is assumed that religious representation will be present regardless of whether or not that representative is a member of the U.S. Navy. This representation would take the form of contracted chaplains in an outsourcing scenario and local civilian clergy in a restructuring scenario. For the purposes of analysis, this allows the benefits of either alternative to be relatively equal. Any inequality would be marginal due to the similarity in duties and small differences in benefits.

28 The possibility exists, of course, for these benefits to be negative. Some service members, presumably a small minority, may have a genuine distaste for military chaplains, which would make the presence of such chaplains a negative benefit, that is, a loss.
Of course, the equality of benefits is the most contested piece of this analysis. Just as the Navy chaplains with whom the author spoke disagreed about the sameness of job descriptions, they also challenged the author’s opinion about benefits. Navy chaplains believe that civilian religious leaders are generally unfamiliar with the unique military environment, and they cite civilian religious communities that are reluctant to accept military members because of their transient lifestyle. They contend that civilian clergy are not properly trained to deal with the nuances of military culture. Some of them make emotional appeals to the value of military chaplains by virtue of their existence within the confines of the “military installations where our people work, play, live, pray, laugh, cry, and worship. They understand from the inside.”

This assessment may be accurate, but these supposed benefits are still unable to be quantified in any real sense. Additionally, it is the author’s empirical opinion that this disparity of benefits continues to exist only on the margin.

Consider the benefits inherent in shipboard and shore-based chaplaincies. Shipboard military chaplains possess the benefit of being able to deal with deployments, but very few ships regularly employ chaplains. If there were significant benefits to having military chaplains onboard ships, is it unreasonable to wonder why each Navy ship does not have one? With regard to shore-based military chaplains, their benefits are more difficult to articulate. They are required to minister to congregations that have specific military issues, but non-military members have no cognitive barrier to understanding these issues. It is reasonable to assume that civilian clergy encounter many people within their congregations who lead lifestyles with which they have no personal experience. Would a clergyman, for example, be unable to minister to a police officer because the clergyman has never been one himself? Similarly, it seems unreasonable to assume that a military chaplain could understand all military issues by virtue of being a commissioned officer. As stated, the benefits of a chaplain as a

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29 Excerpt taken from the text of an e-mail correspondence between the author and a senior chaplain at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 30 August 2005.

30 As stated in Chapter II, only 21 percent of Navy ships include chaplains as permanent crew members.
commissioned officer are difficult to establish on a ship or ashore, and they seem fairly indistinguishable from the same benefits provided by civilian clergy.

1. **CBA versus CEA**

When benefits can be assumed to be roughly identical, a Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) can be used as a proxy for the CBA. Although this is a contested opinion, the author believes sufficient evidence has been shown to infer the similarities between military chaplains and civilian clergy. Using this as the benchmark, the relevant costs of each alternative are tallied and the alternative with the lowest costs should be selected as the most efficient course of action.

**B. COSTS**

There are many relevant costs associated with manpower issues. For simplicity, and due to the fact that there will still be religious representation within the ranks, certain costs will be removed from the analysis because of their similarity among alternative courses of action. For instance, there would still be recruiting, training, and travel costs, regardless of the source of chaplains. Therefore, the relevant costs are reduced to annual salary (including the monetized health, quality of life, and retirement benefits), and a comparison is made between military chaplains and civilian clergy.

1. **Salary for a Military Chaplain**

When the Navy programs the cost of manpower for a select group of personnel, it aggregates them across paygrades and averages out the cost per individual sailor to yield a composite figure. The bulk of this cost is reflected in three items: basic pay, housing allowances, and subsistence allowances. This figure also takes into account all implicit and explicit benefits. These benefits include health care (medical and dental), retirement accrual, commissary and exchange privileges, on-base services (gymnasium, pool, recreational centers, etc.), disability insurance, legal services, educational opportunities, 30 days paid vacation, and various tax advantages.

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31 Arguably, outsourcing or restructuring would reduce these costs because there would be fewer personnel to recruit, train, and transport. The difficulty in assessing these costs, and their assumed marginality, compel the author to omit them from this initial analysis. However, they are addressed briefly in Chapter V.
This process yields a simple figure for assessing manpower costs. For officers in the United States Navy in fiscal year 2005, the annual cost per officer is $114,775. This includes all officers from all communities. Since all chaplains are commissioned officers, these figures apply to them. However, due to the higher-than-average education a chaplain has before he enters the military, his paygrade is often higher than that of a normally accessed officer. This skews the results of their aggregate pay figure to the right; in other words, the pay figure estimated with the above methodology is too low relative to the real figure for chaplains. In the absence of an exact amount for chaplains, the programming rate for all officers will be used.

2. Salary for Civilian Clergy

There are literally hundreds of faith groups in the United States. Even within faith groups, there are organized divisions, and the vast majority of these organizations has someone who holds an official clergy position. May, 2004 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated 35,790 employed members of the cloth. This actually seems quite small, considering that there are over two hundred thousand distinct congregations (mostly Christian) in the United States. However, the BLS estimates do not include self-employed clergy, who may comprise a significant portion of clergy nationwide.

There are large discrepancies with regard to clergy compensation. The BLS data place the mean salary at $40,000. (The May 2004 data for BLS dollar figures are aggregated across six previous semiannual periods, and benchmarked to 2004 dollars. This provides a large enough sample to maintain reliable salary estimates. To properly compare dollar amounts in 2005 dollars, this figure is inflation adjusted. This adjustment yields a BLS mean salary of $41,207.) A 2003 study on clergy compensation undertaken by the Divinity School at Duke University placed the median salary of Catholic priests at

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$25,000 and the median salary of Protestant priests at $40,000 (all salary figures reported from the Duke study include housing). The percentile salary range in this study was from $16,500 (the tenth-percentile salary for Catholics) to $68,000 (the 90th-percentile range for Protestants).\textsuperscript{35} (These figures represent data taken from the year 2000. Inflation adjusting to the year 2005 puts the Catholic median salary at $28,252, the Protestant median salary at $45,203, and the salary range from $18,646 to $76,845.) Various denominations distribute literature aimed at helping individual congregations decide how much to pay their clergy.\textsuperscript{36} Heavily regulated churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, have strict guidelines with regard to compensation and benefits (which are actually quite low). Many churches compensate their clergy in an amount commensurate with the average salary of the members of the congregation. This provides a very broad range of salaries to choose from when attempting to quantify how much the average clergy member receives.

With regard to benefits, the lack of standardization is similar. Some churches provide their clergy a housing allowance, while others provide a parsonage to live in on the grounds of the church. Some organized churches have benefits packages that rival those of some of the top Fortune 500 companies. Clergy with larger congregations seem to fare better. There are also those churches that don’t provide their clergy with any benefits whatsoever. Even though the level of education most clergy receive is on a par with professional occupations, the aggregate compensation packages equal that of social workers and school teachers. According to the Duke study, inadequate compensation of civilian clergy has driven many prospective members away from pursuing this career.

C. COMPARISON

Initially, the figures from the BLS website were used for comparison. But out of concern that many self-employed clergy were excluded from the BLS survey (this might bias the associated salary data in an unknown direction), the author decided to use the


\textsuperscript{36} An example of this is the Wisconsin Conference of the United Church of Christ Clergy Compensation Handbook for 2005 which can be accessed online at <http://www.wcucc.org/ClyComp.htm> (accessed 29 July 2005).
median Protestant salary from the Duke study, which is substantially higher than the Catholic salary. This higher salary was chosen to bias the results so as to understate the Navy’s savings from outsourcing or restructuring.

With these figures, a basic cost comparison can be accomplished. As stated above, the Navy programs a chaplain at $114,775 per year. In contrast, a civilian clergyman can expect to make about $45,000. Because the benefits packages of civilian clergy are so vague, this figure is raised by 40 percent in an attempt to bias upward the civilian compensation, which, again, will bias downward the Navy’s savings. This would bring the civilian figure to about $63,000. That amounts to an approximate $52,000 difference per year per chaplain. Even when biasing so as to create a very conservative estimate, there seem to be opportunities for a less-costly, but equally-effective, group of chaplains. The difficulty is deciding how much of a trade-off between the demonstrated cost savings and the perceived benefit losses is acceptable for the Department of the Navy. There are an infinite number of variations on outsourcing and restructuring the Chaplain Corps. These variations and their potential consequences are explored in Chapter V.

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37 There are many views regarding how much a benefits package should be as a percentage of base salary. Most documents the author encountered put this figure between 25 and 40 percent. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, visit the United States Small Business Administration website at <http://www.sba.gov/> (accessed 31 August 2005).
V. ESTIMATED GAINS FROM OUTSOURCING OR RESTRUCTURING

A. ASSUMPTIONS

In constructing a set of possible scenarios to illustrate the potential cost savings of outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps, the author must make certain assumptions. The following are a broad group of assumptions.

1. **Combat Chaplains Excluded**

   The omission of combat chaplains has been explained in Chapter I. The specific number of personnel associated with this omission is approximately 200.³⁸ This leaves about 700 chaplains to be included in the models.

2. **Shipboard Chaplains Divested**

   Approximately 100 shipboard chaplains are permanent members of a specific ship’s crew. Their duties are seldom shared with ships that do not possess these types of chaplains. Rather, there is normally a group of chaplains attached to the ship’s parent squadron that make infrequent trips among “chaplainless” ships. The existence of these roving chaplains, plus the small percentage of ships that have shipboard chaplains, plus the existence of the lay leader program make a reasonable case for the divestiture of shipboard chaplains. The roving squadron chaplains would take over the duties of shipboard chaplains and be supplemented by lay leaders in both an outsourced and a restructured scenario. Therefore, regardless of the scenario, an initial annual savings of almost $11.5 million could be realized.³⁹

3. **Recruiting, Training, and Travel Costs Remain**

   Outsourcing or restructuring would significantly decrease the number of chaplains in the United States Navy. There would be a corresponding decrease in the number of personnel required to recruit and train these chaplains, and fewer chaplains would mean

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³⁸ The numbers of personnel used for this chapter are taken from the “Yellow Pages” document within the Chaplain Corps community web pages of the Navy Knowledge Online website, <https://www.nko.navy.mil/portal/templates/page/library.jsp?foldId=libfold248061> (accessed 19 August 2005). The author personally counted chaplain billets and has approximated within a reasonable degree of accuracy. Approximation is necessary due to the transient nature of military officers, and to the transient nature of some of the job requirements (e.g. some billets are mobilized for combat in crisis situations).

³⁹ 100 (divested chaplains) X $114,775 (Navy’s annual officer programming rate) = $11,477,500.
fewer chaplains using travel funds. However, these costs would remain in part, if only to prepare the combat chaplains for their tours of duty. Additionally, the chaplains remaining to supervise the Corps would still need training in leadership and management. Therefore, it is assumed that these costs would not represent a significant savings, and would remain within the annual budget of the Navy.

4. **Sufficient Civilian Religious Infrastructure**

Most shore duty billets for chaplains are in Fleet concentration areas such as Norfolk, Virginia or San Diego, California. Some are in Washington D.C. and there are other chaplains sprinkled around the world at other bases, Naval hospitals, and training centers. The vast majority of these areas have civilian populations with associated churches, synagogues, and temples of most religious flavors. Civilian infrastructure must be sufficient to support either the types of outsourcing or restructuring that the author is presenting for review. “Sufficient” is a highly subjective term. An internet search of the greater San Diego area revealed the existence of over 400 churches. A similar search of the Norfolk area also discovered that there were over 400 churches. The author would assign these numbers to the “sufficient” category, and it is assumed that a robust network of churches currently exists around most bases.

5. **Service Member Indifference**

This is a big assumption, and one for which the author has only informal data. In order for outsourcing to be successful, the average sailor must be indifferent as to whether or not the chaplain has a commission. In order for restructuring to be successful, the average sailor must be indifferent as to whether or not services are held on the base. One chaplain with whom the author spoke lamented the lack of participation in on-base services. Informally, the author has questioned over 200 military officers at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA about their preference for a military chaplain over civilian clergy.\(^40\) Less than five percent of them used the religious services that the military provided on a regular basis, and about the same percentage of officers were indifferent as to whether or not the chaplain had a military commission. Although it is

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\(^{40}\) This informal survey was conducted over a year’s period of time, from July of 2004 to July of 2005. The author simply asked service members if they attended church at the base chapel, and if they would prefer military chaplains over civilian clergy.
difficult to support this assumption without a formal survey, it appears that many service members are indifferent about the source of religious representation.

B. OUTSOURCING

An outsourcing scenario would begin within the guidelines outlined in OMB Circular A-76. The various jobs that chaplains perform at shore establishments would be offered to the public, the bidding process would begin, and contracts would be drawn up. Based on need, the Navy could offer one-year, renewable contracts to the required number of eligible churches that are currently part of the endorsing system in place.\textsuperscript{41} These contracts would be for duty at most non-combat related establishments that currently have chaplain billets. The squadron chaplains who may visit ships could also have their jobs outsourced.\textsuperscript{42} After one year, the contracts could be renewed. From this pool of initial civilian clergy, the Navy could draw its necessary number of combat chaplains. To address career progression and rotation concerns (chaplains would not want to stay in combat billets indefinitely), certain shore billets would not be outsourced. These would include billets at recruit depots, service academies, and all levels of administration. Leaving approximately 100 shore billets to rotate into\textsuperscript{43}, and taking account of the above assumptions, would make about 500 jobs eligible for outsourcing.\textsuperscript{44} The annual savings garnered from this outsourcing would be a function of the price bid, but the figures in Chapter IV are used as a guideline. With a $52,000 difference per chaplain per year plus the $11.5 million saved from shipboard divestiture, the possible annual savings to the U.S. taxpayer is roughly $37.5 million.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} There used to be a Navy instruction, SECNAV 1730.3G, \textit{Employment of Civilian Clergy}, detailing this process. According to a senior chaplain at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, this instruction has been cancelled and the subject of contracting will be contained in a forthcoming instruction.

\textsuperscript{42} Civilian services are regularly performed onboard underway ships. The Navy College Program for Afloat College Education (NCPACE) program, where civilian college professors administer undergraduate courses onboard Navy ships, is one of these services.

\textsuperscript{43} This is admittedly a small number of rotational billets relative to other Navy communities. However, this relatively small number of rotational billets would be a strong disincentive to careerism for military chaplains.

\textsuperscript{44} 900 (current strength) – 200 (combat excluded) – 100 (shipboard divested) – 100 (rotational billets) = 500 (eligible for outsourcing).

\textsuperscript{45} 500 (outsourced chaplains) X $52K (price difference) = $26 million. Add this to $11.5 million to get $37.5 million.
1. Problems

There are some problems associated with outsourcing. One problem is that the bidding churches might not represent enough variation to establish a pluralistic environment of religious leaders. Certain churches may not find it financially worthwhile for its clergy to serve the military. For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that there are churches that have earning potential greater than the “going outsourcing rate,” and it is doubtful that they would ever offer the lowest price in a bidding situation. To make up for this shortfall, the military might have to petition certain churches for clergy who would be willing to serve at a lower-than-normal salary. This would invite charges of government establishment of religion. Another problem that would remain with outsourcing is a possible attitude of careerism. With contracts being for a finite period of time, there would be great pressure to become politically attractive as a potential returning chaplain. For those chaplains who wish to make military service a long-term venture, it is reasonable to suppose that their focus would be on maintaining their jobs at the exclusion of providing quality religious care. Despite these qualitative shortfalls of outsourcing, following this course of action would create a definite savings of tax dollars. However, there seems to be a better way to save some money, maintain religious freedoms, and avoid the entanglements of pluralism, careerism, and First Amendment issues.

C. RESTRUCTURING

A restructuring scenario would involve the divestiture of all extraneous chaplain billets. This would amount to the removal of approximately 500 jobs. Sailors would have to rely on the surrounding civilian religious infrastructure for worship opportunities. There may be some areas where there aren’t sufficient civilian resources, but they would be very few. These jobs would be added to the rotational billets for purposes outlined above. The current endorsing system would remain intact, but there would be fewer chaplains recruited each year to satisfy the combat requirements and the rotational shore requirements. An added benefit of a smaller Chaplain Corps is a smaller bureaucracy to manage it. As billets disappear, so does the requirement for oversight and supervision.

46 Recall the range of civilian clergy salaries from the Duke study in Chapter IV (Inflation adjusted: $18,646 to $76,845). The lower salaried churches could consistently outbid the higher salaried churches.
The religious infrastructure that has been constructed already is a sunk cost. Base chapels have already been paid for, and they could remain to be used as community centers. Additionally, visiting clergy from the local community could hold services there on a rotational basis, free of charge. This would solve the problem of transportation for sailors who don’t have the means to travel off base.\(^\text{47}\)

Restructuring in this way would take many years, as the Navy would most likely allow chaplains on track for retirement to finish their careers. Additionally, there would have to be a large decrease in current recruiting. The existing Corps strength of 900 would need to cycle through the series of obligated tour lengths and begin to dwindle down to the projected number of 300 military chaplains. To the U.S. taxpayer, the long-run annual savings of divesting 500 extraneous shore based chaplains could amount to over $57 million.\(^\text{48}\) Add this to the $11.5 million from the 100 shipboard chaplains already discussed, and the potential annual savings of restructuring the Chaplain Corps comes to almost $69 million.

\(^\text{47}\) When the author was discussing these issues with chaplains, the lack of transportation was often brought up as a reason to have on-base services. While the author disagrees that this is a problem (most junior enlisted have, if nothing else, a vehicle), the “problem” could be solved by bringing civilian clergy onto the base if needed. Many civilian pastors and priests with whom the author spoke had regularly donated their services at some point in their careers.

\(^\text{48}\) 500 (divested chaplains) \(\times\) $114,775 (Navy’s annual officer programming rate) = $57,387,500.
VI. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO CHANGE

A. SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Special interest groups are often called by other names: pressure groups, lobbyists, trade associations, labor unions, particularistic groups, or, simply, interest groups. A special interest group is a collection of like-minded people who seek to influence the government in some fashion. The term “special” is used because the issues that the group is concerned about disproportionately affect the members of that group, relative to nonmembers. For instance, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), a powerful labor union, favors high tariffs and trade barriers on imported steel. This creates higher prices for American steel consumers, but significantly increases employment and wages for American steel producers. The significant benefits per member of the USWA create incentives to pursue these trade barriers, while the cost of the price increase per individual consumer is not significant enough for him to expend energy opposing the trade barriers.\(^{49}\) Similarly, the cost per American taxpayer to maintain the Chaplain Corps is small compared with the benefit per military chaplain.

There are a couple of broad reasons for creating special interest groups: (1) dissatisfaction with current government policy or (2) the desire to maintain current government policy. The goal of these groups is often to maintain a given share of a government budget or, perhaps, to increase that share. Interest groups are arguably a necessary function within a democratic society that champions the free exercise of ideas and espouses a concern for diverse viewpoints. They are mentioned here not to make a value judgment about special interest groups, but to classify the behavior of the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps as similar to the behavior of these groups. This special interest behavior can be an obstacle to change and, for change to happen, this obstacle must be addressed.

\(^{49}\) For the classic view of special interest group motivation, see Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action*, Harvard University Press, 1965.
1. The Chaplain Coalition

Disgruntled taxpayers have challenged the constitutionality of military chaplaincy in the past, but various court opinions have upheld the legitimacy of military chaplains by virtue of the military lifestyle.\textsuperscript{50} It is reasonable to assume that these types of challenges serve to create bonds among military chaplains. It affords them a common cause against which to rally.

The Military Chaplains’ Association of the United States of America (MCA) is a non-profit group in Washington, D.C. that represents the interests of chaplains in all of the Armed Services, the National Guard, the Civil Air Patrol, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. It was established in 1925 and granted a federal charter by Congress in 1950. The MCA refers to itself as a “professional support organization,” an “advocacy group,” and “the voice of the chaplaincy.”\textsuperscript{51} In other words, it is a lobbying organization that protects the interests, as its executive sees them, of military chaplains nationwide. Among all other military occupational communities, it is unique; that is, no other organization like it exists to represent a particular military occupation before Congress.\textsuperscript{52}

B. CREATING VALUE IN THE 21\textsuperscript{ST} CENTURY NAVY

In 2002, then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, unveiled a new vision for the transformation of Navy and Marine Corps forces. This new vision, called \textit{Sea Power 21}, called for sweeping changes in the way the Department of the Navy approached its offensive, defensive, and joint operating capabilities.\textsuperscript{53} Additionally, \textit{Sea Power 21} outlined projected changes in the organizational processes of manpower, personnel, and training. \textit{Sea Warrior} and the \textit{Human Capital Strategy} were touted as methods to streamline the force in ways that fully optimized Navy personnel. Much of

\textsuperscript{50} See the opinions of \textit{Katcoff v. Marsh} 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) or \textit{Township v. Schempp} 374 U.S. 203 (1963), both of which defended the military chaplaincy on the basis that instances of military service prohibited the free exercise of religion, and that military chaplains existed to support that free exercise.

\textsuperscript{51} Its website contains detailed information about the organization and can be found at \texttt{<http://www.mca-usa.org/>} (accessed 08 September 2005).

\textsuperscript{52} There are groups such as the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars that represent service members as a whole, but military chaplains have created an exclusive group.

\textsuperscript{53} The October 2002 issue of \textit{Proceedings} magazine outlines this vision in its infancy: \texttt{<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/proCNO10.htm>} (accessed 08 September 2005). To date, Sea Power 21 has gone through transformations of its own, and continues to direct the strategic course of the present day Navy.
the fine print of this initiative was related to downsizing. In the enlisted realm, there were programs created to strip job specialties of unnecessary personnel. Presently, ships continue to lose manpower as technology replaces large crews.

This transformation led the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps, just as it led other Navy communities, to assert and attempt to maintain its own value within this new paradigm. In April 2005, Chief of Chaplains, Rear Admiral Louis Iasiello distributed White Letter #7, his plan for a value-added 21st century Chaplain Corps. This document outlined the future of the Corps as a function of Sea Power 21 and the Sea Warrior initiatives. A Human Care Strategy was devised and the whole process was termed Sea Chaplaincy 21. Additionally, this letter outlined an indistinct bureaucracy in order to make the Chaplain Corps “an operational-centric staff corps,” and, in order to implement this new plan, it gave a timeline of “months and perhaps years.”

Basically, the Chaplain Corps is attempting to create a Sea Warrior Ministry Council (SWMC) in numerous geographic areas. Each SWMC would direct the actions of the next level of chaplains, the Operational Ministry Center (OMC). An OMC would be part of a Regional Support Organization responsible for the operational support of all ships within its purview. The senior chaplain within the OMC would direct the actions of an RMT by sending chaplains where they are needed within the operational spectrum (e.g. assignment to a Carrier Strike Group). Additionally, a Regional Ministry Center (RMC) would be implemented alongside the OMC in order to provide shore services for that area’s community of service members and their families. This entire process is supposed to “meet the emergent needs of the Sea Services in transition [and] build on the legacy of the past with eyes focused on the future.”

1. Old Wine, New Bottles

Sea Chaplaincy 21 does not seem to be a more streamlined, value-added approach to ministry. In short, it appears to be an opportunity to create more chaplains and more

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55 The locations of these SWMCs are Norfolk, VA, Mayport, FL, Groton, CT, San Diego, CA, Bremerton, WA, Pearl Harbor, HI, and Yokosuka, Japan.

56 See Chapter 3, Section A3, Religious Duties.
bureaucracy designed to preserve the legacy of military chaplaincy. Although the focus of *Sea Chaplaincy 21* is supposed to be on operational factors, there is no mention within the document of restructuring the already-oversized shore contingent of the Chaplain Corps. In fact, some of the shore billets that currently exist were created simply to manage its sheer size. Instead of having one central bureaucracy in Washington D.C., *Sea Chaplaincy 21* intends to create six more all over the country in the form of these SWMCs. Layer upon layer of administration is forecasted in order to deliver more ministry to the sailors and their families. By stating the timeline for implementation in terms of years, the Chaplain Corps appears to be readying itself for future scrutiny. Patience will potentially be requested from manpower planners so that the *Human Care Strategy* has time to flourish, as all the while the Corps grows. Ultimately, this new and improved Chaplain Corps does not seem to offer anything new but packaging.

Perhaps this assessment is too harsh. The author does not begrudge the Chaplain Corps in its quest for relevance. It is human nature to fight for existence, and the members of the Corps are acting accordingly. However, if any real change is to be effected, the motives behind the Chaplain Corps’ actions must be clarified. The interests of the few seem to be to charge the many (taxpayers) for potentially unnecessary services. As the Department of the Navy downsizes and optimizes its forces, so must the Chaplain Corps.
VII. CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

A. WANTS VERSUS NEEDS

This paper has addressed the issue of military chaplains from many angles: economic, pragmatic, emotional, and rational. Underlying the entire debate is the concept of limited resources. With enough resources, the United States Navy could fund many valuable quality-of-life programs that would benefit service members in positive and meaningful ways. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Defense resources are limited, and manpower planners must decide which programs are “wants” and which ones are “needs.” Ultimately, in a defense setting where fighting and winning the nation’s wars are the military’s primary functions\(^\text{57}\), comprehensive religious care for everyone is not a core competency.

The author has shown that service members’ religious freedoms need not be attended to by commissioned officers. Religious tasks are remarkably similar among military chaplains and civilian clergy. The assumption that military expertise is required for effective ministry to service members is mistaken; civilian clergy readily minister to service members every day. The opportunity to worship freely in civilian settings is a viable alternative to inclusive chaplaincy programs at every military installation. Although pluralism is necessary for such a diverse constituency as the United States military, a pluralistic religious market is alive and well in the private sector. Perhaps it is a good idea for military members to go off-base to integrate with their surrounding communities; this interaction would help bridge the often-touted civil-military gap.

Fiscally, the potential savings associated with restructuring are significant. With perhaps little or no change in the quality of religious services, the savings would be tens of millions of dollars per year. Efficient practices and conscientious accounting are vital for the continued support of the nation’s people. Optimizing manpower and removing the bureaucracy associated with the Chaplain Corps is a sensible response to the needs of the taxpayers and to the mandates of current Naval leadership.

\(^{57}\) Taken from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, page 2, which states that “the Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win wars.”
The military chaplaincy’s defense of its own position within the military should be recognized as an attempt at maintaining its current billet structure, and subsequently causing an unnecessary pull on the public purse. It is the author’s view that the majority of Navy chaplains are miscoded as militarily essential, and their ranks will continue to grow under their new vision for the 21st century. If this paper does nothing else, it is the author’s hope that it will at least remove the notion that the necessity of military chaplains in all settings is a foregone conclusion. The United States taxpayers, who, incidentally, include U.S. service members, deserve a thorough auditing of Chaplain Corps’ billets in the spirit of OMB’s duty to reduce unnecessary burdens on the public.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Throughout the course of this research, the author found numerous areas in which further analysis could add depth to the subject of religious representation within the military. Although not exhaustive, the following list of topics is relevant for future discussions of resource allocation.

1. Fleetwide Survey

Informal surveys (like the author’s) are often dismissed in favor of more scientific analysis in which questions are carefully worded and responses are meticulously recorded. A significant source of validity could be gained by conducting a fleetwide survey that encompasses a large cross section of the military population. Simple questions could be asked relating to religious preferences and the average use of base religious ministries. To avoid ambiguity, service members could be asked outright if they would support a manpower reduction in the current Chaplain Corps. With information like this, manpower planners would at least know, with a degree of accuracy, the needs of the average service member with regard to military chaplains.

2. Total Force Review

If an interested reader decides that the author’s viewpoint is valid, a logical next step would be to review the chaplaincies in all of the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force maintain sizable numbers of chaplains, and if the Navy decides to divest its chaplains, the other services could follow suit. This study examined only active duty chaplains; Selected Reserve chaplains could be included. Additionally, federal
chaplains assigned to federal institutions (like the Department of Veterans Affairs) could be analyzed, as tax dollars also fund these chaplains.

Another interesting idea would be to investigate the possibility of one Chaplain Corps, assignable to any service as needed. Surely, the dispersed efforts of military chaplains could be consolidated. If a chaplain must wear a uniform, it does not make sense for the uniform to be specific. A concentrated total force Chaplain Corps might be welcome in this era of transformation and joint operational emphasis.

3. Religious Program Specialists

If the Navy restructured its Chaplain Corps, it would also have to restructure the Corps’ enlisted counterpart, the Religious Program Specialist (RP) rating. There are approximately 900 RPs on active duty and this number would decline; fewer chaplains would require fewer RPs. There would be additional savings that the author has not addressed. The Navy Yeoman rating historically covered the duties that are now performed by RPs (except for the U.S. Marine Corps, which used a Marine soldier to accompany the chaplain), so a case could be made for the divestiture of the RP rating. A follow-on study might include a logical restructuring of this enlisted community, and the impact that it may have on service members.
LIST OF REFERENCES


United States Code, Title 10, Section 5142. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains.


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