NATURAL ALLIES?
REGIONAL SECURITY IN ASIA AND PROSPECTS
FOR INDO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Stephen J. Blank

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FOREWORD

One of the hallmarks of the two Bush administrations’ foreign and defense policies has been a growing rapprochement with India. Indeed, in June 2005 the U.S. Government signed a defense agreement with that country. In part, this rapprochement is driven by and coincides with India’s increasingly visible role as a major Asian power. This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The author, Dr. Stephen Blank, also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he also provides a strategic rationale for the development of the partnership to date and for its further evolution.

Numerous analyses of current global trends point to the rise of India as a major transformation in world politics. This work underscores India’s importance and provides a basis for understanding why its relationship to the United States is and will become ever more critical.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
SUMMARY

Indo-American relations increasingly comprise expanded strategic and economic ties. India’s government, led by Prime Minister Mammonhan Singh, has stated its intention to intensify these ties with America. Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For example, President Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the gains achieved since 2001 as a priority.

Prime Minister Singh has invited the President to India. President Bush has indicated his intention to go there, leading Indian analysts to expect that, “What we are going to see is a consolidation of Indo-U.S. ties on a range of strategic issues. We may see a greater emphasis on economic ones as well.”

The Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms sales to India. This deal has many repercussions across the entire range of Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships with a host of important foreign governments like Russia, China, Pakistan, and Israel. Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic foundations of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.

This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South East Asia. The author also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he provides a strategic rationale developing the U.S.-India partnership further.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since 1997, the Clinton and Bush administrations have searched for ways to initiate and sustain a lasting improvement in Indo-American relations.\(^1\) India has reciprocated this search today, even though it changed governments in its 2004 elections—replacing the A.B. Vajpayee administration and the coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with the Congress Party-led coalition, many of whose members are rather more opposed to U.S. policies. Both sides now proclaim that their relations are better than ever.\(^2\) Indeed, in 1998, soon after India’s nuclear tests forced the Clinton administration to impose congressionally-mandated sanctions upon India, Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed the two states to be natural allies.\(^3\) Since then, their mutual rapprochement has led to the lifting of these sanctions and the start of meaningful economic and technological cooperation, with the distinct possibility of expanded bilateral military cooperation.\(^4\) These steps reflect America’s gradual reorientation of its policies towards India and show that Indo-American relations increasingly comprise expanded strategic and economic ties.

India’s government, led by Prime Minister Mamonhan Singh, similarly has stated its intention to intensify both strategic and economic ties with America.\(^5\) Therefore, today there are grounds for optimism concerning the future development of this relationship. Due to these trends, Indian elites believe and have told Americans that great possibilities are in store for a relationship that they now deem to be “irreversible.” Indeed, during 2003, if not since then, American and Indian officials discussed a possible “Asian NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)” although the content of these discussions and of India’s significance for them has not been made public.\(^6\) Thus G. V. C. Naidu’s recent study of Indian policy in Southeast Asia, an important region for both Washington and New Delhi, states that, “Whether with regard to the U.S., Japan, or Southeast Asia, policymakers appear to be convinced that an
enduring bilateral relationship cannot be built unless underpinned by strategic ties.”

Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For example, President Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the gains achieved since 2001 as a priority of his next term. Indian observers were also pleased by President Bush’s re-election since they expressed some concern about a possible Kerry presidency, given his comments about outsourcing jobs to India and the past record of some of Senator Kerry’s foreign policy advisors. Indeed, Prime Minister Singh lost no time in congratulating President Bush and inviting him to India as soon as he can come. President Bush recently reiterated his intention to go to India, leading Indian analysts to expect that, “What we are going to see is a consolidation of Indo-U.S. ties on a range of strategic issues. We may see a greater emphasis on economic ones as well.” This emphasis on economic issues appears to be in tune with the administration’s thinking and, as we shall see below, with much expert opinion as well. More recently it has also become clear that the Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms sales to India. This deal (the details and specific ramifications of which are discussed below) has many repercussions across the entire range of Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships with a host of important foreign governments like Russia, China, Pakistan, and Israel. Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic foundations of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.
CHAPTER 2

BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES TO PARTNERSHIP

One reason for reinforcing U.S.-Indian ties is the persisting and troubling reality that this strategic partnership remains a precarious one that has yet to reach its full strategic potential. Indeed, several observers fear that this relationship is presently treading water.\textsuperscript{12} Others point to continuing Indian suspicions that Washington places a higher priority upon working with Pakistan than it does with India. So, for example, distinguished Indian commentator C. Raja Mohan recently wrote that,

Washington’s decision, for whatever reason, to discreetly handle the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair—the so-called father of the Pakistani bomb whose extensive network of nuclear proliferation was unveiled earlier this year—confirms New Delhi’s assessment that Washington will allow Islamabad to get away with anything.\textsuperscript{13}

Such suspicions unfortunately are congenital, given the zero-sum nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. Nor does the gap in perceptions among American officials, who see Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism as being crucial, while India is an informal ally that provides important but indirect support to this war, make it easier to enhance the very real strategic partnership that exists between New Delhi and Washington.\textsuperscript{14}

Likewise, both India’s and Pakistan’s readiness to insist that Washington support one of them at the other’s expense inserts a “hyphen into the relationship” despite the professed statements of all three governments in this triangle that they want a relationship that is based on an independent calculation of interests, capabilities, etc. Thus Indo-Pakistani frictions dog many, if not all, of the issues on the Indo-American agenda and, when added to the perception of Pakistan’s criticality for the war on terrorism, the ensuing “hyphenization” of U.S. policy retards the full progress of partnership with India.\textsuperscript{15} Hence, one reason for the new offer on arms sales appears to be an attempt to remove India’s unhappiness about recent
disclosures of impending arms sales to Pakistan of almost $1 Billion made up of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles; Phalanx shipborne guns; and P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol strike aircraft. F-16 planes that were ordered earlier and withheld due to sanctions evidently will also be released to Pakistan as well.¹⁶

Nevertheless, U.S. concessions to Pakistan that are not balanced or appear not to be balanced by due regard for Indian interests, sensitivities, and perceptions inevitably will cause bitterness in New Delhi. Announcing Pakistan’s status as a non-NATO ally, making it eligible for weapons like the F-16 that India cannot get, and doing so immediately after Secretary Powell left India without telling it what was happening caused an explosion earlier in 2004. Indeed, it flew in the face of the recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Task Force on South Asia that recommended giving India the status of a friendly country for purposes of negotiating export licenses on defense technology.¹⁷ Moreover, this explosion was entirely foreseeable, and thus the failure to anticipate it suggested a neglect of, or lack of concern for, India or was seen as such. So, as long as Indian policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not accept that their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed, taking India’s interests into account and not taking it for granted is what this partnership must be about on a day-to-day basis.

Bureaucratic failures are also distressingly common. Pentagon officials involved with Indian affairs confess that they lack strategic guidance as to the long-range strategic purpose of this expanding relationship, and this hesitancy invariably translates into policy on the ground and allocation of resources for purposes of policymaking as conducted by Department of Defense (DoD) personnel.¹⁸ As a result, despite expanding bilateral military cooperation that includes a growing number of combined exercises involving all the services of both states’ armed forces and which are moving from tactical cooperation to operational cooperation entailing larger units and standardization of operational procedures among them, those involved in planning and coordinating them find it difficult to discern a strategic rationale for this relationship or those exercises besides the sheer fact of their existence.¹⁹ Consequently, bilateral
military cooperation drives the bilateral relationship but does so in the absence of a sufficiently robust economic or political and strategic dimension. Not surprisingly, this perception confirms the notion that the bilateral relationship is treading water or stagnating at a plateau.20

Fundamental differences of approach to India between and within the relevant cabinet departments of the U.S. Government: State, Energy, Commerce, and Defense, as well as within the Congress, clearly obstruct this relationship’s full development.21 The Democratic Party and the State Department tend to view India through the lens of nonproliferation priorities, whereas the administration and the Pentagon see India as part of the most dynamic strategic region in the world, i.e., Asia, and as an economic and strategic partner of the United States. Without determining whether either outlook is justified or correct, it is clear that State Department officials have obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing it through the withholding of conventional arms and military technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations with India which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003 but also relief from existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and discussions with India on missile defense.

The State Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to arraign India for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of frustration to Indians, especially as they view technology transfer and the ending of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales as touchstones of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s opposition to according India formal status as a nuclear power, clearly a sign that Beijing still seeks to confine India to a lower, purely regional, status as an Asian player while it reaps the benefits and status of being a recognized nuclear power.22 From India’s standpoint, such a ranking is intolerable, both politically and psychologically. At the same time, neither does the State Department’s stance preclude
India’s nuclearization or the development of its weapons arsenal, since there are others who will gladly produce whatever Washington denies. As C. Raja Mohan observes,

The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the international architecture constructed to manage WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation; and belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic partnership with New Delhi.23

Ultimately, the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints on its nuclear programs. Thus it represents a policy of feeling virtuous rather than doing the right thing strategically, since there is no evidence that withholding that status has stopped other powers from proliferating; quite the opposite. Therefore, Indian elites, be they important correspondents and observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military personnel like an admiral whom Juli MacDonald interviewed in her published study of Indo-American strategic perceptions, all speak bluntly about the consequences of the State Department’s and general bureaucratic obstruction here.24 C. Raja Mohan writes that,

Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the Bush administration. Many officials at the political level in Washington recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities, by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will likely remain on paper.25

Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,

Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S. policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other
While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key factor in influencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy clearly are regarded by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation.

Another problem relates to India’s placement within the combatant commands of U.S. forces. Bureaucratic hurdles that place India in U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) and the rest of South Asia and Central Asia in U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) AOR appear to Indian leaders and elites to create their own sense of disjunction in American policy. Thus Arun Sahgal, the first director of India’s Office of Net Assessment in India’s Joint Staff, writes that Indian policymakers and elites are particularly dismayed by the strategic rationale of dealing with PACOM when India’s central concerns lie in CENTCOM.

Moreover, increasingly visible structural faults in the institutions responsible for planning U.S. strategy and policy, regardless of which party leads the government, impede the formulation and implementation of a coherent national security strategy (NSS) in general or toward any country in particular. The failure to impart strategic guidance concerning an increasingly critical relationship to key Pentagon offices in and of itself betrays a policy failure. Worse yet, some prominent past American policymakers disdain the very idea of a strategic approach to world affairs.

Warren Christopher once declared that the United States did not have an overall strategy and, moreover, was not going to get one during his tenure as Secretary of State (1993-97). He had learned as a lawyer, he said proudly, that it was best to handle issues case-by-case as they arose. National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger (1997-2001) has said the same thing, doubting whether anything as grand as “grand strategy” ever really existed.

More recently, General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret), the Commander of CENTCOM in 1997-2000 wrote that,
The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision of all the strategies, from the President’s to the CINC’s [Combatant Commanders in Chief of major U.S. commands like CENTCOM] a reality. There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate the significant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoordinated funding, policy decisions, authority, assigned geography, and many other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security Council, and other government agencies, and made it difficult to pull complex engagement plans together. To further complicate matters, the CINCs don’t control their own resources. Their budgets come out of the service budgets, and these are controlled by the Service Chiefs (who are also double-hatted as the Joint Chiefs), who understandably don’t want to give up their resources to the CINCs. The Service Chiefs have minimal interest in, and little insight into, engagement programs. They’re trying to run their services, and that job’s hard enough without other burdens. Their purpose and function is to train, organize, and equip forces for the CINCS, but what they actually want to do is provide these forces where, when, and how they see best. In other words, CINCS are demanding forces and resources for purposes that the Service Chiefs may not support. Thus the CINC is an impediment—and even a threat—and the rising power of the CINCs reduces the powers of the Service Chiefs. It’s a zero-sum game. Looking at the problem from the other side, the CINCs see the Service Chiefs as standing in the way of what they desperately need; and they are frustrated by the chiefs’ inability to fully cooperate with them or support their strategies. The CINCs want to see their money identified and set aside in a specific budget line, so they know what they have. For all kinds of reasons, the Department of Defense is reluctant to do this. The result is a constant friction between the CINCs and Washington.29

It is unlikely that U.S. policy toward India has escaped these pervasive dysfunctionalities in policymaking.30 And these problems come with costs. For example, at least one assessment observes that due to the perception that Washington will not rein in Pakistan, “Indian leaders are skeptical about U.S. counterterrorism objectives and have dropped references to a ‘strategic’ relationship in which the United States and India would work together to keep peace in the Indian Ocean littoral area.”31 Although for every proposed alternative to the current system, there is a good counterargument, because whatever line of structural and policy reform we take imposes costs and forecloses other options, the current system imposes significant costs upon U.S. policy. It perplexes Indians who want this partnership to grow and expand, creating opportunities for friction and mistrust to erode it. The structural problems cited here (as well
as their opposite numbers in India) also lead to a situation where policy emerges in an ad hoc, incremental, uncoordinated manner that appears to foreign observers as being essentially incoherent, if not inchoate. Meanwhile, our bureaucratic obstructions make it difficult for us to respond to India’s agenda. Similar problems may affect India’s ability to respond to our agenda, if it can discern that agenda. Thus both sides fail to harvest the maximum possible gains from a truly strategic partnership, leaving the door open to an erosion or reversal of recent trends, as there are many skeptics concerning this relationship in both countries.\textsuperscript{32}

Therefore, the question posed here is stark in its simplicity. On what basis can an enduring and solid strategic partnership with India be built and sustained, and what should be its parameters? In other words, this monograph strives to present a compelling strategic rationale for that partnership which is otherwise apparently still lacking, at least in Washington. While India and America are the two largest democracies in the world, that is not enough to justify or sustain a genuine strategic partnership. Neither does an expanding bilateral military relationship suffice to do so in the absence of a strong political and economic dimension to the relationship. For example, the two states’ past relations until the 1990s were not very friendly at all.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, their foreign policy values and approaches are by no means identical. Therefore sharp disputes can still arise, even on important issues, e.g., Iraq.\textsuperscript{34} As Prime Minister Singh recently admitted, invocations of shared democracy or democratic values alone are not enough to provide a foundation for the bilateral relationship, let alone sustain it.\textsuperscript{35} While those expressions of shared values are necessary, always appear as reasons for close relations, and can buttress a partnership based on shared and common interests, they cannot substitute for them.\textsuperscript{36}

Accordingly, the argument presented here is that a basis for enduring security cooperation and partnership must be found, first, in the recognition of shared tangible interests, particularly shared regional interests in key areas of Asia: South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and to some degree, even the Gulf. These are the key regions in which India sees itself as a power of rising influence and capability beyond South Asia. Such an argument must also take into
account India’s rising value as a strategic partner to the United States in Asia. Its economy is expected to grow 6.5 percent in 2004 and has averaged 8 percent annual growth in recent years. It possesses the world’s third largest Air Force and fourth largest Army, both of which are of high quality as attested to by Americans who work with them. Their Navy is also an important player with growing capabilities and ambitions. Similarly, the Indian Army is moving toward network centric warfare as is the U.S. Army, and on several key points its new military doctrine appears to parallel American visions of the nature of future war. India also has convergent strategic interests with the United States. These go beyond defeating terrorism, which is a rising threat all along India’s peripheries, to encompass the safety of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and energy security throughout the Indian Ocean, opposition to nuclear proliferation, and a rising concern despite improving relations with China’s rising power. Both governments are also meeting to discuss threats to stability in South Asia: Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. They seek a freer world trading system and an equitable and permanent peace in the Middle East. As former Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage told the Indian newspaper, The Hindu,

India is soon to be the largest country in the world in terms of population, you have a key geo-strategic location; a large growing middle class; a multiethnic, multireligious society; and a democracy. These are the type of societies that should, we believe, stand as a beacon to the world. We are the same—just a several thousand miles away—a multireligious, multiethnic democracy. To the extent we can both be anchors of stability in our various regions, we raise the level of achievement of mankind and lower the possibilities of conflict.

Armitage similarly emphasized that for this partnership to flourish, it must be based on both sides’ common needs and interests, and not just be a partnership or kind of alliance against a third party. Consequently, the Bush administration understands that this partnership must have a positive agenda to move forward and pay dividends for both sides. At the same time, however, Armitage’s rationale for the new partnership heavily emphasizes the idealistic, even moralizing, tendency so visible in the Bush administration’s national security policies.
Given India’s rising capability in economics and military affairs that increasingly enables it to affect outcomes and influence trends in these three regions, virtually all of India’s foreign and defense policy elite demands recognition of India’s interests throughout Asia and a similar acknowledgement of its stature as a key player there. For example, India’s new Army doctrine states that,

The Indian Ocean region . . . assumes strategic significance due to the high volume of Indian international trade transiting through . . . By virtue of her size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean region, India is expected to play her rightful role to ensure peace and stability in it.44

Equally important, India has reached a stage where it has strategic autonomy. It can make partnerships with whomever it pleases, as its recent agreement for strategic partnership with the European Union (EU) shows.45 Indeed, analysts have recently discerned a Russo-American rivalry for influence upon India over a host of issues: India’s application for a seat on the Security Council, weapons sales and technology transfer to India, and trade and investment issues.46 Similarly, India’s Ambassador to Moscow Kanwal Sibal has stated that India wants to invest in Russian oil fields and move beyond importing Russian military technology and equipment to participating in joint studies and development of new technologies. And India successfully gained much of what it wanted at the December 3-4, 2004, summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.47 These rivalries, and India’s ability to exploit them, illustrate its growing clout and influence in both regional and global affairs. Major players are already making such deals with India, underscoring the fact that India is already, and will become even more, the predominant regional power throughout the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it will be able to conduct its security policy as it sees fit, with whomever it deems appropriate. There is nothing we can do to stop this from happening, though we could delay it if we chose and thus incur enormous Indian resentment. Nonetheless, that would be a fruitless policy as the whole effort to impose sanctions indicates. Indeed, that policy would be against our own best interests as it could lead India to form a bloc for global multipolarity with Russia and China, i.e., to realize former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov’s fundamentally anti-American vision of a strategic triangle.48 The same holds true for civilian and
military technology transfer as well as arms sales. At the same time, because the regions of critical Indian interests are those where American power runs up against its limits, as we have learned from bitter experience in Vietnam and now again in Iraq, both states have vital interests in these areas that they cannot realize unilaterally. Therefore, they need help to realize those interests from like-minded governments who share those interests and who can do something positive towards those ends. From our standpoint, India certainly meets that requirement concerning the Gulf, Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

American experts and officials acknowledge that,

India is in the middle of a lengthy process of moving from the status of a defensive sub-regional middle power, without a clear security strategy, to that of a more offensive-minded major power, with nuclear weapons, with interests to defend in Southeast Asia and the Middle East [we may also add Central Asia — author] and with China as a competitor.

Moreover, it is increasingly obvious to security professionals that our own and India’s positions in Central Asia, and in the South Asian subcontinent, are interconnected geographically. For example, Sir John Thomson, a former British High Commissioner to India, has written that,

The geographical definition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any doubt before, September 11 [2001] has made it clear that we have to take into account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west; all the former Soviet republics to the north; and China to the east. The geographical context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say — sincerely, I believe — that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling disaster in Israel-Palestine.

Similarly, Celeste Wallander of Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, observes that,

When terrorism vaulted to the top of the U.S. priority list, many very important issues seemed to disappear from view. They are coming back, and are likely to affect U.S. policy and options in the region. The India-Pakistan relationship is one important issue that has not gone away, and
which has the potential to significantly alter the working status quo of the
U.S. Central Asian presence. If war between Pakistan and India makes
South Asia a zone of conflict, a U.S. presence in Central Asia becomes
all the more important. . . . A U.S. stake in India and South Asia is likely
to reinforce the trend toward long-term importance of strategic and
economic interests for the United States in Central Asia, by extending the
reach and scope of interests beyond narrow counterterrorism and energy
development.52

These insights show how American and Indian interests are
tied inextricably to both states’ pursuit of important and even vital
interests in more distant theaters, and thus they also underscore the
strategic rationale for Indo-American strategic partnership. Stated
bluntly, we need Indian support throughout much of Asia, as much
if not more than India needs our support. We need tangible Indian
support because our strategic interests and objectives are global,
while the military and other means at our disposal to pursue them
are not keeping pace, creating a gap between ends and means in
our overall NSS. Even the Pentagon’s new basing proposals, which
envision differing kinds of “operating sites” primarily focusing on
Asian issues do not go far enough to overcome this gap.

Even more worrisome, American force posture remains
dangerously thin in the arc—many thousands of miles long—
between Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Okinawa and Guam
in the Pacific. Although there is hope of securing a basing agreement
with Canberra for a site or sites in northern Australia, the multiple
national security threats in the Asia-Pacific region—from the
potential destabilization of Pakistan or Indonesia by radical Islam
to Chinese military aggression against Taiwan—argue for a more
robust deployment of American land forces in the region.53

Key policymakers and analysts, who were instrumental in forging
the better ties with India after 2001, clearly think along the same lines.
Even before September 11, they advanced these arguments in the
expert literature and in policy circles. Before he came to India, former
Ambassador Robert Blackwill argued that America and its Asian
allies—Australia, South Korea, and Japan—should “collaborate to
promote strategic stability in South Asia and to give greater weight
to India’s role in Asia and in international institutions.”54

Ashley Tellis, who served as Blackwill’s deputy in New Delhi in
2001-03, argues that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence
of Indo-American aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of labor between them concerning the regional priorities each one will face in Asia. Thus, India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue of its economic and military superiority that translate into geopolitical primacy there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the smaller states of the region, and influence outcomes to some degree in more outlying, but still relatively near, areas like Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly it will have something like a veto power over South Asian developments. At the same time, in those Asian areas of critical significance to vital U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources, including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain a peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its influence even if it is limited. And that influence can help advance shared bilateral interests if relations with New Delhi are adroitly managed. These areas and issues include the security of the Persian Gulf; freedom of navigation in Southeast Asian waters; protection of Taiwan; and the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri, war on terrorism. In these areas, he writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities and resources between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark as to render Indian preferences entirely irrelevant. Yet,

In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically magnified if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S. operational burdens, provide the United States with those benefits arising from more robust international solidarity, and, in the process, actually enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.

Cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to both states’ benefit as we are seeing in India’s significant assistance to the United States in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

Finally, Tellis even more tellingly observed that,

Indian power will be most relevant in those geographic and issue-areas lying in the “interstices” of Asian geopolitics. The term interstice is loosely used here to denote those geographic, political, or ideational issues lying along the fracture lines separating the continent’s most powerful and significant geostrategic problems. In those areas, great power interests are neither obvious nor vital. Consequently, their incentives to enforce
certain preferred outcomes unilaterally are poor. In such circumstances, rising powers like India can make a difference because their substantial though still not dominant, capabilities can swing the balance in favor of one coalition or another, depending on the actors, issues, and circumstances concerned. Thus, for example, in geographic areas like Central Asia, Afghanistan [after the end of hostilities—author—Tellis’ argument predated September 11], and the island states in the Indian Ocean, and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment, Indian resources and commitments could make a significant difference to the final outcomes obtained.58

Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the relationship will not only benefit India but also the United States. First, Indian power will be felt most directly in areas where the United States has few vital interests and, consequently, the possibility of friction between the United States and India is minimized. Second, both in the interstices of and in the core of Asian and global geopolitics, U.S. and Indian interests have gradually converged and, with the ending of the Cold War, the structural distortions that bedeviled U.S.-Indian relations have almost entirely disappeared. Third, on many issues of great importance to the United States—the balance of power in Asia, the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the rise of religious and secular extremism—Indian interests invariably dovetail with those of the United States and, as a result, are likely to evoke active Indian support.59

Despite the compelling strategic arguments for Indo-American strategic partnership based on these hard strategic realities, too much of recent U.S.-India relations shows a focus instead on issues of nuclear testing, nonproliferation, arms control, and efforts to induce India to place its nuclear weapons program under some form of international and U.S. regulation, if not control.60 Despite the vital importance of preventing South Asian rivalries from “going critical,” that focus works against enduring partnership with India and concentrates relations and governmental attention on those issues which most divide Washington from New Delhi. As Polly Nayak of the Clinton administration observed, “In late 1997, the White House had decided to make India the lynchpin of its South Asia policy and to replace its nonproliferation focus which the Indians hated, with a multifaceted approach in which they were sure the Indians would
welcome under any government.”

Therefore, even with the best will in the world, a focus on those issues impedes the formation of an enduring strategic partnership and multiplies opportunities for bilateral discord. Under those circumstances, success in building a lasting partnership then comes to depend on the good will, personal strength, and vision of politicians in both countries who must override key lobbies that oppose their vision to achieve any part of it. Partnership under those circumstances becomes inherently precarious and fragile, subject to revision, if not erosion, at the first sign of a domestic crisis in either capital or a dispute between the governments.

A focus on common interests and activities based on shared perceptions of regional interests and issues that arises out of a comprehensive and ongoing strategic dialogue would strengthen the domestic proponents and lobbies who support partnership and build good will based on common experiences when difficult issues arise. Given the GWOT’s long-term character, it might also be possible to broaden both Washington’s and Delhi’s engagement with Islamabad so that the really difficult issues in the Indo-Pakistani relationship might be dealt with after successful discussion of less neuralgic and therefore potentially commonly perceived questions. For these reasons, this monograph focuses on the key regions where India intends to display its capabilities, power, and defense of its interests beyond the South Asian subcontinent to include Central Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia, and the issues of arms sales and defense technology transfer between the United States, its allies (particularly Israel), and India. While the author does not slight the importance of nuclear issues in this relationship, they have been covered exhaustively in the extensive literature on proliferation and nuclear issues in South Asia.

India’s Perspectives.

Neither is this a purely American perspective. In 2001, as Indian officials began to respond to the Bush administration’s first initiatives on the way to partnership, they stated then that they had a definite agenda for bilateral cooperation. Already in April 2001, when the
administration made its first overtures to New Delhi, highly-placed Indian sources told the Indian media what those principles and goals were and the premises of their talks with the U.S. Government. The four principles upon which these talks were premised were:

- “India saw itself as a key player which had a rightful place in influencing the global system.”

- Though it was keen on developing a positive and equal relationship with Washington, New Delhi would not compromise upon sovereignty. It was not seeking “alliance” but rather a durable “partnership where security cooperation played a prominent role.”

- India wanted Washington to recognize that Indian strategic interests extended well beyond South Asia to encompass what it now calls an extended strategic neighborhood from the Suez Canal to the Strait of Malacca, an area encompassing the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. “In other words, the U.S., while fulfilling its global obligations, should factor in India’s aspirations and autonomy in this zone.”

- While desiring greater military-technological cooperation and transfers from Washington, India wanted Washington to understand that it would continue to procure most of its hardware from Russia (if for no other reason than that the Indian military depended and still depends overwhelmingly on such arms sales and technology transfer), supplemented by procurements from Eastern Europe. This pattern of procurements also was intended to diversify India’s options so that it did not become excessively vulnerable to any one power or to future U.S. sanctions. Indeed, past U.S. restrictions on transfers to India rankled greatly among India’s elite and fostered a perception of the United States as an unreliable supplier. However, India in 2001 was willing to assure the Bush administration that the weapons thus obtained would not be used in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Thus an implicit, if not explicit, point here was India’s strong desire for an end to sanctions and for regular technology transfer and weapons
sales by America to India. Finally, another implicit principle in this outline is India’s preference for a multipolar world, rather than a bipolar or unipolar one. And India’s ambivalence about unipolarity evidently continues.

Indian officials also stated then that they had a definite agenda for bilateral cooperation. It included cooperation on counterterrorism, i.e., improved intelligence-sharing in Afghanistan, Tibet, and the South China Sea. India also hoped to benefit from advances in U.S. satellite technology and imagery. Both sides also wished to explore possibilities of expanded cooperation in military aviation. And India strove to adopt a fresh viewpoint on issues like Kashmir, Pakistan, and the nuclear question to dispel the impression that Kashmir could be a nuclear flashpoint. Indian officials argued that mere possession of nuclear weapons did not necessarily threaten nuclear war. Rather, poor domestic governance and political instability, as well as undue external dependence, could encourage the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the way to ensure that Kashmir or other issues do not provoke a nuclear clash is for Pakistan to become a well-governed, prospering, and democratic state. Indian officials said that,

India and the U.S., in fact, had a common agenda in encouraging democracy and economic well-being in Pakistan. A moderate democratic Islamic state was necessary and could emerge in Pakistan, if Islamabad, in its self-interest, reined in terrorism. India was also not averse to Pakistan’s positive economic contribution to the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Cooperation in the SAARC could also become a channel for reviving an economic relationship.

Evidently this agenda was largely, if not wholly, acceptable to Washington, for the Bush administration has steadily expanded the sphere of cooperation with India since then. Indeed, in August 2001 the administration announced that it was beginning to lift sanctions imposed in 1998 for India’s nuclear testing, thereby clearing the way for greater military planning, joint operations, and eventual sharing of weapons technology. It also indicated its decision to reinstate the Defense Planning Group (DPG) with India that would discuss issues of bilateral concern regarding Asian security and future bilateral military cooperation. By then the first bilateral military exercise,
a table-top peacekeeping operation, had occurred and would be followed by a joint search and rescue operation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton (USA) had already visited India in July 2001. The administration also revealed that it had been sending encouraging signals to India since the start of its term, including treating India as an ally for briefing purposes regarding President Bush’s May 1, 2001 speech on missile defense. And this perception clearly betokened further cooperation on that issue. What is particularly striking is that U.S. officials’ activities and statements by then revealed to Indian leaders that Washington was “acknowledging that India is a country poised to take its place on the world stage.” Since then, it has become clearer as well that a major Indian objective is to secure U.S. support for an Indian seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Realization of this goal would certainly show U.S. support for India’s enhanced status and standing in world affairs.

At that time U.S. officials also were willing to share their perception of common interests, which almost certainly included countering China though they were, and are, scrupulous not to say so. Instead, as Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage said, “For us to have a sustainable relationship with India, it must be based in and on India and not be a relationship which we try to develop with India to face a third country.” Officials also revealed how they perceived common interests before September 11.

American officials say Washington and New Delhi share a particular interest in ensuring free navigation through the Indian Ocean. An increasing proportion of Persian Gulf oil passes along those sea lanes, as does much of India’s trade, which has soared since it began to reform its socialist economy. Military cooperation with India could also help enhance U.S. military readiness by offering training in the Indian Ocean. American forces have no facilities for training between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, defense officials said. U.S. officials also are careful to say that their aspiration for closer ties with New Delhi does not represent a snub of Pakistan, an American ally during the Cold War and a longtime rival of India.

The idea that India should be both a force for democracy and possess an expanded strategic vision of its role in Asia fully com-
ported with eminent foreign observers like Australia’s Paul Dibb’s strongly worded recommendations to that effect and to the administration’s policymakers’ growing understanding of the importance of India in the overall Asian context. For example, former Secretary of State Colin Powell told Congress in January 2001 at his confirmation hearings that, “India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean and its periphery.” 74 Similarly, Armitage has stated subsequently that one reason for reorienting U.S. policy in 2001, even before September 11, was the perceived necessity to have a relationship with India that was not a “hyphenated one” if a coherent policy against the looming terrorist threat was to take effect. 75

Since then this relationship has progressed to the point where the Pentagon is discussing or has discussed with India the possibility of what has popularly been called an Asian NATO that would include India, even though the formal membership and obligations of the parties have not been disclosed. 76 Since it is not clear what the parties mean by the term an Asian NATO, even when they concede that such discussions have occurred, it is probably more precise to say that Washington and New Delhi are contemplating an ever expanding strategic partnership, not a formal alliance.

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, in its fundamentals, strategic partnership but not formal alliance remains the bedrock of India’s national security or grand strategy. Even when Vajpayee said that the two states are “natural allies,” he consistently still ruled out a formal military alliance and instead meant the term “allies” in a more figurative sense, i.e., something akin to a strategic partnership, a term whose definition is intrinsically malleable. But while the exact nature and dimensions of this relationship are flexible, its direction evidently is fixed. High-ranking Indian officials believe that continuing improvement in the relationship is “irreversible” and would have remained so even if Senator Kerry had been elected President. 77 Leading Indian political figures, analysts, and foreign observers publicly claim a growing convergence of strategic interests and values with the United States and some Indian observers openly advocate an alliance or call for an Asian NATO, even though they do not define that term with any precision. 78 Both sides also believe that strengthening that relationship would add substantially to stability throughout Asia, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.
In particular, they believe that this relationship could provide major security benefits to both sides in the Persian Gulf, South, Central, and Southeast Asia, i.e., all the land masses adjacent to or relatively close to the Indian Ocean.

More recently, Prime Minister Singh publicly outlined India’s interests in this partnership in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He stressed India’s economic development, enduring democracy, and the connection between the Indian diaspora in America as factors abetting bilateral ties and partnership as the basis for the two states’ engagement. But beyond that speech, Indian policymakers under both the Vajpayee and now the Singh governments share an expansive view of India’s interests and rising capabilities. And its interests and capabilities increasingly overlap with those of the United States in key areas like the Gulf and Central Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia.

India’s Regional and Naval Ambitions.

As we have seen, the Bush administration’s initial overtures to India led to a recasting of the relationship, to include India’s regional agenda in Asia. By accepting that agenda, the administration admitted and accepted that India had significant and legitimate Asian interests that coincided with U.S. interests throughout Asia. This admission represented the achievement of one of the April 2001 goals postulated by India, which has long craved recognition as much more than a major South Asian power and been greatly frustrated by its failure to achieve it. Major policy decisions like the decision to go nuclear in 1998 can be attributed to this consuming desire to be seen as a great power. The new Army doctrine cited above expresses the same outlook. But the most telling examples of Indian ambitions can be found in other recent policy statements. In late 2003, signifying its self-perception as a rising Asian power, Vajpayee’s government opted for a 20-year program to become a world power whose influence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia.

Vajpayee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He
claimed that India’s expanded security perspectives require fresh thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security in all these directions. India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably going beyond intelligence-sharing about terrorist activities. This cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. In this context, strategic partnership with Washington is essential because Russia’s ties with India are tempered by Moscow’s dependence on the West, particularly America. Absent partnership with America, this situation would severely constrain Indian options since it could no longer hide behind Russia if it clashed with America.\(^{82}\)

While India formally eschews offensive military projections to intervene unilaterally in other countries, it formally announced its air base in Tajikistan, and hopes to undertake the following military programs through 2013:

- Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan.
- Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
- Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African states, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf nations.
- Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to Myanmar to contain Chinese activities there.\(^{83}\)

Beyond those policies, all the Indian military services are undertaking a major military buildup of conventional weapons, ways of delivering nuclear weapons, and defenses against nuclear missiles by improving communication and surveillance systems. Although all the services will be built up, India’s commitments to missile defenses and to constructing naval warships to make India’s presence in the Indian Ocean “a force to be reckoned with” and thus one capable of force and power projection if necessary are particularly noteworthy. Indeed, India’s naval plans bespeak a very expansive agenda that requires cooperation with Washington.\(^{84}\)
The pattern of Indian naval acquisitions reveals the expansive goals India has charted for itself, to include countering both Pakistan and China. Fulfilling this program would truly make India a naval force to be reckoned within the Indian Ocean. On October 14, 2003, Navy Chief Admiral Singh said that,

> Fulfilling India’s dream to have a full-fledged blue-water Navy would need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more frigates, 20 more destroyers with helicopters, and large numbers of missile corvettes and anti-submarine warfare corvettes.\(^85\)

India’s new naval acquisition program as of 2003 entails spending $20 billion to buy aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, maritime surveillance aircraft, and other ships and gear. The 10 principal combatants of the Navy would be equipped with antimissile missiles; command, control, communications and intelligence systems (C3I); and cruise missile launchers. Officials also look to create and deploy “battalion sized forces at various strategic points . . . [on] short notice, and disperse them quickly from the landing or dropping zone before any adequate enemy response.”\(^86\) Officials also insist on the need for a submarine launched nuclear missile capability, presumably to establish a second strike capability and to counter the naval buildup by Pakistan’s Navy that they see as a “medium term” threat to India. Pakistan’s Agosta 90-B diesel submarines can, along with its three Orion P-3C maritime strike aircraft outfitted with missiles, conduct effective sea denial operations against India’s coast. However, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that the real threat Indian naval planners perceive is China, whose fleet they see, rightly or wrongly, as being increasingly able to project power into the Indian Ocean. One Indian study actually states that the power vacuum in that ocean in this century can only be filled by India, China, or Japan, either by “complete preeminence or by a mutual stand-off.”\(^87\) While this may seem a rather fanciful or extremely alarmist assessment, perceptions often drive policy. Consequently, India has searched for a submarine that could launch nuclear missiles, and aircraft carriers, as well as long-range missiles that could strike targets over 2,500 KM away, clearly a sign that China, too, is in its sights.\(^88\)

India’s maritime acquisitions clearly fit into this strategy that has both an expansive threat assessment and an equally expansive
The Indian navy remains the most powerful in the Central and South Asian region. However, progress remains slow toward achieving the aims set out in the naval doctrine of 2000, mainly due to financial constraints. This new doctrine stressed the need to have a fleet capable of operating in both the eastern and western Indian Ocean by having two operational aircraft carriers and highly capable submarines. Negotiations about the transfer of the Russian (mod-Kiev class) aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, are still ongoing, though it is believed that India cannot afford to pay for the 3-year refit needed to attain operational capability. In February, 2002, [Defense Minister George] Fernandes announced that India would not lease, as was proposed in late 2001, two Russian nuclear-powered submarines, but would instead buy six French Scorpene diesel submarines, with a further six to be built in India. . . . In November 2001, India announced plans to equip some of its principal surface combatants with the BrahMos supersonic antiship cruise missile with a range of 280Km. This was seen as a partial response to China’s acquisition of Russian Soveremnnyi-class destroyers, armed with Russian Sunburn anti-ship missiles.89

And this program has now been adopted, and even extended, by the new Singh government. The May 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine that reflected the Vajpayee government’s outlook won acceptance by the new regime, signaling the elite consensus about India’s national security objectives. Whereas earlier doctrine focused on inward-looking strategies, the new doctrine attempts to deal with “conflict with [an] extra-regional power and protecting persons of Indian origin and interest abroad,” points that clearly suggest action against China and in the Gulf where four million expatriates are living.90 Indian analysts attribute the need for these missions to the likely conflict for scarce energy supplies originating in or near the Persian Gulf. As those resources are depleted, new contenders (i.e., China in particular) will enter these waters, compelling the Indian Navy to “beef up its striking power and its command-and-control, surveillance, and intelligence abilities.”91 Not surprisingly, China’s naval relations with Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia received special scrutiny. The doctrine demands for India a submarine-based nuclear launch capability, as well as a fleet that could operate far from home well
into the Arabian Gulf (or the Strait of Malacca for that matter). Even if this is a long-term rather than an immediate goal, given the costs involved it signifies a marker being laid down, a set of clear objectives, and a corresponding economic-political requirement that can only be met by significantly expanded ties to Washington and other major defense exporters.¹⁹² Not only does this doctrine lay down guidance for a robust program of naval construction and acquisition, especially for such potential submarines as Russia’s *Amur* and/or *Akula* subs, the French *Scorpene*-class and India’s own advanced technology vessel (ATV), it also calls for a marine-based rapid mobility force to conduct missions of landward power projection. The war on land and suppression of enemy power from the littoral mandates the enhancement of that capability, as well as of India’s ability to project airpower from the sea and defend its sea-based and home land-based platforms. This justifies the acquisition of the Russian *Admiral Gorshkov* aircraft carrier and the construction of India’s own Air Defense Vessel or aircraft carrier.¹⁹³ Finally, the Navy intends to increase spending by 40 percent through 2014, and its annual allocation rose from an annual $7.5 Billion during 1997-2001 to $18.3 billion annually for 2002-07.¹⁹⁴

This program requires extensive foreign and American support building upon the cooperation hitherto achieved. It also serves as a challenge to China and to Pakistan while demonstrating the sweep of India’s ambitions and determination to realize the capabilities needed to sustain them. Since this program reflects and embodies an elite consensus, it is clear that Washington must deal with that consensus as it approaches India. Simply because many scholars and analysts dismiss India’s capabilities does not mean that policymakers can enjoy that luxury when dealing with what is clearly a rising, ambitious, and proud government that is the bearer of an ancient civilization. These goals and programs are known by now to the administration, and it has not offered any public criticism of them, suggesting its comfort with India’s growing capability.

Since then, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with both the Omani and Iranian navies, and conducted port calls to those countries, Bahrain, and the UAE. India is also upgrading Iran’s port of Chahbahar and has gained access to Iranian bases in case of
war with Pakistan through its 2003 agreement or treaty with Iran.\textsuperscript{95} India’s ties to Iran may also be deepening as a result of the October 2004 visit to Tehran of India’s National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit.\textsuperscript{96} India’s Maritime Doctrine clearly postulates the importance of a naval presence in the unsettled Gulf.

At the same time, India’s requirements for realizing these goals as they pertain to both the Army and the Navy offer the United States significant opportunities regarding defense technology transfers and arms sales, as well as for strategic coordination with India throughout the Indian Ocean. In this sense, there is a genuine bilateral opportunity for both sides to realize the objectives suggested in 2001 by Ashley Tellis regarding Indian strategic objectives and defense purchases. Tellis observed then that,

Thanks to its economic growth, India is about to embark on another cycle of major military modernization—one that had been postponed for the better part of the last 2 decades. Once this cycle is complete a decade or so from now, it is likely that India will possess: a modest nuclear capability intended to deter both China and Pakistan from mounting the most obvious forms of blackmail; a significant naval capability that allows it to dominate the northern Indian Ocean (and one that would be very interested in active cooperation with the U.S. Navy); a refurbished air force that will remain one of the most effective in Asia; and large land forces that will be able to defend successfully Indian interests against both Pakistan and China (along the Himalayan frontier). Even as this modernization program proceeds, however, India will seek to further accelerate the great improvement in U.S.-Indian relations that has occurred in recent years. Conditioned in part by fears of a rising China, India seeks to promote a relationship that emphasizes “strategic coordination” with the United States. While its traditional, and still strong, desire for political autonomy and its continuing search for greatness will prevent it from ever becoming a formal U.S. alliance partner, it nonetheless seeks to develop close relations with the United States both in order to resolve its own security dilemmas vis-à-vis Pakistan and China and to develop cooperative solutions to various emerging problems of global order. Even as it seeks to draw closer to the United States, India remains committed to developing those instruments it believes are necessary for its long-term security, like nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{97}

Even if this program remains incomplete and is adopted, at least in part, for reasons more closely relating to India’s psychology of
being a great power, it is solidly rooted in material capabilities. In fact, India’s growing economic-technological-military capabilities are very much at the root of this partnership. At least Indian and U.S. officials think so. For example, India’s new Agni II missile can reach targets throughout Central and East Asia, including China. And if India continues building nuclear weapons like an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), it will truly have an intercontinental capability, not to mention an intertheater one. America’s quest for partnership with India duly represents an acknowledgment of those capabilities and of their significance for world affairs. And it should also represent a similar acknowledgement of India’s strategic autonomy; namely, that, while it might prefer partnership and even arms sales from America, it can do perfectly well without either that partnership or those arms sales and not suffer major or at least unacceptable lasting strategic losses thereby.

Nevertheless India, despite its ambitions, faces serious obstacles to its quest for great or major power status in Asia. These obstacles include both domestic, largely economic, obstacles and various regional threats or challenges that would be difficult to meet under the best of circumstances. While India has to be the primary actor who meets and overcomes these diverse challenges, many of them also work against American interests or obstruct Indo-American efforts to maximize the benefits of any potential partnership. Therefore those challenges, too, must be factored into any analysis of prospects for Indo-American strategic partnership.
CHAPTER 3
THE CHALLENGES TO INDIAN SECURITY

It may be a cliché to say so, but Indian security begins at home. The ruling coalition clearly came to power with a mandate to improve the economic life of the masses, many of whom did not feel they were partaking sufficiently in India’s growth. Thus the Singh government’s foreign policy agenda is very much tied to, or grows out of, its perception of economic issues. Moreover, Singh and his coalition partners are acutely aware that failure to deliver improved economic conditions to the masses will trigger a significant loss of popular support. And slowed growth certainly will not create a rising tide of improved economic conditions that could ease social tensions in Kashmir or in the troubled northeast which is already aflame with various low intensity conflicts. Thus the projected growth of 6.5 percent for 2004 actually represents a retreat from earlier projections of matching the 8 percent growth of 2003. In order for the economy to achieve its hoped for growth rate of 8 percent that will allow India to compete with China, improve its internal economic conditions, and play a major power projection role (not only militarily) in Asia, it must therefore attract investment from within and without. And this can only be done by major economic reforms. In this respect, the government’s understanding of these facts corresponds to the increased American understanding of the fact that economics must play a much greater role than previously in Indo-American relations.

Indeed, both Indian and American analysts strongly stressed in reports to the American based Asia Foundation that an emphasis on promoting socio-economic development throughout South Asia, and not just in India or Pakistan, would facilitate the realization of major American and Indian interests and further the overall cause of peace and stability (not to mention development) across the subcontinent. The Singh government clearly understands as well that no foreign policy of any kind can command mass or coalition support or project power abroad unless it directly improves the material conditions of
both the national economy and especially the poor and lower classes who claim to have been left out of preceding growth and who make up its electoral constituency.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, the Navy, in fact, does not have enough funding to make good on the promises it is making or policy goals laid out in the new maritime doctrine. So even if its capability expands considerably, it will not reach its proclaimed goals absent major domestic economic transformation.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, Prime Minister Singh believes that only by transforming the Indian economy can India achieve genuine international recognition and project real power abroad. Thus, given his government’s perspective and those articulated by external analysts and increasingly by U.S. officials, there is a growing consensus about the kinds of economic policies, both domestic and foreign, that both states must pursue jointly in order to strengthen the lagging framework of economic ties and buttress thereby their strategic partnership.

While Singh is confident that his comprehensive program of reducing bureaucratic interference in the economy, liberalization, and decentralization will galvanize the economy, it is also clear that strong foreign investment and issues like energy security must be addressed within a strategic framework if India is to increase its growth rate and keep pace with China.\textsuperscript{104} But the attempt to ensure energy security, which is vital, while also attracting major foreign investment and accelerating technological growth, creates a foreign policy quandary for India. Singh told the \textit{Financial Times} that “energy security is second only in our scheme of things to food security.”\textsuperscript{105} Thus India’s dependence upon secure oil and gas supplies from the Gulf and from Central Asia, as manifested in its energy firms’ quest for equity holdings in Russian, Angolan, Sudanese, Venezuelan, and, most of all, Iranian energy fields or for major deals with states like Iran, represents a vital national interest. Accordingly, in November 2004 India’s state-run oil corporation announced a $3 billion deal with Iran’s Petropars.\textsuperscript{106} At the December 3-4, 2004, summit with Russia, India announced a $3 billion Indian investment in the Sakhalin-3 oil field and the joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil field in the Caspian. India Energy Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar has stated that, “what I am talking about is the strategic alliance with Russia in energy security, which is becoming for India at least as important
as our national security.” Indeed, India’s quest for energy is so driving a factor in its foreign policy that it agreed to have the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) enter what is a transparent dummy bid for the remnants of Yukos in Russia, the most efficient energy producer there that was destroyed by President Putin and his government for political reasons, in order to gain favor in Moscow’s eyes by legitimating this phony auction. Presumably, this favor will lead to enhanced access to Russian energy and heightened cooperation with Russian energy firms. Similarly, India still shows interest in participating in a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, even though it is understandably reluctant to allow Pakistan to have a hand on its gas or oil supply.

While such statements and policies highlight India’s capabilities and ambitions, they also clearly underscore its economic vulnerabilities and the inherent dilemmas of the economic dimension of its ties with the United States. India must balance its dependence upon external energy sources like Iran or Russia with its need for U.S. support. While India’s close ties with Iran have not inhibited the development of a flourishing commercial and military relationship with Israel, those ties could cause trouble with the United States, even if Indian officials like Hamid Ansari, a member of the Policy Advisory Group to Foreign Minister S. Natwar Singh, stated that, “What is going on with regard to Iran is a complex game—part chess, part poker. But we have done our sums with regard to Iran. It isn’t an area where we will be pushed to resolve our position.”

On the other hand, if Iran’s nuclearization could be arrested, thanks to the recent Irano-EU agreement of November 2004, then perhaps it might be possible for some improvement of Iran’s ties with either, if not both, Jerusalem and Washington to occur. If that were to happen, some Indian analysts believe that India could then function as an interlocutor between Tehran and Washington.

The relationship with Iran is very important to India because of the need to ensure reliable energy access, the two states’ common opposition to what they perceived as Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia, India’s rising interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf, and the importance of the North-South trade corridor. This corridor, beginning in Northwest Russia, is the
centerpiece of a grand Russian design to exploit Russia’s geography as a bridge between North and South and East and West, and make Russia the hub of a vast overland and maritime trading and transportation network that would embrace Europe to the West and Iran, Central Asia, and India in the South.\(^{112}\) Obviously, the corridor’s value for India grew when trade routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan were held hostage to Pakistan-backed terrorism before 2002. The North-South corridor bypasses Afghanistan and Pakistan and is a strong symbol of India’s political closeness to Iran, Russia, and Central Asian regimes.

While this relationship with Iran substantiates India’s own claims to be a rising power and reflects Iran’s awareness that cooperation with India benefits it in and around Central Asia, it also exemplifies the broader trend of Indian relations with key actors in Central Asia and the Middle East. Whereas Pakistan’s strident Islamism and support for terrorism and drug-running has strongly alienated Central Asian governments and even estranged Iran and its ally, China, India’s opposition to those policies and superior economic attainments enhances its political status and fosters an alignment with Iran against Pakistani-inspired terrorism.\(^ {113}\) And the powerful linkages that India has created thereby enable it to project power and influence further afield, e.g., the North-South trade corridor with Russia and Iran which could only take shape on the basis of common political goals. The relationship with Iran is not based exclusively either on this fact or on the fact that India’s main supplier of oil will continue to be the Gulf states, Iran among them.\(^ {114}\) But undoubtedly energy is a key factor, along with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Indo-Pakistani relations and general trade, especially as Iran seeks to become a center of the international energy trade and sees Central Asia as the biggest market for its goods and capital investment.\(^ {115}\) In fact, Indo-Iranian relations exemplify the pattern whereby economic and energy security become inextricable parts of a web of greater security and defense interests.\(^ {116}\)

On the other hand, Iran cannot provide the foreign investment or the civilian technological transfers that India desperately needs and for which it looks to Washington. So, in order to preserve its partnership with Washington and obtain the resources that only such partnership makes available, it must indeed “do its sums.” From
India’s perspective, that means debureaucratizing and liberalizing the economy and reducing the obstacles to foreign investment and imports of necessary technologies.\textsuperscript{117} It also means massive investments in infrastructure (which also entails obtaining sufficient energy from abroad while this is happening, and to facilitate the transition to a more efficient energy economy). Infrastructural investments will not only facilitate domestic growth but also the export of Indian goods and investments abroad, so that India can then compete with China—which is increasingly the overarching standard of comparison for India—as it occupies an ever larger role in Asian economies. In an age where the projection of economic power is on a par, if not superior, to the projection of military power as a factor making for a state’s global importance, and given India’s openly expressed ambitions for becoming a great power, there is no other strategic route to economic power. More importantly, it also is the case that Washington and its representatives, in their quest for strengthened partnership with India, have fastened upon a comparable agenda in order to buttress the economic dimension of this relationship.

Washington’s main concerns about India relate to what it believes are obstacles to both domestic growth and foreign investment in India from the United States. The Bush administration wishes to see ongoing reforms of India’s statist and excessively dirigiste and quasi-socialist economy; reduction, if not termination, of India’s extensive trade and investment barriers; and greater protection of American intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{118} Such moves should facilitate an expansion and freeing of trade that both sides claim to want, both for its own sake and as part of a global move toward freer trade. In particular, Ambassador David Mulford strongly emphasizes the pressing need for putting the transformation of India’s infrastructure on a wartime basis so that its quality will be able to support India’s ambitious economic and foreign policy programs.\textsuperscript{119} Mulford also advocates major reforms to eliminate the deficit financing at the federal and state levels in India, and for reforms that will allow capital to be more productive.\textsuperscript{120} Other officials from the U.S. Treasury Department emphasize the increased productivity that would result from a freer economy.\textsuperscript{121} All these statements of high-level official
interest in Indian economic development signify Washington’s heightened overall interest in a stronger India that can participate with the United States on a broad range of foreign and defense policy issues.

However, India’s challenges are not merely economic. In many cases, they are strategic because all around its periphery there are growing threats of terrorism, failing states, insurgency, drug running, and the like. Actually, at least 14 terrorist and separatist movements “of varying rigor and intensity,” other than the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, “are raging across India.” Recognizing this, the U.S. Government has discreetly, but clearly, acknowledged that the challenges to security in areas like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar could open up a third front in the war on terrorism and prevent the full fruition of its growing ties to India. Only quite recently has the full magnitude of the threat posed by these phenomena become clear to or accepted by policymakers, but they are beginning to see them as linked to the long-standing and well-known struggles in Kashmir. Thus, for example, Indian officials tend to regard disturbances in Bangladesh as reflecting that it is “a playground for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).” Excepting Kashmir, we and Indian officials can easily see an accelerating Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, much of which receives financial support from Tamils in Southern India; a floundering state in Bangladesh that is experiencing growing terrorism; a Maoist insurgency in Nepal that is gaining the upper hand over the state there and could either precipitate state failure or a successful violent insurgency that is now apparently spreading into Northeast India; insurgent and terrorist activity in Myanmar that threatens Indian interests and that has led to the participation of Indian military personnel in actions there and to the signing of a new agreement with the government of Myanmar, hitherto regarded as something of a pariah due to its repressive dictatorship.

The threats posed by the efflorescence of terrorism here combine the usual plagues of terrorist activity, insurgency, drug running, and strong evidence of the existence of nuclear smuggling rings, possibly tied to A. Q. Khan’s network that originated in Pakistan. Given the scope of the challenge and Indian officials’ belief that in many, if not all, cases, Pakistani intelligence or military officials are abetting these insurgencies, there is a discernible rise in both Indian military
activity in and around its frontiers, from Sri Lanka to Nepal and Myanmar, even as it withdraws troops from Kashmir in response to lessened terrorist infiltration there. Moreover, Washington and New Delhi are sharing sensitive information about activities at terrorist bases throughout South Asia, particularly Bangladesh and Nepal, and Washington has pledged $1 million to Nepal as security assistance.

U.S. officials agree with their Indian counterparts that terrorist camps in Bangladesh pose a terrorist threat to the stability of the region. The United States is also trying to ascertain the threat of terrorists to Bangladesh itself, as well as the “potential utilization of Bangladesh as a platform to project terror internationally, according to J. Cofer Black, coordinator for counterterrorism in the U.S. State Department.

Clearly the earlier neglect that apparently characterized India’s attitude toward the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is becoming a thing of the past. Indeed, Myanmar, Bhutan, and India are preparing for an armed crackdown against insurgents. But for Indo-American security partnership, these insurgencies and threats along India’s peripheries beyond the struggle in Kashmir point simultaneously in two directions. On the one hand, they highlight the obstacles to India’s grandiose vision of the future and give reasons for alarm about India’s own internal stability. If India cannot find the means to overcome these challenges, even if they are protracted operations, its stability, that of South Asia, and the heralded arrival of a great power will be set back considerably. On the other hand, the threat of spreading terrorism, insurgencies, and failing states has galvanized U.S. officials into taking broader action with India to confront those challenges. Ultimately, the cooperation that we now see along India’s peripheries could serve as a starting point for future highly beneficial security cooperation in the other key areas of Indo-American interests.
CHAPTER 4

INDIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

One area where both the United States and India have vital strategic interests is the Persian Gulf. But while both sides have expansive strategic ambitions regarding the Gulf and share a hostility to Islamic terrorism and a vital interest in ensuring the security of reliable energy supplies from this region, the current situation in the Gulf makes cooperation between them difficult, albeit by no means impossible. Both necessity and ambition, fueled by opportunity, drive India’s efforts to cut a major figure in the Persian Gulf. Four million Indians reside in the Gulf and send valuable remittances home to their kinsmen, making them hostages of the local security situation, but also signifying India’s rising interest in the Gulf. This rising interest takes place in a context dominated by three interacting and profound strategic trends: India’s rise as a major Asian power with continental aspirations throughout all Asia, American dominance of the Gulf, and the visible Indo-American strategic partnership.

Consequently, India is determined to prevent any maritime or landward threat to it from the Gulf. Indeed, following Ashley Tellis’ analysis in 2001-02, we can state that, for India, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf constitutes a vast strategic buffer, an outer ring, if you will, that cannot be allowed to become a base from which policies inimical to India’s interests and security can be pursued with impunity. Because India must engage local states to forestall such negative trends, India robustly counters the related threats of terrorism, proliferation, and the export of radicalized Islam. The threat of proliferation in the Gulf, for example, as abetted by China, obligates India’s policymakers to assert New Delhi’s presence there. As Tellis wrote,

The relationship between China and various key states in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which have the effect of marginalizing India, reducing its access to the region, and creating pockets of Chinese influence in areas where natural resources, physical access, markets, and sources of influence are increasingly coveted, remain a good example of how the relationships among various states in the “outer ring” [of Indian security perspectives — author] could directly affect Indian interests.
India, in many ways, thinks as did its erstwhile British masters who also confronted the threats of advancing major powers and crumbling or failing states on the approach to India. Indeed, the Gulf figures prominently in India’s overall strategic horizons as one of the key areas where it must be able to project power in the future. Indian elites share a consensus that envisions an expanded concept of India’s national interests encompassing Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca. This expanded strategic concept comprises not only classic military and/or geostrategic perspectives, but also a broader definition of security and security interests. For example, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh revealed that, for many years, India’s Middle Eastern policy was hostage to the “communal card” at home, i.e., Muslim sympathies. But now it is freed from that and can determine its policies on the basis of a pure national interest. This kind of reasoning certainly helps explain the vastly improved relationships with both Israel and Iran. However, it obviously is not completely true, as the refusal to send forces to Iraq shows. Nevertheless, this confidence underscored and still underlies India’s apparent willingness to play a partnership role in the Gulf despite differences over Iraq.

Equally, if not more important is India’s acceptance of the logic of the Raj that no maritime threats must be tolerated, as that was the basis of the British threat to Mogul India and of subsequent threats to British interests. That threat was also perceived in the dispatch of the U.S. fleet to check Indian power during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. In 1979, former Admiral A. K. Chatterji wanted “a force equal in size and competence to the naval forces of any one of the superpowers now formally operating in the area.” Defense Minister George Fernandes said in 2000 that, since India has “high stakes in the uninterrupted flow of commercial shipping, the Indian Navy has an interest in the ocean space extending from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.” Others talk of denying outside forces an autonomous capacity to act in the Indian Ocean and thus proclaiming what amounts to a kind of Indian Monroe Doctrine throughout its expanse.

Scholars, too, now see a fundamental change in India’s geostrategic position. In a major study of South Asia’s geopolitics,
Graham Chapman concluded that, “The major deductive viewpoint is that provided by [Halford] Mackinder and [Saul] Cohen, [namely] that South Asia is an independent geopolitical region, strategically placed as one of the rim-land regions flanking the central Eurasian heartland.” Consequently, India, as the dominant power of South Asia, has both the interest and capability to take an active, even forceful, interest in strategic events happening either in the central Eurasian heartland or in the two “shatterbelts” adjoining it, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Hence, India’s active pursuit of national interests in those two regions and Central Asia. Chapman further illustrates how the intersection of geographic location and military capability create India’s expansive strategic vision, and he explicitly invokes the British and Mogul heritages in that context.

India is committed to developing a “blue water” navy capable of strategic action within the Indian Ocean and not just coastal defense. There is some logic to this, in that many important cities and installations, including most of her atomic power stations, are within range of submarine-launched missiles, not necessarily intercontinental missiles like Polaris, but small cruise missiles launched from a submerged or surfaced submarine. These are now within Pakistan’s capability. In other words, India now recognizes that the defense of the sea is as important as the defense of the land borders. The heir to the Moguls and the British appreciates India’s position as a unique geopolitical region, which must face both the potential of land power and of sea power.

Obviously this concept of security reflects both rising Indian capabilities and a sense of pervasive threats on the peripheries, not least throughout the entire Indian Ocean. And the program advocated by Vajpayee, as well as the new maritime doctrine cited above, represents efforts to realize that concept in policy.

India’s determination to prevent hostile powers from controlling the northern approaches to India from both the East and West and to control the maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean clearly derive from both traditional Realist perspectives of strategy and international relations, as well as from British approaches to the defense of the Raj. This determination clearly is also tied to critical aspects of India’s current economic transformation like the need for
secure access to energy. Indian interests in the Gulf, for example, are clearly also closely tied to the need to ensure reliable and regular access to supplies and to tie into the expanding network of the growing north-south corridor trade from Russia and Central Asia through Iran to India and beyond. Indeed, Indian analysts regard the Gulf as the priority source of its anticipated energy needs for the long term, hence its importance to India grows commensurately. In this respect, India, like so many other states, sees energy and overall economic security and defense as being inextricably connected to each other. And such interests also mandate a close relationship with Iran that is quite unlike the posture of frozen hostility that characterizes U.S. relations with Iran. Likewise, India maintains that the Gulf must remain a stable and unimpeded source of energy. India not only depends on a stable supply of oil and gas from the Gulf, it is also now seeking to gain equity investment, through the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), in local energy projects. And India’s vital security interest in stable energy supplies, cited above, is not a function of recent developments in the Gulf but has been a major issue for several years.

Similarly, India’s participation in the aforementioned North-South transport corridor that traverses the Gulf also represents a major trading and political interest insofar as it brings India closer to Russia, Central Asian states, and Iran. Finally, as specified in Vajpayee’s November 2003 program, India will both seek to develop its long-range capabilities of power projection to the Gulf and seek more defense cooperation with local states. This cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. To realize those goals, he argued that strategic partnership with Washington is essential so that India always has the option of U.S. support for its objectives. Otherwise, India’s ability to project power and influence abroad anywhere would be greatly compromised. This overarching strategic fact clearly still applies to Indian policy, even if the government has changed. And since the Indian government has apparently done its sums, as it believes, it has been able to maintain and expand its ties to Iran, while simultaneously expanding its ties to both Israel and the United States. In so doing, it has furthered significantly its own interests
and isolated Pakistan, probably contributing thereby to the latter’s willingness to enter into negotiations with India. Meanwhile, Iran benefits materially and politically from its ties to India that reduce its sense of isolation in the face of perceived American threats.

Thus Iran has sought assistance in building an overland gas pipeline through Pakistan to India. Other options include a pipeline along Pakistan’s shallow water coastline, or on the seabed from the Persian Gulf to India’s west coast, or an already existing fourth option, liquefied natural gas, which is most expensive. India hitherto has rejected including Pakistan in the pipeline so the North-South corridor may come to include gas and/or oil. Iran also seeks Indian support for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), G-17, and G-77 trading regimes and greater business and perhaps also defense ties with India. Finally, both states oppose Islamist takeovers in Central Asia where Iran has been a notably cautious actor. While Pakistan has guaranteed the safety and security of Indian gas or oil supply through an overland pipeline from Iran (and probably must do so since the project originates in Turkmenistan), India remains reluctant. Still, ties to Iran remain strong, given both states’ overall strategic harmony, shared interests, and Moscow’s support behind the scenes. So this pipeline probably will be built.

Iran and India have come even closer with regard to hard security and defense. In 2003 they forged what amounts to an old-fashioned alliance. India will provide repairs and maintenance for Iran’s Russian-built weapons and training for its officers in return for the use of Iranian bases in any future war against Pakistan. Undoubtedly any Indo-Iranian military cooperation will raise questions here and in Jerusalem about Indian policies, but so far that has not precluded India’s advancing ties with either Israel or America. Despite the prospect of a new government, Indian officials in the Ministry of Defense claim that India will still advance military help to Iran. Apparently a joint working group will be established, and Iran wants to go beyond troop training to have India take an advisory role in helping the Iranian Army develop a logistics strategy to manage its stores. The Indian Defense Ministry is also eager to establish regular naval exchanges between the two countries that would include annual joint naval exercises. Clearly Pakistan’s beliefs that it could
destabilize its neighbors and rivals with impunity, using terrorists as its instrument, or that it could then switch sides to recoup a positive position in Central Asia, have been rudely shattered. In Central Asia, Pakistan is now isolated while a potent Indo-Iranian-Russian entente that disposes of formidable economic and military power is visibly taking shape.

India could also bring several assets to the Gulf security equation. India already possesses considerable experience and capability to project power in the form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces abroad. Indeed, in anticipation of playing exactly this role in Iraq, the Army and some in the government began to plan for that mission in 2003. However major domestic political controversy and the failure of the UN to authorize foreign participation in an Iraqi peace operation prevented the government from authorizing the dispatch of troops there. Somewhat surprisingly, in the wake of Iraq’s successful January 30, 2005, elections, there are signs of a reviving Indian interest in according the new regime legitimacy and in getting into position for the competition for reconstruction contracts in Iraq. This could occur even though the strength of opposition among members of the current ruling coalition will, for now, preclude any Indian dispatch of troops to Iraq in the foreseeable future. Although the Pentagon clearly wanted such troops in 2003 and an intense political debate about it occurred as shown by the military’s preparations for such an order, it should have been clear to Washington that the balance of factors in Indian domestic and foreign policy militated against such a dispatch of forces, especially during an election campaign. Nevertheless, the Indian government is already deeply engaged in the Gulf.

For example, while it remains unclear who will join the projected Asian NATO that both India and America have discussed or what its missions, rules of engagement in peace operations, and purpose will be, India has already provided access to the United States in its quest for bases against terrorism in the Indian Ocean, bases which were and are being used to prosecute the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the event of future contingencies, they could be used in the Gulf as well. Because of domestic terrorism, India also regards the Gulf as a potential breeding ground for anti-Indian terrorism, if not more generalized expressions of this threat. Thus it is determined to assert
itself there to prevent that threat’s overt expression and mutation into a threat based on WMD proliferation and the acquisition of such a capability by terrorists.

This opposition to terrorism and proliferation not only brings India and America closer, it also catalyzes India’s drive to outflank the territorial bases of these threats by finding points of influence in the Gulf and Central Asia and by developing a capability to assert and project its power in enduring fashion into these areas. But beyond rivalry with Pakistan, the great strategic objective of India’s rapprochement with Washington is to convince it that India truly merits being seen as an Asian power that can project influence and power on behalf of common interests against common threats throughout Asia. To the degree that the United States regards India as having legitimate security interests in the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and as far afield as the Strait of Malacca, India can then play a much greater role on its own and in support of Washington. Thus frustrating terrorist challenges in a post-Saddam Iraq is intrinsically an important Indian interest, even if it cannot yet commit forces there due to domestic considerations and a different valuation than America’s concerning the need for a UN authorization.

The Indian government not only wants Washington to keep Pakistan “in the dock” and under constant pressure, it also wants Washington to stabilize the Gulf in order to stabilize the South Asian subcontinent and eliminate the territorial and political bases of the terrorism that threatens it. Indian diplomatic support will be discreet and measured, maybe even covert, but there is a visible basis for Indo-American collaboration here, even if it is somewhat limited by the asymmetric, though not opposed, interests of the two states. The architecture for regional security in the Gulf clearly is broader than merely establishing the basis for Iraq’s long-term stability and security. But the latter is the essential precondition for any successful security architecture or structure in the region. And without such an architecture, India’s and America’s interests, security, and standing will be severely compromised.

India’s ambitions, capabilities, experience, and interests all suggest that it is interested in playing a major role in helping to stabilize the Persian Gulf in a post-Saddam era. As C. Uday Bashkar of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses recently wrote,
In the immediate future, U.S. policy toward South Asia will, to a great extent, be determined by the way in which Iraq is stabilized, and the January (2005) elections will be a significant punctuation that will shape the degree of U.S. involvement in that country in the Bush second term. It is relevant that India also shares an interest in the swift return to normalcy to Iraq and its citizens, and it remains to be seen if the U.S. will be able to facilitate such joint effort under the appropriate multilateral banner. India’s abiding concern about radical Islamic militancy and its supra-national aspirations is the more complex element and this will be the common template for the long-term security relationship, not withstanding the immediate divergence over Pakistan and its military DNA.\(^{155}\)

The issue is how do we craft an invitation to India to do so that has a chance of succeeding. Obviously we must stop dismissing the UN, for no matter what we think, India, like many other states, sees its authorization as indispensable to any legitimization of the use of force or for deployment in post-conflict stability operations. Second, before India enters into any such operation, it will be necessary to conduct a candid discussion with it as to its strategic objectives, interests, and concerns in the new Gulf. And those objectives, interests, and concerns must be accommodated. During this dialogue, it will be necessary as well to elucidate its views as to how that structure or architecture should work, and not just what it hopes to gain from its participation in any such system.

Here it should be noted that India appears to be shifting gears in its policy toward Iraq. For example, in December 2004 Iraq interim Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari came to New Delhi, signifying a resumption of formal contacts with Iraq and the change in Indian policy. Indian observers had noted several earlier signs of New Delhi’s interest in moving to adapt itself to the evolving Iraqi situation despite the intense public opposition, particularly strong among members of the ruling coalition, especially the Communist Party, to the U.S. campaign in Iraq. It had become clear to New Delhi that other states were moving to engage the new interim Iraqi government and that it was being excluded by its inflexibility. Thus, even if Indian engagement with the interim government and its successor that was elected in January 2005 remain low-key, India clearly intends to remain engaged with Iraq and help shape a future status quo there.
that is consonant with its interests. And those interests are broadly consonant with U.S. strategic interests regarding proliferation and terrorism.\textsuperscript{156}

Thus there are opportunities for enhanced Indo-American cooperation, even with regard to the evolving situation in Iraq. But for that cooperation to take root, India has to be able to look beyond the domestic opposition to American policy there, and that requires some American actions to facilitate such movement within Indian politics. For example, the perception in India that U.S. policy is characterized by excessive unilateralism must be shown to be groundless. And that altered perception must be based on what is actually transpiring among our allies and us. Allies like India must be consulted and accommodated, much more openly than was previously the case. This consultation must mean, and be seen to mean, more than that they were simply heard and that then we proceeded as we had intended to do anyway. Their interests in a stable Gulf, which, after all, are not far removed from our goals for the area, must be seen as legitimate, and it must be understood that no unilateral American system stands any chance of more than ephemeral success in constructing a post-Saddam order in the Gulf. The beginning of wisdom in constructing a sustainable and enduring Gulf security architecture entails genuine dialogue with allies and partners, and a genuine give and take among them and us. The gains in getting the participation of a rising power with a good reputation in the Gulf and a democratic tradition in this security architecture far outweigh any losses involved in accommodating their interests there and in taking their advice when it makes sense. Since partnership, if not alliance, with India is one of the fundamental points of the administration’s agenda and even preceded September 11, as India’s power and standing grow, it makes all the sense in the world to exploit that partnership on behalf of interests and values that are fundamentally shared and compatible and against common threats. Failure to devise a basis for a significant Indian presence in the new Gulf, on the other hand, all but ensures that the architecture we then build will be built on sand.
CHAPTER 5

CENTRAL ASIA

If the Gulf is of rising importance to Indian security and stability and has been a vital interest of the United States since 1941 when it entered World War II and participated in the Grand Alliance’s occupation of Iran, Central Asia has been vital to India for millennia. Indians like to point out that India frequently has been invaded from Central Asia, and the essence of the Raj’s security policy was to prevent another such invasion. Moreover, geostrategic imperatives of today’s world have transformed the situation, making Central Asia not just vital to India, but also increasingly important to the United States, and not merely because of terrorism. Energy access to this region, in part to ensure a diversity of supplies to America and its allies that does not rely merely on the Persian Gulf, has grown in importance to America since 1992. The geostrategic implications of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also are clear. For the first time in history, externally based naval and air based military power has been projected successfully and sustained against Central Asian forces and targets. As Graham Chapman wrote recently, invoking Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Americans have also now built bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; and so the maritime powers have penetrated the heartland for the first time ever.” Indeed, Norman Friedman calls the war in Afghanistan a littoral war, highlighting the sustained strategic projection of offshore or externally based power into this theater. Second, these capabilities can also be projected from there to all of Asia, or Europe (including the Middle East), and vice versa, making the Transcaspian literally a pivotal Eurasian theater. Therefore we can and must think seriously about the future projection of naval, land, and air power into or from the Transcaspian theater to or from adjacent theaters in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and/or East Asia. But this fact obligates the United States to engage this entire area with more strategic purposefulness in order to maintain permanent access to it and to help ensure its security and stability. Therefore, by using those forms of power projection—which can project ground forces into the
theater and sustain them for a long time—India, America, and other similarly endowed states can now, or in the future, leverage military power in and throughout Central Asia, and from there throughout Eurasia in hitherto unforeseen ways. Not surprisingly, both halves of the Transcaspian, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, now enjoy heightened analytical and policy interest. Ever more security professionals here and abroad realize the importance of addressing the Black Sea and Transcaucasia as well as Central Asia in order to complete the stabilization of Europe or to help stabilize the “Broader (or greater) Middle East” or a reconceptualized Eurasia or consider Central Asia as an integral part of Asian security. Many Indian and American writers, as well as others with expertise in the region, emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia and/or the Caucasus to the current geopolitical order. Frequently, they see new geographical and even strategic unities between the two halves of the Transcaspian and areas like South Asia or Europe. For example, Even before the war in Iraq, Sir John Thomson, a former British High Commissioner to India wrote that,

The geographical definition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any doubt before, September 11 has made it clear that we have to take into account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west, all the former Soviet republics to the north, and China to the east. The geographical context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely, I believe—that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling disaster in Israel-Palestine.

Rajan Menon of Lehigh University also writes that:

A seamless web connects Central Asia proper, the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and China’s Xinjiang province. Thinking in terms of a “greater Central Asia” captures the bigger picture and reflects how forces from one part of this extended region radiate across borders to other parts. Thus, an axiom of both policymaking and analysis should be that the consequences of a major change in one part of greater Central Asia will affect its other parts, often quickly and dramatically and through multiple networks.
In 2003 Indian Foreign Secretary Kinwal Sebal similarly told a U.S. audience that,

Asia has traditionally been seen in terms of its sub-regions, each with its own dynamics and its own problems. Traditionally, we deal with them as unconnected compartments. However, lines that insulate one region from the other increasingly are getting blurred by proliferation deals that link the east to the west, by the chain of terror network(s) across West, South, and Southeast Asia, by the concerns about the safety of commerce from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, by the challenge of connecting major consumers of energy to its sources in West and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{163}

Most tellingly, Paul Bracken writes that,

The arc of terror cuts across the military and political theaters into which the West conveniently divided Asia, essentially for the purpose of fighting the Cold War: the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. The ballistic missile once launched, does not turn back at the line that separates the territory of one State Department desk from another. Thus the Gulf War (of 1991) brought the troubles of the Persian Gulf to Israel, linking theaters that had once been considered separate. Israel, for its part, sends up spy satellites to spy on Pakistan, 2000 miles away, spooking Islamabad into seeing an Indian-Israel squeeze play against it. Chinese and Indian military establishments plot against each other, making East and South Asia one military space.\textsuperscript{164}

Given the Transcaspian region’s proximity to the centers of contemporary terrorism, it is hardly surprising that both U.S. policymakers and foreign analysts see enhanced U.S. attention to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus as essential. Indeed, Blackwill wrote that “Asia is increasingly a geopolitical whole” and recommended that America and its Asian allies—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—consider Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia a geopolitical unit with which they should engage.\textsuperscript{165} And as we have seen, such geopolitical ruminations and policy recommendations are by no means alien to Indian policymakers and analysts. Therefore, it is not surprising that Vajpayee’s 2003 program emphasized Central Asia as a key theater where India must project its power and influence, or that India, since 2000 if not before, has been steadily expanding its presence using all the instruments of power at its disposal.\textsuperscript{166}
Recent Indian assessments of Central Asia thus correspond to emerging American strategic perspectives. Although some analysts believe that America’s supposed partiality to Pakistan leads to a U.S. disinclination to have India be a major presence and potential rival in Central Asia, in fact, India’s interests there derive from the same bases as do American strategy, namely geopolitical interests and energy security.\textsuperscript{167} Since Central Asia has long been a source of potential threat to India, its primary interest here was and is self-preservation.

The basic underlying aim was to ensure that the heart of Asia does not turn hostile to India. Indian policymakers knew it was in their interest to see that these countries also do not end up helping hostile forces or falling prey to the ravages of militant Islam.\textsuperscript{168}

Equally importantly, and like U.S. analysts and policymakers, Indian observers long have seen growing geopolitical rivalry in this area as well as a high degree of potential threat. They intend to take part in the geopolitical competition, not to seek a hegemonic position which they know is beyond them and in any case unattainable, but rather to prevent a hostile force from doing so whether it is Pakistan, China, or Islamic radicalism.\textsuperscript{169} Indian and Russian diplomats have also long shared similar apprehensions about Central Asian security. Already in 1997, Russia’s press reported that in private Indo-Russian diplomatic conversations, “Russian and Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists.”\textsuperscript{170} Thus as both states become economic powerhouses regionally, if not globally, there exists genuine potential for rivalry between them. For example, Indian naval building in and around Pakistan’s port of Gwadar also certainly intends to counter Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean as China is investing heavily in Gwadar’s development. India also hopes to wage economic war on Pakistan by restricting the development of trade from Central Asia through that port even as Pakistan seeks to open its ports to Central Asian states in the hope that it will become their entrepot.\textsuperscript{171} However, it is not only Pakistan’s presence in Central Asia that concerns India. The rising specter of China’s presence there is also a matter of considerable concern to Indian elites.
Not surprisingly, many Indians now view China as India’s current and long-term main rival and threat and see Central Asia in terms of that strategic rivalry encompassing both economics and more traditional security relationships. U.S. analysts in touch with Indian elites before September 11, 2001, observed that Russia’s decline has galvanized Indian apprehensions about Central Asia.

Russian weakness in Central Asia compounds India’s immediate and long-term problems there. In the short term, the chaos in Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia over which Russia might once have exerted a strong restraining influence is now free to spread, and most Indians believe—correctly it appears—that it will spread southward, infecting Pakistan and eventually possibly India’s large northern Islamic population. In the longer term, Russian weakness in the core of Central Asia creates a vacuum, especially in energy-rich Kazakhstan, into which China will expand. Among Indian strategists, one frequently hears the term “encirclement” by China, and they view Central Asia as a part of the top of a China-dominated circle of states that includes most of Southeast Asia, Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. In this sense, Indian national security specialists believe that Russia’s weakness encourages India’s encirclement.

Central Asia’s rising strategic importance to India would be important to its foreign and defense policies even if it was bereft of energy deposits, but the fact that it is and will become an even more important source of oil and gas make it even more important to India which seeks, like China, to diversify its sources of energy supply and which cannot afford to be excessively dependent on the volatile Persian Gulf for its energy sources. And from these twin standpoints of geopolitics and energy, India and China’s rising interest and capacities for projecting power and influence in Central Asia must be mentioned in conjunction with Indo-American ties. According to analysts like James Clad, India, like China, appears to be moving from an approach that emphasized security of supply to one that spreads supply risks through greater reliance on market mechanisms and diversification of supplies. These two states also are moving towards greater reliance on liquid natural gas, two factors that will stimulate investment in capital intensive projects in Central Asia and elsewhere, greater interest in preventing interruptions of seaborne
energy trade, and in the restructuring of their formerly state-owned oil and gas companies. Accordingly, both states now tend to focus on exploiting short-term advantages to lock in, if possible, overall lower cost delivery over the long-term. However, other analysts, like Ashley Tellis, discern a suspicion common to both states of the market mechanism’s effectiveness and viability with regard to securing reliable access to raw materials. Moreover, stability in the energy market assumes a stable Middle East, a highly questionable assumption. Therefore, if problems in the Middle East or in their bilateral relations with each other or with the United States, or crises in world politics on a larger scale preclude the Middle Eastern option, or if their politics veer toward greater reliance on non- and extra-market mechanisms, Indo-Chinese rivalry over Central Asia will grow. Thus it is still unclear whether or not this shared approach that seeks to balance mechanisms of cooperation abroad with maximization of indigenous capabilities will promote greater amity or greater rivalry among them generally, and in Central Asia in particular. To a significant degree, the outcome of their current policies in Central Asia depends on factors beyond either of these states’ control.

Though the balance of the factors impelling each state to assume a larger profile in Central Asia differs, these factors are common to them both. Given the expected length and intensity of the global struggle against Islamic radicalism and terrorism and these two states’ exploding demand for energy and foreign markets, in the context of Asia’s unsettled security equations, we can expect them both to increase their capabilities and interest in Central Asia. Likewise, there already appears to be some ad hoc collaboration in intelligence against the common threats of terrorism and drugs in Central Asia. Finally, we can expect numerous efforts either by them to join forces with other powers against threats that either they or their prospective partners perceive to be in their interests. Consequently both governments’ policies in Central Asia reflect these similarities and differences in their situations.

For example, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) is essentially a Chinese-inspired organization to counter terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang and Central Asia and preserve a mechanism
for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia and Central
Asian states with regard to threats to security there. Often those
threats also are conjoined with China’s efforts to use the SCO against
regional American influence of any kind. As such, it perfectly
embodies the trend to form regional associations or security
organizations in Central Asia that include China or India. Hence, it
is not surprising that India has duly sought to join the SCO to make
sure its voice is heard, although no final answer has yet been given.
Likewise, Russia’s continuing and frequent attempts to create an
Asian security triangle comprising India, China, and Russia against
Islamic unrest and America’s local influence represent an effort to
manage Indo-Chinese rivalry in Asia by bringing both states into
a compatible relationship where Russia holds the balance between
them and can avoid having to choose between them.

America’s efforts to build a broader connection of Central Asian
militaries with its own forces and with NATO, and the talk of an
Asian NATO comprising India, America, and other Asian powers
also reflect this trend and grow out of India’s strategic partnership
with America. Indeed, India has even supported Washington’s
indefinite retention of its bases in Central Asia. Nor is India’s
search for partners in Central Asia and across the continent limited
to Washington, although it clearly is conditioned by Russia’s long-
term weakness. India and Iran have even forged what amounts to
a classic alliance against Pakistan and its support for terrorism in
Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Indian Capabilities and Interests in Central Asia.

Compared to the long-standing awareness of China’s rising
economic power and its implications for Asia, India’s rising economic
power is only beginning to register across Asia. Therefore,
India’s ability to expand its capabilities in Central Asia depends on
successfully continuing this record of growth and extending it to
ever larger sectors of Indian society, much of which still suffers from
terrible poverty and backwardness. Therefore, we cannot doubt
India’s seriousness about playing a major role in Central Asia or its
growing interests there, which comprise internal security against
terrorists, largely sponsored by Pakistan, economic and energy activities, and the desire to play a major role in Central Asia to deny to both China and Pakistan opportunities to encircle India or keep it penned up in South Asia. In other words, beyond perceptions of security or of economic need and opportunity, a primary motive of India’s overall foreign policy and particularly in Central Asia, is India’s determination to play a great power role throughout Asia and belief that it now can begin to do so as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives indicate.

Whereas other powers in and around Central Asia, especially Russia, previously had discerned Indian hesitancy regarding Central Asia, that is no longer the case. Central Asia has definitively entered into the “mental map” of India’s sphere of interests. During the 1990s, India sought to reduce Pakistan’s ability to deflect it from playing the broader Asian role India craved by reaching out to all its interlocutors, including Central Asia. Retired Brigadier General V. K. Nair, a leading strategist, spoke for the entire Indian establishment when he told the U.S. National Defense University in 2001 that,

India needs to evolve a broad based strategy that would not only ensure the security of its vital interests but also provide policy options for effectively responding to developing situations in the area. India’s geostrategic location dictates that the primary focus of its security policies must be its relationship with the neighboring countries and the countries that form part of its “extended security horizon” which in one official publication is defined as “regions with economic, social, cultural, and environmental linkages [that] result in overlapping security interests.”

Central Asia is explicitly and widely cited as part of this “horizon,” and this interpretation of that term was publicly conveyed to Central Asian audiences at a Tashkent conference in 2003 by Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha. And the strategic goals of projecting economic and military influence and power abroad clearly are tied to this determination to cut a major figure in Asian politics.

Indian interests in Central Asia do not only grow out of its rising capability. To sustain that capability and create new avenues of influence for itself, India must find markets abroad and Central Asia was historically a place to look, especially as the Soviet Union collapsed. This major policy innovation grew out of the vacuum
created by that collapse, the pressure of globalization, and the so-called Washington consensus in liberalizing much of India’s quasi-socialist economy, particularly as China’s rise became too palpable to ignore. As Kishore Dash recently wrote,

Such a paradigmatic shift in India’s regional policy can be explained by post-Cold War global political-economic developments. Indian leaders well know that the success of their country’s [concurrent] economic liberalization depends upon its ability to increase exports to new markets in developed and developing countries. Until recently, India has achieved only restricted access to the markets of Japan, North America, and Western Europe due to these countries’ projectionist policies and various kinds of nontariff barriers against Indian products. Additionally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual incorporation of Eastern Europe with the West European economy, India has lost two of its privileged market links.187

India’s trade with Central Asia underwent a tremendous decline in 1991-94 that highlighted its faltering competitiveness with an already reformed China.188 Indeed, observers of Chinese policy quickly grasped China’s exploding economic and political ties with Central, South, and Southeast Asia.189 Thus the appearance of Islamic terrorism, abetted by the Taliban, and behind it, Pakistan, strengthened a rising disposition to see in Central Asia an area where important interests were already at stake. However, interest in trade and investment do not end there.

India’s strategic capability also depends on a rapidly growing economy with a significant and well-known high-tech component that seeks markets and guaranteed energy supplies to sustain this growth. India’s energy deficit, rising domestic demand, and need to sustain high growth rates make securing reliable long-term sources of energy a vital strategic priority.190 The pursuit of energy sufficiency and markets in Asia impels Indian leaders to look seriously at Central Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East, and to attempt to influence trends there.191

The quest for energy access and more open markets is part of India’s overall foreign economic strategy, and on a daily basis, economic power is perhaps the most important instrument in India’s arsenal because it is the indispensable prerequisite for advanced military
capability and for offering other states inducements to cooperate with India. Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral noted in 1997 that much of India’s foreign policy revolves around economic and infrastructural needs.\textsuperscript{192} He outlined a vision of regional economic development, including Central Asia, which he called “our near abroad.” Gujral emphasized investment in infrastructure: railroads, roads, power generation, telecommunications, ports and airports, informatics, cross-border investments, energy exchanges, up to and including “Trans-Asian pipelines,” strengthened regional organizations, tariff reductions and freer trade, and meeting “an exponential surge in energy demand” through the cooperative development of all forms of energy.\textsuperscript{193}

Indian businessmen clearly also are eager to compete with China in the region and exploit opportunities for expanding overland commerce with Central Asia, provided that the trade routes go through pacified countries. As S. Frederick Starr, director of Johns Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute, has observed,

\begin{quote}
The opening of transport corridors to Iran, Pakistan, and India will dramatically shift these dynamics [China’s rising share of Central Asian trade—author]. Indian and Pakistani businessmen and traders are quite blunt about their desire to supplant China as a source of goods for Central Asia. Both countries have assigned governmental commissions to explore the development of transport to bring this about.\textsuperscript{194}
\end{quote}

Obviously hopes for greater trade and Gujral’s vision would collapse if Central Asia, including Kashmir, were engulfed in anti-Indian violence. Then sustaining India’s economic development and internal security would become much more problematic. Thus foreign trade factors are also a compelling motive for resolving the Kashmir issue.

Indian energy companies, including the state-owned ONGC, take part in projects from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and hope to get in on the ground floor with respect to both oil and gas pipelines becoming players in a network that supposedly will revive the old silk route to Asia and give it an Indian branch as well.\textsuperscript{195} India also evidently holds the deciding voice as to whether the projected Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani pipeline will ever materialize. Although
it would greatly benefit all those states, offering Turkmenistan an alternative to Russia’s pipeline system and offering Pakistan and Afghanistan energy and revenues from transit fees, there are considerable economic and political difficulties. Those difficulties are not connected solely to the many political imponderables in all three of those states and Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Financing remains unsettled because political instability precludes a stable climate for investment by the Asian Development Bank and other interested institutions. But while India would be the main consumer of gas flows from this pipeline, it was not invited to the 2002 meetings in Ashgabat that formulated the new proposal and has refused to tie its gas supply to a pipeline through Pakistan. Clearly India’s decision will materially affect economic and political outcomes in the other three states.

Indian strategy also entails further exploration of India’s interior and off-shore regions for energy, investment of domestic resources in them, and welcoming foreign investors, e.g., Russia’s Gazprom. Thus India has developed a four-part foreign economic program to materialize this vision. First, its state-owned ONGC now invests in foreign oil and gas fields across Central and East Asia, even to include Sakhalin. Second, India also aims to assert itself as a major player throughout Asia and cement political ties with key states. Third, India seeks to increase exploration within its own confines. Indeed, with respect to Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran, these policy dimensions march together. Indian and Russian policymakers both accept that the strong bilateral political relationship is insufficient without deeper economic and trade ties.

The fourth aspect is stabilizing Afghanistan, a necessary condition of a revival of Central Asian trade with India that declined precipitously after the Soviet breakup. Instability in and around Afghanistan prevents India and Pakistan from fully realizing potential economic gains from trade with Central Asia. Indian businesses stand ready to expand their overland trade with Central Asia and Afghanistan once they can safely move cargoes through those areas, but violence in Afghanistan, and perhaps Pakistan too, inhibits them. Therefore, India has made a large effort to stabilize Afghanistan, providing financial assistance and aid in
transport, education, and health care. India was also among the first governments to accept the Karzai government there and has steadily intensified its connections with Afghanistan. And by so doing, it has repeatedly aroused Pakistan’s long-standing suspicions about Indian activity there, indicating that their rivalry connected to influence in and over Afghanistan is by no means a thing of the past.\textsuperscript{203}

**Indian Regional Diplomacy.**

To realize these interests and goals, India recently has improved ties with China, Russia, Iran, Israel, and the United States and also is consolidating key military and trading partnerships with them. Similarly, the shared perspective on terrorism with Moscow and Washington has allowed India to form permanent relationships and working groups with those governments to combat terrorism. As the new exercises and potential arms purchases from Washington show, these groups enhance military-political-intelligence collaboration with both capitals and their discussions about Central Asia apparently now include India as a shared subject of discussion.\textsuperscript{204} India’s membership in the UN-sponsored 6+2 process to deal with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and the favorable reaction to its interest in the SCO, also demonstrate its growing weight and repute in Asia generally, including Central Asia. Thus India has substantially improved relations with major players in and around Central Asia. Special emphasis here belongs to Indo-Uzbek and Indo-Kazak relations, which comprise heightened economic exchange and a growing security relationship.

**The Military Instrument.**

India’s policies also reflect the rising importance of military factors and instruments in its overall national security policy. While its conventional power projection capabilities have always been intended for use primarily against Pakistan, they are fungible and usable wherever applicable, e.g., against terrorist activities on the high seas or for aerial reconnaissance over Central Asia or Pakistan’s interior through airborne warning and control system (AWACS) or
satellite technology. These examples show what capabilities India is developing, improving, or seeking to acquire from its suppliers.\textsuperscript{205} Simultaneously, India also projects military power into Central Asia in other forms.

First, responding to Pakistan’s closing of its air space, India negotiated base rights with Tajikistan in 2002. While little is known about this air base, it is reportedly at an operational level and could therefore be used for operations against either Central Asian insurgents in support of a friendly government or Pakistan.\textsuperscript{206} However, this base may not be India’s last one or remain small. Indeed, it could become the spearhead of a deepening Indian involvement in Central Asian defense. Thus the ties with Tajikistan have led to joint Tajik-Indian military exercises involving the air, airborne, and ground forces of both sides.\textsuperscript{207}

India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to Central Asian and to buy from them earlier Soviet models parallels Pakistan’s similar capability, as both are entering the international arms market to find new export markets and keep defense plants open.\textsuperscript{208} Indian spokesmen frankly admit the drive to find export markets among former “pariah” states like Israel and South Africa to achieve economies of scale for their domestic defense industry. They hope that capturing those markets will then reduce Indian dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially as India increasingly can compel them to transfer technology and know-how as part of their sales.\textsuperscript{209} Probably India will provide training and assistance to Central Asian militaries, as do Turkey, Russia, China, and the United States, and also find in them willing buyers of its weapons, especially those made jointly with Russia.

But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into Southeast Asia and Central Asia where China seeks to expand its influence, India must compete with China on price and quality in the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, patrol ships, light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast Asia at reduced price and with better equipment.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore,

\textit{Over the next decade, India intends to produce weapons systems China cannot, including an indigenously designed air defense ship—basically
a small aircraft carrier. Through subsidies, loans, and higher technology, New Delhi hopes to supplant China as a major regional arms supplier. It also can take advantage of underlying concerns about China within Southeast Asia, touting Indian weapons systems as free from the risks of being swallowed by an aggressive China in the future.\textsuperscript{211}

All this also applies to Central Asia, which is already the target of an Indian arms sales offensive. India has sold Kazakhstan and Tajikistan \textit{Ilyushin-76} transports and helicopters, respectively.\textsuperscript{212}

Finally, India has built a burgeoning security relationship with Uzbekistan based on a common antipathy to Islamic terrorism. Indian scholars believe these two states are natural allies who confront the same threats: terrorism, insurgency, separatism, drugs, etc. Uzbekistan steadily has widened its security discussions with India to include intelligence sharing, military and paramilitary training, and joint working groups against terrorism, as India has done with Washington and Moscow.\textsuperscript{213} Here again, New Delhi emulates Moscow, Washington, Ankara, and Beijing. More importantly, it has only begun to display its military instruments of power locally. As long as security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct India or to use this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, India’s projection of all forms of military power will likely grow. Indeed, the threat of terrorism against India and its measures to fight that threat evidently have received sympathetic hearing in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and has allowed India to build enduring security and intelligence cooperation fora with those states.\textsuperscript{214}

\textbf{Conclusions.}

India’s display of its military instruments of power in and to Central Asia is ultimately a harbinger of future trends. As long as security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct India or to use this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, the projection of all forms of military power will likely grow. But India will also increase its capabilities and influence in Central Asia for reasons having to do with internal economic needs like energy and trade, as well as for traditional geostrategic imperatives that will make themselves increasingly important as India’s economy and military capabilities
grow, along with its aspirations to cut a meaningful figure in Asia. This means that Indo-Chinese interests in Central Asia will inevitably collide with each other, but not necessarily violently. Nonetheless, the relationship will contain considerable elements of competition, as is already seen from the history of Indo-Chinese relations.215

While Sino-Indian tensions throughout Asia are likely, whatever stresses divide them in Central Asia will also be a function of American, and to a lesser degree Russian, relations with them. Sino-Indian competition in Central Asia cannot be separated from the larger Asian and global context in which the two countries operate. Thus their rivalry over nuclear issues, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, as well as their current efforts to find a largely economic basis for a *modus vivendi*, will spill over into and influence their relations in Central Asia and vice versa. Indo-American cooperation in Central Asia cannot only help both sides prevent destabilization due to terrorist attacks or potential future Chinese efforts to establish a sphere of influence either unilaterally or with Moscow against Washington, their collaboration can also exercise a moderating or restraining influence on the tendency of Indo-Chinese competition in Asia.

Moreover, India’s and China’s participation in Central Asia, and the degree to which they do so, will be a function of the success of their economic and military policies. If those policies continue to bring about substantial rises in both economic and military capability without endangering the domestic fabric of their societies and governments, that capability will find an outlet in Central Asia as well as elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, if they can continue growing at their current pace for another generation, they may well begin to eclipse other powers’ capability to project meaningful influence and power in to Central Asia, e.g., Russia and Iran. Likewise, if India can surmount the obstacles to a genuine rapprochement with Pakistan, not least among them being Chinese support for Islamabad’s efforts to block Indian hegemony in South Asia, it will become that much more formidable a challenger in Central Asia. After all, there is good reason for arguing that India’s grand strategy took a decisive turn in the 1990s to recover something of the heritage of the British Raj and its quest for enduring influence in Central Asia as expressed by leaders.
like Lord Curzon. Because the capabilities that India can bring to bear in Central Asia are growing and are perceived as legitimate and nonthreatening by local governments, the utility of cooperation with India in Central Asia grows along with its importance to both New Delhi and Washington.
CHAPTER 6

INDIA AS PLAYER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is a region whose importance to both American and Indian interests has risen for the same reasons: the threat of terrorism and the enormous growth of Chinese economic power and influence throughout the region that could soon and relatively quickly translate, or so it is feared, into enduring political and military power and/or influence. Thus Washington’s and New Delhi’s appreciations of potential short-term and long-term threats that could put vital national interests of both states at some risk in this area are convergent, if not identical. If one includes Myanmar in Southeast Asia, for example, the threat posed by terrorists there to India’s Northeast provinces has already been cited. Indeed, the eruption of terrorist activity throughout Southeast Asia has only refocused the attention of both the United States and neighboring states, including India and Australia, on the area. Australia has proclaimed a preventive intervention doctrine, along with assigning forces to the Solomon Islands, precisely to forestall a rise in indigenous civic violence that could lead to further terrorism there, or else originating from there but conducted elsewhere. And it has created a 1,000 mile nautical maritime security zone around its coastline. Similarly, a recent American analysis states openly that,

Southeast Asia is a promising hub for not only al-Qaeda, but also other terrorist groups, and many within the U.S. military view Southeast Asia as the next front in the war on terror. Although there are terrorist networks throughout, there are no overt sponsors of that terrorism. This does make the problem harder to solve since there are no obvious targets, but it also creates greater possibilities for cooperation in the war on terror and opens the door to the expanded use of the U.S. military beyond the Philippines.

Such cooperation has begun with India’s Navy conducting joint patrols with the U.S. Navy in the Strait of Malacca in 2002. And there also appear to be possibilities for trilateral cooperation with Australia, if not other local powers, in prosecuting antiterrorist
missions. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Indian analysts display greater interest in Southeast Asia. So while there may be increased scope for practical bilateral or even trilateral cooperation with Australia here, any serious upgrading of U.S. and Indian influence and capabilities in Southeast Asia, whether pursued singly or in tandem, will force policymakers in India, America, China, and local governments to interact in a highly complex manner.

Moreover, Southeast Asian analysts and elites would welcome greater American and Indian involvement in the region provided that these two governments each adopt a comprehensive view of the Southeast Asian security agenda to comprise all the fields in economics and social issues where mutually beneficial cooperation could occur and where America and India take regional security institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seriously. These strictures, it should be noted, apply more to Washington than to New Delhi, for there is a widespread view throughout Southeast Asia that harbors some reservations and criticisms about America’s willingness to take the nonterrorist security agenda and organizations like ASEAN and the ARF fully into account. Thus Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore writes that,

Southeast Asians do not want the U.S. to see the region purely through the lens of terrorism. Engagement between Southeast Asia and [the] U.S. should be more comprehensive, covering the whole spectrum of social, economic, cultural, political, and security issues. The war against terrorism cannot be won by military means alone. A winning strategy should be multifaceted and include social, economic, political, and military components.

Due to this demand for a comprehensive security strategy, India, as an important neighboring partner of Southeast Asian security organizations, is in an excellent position to find ways of working with Washington to advance shared interests against commonly faced problems that threaten all local governments and other interested parties in Southeast Asia. Obviously, there is a wide field of activity for both the United States and India with regard to Southeast Asian security, especially if one takes the modern and not exclusively military definition of security into account as well as opportunities
for beneficial cooperation between these two states and among them, Australia, and local governments. Indeed, ASEAN members openly state that they seek greater Indian, American, and Chinese economic involvement in Southeast Asia to ensure greater prosperity there. As Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi told ASEAN leaders, without greater integration with China and India, ASEAN cannot remain competitive merely by strengthening intraregional cooperation. Following through on this, in late 2004, ASEAN set up a Regional Trade and Investment Area to enhance the flow of foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia, regional monetary cooperation, and promote an Asian bond market and set up a plan of action to implement the ASEAN-India partnership for Peace, Progress, and Shared Prosperity. And, at least with regard to American policy, there is a widespread feeling in the region that there is a much greater scope for action than what Washington currently perceives.

At the same time both Indian and American policy initiatives in Southeast Asia must confront the challenge that China’s rising power poses even if Chinese intentions are deemed to be peaceful and nonaggressive. Indeed, as Koh suggests, Southeast Asians, for all their wariness about China, perceive its rise not as a threat, but as an opportunity and a challenge. Whether or not that is the case, Indian defense planners are very wary of China, even though a substantial rapprochement is underway between Beijing and New Delhi and despite the fact that India, as its spokesmen regularly announce, will not take part in a policy of open containment of China. Thus, while Indo-American strategic partnership—to whatever degree that it exists—checks China’s ability to dominate Southeast or Central Asia, that partnership cannot, for India at any rate, become a vehicle for containment of China. One reason for India’s calm vis-à-vis China is that, even as Chinese military and economic capabilities grow, causing no small amount of anxiety among Indian elites, so too do India’s similar capabilities. For example, India’s new Agni II missile can reach targets throughout Central and East Asia, including China. But it has refrained from testing the Agni III which could clearly target China and thus provoke it into a missile race with India. And if India continues building nuclear weapons like ICBMs or SLBMs, it will truly have an intercontinental capability,
not to mention an inter-theater one. Similarly, insofar as American and Indian policymakers discuss a version of an “Asian NATO,” that immediately arouses Chinese suspicions. So it is hardly surprising that China immediately voiced concern about what this Asian NATO might mean, and that it equally has been motivated to prevent any kind of Indo-American alliance even if its analysts conform to China’s policy line of downgrading Indian claims to being a major power, even though Chinese analysts contend that such an alliance is unlikely to be a serious one.229

Since the Indo-American partnership constitutes a major strategic reversal from the past history of a troubled bilateral relationship, this rapprochement made China’s government and armed forces sit up and take notice and therefore rethink their relationship with India.230 Indeed, China has gone so far as to publicly support Indian membership on the Security Council.231 Thus the talk of an Asian NATO, as well as the visible signs of partnership, has inclined Beijing to deal more seriously with New Delhi in a departure from its traditional policy of not wanting even to discuss the possibility of India’s being a major Asian power.232 Indeed, China is now calling for upgraded economic and military ties with India, a new departure in its policies as well.233

Similarly, Tellis cites Indian views that India’s perceptions of a threat from rising Chinese power do not mandate a direct confrontation with China, but rather merely a buildup of India’s own capabilities and resources for a subtle multidimensional policy. Partnership with Washington then becomes a major, but still only one, part of that multidimensional strategy that mixes regional competition with engagement on issues of less strategic centrality, suffices to check China’s ambitions, and makes India more worthy of being seen as a genuinely equal strategic partner of America in Asia.234 The many signs of an economic-political rapprochement with China also suggest that Beijing is coming to terms with Indian power, and that New Delhi believes that this recognition suffices to maintain a balance with China for the foreseeable future. Indeed, wherever possible, cooperation on a broader scale than ever before with China may well occur, even if many of the reasons for persisting suspicion remain.235 Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance with Washington as long as both partners understand and accept that
the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and military growth suffices to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the official 1998-99 Indian Defense Report, written soon after India’s nuclear tests displayed open tension with China, already stated that India “does not regard China as an adversary but as a great neighbor with which it would like to develop mutually beneficial and friendly relations.”

Furthermore, Indian officials from Prime Minister Singh on down, profess not to be worried by China’s economic growth, even though China clearly serves both as a rival and as a benchmark against which to measure Indian economic progress. They profess to believe that, because India is a democracy and China is not, India’s slower rate of growth is not a problem because China’s political system will enter into a crisis. Indeed, India’s rising profile easily could presage a fundamental and lasting strategic change throughout Asia, especially if India can maintain a high rate of economic growth into the future. Because India is a democracy, not only would economic growth strengthen its overall capabilities, it probably also would not unleash a major political crisis, something that many people expect or fear for China if growth there continues at a high rate. Indeed, some observers report the possibly counterintuitive finding that, “Indian policymakers are more confident than their Chinese counterparts regarding their ability to deal effectively with domestic ethnic and economic forces.”

In the 1990s the concern that a rising China might economically and politically isolate India from Southeast Asia led Indian policymakers, influenced by world trends and ideas like the Gujral doctrine, to “look East” even well before September 11. And ASEAN welcomed this policy both for its own sake and obviously to serve as a potential counterweight to China. Thus an Indonesian assessment of ASEAN and cooperation in East Asia states that,

At this point some ASEAN countries view the entry of India into the whole framework of cooperation as the strategic means to balance the influence of Northeast Asian countries, which are much superior, compared to those in Southeast Asia. This had been clearly reflected in an analogy made by the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore that “if ASEAN is a fuselage of an aircraft, and Northeast Asian economies serve as one wing of the aircraft, then India’s engagement with Southeast Asia
is—and should be viewed as—the other wing which made the aircraft operational and stable.”

Indeed, that Look East program, a clear response to the end of the Cold War, aimed to upgrade diplomatic and economic relations with the area and put them on a greater, expanded, and regular footing. Once those objectives were accomplished, the extension or projection of military capabilities was found to be less objectionable by Southeast Asian governments than was previously the case. However, Indian governments did so, not just to compete economically and politically but also in line with their aspirations to play a major role throughout Asia. This consensus concerning India’s expansive interests throughout the entire Indian Ocean and its littoral are rooted in India’s geography as it is refracted through the prism of contemporary strategic capabilities (which very much include economic, energy, and technological capabilities) and in domestic Indian political discourse.

As virtually every analyst of Indian policy emphasizes, Indian elites carry within themselves a mental map that says India is a state that has a major power potential and future international importance which should become a major “pole” in an ideally multipolar or polycentric world. This polycentric or multipolar world where India is one of the centers or poles is the ideal Indian goal, hence it is clear that, despite partnership with Washington, there is considerable skepticism about Washington’s penchant for unilateralism. Therefore and despite the need for strategic partnership with America and other major players, India must retain its strategic autonomy to pursue its vital interests throughout its “extended strategic neighborhood,” i.e., Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca. This expanded strategic concept comprises not only classic military and/or geostrategic perspectives but also a broader definition of security and security interests.

Moreover, India has been expanding its strategic profile steadily throughout the Indian Ocean in recent years. Beyond the joint patrols in the Strait of Malacca and the possible discussions with Australia regarding the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is making port calls in Vietnam, the Philippines, and even South Korea and Japan. In July 2004, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia began coordinated
antipiracy patrols there, too, and discussions between them and India are taking place to see if the Indian Navy will join ASEAN members in these patrols. In September, the Indian and Indonesian Navies began patrolling the area west of the Straits known as the Six-Degree Channel that separates the Indian island of Nicobar from Indonesia’s island of Sabang and the coast of Aceh and which is home to virtually all the commercial traffic entering or leaving the Straits. These activities, as well as Indian naval maneuvers and exercises with the U.S. Navy off of Goa and in the Arabian Sea region, underscore India’s arrival as a major player in Asia and reflect the implementation of Vajpayee’s directives even after his government’s defeat.

The enhanced Indian naval profile in Southeast Asia serves several objectives. One is to strengthen India’s so-called “Look East” policy that is intended in part to balance China’s influence in the eastern Indian Ocean region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, etc.) and in Southeast Asia. A second is to familiarize the navy with a potential theater of operations—the South China Sea—that probably would be important in any contingency involving conflict with China. India’s naval presence in this region also is likely intended to help stymie the apparent flow of arms across the Bay of Bengal to insurgents in India’s northeast and to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Finally, as stated by an Indian Navy spokesperson, the deployment would also demonstrate the navy’s ability to operate far from home. Taken together, these latest naval initiatives, in conjunction with an October air exercise with Singapore in Central India, ongoing Indian base-building efforts in Tajikistan and possibly elsewhere soon in Central Asia, the finalization of a defense pact with Sri Lanka and newly strengthened security ties with Myanmar all underscore India’s strategic emergence as a major player in the broad Asia-Pacific region.

Clearly India’s and China’s rising capabilities in economics and defense already impel them to expand their interests even beyond South and East Asia. Both of them will also try to co-opt Washington to support them, if need be, against each other, or in their interactions with other Asian states. Washington, for its part, will also exploit latent Indo-Chinese rivalry for its interests which include, inter alia, holding the balance in South and East Asia. Since the United States
will likely remain the strongest power in Asia for a generation, its role in conditioning Sino-Indian interactions in Asia absolutely is critical. As Mark Frazier writes of Indo-Chinese relations, “future relations between the two states will remain firmly embedded within a triangle formed with the United States.”246 At the same time, local actors in Southeast Asia will also be engaging China, India, and America, thereby multiplying the complexity of local and international interactions.

While there is a current Indian rapprochment with Beijing and a search for common grounds and increased economic interaction, this does not mean that the two states’ rivalry is over—far from it. But for now and the immediate future, that rivalry will be limited by the interests and capabilities of India, China, and all the other states they engage in this region, including America. For now, the mainstream Indian view is that India must be wary of China, but that no serious threat presently exists. However, the future may bring undesirable changes in that regard unless Indian growth keeps pace with China’s growth. Therefore, even if we assume China to be a strategic competitor for both India and Washington, the major architect of a strategy to tie India down to being a contested power in South Asia and a state that cannot play a major role in Asia, e.g., by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means foreordained, indeed it is unlikely, that Washington and New Delhi will reply to that strategy by implementing their own concerted version of the containment of China.247

U.S. leaders are on record as saying that current relations with China are at an all-time high and that a flourishing partnership with Beijing is now taking place.248 Thus current U.S. strategy to China is not exclusively a containment strategy and the future course of those relations depends upon events in Beijing and Washington, if not places which neither can control, like North Korea. None of this diminishes the element of competition in our ties to China or in India’s ties to it. But it does mean that Indo-American collaboration, strategic partnership, or even alliance need not inevitably replicate the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. Indeed, as Arun Sahgal writes, despite both sides’ concern to understand and limit the possible negative consequences of China’s rising power, India “is clear that a long-term Indo-U.S. relationship cannot be based and
sustained on the China containment theory.”

Instead, strategic partnership with America, plus improving relations with other key states in Asia, enables India to have the best of both worlds, partnership with Washington and other key actors, and the strategic autonomy to engage with whomever it chooses whenever it wants to do so. As Mark Frazier writes,

Given the importance of retaining its foreign policy autonomy, India will be reluctant to stake its future on an exclusive alliance with the United States. Instead, India will develop multifaceted, flexible security relationships that also involve Japan, Russia, and ASEAN. The underlying purpose of Indian strategy is thus to signal to China that India can become part of an anti-China coalition, should China take stances that threaten the security of its neighbors.

This strategy grows out of the aforementioned assessment of India’s elite consensus on China and informs all of India’s regional policies in Asia. Direct confrontation with China is ruled out in favor of economic-political cooperation and muted strategic rivalry whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance with America, as long as both partners understand and accept that the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and military growth and its strategic partnership with America suffices to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady and impressive rising power potential demonstrates the power of the democratic option in Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese authoritarianism, which many fear will run inevitably into a major domestic crisis. In that case, an Indo-American partnership will be strengthened by its being “an axis of democracy,” not a purely military alliance whose purpose is containment of China. And this is true even if India is in favor or not averse to further U.S. deployments in the region or if some sort of alliance along the lines of the so-called Asian NATO comes into being. As that alliance has yet to take shape, it could become like today’s NATO, a crisis manager and provider of stability, rather than replicating the Cold War alliance.

On the other hand, China and India currently are undergoing major military buildups, and there is a more honest awareness in both capitals of strategic rivalry and of the need to take each other
into account as strategic factors than was previously the case. In large measure, this mutual realization is due to the fact that the 1998 nuclear tests awoke China to the reality that India would not be deterred from its aspirations to play a major role in Asia. Therefore, Beijing had to take the potential trajectory of rising Indian military and economic capabilities more seriously than it had ever been willing to do beforehand or than it is willing to admit.\textsuperscript{253} Indeed, many Chinese analysts perceive the burgeoning partnership with the United States as more than an expression of India’s efforts to carve out a greater role in Asia. They see this partnership as part of a joint, if generally American-led, effort to encircle China, or at least to contain it. While official China does not mention the possibility of encirclement or of a formal Indo-U.S. alliance in keeping with China’s policy to say nothing that might give rise to the idea that India is a legitimate major player in Asia, undoubtedly this perception does color some of China’s views and may actually be a major feature in its post-1998 efforts to improve diplomatic relations with India.\textsuperscript{254}

Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states, and in Asia more generally, making it the focus of each side’s effort to gain greater leverage and traction in Asia.\textsuperscript{255} Consequently, enhanced bilateral military partnership and arms sales to India offers Washington another card to play when needed and provides both states with an ever-present factor of restraint that acts upon Chinese policy. It also is clear that India’s military buildup, while parallel to China’s, does not have to be as comprehensive as China’s to counter Chinese expansionist ambitions. As long as that Indian buildup suffices to check or to constrain Chinese strategic options, helping it represents a sound investment for the United States. In this respect, the overall picture bears out the Indian argument presented here concerning India’s ability to check excessive Chinese ambitions. Even Chinese sources hint (because they do not wish to discuss this openly) that this is what is transpiring under cover of Washington’s rapprochements with India and other key countries.
like Indonesia.\textsuperscript{256}

To the extent that Indian power, backed up and promoted by Washington, contributes to an overall Asian framework that restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will foster a broader, more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that keeps all powers in play and prevents any one power from making a bid for regional or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts are confident of such an outcome.\textsuperscript{257} It should be noted that precisely such a balance of power is postulated in the U.S. \textit{National Security Strategy} of 2002 as being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia.\textsuperscript{258} So this concept of Indo-Chinese relations ultimately closely correlates with U.S. goals as well.\textsuperscript{259} Certainly Chinese observers have assimilated fully the notion, reiterated by the Pentagon and the Indian government, that India and America “have common strategic interests in Asia and even farther regions.”\textsuperscript{260}

Obviously Southeast Asia is one of those regions. And here, as elsewhere,

\begin{quote}
Beijing cannot afford to place much faith in the common Sino-Indian desire for “multipolarity” because American unipolarity offers India geopolitical advantages that are far more attractive to New Delhi than any prospective multipolarity that brings with it grave imbalances in future Sino-Indian power.\textsuperscript{261}
\end{quote}

In Southeast Asia, this observation is relevant particularly since China has so many historic, vital, and now growing strategic and economic interests in the area that its rising capabilities are perceived immediately as somehow opening the way to a sphere of influence. While India will not represent or present an overt challenge to China, Beijing’s growing regional power stimulates its counterefforts and lends credence to the elite consensus that rising Chinese power here signifies Beijing’s attempt to move into Southeast Asia to encircle India.\textsuperscript{262} This rivalry is particularly visible as regards Myanmar and its neighborhood.\textsuperscript{263}

Thus, observers like Tellis perceive three overarching Indian strategic objectives here, many of which can be seen to harmonize with U.S. interests as well. The first objective is to prevent China from acquiring foreign basing and presence that could threaten the
Indian homeland and its freedom of action in South Asia. The second objective is to prevent China from acquiring sufficient regional influence so as to be able to coerce the local states into supporting Chinese policies aimed at undercutting Indian security. The third objective is to develop strategic relationships with the key states that enable India to operate within the region as required, and to extend support that may be requested by its regional partners.264

These objectives mandate for India a strategy that unites the use of defense and economic instruments of power in Southeast Asia. At the same time, America’s recent success in projecting naval based air power from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan also is not lost on Indian planners who also know that much of Pakistan’s and India’s trade is seaborne and therefore particularly vulnerable to maritime or maritime-based air threats. That consideration is especially pertinent to energy supplies, given instability in Central Asia and the Gulf and adds another reason for a combined military-economic approach to regional security issues in Southeast Asia.

These strategic considerations, in an environment where India’s increasing ability to project power beyond its borders has also long been recognized, bring together economic needs and the impetus for a big navy and an expansive naval policy as detailed above.265 For example, India has not only used its naval deployments to show its interest in restraining Chinese penetration of Myanmar, it has also offered economic assistance and help in the government’s campaign against terrorists to enhance its security. And as a result, the Burmese Foreign Ministry has assured India that any Chinese military activity on the Coco Islands off the Burma coast in the Bay of Bengal “will not be used as a military base by any power against India.”266 Although Indian interests in Southeast Asia are not quite as sharply focused as they are in Central Asia, they are no less real for Indian strategists. Not surprisingly, Indian analysts frequently invoke old strategic and Realpolitik perspectives in India’s quest for regional hegemony in the Indian Ocean, including the waters off Southeast Asia. And they are hardly alone in their approach. Here the clear and specific threat that both precedes and will follow the current terrorist threat is Chinese commercial and maritime penetration (which in Indian threat assessments are one and the same with the ships following the trade) into the Indian Ocean, particularly Myanmar and more
recently Pakistan’s port of Gwadar. If China were to achieve the goals imputed to it by Indian elites, it could then actualize the three potential threats to India from Southeast Asia that Tellis cited.

Therefore the Indian policy response, most notably in its “Look East” policy of the past decade, has combined military and economic programs and both bilateral and multilateral fora, though until recently it has been primarily commercial and diplomatic. India participates in ASEAN’s talks to create a free trade area (FTA). It appears that the major thrust of India’s foreign economic diplomacy here is to push for agreements that incorporate it and Southeast Asia in a formalized free trade regime. Thus India has supported a variety of initiatives spanning both South Asian and Southeast Asian states that would move in this direction. India also participates in the ARF and was clearly invited into it as a hedge against China.

India is also steadily upgrading its commercial and arms sales relationship with Vietnam, which it clearly regards as a principal check upon China’s aggrandizement in the vicinity of the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Apparently ASEAN also increasingly is persuaded that a closer association with India is useful to it for this same purpose of balancing China in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Therefore, as long as India employs a diversified strategy using both economic and military instruments of power and avoids perceptions that it seeks to export South Asia’s dilemmas, including its rivalry with Pakistan, to the area, it should be able to support its and ASEAN’s goal of helping ASEAN become strong enough to ward off either Chinese blandishments or coercion.

For India, Southeast Asia is not just important as a place for trade rivalry with the dynamic Chinese economy and as a strategic or potentially strategic theater for Indian influence, it also has an important bearing on energy security. Based on extensive interviews with Indian military and political figures, Juli MacDonald reports that,

Indians look to Southeast Asia to diversify their energy imports away from West Asia. Indians anticipate that India will rely increasingly on Southeast Asia’s abundant natural gas to meet its growing demand for that fuel. [In addition] several retired Indian military officers spoke of rising Islamic fundamentalism and instability in Indonesia as a
combination that at best provides safe havens for terrorists and at worst could destabilize the entire region. Indians see Indonesia as a key, and increasingly fragile, part of India’s strategic periphery.  

Clearly India and Indian spokesmen also are not afraid to advertise that all of Southeast Asia, including the Eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean and at least some of the land mass adjoining the South China Sea, also constitutes either part of India’s “extended strategic neighborhood” or part of a single strategic unit. Consequently, they readily proclaim that Indian security interests span “the region from the Gulf to Southeast Asia.”  

They do so even though some American military perspectives do not envision India as more than a secondary player in the Eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean whose interests might one day come into conflict with the vital U.S. interest of controlling and/or denying access into the Indian Ocean.  

Indeed, MacDonald found that Indian officers and policymakers claim that India needs no U.S. “blessing” to confer “legitimacy” upon its presence there, as local governments have already done so after substantive consultation.  

She also found that, while India and America concur concerning a harmony of shared interests against common threats—terrorism, piracy, concern for the safety of SLOCs, counterdrug, environmental pollution, counterproliferation, and search and rescue operations—Indians have an expansive view of their responsibilities there that is much grander than what the Americans she interviewed are ready to concede. Thus a retired Indian lieutenant general opined to her that Indo-American collaboration in the Indian Ocean basin helps expand the relationship and perception of India from the Indo-Pakistani conflict, restricts the rise of Chinese power, and protects sea lanes.  

He further elaborated that,  

The Indian Ocean basin is extremely important to India. India seeks to prevent this region from becoming an area of turbulence and competition among the navies of this region. India wants to keep China out of the Indian Ocean. This means that the Indian Navy must be strengthened. It must bolster its bases in the region, including the Eastern Command on the Nicobar Islands. It must work with other navies to protect the sea lanes and enhance all maritime security in India’s EEZ (Economic Exclusion Zone).
Not surprisingly, India has followed his recommendations, even without waiting for the United States to “bless” its policies. India reorganized its naval command to create an Andaman and Nicobar Island command for the Fleet at Port Blair in the Bay of Bengal in 2001 to monitor China’s presence in Myanmar and the Indian Ocean more broadly. In December 2003, India also announced that it would reinforce those bases by basing strike jets, aerial refuelers, and about 100 long, short, and middle range unmanned aerial vehicles there to monitor developments at China’s Coco Island base.\textsuperscript{279} The Andaman-Nicobar command at Port Blair,

Is tasked with exerting influence over Indian Ocean sea-lanes, combating piracy, and guaranteeing the smooth entry of ships heading toward the Malacca Straits. It also includes surveillance and monitoring stations across the 750 Km long Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago. The islands are 1,200 km from India, but just 90 Km from Indonesia and 50 Km from Myanmar. The Indian Air Force plans on establishing a fighter air base at southern Nicobar, giving its newly acquired Russian Su-30MKI (sea based fighters)—likely to be based there from time to time—an extended regional role.\textsuperscript{280}

India is increasing military sales to Vietnam, providing spares for overhauling its aged MiG-21 series fighter aircraft with new avionics and radars to support Russia’s latest missiles, including the R-77 AMRAAMS\textsuperscript{KI} and R-27 DOGFIGHT, sending its officers to Vietnam for training in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare operations, while India’s coast guard and Vietnam’s sea police would cooperate to fight piracy. India also is providing help to build up the Vietnamese Navy, including repairs, upgrading, and construction of warships and patrol craft. Reciprocal visits by senior military officers and regular intelligence exchanges are also part of the agreement with Hanoi, and India has also agreed “in principle” to sell Vietnam the locally developed surface-to-surface Prithvi missile, train Vietnamese scientists in India’s nuclear establishments, and help Vietnam establish its own arms industry for small arms and other kinds of ordnance.\textsuperscript{281} The Indian Navy also conducted combined exercises with the Vietnamese Navy.\textsuperscript{282} As one writer observed, “India needs Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now
taking shape against New Delhi.” The BJP government has also sent some ships to Southeast Asia on goodwill missions, during which they took part in naval maneuvers with Japan and Vietnam.

The exercises and policy actions cited above are also evidence of this growing naval capability and interest in power projection. The Navy is also proposing an amphibious force towards achieving this capability. Clearly the Navy, if not the government, regards itself as a force for stability and a security manager in the Indian Ocean and its littoral against a range of threats that encompasses much, if not all, of the spectrum of conflict, including humanitarian operations, guaranteeing energy supplies, and controlling the strategic choke points of the Indian Ocean.

The Indian government and Navy also are implementing Fernandes’ 2000 statement that Vietnam and Japan are emerging as strategic partners for countering piracy from the Indian Ocean east to the South China Sea. By doing so, they also serve notice on China that they will contest its efforts to dominate that Sea. India’s increasing defense ties to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore (agreeing in principle to letting Singapore train its forces on Indian territory) must also be seen in this light of a common concern about Chinese power in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, a vital lifeline for both states.

Signifying its desire for a visible and favorable strategic profile, India also committed itself to respecting the agreement on a nuclear-free Southeast Asia even though it refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As one commentator indicates, this shows India’s willingness to compromise on strategic issues for the sake of improved relations with Southeast Asia despite Pakistan and China’s nuclear arsenals. Given the linked energy, trade, and strategic issues tying this region to India and due to the presence of Islamic terrorism and a sharp rise in piracy here (perhaps not unconnected with that terrorism), it is clear that this region enjoys a rising profile in Indian and American security calculations, and that it, like Central Asia and the Gulf, reinforces the intertwined nature of energy, economic, and strategic factors in India’s security calculations. Therefore, it is not unlikely that further progress towards a bilateral military and strategic partnership with the United States will include serious discussions about security trends and both sides’ interests
throughout Southeast Asia and its adjoining maritime reaches. But beyond that, at least some Indian analysts think that it is very much in Washington’s interest that India play a substantially larger role here.

What’s in it for the United States? For one, the proposed security system is principally an in-region solution for dealing with two of the biggest international security threats—an over-ambitious China and the spread of Talibanised Islam. Second, this scheme being entirely indigenous, there is none of the odium that attends on U.S. troops deployed locally as in South Korea and Japan. Third, it can eventuate in more economical and even effective policing of the proximal Asian waters against piracy, drug-trafficking, and gun running. It could also protect the sea lines of communications and the oil-bearing oceanic traffic more effectively than the U.S. naval fleets and air flights out of Sasebo Bay and Guam may be able to manage. And, finally, it in no way precludes the presence in the extended region of the U.S. armed forces or limits U.S. military initiatives. But crucial to making this system work is India’s being convinced of its “manifest destiny” and for it to act forcefully. It will require in the main that New Delhi think geostrategically and give up its diffidence when it comes to advancing the country’s vital national interests and its almost knee-jerk bias to appease friends and foes alike. The corrective lies in the Indian government expressly defining its strategic interests and focus and, at a minimum, proceeding expeditiously towards obtaining a nuclear force with a proven and tested thermonuclear and an ICBM reach. Nothing less will persuade the putative Asian allies that India can be an effective counterpoise to China in the region, or compel respect for India in Washington.²⁹⁰

Two conclusions emerge from this discussion of Indian activities and interests in Southeast Asia. First, India’s own actions and outlooks, combined with growing U.S. interests and the stress on U.S. military capabilities, should impel both governments to initiate a sustained bilateral discussion on roles, interests, threat perceptions, and responsibilities throughout that area. Second, we should not underestimate the importance attached by India to all of Southeast Asia. Beyond Vietnam, India might find possibilities for enhanced defense cooperation with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the United States, either bilaterally or in a multilateral forum.
with some or all of these states. There are many dimensions for this kind of cooperation to take shape, e.g., provision of intelligence support and training in the war against terror, patrolling the Strait of Malacca, or as a supplier of military technology and parts to local militaries.\textsuperscript{291} Indeed, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), one of India’s leading defense firms, seeks to become an aviation industry hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become, in general, a hub for missile building programs throughout Asia, and even Africa.\textsuperscript{292}
CHAPTER 7

PRACTICAL MILITARY COOPERATION

As India’s April 2001 agenda indicates, it is critically important to India that America treat it as an equal and that this relationship lead to “partnership where security cooperation played a prominent role.” India wants both the respect it feels has not been forthcoming in the past and sustained security cooperation with the United States.  

Therefore, its practical military actions in cooperation with the U.S. military or in support of American interests have a dual goal, not just to improve the relationship but also to show Washington how important and useful an ally India can be. Certainly many officers in the U.S. armed forces have come to know the high quality of India’s Navy, Air Force, and Army and on these grounds alone recommend greater military cooperation with India in general and with these services in particular. At the same time, these actions are or at least should be clearly undertaken as well out of hard-headed calculations of national interest on both sides because they add substantially to both sides’ capabilities to realize their vital and important Asian security interests. For example, General William J. Begert, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), stated that, “The increased interaction between U.S. and Indian military services helps U.S. efforts to reduce tensions between India and its neighbor, Pakistan.” Yet, a full strategic appreciation of the benefits of bilateral military collaboration was absent from the Pentagon, at least as of September 2004.

By practical defense cooperation, we mean not only joint and/or combined exercises among and between the forces of the two governments but also a regular cycle of mutual high-level interchanges among both political and military leaders, intelligence sharing and cooperation, and the forging of practical cooperation on security issues like missile defense, weapons sales, and technology transfer. From everything that has been written, it is clear that these manifestations of cooperation are important, if not critical, to both India and the United States in their relations with key allies and
partners. Therefore, the indices and trend lines of such occurrences represent a telling sign of the health and direction of the relationship over time. Moreover, they also represent substantive progress to the establishment of viable and credible mechanisms for continuous strategic dialogue and interaction and provide this relationship with a basis for further advances.

For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (USAF) traveled to India in July 2003 for talks with his Indian counterpart and discussed ongoing bilateral military ties. In his own words, he did so because “Not only is India’s cooperation in the global war on terrorism significant, but the U.S.-India military cooperation continues to increase, an important fact, given that India will soon have the largest population in the world.”

In this respect, General Myers’ visit is only the most recent of what Blackwill called “a continual parade” of high-ranking U.S. officials’ visits to India and six major joint exercises as of December 2002. These visits also comprise a similar “parade” of high-ranking Indian officials, including Prime Minister Vajpayee, to Washington. Moreover, the interaction among officials at the highest ranks of government and of high-ranking military officers provides a valuable mechanism for continuous interaction and cooperation beyond exercises. Thus, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Secretary of State Colin Powell have traveled there frequently, and former National Security Advisor, now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in frequent contact with her opposite number, Brajesh Mishra, who traveled frequently to Washington. Likewise, over 100 senior policymakers traveled to India from late 2001 to December 2002.

The practical materialization of this kind of regular contact expresses itself in the joint DPG that was reestablished in 2001 with Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith in the lead for the U.S. side. The invigoration of the DPG paralleled the equal strengthening of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter-Terrorism and the ongoing bilateral economic dialogue. At its initial meeting on December 4, 2001, the DPG went beyond exchanging views on the progress of the campaign against terrorism to that point in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Noting that both India and the United States have been targets of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their
defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives, including expanding mutual support in this area. The two sides also recognized the importance of joint counterproliferation efforts to achieve the goals of their defense cooperation.  

At these meetings the DPG also committed its members to an increased pace of high-level dialogues, bilateral military exchanges and other combined activities, including programs for combined humanitarian airlift, special operations training, small unit air/ground exercises, naval combined personnel exchange and familiarization, and combined training between the U.S. Marines and corresponding Indian forces. The DPG also established an ongoing security cooperation group to manage the defense supply relationship which is a critical part from India’s standpoint, if not America’s, of this relationship and agreed to discuss “bilateral ties in the field of defense production and research, military planning, India’s triservice doctrine and tri-service institutions.” As President Bush had already waived sanctions imposed on India for its nuclear tests, the DPG also took up the critical issue of arms sales and announced that,

The two sides underscored the importance of a stable, long-term defense supply relationship as part of the overall strategic cooperation between India and the United States. Since the waiver of sanctions, a number of applications for export licenses have been approved by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and are in the process of notification to Congress. These include licenses such as that related to weapon locating radars. The U.S. also agreed to expeditious review of India’s acquisition priorities, including Engines and Systems for Light Combat Aircraft, radars, multi-mission maritime aircraft, and components for jet trainers and high performance jet engines. To assist this licensing and sales process in the future, the two sides have resolved to establish a separate Security Cooperation Group to manage the defense supply relationship between India and the United States.

In January 2002, the JWG on Counter-Terrorism met in New Delhi and was led by Mishra and Ambassador Francis Taylor, the State Department’s “point man” on terrorism. It discussed finalizing the project of creating the sale of U.S. electronic sensors to be used on the international border with Pakistan and which could be placed on the disputed Line of Control (LOC) dividing Indian and Pakistani...
controlled Kashmir. India then claimed that this outcome constituted an official American recognition of Pakistan’s support for “terrorist” infiltration across the border. Since then the DPG has further expanded its remit so that its discussions now include virtually all aspects of the bilateral agenda. For example, at its meetings on June 1-3, 2004, the DPG’s agenda was expected to include,

The entire gamut of Indo-U.S. defense relations including strategic issues, joint exercises, training and acquisition. . . . The talks will also review counterterrorism requirements of India, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and peace and stability in Asia. Since then the DPG has further expanded its remit so that its discussions now include virtually all aspects of the bilateral agenda. For example, at its meetings on June 1-3, 2004, the DPG’s agenda was expected to include,

Subsequent reports indicated the growing convergence of views on these issues.

Finally, another bilateral working group on cyber-terrorism was also set up in 2001-02. This “Cyber Security Forum” has an extensive program of action to address cyberterrorism and information security. Thus this forum connects as well to the broader agencies that are cooperating on Counter-Terrorism and intelligence sharing. This sharing became possible in January 2002 when Fernandes signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Washington and has particular relevance as both sides try to determine the extent to which Pakistan may or may not have reduced, if not terminated, terrorist infiltration into Kashmir. Judging from remarks by Blackwill and Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell, as well as Indian intelligence findings through 2003, not enough had happened in that regard to justify optimism. However, it does appear that in 2004, in no small measure thanks to U.S. pressure, the flow of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir and the incidence of terrorist operations there had abated noticeably already after 2002.

The establishment of new agencies and invigoration of existing fora for cooperation shows that despite obstacles, a real structure for enhanced and routine cooperation that both sides can use if they wish to is taking root. Cooperation through these working groups and other bodies encompasses exercises, intelligence sharing, trade and economic relations, defense and technology transfers and joint
Counter-Terrorist activities. Thus the framework for expanded cooperation, particularly as seen in continuing visits, working group, and other agency meetings and exercises is vibrant and expanding.

**Combined Exercises.**

Six major combined exercises were carried out in 2002, and Myers’ remarks cited above, as well as the author’s conversations with members of the various services of PACOM, indicate that more and perhaps bigger ones, either in number or in scope, will take place. These exercises will also move from being tactical ones to encompassing larger units. Thus they will have a more operational nature. At the DPG meeting in August 2003, the participants registered their satisfaction at the expansion of these forms of cooperation since 2002. Those exercises include:

- Combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise in Northeast India:
- Combined Air Force exercise in Alaska;
- Complex naval exercises on the East Coast of India;
- Delivery of “Firefinder” radars to India;
- Senior-level missile defense talks;
- And conclusion of a master information exchange agreement to facilitate cooperation in research and development of defense technologies.

However, there were more exercises than those described here. For instance, there was a bilateral airlift and supply exercise in India from October 20-26, 2002. Nor does the DPG’s concise description of exercises capture their full range. A report of the official visit of Chief of India’s Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh in September 2002 observed that,

As part of the growing Indo-U.S. Defense cooperation, naval interaction between the two countries has intensified this year with the commencement of the Straits of Malacca joint escort mission in April; several port visits by U.S. naval ships to India followed by passing exercises; and a big increase in the number of Indian naval officers training in the U.S., the revival of the “Malabar” series of annual joint exercises (Malabar 2002) scheduled in the Indian Ocean next month; and the Search and Rescue exercises scheduled later this year; are further significant milestones in this cooperation.
The Malabar exercise (Malabar IV) involved surface, subsurface, and air operations, and an exchange of both sides’ aural and electronic signatures, giving some idea of its scope. And as they are scheduled to expand in size and sophistication in 2005, they exemplify the progressive trends in bilateral military relationships.\textsuperscript{316}

The U.S. Army also plays a key role in these exercises. In October 2002, Indian and U.S. Army and Air Force personnel from the PACOM carried out an exercise in Alaska. This exercise, the second of two such airborne joint exercises during 2002, aimed to have each side learn from the other’s experience and procedures towards achieving “interoperability.” Both countries’ forces carried out parachute drops, scouting/airborne assault missions, and various levels of joint firing exercises in conditions of cold and wet weather. Such exercises in these climates are very relevant to potential scenarios in Kashmir, the Himalayas, and potential winter operations in the Afghan mountains. The earlier exercise at Agra in May 2002 rehearsed such operations in vastly different but equally relevant climatic conditions, i.e., desert-like conditions which were particularly relevant in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, respectively.\textsuperscript{317} Finally, in September 2003 U.S. Special Forces conducted a combined exercise with Indian commandos based in Jammu and Kashmir. These exercises, conducted in high altitude, dry, and rocky terrain similar to that in which Osama Bin Laden is reported to be hiding, fostered greater interoperability among the forces involved and helped train U.S. forces in terrain that would otherwise not be available to them in the United States. The forces involved conducted rock-climbing, surveillance, and a cliff assault using the latest infantry weapons needed for operations behind enemy lines.\textsuperscript{318}

Beyond these exercises, other forms of cooperation to upgrade interoperability, intelligence sharing, and planning are taking place. The U.S. Joint Staff and India’s IDS have established a normal relationship to discuss planning and triservice doctrine as envisioned by the DPG. Likewise, the U.S. and Indian Defense Intelligence Agencies have instituted a formal relationship and both militaries are discussing doctrinal issues. Washington has requested that U.S. troops be allowed to attend training courses at India’s prestigious Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte, Mizoram, and the High Altitude
Warfare School at Gulmarg in Kashmir. The former request has been accepted, while the second request is pending as of this writing.\textsuperscript{319} In return, Indian defense officials are seeking to increase Indian forces’ participation in American institutions of military education and training and increased use of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.\textsuperscript{320} Finally, according to Australian analyst Ian Storey,

Future exercises are likely to include larger-scale Malabar exercises, while the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) are planning joint combat exercises involving fighter aircraft including IAF MiG-29s and Sukhoi-30 “Flankers” and USAF F-15C “Eagles” and F-16 “Fighting Falcons.” The USA specifically requested joint air exercises with the IAF’s SU-30s [the best Russia makes—author] as the USAF wants to familiarize itself with this kind of fighter [Su-30s also are operated by the Chinese Air Force—original].\textsuperscript{321}

Thus these exercises are comprehensive and growing in scope, provide numerous benefits to all the services involved, and have immediate operational and tactical relevance beyond the strategic point of instituting and establishing durable working relationships among both sides’ forces and officers. \textit{Jane’s Defence Weekly} published a list of combined exercises in 2004. The Air Forces conducted Operation “COPE INDIA 04” in February and COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER in June. In November 2003 the two Navies conducted Malabar 04 exercises that were followed by Search and Rescue exercises through 2003-04 and an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise in April 2004. In 2004, the Indian and U.S. Armies conducted Army Aviation exchanges, a peacekeeping operations workshop, the continuing special forces ‘Iroquois’ series of exercises, and Operation YUDH AABHYAS 04. And the Marines conducted a High Altitude Artillery exercise in November 2003.\textsuperscript{322} But beyond these signs of a deepening and expanding relationship, these exercises provide the immensely important foundation of shared experiences, understanding, and training that make it possible to go beyond exercises and even smaller, though important, operations like Search and Rescue to talk seriously about combined operational planning. Indeed, the evidence of recent exercises with India’s Air Forces in Operation COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER has forced
us to rethink the issue of whether the F-15 is, in fact, superior to Russian made Su-27, Su-30, and even older MiG-21 Fighters armed with Russia’s AA-10 Air-to-Air missiles. So there is no doubt of the importance and benefits of these exercises to both sides.
These combined Indo-American exercises and the high level of intergovernmental and intermilitary dialogues are all essential to the creation of a durable partnership, if not alliance. They establish trust; a sound knowledge base of both sides’ interests, capabilities, and objectives; predictability; and mutual confidence among the players. They also create overlapping and routinely functioning mechanisms of communication and dialogue between the two sides. All those attributes are essential ingredients of a successful alliance. If there really will be an Asian NATO or some other kind of as yet undefined alliance, those exercises and dialogues would constitute the foundation of that alliance. But for an alliance to materialize, there has to be resolution and concord concerning its purpose and both sides’ contribution to the realization of each other’s interests and objectives, especially mutual defense. Otherwise partnership on an ad hoc basis and warm, but noncommittal, relations will be the best we could hope for. We see these points or considerations emerging with special clarity as regards the discussions concerning an Asian NATO.

At present it is unclear exactly what that entails, although some aspects appear to have been hinted at in the press. In his campaign to expand the scope of the bilateral partnership with New Delhi, Blackwill also strongly urged the administration to invigorate “military-to-military relationships with those Asian states that share our democratic values and national interests,” i.e., India. America thereby would not only strengthen its position in the GWOT, but also more generally in the Indian Ocean and largely at Russia and China’s expense. Thus some see in this Asian NATO an updated version of the old Cold War Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance or containment of China during the Cold War. Others like Professor Madhav Nalapat, an advisor to India’s National Security Council, who is close to Dr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the...
Office of Net Assessment, argue for such an alliance to “defend democratic values and exclude countries with authoritarian structures or religious states. The test [for membership of such an alliance] is whether people enjoy equal rights under the law and the democratic freedoms that this alliance would defend.”326

Such statements suggest that there is, or at least was during Vajpayee’s tenure, considerable interest in official and semi-official circles about the possibility of such an alliance.327 The fact that this definition also excludes Pakistan and China is not lost on either side. But it also suggests what at least some Indians want out of it. However, beyond an alliance against or to contain China and/or Pakistan that would overtly restore bipolarity in Asia—something that nobody in either government has espoused—there are clearly some Indian elites who view any alliance with America as allowing for a substantial expansion of India’s political-military reach to the areas outlined above. In other words, partnership with America will not only realize Washington’s but also New Delhi’s agenda, which are both expansive ones. If we are to proceed towards some form of an Asian NATO, these strategic interests of India, as seen by at least some members of its military-political community of elites, must duly be taken into account. Since any serious contradictions in these two expansive agendas would preclude any effective strategic coordination, the need for ongoing high-level strategic dialogue on a host of issues like those discussed above, is imperative.

The expansiveness of India’s agenda emerges from many sources, e.g., Vajpayee’s program cited above, the new naval doctrine, India’s continuing foreign policy and India’s own ingrained self-perception as a major global or at least Asiatic power.328 Vajpayee’s directive lays out the sphere of strategic interests that such an alliance would embrace, i.e., from the Middle East and former Soviet South to the Strait of Malacca, and at least some of the issues that must be dealt with—Pakistan, arms control, missile defense, Iran, terrorism in general and Indo-Pakistani relations, and of course, China’s rising power. But it is not clear how this expansive version of Indian aims might comport with those of the other listed potential members of this alliance, Japan, Australia, and Singapore.329 Neither is it at all certain that the new Indian Government led by Prime Minister Singh
subscribes to the idea of an Asian NATO. Finally, it also is unclear whether any Asian NATO seen from Washington encompasses the same strategic outlook as does India’s outlook.

These difficulties in the way of deeper and more sustained practical coordination do not, however, preclude the achievement of that coordination provided that both sides are willing to meet the other’s interests and perceptions. This is the reason why sustained high-level official and unofficial dialogue is so necessary, because that is a proven method by which differences in understanding can be bridged. Interestingly enough, although India has long publicly harbored expansive ambitions in the Indian Ocean, its practical cooperation with the United States and desire to be seen as a reliable partner have led it to take steps that were hitherto believed to be impossible. For example, in June 2001, i.e., before the terrorist attacks of September 11, Defense and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh indicated that he did not exclude the possibility of U.S. access to military bases in India because both Australia and America now recognized India’s regional role, and this changed situation made military-to-military cooperation a major aspect of overall bilateral cooperation with the United States. Since then, Indo-American cooperation in the Indian Ocean has grown. Despite years of trying to prevent any foreign state from getting near Diego Garcia and Eastern Sri Lanka’s base and port of Trincomalee, India has acted on behalf of the U.S. Navy to secure its access to these ports and offered Washington access to its own ports for the GWOT. In return, Washington successfully pressured the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to persevere in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. The Bush administration has recognized that access to these bases in the Indian Ocean not only allows it to exercise considerable command and control of the seas through that ocean, but also is extremely valuable for operations and missions from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and could thus also serve as a check upon Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean. This fact alone illustrates India’s enduring relevance to any U.S. strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and in projecting power to Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and the Gulf. Moreover, at the moment, U.S. ships and planes now enjoy a case-by-case access to Indian bases. Conceivably, this access could
become part of this Asian NATO and ultimately lead to a more regularized right of access that would be in tune with the broader transformation of U.S. strategy because, since 2001 the United States has been seeking broader access to bases throughout Asia.\textsuperscript{333}

Administration officials have spelled out openly the rationales for obtaining new bases throughout Asia. The \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review} (QDR) of 2001 openly asserted the need for more forces and bases in Asia due to the expansion of threats there across the spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{334} Subsequent statements and testimony by Pentagon officials reinforces and expands upon the strategic rationale for this. Basing himself upon that QDR, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Brookes told Congress in 2002 that,

\begin{quote}
Distances in the Asian theater [note the singular – author] are vast, and the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. Moreover, the U.S. has less assurance of access to facilities in the Asia-Pacific region than in other regions. The QDR, therefore identifies the necessity of securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and developing military systems capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support. The QDR also calls for a reorientation of the U.S. military posture in Asia. The U.S. will continue to meet its defense and security commitments around the world by maintaining the ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping time frames. As this strategy and force planning approach is implemented, the U.S. will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. Over time, U.S. forces will be tailored to maintain favorable regional balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement.\textsuperscript{335}
\end{quote}

In subsequent testimony to the House, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman fully explicited the administration’s thinking regarding overseas basing in Asia. Rodman stated that the administration’s goals entail tailoring our forces abroad to the particular conditions of those regions and strengthening U.S. capabilities for prompt global response anywhere. He observed that since threats are not confined to a single area and because we cannot anticipate where the next one will be even though an immediate response is often warranted, we need a capabilities based strategy, not one based on force levels. Forces are not expected to fight where they are based, and mobility and
speed of deployment are the critical factors. Rodman then laid out the working assumptions behind the transformation of our basing structure. And a consideration of administration objectives, taken in conjunction with these assumptions, immediately tells the reader why an Asian NATO with India is now a priority.

India as an ally or area where bases may be located meets virtually every criterion laid out in Rodman’s testimony. These working assumptions for the transformation of our basing structure are as follows:

- U.S. regional defense postures must be based on global considerations, not regional ones.
- Existing and new overseas bases will be evaluated as combined and/or joint facilities as befits the new emphasis on combined and joint operations.
- Overseas stationed forces should be located on reliable, well-protected territory.
- Forces without inherent mobility must be stationed along major transportation routes, especially sea routes.
- Long-range attack capabilities require forward infrastructure to sustain operations.
- Forward presence need not be equally divided among all the U.S.’ regional commands in order to reduce the “seams” that separate them from each other.
- Expeditionary forces and operations require a network of forward facilities with munitions, command and control, and logistics in dispersed locations.

All these requirements would increase U.S. forward forces’ capability for deterrence and operations and allow for reinforcement of other missions by reallocating forces. Rodman observed that we intend to accomplish these objectives by increasing precision intelligence and strike capabilities on a global basis and exploiting our forces’ capability for superior strategic mobility. Therefore, changes in U.S. basing policies aim to strengthen defense relations with key allies and partners and respond more effectively to unforeseen contingencies. These changes entail:
• Diversifying the means of U.S. access to overseas bases and facilities to obtain military presence closer to combat regions and offer our forces a broader array of options;
• Posturing the most flexible forces possible for overseas missions so that they will be capable of conducting a wide range of expeditionary operations; and,
• Promoting greater allied contributions and establishing more durable defense relationships with those allies and partners.  

India, due to its location, excellent ports, many air bases and developed infrastructure, democratic values, and the harmony of interests with the United States, would exemplify such an alliance if it came about. But it is by no means clear that an alliance will emerge from those discussions on an Asian NATO or that we will obtain permanent peacetime access or lodgment and deployments in Indian bases. Nor is it clear how the requirements of an alliance with Washington would square with what appears to be an alliance with Iran and rapprochement with China. A formal alliance would require a sovereign political decision by India’s government, a treaty, and probably Parliamentary ratification, which cannot simply be counted on in advance—especially with the new government in power since it will be a left-wing coalition. Therefore, to obtain these capabilities and this access, Washington also must respond to Indian needs and interests. And even if it does so, in some cases that might not be enough to achieve what we want.

The effort to obtain Indian participation in Iraq cited above exemplified this possible dilemma.  It showed that obtaining Indian support in Iraq and for a binding alliance would require considerable “side payments” by the U.S. Government, and even then that might not be enough. Similarly, it would be extremely naïve to hope that India will give America bases and opportunities for permanent lodgments and deployments on its territory or in its sphere of interests without demanding ultimate discretion over how those bases and forces are used. In other words, we will have to be forthcoming to some discernible and presumably considerable extent on India’s regional and defense agendas if we are to elicit support for
anything resembling an Asian NATO. For example, a recent article about the negotiations over an Asian NATO observed that,

The aggressive U.S. push is tempered by India’s own reluctance to rush into any such arrangement without securing its immediate objective of dousing terrorism on its borders inflamed by the policies of Pakistan’s military establishment. In fact, what could have been a straightforward defense relationship with Washington has been complicated by the U.S. State Department’s relentless patronage of Pakistan’s military dictatorship at a bruising cost to India.  

Whether or not this perception of U.S. policies is accurate or not is irrelevant because it is shared by much of India’s military-political elite and constantly reiterated in the press. Therefore, it is a constant factor in Indian media and politics that any Indian and U.S. Government must take into account. But what is important here is that the United States cannot secure or even begin to pursue its broader agenda in Asia through the mechanism of an Asian NATO or some other alliance system without substantive actions to address India’s own security agenda and priorities, which are rather different than America’s, for all the harmony of interests between them. That agenda involves India’s ability to influence trends in the geographic areas listed above, and in particular three other issues of major concern: missile defense, general technology transfer, and Pakistan. In other words, no policy of unilateralism, however it may be clothed, has a chance of success in enlisting Indian support, which is increasingly necessary for the advancement of U.S. interests in the Gulf, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, or with regard to missile defense and proliferation.
CHAPTER 9

INDIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense is an issue that cuts in several directions for India. On the one hand, many commentators both here and abroad, mainly those opposed to the Bush administration’s missile defense programs, contend that America’s construction of missile defenses will lead China to build more missiles to retaliate against or overcome our system. This in turn would then threaten India further, causing it to feel impelled to build defenses and add to its offensive capabilities, leading Pakistan to follow suit in turn, and thereby creating a kind of Asian chain reaction. A Chinese reaction to build more offensive missiles to defeat an American system would also probably force India to build more of its own offensive medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) to deter China and retain a second-strike capability as prescribed by the classical theory of deterrence.\(^{341}\) Since India faces two adverse nuclear powers, China and Pakistan, U.S. missile defenses could entail further complications in India’s security environment that are decidedly negative. Another negative possibility is that the U.S. system might not work, while other nations further arm themselves with increased offensive capabilities or else they may acquire still newer technological and military capabilities that would force India into an exhausting competition with them.\(^{342}\)

On the other hand, it equally is arguable that China’s buildup is continuing anyway, regardless of what America does. Since advocates of this view contend that America’s commitment to missile defense is not the real factor driving China’s nuclear and missile buildup, India might as well take effective steps now to ensure its own security. India, this side argues, has no credible ally in Asia, and indeed faces an array of political and military threats, including nuclear ones from Pakistan and China. Consequently, a Chinese buildup, coupled with India’s commitment to no first use, may render any hope of possessing a survivable second strike capability illusory. Hence defenses are needed, and sooner rather than later.\(^{343}\) By the same token, an effective U.S. missile defense would provide possibilities
for extension of that “missile umbrella” to allies. As the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) stated during the Clinton administration, “such a globally expansive missile defense system would help safeguard unipolarity, providing the impetus to other nations to enhance their military arrangements with the United States and come under its missile-defense umbrella.” Thus there were and are positive and negative features in the U.S. program as India might have seen it. A third argument in favor of missile defenses takes an anti-American twist, namely, that by building them, India somehow would render itself more capable of resisting American bullying and unilateral or neo-imperial tendencies. Or, equally importantly, these factions hope to escape the irksome situation where India still depends on foreign military suppliers for advanced technologies. As one recent study observes,

While much has changed in India’s relations with the West, and with the United States in particular, the West’s continued support to Pakistan and its ambivalence towards China is the cause of lingering suspicion that India stands without allies in its disputes against its two adversaries. Russia, too, is of little help, especially with regard to China. This sense of isolation has persisted, and continues to suggest that the country needs some level of deterrence against even the big powers. The events in Iraq have only reinforced such thinking.

Obviously this argument plays well among those sectors of Indian opinion that harbor decidedly negative views of U.S. policy. But it, too, leads to policy conclusions that no less decidedly concur with current administration preferences.

What this discussion of alternatives, however rudimentary, shows is that,

Critical decisions relating to further “horizontal proliferation” in South Asia—that is to say, decisions bearing on both the number and kind of strategic technologies acquired—will ultimately be linked to larger Indian perceptions about issues relating to “vertical proliferation” and by extension, the structure of the global nuclear regime in general. This in turn implies that as long as Indian decisionmakers perceive that the existing nuclear weapons states either will not or cannot move toward deeper stockpile reductions that will ultimately lead to nuclear abolition, India (and by implication, Pakistan) will not countenance the prospect of rolling back its own programs. This obduracy is linked both to strategic
concerns about perceived threats emerging from some of the nuclear weapons states—China in particular in the case of India—and to ideational fears about enshrining “discriminatory” organizational regimes such as the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) in international politics.  

A second consequence of this way of thinking about nuclear weapons is that India will not yield unilaterally its nuclear assets or roll back programs without constraints on other potential threats. Therefore, American approaches to nuclear weapons issues will exercise the greatest influence on India of all players. This is not only because Washington can extend or withhold strategic technologies and weapons, but also because its own strategy will influence all the other nuclear players. Third, this line of reasoning implies strongly that one way to slow down India’s nuclear program is for America and the other nuclear powers’ partners—primarily Russia—to reduce their dependence upon nuclear weapons and their stockpiles.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that in May 2001 India applauded President Bush’s National Defense University speech outlining his view of missile defense, citing, in particular, his assertion that the classical canons of deterrence no longer sufficed and that we were now living in a transformed strategic environment. Certainly one facet of Bush’s speech and of subsequent American strategy was the commitment to reduce substantially the number of strategic offensive missiles and warheads in the American and Russian arsenals. This policy accorded with a longstanding Indian demand and had been one of the major reasons why India had consistently stood apart from the NPT, which had required progress towards such reductions. As long as such reductions did not occur, protestations of the need for nonproliferation seemed to New Delhi like a hypocritical attempt to keep India in what its leaders called nuclear apartheid, while reserving the benefits of possession of nuclear weapons to the existing members of the club. Bush’s new formulations and the subsequent treaty of Moscow in 2002 (the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [SORT]) clearly shattered what India saw as the preexisting paradigm here.

While this positive response was not quite an endorsement of national missile defense (NMD), it certainly was a strong signal of interest in the idea. Some commentators explained that India’s
reaction was that it saw from Bush’s and his administration’s statements that NMD was inevitable; therefore, India might as well accept reality and position itself to benefit from technology transfer relevant to it and from the opportunity as a nuclear power to shape the future rules of the international nuclear game. But it is also the case that the decision to support Bush’s speech and subsequent initiative flowed logically from the principles of nuclear policy stated above. Indian analysts like C. Raja Mohan duly contended that by mid-2001, India adroitly had positioned itself vis-à-vis Washington on the issue of missile defense. As he wrote then,

Mr. Vajpayee will be right in claiming that India is now in tune with all the four aspects of the [Bush administration’s] strategic framework: radical nuclear force reductions, strengthening the nonproliferation regime, counter-proliferation, and missile defenses. In endorsing missile defenses and nuclear cuts envisaged by the two great powers, Mr. Vajpayee can also demand a larger Indian role in managing the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by becoming a member of the various export control mechanisms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He can also proclaim Indian interest in a cooperative counter-proliferation strategy that hopes to deal with the emerging threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors.

More recently he analyzed the problem from the standpoint of India’s own declared nuclear doctrine.

India believes that missile defenses are an all important supplement to its strategy of nuclear no-first use. Having deliberately accepted the risk of absorbing a potential nuclear first strike by its adversaries, India hopes the deployment of missile defenses will help curb the temptations of a first strike against it. India may have two other reasons behind its quest for missile defense. One is the presumed need to cope with the growing spread of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them around its neighborhood. The other is the recognition that the development of missile defense appears an inevitable technological trend, and a country like India has no choice but to invest in it.

Therefore, it is clear that India’s interest in missile defenses in some form of association with the United States, either directly or through a third party like Israel, has grown. In November 2001
India Ambassador for Disarmament to the Permanent UN Mission in Geneva Rakesh Sood publicly speculated about India building missile defenses if the preliminary research and development (R&D) turned out to be fruitful. This missile defense would be a limited one, unlike the projected U.S. national missile defense. In September 2002, it was revealed that bilateral military and intergovernmental consultations on missile defense were taking place. Since then, it has also become clear that if legislation is passed in the United States permitting either research into nuclear weapons or even testing, that India, and probably Pakistan, would follow suit. Again, this would follow the logic of America being the main, though not only external influence upon Indian strategic policy. The conclusion that India would then test nuclear weapons is not necessarily at odds with the Pentagon’s preference. For in July 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea testified to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that,

We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend yourself against these missiles is something we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians [and] with the Pakistanis if they’re interested.

Meanwhile India is stepping up production of its Prithvi and Agni missiles to counter Pakistan’s Hatf, Shaheen, and Ghauri missiles, along with its successful quest for the U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2 missile defense system, the accompanying Green Pine radar system, and Russia’s S-300 V theater missile defense system. India has also asked the administration for the Patriot missile defense system (PAC-3). These examples of transfer of advanced technology serve for Indian elites as a test of how serious the administration is about technology transfer and arms sales, a critical issue for New Delhi. India clearly is trying to develop both an indigenous and reliable missile defense system, at least for its Western border with Pakistan. India also reaffirmed the view it shares with Washington that missile defenses enhance cooperative security and held a missile defense workshop in India in 2004. India also agreed to participate in the 2005 Roving Sands missile defense exercise with the United States. Finally, in September 2003, as a result of previous bilateral meetings where the issue of missile
defense was discussed, President Vajpayee submitted a proposal to President Bush, laying out the conditions under which “Vajpayee accepts a U.S. condition that India establish a strict nonproliferation regime, and assents to U.S. monitoring of the deployment of missile defenses—and possibly even overall U.S. control of deployed systems in India.” In return, the United States would help create a missile defense shield for India against both Pakistan and China’s perceived increasing nuclear threats, or possibly in some sense to control missiles deployed in India. While some officials profess concern that India might export U.S. technologies to Iran (a fear that India alleviated with Israel by agreeing not to transfer Israeli defense technology to Iran), India also received a green light to buy the joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow missile defense system.

Vajpayee’s September 2003 proposal triggered a major debate within the U.S. national security bureaucracy on the advisability of lifting sanctions and of sharing data with India on missile defense. The State Department, and particularly the U.S. arms control community, much of which is lodged there, tends to look at India through the lens of proliferation and to prioritize that issue above all others in the relationship. Without entering into an assessment of whether this outlook is justified, correct, or not, it is clear that these officials have obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing it through the withholding of conventional arms and military technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations with India, which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003, but also relief from existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and discussions with India on missile defense. Indeed, as we saw above, the Pentagon has stated publicly its support for India’s having its own missile defense system. Naturally this divergence in outlook has created major policy debates within the administration, slowed the momentum in the development of the partnership (at least from the Pentagon’s standpoint), and caused enormous resentment in India.
It appears that the Pentagon’s viewpoint prevailed to some degree during the winter of 2003-04. In December 2003, it was reported that an agreement would be signed in January 2004, ending most U.S. sanctions on advanced technology transfer to India, in return for India’s tightening up of its regulations and laws relating to export controls over materials usable for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On January 12, 2004, both governments released an announcement stating that they had agreed that the U.S Government will expand cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. There will also be an expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues (i.e., tightening up of Indian export control laws and regulations) and an enhanced dialogue on missile defense. By all accounts, this outcome greatly satisfies Indian elites who viewed access to these technologies as the litmus test of America’s seriousness in building close ties to India. Indeed, Vajpayee and President Bush both stated that the vision of the bilateral strategic partnership that they share “is now becoming a reality.” Although it is also abundantly clear that the State Department is going to drag its feet on approving these technology transfers where they could relate to proliferation of WMD, this outcome seems to have satisfied everyone at least for now.

Thus it appears that India, under Vajpayee, was ready to move both toward a genuine alliance involving missile defense that entails a commitment to missile defense or to protection under the U.S. program that is coming into being. Whether the new government will continue along that line remains to be seen. But Vajpayee’s 2003 initiative and Bush’s response in January 2004 signify an increasingly solid basis for strategic cooperation on the basis of expanded dialogue and R&D between both countries. To the extent that strategic dialogue continues here and is successful, it could also spill over into other areas with no less productive results. This is especially true for the linked issues of technology transfer and arms sales, issues that are far more problematic insofar as a strategic partnership is concerned.
CHAPTER 10

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES

The part of the April, 2001 agenda pertaining to arms sales and technology transfer may arguably be the most critical part of the agenda as far as Indian elites are concerned. MacDonald reached the conclusion, based on many interviews, that “For Indians, technology transfer from the United States is military cooperation’s touchstone.”\(^{368}\) Other Indian assessments confirm the great importance that India attaches to transfer of civil and defense technology, including technologies for missile defenses, as a critical and essential element in any partnership with America.\(^{369}\) For Indian officials and observers America’s willingness to enter into serious technology transfer and arms sales is a fundamental barometer of the seriousness with which it views this relationship. Certainly many observers believe that requests like those for the PAC-3 also are intended to gain access to such technology as well as to fill up gaps in Indian security.\(^{370}\) Undoubtedly this issue will come up, if it has not already done so, in discussions about an Asian NATO, for transatlantic arms sales and technology transfer are very important issues within NATO as well. But the issue of technology transfer and arms sales to India will not only directly affect the bilateral relationship with America, it will also affect American allies, particularly Israel, who is emerging as a major supplier to India. And it also is an issue where India’s rising economic and technological capabilities as well as its ambitions could allow it to play off other potential suppliers against America, for it is obvious that major players in the transfer of both civil and defense technologies, not to mention weapons systems, increasingly believe that India, whose demand is huge, is a market from which they cannot afford to be excluded. In this regard India exemplifies some of the major contemporary trends in the global arms market, which in many respects is now a buyer’s market where sellers must increasingly compete against each other to meet clients’ demands.\(^{371}\)

Indian elites attach so great an importance to technology transfer and arms sales for the following reasons: first it will confirm the U.S. understanding of India’s rising importance as both a regional
and global power with whom it shares a serious partnership and converging strategic interests on a wide range of issues. Second, Indians want the technological transfer and arms sales up front as a sign that the U.S. Government is willing and able to share its weapons with India and that America will then be seen as a reliable partner that is committed, by virtue of the previous arms deals, to long-term partnership with India. This appears to resemble the pattern with Indo-Russian relationships going back to 1955. Indian interviewees, all of whom concurred on this point, told MacDonald that such transfers would signify U.S. acceptance of India’s strategic role in the regions of India’s interests as a source of stability in support of American interests, that Washington regards India as a serious partner with similar strategic concerns, but which can be trusted to use the technology. Withholding of technology indicates a belief that India cannot be trusted. A third perception is that technology transfer and arms sales show India that it is regarded as a preferred friend, not as a former Soviet ally or rogue state that deserved to be sanctioned because it looked after its own interests exactly as America does.

Indians also see technology transfer as enabling them to perform the expansive role they wish to play in world politics.

So while Russian weapons remain the bedrock of the Indian defense arsenal and may conceivably dominate that market for the foreseeable future; major changes are afoot in India’s weapons programs, particularly as India’s comprehensive rearmament during this decade promises to be one of the most lucrative sources of funding for global arms companies. American officials and analysts already talk about the extensive modernization of the Indian Air Force that will have to take place soon and the need for America rather than other sellers to win the contract to replace the IAF’s fighters. Moreover, as the gap between American and Russian military technology widens and as the gap also widens between European and Russian technology on the one hand and between U.S. and European technology on the other, some Indian experts argue that we can expect increasing Indian purchases from the Europeans (including the Israelis) and even more from the United States. Thus for India technology transfer comes in several different forms. First, there is the hope for increased American trade and investment
in general, not least in the technology sector. In that context there is particularly strong interest in receiving greater access to U.S. civilian high technology that also possesses military applications, i.e., so-called dual use technology.\footnote{377}

There is increasing hope in Indian circles that India’s ability to gain access to this kind of technology will grow steadily as a result of the Bush administration’s Next Steps in Security Policy (NSSP) program of which the January 12, 2004 announcement was the first step. The NSSP, according to Administration officials, fully represents its name, i.e., it is an attempt to tie together existing and new programs and Indo-American desires for mechanisms to strengthen the idea and reality of a bilateral strategic partnership that meets India’s craving for technology transfer and arms sales while also satisfying the administration’s perception that such transfers should also embrace civilian technology and the private sector. It duly grows out of India’s long-expressed desire for unimpeded technology transfer, especially dual-use technology, arms sales, and space and nuclear technology transfer while respecting anti-proliferation concerns and the Bush administration’s broad-gauged effort to reinforce private and public sector cooperation with India. From 2001-2003 Indian officials described these three issues as the trinity and, pace MacDonald, presented it as a touchstone of the sincerity of U.S. interests in a partnership. In 2003 missile defense was added to this trinity, making it a quartet and President Bush’s January, 2004 statement, cited above, represented the first step in the multi-phase NSSP.\footnote{378} Even though several non-governmental experts still maintain that while India is not regarded as a proliferator, existing legal obligations might lead to bureaucratic obstacles that degrade the value of the program. Some Indian analysts, too, hold this view.\footnote{379}

Nevertheless Under-Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster and his Deputy, Matthew Borman, have both emphasized that this is a serious and genuine program even if it is a multi-phase one. Phase one, or the first step, was the January 2004 announcement that Juster presented as providing a “framework for takeoff” for the overall NSSP.\footnote{380} He emphasized that the Bush administration desires to use the program to strengthen a bilateral strategic partnership and also to
deepen bilateral ties among both states’ private sectors. That would give everyone a much greater stake in the bilateral relationship, thereby preventing political disputes from derailing it. Second, the NSSP, as embodied in the January 2004 bilateral statement, outlines several phases of reciprocal steps that can be taken that would really enable the United States to ease its licensing requirements and other technology transfer restrictions, while at the same time insuring that our nonproliferation commitments and policies are intact and that both of our countries jointly work together to ensure that the nonproliferation goals we share are met.\textsuperscript{381}

As Borman also notes, the NSSP binds the two countries together and adds a nonproliferation and high-tech trade relationship to their common interests while leading to the removal of India’s Indian Space Research Organization from the Commerce Department’s list of entities to be sanctioned. It has also applied a presumption of approval for all dual use items excepting the troubled reactors at Tarapur, which come under the aegis of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed to eliminate the need for export licenses for 25\% of all U.S. items that India seeks to import.\textsuperscript{382}

Ultimately, fulfillment of this multi-phase program will allow India to move from being a country that was on various U.S. export lists to one that can obtain civilian nuclear, space, dual–use, and eventually, should it so desire, ballistic missile defense technology, though this last one depends on India’s decision whether to pursue BMD or not.\textsuperscript{383} In September-October 2004, both sides announced the completion of phase 1 and commenced movement to phase two of the NSSP.\textsuperscript{384} As Tellis noted, the NSSP should, for several reasons, be regarded as a revolutionary point of departure in bilateral relations, despite the criticisms of some Indians that it did not change the laws that India earlier found to be so irksome. First, the NSSP sees India not as proliferator, but rather as part of the solution to the proliferation issue. Thus India gains access to world class technologies while formally remaining outside the global nonproliferation regime. In return India will institutionalize its world class export controls.\textsuperscript{385}

This is the true revolutionary import of the NSSP: a change in the U.S. strategic orientation towards India that in time will be far more consequential than the minutiae encoded in the current agreement.
In effect, the NSSP implies the administration would seek to build a transforming partnership with India that includes satisfying its longstanding desire for greater access to restricted commodities so long as it does not utilize these artifacts to advance its own strategic programmes or for unlawful export. Some might argue that if the Bush administration wanted to be truly revolutionary, it would not only increase New Delhi’s access to controlled technologies but would also permit their utilization in India’s strategic weapon programmes. While this policy may be desirable in the long run, no U.S. administration today can permit such an arrangement without completely undermining the global nonproliferation regime at a time when it is more fragile than ever before. It is to Bush’s credit that he has actually reached out to India in such unsettled times. True, the administration is not yet prepared to support India in enlarging its strategic capabilities. However, it has expressed its willingness—through the NSSP—to at least look the other way. As U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford recently noted, the United States does not have any agreement comparable to the NSSP with two other states –Israel and Pakistan –that share India’s anomalous status in the nonproliferation order. That the administration has consented to such a unique covenant speaks volumes for New Delhi’s importance in the president’s geopolitical calculations.\textsuperscript{386}

Third, the NSSP not only shifts U.S. perspectives, it also opens the way to further, even more consequential changes in policy than have hitherto been the case. It creates a mechanism for reciprocal and mutually beneficial actions as well as a structured process for discussing issues of concern without jeopardizing the overall strategic relationship.\textsuperscript{387} At the same time, the NSSP bypasses many of the obstacles to one of India’s most compelling interests, namely the termination of all restrictions upon direct access to purchases of U.S. weapons systems and defense technologies. Although the Bush administration has lifted many earlier sanctions, this access is not yet as open as India would like, and, in any case, negotiations over the sale and acquisition of major defense systems generally are protracted affairs everywhere. While we will only be able to see the extent to which India has successfully achieved its goals regarding the acquisition of U.S. defense systems over the medium to long-
term, the administration is moving rapidly, as noted above, to overcome even that barrier to partnership. In offering a program of conventional weapons sales to India, the administration confirms what the DPG recognized already in August 2003, i.e., there is reason to believe that the earlier obstacles to defense sales and technology transfer are being overcome. For example, at the May 2004 DPG meetings the issue of selling the Orion P-3C reconnaissance plane to India was discussed, apparently favorably as it is now going to be sold to India.

More recently, in the fall of 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld visited India. While he was greeted with a storm of protests from the media, evidently to some degree orchestrated by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, over proposed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, national security advisor J. N. Dixit, who died suddenly on January 3, 2005, reportedly told him that, “I am not going to whine at you—I am going to only tell you that you can go ahead and do what you like with the Pakistanis. But if U.S. aid to Pakistan upsets stability in this region, then India reserves the right to address this instability in any way it chooses.”

Not only did Rumsfeld get this message, he said Washington would build a stronger relationship, including defense ties, with India and also brought forward the discussions on a U.S. package of arms sales that would be offered to India and that was revealed a week before he came to New Delhi. The arms sales package offered by the Bush administration also eclipses what it proposes to offer Pakistan.

The offer includes the much-touted Patriot anti-missile defense system that tackles aircraft and also tactical and cruise missiles, C-130 stretched medium-lift transport aircraft, P-3C Orion maritime surveillance planes, and even F-16 fighters. The United States has also offered Perry-class frigates and Sea Hawk helicopters, while special operations forces will be looking at chemical and biological protection equipment.

Although India may not accept the F-16s because it already possesses Su-30MKI’s and French Mirage 2000s, it is likely to pick up the P-3C to obtain the long-range maritime surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities it possesses. Moreover, this deal provides
the necessary strategic depth to India’s arsenal to distinguish it from either Pakistan or China. For example, the P-3C that India is being offered is an upgraded version with the latest avionics and equipment as well as offensive capabilities that eclipse what Pakistan is being offered.\textsuperscript{394} This offer confirms the trend cited in the 2003 DPG meetings of an increasingly favorable environment for weapons sales. And it also underscores the fundamentally strategic and qualitative transformation of past policy that, as Tellis observed, is embedded within the NSSP. But this is by no means the only way in which India can assure itself of a regular access to quality weaponry and high-tech transfers that links it up to the United States.

The third way in which India can enhance its access to U.S. technologies and weapons is through purchase of systems that are jointly made by the U.S. and other third parties, e.g., Israel. This is one reason for the interest in Israeli missile defense and AWACS-like systems such as the \textit{Phalcon}. But negotiations for these systems also are inherently protracted affairs because of the legal restrictions incumbent upon U.S. partners regarding the subsequent sale of these systems to other governments and to political considerations that may be brought to bear inside the United States. Thus earlier Washington forced Israel to scuttle its deal to sell the \textit{Phalcon} to China. And since Israel coordinates its arms sales with Washington due to the close technological and defense links between them, Indian purchases from Israel can open another or broader pipeline to U.S. defense sales.\textsuperscript{395}

Furthermore, India is a notoriously slow negotiator in arms deals. Consequently, going the route of third party sales and technology transfer with states other than Russia or the United States is a very time-consuming process. As a result, it is possible that by the time the deals are finalized the weapon or technology in question may no longer be state of the art and the costs attached to the goods under discussion will probably have risen as well. Therefore this method of obtaining arms is not cost-free.

The high priority of such defense sales, and not only from the United States and its allies, is a constant reminder that India’s indigenous defense industry still cannot produce sufficient high quality, reliable, state of the art, and competitive weapons systems
for domestic use and for export abroad. Although several high-ranking military figures—e.g., the new chief of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi—espouse greater indigenization and point to India’s rising economic capabilities, this is only beginning to bear fruit. In the meantime, imports in many sectors will be necessary for quite some time. For example, the Air Force must replace half of its 350 planes and is seriously short of spare parts for half of them.

Therefore India, like many other aspiring arms producers, must still rely on foreign providers and seek offsets, technology, and knowhow transfer, as well as direct product sales in order to maintain its forces at a competitive level and to find a way to bring its defense industry up to global standards. This consideration places India in several quandaries, particularly, if as seems to be the case, its problems remain intractable and it still must rely excessively upon Russian weapons, which appear to be manifesting ever more problems to judge from the Indian press. For instance, this dependence upon Russian tanks obviously irks those who are pushing for the completion of the indigenous Arjun tank project despite the many problems that have dogged this project since its inception.

Throughout its history India has sought to eschew excessive dependence upon any one source for the provision of arms and to obtain as much self-sufficiency as possible in its defense sector. Given the socialistic and dirigiste origins of Indian defense industrial policy, the ensuing rigidities and failures of that sector as characterized in numerous studies are well known. But these failures to attain the objective of self-sufficiency, a goal that is particularly chimerical and difficult under globalization, have left their mark on Indian defense policy writ large and forced that policy and policymakers to accommodate themselves to reality.

As a result, India actually pursues three simultaneous avenues to modernization of its defense arsenal: importing weapons, importing foreign production technology for licensed production, and indigenous production. We can see aspects of each of these pathways to building a robust defense capability and some of the consequences thereof in Indian defense policy and the bilateral ties with America. First, India still tries to upgrade its indigenous capabilities. Indeed it seeks to become a major arms exporter consonant with Vajpayee’s
November 2003 directives cited above. For example, Vijay Kumer Saraswat, program director for development of ballistic missile defense systems, recently said that India might soon begin exporting ballistic missile systems that could be used in local warfare, a term he did not define. India seeks to become a major exporter of weapons not just because that would give it the semblance, if not the reality of self-sufficient arms production, but because many still hanker after the status accruing to such states or fear too much dependence upon outsiders. Probably no less important is the fact that Indian elites now see arms sales as a way to gain influence in key zones, as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives suggest. We see this approach with particular clarity as regards Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Here economic motives, the quest for status, and classical great power politics come together.

India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to Central Asian governments parallels Pakistan’s similar capability as both are entering the international arms market to find new export markets and keep defense plants open. Indian spokesmen frankly admit that they seek export markets to achieve economies of scale for their domestic defense industry. Capturing those markets will, in turn, reduce Indian dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially as India can increasingly compel them to transfer technology and knowhow as part of their sales. Probably India will provide training and assistance to Central Asian militaries as do Turkey, Russia, China, and the United States, and also find in them willing buyers of its weapons, especially those made jointly with Russia.

But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into Southeast and Central Asia’s markets where China seeks to expand its influence, India must compete with China on price and quality in the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, patrol ships, light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast Asia at reduced price and with better equipment. Furthermore, as India intends to supplant China as regional supplier of arms, it will aggressively seek markets in Central and Southeast Asia. For example, India has already sold Kazakhstan and Tajikistan Ilyushin-76 transports and helicopters, respectively. In order to realize these
goals, India must also undergo a simultaneous modernization of its existing indigenous defense industries. Thus India is now also trying to stimulate its naval defense industry as well to build up capabilities for a robust and competitive indigenous naval defense industrial sector. As noted above, HAL also seeks to become an aviation industry hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become a hub for missile building programs across Asia and Africa.

However, many obstacles stand in the way of achieving this objective of becoming a major indigenous producer of weapons for export. Indigenous industries are heavily subsidized and have a poor track record replete with long delays, cost overruns, and inferior quality. Moreover, there is a very serious problem with the transfer of technology from civilian discovery and use to military production and use. As a result of these outcomes, India has had to resort to the other alternatives listed above. But, given the institutional and political inflexibilities and rigidities that pervade India’s defense industrial system, it is unlikely that it will give up that dream unless it bites the bullet, so to speak, and abandons it by giving more scope than it has done until now to private and foreign investors and producers. Paradoxically, to have any chance of realizing indigenization to any significant degree, India must, for now, increasingly import technology and open up Indian production facilities to foreign ownership and participation.

Indeed, that has begun to happen because India found it had no choice if it wished to remain competitive in a globalized world, and if it wanted to acquire the best technologies on the market. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated in its annual report for 2004, arms imports by India increased by more than 100 percent in 2003 over 2002 to the highest level for the present 5-year period, maintaining a constant increase since 2000. While Indian imports accounted for only about 9 percent of major arms imports in 1999-2003, giving India second place for the period, India accounted for 19 percent of global transfers in 2003, making it the largest recipient that year. Russia provided 79 percent of all Indian arms imports in 1999-2003 and 75 percent in 2003.

Since these figures show also that Russian arms exports to India decreased in 2003 and were a somewhat smaller percentage of a much larger market, this trend in Indian defense policy also creates
expanded opportunities for the United States and its allies, like Israel, to gain greater entrée into the Indian defense market. And there are many signs that these exporters to India would be welcome because imports are essential for India to meet its defense industrial and strategic objectives. For example, HAL is also pressing an outsourcing program whereby it will help private Indian companies find and choose foreign partners to undertake high-tech projects like avionics integration, weapons system integration, and other related efforts. This program is intended to “lay the foundation for a credible domestic aerospace industry base that could meet the majority of India’s military aerospace requirements in the next 10 years.” Thus it is clear that a major part of the growing diversification of India’s defense industrial program is intended to stimulate domestic production by opening up that sector of industry to outside foreign private investment.\textsuperscript{414} Jasjit Singh, Director of the prestigious Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, suggested that in the future, “Collaboration [with Russia and other powers—author] must extend to components and sub-systems which could be handled through the private sector. We need to link up with industrial countries for joint development, production, and sales.”\textsuperscript{415} Many states, Israel and the United States among them, can be expected to take advantage of this opportunity and to do so with India’s blessings.

Indeed, such programs are necessary if India is to realize its goal of being a competitive military player, not to mention becoming a major defense exporter. For instance, it is clear that India faces several continuing problems if it continues to rely so much on Russian defense systems. Engine trouble forced it to ground all 18 of its fleet of Sukhoi-30MKI Fighters in August 2003. The AL-31 engine developed trouble after only 1,000 hours of flight time. As these fighters lie at the heart of India’s future Air Force strategy, due to their long range and midair refueling capacity, these flaws are telling indicators of the risk associated with an almost exclusive reliance upon Russian systems.\textsuperscript{416} And they are hardly the only instances of Indian unhappiness with Russian performance. Three areas in particular seem to have caused some anxiety in New Delhi. In March 2002, \textit{The Times of India} reported that the Parliamentary Standing Committee had issued recommendations last week urging the government to
avoid overdependence on Russia for armaments and spare parts. The committee report reportedly did acknowledge that Russia has been and will remain a steadfast source of defense equipment for India, but cautioned that New Delhi’s current dependence on Moscow for as much as 80 percent of its arms imports is not a healthy situation. It likewise observed that Russia was not providing military hardware on the same beneficial financial terms that it had during the Soviet era, and urged both that New Delhi cease making advance payments for future weapons acquisitions from Russia, and that it seek in the future to put more defense contracts up for competitive tender.417

There also are numerous complaints about the failure of the Russian contractors to deliver systems and parts rapidly—a long-standing defect of the Russian defense industry. In fact, India has warned Russian industry that if their products are not reliable and of the highest quality, India will shop elsewhere.418 This failure to obtain timely delivery is becoming a major impediment to realization of Indian defense programs. For example, in 2002 it became clear that, given the worsening relations with Pakistan, India was seeking to diversify its foreign purchases and also use foreign partners to develop its own defense industrial capability, e.g., by conditioning purchases on obtaining offsets from the sellers to develop that indigenous capability. This search for offsets continues a long-standing Indian policy.419 Thus one major solution to the problem inherent in excessive reliance upon Russian production is the acquisition of foreign licensing in the form of transfer of technology from Russia to build weapons inside India, i.e., offsets, a process whereby the seller transfers know-how and production capability, as well as weapons, to the buyer. However, it is also clear that the prospects of major American arms sales to India alarms Moscow for it threatened India that it could not merge Russian systems with forthcoming American ones without running the risk of litigation and charges over abuse of intellectual property. India saw this as a naked attempt to force it to buy Russian spare parts at exorbitant prices instead of shopping around or making them locally.420 While the problem was resolved in negotiations during Russian President Putin’s visit to India in December 2004, it still underscores the decreasing attractiveness to India of dependence on Russia. But at the
same time, India’s dependence on Russian defense production has greatly diminished, and it is Russia, whose defense industry remains in a precarious condition, that depends on the Indian market for its survival.421

Offsets to India from Russia have become a critical factor in maintaining the long-standing ties to Moscow and its defense industry, while for Russia it is a vital interest to retain a customer who buys about 40 percent of Russia’s annual exported defense production, the only production it can sell anywhere since its own army cannot buy the weapons. For example, beyond the existing $10 billion program of weapons sales from Russia to India, India collaborates with Russia on joint production of a fifth-generation fighter. More broadly, India is the only country with whom Russia is collaborating on joint production of sophisticated and futuristic weapons systems.422 Likewise India, not China, gets Russia’s best weapons that currently are being produced, systems that not even Russia’s armed forces can obtain. And Russia is building a missile defense system based on its S-300 missiles, a move that certainly raised eyebrows in Beijing.423 Moscow offers offsets in the form of technology transfer of production skills and know-how to India, one of its largest customers. And while India obviously seeks to diversify its sources of foreign procurement, even so Russian officials and exporters continuously have voiced optimism dating back to 2000 when the press reported that,

Russian exporters are still optimistic that they will be able to retain their positions in the Indian market. To do so, they have had to develop a fundamentally new approach to cooperation with India. While Russia used to offer ready-made weapons systems, now the emphasis is on joint design and production. This new approach was reinforced during Vladimir Putin’s [October 2000—author] visit to India, during which the two countries signed an agreement in which they pledged to protect the confidentiality of classified information transferred to or developed in the course of their joint activity. As a result, Russian and Indian researchers can now conduct joint R&D. Moreover, the leading participants on the Russian side will no longer be the Rosoboronexport (Russian Defense Export) State Company, but our actual R&D organizations. The work will focus primarily on the development of reconnaissance satellites and surface-sea-and-air launched cruise missiles, as well as nuclear submarine design.424
However, it is not clear that this Russian optimism is well-founded or reciprocated by India, even though it still exists among most, but by no means all, Russian producers and officials. For example, the Defense Ministry in July 2004 announced that it is phasing out MiG series jets, which the Indian press derisively refers to as flying coffins, over the next decade. India’s behavior vis-à-vis foreign arms and technology sellers also indicates that New Delhi is reorienting its overall defense technology relationship with Western countries. Apart from the well-known economic advantages of greater access to an interaction with large markets and investors in purely civilian fields of high technology and information technology (IT), one of India’s strongest economic calling cards, greater access to the U.S. technology market and greater U.S. interest in India under benevolent government sponsorship offer New Delhi several tangible strategic rewards. First, since civilian technologies are today’s cutting edge systems as opposed to military ones that played that role a generation or so ago, greater closeness to the U.S. market stimulates and provides a greater guarantee of India’s ability to maintain a competitive profile, even possibly reach a breakout stage, or make equivalent technological discoveries. In turn, that capability or those possible discoveries make it possible to overcome the barriers in India between civilian and defense technologies that have impeded defense production. That outcome would generate real prospects for ensuring that the defense industrial base remains a competitive one and also permits greater indigenization of India’s capability to produce its own dual-use technologies or to re-export American systems to other buyers. A second indirect benefit of such trade is that the foreign pressure generated by such trade might also push India’s lagging defense industries to become more robust and competitive.

A third benefit that would accrue to India from greater exposure of American firms to it and vice versa is already discernible in the rival Chinese case. Substantially expanded U.S.-Indian trade and investment ties would promote creation within the U.S. political system of an Indian lobby that could influence American foreign and defense policy constantly just as the expansion of such ties to China has produced an influential lobby that clearly restrains expressions
of hostility to China in our policy when the pressure builds to take such actions. An equivalent Indian lobby would promote favorable strategic ties to India and win friends and influence for New Delhi on Capitol Hill and elsewhere throughout our political system. New Delhi clearly understands the potential significance of a lobby of Indian-Americans and of high placed friends in the business community for its broader strategic objectives.\footnote{427}

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Indian commentators regarded access to nuclear, high-tech, and space cooperation with the United States as the “trinity” issues, and hope for a more accommodating U.S. position on transfer of critical technologies when issues come before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).\footnote{428} Neither is it surprising, under the circumstances, that the turn to Israel has taken place. Indeed, the Vajpayee government, building upon past precedents, effected an amazing transformation of India’s defense relationship to Israel, and it appears that the present regime is building effectively on it.\footnote{429} In 2003, \textit{Defense News} reported that the Indian government is working on a program whereby Israel would replace Russia as India’s largest supplier of weapons and defense equipment by 2008. Under the terms of this program, India will identify the products it wants and ask the Israeli government to negotiate with Israeli firms on its behalf, just as Jerusalem does with regard to its own weapons. Israel is already India’s second largest supplier of military systems, if not, as some think, India’s largest supplier. Therefore, this program could effect a major transformation in India’s security relationships.\footnote{430} Israel evidently is willing to sell India some of its latest and most sophisticated weapons systems, e.g., the Advanced Naval Attack Missile and the Next Generation Defense Missile, provided India also invests in their development.\footnote{431} Similarly, India seeks Israeli investment in Indian defense industry to modernize it and make it more competitive.\footnote{432}

India’s wish list from Israel reveals the scope of its strategic interests. India seeks super-high satellite imagery resolution technology from Israel to gain critical real-time targeting capability to improve the accuracy of India’s ballistic missiles and gather intelligence concerning terrorist and Pakistani activities in Jammu and Kashmir.\footnote{433} Indian army planners, frustrated by the slow pace
of India’s indigenous ballistic missile programs and alarmed by Pakistan’s progress in that area, also advocate an emergency purchase of either Russian or Israeli missiles, even though Israel’s Long Range Artillery (LORA), if sold, would, with minor adaptations, trample on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). That sale might be a bridge too far for U.S. authorities to accept.\textsuperscript{434} India also seeks Israeli help regarding a new inertial navigation system for long-range missiles like the Agni III, the multi-target surface-to-air missile, and for short-range missiles like the sea-skimming Dhanush.\textsuperscript{435} Other issues under consideration are Israeli avionics for India’s Russian-built fleet of aircraft, tanks, improved artillery systems, fire control and thermal imaging systems for tanks, maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and “platforms with longer reach and sustainability at sea.” These include the Barak ship-defense missile and UAVs.\textsuperscript{436} These requests come on top of existing purchases of UAVs for all of India’s services, avionics, night vision devices, artillery, artillery radars, fast attack naval craft, an electronic warfare system for the INS Virat, and ammunition.\textsuperscript{437} Israel is also training up to 3,000 Indian commandos in urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{438} Moreover, this cooperation is poised to grow. There are fresh reports that the Mossad will train Indian intelligence personnel. Apparently India’s Cabinet Committee on Security has decided to solicit Israeli training for four new Special Forces battalions which will be stood up to fight the insurgency in Kashmir. Likewise, India has already purchased several Barak missile systems for its Delhi class destroyers, and Israel’s evident willingness to sell the ANAM and the NGD missile has been cited above.\textsuperscript{439}

Other projects under consideration clearly suggest Indian interest in responding to Pakistan’s acquisition of North Korean SRBMs and MRBMs that can strike deep into India, and to China’s development of similar conventional and nuclear missiles. Thus India is discussing acquisition of an aerial attack vehicle configured for striking ballistic missiles during their boost phase. India has also asked Israel for advanced surveillance equipment and an ABM defense system and received two Israeli Green Pine radars and aerostat balloons and UAVs for use both by the Army in Kashmir and by the Navy for monitoring and surveillance in the Arabian Sea and around the Andaman and Nicobar islands.\textsuperscript{440}
India’s opening up of its defense sector to foreign investment creates opportunities not only for Israeli investors and for the acquisition of licenses for domestic production from Israel, France, Russia, etc., but it also creates greatly expanded opportunities for America both directly and through the provision of Israeli assistance, much of which is contractually tied to American assistance. Indian elites know this and value the Israeli tie in part because it opens doors in Washington which were hitherto blocked and which might be blocked again.441 As Tellis wrote in 2001,

It is worth noting that India’s interest in Russian strategic technology is accompanied by a growing interest in French and Israeli technology. The parallelism in these cases is fascinating: all three states are seen as repositories of critical strategic technologies of interest to India; all three states are seen to be sufficiently independent of U.S. political pressure as far as transferring many technologies to India is concerned; and all three states are perceived to be driven more by commercial considerations than by ideological interests, and even these, to the degree that they exist, are viewed as aligned with rather than opposed to Indian perceptions. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect that India’s strategic ties with each of these countries will grow, both in connection with its strategic programs and otherwise.442

However, the opportunities now being generated to acquire freer access to American civilian and defense technologies, as well as to weapons systems, open up opportunities for both parties to strengthen their ties and to enhance India’s own defense capabilities through the invigoration of cooperation. That cooperation would facilitate not just licensing or direct sales, but would also help India overcome the problems that have hampered its quest for indigenization. This hardly means the millennium is at hand for Indian defense. But it does offer it new possibilities that should be seized if India truly wants to materialize the expansive security agenda that its elites share.
CHAPTER 11

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES
IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While India’s wish list to Jerusalem is expansive, it pales in comparison to what India wants from Washington. That “wish list” is still more expansive and revealing of the scope of Indian policy ambitions, as shown in Defense Minister George Fernandes’ visit to Washington in 2001. India then requested:

- Land, sea, and air-based communication and surveillance platforms and systems;
- Testing facilities for land, sea, and air-based weapons, avionics, electronic warfare equipment, and radar;
- Small arms and other infantry gear;
- Testing equipment for defense research programs, including command and control weapons and laser weapons;
- Air defense network management; and,
- Current and future training concepts.443

India’s wish list from the United States regarding civilian and dual-use technology transfer is equally expansive. At a July 2003 meeting of the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), a group that brings together private business and governmental officials, a discussion of specific proposals for joint development in defense technology included the following items: Communications systems, including multiplexer and frequency hopping systems, satellite networks, information security, encryption technologies and solutions; minesweeper technology; shipbuilding; combat aircraft; development of precision guided munitions, including laser guided munitions; nanotechnology; UAV technology and associated sensors; data links for airborne and vehicular surveillance platforms; software development; manufacture of electronic components; test equipment; tanks and armored vehicles, missiles, rockets, and launchers; radar and sonar systems; air defense systems; torpedoes and mines; and
small arms and guns. India’s abiding fears that America is not a reliable supplier and confusion about export controls, plus the fact that actual release of exports is much slower than the declared policy, India’s own cumbersome bureaucratic deformities regarding a lengthy acquisition process, and a lack of interoperability between both forces also figured prominently in the discussion.

In practice, of course, the Indian government cannot address so extensive a list of desired technologies and/or weapons systems to Washington. Nevertheless, this list shows the desire for partnership even under the existing obstacles and the expansiveness of Indian objectives. The government’s official requests to Washington also show this expansive Indian perspective. For example, in April 2003, the plan prepared for the Indian military developed by the Directorate of Defense Policy and Planning for the Army, Air Force, and Navy advocated a rapid reaction capability for real-time troop deployment to countries along the rim of the Indian Ocean to create a defense umbrella for them. This plan, “India’s Strategic Vision,” envisions cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, and Vietnam. And it comports with Vajpayee’s directives above. However, it cannot be carried out, given India’s lack of fast long-range aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities, Airborne Early Warning and Command (AEW&C) aircraft, attack helicopters, and a carrier in addition to the existing INS Virat carrier. These deficiencies, which the report insists cannot be made up by India’s defense industry, put it at a disadvantage relative to China, which allegedly can project major power into the Indian Ocean area. Therefore, the only way to acquire these capabilities is through foreign suppliers.

More recent reports suggest that planning for anti-Chinese contingencies is still driving much of India’s defense acquisitions policy, particularly with regard to naval and air forces, while the Army is still tasked with contingencies closer to home that primarily target Pakistan and the terrorists it has supported. The Indian Defense Forces’ new strategic plan mandates the purchase of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft like the P-3C and the development of littoral warfare capabilities. The Army must prepare to fight intense, short wars against the backdrop of terrorism and possible nuclear threats. Meanwhile, the Air Force is to buy up to 125 multirole aircraft and
upgrade aging air defense systems. And despite the improved Sino-Indian dialogue,

India plans future acquisitions based on a scenario involving conflict with China, a Defense Ministry official said. The Agni-3 nuclear-capable missile, with a range of 3,000 kilometers, is ready for testing, and the Indo-Russian BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile, with a range of 290 kilometers, will enter Indian Navy service in 2005, the official said. The Air Force also received its fifth Il-78 serial tanker from Uzbekistan, which will enable the service’s SU-30MKI and Mirage 2000-H combat aircraft to fly deep inside China.

All these requests, as well as existing programs that are bringing new weapons into active service, suggest the breadth and scope of Indian goals and the capabilities that India seeks to acquire in order to play the great role it envisions for itself in Asia. And the large scope of India’s requests might also explain at least some of the U.S. bureaucracy’s earlier hesitancy in giving these systems and platforms to India, even though arms manufacturers now see great potential in the Indian market, thanks to the Pentagon’s intervention. Indeed, in August 2003, the Pentagon showed its approval for sale of the Orion and for a “deep submarine rescue vehicle,” and for intelligence equipment and sensors that would allow India to monitor passage through Kashmir by terrorists and other infiltrators. Indian reports also said that the Pentagon cleared numerous other export licenses that were being held up in the bureaucracy even as late as November 2004, i.e., up until just before public word of the projected U.S. arms sales to India were announced. However, the combined force of India’s needs and capabilities, coupled with the transformation of U.S. policy regarding arms sales and technology transfer discussed above suggest that we may now be crossing a threshold in the bilateral relationship with regard to arms sales and technology transfer.

Still, there are obstacles to the realization of such transfer, e.g., the rivalry between the State and Defense Departments that pertains to India. As noted above, the State Department and particularly the U.S. arms control community, much of which is lodged there, emphasizes the proliferation perspective when it looks at India. That perspective, regardless of whether it is justified or not, is clearly conducive to the obstruction of arms sales to India because of continuing unhappiness.
over its nuclearization. Evidently some officials there still believe that India can be kept from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing it through the withholding of conventional arms and military technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf told the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference on the Nonproliferation treaty that,

Turning to South Asia, our focus there is not on compliance, as neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. While we remain committed to universal NPT adherence, our focus in South Asia has been and remains on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability—be it through nuclear testing, deployment, nuclear use, or proliferation to other countries. The United States has an active dialogue with both countries on these issues. We have taken steps recently with both countries to strengthen relations in order to advance our regional goals, enhance the fight against terrorism, and to secure cooperation from both countries on export controls. These steps should not, however, be taken to suggest that we have “accepted” the status of either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. We have not. Moreover, we will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire nuclear weapons or for the 1998 tests that made the world and the region a more dangerous place. We have steadfastly avoided taking any actions that would be contrary to our long-established nuclear export control policy. India and Pakistan remain ineligible under U.S. law and policy for any significant assistance to their nuclear programs. We continue to call on India and Pakistan not to conduct nuclear tests, to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to take steps to reduce regional tensions and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.  

Obviously such a position flatly contradicts the logic embodied in the NSSP and the President’s offer of weapons to India. 

State Department officials also are extremely alarmed (and with good reason) about the possibility of Indo-Pakistani conflicts breaking out over Kashmir or other issues, even though that has not stopped either side from developing nuclear weapons indigenously. State Department officials publicly cite both India’s and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons as a threat to American interests and troops because they are a factor that can ratchet up regional instability. While formally this may be true, this assessment, Indians reply, omits to mention that Pakistan has used terrorism as a weapon,
secure in the knowledge that it can match escalation. Thus each side’s nuclear weapons serve rather different purposes and have rather different consequences, which are not equal either for the region or for the United States.\textsuperscript{451}

The State Department’s emphasis on nonproliferation emerged clearly in a speech by then Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass who stated on January 7, 2003:

\begin{quote}
Despite this impressive list of areas of joint cooperation, there is more we can work on together. Security cooperation tops the list. A key component of our growing security collaboration must be geared toward stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and India share a common interest in bringing about a world where materials and technologies for the production of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are difficult to acquire. India has shown its willingness to identify proliferators; we do, however, look for even more aggressive Indian action on this front, and are prepared to work together and share experiences to help India achieve our common goal of stopping onward proliferation.\textsuperscript{452}
\end{quote}

In fact, it is rather doubtful if India shares this aim, at least so far as its ability to acquire new nuclear technologies and capabilities is concerned, given its nuclear weapons development programs. While India certainly opposes other states’ nuclearization and does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it is unclear if it really holds the State Department’s view, or does so as intensely as does the State Department. As Tellis points out, based upon the Indian policy framework cited above, which is taken from his magisterial study of Indian nuclear policy,

\begin{quote}
The current global nuclear regime therefore influences the future direction of India’s nuclear regime in at least one straightforward manner: it makes denuclearization impossible, and to the extent that it allows the nuclear weapon states to continually maintain and perhaps improve their arsenals even if only in qualitative terms, makes further Indian movement in the direction of denuclearization all the more likely. \textsuperscript{453}
\end{quote}

Moreover, India shares the principles of U.S. nonproliferation policy but dissents from their application to the region because of India’s proximity to China and Pakistan and its commitment to
democratic and restrained defense policies. In addition, India fears that the application of this nonproliferation policy is inherently discriminatory, since Washington will not abide by the strictures it preaches to others and that India would then be locked out of key avenues for enhancing its security. Furthermore, this logic leads Indian policymakers into an acceptance of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Indeed, they apparently argue that Pakistan should now feel more secure by virtue of having them and thus be able to curtail such manifestations of its abiding insecurity like the support for terrorism.

Nevertheless, the State Department and its spokesmen, including Blackwill when he was ambassador, regularly emphasize that one of the main common interests of the two states is stopping nuclear proliferation, even though he was also at pains to insist that America was a reliable friend and supplier of technology. This State Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to arraign India for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of frustration to Indians, especially as they view technology transfer and the ending of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales as touchstones of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s opposition to according India formal status as a nuclear power, clearly a sign that Beijing still seeks to confine India to a lower, purely regional status as an Asian player, while it reaps the benefits and status of being a recognized nuclear power. From India’s standpoint, that ranking is intolerable both politically and psychologically. Neither does the State Department’s stance preclude India’s nuclearization or the development of its weapons arsenal, since there are others who will gladly sell whatever Washington denies. As C. Raja Mohan writes,

> The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the international architecture constructed to manage WMD proliferation; and belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic partnership with New Delhi.

Ultimately the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints and represents
a policy of feeling virtuous rather than doing the right thing strategically, since there is no evidence that withholding that status has stopped other powers from proliferating; quite the opposite. Therefore, Indian elites, be they important correspondents and observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military personnel like an admiral that MacDonald interviewed, all speak bluntly about the consequences of the State Department’s and general bureaucratic obstruction here.\footnote{C. Raja Mohan writes that, Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the Bush administration. Many officials at the political level in Washington recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities, by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will likely remain on paper.}{459}

Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,

Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S. policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other countries from selling India technologies (e.g., Israel). For Indians, this is a direct affront to their security interests.\footnote{While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key factor in influencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy are clearly regarded by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation. This makes Vajpayee’s willingness to accept U.S. supervision over the missile defense program in 2003 all the more bold a proposal in the context of Indian perceptions. For example, Sahgal criticized the U.S. dilatory attitude toward technology transfers as well as the bureaucratic structure for policymaking toward India and writes that,}{460}
The centrality of technology transfers in building a strong and enduring relationship is underestimated. From the Indian perspective, technology transfers are the touchstone for forging a long and stable strategic relationship, in particular dual use technologies, space technologies, and those related to nuclear risk reduction. U.S. righteousness in this regard is distressing particularly when much more advanced technologies have been sold to its strategic competitor, China. Long bureaucratic delays on account of differences between the departments of State and Defense, particularly when attempts are made to hyphenate India and Pakistan under the maxim of regional stability. Another area of differences relates to structural concerns. What is particularly irksome is the strategic rationale of dealing with the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) when India’s central concerns lie in [the] Central Command (CENTCOM).

Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal similarly told an audience at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in February 2003 that, while there has been much progress in deepening cooperation in science and technology to overcome past constraints, there is still much work to do. Accordingly,

A broad cooperation in science and technology and a more robust trade in high technology areas should be an important element of our strategy to stimulate our overall economic relations, because in so many ways India and the United States are already pioneering international partnerships in knowledge-intensive industries.

This cooperation already began to appear in the February 2003 technology agreement between the United States and India. A bilateral technology cooperation group has been formed to promote high-tech trade and thus remove many of the barriers that have impeded such trade in the past. At the same time, the agreement recognizes the need to prevent dual-use exports of sensitive technology as prohibited by U.S. export control laws. While there are high hopes in India’s high-tech sector due to this agreement, in a sense it exemplifies some of the problems involved in bilateral technology transfer. Despite the promised reduction of barriers to trade in supposedly purely civilian and commercial high technology, it also is clear that the efforts to overcome obstacles to expanded technology transfer and investment that currently exist in both countries and which impede the kinds of relationships called for by Sahgal and Sibal, among others, very
much apply to defense technology that is directly obtainable from the United States. This pertains both to entire weapons systems and to enabling technologies. Some of these impediments apply, for instance to dual-use technologies like nuclear reactors. As a recent paper by two members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that was written for the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR) observed,

India pressures nuclear reactor suppliers to adapt the nonproliferation regime to India’s benefit. India wants access to nuclear reactors and other sensitive technologies that have been denied on nonproliferation grounds. New Delhi makes such cooperation a test of U.S. willingness to elevate Indo-American relations.465

Unfortunately other states, like Russia and France, supplied India with such reactors and might be interested in doing so again if nonproliferation strictures could be revised. Indeed, Russia is now promoting the idea of floating nuclear reactors and/or plants off India’s shore.466 Thus, as in so many other cases, the U.S. Government must acknowledge that blocking the transfer of sensitive technologies may allow other states to capture that market and for political relations with a key state to suffer. It is an abiding dilemma for policymakers and for which there are no easy or uniformly correct answers. But this consideration raises another reason why it would be quixotic to expect that State Department disapproval for the nuclear tests of 1998 could effectively translate into India’s denuclearization, or that we can punish India for those tests without severe costs in both economic and political, not to mention strategic influence over India’s government. Like it or not, India has alternatives to U.S. displeasure and, while we can impose costs upon New Delhi, they will rebound upon us and ultimately not prove decisive because others will be only too happy to enter into the breach.

And the issues involved with the sale of dual-use or more specifically military systems to India push these dilemmas to the fore. The question of arms sales to India surfaces many of the factors or asymmetries in the bilateral relationship with Washington that obstruct deepening of this relationship, as well as the immense potential benefits for both sides that are now clearly visible to
proponents of a deeper and more intimate bilateral strategic relationship. India’s military requests, as stated to Washington and as seen by its other ongoing acquisitions, also reveal the extent of its strategic ambitions and perceptions, which some officials here might find objectionable. Despite the lifting of sanctions, only the Firefinder radar system has so far been sold to India. Much of the reason for the obstacles to completing these deals clearly has been the State Department’s obstruction. These sales and discussions also highlight the threats India faces, missiles, theater conventional war, and terrorism, if not some combination of the three or of any two of these contingencies. But they also show us that India’s full commitment to being the dominant military player in South Asia and its determination to acquire the needed military capabilities to realize that ambition.

However, it is not clear that by doing so, it will achieve peace, security, or a lasting partnership with America beyond the Bush administration’s current term. If there is to be a lasting partnership, the remaining obstacles to it must be cleared away. We have cited the bureaucratic rivalry between the DoD and State Department, but those rivalries do not, by any means, exhaust the defects cited in our bureaucratic structure with regard to Indian policy, as analyzed by MacDonald.467 India’s anomalous position between USPACOM, which includes India in its AOR, and USCENTCOM, where it is absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are in that command’s AOR, causes it to be lost in “a kind of ‘strategic ether’ between two powerful unified commands.”468 Indians interviewed by MacDonald criticized this bifurcation in policymaking because India’s interests regarding Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Gulf cannot be discussed in PACOM since those areas are outside of its AOR, yet India cannot come to CENTCOM because it is not in CENTCOM’s AOR. They also uniformly felt that, because PACOM encompasses so many important Asian governments, India’s interests do not receive the priority level of attention that they warrant. One high-level Indian policymaker told MacDonald that,

To understand Indian national interests and India’s potential role in the region, the United States must view the Indian Ocean as a region, not a bunch of segments. An institutionalized link between CENTCOM and
PACOM that allows the United States to understand India’s role across the region is required. Absent an integrated view of the region, the relationship will continue to face the communications breakdowns that occurred after 9/11. Areas of shared concerns, such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, narco-trafficking, and sea lane protection cascade across the PACOM and CENTCOM.469

Yet American officers argue that it is beneficial that these countries are separated in the two commands since, otherwise, combatant commanders could not achieve relationships of trust and confidence with Indian and Pakistani officials. Therefore, they believe the current structure allows the U.S. military to build cooperative relationships with both those states irrespective of the current state of relations between India and Pakistan.470 They also claim that there is sufficient interaction between the two commands to allow for the creation of good policy relationships with each state and that Indian complaints about this division of commands stems from a fundamental misapprehension of the role of the combatant and unified commands in American defense policy.471 Unfortunately, MacDonald’s evidence of a lack of interaction between these commands, and of Indians’ clear understanding of the nature of U.S. defense policy organization, and the clear demonstration of the astonishing incoherence in our national security bureaucracies where India is concerned shows these claims to be misconceived and not grounded in reality.472

In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic space that are now clear to analysts and officials (and not only in the United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustified, and counterproductive complacency is about existing structural relationships. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, as well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.
A successful U.S. policy towards India will find a way to balance our interests and values with India’s interests and values. It also will maximize the areas of agreement and consonance, while not allowing disagreements to go beyond that phase and corrode the relationship as a whole. Given the history of Indo-American relations and the current gaps between both states, e.g., on Iraq, the two governments’ disparate foreign policy traditions, contemporary political realities in both countries, and the problems of making coherent policy toward the other state that exist within both bureaucracies, sustaining and advancing this partnership will inevitably be a difficult and persisting challenge to both governments. However, it is well worth it to us not to become disappointed by the size of the challenge or the disparities between American and Indian policies and perspectives. This is because the potential payoffs to us in Asia and beyond from an enduring partnership are enormous and long-lasting.

A clear-eyed assessment of existing possibilities should be based on U.S. interests and values. Those interests dictate, first of all that policy work towards the following objectives:

• Winning the war on terrorism: preventing the al-Qaeda and Taliban networks from operating freely and ultimately destroying them requires long-term systematic cooperation with Pakistan’s armed forces, since they alone can conduct sustained operations in that “theater” and their support is essential for any operations we might wish to undertake there as well.

• At the same time, it is also essential to help stabilize the overall South Asian balance to prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed or radical Islamic state. That broad aim is essential to preventing the recurrence of Kashmiri and other terrorist
activities and the further inflammation of Indo-Pakistani relations. It also is essential to making progress, not just on reducing tensions that could ultimately trigger a nuclear exchange in South Asia but on helping Pakistan move towards greater liberalization and democratization. This requires not just military assistance but continuing and even increasing the economic dimension of U.S. foreign policy programs in South Asia. Moreover, they should include not just India and Pakistan, but also the neighboring states of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, since all of them are menaced by conditions that could lead to state failure or civil war, and the recruitment of many more cadres for terrorism and insurgency against their own governments, India, and the United States.  

• Third, it is essential to act to facilitate the moderation of Indo-Pakistani tensions so that Pakistan will not feel obliged to resort to terrorism, or to support violent Islamic extremism. Doing so also lowers the likelihood for either conventional or nuclear conflict in the region especially as the latter may grow out of the former. Another factor here is that, since 1999 when both sides became nuclear weapon possessors, there have been two crises, Kargil and the crisis of 2001-02, that led to low-level conventional conflict between the two armies in 1999 and then to mobilization of the Indian army in 2002. A third such crisis could easily go beyond those levels, especially as many in India now profess to hold a doctrine saying that India’s conventional superiority now allows it to wage a “limited conventional war,” i.e., a war against Pakistan for limited objectives using purely conventional means. Whether or not they are right, Pakistan holds to a doctrine of nuclear first use and the threat of defeat in a conventional war could tempt its leaders to throw the nuclear dice to forestall such an outcome. Preventing such conflicts is therefore a matter of the highest urgency. Since neither side now accepts that we should be actual mediators, we need to adopt instead a role as facilitator of conflict resolution, but do so with clear objectives and policies in mind as discussed below. And, in fact, it is mainly U.S. pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad that
has been the catalyst for both sides to begin what amounts to a peace process, however fragile, and insecure. While we should not be negotiators for either or both sides, we must be facilitators and encouragers of this process.

• Fourth: As the NSS and QDR both proclaim, the administration has postulated the long-term goal of forging a new balance of power in Asia on behalf of democratic change and against any one power’s excessive aggrandizement. \(^{475}\) This obviously means China, but it does not have to be containment in its classical sense. A robust partnership with a flourishing and democratic India whose power is growing will of its own accord limit China’s ability to alter that balance in Southeast Asia in ways contrary to our own and India’s interests. Creation of a pro-democratic balance, as called for in U.S. policy documents like the NSS and QDR of 2001 is a vital and shared strategic objective for both states whose relevance must be kept in view.

Those objectives are clearly consonant with India’s interests, e.g., as expressed in the April 2001 agenda stated above. But achieving them together requires special care and sensitivity since India cannot be dictated to and will bridle at any such effort. Moreover, it is not an ally like other NATO members and seeks partnership, not alliance, with America. Therefore exchanges must take place on the basis of mutual equality and mutual understanding. So, work in all these areas to sustain and advance the partnership must take those factors into account. For instance, any cooperation with Pakistan that is not explained in advance to India and that is not taken as part of a broader strategic approach to keep both those states as partners with us is bound to undermine our relationships with either one or both of those states. Therefore, as policy moves forward, we must maintain constant coordination with both governments concerning our initiatives there, not in order to give one or the other a veto or blank check, but in order to keep them both within a framework where common or at least harmonious interests can be advanced together and by joint action.

The United States needs a strategic perspective on South Asia that transcends but includes the current war on terrorism where
Pakistan is the second front. While the foregoing analysis challenges the standpoint taken by analysts like Norman Friedman, that India is or was “irrelevant” to the war on terrorism, there is no question that Pakistan’s support is vital and urgent, even if its considerable support also is laced with a good deal of backsliding and temporizing due to the strong position of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistani politics and the resonance of the Kashmir issue there.

Today the distinctions between U.S. and Indian perceptions pertain with particular force to South Asian issues and relationships, especially Pakistan and the issues involved in the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Assuming that genuine strategic partnership among India, Pakistan, and the United States against terrorism and other future threats is desirable is not necessarily an Indian view. But it certainly should represent the objective toward which Washington should strive, since such a partnership also reduces the likelihood of other potential threats in Asia. Specifically, such a partnership reduces China’s incentives and ability to meddle in South Asia’s troubled waters and opportunities for both Beijing and Islamabad to continue the reckless policies of proliferation that are now causing international insecurity across much of Asia, even to the point of becoming a major problem for China. At the same time, progress towards Indo-Pakistani conflict resolution now accords with the interests of both Russia and China because of the threat they both perceive from the terrorist virus that has been let loose in South and Central Asia. This partnership also imposes a severe penalty upon Pakistan for continuing to support terrorism and pressures it to both combat terrorism actively, as it has done, and to move, however cautiously and reluctantly, towards a genuine dialogue with India. However, for America to move steadily and successfully towards this outcome, it needs to begin with a realistic assessment of the current situation.

Many Indian analysts now argue that China is the principal rival of both India and Washington and that Washington needs India to meet the Chinese and/or Muslim challenges successfully. Consequently, the United States has a fundamental stake in the growing capability of India to provide a major counterweight to forces in Asia that are clearly antagonistic towards American interests. “Washington has
yet to realize that India can play the role of a major friendly power only if it is able to secure and preside over a stable and legitimate order in South Asia.478

However, the legitimacy of the regional order must precede any recognition of India’s presiding over it, which would be the natural outcome, given its power and a three-way partnership with Pakistan and the United States. That means Pakistan must also agree to a new regional order and to some sense of the legitimacy of India’s leading position there. This requires that Pakistan not feel its security threatened if it is to live in peace with India and acknowledge its superior regional and continental position. Only the United States can provide that reassurance and deterrence of both sides needed to sustain such a regional order.479 Indeed, there is no way for Indian power to be regionally secure without a prior establishment of both its legitimacy and a consensus with Pakistan on that basis. Thus the partnership which we must now build with India and Pakistan must create its own legitimacy to be recognized by both sides and be truly effective. At the same time, America’s growing intimacy with India and Pakistan already has sparked a frank dialogue that forges consensus rather than simply assumes either that consensus’s prior existence or that India (or Pakistan) will act according to our perception of its interests and conform to our interests and objectives.480

Beginning with this recognition of reality, we can undertake to forge a real and lasting partnership that will outlast the present governments in both countries and conform to both states’ deepest values and strategic interests. For this purpose, both political and institutional steps are needed here. The political steps comprise both the vision upon which an enduring and genuine partnership must be based and the diplomatic precepts that should govern U.S. strategy and conduct toward India and the agenda of regional security where India is a player. The institutional steps are concrete actions that the U.S. Government and its departments should carry out, not just including specific policies, e.g., concerning technology transfer, but also in adapting the institutional structure of government so that it can maximize the gains that we hope to obtain from cementing a long-term partnership.
First, the administration needs to devise a more unified approach to India and to the subcontinent as a whole. It is clear that the State Department and Congress are inclined to worry more about India as a nuclear state and proliferator than to see it in the regional context as a strategic partner of the United States. The Pentagon, on the other hand, sees India mainly through the lens of strategic partnership and regional security, rather than as a potential threat by virtue of the nuclear issue and Pakistani provocations. Thus, there is an organizational and conceptual disjunction affecting policy toward South Asia throughout the administration, with the State Department emphasizing the threat from proliferation by both sides in South Asia and responses drawn from the traditional repertoire of arms control. DoD, for its part, manifests a skeptical attitude toward those traditional precepts of arms control and deterrence. Hence it promotes the transfer of missile defenses to India. 481 As long as the struggle between these two departmental views continues unabated or unless it is superseded by new paradigms through which to view the subcontinent, U.S. policy there will fail to achieve a lasting strategic partnership with either India or Pakistan. That is because the basis upon which Washington then will approach this region will be an internally unstable one, and rival bureaucracies will sabotage each other’s initiatives. To make this argument does not mean to minimize either the dangers from the situation in South Asia, or to overlook the real gains that could accrue to both India and the United States from a partnership seen primarily through the perspective of common threats facing both states in Asia. Rather, it is a call for the administration to establish a consensus within itself and for subsequent administrations to do likewise concerning what is most important and enduring in this relationship and to proceed on a bilateral basis from there. Likewise, recent research has found that the structure that ties together civilian agencies and regional combatant commanders is seriously defective and in need of substantial reform. 482 These findings apply across the globe, not just to India and Pakistan. But they clearly inhibit the formulation and implementation of truly strategic and well-conceived policies. A more auspicious basis for addressing the American relationship with India actually would be to focus upon or emphasize those features of both states that are held in common, beginning with the fact that
they are both multi-confessional and ethnic secular democracies.

Second, their vital interests are threatened by Islamic terrorism, which deliberately has targeted them. These two points, it should be noted, also may be applied to Israel, which is why some groups in both countries talk of a kind of triple alliance among those three states.\textsuperscript{483}

Third, both states share a common interest in constraining the growth of Chinese power and influence in Asia, and are opposed to one of the main instruments of China’s counterpolicy for restraining their capabilities in Asia; namely, China’s creation of a ring of proxies to whom it is proliferating technology and systems both of a conventional and nuclear nature.\textsuperscript{484}

Fourth, they increasingly have compatible, if not convergent, economic interests, and South Asia is a great field for both to develop.

Fifth, their common interest in democracy, opposition to terrorism, attempts to forestall and oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and concern about China’s intentions suffices to create a strong basis for partnership, even if the economic link between them was tenuous and would do so even under the present conditions of Indo-Chinese rapprochement. However, both the Indian and American governments also need to eliminate barriers to each other’s trade and investment in their respective countries and create a viable basis for future transactions involving military weapons systems, technologies, and dual-use systems.

On the basis of a common opposition to terrorism and emphasis on democracy, they also can approach Pakistan individually, or together as the case may be, to induce it to take steps to democratize its polity; liberalize its social, economic, and religious institutions; and, in general, ameliorate conditions along the Line of Control. Therefore, it is urgent that we craft a better and more workable approach to the question of Pakistan’s role in the anti-terrorist alliance and in regional security in South Asia. The urgency of preventing a return to power by terrorists in Afghanistan or the failure of the state in Pakistan—unquestionably a strategic nightmare for India and not its desired outcome—impels the administration to see South Asia in a broader strategic perspective than the war on terrorism. It may not
be satisfactory to us, but it could well be the case for both India and
the United States that the Musharraf regime is the best one available,
given what Pakistan’s internal political landscape has come to look
like. It already is clear that stability in Central Asia, now a much more
important theater of operations than previously was the case, also is
imperiled by the prospect of destabilization in either Afghanistan
or Pakistan. Those outcomes would enhance terrorist and Jihadi
capabilities in Southeast Asia tremendously as well as in the Middle
East, making the stabilization of South Asia probably just as urgent
a matter of security for those two regions as well. And, of course, as
many have pointed out, a collapse of the regime in Pakistan could
lead to the following “nightmare outcomes”: transfer of nuclear
weapons to Jihadi control or to elements that would allow those
elements to conduct more terrorist actions abroad under protection
of the “extended deterrence” offered by those weapons. Then those
Jihadi elements could resort to nuclear blackmail, if not actual use
of those weapons, and/or to carry out more operations like the 1999
Kargil attacks. All of those possibilities represent nightmare scenarios
for all concerned.

The quest for equilibrium and balance over and above the need to
defeat terrorism, and to realize common interests across Asia, makes
it equally important to overcome, or reverse, or alleviate Indian
perceptions that Pakistan is not much more than China’s instrument
for containing the rise of Indian power, harassing Indian efforts to
break out of the South Asian “ghetto,” and a legitimate outlet for
Chinese proliferation, which can then go on to other, even more
dangerous destinations like Iran and North Korea. Washington
must be able to exercise not just a restraining influence upon Pakistan,
but also become a decisive, if not the decisive, interlocutor for it to
subsume Indo-Chinese and South Asian rivalries in this framework of
equilibrium. There are signs that such an exercise might be possible,
but we cannot underestimate the difficulties along the way to such
an amelioration, not to mention a resolution, of existing tensions.

The difficulties are clear to observers. As reported by the Far
Eastern Economic Review, Islamic fundamentalism in the Pakistani
army is growing, officers have recently been arrested for aiding
al-Qaeda, which operates increasingly with the toleration of the
Army in Pakistan, and the Army until recently has “turned a blind
“eye” to terrorists crossing into Kashmir. This is in addition to two assassination attempts against Musharraf on December 14 and 25, 2003, which indicated, as he admitted, penetration of the army and of his inner circle as well. This “unreliability” of the Pakistani armed forces is, or should be, unacceptable for Washington, since numerous reports testify to the continuing help rendered by these fundamentalist parties to the Taliban and other terrorist groups inside Pakistan as they continue to fight the United States. Nor is it acceptable to New Delhi for obvious reasons. Consequently, it is not surprising that under U.S. prodding, there have been several Pakistani offensives into its tribal area to uproot the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other terrorists.

These considerations demonstrate a community of interests between New Delhi and Washington that terrorism in or potentially supported by Pakistan must be fought resolutely. Yet while American officials publicly extol the support given by Pakistan to us in the war on terrorism, this only frustrates India more since Indian analysts believe that this terrorism is orchestrated, or at least tolerated, from the top of Pakistan’s government and military, and that we are inclined to play it down in the interests of having Musharraf take on the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Likewise, any hint of arms sales to Pakistan generates what Dixit called whining, as noted above. While Indian analysts apparently display little hope that Pakistan will desist from terrorism, Pakistan’s government had maintained well into 2004 the argument that it proclaimed in 2002 that it has gone as far as it can and that it is up to India to launch initiatives to resolve outstanding issues, among them Kashmir. However, until now, India clearly has wanted Pakistan to be put into the dock, arraigned, tried, and convicted, even though doing so is beyond anyone’s capability. It is possible that gestures such as the announcement of a nuclear hot line between India and Pakistan in June 2004 might lead to further agreements that actually do something about the sponsorship of anti-Indian terrorism. But until now, naturally the result has been considerable disappointment in America’s failure to break this modus vivendi and the support of many politically active Pakistanis for the Jihadi groups operating against both Washington and India’s interests. As a result, there have been many Indian expressions, even
from high-ranking officials, of frustration with Washington and anger at its double standards and unwillingness to, as they see it, fully take Indian interests and desires into account.\footnote{491}

In order for a consensus among India, Pakistan, and the United States to grow, Pakistan must fully understand that, having called terrorists into being to serve its own anti-Indian policies, it now finds itself threatened by its own creation. Yet it will take years to uproot the terrorist virus and its deep-rooted causes inside Pakistan, a task that entails reversing the whole recent trajectory of Pakistani policies, moving over time towards a solution with India on outstanding issues; reversing Pakistan’s domestic political course; and moving towards democratization and economic development, rather than toward military posturing and incitement of violence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Kashmir.\footnote{492} Overcoming the myriad threats to Pakistan must take time and must involve a positive dialogue with India that may in many respects be unpleasant for India, given its heavy-handed response to the violence in Kashmir.

Practical steps are needed here urgently, given the stakes involved. Since it will not be accepted as a mediator and has therefore shunned this role, Washington ought to facilitate this dialogue and repeat its activities in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs. This kind of dialogue is essential if Pakistan is to stop being a threat to the regions it inhabits and instead become a factor for stability, an outcome that is manifestly in India’s interests, as that alone will allow it to play the broader Asian role it clearly craves. Therefore, support for such a dialogue and for its positive reinforcement by mutually satisfactory agreements over time on outstanding issues large and small is equally manifestly in Washington’s interests. The question is how to facilitate this process and enhance America’s now unique interlocutor status with the two South Asian governments without being trapped in the struggles between them.

Several recent writings by both Indian and American authors suggest practical steps that can be undertaken to facilitate this dialogue. First we must continue to realize that the intense U.S. effort to defuse Indo-Pakistani tensions since 2002 has opened up space for India and Pakistan to begin to discuss outstanding issues, including Kashmir, and for Washington to assist them in doing so.
Now both states have several commercial and security incentives to enlist Washington on their side as they have done in nuclear crises. This facilitates Washington’s ability to engage in a process of helping them to negotiate solutions to outstanding issues over time. Washington enjoys that status as a privileged interlocutor, especially as both sides have tried repeatedly to entice it to join their side or accept their view of the numerous recent crises in South Asia. This pattern of behavior whereby both sides resort to provocative actions intended to elicit an equally, if not more provocative response which can then be used to arraign the other side in Washington is all too frequent an occurrence. Indeed, an examination of the recent crises involving India and Pakistan that revealed the possibility of escalation, even to the nuclear level, indicates that strong diplomatic action by Washington was essential to prevent these crises from escaping control and becoming hot wars. As this study also indicated that both sides “had learned nothing and forgotten nothing” and were therefore predisposed to play games of chicken with each other and launch provocative crises, Washington’s role is therefore vital. Given both sides’ nuclear capabilities, such “games” as the Kargil offensive in 1999 or the use of terrorism and India’s coercive diplomacy in reply during 2001-02 can bring about precisely the crisis that nobody professes to want. Thus, in fact, although administration spokesmen claim that “in every instance, Indian and American objectives, far from being antithetical are complementary,” this assertion is not quite true. But they can become more convergent than was previously the case. Even if many Indians, as these officials profess, want Pakistan to achieve a “soft landing,” it is not clear that Pakistan does or can do so or that this will remain the policy of the Indian government if Pakistan refuses to meet its initiatives or stop supporting terrorism against it. Therefore a well-organized political strategy on the administration’s part is needed to bridge the gaps between both India and Pakistan so that they can reduce tensions between them, devise an enduring and viable mechanism by which they can continue to seek to reduce conflicts, and both work together with America in a redefined political environment where all sides can realize important and possibly even vital interests.

Second, Washington should avoid taking a position on the final outlines of an accord concerning Kashmir or other issues. Rather,
it should support activities like Track Two and regional dialogues, encourage foreign investment in both states and Kashmir, tailor its assistance to democratizing projects, and emphasize that the issue in Kashmir is primarily a human rights, or democratic, issue. This avoids getting entangled in each side’s claims, actually maximizes the interests of all concerned, and facilitates a final settlement.  

Third, the framework for a resolution must include the cessation of Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism and violation of the current cease-fire; efforts to facilitate conflict resolution and confidence-building between India and Pakistan; and free, fair, and nonviolent elections to the state assembly on India’s side of Kashmir. Likewise, as cross-border terrorism diminishes, India can begin to thin out its deployments at the border.  

Given the intensity and obduracy with which both sides now hold to their positions, Washington always will come under pressure from both sides to lean towards one or the other. While it may be true that, as former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated, “we probably have the best relations we have had with India and Pakistan now than in many, many years,” it is by no means assured that we can maintain that situation and keep both states in an alliance against Islamic terrorism without a well-conceived and active policy. Nevertheless, the return of both parties to composite negotiations (their phrase) over all the issues that divide them that was announced in January 2004 and the progress, albeit limited, since then, are very much due to American diplomacy. And this effort must be continued and reinforced. Policy toward India or Pakistan also always will have to take account of the regional dimension of this relationship and the impact of our decisions upon the third member of this “triangle.” Making the need for a more important clear-sighted, yet adroit policy is the absence of factors of a political or structural nature that could serve, absent U.S. diplomacy, as mediating forces in Indo-Pakistani crises. The absence of such forces both reinforces and stems from both sides’ tendencies to launch and escalate crises suddenly and heightens the urgency of action to contain those crises, all the while validating President Clinton’s observation that South Asia, and especially Kashmir, are the most dangerous places on earth.  

To these considerations, we must add the fact that U.S. concessions to Pakistan that are not balanced or appear not to be balanced by
due regard for Indian interests, sensitivities, and perceptions will cause bitterness in New Delhi, as noted above. So, as long as Indian policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not accept that their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed, from our standpoint, taking India’s interests into account and not taking it for granted is what this partnership must be about on a day-to-day basis. Thus Washington must not relax the pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting terrorism, either in Kashmir or in Afghanistan; to stop proliferating to other countries, either through governmental or quasi-private channels; and to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons and materials. In return, Washington should do its utmost to ensure that the negotiations now beginning over Kashmir and other issues with India move forward.

While ensuring that neither country is blindsided by our moves toward the other is essential, constructing mechanisms where both countries and the United States can interact together regularly on issues of common concern would also be desirable. Such working groups or Track Two programs can provide much useful basis for stimulating a mutually beneficial dialogue and for floating new initiatives that could ameliorate tensions. For example, there is an urgent need for large-scale infrastructural and environmental projects in Central Asia, in energy and water conservation to be sure, but not only there. These projects, which should also include Afghanistan, would benefit all sides, and certainly Indian and Pakistani business interests would benefit greatly from them. Joint military training for local armed forces also could become a possibility if all three states and the host governments could agree. A U.S. proposal to guarantee the safety of projects like oil and gas pipelines would also be beneficial. It would build confidence and shared interests, reduce Iran’s ability to make trouble in Central Asia, provide those states with needed outlets to the Indian Ocean, and reduce their dependence upon Russia’s infrastructure. Track Two dialogues or working groups could formulate such proposals while ensuring that the trilateral dialogue goes forward.

This sensitivity needs to be established as well for the bilateral defense relationship and security cooperation with India. Policy adjustments within a relatively stable framework are the stuff of politics, and this is especially to be expected at a time when
governments change or could change, as is the situation in this bilateral relationship. Both the Indian and American governments will be adjusting their relations to each other based on the balance of factors in the relationship so it is obvious that there will be changes from the Vajpayee to the Manmohan Singh governments. Nevertheless, the new government has made clear that it wants to continue the strategic partnership with Washington. That is clear from the recent DPG meetings and the result of Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh’s visit to Washington in June 2004. Indeed, that was his first foreign visit, symbolizing the priority he and the government attach to the American connection. Certainly the Bush administration appreciates this, for key officials like Secretary Powell have expressed their confidence that this relationship will continue largely along previous lines.

We can see how this newly modulated relationship is taking shape from the new government’s initial moves and statements and Washington’s corresponding actions. Even though the new Indian government has stated that it will (not surprisingly) pursue an independent policy in favor of multipolarity in world politics and against unilateralism, Natwar Singh also stated that relations with Washington are of “exceptional importance” and should not be “episodic.” Indeed, India aims to strengthen and deepen those ties. As did the previous regime, the new government will seek to deepen relations with China. But it is unlikely that it will spurn Japan’s recent public offer to establish a “global partnership” with India to balance China’s rising power. Indeed, it is already discussing collaboration on terrorism and defense cooperation with Japan, evidently in the Indian Ocean’s sea lines of communication. Similarly, even though the regime claims to greatly value its relations with the Islamic world and is well aware that some 4 million Indians live in the Middle East and are thus hostage to developments there, it will, we are told, probably not go further than to condemn certain Israeli actions rhetorically, e.g., its operations in Gaza in May-June, 2004. So while there will be a new thrust toward perhaps greater balance between Israel and the Palestinians and reiteration of support for a Palestinian state (hardly a novel approach since both Washington and Jerusalem publicly support such an eventual outcome), the new government “is
unlikely to do anything that may jeopardize Delhi’s second-largest arms supplier.” Instead, as a former diplomat claims,

The India-Israel relationship has acquired substantive content in the past which serves the mutual need of both countries. . . . India will carefully balance its national interest with other considerations before making any policy changes which I don’t think will happen.

Plans for intensifying infrastructural linkages connecting India to Central Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Iran also are going forward in line with earlier plans.

Military modernization remains the watchword of the government, and this will clearly lead it to continue seeking the most effective ways to upgrade India’s defense industries and defense capabilities. Therefore, the government is apparently going to continue mainly along previous lines of foreign acquisitions. The package announced in late 2004 and discussed above is further evidence of movement towards regularizing arms sales to India. Evidently the BJP government’s support for missile defense in 2002 also helped persuade the administration to support the sale of the Phalcon to India. And while Washington is ready to increase military ties, including combined military exercises, the domestic cost of formally supporting the missile defense program might prove to be too much of a burden for the Indian government to bear, even though it has said it will debate it fairly. Given the Indian government’s clear desire to develop this partnership, such tactics might not be the most productive way to achieve our broad strategic goals, since they immediately thrust controversial issues that not even all of our allies accept into the foreground of the agenda.

At the same time, perhaps the most significant statement of India’s defense plans is the release of the semi-classified Indian Maritime Doctrine. This doctrine offers real possibilities for enhancing cooperation with the U.S. Navy against terrorists; forging broader ties based on sales of naval technologies, weapons, and platforms; and restraining the growth of Chinese power in the Indian Ocean, three shared and key strategic goals. The Indian Navy will implement minimum nuclear deterrence by achieving a real SLBM, probably from Russia, generate a littoral warfare capability that entails power
projection ashore, and seek to dominate the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The latter objective in particular almost inevitably entails closer cooperation with the United States, and especially the U.S. Navy, because India and the Pentagon are clearly animated by a genuine alarm about the growing capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).\textsuperscript{512}

Through force enhancements and acquisitions like the P-3C Orions and surface vessels bought from Russia, France, etc., the Indian Navy (IN) will extend its capabilities and reach, enabling it to undertake new and more distant missions. It will aim to counter distant and emerging threats; protect Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC); combat piracy; and, most importantly, dominate the IOR “choke points, important islands, and vital trade routes.”\textsuperscript{513} Thus later in 2004, the IN will start policing the IOR together with the Singaporean, Thai, and Philippine Navies to check piracy, weapons smuggling, drug running, and all potential threats to commercial sea traffic. According to Commander Uday Bashkar, these actions signify India’s reliability and credibility as an ally to ASEAN members and to China. To add to its profile, the IN has also stepped up maneuvers with the U.S., Russian, French, ASEAN members, Iranian, UAE, and Kuwaiti navies.\textsuperscript{514} So enhanced naval cooperation with America, either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis with Southeast Asian states and foreign governments’ naval forces, is a real possibility that is likely to continue if not increase.

Even in Iraq, there is an attempt to build bridges despite the strong public and parliamentary opposition to the war there. When the UN passed Resolution 1546 in June 2004, setting the parameters under UN auspices for the transition to a new government until elections by January 2005, Natwar Singh indicated that the government would have to look carefully at the “changed situation.”\textsuperscript{515} However, this triggered an explosion at home and indicates the limits that still exist to this relationship. Although Washington has launched a major lobbying campaign to get the new government to support its position in Iraq and the presence of Iraqi troops under the terms of Resolution 1546 and then up to 20,000 troops there, the government’s coalition partners, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Left Front, have made it clear that any such approval of Washington’s policies
in Iraq, not to mention dispatch of troops, will lead them to call out protest marches and demonstrations. Thus the government has had to temporize and tell Washington that it cannot yet send troops to Iraq, lest the domestic scene unravel.\textsuperscript{516}
CHAPTER 13

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

This episode, like earlier struggles over Iraq, suggests the obstacles to deeper partnership and the problems that must be overcome for it to flourish. As long as the government depends on a coalition comprising the substantial anti-American left-wing parliamentary parties in India, it will be constrained in its approach to America and Washington’s agenda. Nevertheless, it is clearly following in its predecessor’s footsteps as regards the United States and even to a significant degree, Israel. Still, attempts by Washington to pressure the government to submit to U.S. policies that are beyond the coalition’s or the government’s capability to sustain will unduly burden the relationship and could ultimately drag it down. India’s domestic politics compel us to tread warily and emphasize those areas of the bilateral agenda where joint cooperation can take place smoothly and quickly so that we can then build capital to do the harder issues together.

Domestic politics will influence Indian policies of interest to us in several directions. Foreign and defense policy may have to take more account of coalition partners and necessarily will become more consultative and less subject to the governmental ministries’ and the Prime Minister’s exclusive discretion. This could also entail a probable weakening of the National Security Advisor’s and the National Security Council’s power. There will be more of the moralism that is bred in the bone of the Congress Party and possibly more rhetoric about multipolarity. But it will also be coupled with Realpolitik when concrete needs are at stake, a combination that tends to alienate many Americans if not handled carefully. On the other hand, there probably will be continuing pressure from India to induce us to compel Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism and negotiate in good faith with New Delhi. So, with proper care, the relationship can still go forward. Ashwani Kumar, a Congress Party member of the upper house of the Parliament, displayed this blend
of moralism and Realpolitik when he told an American audience in 2003 that,

The inescapable logic of the situation supports a purposive engagement between India and the U.S., consistent with a theory of power that allows for differences in perspective on some issues. We need to deal candidly with differences about both means and ends. There is no escape from a brooding moral dimension to a philosophy of power tailored to foster international conciliation and peace. Indeed, “without a moral yardstick constantly applied to action, the possession of power, large or tiny, is always subject to misuse.” Iraq has shown that present ills triumph over philosophy. We need to accept that there cannot be a selective war against terror and that the processes of armed engagement are as important as the ideals that it is intended to support.\textsuperscript{518}

But candid discussion is not enough, given the constraints that exist on policymaking now in both capitals; we also need to do more than just not being disagreeable about differences, while speaking candidly. We must also constantly and simultaneously stress commonalities. We must also avoid needless or thoughtless mistakes that compound an already difficult strategic position and overcome the obstacles cited above. As we have suggested, DoD apparently is gradually wresting control of the issue of arms sales away from the State Department, which still seems intent on denying India formal recognition or acknowledgment as a nuclear power. The administration still has not recognized India as such, possibly fearing that other potential proliferators might be further emboldened to carry out a nuclear weapons program and thereby obtain the benefits that would accrue to India from being recognized as a nuclear power. On the other hand, good policy is rarely one that is maintained in the face of overwhelming and contradictory facts. Regardless of the potential deterrent to other proliferators, there does seem to be something of tilting at windmills in maintaining this stance rather than at making policy on the basis of existing realities. Defending an untenable position regarding India and Pakistan in order allegedly to deter proliferation makes little sense.\textsuperscript{519} It seems unlikely that we can achieve our nonproliferation goals by denying plain facts that State Department officials clearly acknowledge, especially as virtually every bilateral statement raises the point
that both states oppose nuclear proliferation and that this common orientation is a factor making for a strategic partnership.520

While going to the extreme of maintaining for New Delhi essentially an open account at the Pentagon is not desirable, a more reasonable procedure for screening and evaluating its requests for weapons systems and technologies also needs to be in place. This is particularly the case now that Pakistan has been declared a non-NATO ally, placing it symbolically on a par with Israel and South Korea, and giving it opportunities to receive weapons like the F-16. This procedure for handling Indian arms sales requests also must be integrated not only with the commitment to global nonproliferation, but also to the regional context within which we and New Delhi seek to operate either jointly or in parallel. This consideration is one more reason why it is eminently desirable that Washington, New Delhi, and Islamabad forge a clearer and more permanent working relationship among themselves. It also suggests a more active dialogue with India concerning Iran.

Finally, a solid partnership with India helps stabilize Asia beyond the subcontinent and enlarges the balance within which a rising China will soon appear. Reports indicate that what one journalist calls “the outsourcing of global security, with India once again getting the job” is accelerating under the Bush administration’s leadership. Even though India is determined to retain its strategic autonomy and not be excessively dependent on anyone for major political or defense goods, there is a clear convergence of aims with the United States on many issues affecting Asian security. K. Santhanam, Director of the prestigious Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), cites security of the oil lanes, the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, and relations with China as areas where a “natural convergence” of interests is occurring.521 Other analysts go farther in their assessments of what this relationship now means and could mean in the future. For example, C. Raja Mohan writes that,

For skeptics, the suggestion of an area of peace in Asia remains wishful thinking. It is in fact rooted in the fact that the much feared cold war between the United States and China has now been postponed, probably indefinitely. It is built on the real potential to deepen the economic integration of Asia. It is founded on the recognition that all the major
powers in the region face threats—not from the unrealized geopolitical ambitions of the other but from religious extremism and terrorism flourishing from many failed and failing states in Asia. The importance of the changing nature of great power relations in Asia is not abstract. It offers India a rare opportunity to transform the international relations of the subcontinent. . . . As the weakest of the great powers, India has no reason to choose options of aligning with one great power against another. India must instead focus on intensifying its current multidirectional engagement of all the major powers in the region and become an indispensable element of the Asian balance of power. A creative Indian policy must aim at leveraging the rise of China and Japan and the Sino-U.S. entente to transform its own security situation in the subcontinent. India is now in a position to mobilize American, Chinese, and Japanese power to engineer internal change in Pakistan and nudge it in a direction of political moderation and regional economic integration.522

It is clear that, while he eschews an alliance with Washington, he is recommending a strategic partnership to induce Pakistan to move toward democracy and away from support for terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Tellis similarly observes that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence of Indo-American aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of labor between them concerning the regional priorities each one will face in Asia. Thus, India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue of its economic and military superiority that translates into geopolitical primacy there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the smaller states of the region, and influence outcomes to some degree in more outlying but still relatively near areas like Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, it will have something like a veto power over South Asian developments. At the same time, in those Asian areas of critical significance to vital U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources, including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain a peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its influence, even if it is limited. And that influence can add to the advancement of U.S. and shared interests if relations with New Delhi are managed adroitly. These areas and issues include: the security of the Persian Gulf, freedom of navigation in Southeast Asian waters, protection of Taiwan, and the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri war on terrorism.523 In these areas, he writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities
and resources between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark as to render Indian preferences entirely irrelevant. Yet,

In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically magnified if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S. operational burdens, provide the United States with those benefits arising from more robust international solidarity and, in the process, actually enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.

Thus cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to both states’ benefit. Certainly, we are seeing precisely this kind of outcome in India’s significant assistance to the United States in the global war on terrorism.

Finally, as Tellis even more tellingly observed above, Indian power can be most relevant to U.S. policies in the so-called interstices of Asian geopolitics where India’s capabilities are strongest and ours are most limited, e.g., in Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment. As he did above, Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the relationship will not only benefit India but also the United States. This Indo-American interaction will take place and be felt most directly where Washington has few vital interests. That should minimize possible frictions between Washington and New Delhi. Second, as regards both Asian and global geopolitics, Indo-American interests are convergent. Third, on many issues of great importance to the United States—the balance of power in Asia, the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the rise of religious and secular extremism—Indian interests invariably dovetail with those of the United States and as a result are likely to evoke active Indian support.

At present, some scholars question if there really are deep-going and fully shared interests leading to common actions regarding the policies of India and America in South Asia. Specifically, it is by no means certain to all observers that both these governments have fully congruent or at least parallel interests and perceptions regarding Indo-Pakistani relations and the local dimensions of the war on terrorism that would allow them to make the most of their
relationship with each other. As one assessment of the bilateral relationship observes,

But unrestrained giddiness about “paradigm shifts” or a strategic rapprochement between India and the United States is premature. To the contrary, substantive differences over the nature and goals of Indo-American partnership are likely to complicate future relations between the world’s two largest democracies. A short list of issues where Washington and New Delhi will find it difficult to collaborate would include, Pakistan, China, Iran, Iraq, the World Trade Organization, and the future of the global nonproliferation regime. India will continue to prefer a multipolar world order, whereas the Bush administration, even more than Clinton’s, is likely to assert U.S. dominance and insist on Washington’s right to act unilaterally.528

We have already seen this gap between Indo-American perceptions happening with regard to Iraq and India’s excellent ties to Iran and its stance on global trade further confirms that there are real differences with Washington on certain important issues in world politics. However, it is by no means correct that previous differences of opinion must be decisive or cannot yield to new perceptions and policies. The current case of China is an example. Even if we assume China to be a strategic competitor for both India and Washington and a major architect of a strategy to tie India down to being a contested power in South Asia without a more continental focus in Asia, e.g., by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means foreordained that containment is or will be the necessary response of both capitals to China.529 Even as other Asian states, e.g., Japan, approach India with calls for partnership that are clearly intended to counter China, India, as we saw above, opposes any idea of a policy based on containment of China.”530

This point of view coincides with Tellis’ assessment of India’s elite consensus on China cited above, that India’s sense of possible threat due to China’s rising power did not mandate a direct confrontation with China, but rather merely a steady buildup of its own multidimensional capabilities and resources for regional competition, which suffices to check China’s ambitions and make India more worthy of being seen as a genuinely equal strategic partner of America in Asia.531 Direct confrontation with China is
thus ruled out in favor of economic-political cooperation and muted strategic rivalry whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance as long as both partners understand and accept that the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and military growth suffices to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady and impressive rising power potential demonstrates the power of the democratic option in Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese authoritarianism, which many fear will inevitably run into a major domestic crisis.\(^{532}\) In that case, an Indo-American partnership will be strengthened by the fact of being “an axis of democracy,” not a purely military alliance whose purpose is containment of China.\(^ {533}\) And this is true even if India is in favor or not averse to further U.S. deployments in the region, or some sort of alliance along the lines of the so-called Asian NATO comes into being.\(^ {534}\) As that alliance has yet to take shape, it could become like today’s NATO, a crisis manager, and provider of stability, rather than the Cold War alliance.

Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states, making it the focus of each side’s effort to gain greater leverage and traction in Asia.\(^ {535}\) Consequently, enhanced bilateral military partnership and arms sales to India offer Washington another card to play when needed and provide both states with an ever-present factor of restraint that acts upon Chinese policy. As long as that Indian buildup suffices to check or to constrain Chinese strategic options, helping it constitutes a sound investment for the United States. In this respect, the overall picture bears out Tellis’ argument that, as long as India’s buildup of economic and military power takes place at a moderate but visible and sustainable rate, it will suffice to restrain Chinese ambitions and serve both Washington and New Delhi’s interests. At the same time, a discernible rise in both Indian and American economic and defense presence, as well as capability, in and around Southeast Asia will also help establish a continuing balance there and prevent China from deploying its
rising economic and military power and becoming too great a threat to the region’s independence. Undoubtedly Chinese analysts and officiandom recognize this possibility and signs of its appearance in Southeast Asia. In other words, to the extent that Indian power contributes to an overall Asian framework backed up and promoted by Washington that restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will contribute to a broader, more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that keeps all powers in play and prevents any one power from making a bid for regional or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts are confident of such an outcome. It should be noted that precisely such a balance of power is postulated in the U.S. NSS of 2002 as being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia. So this concept of Indo-Chinese relations is in close harmony with American goals as well. Moreover, at least some Indian analysts believe that U.S. forces in and around Central Asia will not soon be withdrawn, and that Washington will continue to play the leading role in trying to moderate India’s troubled relations with Pakistan. Therefore, these two policies will constrain Chinese options in the area and stabilize the regional and overall Asian balance by doing so. Certainly Chinese observers have assimilated fully the notion, reiterated by the Pentagon and the Indian government, that India and America “have common strategic interests in Asia and even farther regions.”

Despite the growing amity of bilateral relations with India and the rhetoric of a complete identity of interests, that is not yet the case. While we already have made suggestions as to ways to forge this strategic consensus, it is no less important to “encase” those proposals within a viable strategic framework. Apart from bureaucratic obstructions either in Washington or in New Delhi, it is clear that for an alliance to flourish it has to go beyond shared enemies and the rhetoric of common values. In other words, if there truly are shared interests, they must be made real and activating principles of common policies and actions and embedded in viable mechanisms for undertaking those actions and shared values that animate them.

The basis for the continuing vitalization of this partnership would be to move together toward the creation of a democratic security community, e.g., as suggested by Henry Nau. Indeed, using this
aspiration and foundation to continue the building of partnership with India flows naturally from the administration’s most basic foreign policy precepts. As President Bush recently stated, “The work of building democracies in nations that have endured decades of tyranny is hard. It’s hard work. It will require the kind of sustained commitment that won the Cold War. We accept that duty. We accept that duty in our time because our cause is right.”541 The 2002 NSS and President Bush’s second inaugural speech also make clear that this is the foundation principle for the administration’s overall national security policy.542 Furthermore, strengthening of our alliances and security communities with like-minded democratic states in both Europe and Asia, even when they disagree with us, invigorates our overall mutual ties. Thus India has been perturbed by the disunity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance over Iraq, even if it has not publicly voiced its apprehensions on this point.543

As Nau describes this security community, its attributes and advantages are as follows. First of all,

The administration needs a new conceptual framework to integrate the various elements of its Asian policy. Traditional frameworks pose policies as alternatives—for example, containment or engagement. The framework of a democratic security community integrates alternatives. Unlike traditional concepts, a democratic security community operates on the basis of common democratic values, not just common foreign policy interests (alliances) or common international institutions (collective security arrangements). The community distinguishes clearly between America’s democratic allies in Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India (and indirectly Taiwan), and its more conventional, perhaps temporary, allies or collective security partners in the war against terror, such as China and Russia.544

Thus, second, our existing anchors to Japan, South Korea, and Australia remain in place for our overall Asian policy, along with the ability to avoid the drift of policy either toward a premature collective security arrangement with China or to classic balance of power politics. While constructing a framework that can restrain Chinese power, we at the same time, hopefully along with India, act to channel that rising power’s growth in constructive directions. This is because a security community, unlike an alliance, does not
need an external adversary upon whom to focus. Consequently, both Washington and New Delhi can then conduct extensive economic and political relationships with difficult states like China and Pakistan, and even engage in genuine strategic cooperation with them when necessary, yet also pressure them to move in directions that are more congenial to the members of the security community’s interests.\textsuperscript{545} Yet even if any of the members of this community conducts its own policy that diverges from that of another or all the other members, that need not create a rupture or even a crisis within the community. Meanwhile, the possibility of closer bonds, e.g., an alliance, remains intact and vital, given the preexisting foundation of shared values, not just interests.\textsuperscript{546} In this way, Washington can also place pressure upon Pakistan, either overtly or discreetly as the case may be, to move away from support for terrorism. The option of joining this security community, as happened in Europe, then becomes too positive a benefit to be traded away lightly. As Washington is already placing such pressure upon Pakistan, this approach would then become even more compelling and might create sufficient political space over time for, first, a diminution of the crisis atmosphere in and around Kashmir and the borders with India and, second, for a gradual resumption of the dialogue between India and Pakistan that might then flower into a productive process.

As former Ambassador to Sri Lanka Teresita C. Schaffer writes,

To avoid repeating history, U.S. policymakers must depersonalize policy toward Pakistan and establish two fundamental bases for engagement: a long-term democracy agenda designed to strengthen and legitimize Pakistan’s institutions; and a sustained and realistic approach to working with both Pakistan and India to deal with and ideally resolve their enduring, dangerous dispute.\textsuperscript{547}

Nau’s approach also creates a means by which the bureaucratic rivalry in Washington over how to deal with India might be overcome. The emphasis on a democratic security community changes the framework by which we address issues of proliferation and conflict resolution in South Asia. First of all, it places the center of gravity of U.S. policy in South Asia, and even Central Asia, precisely where it ought to be, namely, the promotion of pluralistic and more
developed societies, not because we like them but because states that move successfully in this direction over time find themselves less encumbered by threats to their internal security that drive both state failure or belligerent foreign policies. Pakistan is a case in point, but it is an axiom of security in the Third World that the perception of the state’s being in danger primarily from internal causes is a major driver of foreign and defense policies. Second, Nau’s formula creates a policy environment that offers numerous positive inducements for states to liberalize, if not democratize, because such policies ease their external (as well as domestic) security challenges. This is precisely why a new emphasis on socio-economic dimensions of our overall South Asian policy should be considered strongly by the administration and Congress.

Nau’s formulation also thereby places pressure upon Pakistan to cease and desist from its previous proliferation to North Korea and Iran by threatening it with meaningful isolation if it continues to undermine this Asian security community. Likewise, it also allows us to approach India in terms that are different from the ongoing bureaucratic debate. We need to accept that India will not renounce nuclear weapons to suit our moralistic tendencies in foreign policy. But we can craft an approach to India that subsumes all discussion of military assistance in any field under an approach that is based upon what we share rather than what divides us. At the same time, Nau’s approach also moderates fears that Indo-American partnership or alliance will be explicitly or implicitly nothing more than a containment scheme directed against China. While these two states and others might unite to counter excessive or negative aggrandizement of Chinese power, they also will be creating both negative and positive incentives for China to act in concert with their purposes based on concrete shared interests that can then bring about a change in values over time in Chinese thinking. Chinese power, though growing, will then be growing in directions that are nonthreatening to the partners and other Asian states.

In the context of Nau’s proposed formula, we can also recommend specific policies that would strengthen the bonds of partnership with India, while avoiding the trap of overcommitment and of a too hastily formed alliance, which would then rest on an incomplete and
therefore wobbly foundation. As suggested in a 2003 report by the Council on Foreign Relations but also in some cases going beyond it, a sound approach to strengthening ties with New Delhi would require the following specific policies in the defense and foreign policy sector (I omit the specifically economic aspects here that do not relate to those issues, but they are all worthy of consideration):

- Continuing strong and public support at the highest levels of government of enhanced bilateral cooperation to emphasize to bureaucracies and publics in both countries the need for effective and unified policymaking by those bureaucracies;
- Maintenance and, as possible, enhancement of official cooperation and dialogue on political, security, and intelligence areas;
- Reinstitution of an official dialogue on bilateral and international economic policy issues; and,
- Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement to spur expanded economic ties and thus provide a solid floor beneath which the security relationship can never fall.

On its own, the United States should also undertake the following actions:

- Ease restrictions on cooperation in the civilian satellite sector; and,
- Treat India as a “friendly” country with regard to the granting of export licenses of defense equipment and dual-use technologies.

Adopting these two measures as policy has just become more likely as both sides have agreed to formalize a framework of action that would enable India to obtain dual-use technologies from the United States. This agreement would allow India to receive civilian nuclear, space, and other technologies. This process could also allow HAL to form agreements with other major defense producers as it has long wanted to do. India now will also obtain greater access to Western and American firms that can provide it with the technologies for information warfare and C³I systems that it desires. Likewise,
real possibilities for bilateral cooperation in space also can now be envisaged. Most of all, this decision goes a considerable distance in demonstrating to India the seriousness with which the United States now approaches its ties to New Delhi.\textsuperscript{551} Other policy steps would also be of major importance in cementing this relationship and making it both a productive and enduring one. Again, in following the CFR’s suggestions but also expanding on them, this study recommends that the U.S. Government study ways to fit India and Pakistan into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime without upsetting it and to make maximum effort to prevent either or both of them from any further proliferation of WMD technologies or systems. This would require both India and Pakistan to adopt and enforce more effective export control regulations and laws.\textsuperscript{552}

These policy recommendations are essential because it is vital to the success of building a partnership, if not a more intimate relationship, that both sides treat each other’s interests seriously. As a retired Indian general told MacDonald,

\begin{quote}
Indians understand that the United States has sustained interests in the regions that are part of India’s extended security horizon and that it will act to protect them. But as an equal partner, we expect increased consultation about U.S. objectives and intentions in these areas. Without consultation, we cannot identify areas of convergence and work jointly with the United States to maintain peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{553}
\end{quote}

In other words, absent a robust, frank, intimate, and enduring dialogue among equals, no genuine and lasting partnership is possible. This would not only hurt India; it would hurt America as well, and make the achievement of many of our vital interests much more difficult. This emerges clearly from MacDonald’s interviews with American military personnel.

Generals have observed to her that “Access to India would enable the U.S. military “to be able to touch the rest of the world” and to respond rapidly to regional crises.” Likewise, the Air Force would gain by access to India because that would bring it closer to the entire area of instability from the Gulf to Southeast Asia including Central Asia. Moreover, India’s well-developed infrastructure could assist U.S. power projection forces in many ways.\textsuperscript{554} A strong and
viable partnership with India would constitute recognition of the security situation throughout Asia that is increasingly a seamless web that embraces all the areas where India is displaying keen, if not vital, interests and where the United States as well is now militarily engaged. This notion of increased security interdependence among all the different regions of Asia, including the Gulf and Central, South, and Southeast Asia, is now becoming as well a commonplace of international—not just American—scholarship and analysis. Therefore effective policy in support of vital U.S. interests must acknowledge the transformations taking place on the ground and respond accordingly.

That response appropriately entails significant bureaucratic and institutional restructuring in order to conduct our overall security policies in Asia more effectively and, in particular, strengthen the relationship with India. Indeed, MacDonald’s report found that, “both the U.S. and Indian systems are poorly organized to build a robust military relationship that maximizes the strategic benefits for both sides.” In order to overcome both the negative perceptions on both sides that cloud effective partnership and the resulting suboptimal policy outcomes, she and this author find substantial reasons for reshaping the institutional framework within which U.S. policy is conducted. Reorganization or bureaucratic restructuring serves many purposes besides aiming to effectuate a more unified and coherent policy process in regard to India throughout the U.S. Government. The positive benefits of an intelligent and successful reorganization go beyond merely eliminating contradictions among departments and agencies or bureaucratic bottlenecks. Effective reorganization that creates this unified approach enhances mutual predictability for both governments and thus enhances mutual confidence and trust. Second, changing the bureaucratic mechanisms through which policy is implemented also changes behavior of those entrusted with its implementation, and thus their perceptions as well. All these changes, if accomplished, will produce better policymaking and implementation and improve the overall quality of the relationship thanks to the increase in mutual confidence and predictability. The same conclusion would hold true as well for successful institutional reorganization on the Indian side.
But beyond these positive outcomes, such reorganization also would go far to overcoming the main obstacles to an enhanced and enduring strategic partnership. We have identified four major obstacles that either impede or have impeded the realization of this partnership. They are the issue of technology transfer, the gap between the State Department and DoD approaches to India, an incomplete convergence of strategic interests within a larger context of general convergence of interests, and last, the fact that India’s anomalous position between USPACOM, which includes India in its AOR, and USCENTCOM, where it is absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are in that command’s AOR, causes it to be lost between two powerful unified commands.”

In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic space that are now clear to analysts and officials (and not only in the United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustified, and counterproductive complacency about existing structural relationships are. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca as well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.

Therefore, the most effective way to sustain what has already been achieved in the bilateral relationship is for the President to order a review of the way in which our national security structures (and not just the State and Defense Departments and NSC, but also their respective subcomponents) are organized to deal with India and Asia generally. This review should aim to overcome the tensions between the Pentagon and State Department that are universally recognized as an impediment to improved ties as well as the inability to see India and its interests as a whole that plagues the components of both our military commands in Asia and the Departments of State, the Pentagon, and the NSC. Given the gravity of the consequences
of this reorganization for all our Asian relationships, this high-
level review should be comprehensive and carefully organized. But
the need for this review is obvious. In order for the United States
to take most effective advantage of the transformation of Asia as a
strategic entity or entities where India plays a large and growing
part, it must reorganize the way it does business with India and Asia
in general. As the world and its strategic realities change, so must
our institutions adapt and change lest they become ineffectual and
obstacles to the realization of our strategic interests. The issue here is
not any one particular reorganization scheme for all those institutions
within and among the U.S. Government’s departments. We are not
advocating any particular line of approach here, and it would be
presumptuous to do so in view of the immense task of such a review.
Rather, we are calling for a fuller understanding of and response to
the strategic transformation that is engulfing Asia, India, and our
relations with Asia and India in particular. Once that realization
of the growing strategic importance of India and Asia materializes
and is fully internalized across the national security sector of the
government, the opportunities for cooperation and for an ongoing,
frank, yet respectful, and intimate discussion of strategic issues with
India truly can get off the ground. Absent such a strategic review
and reorganization in both countries, the relationship between
Washington and New Delhi will resemble a spavined horse: it walks,
but it cannot run, and it cannot even walk as quickly as possible.

In order to underscore the breadth of India’s role in the
emerging new Asian strategic order, this monograph has looked
comprehensively at India’s policies and interests across the breadth
of Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca, and at the
points of contact with the United States in the war on terrorism,
missile defense, and technology transfer (both civil and military). By
doing so, this monograph has aimed to alter perceptions by giving a
deeper sense of the scope of India’s role in Asian and world affairs
and of its genuine and emerging importance to the United States.
The changed realities to which India both responds and contributes
must also evoke in both New Delhi and Washington a series of
ongoing institutional responses to those new realities, so that both
sides can most effectively cooperate with each other. A recent UN
report on the war on terrorism shows that few states are cooperating
to the fullest degree possible in this war, a finding that helps explain
why it could well be more protracted and difficult a war than was
even imagined earlier when everyone knew it would be a long and
arduous struggle.\textsuperscript{559} The Indo-American relationship for a long time
has been plagued by mutual suspicions and misperceptions that
have impeded collaboration between the two largest democracies
in the world, a cooperation that could be decisive in the war on
terrorism and in helping large parts of Asia to achieve more security,
prosperity, and democracy.

The intensity of the threat of terrorism faced by both India and
the United States underscores the stakes involved in this war and
in mastering the general strategic transformations of our time.
Continuation of that history of failed relationships when genuine
partnership is within our grasp and requires the sustained attention
of both the topmost ranks of government in both countries and of
their respective national security bureaucracies to achieve it, would,
given those stakes, be worse than a crime. Indeed, it would be a
profound mistake at the highest level of grand strategy.


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48. Conversations, USPACOM.


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62. Talbott.


64. Ibid.; *South Asia Monitor*, NO. 34, June 1, 2001.


66. Ibid.

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70. Ibid.

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72. Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India.”

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81. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”
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83. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
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94. Ibid.
96. Ibid.


102. Conversations, USPACOM.


104. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Quentin Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,” *Financial Times*, November 11, 2004, p. 15.

105 Ibid.

106. Peel, p. 15


117. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,” p. 15.


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120. Ibid.


123. Conversations, USPACOM.


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128. Ibid.


131. Ibid., p. 250.


137. Ibid.

138. Ibid., pp. 130-131.

139. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” p. 10.


143. Calabrese, pp. 60-82; Smita Gupta, “Threats of Terrorism Bring India, Iran Closer,” The Times of India, April 15, 2001; Pattanayak.

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147. Ibid.; Rethinaraj, pp. 38-40; Calabrese, pp. 60-82.

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189. *Ibid*.


191. *Ibid*.


198. Ibid.


200. Ibid.


202. This is based on conversations with S. Frederick Starr, Director of the Central Asia Caucasus, Institute of Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; Starr.


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212. Ibid.

213. Ibid.


216. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: pp. 204-210, 224-236.


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226. Koh, p. 43.


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244. Ibid.


250. Frazier, p. 316.


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258. NSS.


269. Sahgal, “India: The World’s Parade Ground”; “India’s ASEAN Strategy.”

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272. MacDonald, p. 10; Nair, “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective,” Jasjit Singh, “Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: An Indian Perspective,” p. 57.

273. MacDonald, pp. 41, 51.

274. Ibid.


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277. Ibid., p. 41.

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321. Storey, p. 42.


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353. Ibid.


360. Ibid.


362. Ratnam and Raghuvanshi, pp. 1, 8.


368. MacDonald, pp. 94-95.


372. MacDonald, pp. 93-104.

373. Ibid.

374. Ibid.

375. Conversations, USPACOM.


377. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.


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383. Ibid.


386. Ibid.

387. Ibid.

388. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.


394. Ibid.


400. Ibid.


406. Ibid.

407. Ibid.


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417. Ibid.


420. Kapisthalam, p. 29.


427. Sibal.


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453. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, p. 22.

454. Ibid., pp. 26-29.

455. Ibid.


460. Ibid.

461. MacDonald, p. 59.


463. Sibal.


467. MacDonald, pp. 119-132.

468. Ibid.

469. Ibid.


471. MacDonald.

472. Ibid.


475. NSS; QDR.


485. Ibid.


488. Malhotra, “India After JN Dixit.”


495. Ibid.


500. Ibid.


503. Such conferences of academics and experts discussing issues of mutual concern in an unofficial capacity in a series of non-binding and unofficial fora has been very productive in stimulating international dialogue on East Asian security issues. And while they have not worked so well on the Middle East, that is not due to any inherent defect in the concept as such. Moreover, such conferences, albeit not under any formal track two auspices, already are taking place here and abroad.


508. Roche.


514. Ibid.


516. Srivastava, “India’s Top Guns Head for the US”; Shahin, “India and the Interim Mess in Iraq.”

517. That is because our own muscular combination of Realpolitik and moralism can be and often is no less irksome to other governments.


520. Ibid.

521. Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally.”


524. Ibid.

525. Ibid., p. 263.

526. Ibid.

527. Ibid.


529. Ibid., pp. 21-25.


538. NSS.


545. Ibid., pp. 138-150.

546. Ibid.


549. Cohen, pp. 53-74; Sobhan, pp. 55-83.

550. This, of course, is a peaceful method (though with force not invisible) of achieving the favorable balance of power that the NSS and the QDR both discuss.


553. MacDonald, p. xxvii.


556. MacDonald, pp. 119-120.

557. Ibid.

558. Ibid.

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