HISTORY OF
PRISONER OF WAR
UTILIZATION
by the
UNITED STATES ARMY
1776-1945

By
GEORGE G. LEWIS
Lieutenant Colonel, MPC, United States Army
and
JOHN MEWHA
Captain, Armor, United States Army

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUNE 1955
This study is primarily a treatment of the use of prisoner of war labor by the United States Army. It also provides a comprehensive treatment of the employment of prisoners of war by private employers in the United States. The primary objective of this monograph is to provide in one volume a comprehensive record of the use of prisoner of war labor for the guidance of General Staff officers and students in the Army school system. It is hoped that this study will assist the industrial and military mobilization planners of the future to provide for the use of prisoner of war labor. The material will also aid those interested in military affairs to understand some of the basic problems connected with the employment of prisoners of war.
DA Pamphlet 20–213 is published for the information and use of all concerned.

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FOREWORD

The Office of the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army is currently preparing a series of special studies dealing with recurrent problems that will always be of interest to the Army. The studies already completed include The History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, and The History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army. These studies were undertaken to implement the Army's policy of exploiting all historical data that may be of practical value.

This study is primarily a treatment of the use of prisoner of war labor by the United States Army. It also provides a comprehensive treatment of the employment of prisoners of war by private employers in the United States. The primary objective of this monograph is to provide in one volume a comprehensive record of the use of prisoner of war labor for the guidance of General Staff officers and students in the Army school system. It is hoped that this study will assist the industrial and military mobilization planners of the future to provide for the use of prisoner of war labor. The material will also aid those interested in military affairs to understand some of the basic problems connected with the employment of prisoners of war.

Since this document includes only problems through World War II, it is merely background for the events which have followed that conflict. An additional monograph concerned with the employment and treatment of prisoners of war during the recent Korean action is being prepared overseas.
PREFACE

Man power has been at a premium in nearly every major war in which the United States has participated. In the event of a future conflict against a foe who may be numerically superior, every available source of manpower may have to be used. This will include captured enemy personnel. The successful prosecution of the war may depend upon the utilization of these prisoners of war.

Up to this time no record of the use of prisoners of war in past wars of the United States has been available. This study will fill the void and provide staff officers, students at Army schools, and other interested persons with detailed information on the Army's use of prisoners of war in the past. It offers no specific formula to be followed in utilizing prisoners of war but it does provide information that may be useful to those who may be responsible for their utilization in the future. The footnotes will be of help to those interested in making a more complete study of certain aspects of the subject.

The study is divided into three parts. Part One, "The Early Wars," contains three chapters covering the period from the Revolutionary War through the Civil War. Part Two, "The Beginnings of Global Warfare," contains three chapters covering the period from the Spanish-American War to the beginning of World War II. Part Three, "World War II," contains the bulk of the study. The planning, policies, interested agencies, and actual employment both in the continental United States and in oversea theaters are presented in detail.

Since the authors have been allowed complete freedom in research and in the development of ideas, it must be emphasized that the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached are their own and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Lt. Col. George G. Lewis, who initiated the project, wrote drafts of chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 before being transferred to another assignment. He was assisted for a time by 1st Lt. Martin J. Miller who wrote portions of chapter 10. 1st Lt. John H. Beeler wrote the original draft of chapter 3. Capt. John Mewha researched and wrote chapters 7 to 9, portions of chapter 10, and chapters 11 to 17. After Colonel Lewis' reassignment, Captain Mewha extensively revised and rewrote parts One and Two.
Appreciation is expressed to all who participated in the preparation of this study and to The Provost Marshal General and The Provost Marshal General's School for their comments and criticisms on the manuscript.
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Credit.—Photographs are from the files of the Department of Defense.
PART ONE

THE EARLY WARS

Chapter 1

The Revolutionary War

The United States Government, even in its infancy, accepted the customs of nations and sought to apply the concepts of international law to its prisoners of war. From the Revolutionary War through World War II, the American Army has used the services of captive enemy soldiers. In the earlier wars, the emphasis was on exchange, ransom, voluntary enlistments, parole, and, in some instances, retaliation, all methods by which prisoners of war can be utilized, rather than the later concept of the use of prisoners of war as a labor force.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

On 19 April 1775 the Massachusetts Militia engaged the British in battle at Lexington. This was the opening action of the American Revolutionary War, and with this battle began the experience of American armed forces with the administration and utilization of prisoners of war. The Continental Congress declared on 2 January 1776 that the status of its prisoners of war was “a restraint of honor only.” Accordingly, it sought to apply humanitarian concepts in its treatment of the prisoners. But at the same time, the British practice varied between the observance of the laws of warfare and the less generous procedures customary in subduing domestic disturbances. The British preferred the latter description in characterizing the American resort to arms. Because of the continued mistreat-
ment of American prisoners by the English, the American armies took steps to accord similar treatment to British captives. On 11 August 1775, General Washington wrote to Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage: “My duty now makes it necessary to apprise you, that for the future I shall regulate my Conduct toward those Gentlemen, who are or may be in our Possession, exactly by the Rule you shall observe towards those of ours, now in your Custody.”

As a rule American commanders temporarily secured their prisoners of war (PW’s) within the facilities of the local provost guard until they could be accommodated elsewhere. When a permanent internment site was selected, the local provost guard, composed of detachments of men of the line, escorted the prisoners to the new camp. Frequently, the prisoners were quartered in county jails pending their transfer to centralized prisoner of war barracks or encampments located in areas considered secure to the Continental forces. At these camps, the guard was provided for the most part by the local Militia. This resulted in a lack of uniformity in controlling the prisoners, and numerous escapes were reported.

The enemy troops captured by the Americans were usually segregated according to nationality, that is, the British from the Hessians; and different treatment was accorded the two nationalities. The Hessians had a different attitude toward their confinement than did the British, and the Americans feared the greater inclination on the part of the British to escape. Officer PW’s were customarily permitted the liberty of parole within a designated area. At their own expense they found quarters for themselves in private homes or inns while they awaited exchange. Enlisted PW’s were occasionally billeted in private dwellings, but more frequently they were confined in barracks surrounded by barricades. However, to retaliate against British actions and to obtain British conformity to the standards of international laws of warfare in the treatment of American prisoners, U. S. commanders often ordered close confinement for the enemy prisoners in their possession. They also threatened future reprisals against Brit-

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Revolutionary War Records, National Archives; Journals of Congress, V, p. 531.
6 Journals of Congress, IV, pp. 86, 107, 176, 371. For an example of an officer’s parole form, see: Ibid., p. 371.
8 These were erected at the direction of the Continental Congress to prevent the civilian populace from having any intercourse with the prisoners of war. See: Ibid., V, p. 531; VII, p. 191; and IX, p. 773.
ish prisoners if considerate treatment was not accorded to American PW's. General Washington and other American commanders gave consideration to the complaints of the prisoners and ordered military investigations if the complaints were about the treatment received. The American Army also cooperated in the receipt of British aid to their men held custody by the Continental forces. (It had long been the practice for a nation to furnish supplies to its troops made captive by an enemy.) When Great Britain failed to send supplies to maintain her men in American hands, the attitude of Congress wavered between providing them two-thirds of the amount given to active American troops, or the measure supplied to American prisoners by the British. In 1782, Congress directed the Quartermaster General's Department to issue the prisoners of war the following articles of the soldier's ration: bread, beef or pork, soap, salt, and vinegar.

The First Experiences of Prisoner Utilization

Exchange

The prisoners taken by the American forces at Concord and Lexington were placed in the custody of the Committee of Safety, and steps were immediately taken by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to exchange them for Americans in British custody. On 28 April 1775, the Congress ordered certain captured British officers to be sent to Providence, R. I., to be used in negotiating the exchange of several prominent Americans interned on a British warship at Newport. Apparently these negotiations were unsuccessful; but on 16 June 1775 an exchange was concluded at Charlestown, Mass., between Pres. James Warren of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, who with Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam represented the Americans, and Maj. James Moncrief, representing the British. This was the earliest attempt at American prisoner of war exchange, the form of PW utilization most prevalent in the Revolution.

By the summer 1776, both the Continental Army and the British held numerous prisoners of war. To secure their return, in July 1776

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Congress authorized the local commanders in each department to negotiate for the direct exchange of the prisoners on the following basis: "One Continental officer for one of enemy of equal rank, either in land or sea services; soldier for soldier; sailor for sailor, and one citizen for another citizen." On 20 July 1776, Gen. Sir William Howe, British commander in chief, advised General Washington that he had authority to negotiate for an exchange of prisoners of war. Ten days later, General Washington told General Howe that Congress wished to arrange a general exchange, rank for rank, soldier for soldier, sailor for sailor, and citizen for citizen. Howe agreed to this but with certain exceptions: he had no authority over seamen, and he would not exchange deserters. This was acceptable to Congress, and the exchange was made.

General Washington and General Howe concluded a number of local exchanges during the next two years, General Washington's practice being to request the return of Americans who had been longest in captivity. Eastern and southern officers were returned in equal proportions except when General Washington requested particular persons. Local exchanges continued throughout 1777; for instance, 123 prisoners of war were exchanged in Rhode Island on 11 February 1777.

In early 1778, Congress and General Washington sought to consummate a general exchange with the British Government that would last for the duration of the war. American and British commissioners met at Germantown, Pa., on 31 March 1778 and again at Newtown, Pa., on 6 April 1778, but they could not reach an agreement. The American commissioners were bound by certain congressional resolutions which demanded that (1) the enemy settle the expenses of prisoners of war not with the inflationary Continental currency but with actual coin on a par value with the paper issue; (2) all Loyalists be returned to the states so they could be punished as traitors; (3) Maj. Gen. Charles Lee be exchanged for Maj. Gen. Richard Prescott (this was his second imprisonment); and (4) all supplies issued to enemy prisoners be replaced in like quantity. On the other hand, General Howe's authority had been limited to personal powers based on his military commission and command, whereas the American commissioners represented powers, delegated to General Washington by Congress, to bind the Nation. The British commander apparently had been specifically instructed by his government not to negotiate on a national basis,

as the British wanted no implication of acknowledgment inconsistent with their claim that the conflict was but a domestic disturbance. As a result, negotiations failed.  

By May 1778, Congress was willing to permit an exchange of all officers and enlisted men. This was to be an equal exchange of all soldiers and officers, but the legislative body would not permit an exchange of privates for officers; however, it was willing to accede to an exchange of Burgoyne’s officers. This action by Congress was the result of a proposal by General Howe after the failure of the Germantown and Newtown negotiations. With both sides willing to concede certain points, an exchange was made from May to July 1778. It was simply an agreement between two contracting parties and not between nations.

Meanwhile, British seamen captured by American naval forces were released on parole either at sea or in France. In June 1778, the American commissioners in France reached a temporary agreement whereby British prisoners would be released to Lord Howe in America, and American prisoners interned in England would be exchanged in France. Benjamin Franklin, one of the American commissioners, feared the British would pick out “... the worse and weakest of our people to give in exchange for your good ones.” Therefore he insisted that those longest in confinement be exchanged first.

At this time France was a neutral nation and refused to intern British prisoners captured at sea by U.S. forces. But in August 1778, after it declared war on Great Britain, France issued orders that the “... prisoners shall be conducted, guarded, and maintained in the name and at the expense of the United States.” These were used in local exchanges, both in France and in Holland; the first exchange took place in France in May 1779.

In the United States, a second attempt was made in 1779 and 1780 to arrange a general cartel with Sir Henry Clinton, then British commander in chief, but again the British commissioners were not permitted to admit any expression which tended to acknowledge the independence of the American states. For this—and other reasons—the negotiations failed. The other reasons were: first, and most important, difficulties were encountered over the adjustment and settlement of accounts of maintaining the prisoners of war. Second, the British at this time held very few American privates as prisoners; this would have necessitated the Continental Army exchanging a relatively...
high proportion of British privates for American officers in British custody.23

Limited exchanges continued as before, and toward the end of 1779 a rather extensive exchange took place in the South. The Continental Army held approximately 375 enemy prisoners throughout the Carolinas and Georgia, and these were exchanged for 269 Americans—the remaining 106 were to be delivered on the next exchange. A few officers were exchanged at the ratio of 1 officer for 10 privates. The exchange was so complete that Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln wrote, "We have none [prisoners] now with the Enemy saving a few officers."24

During December 1779, the following tariff for the exchange of prisoners of war was arranged in New York:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Exchange Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sergeant</td>
<td>2 privates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ensign</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lieutenant</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>captain</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonel</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brigadier general</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major general</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lieutenant general</td>
<td>1,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjutant and quartermaster</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surgeon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surgeon's mate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surgeon of hospitals</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deputies and assistants</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All others of the staff according to the rank they held in the line. Another arrangement was concluded . . . by which the money price of ransom was agreed to, as well as their relative importance, privates being one. According to that, a commander-in-chief was rated . . . (about eight thousand dollars), and equal to five thousand men. A major general was rated . . . (about four hundred dollars), and equal to three hundred and seventy-five men. Other officers in proportion.25

Overseas in France, the American commissioners and British officials signed a "Cartel for a General Exchange of Prisoners" at Versailles on 12 March 1780. This cartel contained the following provision that applied to prisoners at war interned in England and in France: "The prisoners shall be exchanged man for man, according to their rank and qualities, or for a certain number of men as equivalent,

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or for certain sums of money in form of ransoms.” But by this time, the attitude in the United States in respect to a general exchange was undergoing a change. In July 1780, General Washington advised “. . . exchanges of prisoners, though urged by humanity, is not politic. It would give force to the British, and add but little to our own. Few of the American prisoners belong to the Army and the enlistment of those who do, is nearly expired.” It is apparent that the military at this time did not favor such an exchange.

Again, in late 1782, England proposed to “. . . exchange seamen for soldiers, they having no soldiers in their [England] hands; that the soldiers so exchanged should not serve for one year against the United States; that the sailors might go into immediate service; that the balance of the soldiers in our [Congress] hands should be given up at a stipulated price.” Congress rejected this as being unequal; as letting loose a force that might be employed against our allies in the West Indies; and as making no provision for the maintenance of the prisoners. Also, the British commissioners again did not have the authority to represent the King, a fact that Congress insisted upon so that any debt incurred by the commissioners would be binding on the British nation.

Negotiations continued throughout the war in an effort to conclude a general exchange cartel, but to no avail. Local exchanges did continue, even to the extent of permitting some individuals to return to their lines on parole to arrange for their own exchange.

The Commissary General of Prisoners

Due to a lack of uniformity in providing for prisoners of war, Washington in 1775 asked Congress to appoint a commissary of prisoners in “. . . these parts [Massachusetts] to attend to providing of necessaries for Prisoners dispersed in these Provinces.” Despite other letters with the same recommendation, it was not until 7 October 1776 that Congress resolved that a commissary of prisoners be appointed by each of the states. When the recommendation finally was followed, confusion resulted: lack of uniformity in the management of the prisoners was prevalent; each state was concerned solely with its own interests when exchanging prisoners with the enemy; and some states failed to take sufficient measures to guarantee the security of the prisoners. Because of a lack of centralized control, the conditions gradually worsened until on 13 January 1780, at the request of Gen-
eral Washington, Congress moved to reorganize prisoners' affairs. To remedy the "shameful and injurious manner" in which prisoner exchanges were being made, Congress appointed a Commissary General of Prisoners. It resolved that all prisoners captured by the Army or Navy of the United States or by subjects, troops, or ships of any state should be delivered into the care and custody of the Commissary General of Prisoners, his deputies or assistants. In all respects, the captured enemy were to be deemed and treated as prisoners of war of the United States. General Washington, as commander in chief, received the authority to select the Commissary General of Prisoners and to appoint U. S. deputy commissaries in the different states.

Congress directed that thereafter the states were not to exchange prisoners but that all exchanges were to be made through the Commissary General. As a concession to the states, Congress provided that prisoners taken by ships or troops of any particular state would be exchanged for men from those states. However, any surplus prisoners were to be exchanged regardless of the state of capture. The United States was to bear the costs to the states for transporting prisoners to the custody of a U. S. deputy commissary of prisoners. If one was not convenient, the prisoners were to be delivered to the county jail where, pending their removal, the United States was to be charged with the cost of their maintenance. All officer prisoners of war on parole were required to pay their own expenses, including that for physicians, surgeons, and attendants, unless confined in hospitals. Such expenses were required to be paid before the prisoners' exchange would be effected.

The Commissary General of Prisoners and his deputies had to make regular monthly returns to the Board of War as to the number, situation, and exchange of all prisoners and to render such other reports as circumstances deemed necessary. The congressional resolution also specified that all exchanges of prisoners of war were to be made on an individual basis of soldier for soldier and sailor for sailor. General Washington was reauthorized to conduct exchange arrangements directly with the British commander.

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37 Reimbursable maintenance costs to the states for PW's in confinement or on the march were limited to two-thirds of a soldier's ration. See: Order Book, XIX, p. 80. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.
The Convention Army

When Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne surrendered his British forces to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates at Saratoga, N. Y., on 17 October 1777, over 5,000 enemy troops fell into American custody. Under the terms of the Articles of Convention executed between the two generals,

A Free Passage [is] to be granted to the Army under Lieut. Genl. Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America, during the present Contest; and the Port of Boston is Assigned for the Entry of Transports to Receive the Troops whenever General Howe shall so Order. Should any Cartel take place by which the Army under Lieut. General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchange'd, the foregoing Article to be void as far as such exchange shall be made.

These troops, known as the Convention Army, were marched under guard to Boston, the designated port of embarkation, where the English were quartered outside the port on Prospect Hill and the Germans on Winter Hill. The British officers were permitted to quarter themselves in the towns of Cambridge, Mystic, and Watertown, and were granted a parole of about 10 miles circumference excluding the city of Boston.

Winter set in making sailing conditions between New York and Boston dangerous; therefore, General Burgoyne requested permission of Congress to move his troops to Providence where they could more readily embark. Realizing the force that would be released to the enemy should the exchange of the Convention Army be made, Congress not only denied the request but forbade any embarkation until the surrender articles had been ratified by the British King and Parliament. Such ratification was not forthcoming since such an act would have admitted the authority of the American Congress and the independence of the United States. As a result, the Convention Army became prisoners of war with no hope of release except by exchange.

Since the records and accounts of American PW operations during the Revolutionary War are disconnected and fragmentary, a chronological extract from the collected letters of a young British officer who wrote of his experiences as an American PW is presented for corroborative purposes. Ens Thomas Anburey who was with Gen Burgoyne and his Convention Army at the surrender at Saratoga, N. Y., was a PW for almost four years from Nov 1777 to Sep 1781. In his writings, Ens Anburey speaks of the treatment, supplies, food, quarters, guards, escapes, censorship, exchange, proselyting, and employment of PW's. See: Thomas Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America (London, 1789); see also parallel account of Gen Riedesel, commander of the German forces, in Eelking, Memoirs and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel, I, pp. 179-230, and II, pp. 1-89.

40 "The prisoners numbered five thousand eight hundred, of whom half were Germans..." See: Sir George O. Trevelyan, The American Revolution (New York, 1899-1913), IV, p. 194.

41 Francis J. Hudleston, Gentlemans Johnny Burgoyne (New York, 1927), pp. 208-09, 257. Gen Burgoyne felt that they would be exchanged for the troops then in Britain who in turn would be sent to Sir William Howe.

42 Anburey, op. cit., II, pp. 74, 77, 81, 191; Sparks, op. cit., V, pp. 143-45, 186n.; Lossing, op. cit., p. 82 n.
When the Council of Boston was informed of the status of the Convention Army, for security reasons it moved the English prisoners to Rutland, 55 miles away. Because the German prisoners were submissive they were permitted to remain near Boston. At Rutland, the English enlisted men were confined in barracks surrounded by 20-foot pickets, while the officers obtained quarters in nearby private homes. During this time, many prisoners deserted.\textsuperscript{43}

The presence of part of the Convention Army at Rutland posed a problem. If the prisoners were continually locked up, they were apt to complain of the severity of treatment or of the insufficient food and clothing. If they were given freedom within the town limits, there were likely to be collisions with the local authorities and townspeople. This was partially solved by allowing many to go to work in the countryside; there they found the food and country living much more satisfactory. Others were later parcelled out to nearby towns as laborers and artisans where the prisoners “forgot the duties of a soldier” and became so much a part of the local life that when the government ordered their removal the townspeople rescued them from the collecting officers.\textsuperscript{44}

Massachusetts wanted the southern provinces to share the burden of ministering to the prisoners, and Congress agreed with its claim. The war was then being fought in the Jerseys (a term then applied to New Jersey) and New York, excluding their consideration; Pennsylvania was considered too ravaged by war; and Maryland was believed to be too small a province to support the Convention Army. Thereupon, Congress selected Virginia because of its size, fertility, and the security it offered.\textsuperscript{45}

In October 1778, Congress passed a resolution to march the Convention Army from Massachusetts to Charlottesville, Va., to remove them from the immediate scene of military operations. But since the 800-mile march was to be done in the dead of winter, the officers of the Convention Army were convinced that it was to cause the men to desert in considerable numbers.\textsuperscript{46} Regardless of the reason for the move, many, especially the Germans, did desert in the course of the march to Virginia. The Hessians, seeing the comfortable manner in which their countrymen lived in America, deserted in great numbers as the Convention Army moved through New York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{47} Many of these deserters were recruited into the American Army, a fact that made General Washington caustically remark that

\textsuperscript{42} Anburey, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 192-93; Sparks, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 296-97.

\textsuperscript{43} Newcomer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 94, 156.

\textsuperscript{44} Anburey, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 324-25.

\textsuperscript{45} Claude G. Bowers, \textit{The Young Jefferson 1743-1789} (Boston, 1945), pp. 229-31; Anburey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{46} Anburey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 275; Lowell (\textit{op. cit.}, pp. 287, 290) states that 655 Englishmen and 160 Germans had deserted by 1 Apr 1778.
it simply gave the enemy back the men they had lost—that they would desert again to the British at the first opportunity.48

The march was made in good weather by way of Valley Forge, Lancaster, and York, Pa. But from Fredericks Town, Md., to Charlottesville, Va., the march was hindered by heavy snowfall and bad roads. On the arrival at Charlottesville, it was reported that no pen could describe the scene of misery and confusion—the town consisted of only a court house, one tavern, and about a dozen houses. Since the army had not been expected until spring the prisoners were quartered in a few roofless log cabins. Food was scant and consisted of a little salt pork and corn meal cakes. Because of the situation, the officers were permitted a parole circuit of almost 100 miles in which to find themselves lodging. This included the city of Richmond.

The prisoners, through their own efforts, speedily remedied the situation. They cleared the ground of the encampment area, divided it into small plots, and fenced and cultivated them. By their own efforts, the prisoners produced much of the food they required. In addition, they repaired and built additional barracks for themselves. Among other things, they built a theater, a coffee-house, and a cold bath. Many of the captured officers built homes near the camp where they resided with their families, which they had brought to America with them.49

Many English PW's deserted rather than endure their prison life in Virginia. Approximately one hundred reached New York, but sixty or seventy were caught and returned to Charlottesville where they were confined in a picketed prison near the barracks.50 On the other hand, the German prisoners were content with their lot, being

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4 Miller, op. cit., p. 507.
50 Anburey, op. cit., pp. 388–89.
paid by the British and not having to fight. Further, the Americans permitted the Germans to go around the countryside to work. As a result of their handicrafts, they earned money exclusive of their military pay.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 390-91; Trevelyan, op. cit., p. 206; Belking, Memoirs and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel, II, p. 41.}

The Convention Army stayed in Virginia until October 1780 when it was again moved. Since Cornwallis had achieved some military successes in the Carolinas, Congress thought his intention might be to retake the prisoner army. Therefore, the army was put on the march by regiments in much the same manner as it had left New England, except its place of destination was unknown. Maryland, upon approach of the army, absolutely refused admittance fearing such a group would distress the inhabitants of so small a province. In fact it actually opposed a crossing of the Potomac with arms. Until the matter was adjusted, the army remained in Winchester, Va., at an old fort, and some of the prisoners worked on nearby farms. Other PW’s who were offered work in Richmond refused to do so for fear their officers would deem them deserters.\footnote{Calendar of Virginia State Papers, I, p. 486; Max von Belking, The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence, translated and abridged by Joseph G. Rosengarten (Albany, 1892), p. 215.}

Maryland and Pennsylvania did not want the prisoners of war because of the economic burden; therefore, the Commissary General of Purchases arranged to have Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland equally furnish the necessary provisions.\footnote{Lucy Leigh Bowie, “German Prisoners in the American Revolution,” Maryland Historical Magazine, XL (1945), p. 193.} In late November, the Convention Army moved to Fredericks Town Md., where it remained temporarily. Here the prisoners were quartered in comfortable barracks, supplied with provisions, and allowed many privileges. They were allowed to work for the inhabitants of the town, and they could go into the country to purchase vegetables.\footnote{Anburey, op. cit., p. 439.} The German prisoners were sent to Fort Frederick, but despite the improved conditions, desertions continued.\footnote{Bowie, “German Prisoners in the American Revolution,” op. cit., p. 188; Anburey, op. cit., pp. 437, 444-45, 456.}

Because of the fear of an attack by Cornwallis to form a junction with other English troops that had been landed in Virginia, Maryland wanted the prisoners moved. And, as expected, orders arrived to move the Convention Army to Lancaster, Pa. Upon arrival at Lancaster, the enlisted men were separated from the officers—the latter being sent to Kings Bridge, Conn., for exchange.\footnote{Anburey, op. cit., p. 441; Bowie, op. cit., pp. 448, 450; Calendar of Virginia State Papers, I, p. 592.} Other than the officers, none of the Convention troops were restored to their native countries until the was was over.\footnote{Trevelyan, op. cit., p. 207; one British historian stated that after the separation of the officers and men, the enlisted PW’s “. . . vanished no man knows whither.” See: John W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1911), III, pp. 242-43.}
Retaliation

The use of prisoners of war as instruments of retaliation was often threatened and sometimes used during the Revolutionary War. General Washington in 1775 had notified the British that their conduct toward American PW’s in their possession would determine the treatment accorded British and Hessian prisoners of war. The British in turn maintained that, although they considered the war as a civil uprising, the prisoners were not considered traitors and were being treated with kindness.55

However, in late 1776, after the British had captured Maj. Gen. Charles Lee of the Continental Army and had threatened to court-martial him as a deserter from the British Army, General Washington wrote Sir William Howe: “. . . any violence you may commit upon his life and liberty, will be severely retaliated upon the lives and liberties of the British officers, or those of their foreign allies in our hands.” 59 This tone was often heard, both in the United States and abroad. The American commissioners in France wrote to Lord North on 12 December 1777: “Your Lordship must know, that it is in the power of those we have the honour to represent, to make ample retaliation upon the numerous prisoners of all ranks in their possession; and we warn and beseech you not to render it their indispensable duty.” 60

To retaliate against the treatment accorded Col. Ethan Allen by the English, Congress ordered Maj. Gen. Richard Prescott, a British officer, to be placed in irons and confined in jail.61 Throughout 1777 and 1778, both Congress and General Washington protested the treatment accorded American PW’s who for the most part were treated as common criminals. British officers in American custody had been allowed $2 per week by the Continental Congress to support themselves, and British privates had been granted permission to work and keep their wages. When the British continued their mistreatment of American prisoners, Congress withdrew the $2 allowance and recalled all those prisoners at work. They were then accorded treatment similar to that received by American prisoners of war. The various state governments assisted in executing this policy of retaliation.62

In the South where the predominant pro-British population aided the English troops, retaliation was even more prevalent. For instance, in February 1779, 70 Tories captured in North Carolina while slaughtering cattle for food were tried for high treason and con-
demned to death. Five of the most active prisoners were hanged, and the others were pardoned.63

Recruitment of Enemy Prisoners of War Into the Military Service

Comparatively early in the conflict, British deserters and even prisoners of war were enlisted in the American Army. Because of so many desertions to the enemy and the espionage activities of these former prisoners, both the Continental Congress and General Washington disapproved of this practice.64 Washington, however, urged that those already enlisted not be withdrawn: "I would not have them again withdrawn and sent in, because they might be subjected to punishment, but I would have the practice discontinued in the future."65 Enlistments continued, however, and Congress, no doubt in view of the manpower situation, authorized the raising of German battalions, and in August 1776 authorized the granting of land bounties to enemy deserters.66

In 1778, Congress promised Hessian prisoners of war who joined the Continental Army a higher rank and an appointment to a corps which was composed exclusively of Germans. This corps was employed on frontier or garrison duty.67 Later in 1778 the congressional policy appeared to waver, and a congressional committee condemned the practice of enlistment of enemy forces as being "impolitic." At this time, General Washington also objected to the policy.68 The recruiting of disaffected men (especially the foreign-born), prisoners of war, and enemy deserters was a contributing factor of some importance in the desertion of American troops. Such recruits demoralized the American soldiers who deserted upon the least excuse.69

By 1782, however, the manpower situation had become so acute that Congress issued another proclamation to the German PW's urging them to join the Continental Army and promising promotions to their commissioned and noncommissioned officers. This was done at the suggestion of General Washington who now thought the German veterans would strengthen the American army.70 The recruitment of the Hessians was done openly. Although some recruitment was done, the

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63 Lossing, op. cit., II, p. 506.
68 Journals of Congress, XII, p. 1159.
70 Congress in its resolution stated that "... the Commander in Chief has for several years made trial of the fidelity of some of the German prisoners, who were formed into a separate corps, and highly approves their past conduct." See: Journals of Congress, XXII, p. 275. See also: Miller, op. cit., p. 507; Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence, pp. 19-21; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., XXV, p. 467.
only record that can be found is that Count Casimir Pulaski com-
manded a corps comprised of approximately 400 German deserters.\footnote{\textit{Lowell, op. cit.}, p. 288.}

As an inducement to Canada to join with the United States, a pro-
posal was made in Congress in 1782 to establish a regiment composed 
of Canadian PW’s who would be willing to enlist. But apparently 
this proposal was lost in committee.\footnote{\textit{Journals of Congress}, IX, pp. 986, 1037.} Congress had earlier approved a 
similar resolution on 5 August 1776 that permitted the voluntary en-
listment of captured Canadian seamen into the American naval forces 
and had granted permission to the states and private individuals to 
enlist British seamen taken prisoners.\footnote{\textit{Journals of Congress}, IX, pp. 986, 1037.}

\section*{Employment of Prisoners of War}

During the Revolutionary War, there was no definite policy or or-
ganized program for the employment of prisoners of war at useful 
labor. For the most part, enlisted prisoners were placed in restraint 
pending an exchange, although Congress did permit them to exercise 
their trades and to labor to support themselves. Officer PW’s were 
usually paroled within a certain area while waiting exchange and were 
not employed.\footnote{\textit{American Archives}, ser. 4, vol. VI, p. 1587.} Before the Continental Congress authorized each 
state to appoint a Commissary of Prisoners, local state and town com-
mittees dealt with the prisoner of war problem and were responsible 
for the labor of the prisoners. In June 1776, 217 Scotch Highland 
Regulars captured aboard a British transport were turned over to the 
state of Virginia who sent the cadets and noncommissioned officers to 
places of security along the frontier; the privates were distributed by 
local committees to families throughout the middle counties where, 
one to a family, they could be employed at such wages as they would 
accept. In this way, the prisoners were secured as well as usefully em-
ployed.\footnote{\textit{American Archives}, ser. 4, vol. VI, p. 1137; \textit{The Public Records of the State of Connect-
icut}, I, p. 419, and II, p. 214.} Richard Henry Lee stated that this permitted the prisoners 
a chance “... to become the Citizens of America instead of its ene-
emies.”\footnote{\textit{Charles Lee (ed.) \textit{The Lee Papers} (“Collections of the New York Historical Society, 
1872.”) Vol. II [New York, 1873]), p. 98.}

Also in June 1776, the Committee of Prisoners in Connecticut re-
solved that those prisoners of war, except officers, who desired to labor 
at their respective trades could do so; and that they would receive 
wages in addition to the costs of the billeting allowed by the Continental Congress.\footnote{\textit{American Archives}, ser. 5, vol. I, p. 1137; \textit{American Archives}, ser. 4, vol. VI, p. 419.} However, it decided that it would be unsafe and 
improper to employ them in making firearms, gunpowder, casting 
cannon, cannonballs, or in erecting fortifications.\footnote{\textit{American Archives}, ser. 5, vol. I, p. 46.} On the other hand,
the Continental Congress resolved on 22 July 1776 that a "Captain Joy [would] have liberty to employ eight of the Prisoners in the business of casting Cannon." In Massachusetts, the committees of Springfield, Westfield, and West Springfield met on 3 July 1776 and formulated regulations requiring among other things that an employer of the services of a prisoner of war send a copy of the labor agreement to the local committee within three weeks.

The First Large-Scale Employment of PW's

Probably the first large-scale attempt at systematized employment was at Lancaster, Pa. On 26 December 1776, the Continental Army captured approximately 1,000 PW's at Trenton, N. J., and marched them to Lancaster, Pa., where they were confined. When news of the success of the battle reached Congress, a committee advised General Washington not to exchange the prisoners, who were mainly Hessians: "We think their capture affords a favourable opportunity of making them acquainted with the situation and circumstances of many of their countrymen..." Consequently, they were imprisoned. Upon the arrival of the PW's at Lancaster, a census was taken of those who had skilled trades, and 315 were found to be skilled artisans. These included weavers, tailors, shoemakers, stocking-makers, millers, bakers, butchers, carpenters, joiners, smiths, and plasterers.

Several factors influenced the eventual use of the PW's. First, the crowded conditions of the barracks and the shortages of rations warranted this action; second, the Hessian prisoners of war, who were more often paroled to work than were the British, were considered more dependable from a security standpoint; third, numerous requests were made for the prisoner of war labor. Therefore, on 3 March 1777, the Council of Safety at Lancaster authorized that the Hessian prisoners be paroled to trustworthy persons for employment. Returns had to be kept which listed the names of the employers and the names and occupations of the prisoners.

When the PW's were hired out, Congress paid them in money the value of their rations. In addition, the farmers gave them their meals and $7.50 per month. The person who hired them was responsible for their security and was required to pay Congress $200 if one deserted. (There is record of this security being as high as £1,000 in the case of an expert wheelwright.) As craftsmen were in great...
demand, by March 1777 the American authorities had allowed the prisoners to be hired out in the Lancaster area. Later the area was expanded. At Easton, Pa., the prisoners who worked received $1 per day with which they could buy apparel in local stores. Thirty were selected to make shot and cannon for the American Army at a forge and iron foundry at Mount Hope, N. J., and, at one time, a group of Scotch prisoners was hired by Pres. John Witherspoon of Princeton University, a fellow Scot. The officers who were paroled were allowed the following numbers of orderlies: field officers, three soldiers for servants; captains, two soldiers; subalterns, one.

In August 1777 when the British fleet entered the Chesapeake Bay, General Washington ordered the prisoners at Lancaster to be moved to Reading, Pa. To assemble the prisoners of war "... a bellman went around the town of Lancaster calling upon all inhabitants ..." who had hired Hessian prisoners to take them to the barracks and to receive receipts for them.

Some British officers stated that the German PW's who were taken to Lancaster and Reading were visited by American clergymen who read them the following proclamation:

The King of Great Britain refused to pay for their maintenance, their Tyrant princes also had abandoned and sold them. Congress did therefore leave it to their choice, either to enlist in the American Service, or pay 30 $ currency of Pennsylvania for their past maintenance in hard money, which sum, if they could not afford to pay, the farmers would advance for them on binding themselves to serve them for three years, in both of which case they must take the Oath of Allegiance to the United States.

The prisoners were advised by the clergymen to accept the first alternative rather than to be indentured to the farmers. One of the most notorious instances of this indenturing was that of 35 prisoners of war bound out to ironmaster John Jacob Faesch, at Mount Hope, N. J. These PW's wrote that Faesch had procured them from a Philadelphia jail. On two occasions, they escaped and were recaptured, and on each occasion, Faesch procured their freedom—one time by paying $20 each for them, whereupon he deducted this sum from their wages. The prisoners claimed they were cruelly beaten after each recapture.

When the British advanced into Pennsylvania, the prisoners were moved to Winchester, Va., in two contingents where those Germans in the first group were allowed to hire themselves out as farm

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87 Haffner, op. cit., p. 376.
89 Bowie, "German Prisoners in the American Revolution," op. cit., p. 186.
90 Ibid., p. 188.
92 This had been prohibited by a congressional resolution of 22 May 1778. See: Lowell, op. cit., pp. 288-89.
93 Morris, op. cit., pp. 304-05.
The others were imprisoned. Later when the barracks at Winchester became overcrowded and some of the prisoners were ordered to Frederick, Md., the Virginia farmers protested the loss of the cheap labor supply. A few of the prisoners at Frederick hired themselves out to work their trades and to cut wood for the barracks master. Others were hired to work at iron and salt works, and some worked as farm hands to thresh wheat to supply the French fleet. The use of a prisoner of war "band of Musik" was authorized at Frederick to play for ladies who were "all anxious for the musik..." These prisoners were paid a salary.

The Hessian band captured at Trenton was kept at Philadelphia where it played for a dinner given for Congress on the first anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. When Congress was forced to leave Philadelphia, the band accompanied it. It was in constant demand for parties and balls of all sorts, and for each night's performance received £15. The limits of the parole of its members covered a wide area.

**The Surrender of Cornwallis**

On 19 October 1781, Lord Cornwallis surrendered approximately 7,000 men to General Washington at Yorktown. In the preliminary talks, General Washington would not agree to sending the prisoners back to Europe but stated that the garrisons of York and Gloucester and all seamen "... will be received as Prisoners of War." Under the terms of the surrender agreement, the prisoners were to be kept in either Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania while Cornwallis and a number of his officers were to be sent on parole to New York. As it turned out, the prisoners were divided between Winchester, Va., and Fort Frederick, Md., with the German prisoners going to Fort Frederick.

Part of the Germans received at Fort Frederick were turbulent and part were well behaved. To better manage the turbulent group, it was planned to hire out the cooperative prisoners. However, Elias Boudinot, the Commissary General of Prisoners, refused this plan, stating that it would counteract orders issued by Congress that all prisoners

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96 Board of War Reports, ser. 147, vol. II, No. 515.
97 Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, XXIV, p. 432 n.
99 Fortescue states that 6,630 men surrendered, of whom 2,500 were Germans. See: Fortescue, *op. cit.*, III, p. 401.
100 Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, XXIII, p. 237.
101 Ibid., pp. 290-61, 303. The only record that could be found concerning Americans who fought for Lord Cornwallis states that he "leaves them to be hanged." See: Wharton, *op. cit.*, I, p. 312.
would be kept in close confinement. Thus the employment program was curtailed.

There are, however, other scattered records of employment. In September 1782 Maj. Gen. Henry Knox was authorized to use German prisoners of war as "armourers." General Knox was told that he could secure prisoner cooperation if he would promise them their liberty in 12 months or upon completion of a stipulated period of work. Captured drivers were kept along with their wagons and horses to serve the Continental Army. In the South there is some record of the battlefield employment of PW's. Those taken at Kings Mountain, N. C., were used to bury the dead while others were employed to carry weapons from the battlefield. Their use was a necessity since no other labor was available. In December 1782, Congress passed a formal resolution for the employment of British prisoners of war. It proposed "That the Secretary of War be empowered to permit any British prisoner to hire himself as a laborer, provided the person who employs him shall give sufficient security for his appearance when called for ... and that he pays to the Superintendent of Finance four dollars monthly for the hire of such prisoner. . . ." Although the Secretary of War authorized the employment of the British PW's there is no record of any widespread use. However, because of demand, ironmasters and shoemakers among the PW's had no difficulty in obtaining employment during the post-Yorktown period. Inhabitants who had cared for sick and wounded prisoners of war were willing to hire them when they recovered, and Congress sanctioned this employment under bond.

The Cessation of Hostilities and the Peace Treaties

In 1782 a bill was passed in England releasing all prisoners of war, and by 20 April 1782 ships were being prepared to transport them to America. In the United States after the ultimate cessation of hostilities, Congress, on 15 April 1783, resolved that the Secretary of War, in conjunction with the Commander in Chief, should make proper arrangements for setting at liberty all land prisoners. The agent of the marine was to release all naval prisoners. This resolution took place after Congress had ratified a proposed treaty of peace that stated "... all prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty. . . ."
Accordingly, Washington asked Sir Guy Carleton, the British Commander in Chief, whether he wanted the prisoners marched overland to New York for embarkation, or whether he wanted to take them part way by water transportation. Washington suggested the latter because of the season of the year and the inclement weather. At this time, 1,500 prisoners of war, including women and children, were quartered at Fredericktown, Md., and 4,500 were interned in Pennsylvania. Carleton replied on 24 April 1783 that a lack of tonnage to transport the prisoners made it necessary to march them to New York.

To recall those prisoners who were working, ads were placed in local newspapers, but a number of Hessian prisoners were offered a unique scheme to remain as free residents of the United States. The Superintendent of Finance was indebted to certain ironmongers who had supplied shot and shells to the American Army, and to work out the debt the Superintendent of Finance indentured some Hessian prisoners to the ironmongers. In one such instance, 33 Hessians worked for John Jacob Faesch and obtained their freedom and release by working out an indebtedness of $80 each. Other Hessian prisoners of war, who had married or who had deserted and had taken up residence in America, were permitted to ransom themselves for 80 Spanish milled dollars (hard money). Those who could not raise the amount usually found some Americans who were willing to advance it in return for labor for a fixed term. These prisoners were called "redemptioners," and their bargains had a type of legal sanction. They were made public at church, and they were generally acknowledged as binding. Approximately 6,000 Hessians remained in the United States after the Revolutionary War. The development of woolen and worsted industries in this country was aided both by British PW's and by deserters from the British Army who remained in the United States after the war.

By July 1783 all the American prisoners in England had been discharged, and by 3 September 1783 all the prisoners of war in the United States had left except those who chose to stay behind.

The Treaty of Paris which was concluded with Great Britain on 3 September 1783 and ratified by the U. S. Congress on 14 January 1784 stated in article VI "... and that those who may be in confine-
ment . . ., at the time of ratification of the treaty in America, shall be immediately set at liberty. . . ."

The following year, the United States reached a similar agreement with Prussia (the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1785), whereby in the future PW's would be granted certain rights, among which was the right to appoint a commissary to make open reports to their native country. The treaty is notable in that it furnished the precedent that formally specified the duty of the captor toward its prisoners, and, as such, was the forerunner for the multilateral conventions among nations relative to the treatment accorded prisoners of war. The treaty concluded: "... it is declared, that neither the pretense that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this . . . article; but on the contrary that the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided, and during which they are to be sacredly observed as the most acknowledged article in the law of nature or nations." 170

Reenacted in 1799 as the Treaty of Berlin and extended in 1828, this treaty of 1785 existed as the only mutually effective agreement between the United States and Germany relative to the treatment of prisoners of war during World War I.117


Chapter 2
Prisoners of War as Instruments of Retaliation and Parole

The War of 1812

During the War of 1812, the United States Government adopted measures to solve prisoner of war (PW) problems as they arose, evidently profiting by the experiences gained in the Revolutionary War. A Commissary General of Prisoners was appointed to supervise and conduct prisoner of war activities in the United States; an American commission was maintained in London for the purpose of negotiating an exchange cartel; and both the United States and Great Britain maintained agents in the other’s territory to aid nationals in enemy hands and to effect exchanges.

Enemy prisoners of war captured by American forces were immediately evacuated from the fighting zone to a safe area where they were either quartered in private homes on a contract basis, or, if the number captured so warranted it, in PW camps established on military bases. If the PW’s were quartered in private homes, the United States Government assumed the cost of their board and lodging. Similarly, the services of a physician and burial services were provided for, either by private contract or by the U. S. Army.1 There was no organized PW employment program during the War of 1812, nor was there any program for the enlistment of enemy PW’s into the American military services. But they were used as instruments of retaliation and exchange.

Retaliation

Perhaps historically one of the most famous illustrations of the use of prisoners of war as instruments of retaliation occurred in the War of 1812. In the late fall of 1812, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Winfield Scott surrendered his small force of Militiamen to Brig. Gen. Robert H. Sheaffe after the Battle of Queenston, N. Y. Colonel Scott and his men were imprisoned in Canada, but 23 Americans who

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were Irish by birth were seized by the British and sent to England to be tried as traitors.

When Colonel Scott was released in January or February 1813, he appeared before Congress to press the subject of retaliation against British prisoners of war. A bill vesting "the President of the United States with powers of retaliation" was introduced and would have passed if the President had not already had full constitutional powers to conduct the war. Nevertheless, Colonel Scott, upon his return to duty and with the permission of the President, selected 23 British PW's to be confined in the interior of the United States in retaliation.

In October 1813, Sir George Prevost, the British representative in Canada, ordered 46 American officers and noncommissioned officers placed in close confinement to insure the safety of those imprisoned by Scott. The United States responded by imprisoning a like number, whereupon Prevost ordered all American officer PW's in his department, without distinction of rank, to be placed in close confinement. These retaliatory measures gradually relaxed in the spring of 1814.²

Exchange

Although local battlefield exchanges had taken place, the first formal negotiations between the United States and Great Britain for the exchange of prisoners of war began in November 1812. On 28 November 1812, agents of the United States and Great Britain met at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and concluded a provisional agreement for the exchange of naval prisoners. However, the United States objected to certain portions of the agreement, and it did not go into force. Nevertheless, it did serve as the basis for the Washington Cartel of 1813.³

The Washington Cartel

On 14 May 1813, John Mason, the Commissary General for Prisoners of the United States, and Thomas Barclay, His Britannic Majesty's agent for prisoners of war, signed a cartel for the general exchange of all Army and Navy prisoners of war based on the Halifax agreement of November 1812.⁴ The cartel specified the prisoners would be exchanged without delay and as speedily as circumstances would permit, and provided a schedule of equivalents for the exchange. It stipulated that if either nation at any time delivered more PW's than it received, it was optional with such nation to stop sending more prisoners on credit until a balance had been achieved.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Dept. of State Publication No. 175), VII, pp. 568-73.
⁴ Ibid., II, pp. 557-65.
Provision was made to permit PW's to return to their homeland on parole on the condition that they would not reengage in military activities against the other side until they had been designated as regularly exchanged. When both sides, through an exchange of approved lists, acknowledged such an exchange, the prisoners were freed from any parole conditions and could serve again in the military forces.

In addition to parole and exchange provisions, the cartel provided for the treatment and discipline of prisoners of war consistent with the humanitarian concepts of the period. Types of food and a healthful diet were prescribed, and agents from both governments could inspect the quantity and quality of the subsistence provided. The agents also had the liberty of supplying their prisoners with clothing and with such other small allowances as were deemed reasonable. No reference was made to prisoner of war employment.

The U. S. Secretary of State immediately ratified the cartel, and copies of the instrument were printed and distributed widely. The British Government objected to several details of the provisions and never ratified the cartel. Nevertheless, it was treated by both sides as being in full force from 14 May 1813 (the date of its signing by the United States) until 8 February 1814, at which time the objections of the British Government were made known. However, there was an understanding that the cartel should continue in force after 8 February so far as it was not further objected to by the British Government.6

During the war, other agreements for the exchange of PW's were also made, the most important being a convention signed at Montreal on 15 April 1814. In March 1814, the United States Government sent Brig. Gen. William H. Winder to Quebec to negotiate for the exchange of prisoners, but the negotiations were temporarily suspended when President Madison refused to consent to the release of the 23 British officers who had been imprisoned by Colonel Scott unless the 23 Irish-American prisoners in Great Britain were simultaneously released. Finally on 15 April 1814 at Montreal, General Winder and a Colonel Baynes, who had been appointed by Sir George Prevost to negotiate the exchange, signed the articles of a convention for the mutual release of all PW's, hostages or others, except the 23 Queenston PW's, the 23 American-held PW's, and the 46 American officers held as hostages for the 23 British officers interned by the United States. Those on parole were released by this exchange and could reenter the military service after 15 May 1814. None of these provisions, nor those of

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other agreements, were regarded as militating against the Washington Cartel.\textsuperscript{6}

Very soon after the signing of the convention, England sent word that proceedings had never been instituted against the 23 Irish-Americans and that they had been restored to the condition of ordinary prisoners of war. The hostages on both sides were immediately released, and early in July 1814 another cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war was ratified and executed.\textsuperscript{7}

With the cessation of hostilities and the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on 24 December 1814, both sides released their prisoners of war upon payment of debts contracted by the prisoners during their captivity.\textsuperscript{8}

**The War With Mexico**

During the two years of the Mexican War, 1846-1848, American forces captured numerous prisoners of war. Because of the problems involved (including costs and supply) in either holding them behind American lines or sending them to the United States for internment, the PW's were generally released on parole and permitted to return to their homes on the condition that they would not reengage in the hostilities. Those who would not give their parole were placed in custody.\textsuperscript{9}

The President of the United States approved of this policy in 1846, as is evidenced in the following message from the Secretary of War, W. L. Marcy, to Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor:

> The President has seen, with much satisfaction, the civility and kindness with which you have treated your prisoners, and all the inhabitants with whom you have come in contact. He wishes the course of conduct continued, and all opportunities taken to conciliate the inhabitants, and to let them see that peace is within their reach the moment their rulers will consent to do us justice.\textsuperscript{10}

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, commanding the American forces, reported that at times he released all prisoners on parole, officers and en-
listed men alike. Those who would not sign a parole were sent to a central point to await exchange.\footnote{Hq Army of Occupation, SO 189, 7 Dec 1846. Filed in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 526-27.} Thus, the 3,000 prisoners taken in the battle of Cerro Gordo in April 1847 were paroled as were the prisoners captured at Vera Cruz and elsewhere.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 982, 1955-59; Justin H. Smith, \textit{The War with Mexico} (New York, 1919), II, pp. 32, 340 n. 27.} However, the release of the 3,000 at Cerro Gordo by General Scott brought about a change in the official Government attitude:

\begin{quote}
Your course hitherto, in relations to prisoners of war, both men and officers, in discharging them on parole, has been liberal and kind; but whether it ought to be still longer continued, or in some respects changed, has been under the consideration of the President, and . . . so far as relates to the officers, he thinks they should be detained until duly exchanged. In that case, it will probably be found expedient to send them, or most of them, to the United States. You will not, therefore, except for special reasons in particular cases, discharge the officers, who may be taken prisoners, but detain them with you, or send them to the United States, as you shall deem most expedient.\footnote{H Exec Doc 60, p. 1233. See also: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1227-51.} 
\end{quote}

As a result of this change the majority of the Mexican officers captured at Chapultepec were placed in confinement.\footnote{Although 700 Mexicans were made prisoners and 2,000 were killed or wounded at Chapultepec "about as many deserted the colors and went off to their homes." See: Elliott, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 534-35.}

Some "head-for-head" exchanges of individual prisoners took place on occasion, but there is no record of any productive employment of prisoners of war in Mexico nor of their enlistment into the United States armed forces.\footnote{H Exec Doc 60, pp. 297, 437; Smith, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 32, 340 n. 27.}

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, concluded on 2 February 1848 and which settled the dispute with Mexico, provided "All prisoners of war taken on either side, on land or on sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the exchange of ratifications of this treaty." Ratifications were exchanged on 30 May 1848.\footnote{Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 1107, 1109.}
Chapter 3
The Lack of Utilization of Prisoners of War During the Civil War

The Civil War provided the United States Army with its first experience in the custody and administration of a large number of prisoners of war (PW's). During the war, there was no definite pattern of prisoner of war utilization by either the Union or Confederate forces, and, for the most part, the majority of the prisoners sat out the war in idle confinement and in varying degrees of physical comfort or hardship.

The principal form of utilization was represented by a formal exchange cartel in July 1862 between the North and the South to recover personnel who had fallen into the hands of the other side. Later this agreement broke down under situations that suggested the resort to military expediency. Both sides also permitted prisoners of war to volunteer for enlistment in the forces of their captor, but the employment of the PW's as a labor force never materialized, although in the Union Army such a plan was suggested. In the closing months of the war, the Office of the Commissary General of Prisoners issued the first formal instructions for the employment of prisoners of war in the history of the United States Army.

The outbreak of hostilities in April 1861 between the Federal Government and the seceding States found neither side prepared to handle large numbers of prisoners of war. Past experience of the Army was able to contribute but little to the solution of such a problem. Brevet Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the General in Chief, had a wealth of experience accumulated during more than half a century of active duty, including both the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico. But the experience in respect to prisoners of war in these two conflicts bore only tangentially on the problems of large-scale civil warfare.

The problem confronting the Federal Government in the Civil War was similar to that encountered by Great Britain during the Revolutionary War. Both had maintained that the opposition represented a rebellion against constituted authority and had no existence in law. Hence its leaders, and all who supported them, were considered as engaged in treasonable activities and if captured were to be treated as
traitors under the penalties of law. But this concept could have a practical validity only if the rebellion were contained or subdued within a short time. Such was not the case in the Civil War, and the repulses suffered by the Union armies during the summer of 1861 left more prisoners of war in the hands of the Confederate authorities than the Federal forces had captured. Under such circumstance, the South was in a position to retaliate to any extreme measures.

For the first year of the war little was done on either side to regularize the handling of PW's. The Confederate authorities were willing to release, either on parole or through a formal exchange, the PW's in their hands. On the other side, the Union authorities feared that the conclusion of a formal agreement on the subject of PW exchange would constitute de facto recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent sovereign power, and this the Administration would not concede. It was not until the North became encumbered with large numbers of Confederate captives following the successful Henry and Donelson campaign in Tennessee in 1862 that a serious attempt was made to resolve the prisoner of war situation.

The Commissary General of Prisoners

During the early months of the war Confederate prisoners for the most part were imprisoned in the coastal fortifications at New York and elsewhere. In October 1861, Lt. Col. (later Brevet Brig. Gen.) William Hoffman, 8th Infantry, was detailed for duty as Commissary General of Prisoners under the supervision of The Quartermaster General, Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs. General Meigs had the definite opinion that prisoners of war should not sit the war out in Northern prison camps and instructed Hoffman: "As far as practicable they [prisoners of war] must be required to furnish their own clothing, and to provide themselves the means for this purpose they may be permitted to engage in any occupation which they can make profitable and which will not interfere with their safekeeping..." But seemingly no action was taken on Meigs' instructions.

As the war progressed into its second year, the number of Confederate prisoners in Union hands increased considerably. The forts along the eastern seaboard were no longer adequate to house the thousands of PW's taken in the successful western campaigns, and a number of camps, which had been constructed as rendezvous for Volunteers, had to be stockaded and converted into PW camps. These were located chiefly in relatively secure areas of the Middle West; notably at Camp Douglas, Chicago, Ill.; Camp Chase, Columbus, Ohio; and

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2 Ltr, Meigs to Hoffman, 26 Oct 1861. Ibid., pp. 122-23.
a camp at Alton, Ill. Later the Volunteer rendezvous at Elmira, N. Y., was converted into a PW camp.

Because of the large number of prisoners of war held on both sides, a change also was made in the status of the Commissary General of Prisoners. In June 1862 this office was removed from the jurisdiction of The Quartermaster General, and Colonel Hoffman became subject only to orders of the War Department. Early in October of the same year the headquarters of his bureau was transferred to Washington. By 31 October 1862, the Commissary General of Prisoners had direct charge of all Union prisoners of war released on limited parole in the North and supervised PW maintenance in all Northern internment camps.

Formal Exchange: The Dix-Hill Cartel

In the meantime negotiations had begun between the Union and Confederate authorities relative to the exchange of PW's. Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, commander of the Federal garrison at Fort Monroe, and Maj. Gen Benjamin C. Huger, commanding the Confederate defenses of Norfolk, opened negotiations in June 1862 which were concluded by Maj. Gen. John A. Dix (representing the Union forces) and Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill (representing the South). The negotiations between Dix and Hill resulted in the signing, on 22 July 1862, of a cartel governing the exchange of prisoners of war on both sides. The agreement consisted of seven articles and three supplementary articles, with a short preamble. The preamble carefully skirted the question of recognition, thus, “The undersigned having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war have agreed to the following articles.”

Article 1 contained a detailed scale of equivalents which were to be the basis for all exchanges: A commanding general or an admiral was rated as the equivalent of 60 privates or common seamen. This comparative valuation extended to naval petty officers and noncommissioned officers in the Army and Marine Corps who were considered to be worth two privates or common seamen. Private soldiers and common seamen were to be exchanged for each other, man for man. This article also stipulated that the officers and men of privateers should be considered to be prisoners of war and not pirates.

The second and third articles dealt with the problem of civilian prisoners. It was agreed in Article 2 that persons holding Militia...
rank were not to be held as military prisoners unless they were actually
on active duty at the time of capture, while Article 3 stated that
captured civilians could be exchanged only for persons of an equiva-
 lent status. The remaining articles dealt with the actual mechanics
of parole and exchange, and the effect of the agreement upon the
availability of the released PW’s for further military service.

The Dix-Hill Cartel was an agreement for the immediate parole
and eventual exchange of all PW’s. The character of the parole was
in the nature of a quasi-exchange, per parolee, to be effected by a tally
system with conversion to an actual exchange. It was not antici-
pated, therefore, that large numbers of PW’s would accumulate either
in the Confederacy or in the North. If, for any reason, the continuous
release of PW’s should cease, no provision was made for the uniform
treatment of captured soldiers while in the hands of the enemy.⁶

The lack of any agreement on this aspect of the prisoner of war ques-
tion caused much bitter recrimination on the part of both belligerents.
Moreover, almost from the moment of signing, both the Federal and
Confederate authorities evaded the stipulation in Article 8 that both
sides should “carry out promptly, . . . and in good faith” the details
of the agreement. At the time the cartel was signed (in the summer
of 1862) the Union armies were in the midst of the disastrous Penin-
sular campaign south and east of Richmond, which resulted in the
South’s capturing great numbers of Union prisoners. Consequently
the Federal Government was most anxious that the exact terms of the
cartel be carried out. But after the tide of war turned in 1863, the
preponderance of prisoners was held by the North, and the Confed-
erates were then constantly pressing for the complete observance of the
exchange agreement.⁷

Due to this mutual failure to observe the Dix-Hill exchange pact,
both the North and the Confederacy were confronted with the problem
of ever increasing numbers of prisoners of war who had to be fed,
housed, and clothed. For the South it proved to be an impossible bur-
den. The transportation system of the southern states, already
strained to the breaking point in the effort to supply its armies, was
unable to provide adequately for the additional thousands of PW’s con-
centrated in the Confederate prisons. Southern soldiers imprisoned
in the North fared much better by comparison, although there was
room for improvement.⁸ Both in the North and South there was con-
tinual agitation that the prisoners of war be used in some way to serve
the ends of the captor, either militarily or economically.

⁷ See: The Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives Made During the
Third Session of the Fortieth Congress, 1869 (Washington, 1869), IV, pp. 294, 335–61,
379–561.
LACK OF UTILIZATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR DURING THE CIVIL WAR

The Military Recruitment of Prisoners of War

Union Forces

From an early date various sources pressured the War Department to permit the enlistment of PW's into the United States Army. In the international laws of war, according to the Lieber Code,\(^9\) it was unlawful to force enemy subjects into the military service; but ambitious Volunteer officers, and even recruiting officers for the Regular Army, were not above seeking permission to recruit among the Confederate prisoners.\(^1\)

The policy of enlisting prisoners of war into field units of the captor, although not prohibited to the captor state by the laws of war, was fraught with danger for the enlistee. If captured again in battle by the forces of his state of origin, he was liable to be tried and executed for desertion.\(^11\)

The policy of the administration wavered continually throughout the war between outright sanction of the recruiting of prisoners of war and entire prohibition. As the old regiments in the field became reduced through battle losses and disease, army commanders in the field clamored to recruit PW's for their depleted units. The War Department seemed unable to come to a definite decision and hold to it. As early as July 1862 Secretary Stanton wrote to the United States marshal in New York City "to visit and hold communication with the persons now held as prisoners of war at New York for the purpose of ascertaining whether any and how many of them are willing to enter the military service of the United States, and to make a report to this Department."\(^12\) At the same time Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, who had recently captured New Orleans, energetically recruited for his regiments from among the PW's taken at the surrender of that city. The Confederate authorities complained that "scores of

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\(^9\) In 1863 at the request of Pres Lincoln, Dr. Francis Lieber, a recognized expert in the field of international law, prepared the "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," which was promulgated to the Army as GO 100, 24 Apr 1868, and which was known as the Lieber Code. This code is acknowledged as one of the classic documents of the laws of war and was the first codification of international law relative to PW's ever issued by a government as a directive to its armed forces in the field. Based on the Treaty of Berlin, it reiterated the duty of the captor to protect PW's. It also expressed certain obligations on the part of the PW's: (1) to work when required for the benefit of the captor (the work to be performed according to the PW's rank and condition); and (2) not to conspire to escape or rebel. See: Francis Lieber, *Guerilla Parties* (New York, 1862); J. B. Mason, "German Prisoners of War in the United States," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXIV (Apr 45), p. 199; Thomas E. Holland, *The Laws of War on Land* (London, 1908), pp. 71-72; Phily, op. cit., p. 18.


\(^11\) In late 1862 Gen Ben Butler complained that seven German residents of Louisiana who had enlisted in the 8th Vermont had been captured and executed as deserters by the Confederates. See: Ltr, Butler to Halleck, 14 Nov 1862. *Ibid.*, p. 708.

them have been daily going over to the enemy and enlisting . . . until now there are very few left . . . not in the ranks of the enemy.”

By the beginning of 1863, the Secretary of War had changed his mind as to the advisability of enlisting prisoners of war and even prohibited such enlistments. But by spring the official attitude had changed again. Between May and August 1863 some 600 Confederate prisoners were enlisted by the 3d Maryland Cavalry and 1st Connecticut Cavalry Regiments from among the captives confined at Fort Delaware. But the practice was again prohibited by the Secretary of War on 21 August.

The occupation of Tennessee and the establishment of a provisional government under Brig. Gen. Andrew Johnson brought demands that PW’s, particularly those who had been conscripted into the Confederate army from the Unionist regions of East Tennessee, be permitted to join the Union armies. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, the commanding general of the Department of the Ohio, whose department included East Tennessee, wrote to Colonel Hoffman that “it would be very cruel and unjust to force these loyal East Tennessee conscripts back into the rebel ranks by exchange. . . .” He stated that he would be pleased “to have some arrangement made by which they could be released on taking the oath, or be allowed to enlist in . . . East Tennessee regiments.” Secretary Stanton almost at once decided to make an exception of these PW’s who had been conscripted into the Confederate service. General Burnside, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding the Department of the Missouri, and General Johnson, the Military Governor of Tennessee, were authorized to accept “prisoners of war who have been impressed into the rebel service. . . .” But again in August the Secretary directed that “. . . hereafter no prisoners of war be enlisted in our Army without his special sanction in each case,” a ruling that brought forth a strong protest from Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commanding the Department and Army of the Cumberland. He believed that possibly thousands of prisoners of war could be enlisted and that if each individual case had to be referred to Washington, recruiting would be materially impeded. Once again Stanton retreated and told Rosecrans to go ahead and enlist as many as he could, that ap-

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Lack of utilization of prisoners of war during the Civil War

In December another general clamored for permission to recruit prisoners of war. General Butler, then commanding at Fort Monroe, wrote Stanton inquiring whether any objection would be voiced "... to my enlisting as many prisoners as may desire to do so after they know they can be exchanged [italics author's] either in the regular or volunteer forces of the United States or that of any State?" On 2 January 1864, Lincoln wrote to Butler: "The Secretary of War and myself have concluded to discharge of the prisoners at Point Lookout the following classes: First. Those who will take the oath prescribed in the proclamation of December 8, and, by the consent of General Marston, will enlist in our service." Six days later Butler directed the commanding officer at Point Lookout, Md., to commence the enlistment of prisoners into either the Army or the Navy. General Butler entered the project with much energy, apparently expecting a considerable enlistment from among the PW's. This was, in fact, the most ambitious PW recruitment drive to be launched during the war. Each PW was interrogated alone, and if he expressed a desire to enlist, the oath of allegiance was administered at once. An officer from Butler's headquarters was detailed as recruiting officer, and an examining physician was appointed.

Figure 2. United States general depot for prisoners of war at Point Lookout, Md.

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21 Ltr. Lincoln to Butler, 2 Jan 1864. Ibid., p. 808.
22 Ltr. Butler to Brig Gen G. Marston, 9 Jan 1864. Ibid., p. 823. See also: Ibid., p. 826.
20 March, General Butler's efforts had succeeded to the extent that he petitioned the War Department for permission to muster his prisoner of war recruits as a regimental organization. This permission was granted by The Provost Marshal General on the 24th, and General Butler was requested to make nominations for officers in the new regiment. Later two additional regiments were authorized.

As the struggle continued and fewer men came forward as volunteers, the State governors on whom fell the task of raising the State quotas, also began to cast eyes upon the manpower resources behind the PW stockades. Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, an administration stalwart, was particularly insistent in his demands; and the War Department found it difficult to refuse compliance. In September 1863 Governor Morton requested permission to enlist "between 100 and 200 Irish Catholics . . . who desire to enlist in the Thirty-fifth Irish Indiana Regiment." On 19 September Stanton granted Morton the authority to "release the 200 Confederate Catholics mentioned in your telegram, and the colonel of the Thirty-fifth Indiana is authorized to enlist and muster them into his regiment, but without premium, advance pay, or bounty." By 1864 the manpower shortage in the North had become even more acute. Many communities, unable to raise their quotas without a draft, suggested that recruits from the PW camps be enlisted and credited to the district, which would pay the regular enlistment bounty to such recruits. One such scheme was actually approved by President Lincoln in September 1864. President Lincoln wrote:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, September 1, 1864.

It is represented to me that there are at Rock Island, Ill., as rebel prisoners of war, many persons of northern or foreign birth, who are unwilling to be exchanged and be sent South, but who wish to take the oath of allegiance and enter the military service of the Union.

Colonel Huidekoper, on behalf of the people of some parts of Pennsylvania, wishes to pay the bounties the Government would have to pay to proper persons of this class, have them enter the service of the United States, and be credited to the localities furnishing the bounty money. He will therefore proceed to Rock Island, ascertain the names of such persons (not including any who have attractions southward), and telegraph them to the Provost-Marshal-General here, whereupon direction will be given to discharge the persons named upon their taking the oath of allegiance; and then, upon the official evidence being furnished that they shall have been duly received and

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23 Ltr, Fry to Butler, 24 Mar 1864. Ibid., p. 1096. The Office of the Provost Marshal General was in charge of the overall recruitment program. Therefore, the recruitment of enemy PW's necessitated close cooperation with the Office of the Commissary General of Prisoners. See: Ibid., p. 257. See also: Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States (Its Organization, Duties, Pay, and Allowances), from 1775 to 1901, compiled by Maj Gen Henry C. Corbin and Raphael P. Thian (Washington, 1901), pp. 667-70.


25 Ltr, Stanton to Morton, 19 Sep 1863. Ibid., p. 824.
mustered into the service of the United States, their number will be credited as may be directed by Colonel Huidekoper.

[Indorsement.]

The bearer will present the list of names contemplated within. The Provost-Marshal-General will please take the proper steps to have them examined, mustered in, and discharged from prison, so as to be properly credited, all according to the within.

A. LINCOLN

This action was so unusual that both President Lincoln and the Secretary of War thought it necessary to explain it to the commanding general, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who had protested such recruitment. Stanton on his side disclaimed any responsibility for the President's action, and sought Grant's advice as to what disposition to make of any recruits that might be raised in this manner. Grant replied the same day and advised that they be placed all in one regiment and sent either to New Mexico or placed on duty with General Pope.

All in all, nearly 1,500 prisoners were enlisted and organized into three regiments known as the 1st, 2d, and 3d United States Volunteers. These three regiments and an additional regiment, recruited at Rock Island, Ill., by direction of the President, were not used in direct contact with Confederate forces, but were sent to the frontier for essential service against the Indians. This protected the former Confederate soldiers against falling into the hands of the Confederate authorities, and released veteran regiments serving on the frontier for service at the front. Two more regiments of prisoner volunteers were authorized early in 1865. In all, six regiments of U. S. Volunteers were organized and sent to the western plains. Confederate prisoners of war were not a principal source of manpower for the northern armies for the total recruited was probably under 10,000, not a large number considering that during the war approximately 150,000 Confederate soldiers were captured or surrendered to the loyal states.

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27 Ltr, Lincoln to Grant, 22 Sep 1864. Ibid., p. 740.
28 Ltr, Stanton to Grant, 25 Sep 1864; Grant to Stanton, 25 Sep 1864. Ibid., p. 744.
30 Ibid.; Hr, Grant to Stanton, 25 Sep 1864. Ibid., p. 744.
32 Official Records, ser. II, vol. VIII, p. 831. A total of 6,334 PW's were recruited for the military service as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>6,334</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 23d and 65th Ill. Vols.</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 35th Ind. Vols. (Catholic)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 3d Md. Cav</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 1st Conn. Cav</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 8th Vt. Vols</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in 1st U. S. Vols. (at Pt. Lookout, Md.)</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnote continued on following page.
Confederate Forces

Confederate officers made some effort to recruit Union prisoners of war, although such a program was not widespread. In November 1864 the commanding officer of the Confederate PW camp at Camp Lawton, Ga., reported that 349 of his charges had enlisted in the Confederate service. At Camp Millen, Ga., Confederate officers came daily into the PW camp to solicit recruits, and a few hundred joined with them. A Federal prisoner of war reported, probably with great exaggeration, that 2,000 at Belle Isle joined the Confederate arm. Undoubtedly many of these "galvanized Yankees" were foreigners, who cared little for either belligerent, and others who took the oath as a means of freedom and escape northward. About a thousand captured Irish Catholics took the oath of loyalty and joined the Confederate army, but at the first opportunity all deserted. A Confederate Catholic suggested later that the oath could be made to hold if such prisoners of war swore it before a Catholic priest.

In general the Confederate War Department was reluctant to fill its ranks with former enemies. In the fall of 1864, Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones requested that Gen. Braxton Bragg permit him to recruit among the Federal prisoners of war confined at Charleston, S. C. General Bragg's letter to the Confederate War Department was indorsed by the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, as follows: "A battalion or two might be formed of the foreigners—the Yankees are not to be trusted so far, or at all."

PW's as Instruments of Retaliation

The problem of what to do with the thousands of captives became acute after the breakdown of the exchange agreement. The major solution—to do nothing but let them accumulate in prison camps—was apparently the result of fear of reprisals; and on several occasions reprisals were resorted to by both sides to exact concessions.
When the Federal Government began to raise Negro regiments, the South regarded the action with something akin to horror. The Confederacy interpreted it as a move to incite a servile insurrection among the slave population of the seceding states and announced that Negroes captured in arms would not be considered as prisoners of war. In retaliation the President issued a proclamation on 30 July 1863 ordering:

\[\ldots\text{ that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel soldier shall be executed, and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war}.\]

This was, almost without exception, the official administration policy throughout the war: prisoners of war were to be forced to labor only as an instrument of reprisal against some act of the enemy.

In July 1863 when Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck requested permission to use prisoners of war as laborers on the fortifications of Baltimore, General Halleck, the General in Chief, refused on the grounds that no instance was known in which the enemy had compelled prisoners to work on fortifications. The decision was made despite the Lieber Code provision that PW’s might be required to work for the benefit of the captor, and despite the lack of prohibition against employing the prisoners on work connected with military installations. General Halleck appeared to have considered the use of PW labor only from the aspect of retaliation.

Maj. Gen. (later Gen.) William T. Sherman, on finding his approach to Savannah heavily laid with torpedoes (the Civil War equivalent of land mines), stated that “this was not war, but murder . . . .” In retaliation, he used prisoners of war to remove the torpedoes.

The labor shortage was more sharply felt in the South than in the North, and it was perhaps as a result of pressing need that the Confederacy adopted a policy of employing captured Negro soldiers on various public works, particularly in building fortifications. In October 1864, Federal officials noted that the Confederacy was employing upward of 100 Negro prisoners of war in the trenches. General Grant at once authorized a like number of Confederate PW’s to be put to work, under the fire of their own artillery, on a canal that was being dug across a neck of the James River. This prompt retaliation caused

\[39\text{ WD GO 252, 31 Jul 1863. } \text{Ibid., ser. II, vol. VI, p. 163; Reports of } \text{Third Session of the Fortieth Congress, 1869, pp. 284–85, 461.}\]
\[40\text{ Ltrs, Schenck to Halleck, 6 Jul 1863; Halleck to Schenck, 6 Jul 1863. } \text{Official Records, ser. II, vol. VI, p. 85.}\]
\[41\text{ Lieber Code, art. 76.}\]
the Confederates to withdraw the Union PW’s at once. At Mobile, Ala., more than 800 captured Negro soldiers were employed on the fortifications, an act that caused Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, the commander of the United States forces in west Florida and southern Alabama, to assign a similar number of Confederate prisoners to work on Union defenses.

**Prisoner of War Labor**

**The Federal Government**

Generally speaking, the North was reluctant to use prisoner of war labor, and almost without exception, the PW’s were idly confined in stockades. The loudest dissenting voice to this policy of enforced idleness was that of The Quartermaster General, General Meigs, who as early as 1861 instructed the Commissary General of Prisoners to make the Confederate prisoners earn their keep. Although his early advice was not followed, General Meigs continued to insist that much useful work could be obtained from the prisoners. While on a tour of inspection in the western theater of operations in November 1863, he wrote General Halleck that to transport the numerous prisoners of war in that area to a safe place would involve the Government in considerable expense. He therefore proposed that they be used to the advantage of the Government. In building bridges, repairing railroads which they have destroyed, and in handling stores, forage, and subsistence. To this General Meigs received the blunt reply that it is not deemed expedient to employ prisoners of war on public works or as laborers.

General Meigs then consulted Dr. Francis Lieber, the international expert, who had drawn up the code for the conduct of the armies in the field. Dr. Lieber stated that all European precedent favored the employment of prisoners of war on public works. “Prisoners of war are universally set to work, whenever work can be found,” he wrote.

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45 Some Confederate prisoners claimed they were compelled to unload Federal vessels and to erect buildings for Federal officers. If they refused, they said, they were driven to work with clubs. See: *Official Records*, ser. II, vol. VIII, p. 347. Another Confederate prisoner at Point Lookout, Md., stated that some prisoners (artisans or mechanics) were employed without pay. See: Luther W. Hopkins, *From Bull Run to Appomattox* (Baltimore, 1908), pp. 169-80, and Henry Steele Commager (ed.), *The Blue and the Gray* (Indianapolis, 1950), II, p. 696.


mander who should be proved to have neglected to use prisoners for such work or for repairing bridges or railroads or for fetching supplies . . . would be cashiered." 48

However, Dr. Lieber and General Meigs were too far advanced for the rest of the Army, and all that was accomplished with PW labor except for retaliation instances was the construction of a sewer and waterworks at the Rock Island, Ill., prison and a drainage ditch at Elmira, N. Y. 49 The project at Rock Island resulted in the establishment of a regular system for PW employment on public works and showed what might have been accomplished had The Quartermaster General been given full authority to act on his ideas.

As a result, on 13 June the Commissary General of Prisoners issued a circular with the approval of the Secretary of War that defined the conditions of such employment. 50 The circular established the pay rate at 10 cents per day for skilled PW laborers and 5 cents per day for unskilled PW labor. Moreover, this sum was not to be paid directly to the prisoner but was to be deposited to his credit with the post commandant or with other officers charged with handling PW funds. With his pay the prisoner could purchase food and tobacco. Finally, the circular specified that a significantly higher ration be issued to a PW engaged in manual labor than that issued to idle prisoners. 51

The Confederacy

Captured white and Negro soldiers were accorded different treatment by Confederate officials. The whites were placed, for the most part, in idle confinement at such prisons as Libby and Andersonville. The Negro soldiers, on the other hand, were seldom imprisoned but were distributed among the citizens or employed on government works. "Under these circumstances they receive enough to eat, and are worked no harder than accustomed to." 52

Although there are isolated instances of where the Confederacy used the labor of white prisoners of war, there is no indication that any large-scale attempt was made to utilize the thousands confined in their stockades. As early as September 1861, the Confederate Government considered working PW's, or at least approved of their use. In the words of Jefferson Davis: "They might as well work as they have to be fed." 53

PW labor was used for details connected with the internment camps. For instance, at Camp Sorgum, S. C., 100 prisoners at a time were allowed to go into the woods on parole to fell trees, which were used in the construction of the camp. At Salisbury, N. C., the PW's dug wells for a water supply; and at Andersonville, Ga., the PW's were used to expand the camp.54

A sprinkling of PW's chose to take the oath of allegiance to the Confederacy and work in factories and at other skilled trades. Now and then a prisoner was paroled to live outside the prison and to work at some skilled trade.55 At Richmond in early 1863, 200 Union prisoners took the oath of allegiance to the Confederacy and began working at $2 a day, 60 of them at the Tredegar Iron Works.56

By 1864 the shortage of skilled labor in the Confederacy led authorities to consider the use of prisoner of war labor in the manufacture of military supplies. An attempt was made to establish a shoe factory at the Andersonville, Ga., prison, but the effort apparently failed because of the difficulty in procuring necessary tools and equipment.57 However, citizens not connected with the military establishment could employ the PW's at Andersonville. A general order issued in June 1864 stipulated that persons wishing to employ PW's had to state in their application the particular work to be done. The post commander then had to approve it in writing.58 Moreover, manufacturers of vital war materials were permitted to recruit volunteer labor from among the prisoners. One PW reported that at Columbia, S. C., inducements of good wages, plenty of food and clothing, and the freedom of the place were tendered to any prisoner who would work in a Confederate arms factory.59

The Cessation of Hostilities

The surrender of Gen. Robert E. Lee to Gen. U. S. Grant on 9 April 1865 established a policy whereby the bulk of the Confederate army was free to return to their homes. Under the terms of the Appomattox surrender the officers gave their paroles not to take up arms until properly exchanged and each company or regimental commander signed a like parole for the men of his command. The officers were allowed to keep their side arms, their private horses, and their baggage, and were to "... be allowed to return to their homes, not to

54 Reports of ... Third Session of the Fortieth Congress, 1869, p. 185.
55 Coulter, op. cit., p. 473.
57 GO 40, Hq. Post, Andersonville, Ga., 8 Jun 1864. Ibid., p. 215.
58 Isham, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside." On 17 April 1865, Generals Thomas and Canby were authorized to give the same terms to Confederate forces in the west and south. Altogether 174,223 Confederate prisoners of war were released on parole.

The PWs in confinement were released by stages. Early in May 1865, those prisoners below the rank of colonel who had signified a desire to take the oath of allegiance before the fall of Richmond were released on parole. According to General Hoffman, the Commissary General of Prisoners, at the time of the surrender over 50,000 prisoners of war plus 5,000 Confederate officers were confined in 17 military prisons. He wanted at least 50 of them below the rank of general discharged daily, and his views seemingly are reflected in President Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty. In the proclamation, President Lincoln stated that all officers, except those with a rank above colonel in the Army and lieutenant in the Navy, could be discharged upon taking the oath of allegiance.

However, when the release order appeared on 6 June 1865, it allowed the following: (1) the discharge of all enlisted men of the Army and petty officers and seamen of the Navy upon taking the oath of allegiance; (2) the discharge of all officers, captain or lower, in the Army or below lieutenant in the Navy, provided they were not graduates of the U. S. Military or Naval Academies, and if they took the oath of allegiance; (3) as many as possible to be discharged daily; and (4) The Quartermaster General to furnish transportation to the point nearest the prisoners' homes, either by rail or by steamboat.

This order remained in effect until July 1865, at which time the President of the United States ordered the release of all prisoners of war except those captured with Jefferson Davis. The released PW's had to take the oath of allegiance and to give a good behavior parole. Thus, out of 96,408 prisoners of war captured and confined by the Union Army, only 6 remained as of 20 October 1865.

To summarize briefly, in the Civil War both sides were crippled by a shortage of manpower, yet both sides overlooked the vast labor pool offered by idle prisoners of war. Some were used to a limited extent, but animosity toward the opposing belligerent excluded any

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63 WD GO 85, 8 May 1865.
66 WD GO 108, 6 Jan 1865.
widespread employment. Consequently the majority of prisoners on
both sides spent their confinement in enforced idleness. The South,
of a necessity, used PW labor more than did the North. The one
Northern experiment, at Rock Island, Ill., clearly indicated the value
that PW's might have had if properly utilized.
The years following the Civil War marked a period of reconstruction and expansion. The growth of population and the movement westward brought about a series of clashes between United States military forces and different Indian tribes. Prisoners of war taken in these conflicts were few, yet their experiences were similar to those suffered by American troops during the mid-20th century Korean conflict. Captured troops were usually tortured or were put to death; some were held for ransom or as hostages. And the Indians were treated in much the same way by the American troops.

The First Prewar PW Planning

As the 19th century drew to a close, American relations with Spain were becoming more strained and resulted in a declaration of war on 25 April 1898.\(^1\) The Spanish-American War was of such short duration that it could scarcely be called a war—hostilities lasted only approximately three months. But the war is important to the prisoner of war utilization program, not because of the number of prisoners captured nor of their utilization, but because it represents the first time that a PW program was formulated in advance of the capture of the prisoners.

While Maj. Gen. William Shafter’s forces were besieging the city of Santiago, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General of the Army, proposed an overall plan to terminate hostilities on Cuba. General Miles’ plan was to march General Shafter’s forces, after the capture of the district of Santiago de Cuba, through rolling country (which was reported free of yellow fever) to Poron and Taguagabo and then to Villa Clara on the northern coast of Cuba. His objective

\(^1\) For an account of the growing tension between the United States and Spain and the outbreak of war, see: Kreidberg and Henry, op. cit., pp. 210–11.
was to secure some deep-water harbors so that new troops could be disembarked to conduct a campaign into the interior.

In formulating his plan, General Miles figured that “several thousand prisoners” would be taken with the capture of Santiago de Cuba and that the capture of Puerto Rico, a second objective position then under consideration, would add at least 30,000 more prisoners of war. Realizing the lack of adequate roads, which were necessary to support such an operation, he proposed that the prisoners of war be used to “build the road as they go at the rate of 5 miles per day as that army corps marches . . . .” In supporting his proposal he stated:

I make this suggestion as having three advantages: First we could employ at reasonable compensation such prisoners as desired occupation in road building; second, we could move into the interior of Cuba our large cavalry command without serious molestation; third, we would be operating during the rainy or sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba . . . .

Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have upward of 50,000 prisoners, and if we could, by judicious humane treatment, use them in a way that would be advantageous to themselves and to our interests, I think it would be advisable.

General Miles advised further against evacuating the prisoners to U. S. Army camps or the United States for fear of infecting the American populace with disease. The War Department, however, disapproved of General Miles’ plan and ordered him to organize an expedition for “movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico.” The proposed plan remains, nevertheless, the first instance of PW planning prior to capture by U. S. forces.

Meanwhile, during the first attack on Santiago early in July, very few Spanish troops were captured. Those taken were surprised at the humane treatment they received. Later, approximately one hundred surrendered voluntarily. There was little opportunity to employ them as a labor force, although one United States soldier, in showing some of the prisoners to his regiment, referred to them as “dandy kitchen police.” A few were used in a local exchange to regain the release of some American sailors who had fallen into the hands of the Spanish. On 17 July 1898, the entire Spanish force in the Santiago de Cuba district (approximately 24,000) surrendered on terms that

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2 Report of the Secretary of War, Miscellaneous Reports,” Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, p. 25.
3 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
4 Ibid., p. 96.
6 The Santiago Campaign (Richmond, Va., 1927), pp. 75, 358.
7 “Report on Conduct of the War,” I, p. 323. Gen Miles later stated that during the Spanish-American war “not a [U. S. Army] prisoner, color, gun, or rifle has been captured by the enemy.” See: “Report of the Secretary of War, Miscellaneous Reports,” Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, p. 34.
included parole and the earliest possible return to Spain at the expense of the United States. The surrendered troops were disarmed, with the exception of the Spanish officers who were allowed to retain their sidearms, and were isolated in separate camps from the American troops for fear of yellow fever.  

After the surrender of Santiago de Cuba, an expedition under General Miles sailed for Puerto Rico to reinforce the troops fighting there. On 13 August word was received of the signing of the peace protocol, setting forth the same conditions of surrender as had applied in Cuba.  

Meanwhile, after Rear Adm. George Dewey had defeated the Spanish fleet in the Pacific, the War Department dispatched an expedition to the Philippines under the command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt. On 13 August Manila, the capital city, fell and approximately 13,000 prisoners of war were taken into U. S. custody.  

The agreement concluded between General Merritt and His Excellency Don Fermín Jaudenes, acting general in chief of Spanish troops in the Philippines, included the following: (1) all prisoners, other than officers, would surrender their arms and would remain under control of their officers and in quarters designated by U. S. forces "until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations"; (2) all officers and men in captivity were to be supplied by the United States, according to rank, with rations and necessary aid "as though they were prisoners of war" until the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Spanish soldiers were quickly brought in from the intrenchments surrounding Manila, formed into regiments, and disarmed. They were kept in the walled portion of the city where for the most part they occupied its churches and convents. Word soon arrived of the peace protocol and the Spanish soldiers, except those who chose to remain, were repatriated to Spain.

Repatriation of the Spanish prisoners of war was done as quickly as possible. By 17 September 1898, all prisoners of war had been evacuated from Cuba except a few yellow fever patients and a small number of soldiers who elected to reside on the island. All Spanish troops were evacuated from Puerto Rico by October 1898, but because
of the distance involved and the native insurrections, the evacuation of the Spanish from the Philippines lasted until 1900.\textsuperscript{13}

The Philippine Insurrection

The surrender of the Spanish forces in the Philippines did not result in peace for the occupying United States forces. The next few years were marked with 2,811 contacts with Filipino insurrectionists, ranging from minor skirmishes to small-scale actions. During these engagements prisoners of war were taken. These were imprisoned but were treated humanely and with kindness.\textsuperscript{14} Many were released as a result of a proclamation of amnesty on 1 April 1900 and after taking the following oath of allegiance: "I hereby renounce all allegiance to any and all so-called revolutionary governments in the Philippine Islands and recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States therein. . . ."\textsuperscript{15} Some who continued to defy authority were deported to Guam. These included 50 prominent Filipino insurgent army officers, civil officials, insurgent agents, sympathizers, and agitators.\textsuperscript{16}

During the spring of 1900, General Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the insurrectionists, was captured and voluntarily ascribed to the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation to the Philippine people, he urged the termination of hostilities against the United States. Guerrilla activities continued, however, until April 1902 at which time Malvar, the last important insurgent leader on Luzon, surrendered along with eight to ten thousand troops. On 4 July 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of peace and amnesty for all except those convicted of murder, rape, arson, and other serious crimes.\textsuperscript{17} Thus ended the organized native resistance in the Philippine Islands.

\textsuperscript{13}The cost of repatriating the Spanish from the Philippines was $908,583.75. See: "Reports of the Secretary of War," Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899–1903, p. 15. See also: Frederick Louis Huidekoper, The Military Unpreparedness of the United States (New York, 1915), p. 239.

\textsuperscript{14}"Reports of the Secretary of War," Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899–1903, pp. 14, 261. See also: Annual Reports of the War Department, June 30, 1899, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{15}"Reports of the Secretary of War," Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899–1903, pp. 101–02.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 173.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., pp. 173, 256–57.
Chapter 5
Prisoner of War Employment During World War I

Modern warfare with its great demand for manpower to support large field armies and essential war industries places a premium on the labor supply of all belligerents. Consequently, the labor potential offered by prisoners of war influenced policy making during World Wars I and II. To exchange PW’s would have given the enemy workers for essential industrial plants, even though they might be forbidden to reengage in actual hostilities. Therefore only limited exchanges were made, and World Wars I and II were characterized by an emphasis on the use of prisoners of war as a labor force.

Pre-World War I Planning

The Hague Conventions

At the invitation of Czar Nicholas II of Russia, representatives of 26 powers of Europe, Asia, and America assembled at The Hague on 18 May 1899 to define the laws of warfare. Twenty-four of the nations, including the United States, adopted and ratified the “Hague Convention of 1899 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.” This was the first time an agreement of such nature had been ratified by so many nations. With respect to prisoners of war, the agreement outlined the duties of both the captor and the prisoner. One article in particular, Article VI, had a definite effect on the prisoner of war employment program. It provided that the captor state could employ prisoners of war, thereby announcing a principle that had already been practiced by many countries.¹

In 1907, the powers again gathered at The Hague to correct certain deficiencies that appeared in the 1899 convention. The program adopted contained the same provisions for prisoners of war as did the earlier convention. However, the Hague Convention of 1907 included an article which subsequently affected the belligerents during World War I. Article II declared that the respective conventions would only apply between contracting parties, and then only if all the belligerents were parties to the convention. Because of this the Treaty of Prussia of 1785 with its later amendments became the only effec-

¹Fooks, op. cit., pp. 17, 208.
tive agreement during World War I that obligated Germany and the United States with respect to prisoners of war. Two of the belligerents in World War I, Montenegro and Serbia, did not sign the Hague conventions. Nevertheless, during the war, the United States complied fully with the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907.

Early U. S. Regulations

For 15 years following the Spanish-American War, only U. S. planning for prisoners of war was the incorporation of general provisions for capture and treatment (as required by the Hague conventions) into the U. S. “Rules of Land Warfare” and Army “Field Regulations.” However, the threat of war in Europe in 1913 motivated the War College Division (WCD) of the Office of the Chief of Staff to prepare a set of “general rules for the government and control of prisoners of war.” These were incorporated into a proposed general order in case the United States should become involved in the hostilities. Primarily, they were designed to guide officers concerned with or designated to command internment camps.

The proposed order authorized the employment of prisoners of war on any military or public project not having a direct connection with military operations. Private employment of the PW’s, both by corporations and individuals, was also authorized, as was the use of the prisoners to maintain themselves—but certain requirements had to be fulfilled. The work had to benefit the PW’s morale and physical welfare and had to be of benefit to the public; it had to be suitable to the PW’s rank and work capacity; and the PW had to be paid a reasonable wage. The order also charged the commandants of internment camps to “... prescribe such other and further rules for the good order and discipline of the prisoners of war, interned and under their control, as may be necessary.” Supplemental rules had to be consistent with the “Rules of Land Warfare” as published for the armies of the United States.

Although certain suggestions made by the Office of The Judge Advocate General were incorporated, the order was never published. During this time, military operations were being conducted along the Mexican border, and captives were commonly alluded to as “interned prisoners.” The exact status of these prisoners was not clear, and to grant them the status of prisoners of war might have raised serious

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3 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1918, pp. 7, 48-49; Frory, op. cit., p. 22.
4 Memo, Ch, WCD, to CofS, 29 May 14. WCD 8580-1. Records of the War Department General Staff (WDGS). National Archives. A copy of the proposed general order is in author’s file.
political questions which the United States desired to avoid. Therefore, the Secretary of War directed that the proposed order not be published at this time.\(^5\)

Copies of the proposed order were sent in March 1915 to the American military attaches at London, Vienna, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, Rome, Tokyo, Petrograd, and Bern, with instructions to compare the rules pertaining to prisoners of war with those in force in these respective countries. The attaches were to obtain copies of these foreign rules for the Chief of Staff.\(^6\) Prisoner of war planning in the United States rested at this stage until the following year.

**Army-Navy PW Agreement, 1916**

In July 1916, the Secretary of the Navy proposed that the Army accept custody of all prisoners of war captured by naval forces and suggested further that the Army detail an officer to cooperate with a naval representative in formulating plans and regulations to effect such transfers. The Army agreed, and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker designated Col. C. W. Kennedy of the General Staff, War College Division, for the task.\(^7\) Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels designated Lt. Comdr. Adolphus Staton.\(^8\)

In the course of the planning, three important questions arose. Specifically they were—

(a) Will the War Department take charge of prisoners of all classes captured or arrested by any agency of our government in time of war?

(b) If other departments of the government are to have charge of non-military prisoners, will the War Department have permanent charge of all prisoners of military status whether captured by the Army or Navy?

(c) What special bureau or branch of the War Department will have general charge of prisoners of war?\(^9\)

Since a search of current European practices revealed that each country adopted plans best suited to its own conditions and since a survey of American practices in past wars revealed but little, Colonel

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\(^7\) Memo, WCD for CofS, 24 Jul 16, sub: Disposition to be made of Naval Prisoners of War. WCD 8580–6. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

\(^8\) Comdr Staton was later replaced by Comdr Raymond Stone. See: Ltr, Sec of Navy to SW, 2 Aug 16. WCD 8580–7; ltr, Sec of Navy to SW, 20 Sep 16. WCD 8580–10. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

\(^9\) Memo, Col C. W. Kennedy for CofS, 27 Sep 16, sub: Transfer of prisoners of war from the custody of the Navy Dept to the War Dept. WCD 8580–8. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
Kennedy referred the questions to The Judge Advocate General and the Chief of Staff.  

Both The Judge Advocate General and the War College Division concluded that the War Department should take charge of prisoners of all classes captured or arrested by any agency of the government in time of war. This answered the first two questions. In respect to the third question, it was decided that the Adjutant General’s Department was best suited to care for the prisoners as it was charged with the responsibility for the disciplinary barracks and with the recordkeeping for the Army. Therefore, early in December 1916, The Adjutant General was advised by the Chief of Staff that a division of his office would have general charge of all matters connected with war prisoners, and that he should make the preliminary plans necessary to enable the division on the outbreak of war to take up the work promptly. And on 14 December 1916 “Regulations Governing the Transfer of Prisoners of War from the Custody of the Navy to that of the Army” were completed.

In summary, these regulations, effective in time of war, provided:

1. All war prisoners (a broader term than prisoners of war, because it included enemy aliens as well as captured enemy forces), except those to be detained elsewhere for health or sanitary reasons, would be placed in the custody of the War Department.
2. Naval forces would detain war prisoners only so long as necessary to effect their transfer to a place of confinement designated by the Army’s Adjutant General.
3. Transfers would be under naval guard until the prisoners were turned over to the proper Army commander who would give a written receipt for the prisoners.
4. Transfer of responsibility would be accomplished upon delivery of the receipts which would show the name, rank or rate, nationality, and sex of the prisoners transferred.

Regulations Governing the Custody of Prisoners of War, 1917

To comply with his instructions, The Adjutant General prepared tentative regulations pertaining to war prisoners and their internment. Certain details, such as locations, inspection, and decentralization of control, depended on the development of war and the number and

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10 Ltr, Col C. W. Kennedy to JAG, 15 Aug 16, sub: Formulation of plans and regulations for the transfer to the Army of Naval prisoners of war. WCD 8580-9; memo, OCS for Ch. WCD, 28 Sep 16. WCD 8580-9. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
12 Memo, Maj Gen H. L. Scott, CoFS, for TAG, 4 Dec 16, sub: Policy as to custody of prisoners of war and nonmilitary persons interned during time of war. WCD 8580-12. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
13 Memo, Brig Gen J. E. Kuhn, CoFS, for CoFS, 27 Feb 17, sub: Regulations for war prisoners and their places of internment. WCD 8580-15. Records of WDGS. National Archives. A copy of the regulations is in the author’s file.
types of prisoners taken into custody; therefore, only general provisions were provided in the regulations. Guard personnel was to be furnished at the rate of one company for each 1,800 prisoners, and the use of prisoner labor to erect temporary facilities in the internment camps was permitted. The regulations also incorporated the Army-Navy agreement of December 1916 and the proposed general order of 1915. These regulations, designated as Special Regulations No. 62, "Custody of Prisoners of War, 1917," were approved and published on 29 March 1917, shortly before the declaration of war by the United States.  

The Internment Problem

The United States entered the European conflict on 6 April 1917 and during the spring and summer considerable interest was shown by the public in the administration and internment of prisoners of war. Citizen committees were formed; editorials appeared in the press; and pressure was exerted on congressional leaders in the form of letters. The War Department invited the Committee on Internment, a subdivision of a self-organized civilian group known as the National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor, to furnish plans for the internment of enemy aliens in the United States for consideration by the War College Division. The 126 pages of plans submitted by the committee, based upon a study of pertinent international law and the experiences of the current belligerents, proved to be of so great a value that they were referred to The Adjutant General for his information.

Newspaper editorials and letters to different executive and legislative agencies of the Government urged the transfer of allied prisoners of war from Europe to the United States for one of the following reasons: to free the captors of the economic burden of their support; to relieve allied soldiers from guard duties and permit their redeployment to the front; to supply needed labor in the United States; to offset the United States' share in the cost of PW maintenance through their use as a labor force in America; to minimize the danger of submarine attack upon returning transport vessels due to the presence of prisoners of war aboard; to have hostages in the United States to insure good treatment of American PW's in the hands of
the enemy; and to encourage a flow of new citizens to the United States after the war. 17

The War College Division reviewed the suggestions in the light of their legality and effectiveness, and concluded:

... that strong objection will be made by the Allied powers themselves against any measures looking to the removal of the German war prisoners where labor is required by them for the conduct of the war. It is a fact that labor or manpower is the one crying need of all belligerents, and France and England at least, have need for every man.18

In January 1918, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State and The Adjutant General, the War Department asked Gen. (later General of the Armies) John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief, AEF, for recommendations as to whether all PW’s captured by American forces should be interned in the United States or turned over to the Allies or a neutral power.19 General Pershing replied on 7 January that “Prisoners of war should be utilized here [France] as laborers under our own jurisdiction, although shipping some prisoners of war to the United States might be advantageous later in prevention of U-boat attacks provided we can accomplish same without reprisals. ...”20

Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff recommended that all PW’s be shipped to the United States, and that under no circumstance should they be turned over to the Allies or to a neutral power. The War College Division believed that keeping numerous prisoners of war behind American lines, despite the potential value of their labor, would impose too great a strain on supply channels. It also feared that Germany would consider their retention a violation of Article XXIV of the 1785 treaty with Prussia as amended.21

The Secretary of War, however, preferred the recommendations of General Pershing that PW’s be retained in France unless so many were captured that it would be impracticable to provide guards. Therefore, in February 1918, he advised General Pershing and the Secretary of State that prisoners of war captured by American forces

17 WCD 8580-21 and -22. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
18 Memo, Brig Gen J. E. Kuhn, WCD, for CofS, 22 May 17, sub: Transfer of German prisoners of war from Allied countries to America. WCD 8520-22; memo, Ch, WCD, for CofS, 22 May 17, sub: Use of German prisoners as hostages on ships carrying munitions to Europe. WCD 8580-24. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
21 Art. XXIV provided in part “… that they [prisoners of war] shall be placed in some parts of their [Prussia and the United States] dominions in Europe and America, in wholesome situations. …” See: Memo, Ch, War Plans Div, for CofS, 21 Jan 18, sub: Questions connected with proper disposal of our prisoners of war. WCD 8580-69. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
in France would be retained in the theater. But the State Department and the War Plans Division (WPD) still maintained that the retention of PW's in Europe would violate treaty obligations. Gradually Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, was persuaded to the viewpoint of the State Department and War Plans Division, and on 5 June 1918 Pershing was notified that all PW's would be interned in the United States.

This placed General Pershing in an embarrassing situation. On the one hand, in view of the labor shortage in Europe he had requested prisoners of war from the Allies for labor. On the other hand, he now had the order to ship them to the United States for internment. Confronted with this situation, General Pershing cabled the War Department that the new ruling be reconsidered in the light of the critical labor situation in France and the arrangements which had been completed with the British and French. He did not object to the transfer of officer prisoners of war to the United States for internment.

On receipt of this cable and on the advice of the State Department, who apparently realized the international complications that might arise, the Chief of Staff reversed his stand and authorized the retention of "... German prisoners of war in France provided that they are not surrendered to our co-belligerents. ..." Thus it was finally determined that the bulk of prisoners of war captured by U. S. forces would be retained in France for use by the American Expeditionary Forces.

Since no mention was made of the disposition of interned enemy officers, they were kept in France pending further instructions from Washington. In September 1918, at the suggestion of the French mission to the AEF, General Pershing again recommended that officer PW's be sent to the United States since they "do not work and their maintenance here involves unnecessary use of guards, lodging, and subsistence." Although this recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of State, the officers were ordered held in France. The question of their status was then before a diplomatic conference at Berne, Switzerland, between German and American representatives, and before it was decided the armistice intervened.

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22 Memo, OCofS for TAG, 12 Feb 18, sub: Questions connected with proper disposal of our prisoners of war; ltr, SW to Sec of State, 12 Feb 18. WCD 8580-75. Records of WDGS, National Archives.
23 Memo TAG for CofS, 12 Jun 18, sub: Enclosed cablegram received in AGO June 9, 1918. WCD 8580-107. Records of WDGS, National Archives.
26 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, p. 382.
27 WCD 8580-121. Records of WDGS, National Archives; see also: Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, p. 392.
28 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, p. 322; see also: WCD 8580-122. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
Planning for PW Employment in the United States

Upon the outbreak of war, The Adjutant General took steps to comply with Special Regulations No. 62. Forts Oglethorpe and McPherson in Georgia and Fort Douglas, Utah, were designated as war prison barracks; retired officers were recalled to command the barracks; one guard company, formed from a nucleus of 10 or more men taken from established guard companies at U. S. disciplinary barracks, was assigned to each of the new prison barracks; and married men, soldiers approaching retirement, retired noncommissioned officers, and other retired soldiers were used as fillers in the guard companies. So rapidly was the plan put into effect that eight days after the start of the war, approximately 800 German sailors were already interned in the barracks in Georgia.\(^{29}\)

Although the number of prisoners of war in the United States did not greatly increase during the summer of 1917, many administrative details had to be worked out: the mechanics of mail censorship had to be solved; diversion and exercise facilities had to be provided; segregation for security and disciplinary reasons had to be accomplished; employment had to be considered; and arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, for the inspections of camps by the protecting power, and for captured enemy officers had to be made. The latter three details, and others involving international agreements, were in due course the subjects of diplomatic agreements made through a neutral power with Germany.\(^{30}\) The prewar general regulations of The Adjutant General had left all such details for development during the course of the war.

In considering the employment of prisoners of war, it appeared desirable to the planners that maximum work opportunities for the PW's would aid their morale as much as it would benefit the United States. Certain work, such as PW employment as tailors, cobblers, and the like, recommended itself, but the War Department also considered PW employment on public works. On the other hand, in September 1917, a request by the Governor of Utah and other State officials for the use of prisoners of war to save the sugar beet crop around Salt Lake City was refused. It was not deemed advisable at this time to authorize the employment of prisoners of war by private individuals or by corporations. Actually, an authorized PW labor program, except to maintain PW camps, was nonexistent.

In November, at the request of the Secretary of War, the National Committee on Prisoners and Prisoner Labor prepared a plan whereby PW's would be used to maintain public highways. This plan had

\(^{29}\) See: WCD 8580 A—1. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

\(^{30}\) WCD 8580—32, —33, —43, —52, and —58. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
the approval of six Eastern States, the United States Forestry Service, the Geological Survey, and the Office of Public Roads and Engineering of the Department of Agriculture. The internment camp commanders also recommended the plan but requested it be laid aside until more prisoners were available. After careful study, the War Department concluded that such employment would be desirable both for the prisoners and for the public benefit and instructed The Adjutant General to place this general policy into effect. A provision was also made whereby in exceptional cases PW's could be employed by private parties or by corporations for limited periods to prevent the loss of crops ready for harvesting, or for other similar purposes. Such employment was to be governed by the same rules and regulations that applied to work for the public service, and each individual case had to be approved by the Secretary of War. At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, civilian enemy aliens, except those who volunteered to work, were exempt from all forms of compulsory labor except that connected with their own administration and maintenance.

The Pay Problem

In December 1917, the Secretary of Labor, referring to the proposed labor plan, wrote: "I do not anticipate any serious protest from the workers as a result of the employment of prisoners of war in such occupations as road building, if care is taken to require the payment of the prevailing rate of wages in the neighborhood and the observance of the prevailing conditions." The Adjutant General, however, objected to "the payment of the prevailing rate of wages" since the wages for road labor were so high that it would be possible for the PW to receive a greater daily stipend than that received by the average U. S. soldier. Such an action, he thought, would bring a storm of indignation. The War Plans Division of the Chief of Staff's Office disagreed and felt that although The Adjutant General should have a free hand in fixing the PW's pay when they were engaged in noncompetitive work, work for private parties or corporations or in other competitive labor should be paid at the prevailing wage rate, less the cost of PW's maintenance. The Division recommended, however, that except for

31 Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky.
32 Memo, Brig Gen H. P. McCain, TAG, for SW, 5 Nov 17. WCD 8580-45. Records of WDGS, National Archives.
33 For information concerning PW employment practices of other nations during WWI, see: Memo, Col P. D. Lochbridge, Actg Ch, WCD, for CofS, 17 Nov 17, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War in the U. S. Ibid.
34 Memo, OCoS for TAG, 23 Nov 17, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War in U. S. Ibid.
serious emergencies, competitive work should not be given to the prisoners. This would also avoid giving the enemy any reasonable grounds for retaliation.\textsuperscript{37}

In March 1918, information was received concerning the pay practices of other nations. Briefly and with reference to the interests of labor unions, the general payment principle was to pay the same rate as that received by free labor for similar work. Account was taken of the PW’s efficiency as compared with the ordinary work performance of free native labor. Another factor considered was that the progress of the war had not resulted in a labor shortage; consequently, PW labor did not compete with the employment of free labor.\textsuperscript{38}

“Regulations for the Employment of Prisoners of War, 1918”

As a result of the investigations and recommendations, on 28 March 1918, the War Department issued “Regulations for the Employment of Prisoners of War, 1918” which provided that the Secretary of War would fix the rates for PW labor on government contracts. Other work and compensation was to be settled in agreements between private employers (and other branches of the public service) and The Adjutant General. The regulations thus avoided setting a standard amount to be paid by the employers and the exact amount to be paid the prisoner of war. Employers, other than the War Department, had to reimburse monthly the commandant of the war prison barracks concerned for any work performed by the prisoners of war; and the commandant, in turn, had to credit the individual PW’s account with the amount actually earned. Pay and other credits given for work performed for the War Department were to be used to improve the prisoner’s lot; the balance, less the cost of their maintenance, was to be paid to the PW on his release.\textsuperscript{39}

All classes of PW’s, except commissioned officers and those physically unfit for labor, had to do any work necessary for their self-maintenance; and all, except officers, could be required to work for the public service. When specifically authorized and on written request, the prisoners could also work for private employers or for corporations. On written request, petty or noncommissioned officer PW’s could be given supervisory work.

Other administrative employment details were prescribed in the regulations, such as classification of the PW’s as to their physical ability to work, accounts and disbursement of pay, tools and equip-
ment, work supervisors, contractual arrangements, construction, discipline, guards, supply, and administration of work camps.

A copy of the regulations was forwarded to General Pershing in France for his information, and the employment provisions were embodied in diplomatic drafts sent to Germany.  

**PW Labor in the United States**

During World War I, only 1,346 enemy prisoners of war, comprising officers and crews of German auxiliary cruisers which were lying in United States ports at the opening of hostilities, were in confinement in continental United States. Only these were employable under existing regulations. Because of the limited number available that could be employed, the PW employment program as it developed in the United States entailed more planning than actual labor. As the plans were being made, an unsuccessful prison break at the war prison barracks, Fort McPherson, Ga., focused attention on the inactivity of the prisoners and on a definite lack of discipline on the part of guard personnel. The Inspector General, on conclusion of his investigation of the affair, recommended a compulsory PW employment program, stating that such a program was necessary for the preservation of the PW's health as well as for their discipline. Although the employment plans for prisoners of war in the United States were adequate, the limited number available greatly restricted their use.

Civilian requests from various sections of the United States for prisoner of war labor also focused attention on the need for an employment program. A farmer in Texas wanted to use a "few thousand" to plant crops. In California, the Inyo Good Road Club and the Berkeley Defense Corps condemned the war prison barracks as being "... practically summer resorts amidst surroundings of comfort amounting to luxury ...," and advocated the use of PW's on the construction of a proposed system of national highways for the Pacific Coast States. In Vermont, PW's were requested for farm labor.

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49 Memo, Ch, WPD, for CoS, 7 Mar 18, sub: Letter from Sec of State inclosing draft of proposed convention respecting the treatment of prisoners of war. WCD 8580-76. Records of WDGS. National Archives.


43 WCD 8580-128. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

44 Memo, Dir, WPD, to CoS, 16 Oct 18, sub: Resolutions requesting that prisoners of war be required to work on highways, Pacific Coast States. WCD 8580-136. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

The military services in the United States felt the labor shortage as much as private enterprise, and it was through the unauthorized use of prisoners of war by the camp quartermaster at Camp Sevier, S. C., that the scope of approved work on military installations was broadened. In the summer of 1918, the War Department sent 100 prisoners of war from the war prison barracks at Fort McPherson, Ga., to Camp Sevier, S. C., to cultivate a post garden. Similar groups were sent to Camp Devens, Camp Jackson, Camp Grant, Camp Sherman, and Camp Wadsworth, for the same purpose. At Camp Sevier, the camp quartermaster, who had been unable to secure sufficient workers from local sources, used the PW's to unload coal and supplies, to repair tentage, and to shoe horses. Authority for this type of work had not been granted by the Acting Quartermaster General, and when the unauthorized work was discovered, the matter was referred to the War Department for decision. Since such employment was appropriate under existing War Department regulations, since it was permitted by international law, and since it was in accordance with diplomatic agreements with Germany, the War Department in March 1919 formally authorized the use of prisoners of war for general camp police work and for work on camp utilities.  

Other developments in the PW employment program in the United States were the broadening of policy with respect to the employment of PW noncommissioned and petty officers, and the firm position taken in requiring noncommissioned officer (NCO) PW's to work for their self-maintenance. In October 1918, the commandant of the Fort McPherson, Ga., War Prison Barracks requested permission to use 20 volunteer PW petty officers to pick cotton for a farmer in the vicinity. The necessary number had already volunteered and could be spared for the job, but the work was not of a supervisory nature as required by existing regulations. After consideration, the War Department liberalized its policy and authorized the requested work. At the same time, a firm position was taken in requiring PW NCO's and petty officers "to perform work necessary for their comfort or for the upkeep of their prison barracks."

Establishment of Responsibility for PW's in AEF

On 6 June 1917, the first American troops to serve in Europe landed in France; and for the first time, a large American army was to operate outside continental United States for an extended period of time. After 20 July 1917 responsibility for prisoners of war in the American Expeditionary Forces was vested in the following: G–1 Section,
PRISONER OF WAR EMPLOYMENT DURING WORLD WAR I

General Staff, who was responsible for the general policy governing their disposal; The Adjutant General, who maintained a Prisoner of War Information Bureau; and The Provost Marshal General, who had the actual charge and custody of the prisoners. Before this, the Army Field Service Regulations had not provided for a Provost Marshal General's Department nor for any other central authority to supervise military police or related PW activities. Commanders of trains within combat divisions, commanders of defense districts on the line of communications, and others were charged with the control of military police and with the exercise of provost marshal functions. Each performed the same duties independent of the others and reported to various departments within the commands. The activities were too decentralized to permit any effective exercise of overall responsibility, and it was to provide this needed centralization of authority that General Pershing created a Provost Marshal General's Department within his headquarters in July. The department was also charged with the execution of prisoner of war policies, but it was not clear who had responsibility for the enunciation of policies to be followed. According to Brig. Gen. Harry H. Bandholtz, The Provost Marshal General of the AEF, the order did not allocate the responsibility for policy decisions. However, the AEF G-1 differed, charging The Provost Marshal General "will issue such instructions and regulations . . . as may be necessary." Responsibility was finally fixed in November 1917 when G-1 was formally charged with all prisoner of war policy decisions. Since no prisoners were being taken by American forces at this time and the General Staff was occupied with more important matters, prisoner of war planning rested for 1917.

Organization and Treatment of PW's in France

In June 1918, the influx of prisoners of war, caused by transfers from the Allies and an increase in the number captured by American forces, made it necessary to use tentative instructions prepared by The Provost Marshal General until formal regulations could be prepared. New instructions were soon forthcoming, and responsibility for the custody and control of the prisoners of war was vested in The Provost Marshal General from the time the PW's arrived at a division inclosure.

49 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, pp. 314-15, 317-18, 323; See also: AEF GO 8, 5 Jul 17.
50 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, p. 329.
51 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XII, p. 211.
52 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services, XV, p. 329.
53 AEF GO 106, 1 Jul 18.
Evacuation Procedures

Prisoners of war, when captured, were immediately disarmed and sent to a brigade headquarters where they were searched for concealed weapons and documents that might have escaped previous observation. From brigade headquarters the PW’s were sent to a division inclosure where they came under the control of The Provost Marshal General although the division provided the necessary officers and guards when required. Here the prisoners were interrogated by intelligence personnel, and then, under guard furnished by the PMG, were escorted as expeditiously as possible to a central PW inclosure in the rear area.

On arrival at the central PW inclosure, the prisoners were sent to a receiving stockade where certain articles of equipment, such as overcoats, blankets, gas masks, and mess kits, were removed and sent to salvage depots. To facilitate further search in the receiving office, the PW’s were instructed before entering as to what personal articles could be kept. Money could not be retained, and a receipt was given for it or any other personal property taken from the prisoners.

At the receiving station, the PW’s were issued tags bearing their PW serial numbers. At this point each filled out a general information form from which index cards were made and addressed a postal card to his family informing them of his arrival at the PW inclosure and of his state of health. When this was completed the PW’s were required to bathe, after which they were given a medical examination and issued renovated, dyed clothing. The PW’s were next classified according to occupational history and were sent to a stockade where they awaited assignments to a labor company. Assignments were made according to the PW’s labor classification.

General Treatment of Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war received the same type food, clothing, and quarters as were provided for American troops. They also received the same medical treatment given to the men of the AEF. For their welfare, the prisoners had many forms of entertainment and recreation: PW orchestras were organized; each PW stockade had a supply of footballs, baseballs, handballs, and boxing gloves; and in some instances, the PW’s were permitted to engage in athletic contests with other PW companies. Generally, the prisoners of war reacted favorably to the treatment received.

64 The cards included the PW’s name, rank, serial number, occupation before entering the military service, and the date of arrival at the inclosure.
PW Employment Policy in the AEF

The AEF employment policy required prisoners of war, other than officers, "... to labor for the public service." Those in authority considered the constant employment of the largest number possible would be for the welfare of the prisoners themselves, as well as in the best interest of the United States. Consequently, all PW privates were required to do manual labor unless they possessed special qualifications for clerical, mechanical, or other skilled labor. PW non-commissioned officers were required to work as clerks or interpreters or to supervise the work done by the privates. On the advice of The Judge Advocate General, AEF, corporals and soldiers of lesser rank were regarded as privates and were worked accordingly. Prisoner of War Labor Company No. 86, for example, was comprised almost entirely of PW corporals.

In accordance with the Hague Regulations (although they were not considered as being binding since some of the belligerents were not signatories), prisoners of war were not required to engage in any work directly connected with military operations. They could not be employed within the range of enemy shell fire, which was construed to be within 30 kilometers of the front lines, except when carrying wounded to the rear. No PW's were used in occupied Germany.

PW Labor Companies

On 26 July 1918, the first prisoner of war labor company in France was organized; and by December 1919, 122 had been formed at central PW inclosures. The different type companies, consisting of approximately 250-450 men, were classified according to the skills of the component privates. On an average, 50 of these men were PW non-commissioned officers who served as work supervisors or company specialists. The PW classification and assignment resulted in the formation of specialist companies, such as construction, roadbuilding, etc., and general labor companies.

According to the existing PW directive, an American officer was to be appointed by GHQ to command each PW labor company and was to be responsible for its discipline and administration. In general practice, however, the officers were assigned to The Provost Marshal.
General for duty with escort guard companies, and, upon reporting, were reassigned to the PW labor companies.

After the organization of a PW labor company, an American escort guard company was attached. The guard companies were under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General, and personnel for them came from any general replacement source. Consequently, they were necessarily nondescript, without esprit or training, and were largely dependent for success upon the initiative and good sense of their chance officers and men. Nevertheless, the work program succeeded because in a large measure the PW's were well disciplined and accepted willingly the conditions of work.62

The strength of the escort guard companies varied with the nature of the work performed by the prisoners of war. If the PW labor companies were split into small detachments for specific tasks, a second escort guard company was furnished. Usually the ratio was one guard for ten PW's, although the original ratio was one guard to five prisoners of war.63

After the organization of a PW labor company and the attachment of an escort guard company, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, AEF, allocated it to a department of the Army that needed a particular type service represented by the labor company. [See chart 1.] Once assigned, the company worked under the direction of the using agency.64 Prisoner of war labor companies organized before the armistice could not be used on work directly in support of combat units, but after the armistice these restrictions were removed and the companies were used on any type work.

Disciplinary Problems

Disciplinary problems connected with the execution of work orders by the PW's were few. When two escaped PW's in PW Labor Company No. 59 were recaptured, they were placed under added restraint; whereupon the other PW's refused to work until the penalty was lifted. To induce compliance with their work orders, the PW company commander applied a policy of administrative pressure and refused to issue rations until the prisoners returned to work. The announced "no work, no eat" policy resulted in an almost immediate resumption of labor activities, and the work produced and the man-

ner of performance was better after the incident than before. Enlisted prisoners of war were paid for each day's labor performed, other than for their own self-maintenance. No money was given to the prisoners, but the prisoner's personal accounts were credited with the sums earned. The rate of work pay was fixed at a minimum of 20 centimes per day for PW privates working as common laborers, and a maximum of 1 franc per day for German noncommissioned officers acting as sergeant majors. If a PW desired, he could draw upon his account, in which case he was issued canteen tokens or script to purchase needed incidental items. PW officers were not required to work and were paid at the following monthly rate: lieutenants, $83.35 per man; officers of higher rank, $95.25 per man.

The Armistice

On 11 November 1918 at Compiegne Forest, Germany signed an armistice that concluded hostilities in France. Under the armistice terms, German troops withdrew immediately to Germany, but the prisoners of war already in Allied custody were to remain in France until the treaty of peace came into force at the exchange of ratifications. They were then to be repatriated to Germany as quickly as possible.

During the interim period between the armistice and the treaty of peace, a period in which the bulk of the employment of prisoners of war by the United States Army took place, the AEF held approximately 48,000 prisoners of war, including PW's who had been shipped to France from the United States. These were employed under the same regulations that applied during hostilities, and were used on the maintenance of roads, in motor shops at Vernoil, on railroad and pier construction, and on salvage work. Ratifications of the peace treaty were exchanged on 10 January 1920, the prisoners were exchanged, and by 31 August 1920, the AEF headquarters in France was discontinued.

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# Chart 1. Types of Labor Performed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Number of companies performing this work</th>
<th>General work performed by companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Section No. 1.</td>
<td>20 escort companies, 20 labor companies</td>
<td>Salvage work, bakery work, warehousing, repairing roads, steel and construction, engineering, general labor, fatigue detail, quarry work, handling lumber, ditch work, sanitary detail, unloading and loading freight cars, laying pipeline, QMC work, machine shop work, laundry, upkeep of indolent, truck operation, carpenter work, cleaning docks, sewer construction, railroad repair, vessel repair, sawmill work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Section No. 2.</td>
<td>12 escort companies, 12 labor companies</td>
<td>Road work, railroad repairing, warehousing, sawmill work, handling coal, general labor, storage, track repair, road maintenance, railroad track maintenance, carpenter work, car loading, painting, stevedore work, sanitary work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Section No. 5.</td>
<td>10 escort companies, 9 labor companies.</td>
<td>Cutting wood, repairing roads, building barracks, quarry work, miscellaneous work, sanitary work, general engineering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Section No. 6.</td>
<td>1 escort company, 1 labor company.</td>
<td>Loading and unloading cars and stacking merchandise at depot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Section No. 7.</td>
<td>4 escort companies, 4 labor companies.</td>
<td>Road work, building construction, loading and unloading stone and coal, warehouse work, salvage work, and truck work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Section.</td>
<td>27 escort companies, 13 labor companies.</td>
<td>General labor, quarry work, engineer and construction work, orderlies for officer prisoners of war, tailors, cooks, road work, wood cutting, work for hospital, warehouse work, handling of supplies, loading cars, salvage, camp duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Section.</td>
<td>36 escort companies, 32 labor companies.</td>
<td>Road work, quarry work, general work, engineer construction, camp construction, engineer water supply, stockade construction, repairing, transportation, sanitary detail, machine shop work, repair work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: AEF, Commander in Chief’s Report, pp. 46a, 47. AEF Records. National Archives.*
### Chart 2. Prisoner of War Daily Wage Rates Overseas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Detailed as or for</th>
<th>Amount per day (centimes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant majors</td>
<td>Sergeant major</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Chief clerk</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>Hospital orderlies</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant majors</td>
<td>Asst. sergeant major</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>Mail sergeant</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Supply sergeant</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Mess sergeant</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>First sergeant</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Duty sergeant</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance corporals or privates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Assistant clerk</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plumbers</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Machinists</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Tinsmiths</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Painters</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Drillmen</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Chief carpenter</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Chief interpreter</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Masons</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Barbers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Shoemakers</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Interpreters</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 6
Planning Between the World Wars

Prisoner of war planning between World Wars I and II revolved about the following problems: the establishment of an agency responsible for the prisoners; the apparatus for caring for the prisoners; and the very limited preparations for prisoner of war employment, the planners making no differentiation between prisoners of war and interned civilian enemy aliens. In general, no adequate plans for handling captured enemy personnel were formulated until 1937—only broad and general policies were made. However, certain international agreements were made that had an effect on subsequent planning.

The Geneva Conventions of 1929

During the spring and early summer of 1929, representatives of the major nations of the world met in Geneva, Switzerland, to revise the codification of international laws relating to prisoners of war. This resulted in the signing on 27 July 1929 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and the Geneva Red Cross Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (the Geneva Red Cross Convention). The 97 articles and I annex of the Prisoner of War Convention were an attempt to diminish the rigors of war and to mitigate the fate of the prisoners. Among other things, it required PW's, other than officers, to work for the benefit of the captors; however, the work could not be directly related to war operations nor could it jeopardize the health and safety of the prisoners. Furthermore, the prisoners had to have certain qualifications and aptitudes for the labor to which they were assigned. The 1929 Red Cross Convention superseded the Red Cross Conventions of 1864 and 1926 and defined the status of captured enemy sick and wounded. It also defined the status of captured medical and sanitary personnel and chaplains attached to armies, and outlined the

2 For a list of countries that had ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 as of 7 Dec 41, see: TM 27-251, “Treaties Governing Land Warfare,” p. 151. For those who signed or adhered to the PW Convention, see: Ibid., p. 127.
treatment to be given them. These were not considered prisoners of war but were defined as being “protected personnel.”

**Early Planning, 1919–1938**

In his final World War I report, Brig. Gen. Harry A. Bandholtz, The Provost Marshal General of the AEF, protested against the dissolution of the Military Police Corps and the Provost Marshal General’s Department, and advised against any future dependence on such emergency measures as had been adopted during World War I. General Bandholtz stated that the U.S. military experience in World War I “clearly and expensively” demonstrated the need for a permanent establishment to assure adequate prior planning for military police activities and the related prisoner of war program. Nevertheless, the Department and the Military Police Corps were abolished, and the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) became responsible for prisoner of war planning. Planning for military police consisted of the preparation of tables of organization for a vaguely contemplated corps of military police.

In July 1924, the War Department designated Brig. Gen. S. D. Rockenbach, Commanding General, District of Washington, as Acting Provost Marshal General of the War Department in addition to his other duties. General Rockenbach was instructed to make plans for a Military Police Corps which would be established “... on the outbreak of war if the President so directs. ...” These plans and a provision for the Corps were to be included in the War Department General Mobilization Plan. At the same time General Rockenbach was appointed, an acting provost marshal was also appointed in each corps area, department, and division headquarters.

General Rockenbach, in preparing the plans for the Military Police Corps, also prepared a proposed manual to govern its activities. The manual included instructions for prisoners of war and for their employment. Since the manual was based on the experiences of the...
American Expeditionary Forces, the employment provisions were more concerned with active theater operations than with employment by private employers in the Zone of the Interior. None of the World War I provisions relating to private employment were included, but other employment provisions, such as the organization of PWs into labor companies at prison inclosures and their allocation to various Army agencies for use, were clearly defined.

In June 1926, the War Department directed the Acting Provost Marshal General to revise the manual and to put it into the format of a series of Army Regulations and Training Regulations. When this was completed, the revised regulations provided for PW labor companies, adjustable in size according to the number of guards available, to be assigned to departments of the Army for labor. They were to be directly controlled by the Provost Marshal General in the Zone of the Interior or by the Deputy Provost Marshal General, GHQ, in a theater of operations. Thus the "company" was a work group rather than a military organization. The regulations also suggested the prisoners be employed on construction and repair work, provided the work was not directly connected with war operations.

Although the proposed regulations embodied the experiences gained in France during World War I, as a basis for future planning they were somewhat deficient. The employment of prisoners of war in France for the most part had taken place after the armistice; consequently, the planners felt little need to define the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 that prohibited the use of prisoners on work connected with war operations. Also, the small number of prisoners of war in the United States from 1917 to 1919 had not warranted their use by private employers. Because of this, the planners in 1926 did not provide for such future employment although they did provide for PW employment for the public service. (No provision was made for PW employment in any of the Industrial Mobilization Plans.)

The regulations as proposed were not published. The Infantry Board thought it inappropriate to issue Army Regulations for a Military Police Corps before such a corps was authorized by law; therefore, the Chief of Infantry recommended that they be prepared but that they not be published. The regulations were finally prepared...
under the direction of The Adjutant General, but were to "... be held until such time as the Secretary of War specifically authorized their publication." The regulations were never published, and until 1937 no further significant developments occurred in military police or prisoner of war planning.  

Publication of the MP Manual

In December 1937, the War Department published a Military Police Basic Field Manual based generally on the final report of General Bandholtz and incorporating the general provisions of the 1929 Geneva Conventions. Among other things the manual provided for the organization of a PMG Department with responsibilities similar to those of the PMG, AEF, in 1918, and with a provost marshal in the theater of operations to exercise supervision and control of all military police units other than those forming an element of a tactical organization. The theater provost marshal was charged with the reception, care, disposition, and security of all PW's in the theater, including supervision and control of all prison inclosures and with the maintenance of records at the camps which were to be transmitted to a Prisoner of War Information Bureau in Washington. The manual further specified the wartime duties of headquarters and field provost marshals. The Provost Marshal General, when appointed, was designated to prepare the military police portions of the War Department's operational plans and regulations governing the establishment and operation of "war prisoner barracks."  

With respect to employment, the manual directed that the PW's be formed into labor companies at designated inclosures or barracks. Each company was to be commanded by an American MP officer, assisted by necessary enlisted personnel. The companies were to work under armed guard for the commander of the unit to which assigned, and, if rigorous supervision was maintained, the PW companies could be used for construction or repair work.  

The manual briefly described the general scope of PW operations from capture to internment, but comprehensive planning was postponed until the activation of the operating agency—the Provost Marshal General's Department. Such was the extent of planning when hostilities began in Europe in 1939.

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10 Ltr, AG to CG, Dist of Wash, 18 Aug 27, sub: Proposed Army and Training Regulations for the MP Corps. Ibid.  
11 In August 1936, an Army Regulation restated that the Personnel Division, G-1, WDGS, was responsible for policy review and planning for prisoners of war. See: AR 10-16, 18 Aug 36, par. 8b.  
12 The Adjutant General had had this responsibility in 1917.  
The Emergency Planning Period, 1939–41

War in Europe brought increased activity in the War Department. New Mobilization Regulations (MR) issued in December 1939 again projected an organized Military Police Corps in the event of a national emergency. They also recommended a peacetime cadre for an Office of the Provost Marshal General.\textsuperscript{14} Despite these regulations, further plans issued as late as April 1940 still charged G–1 with responsibility for policy, planning, administration, and the supervision of prisoner of war affairs until the emergency warranted the activation of The Provost Marshal General—Military Police program. Until this occurred, The Adjutant General’s Office was to act as a limited interim operating agency\textsuperscript{15} and was to establish, organize, and operate a Central Prisoner of War Information Bureau and field branches as required by the 1929 Geneva PW Convention. It was also to transfer to the war prisoner barracks any PW’s or interned enemy civilians evacuated to the United States from theaters of operations.\textsuperscript{16} The position of a provost marshal on a commander’s special staff was further provided to advise on the duties of the military police and prisoner of war operations.\textsuperscript{17}

Appointment of The Provost Marshal General

During the summer of 1941, two events led directly to the appointment of The Provost Marshal General. Certain alien ships were being seized and their crews interned in the United States.\textsuperscript{18} Also in the event of war some 18,500 civilian enemy aliens would have to be interned. In order “to vitalize and coordinate planning in connection with enemy alien internment matters,” an administrator, The Provost Marshal General, was needed.\textsuperscript{19}

Because of the knotty legal problems connected with this job and at the suggestion of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the President appointed Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, The Judge Advocate General, as The Provost Marshal General in addition to his other duties. A cadre from the Office of The Judge Advocate General was provided, and an office was established under G–1, pending a total Army

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] MR 1–1, “Personnel, Basic Instructions,” 1 Dec 39, par 32b (4).
\item[15] MR 1–11, 1 Apr 40, secs. III and IV, par. 10; Geneva PW Convention, 1929, Art. 77, Treaty Series 846.
\item[16] FM 100–10, “Field Service Regulations, Administration,” 9 Dec 40, sec IV, par. 417.
\item[18] Act of April 16, 1919. 40 Stat. 531; see also: Secs. 4067, 4068, 4069, 4070 of Rev. Stats.
\item[19] Memo, SW Stimson for Roosevelt, undated, sub: Appointment of Provost Marshal General, approved and initialed by the President and returned to AGO, 31 Jul 41, AG 370.81; see also: G–1 15182. DRB, TAG.
\end{footnotes}
mobilization. The office had but one function at this time—to control enemy aliens.

Establishment of the Military Police Corps

Although the Office of The Provost Marshal General was established, the Military Police Corps was still an embryonic organization. Consequently, military police duties were performed by temporary details of officers and enlisted men from various arms and services.

Recognizing the need for a centralized operating authority higher than the corps area provost marshal and the need for special war training, the Secretary of War ordered the establishment of the Corps of Military Police on 26 September 1941. The Provost Marshal General became chief, and finally acquired the jurisdiction that had been contemplated in prewar planning.

The Alien Program

Planning for alien control late in 1939 and early in 1940 consisted of bringing mobilization plans up to date. In April 1940 The Adjutant General became responsible for enforcing the enemy alien laws. Local military corps area and departmental commanders were to provide temporary custody for aliens arrested or detained by Department of Justice officials, if so requested by Federal district attorneys or U.S. marshals. If permanent internment installations were to be provided, the local commanders were to establish and maintain them.

An Army and Navy local joint committee met at Seattle, Wash., on 31 October 1940 to plan for such an emergency, the results of which demonstrated that existing mobilization plans did not provide for the arrest and detention of aliens before the declaration of war should such action become necessary. Consequently, in March 1941, the War Department made the corps area commanders responsible for their acceptance and temporary detention of aliens upon declaration of war or when authorized by the War Department.
The War Department was to inform the corps area commanders of the estimated number for which each would be responsible, and they were to prepare plans accordingly. Three permanent internment camps were to be erected, a 6,000-man barracks in the Fourth Corps Area, and two other sites in the Eighth Corps Area.

G-1 believed that two existing manuals were adequate in covering the administration of the war prisoner barracks and for the care of enemy prisoners of war and civilian enemy aliens, but these did not provide the sufficient necessary detail as became apparent later. One, "Rules of Land Warfare," simply defined those entitled to be considered prisoners of war and the nature of treatment to be rendered under international law. The other, "Military Police," defined briefly the responsibilities of the field provost marshals and military police units towards the prisoners. Instructions pertaining to PW employment were confined to paraphrases of the War Department document, "Rules of Land Warfare," and the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention.

The War Department-Department of Justice Agreement

During this planning period, the War Department and the Department of Justice enemy alien committees worked on an overall program designed for cooperation between the two agencies which resulted in a "Joint Agreement of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General respecting Internment of Alien Enemies," dated 18 July 1941. In accordance with this agreement, the War Department formally agreed to detain permanently all male enemy aliens in the United States, including the crews of enemy ships ordered interned by the Department of Justice. In U. S. territorial possessions this applied to all aliens, including women, ordered interned by any authority. G-1 Division retained responsibility for the broad basic plans and policies relating to prisoners of war and enemy aliens, and thus nominal supervision. The responsibility for administrative supervision rested with The Provost Marshal General.

In October 1941, a suggestion by G-4 that the corps area commanders needed guidance in the receipt and internment of prisoners...
of war since many crews of alien warships were being seized in American coastal waters drew attention to the fact that existing publications were inadequate for internment operations. New instructions were immediately drawn up which considered, among other things, the labor potential of the prisoners of war. Since the basic employment provisions of the Geneva PW Convention permitted but did not direct PW employment, the fundamental policy decision to be made was whether to use them or not. This was soon decided, and in December 1941 employment instructions were issued to guide those in the field. Basically they were the labor provisions of the 1937 manual.31

**Internment Camps**

The Department of Justice and the War Department agreed that the Military Establishment would construct three permanent internment camps in the southwest, middle south, and southeast (each to accommodate 3,000 or more prisoners of war or enemy aliens) in the event war was declared. Until that time, the nine corps areas were to provide temporary detention facilities as needed to be used for a maximum of three to five months. In the permanent internment camps, internees or prisoners of war were to be divided by nationality and assembled into self-contained compounds of 1,000 persons. They were to be further subdivided into labor companies of 250 prisoners each.52

Soon after his appointment, The Provost Marshal General vainly requested the immediate construction of the permanent internment camps. However, at a joint conference between the Navy and War Departments, in late 1941, Navy representatives reported that in carrying out the announced presidential policy of protecting American shipping by force if necessary, prisoners of war would be captured. They further stated that the Navy expected to turn all such prisoners over to the Army for custody as was the case World War I.54

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50 DF, Brig Gen R. A. Wheeler, Actg CofS, G-4, to G-1, 20 Oct 41, sub: Disposition of Captured Crews of Alien Men of War (1st, 6th, and 9th Corps Area). G-4/32860. PMGO 014.33, Gen PW #1, 1941 (S). DRB, TAG.

51 FM 29–15, “Military Police,” 8 Dec 41, pars. 4, 7, 8; Change 2 to ibid., 2 Apr 42, par. 8; Change 3 to ibid., Nov 43, pars. 2, 4.

52 One U. S. military escort guard company, consisting of 3 officers and 134 enlisted men, was to guard 4 PW labor companies at work either in the inclosures or outside the camps. The ratio of prisoners to overhead escort personnel was to be approximately 7½ : 1. See: T/O 19–47, 1 Apr 42; see also: Maj Gen A. W. Gullien, PMG, for CofS, 18 Jan 42, sub: Current Requirements for PW and Alien Enemy Internment Camps, Continental United States. Copy in OCS 2/220–36. DRB, TAG.

53 Memo, Maj Gen A. W. Gullien for CofS, 27 Sep 41, sub: Disposition of detained members of alien men of war. PMGO 014.33, Gen PW #1, 1941 (S). DRB, TAG.

54 The World War I Army–Navy PW agreement was again confirmed in substance on 10 Oct 41, but certain administrative procedures were simplified. See: Memo, Brig Gen Wade H. Halslip, ACoFS, for CofS, 9 Oct 41, sub: Continuance of Regulations on Naval Prisoners of War (C). Case 21227: 21. OCS Files. DRB, TAG.
To meet this possibility, G–1 suggested that The Provost Marshal General resubmit a request for the immediate construction of one permanent internment camp. Although this was done in September 1941, the request was disapproved for lack of funds. Thus, the United States entered World War II with no permanent internment camps in use or under construction.

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35 Memo, Brig Gen Wade H. Haislip, ACoS, G–1, for CofS, 26 Sep 41, sub: Custody of foreign seamen turned over to the Army by the Navy Department (S). Case 21227: 16. OCS Files. DRB, TAG.
United States Application of International Law in World War II

The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention states: “The provisions of the present Convention must be respected by the High Contracting Parties under all circumstances. In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between the belligerents who are parties thereto.”

When war was declared, the U.S. State Department requested the Swiss Government to inform the enemy nations that the United States would comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War and Red Cross Conventions of 1929. It also requested the Swiss Government to obtain and transmit the intentions of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The enemy nations soon obliged and indicated that they would observe their convention obligations.

The United States also attempted to extend the convention’s humane provisions to interned enemy aliens by defining prisoners of war as “... every person captured or interned by a belligerent power...” Japan, however, declined this definition and stated: “During the whole of the present war the Japanese Government will apply, mutatis mutandis, and subject to reciprocity, the articles of the Convention concerning prisoners of war to noncombatant internees of enemy countries, on condition that the belligerent States do not subject them against their will to manual labour.”

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1 Art. 82.
2 Telg 330 and 331, Sec of State (Hull) for American Legation at Bern, 18 Dec 41. Records Service Center, State Dept.
5 Report of the International Red Cross Committee, pp. 442–43.
To secure Japan's consent, the United States modified the definition, eliminating the right to require interned civilian enemy aliens to work. Thus, civilian internees could not be validly classified as prisoners of war in the full sense of the term. Japan's adherence to the convention *mutatis mutandis*—that is, it reserved the right to change certain non-essential features—permitted the United States leeway in ministering to Japanese PW's.

Throughout World War II, the U. S. State Department conducted numerous negotiations through neutral powers with the enemy nations with reference to the labor, pay, treatment, exchange, and repatriation of prisoners of war. Close adherence was paid to all international agreements affecting these prisoners.

**Adherence to the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention**

**Exchange**

The Geneva PW Convention made the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war, regardless of rank or numbers, an obligation on the part of the belligerents. It also stated that repatriated prisoners could not be restored to active military service.

The nearest approach to a general exchange during World War II occurred when the United States and Germany mutually agreed to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war and a limited number of sanitary personnel. By a modified contract, both agreed to retain certain protected sanitary, medical, and religious personnel to serve the needs of their countrymen who were detained as prisoners of war. The number retained was to be in proportion to the number of prisoners of the same nationality. Those in excess were to be repatriated upon giving their parole not to assume combat duties. This parole requirement was an incidental and not an integral part of the American PW utilization program; it was in the nature of a retaliatory action on the part of the United States to counteract certain enemy propaganda.

The War Department made but one attempt to achieve head for head exchange during World War II. The United States and Germany negotiated to exchange head for head a small number of German PW's, who had been sentenced to death for the murder of...
fellow prisoners, for an equal number of American soldiers condemned to a similar fate by the Germans. The exchange was never consummated; during the spring of 1945, before negotiations were completed, Allied forces overran the German territory containing the condemned Americans and freed them from German control. However, by negotiating for the exchange of these prisoners of war, it can be assumed that the United States recognized the principle of the legitimate use of captured enemy personnel as means of exchange.

Employment

The planners for prisoner of war employment during World War II considered the provision of the Geneva PW Convention that prohibited work directly concerned with military operations as not applicable to that necessary for food, shelter, and clothing, even though the armed forces might derive some benefit. However, they did decide that the prisoners could not work on projects solely of value to active war operations. For example, PW's could manufacture trucks and truck parts, some of which would be used by the general public while others would eventually be used by the military. But they could not be employed in manufacturing parts that were exclusively used on tanks. Some PW's did make camouflage nets, whose protective purposes could be applied to many fields. Similarly, work on gas masks was also permitted. PW's also worked in agriculture, in food processing, and in clothing plants, although some soldiers in combat eventually benefited from their labor.

Labor Pay

In 1942 the United States lacked an agreement with the enemy nations that would establish the minimum labor rate to be paid prisoners of war. Therefore, the War Department set the rate at 80 cents a day per prisoner employed, roughly based on the $21 a month paid the American private in 1941.

At the request of the War Department, the Department of State proposed to the enemy powers that all PW's be paid for their labor at this same rate, but this was not to include work necessary for PW administration and maintenance. Germany replied that internal conditions prevented her from paying the suggested rate, and Italy and Japan did not respond to the American proposal. Nevertheless, the United States continued throughout the war to pay the PW's in

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9 See G-3 Operations Division Files. DRB, TAG; see also: "History of the PMGO," op. cit., pp. 467–71.
11 Ist Ind, Ch, Aliens Div, PMGO, to TAG, 29 Oct 42, sub: Prisoners of War. PMGO 383.6 Labor (8). DRB, TAG.
canteen coupons, or credited to a trust fund, the 80 cents a day (or 3 Swiss francs) for labor both in the States and in Europe. In addition, each PW was given 10 cents a day gratuitously to enable him to purchase certain necessities. Since Japan had accepted the PW Convention conditionally, there was a variation in the pay rate for Japanese prisoners of war.

Work performed by the PW's for their own benefit, whether within or outside the PW camps, had been regarded by the planners as unpaid work, but in actual practice became divided into both paid and unpaid labor. The War Department realized that the PW's morale would be affected and hence their labor efficiency impaired if they were denied an equal chance to perform paid work. Therefore, it ruled that necessary work within the camps that excluded the PW's from other remunerative labor would be classified as paid work. The camp commanders were to determine which jobs were necessary.  

### The 1942 Manual

In early 1942 the War Department set forth its basic enemy alien and prisoner of war policy, the first that supplemented the Geneva Convention, with the publication of the manual, “Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War.” This guide for handling enemy personnel was simple in nature, reflecting the convention and the methods used in World War I. Because of the need for security precautions, the War Department considered portions of the alien and prisoner of war programs as being interchangeable.

The 1942 manual outlined the limitations of the Geneva Convention; but at the same time, it stated that prisoners of war could be used on any work, provided it was not directly connected with war operations or was not dangerous to the prisoners. Generally, the manual paraphrased the permissive provisions of the convention: “Except as hereafter provided, all employable internees will perform such labor as may be directed by the camp commander provided such labor is commensurate with their ages, sexes and physical condition.” The term “employable internees” included those persons (officers excepted) technically described as prisoners of war, but excluded all enemy aliens.

PW labor was divided into two classes: Class One labor was that required to maintain internment camps. Class Two included all other

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13 The manual directed: “To the extent possible enemy aliens and prisoners of war will be kept in different camps. The same type of facilities will be provided for each class and the same treatment will be accorded each class subject to certain exceptions in favor of officer prisoners of war.” See: “Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War,” op. cit., p. 7.

14 Ibid., p. 36.
types—projects sponsored by the War Department or other Federal agencies, by states or local governments, or by private employers—not directly connected with military operations.

Contract employment was also authorized for individuals or agencies other than the War Department or other Federal branches. Usually the contract, which was required for the services of the “internees,” was between The Provost Marshal General or his authorized representative (acting on behalf of the Secretary of War) and the prospective employer. The agreement regulated the type and amount of labor to be performed, location, working hours, the amount to be paid by the employer, and the workmen’s accident compensation. The War Department agreed to guard, clothe, quarter, and transport the PW’s and to furnish their medical care. The employer was to furnish the necessary work equipment, materials, and the supervision on the job. Thus, the April 1942 policy statement contained the principle that control of prisoners of war at all times would remain in Army hands except for the extent of on-the-job supervision. This principle was firmly retained throughout the war.

The employer and the local camp commander were to agree (subject to the approval of the PMG) to the amount to be paid the United States for PW labor, but it could not be less than 80 cents a day per prisoner. Outside the United States, the theater commander was to establish the costs to any employer other than the military services.

Maximum working hours were 10 per day, including travel to and from the job. Employed PW’s were to be allowed a 24-consecutive hour rest period each week, preferably on Sunday, at intervals of no longer than 9 days. The PW’s were to perform only assigned duties under the direction of the using service, and were to be detailed only to jobs that were directly supervised. PW’s could not work in or about the internment camp except on regular authorized and supervised jobs.

The 1942 Army Reorganization

Meanwhile, on 9 March 1942 a reorganization of the Army had taken place. Under the reorganization the War Department General Staff assisted the Chief of Staff in the direction of the field operations of the Army of the United States. It was specifically charged with the duty of providing subordinate commanders with such broad basic plans as would enable them to prepare and execute detailed programs.

Three zones of the interior (ZI) commands were created—Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply—to which

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18 Ibid., pp. 38–39.
19 This provision was not repeated in subsequent WD directives nor in TM 19-500. These provisions were applicable outside the continental United States only to the extent deemed feasible by the theater commander concerned.
were delegated duties connected with ZI administration, supply, or-
ganization, and training. All the supply arms and services and the
technical and administrative services, plus the Engineers and Signal
Corps, were placed under Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Commanding
General, Services of Supply (SOS). In the discharge of his duties,
the SOS commanding general was directed to use all judicious short-
cuts in procedure to expedite the war’s operations.

The major purpose of the reorganization was to achieve decen-
tralization and to free the General Staff from a multitude of detail,
thereby permitting it to function as the planning and policy-determin-
ing agency for the Chief of Staff. After the reorganization the War
Department General Staff exerted every effort to assist the new SOS
command in its operation.

Before the reorganization, Personnel Division, G–1, had been re-
ponsible for prisoner of war planning and policy determination, and
the Office of The Provost Marshal General for their execution. The
new plan, however, did not list this PW responsibility as a duty of
G–1; it was assumed that it had been transferred, along with the
operations of The Provost Marshal General, to the SOS Command.
Four months later, a revised Army Regulation (AR 10–15) again
gave the responsibility to G–1, but he did not fully exercise this au-
thority until April of the following year. In practice, therefore, PW
matters were generally referred to the PMG for staff action despite
his remote position under the new Army organization. If done cor-
rectly, this was both tedious and prolonged, and if a referral was made
direct, as sometimes occurred, it was usually uncoordinated.

From 9 March 1942 to April 1943, in contrast to his former Special
Staff position, the PMG functioned under the Commanding General,
SOS, and reported to him through the chief of Administrative Serv-
ces and the Chief of Staff, SOS. The Civilian Personnel Division
(later termed Industrial Personnel Division) also had limited control
over his activities. The PMG office thus was a subordinated “operat-
ing division” subject to various levels of coordination, staff super-
vision, and command within the Services of Supply. In April 1943,
after G–1 resumed staff supervision over prisoner of war operations
(coupled with later adjustments and simplifications in the organiza-
tion of Army Service Forces [ASF], The Provost Marshal General
was restored to a more favorable position. By June 1945, he re-
ported directly to the Chief of Staff, ASF, as a full staff advisor. He
also had administrative supervision over PW operations and made
detailed plans for the approval of G–1. [See chart 3.]

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18 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, sub: WD Reorganization.
19 Gen Somervell immediately before the reorganization had been the WD ACoS, G–4.
20 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, WD Reorganization Chart D; Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National
21 Services of Supply (SOS) became Army Service Forces (ASF) 12 Mar 43.
The Alien Internment Program

While work was proceeding on the 1942 manual, the internment program was gaining momentum. Funds were allocated to local and oversea commanders to construct initial or additional temporary facilities as needed. In addition, The Quartermaster General was directed to begin the immediate construction of a permanent alien enemy camp on the Florence Military Reservation in Arizona.\(^2\)

While work was proceeding on the permanent camp, 10 emergency camps were established by the service command concerned on Army posts strategically located on each coast and the United States land frontiers to impound the expected internees.\(^3\) Two additional 3,000-man camps and one 500-man officer prisoner of war camp were authorized in January 1942, plus planning for two more 3,000-man camps if needed.\(^3\) The increase in the number and the reduced size of the permanent camps violated the existing agreement between the Secretary of War and The Attorney General. But with the latter’s consent, it was amended to permit the Secretary of War to locate and determine the size of the camps at his discretion. This removed any obstacle to the construction program.

Meanwhile, the War Department wanted to move many alien enemy civilians from the west coast for security reasons. To prepare for this, the PMG, together with G-4, selected specific sites for additional camps in the Southwest. By March, the estimated number to be interned reached approximately 100,000; consequently the immediate construction of nine additional permanent alien camps and one officer prisoner of war camp was authorized for the sites selected.\(^4\) Fourteen additional camps were also in the planning stage. However, the number of interned alien enemies never approached the March 1942 figure; as a result, the permanent camps under construction (costing approximately $50,000,000) as well as those in the planning stage became largely unneeded for their original purpose. Later they were used to intern prisoners of war.

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\(^2\) The camp was to have an initial capacity of 3,000 internees, capable of expansion to 6,000 plus overhead. It was to cost an estimated $4,800,000. See: Memo, Gen Somervell, ACofS, G-4, for TAG, 9 Dec 41, sub: Construction of Facilities for the Internment of Alien Enemies and other Prisoners of War. PMGO 255 Gen PW #1 (Sep 41 thru Dec 42) (C). DRB, TAG.

\(^3\) 1944 Regional Conference, PW Commanders, "Put Prisoners on Organized Well Planned Work," p. 5. PMGO A 48-225/76. DRB, TAG.

\(^4\) These camps were to be completed by August 1942 and each was to cost $2,500,000. See: Memo, Maj Gen A. W. Gullion for CofS, 3 Mar 42, sub: Current Requirements for Prisoners of War and Alien Enemy Internment Camps, Continental U. S.; memo, Col C. H. Searcy, Ch, Requirements Div, SOS, for Ch of Engrs, 18 Mar 42, sub: Current Requirements for Prisoners of War and Enemy Alien Camps, Continental U. S. Both filed in AG 014.311 (1-13-41) (C). DRB, TAG.

\(^5\) Memo, Maj Gen A. W. Gullion to Ch of Admin Secs, SOS, 22 Mar 42, sub: Current Requirements for Prisoners of War and Alien Enemy Internment Camps in Continental U. S. AG 014.311 (2) (3-22-42). DRB, TAG.
The Proposed Transfer of British Prisoners

Early in 1942 the War Department directed the transfer of all captured enemy personnel to custody within the United States, except those taken by the Navy at some distance. This was done to relieve overseas forces from the problems of guarding, feeding, and housing prisoners of war. But very few prisoners of war were captured by U. S. forces in 1942.26

In August of that year Great Britain proposed that the United States intern 50,000 British-captured prisoners of war on one month’s notice, and an additional 100,000 on three months’ notice. The British Charge d’Affaires stated that any sudden influx of prisoners by wholesale captures would overtax accommodations in the British Empire.27 Because of the urgent nature of this appeal, it was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by them to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS). Since these prisoners of war would have to be quartered in the United States, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, directed the JPS to approach the question from the point of view of its effect on the overall war effort rather than upon any inconvenience it might cause.28 General Somervell concurred with this view and directed the SOS to give unqualified support.

The JPS, in its reply, recommended that only 50,000 PW’s be accepted for custody in the United States and suggested that the remaining 100,000 be interned in Canada and employed on such work as the Alcan Highway project. It thought the presence of such a large number of prisoners of war in the United States would constitute a security hazard to the many U. S. war industries. The JPS had assumed that the majority of these recommended 50,000 would be unskilled laborers; therefore, it suggested that PW camps be established in the following type areas where mass employment of the prisoners would be possible:

1. Forests (conservation),
2. Agricultural regions (mass farming),
3. Areas where roads were to be constructed, airfields built, and where other construction involving manual labor was planned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, decided that it was impractical to split the 150,000 prisoners and agreed to accept them with the understanding that the War Department be given a minimum of one month’s notice before receipt of the first consignment of 50,000. One month’s notice was also to be given for each consignment thereafter.

26 By May 1942 only 32 prisoners of war were interned in the United States; by August, 65; by November, 431; and by 31 December, 1,881. On the other hand, by December 1942, enemy aliens interned amounted to approximately 4,000. See: “Prisoner of War Operations,” op. cit., pp. 31-35.
27 Great Britain then held 23,000 German and 250,000 Italian prisoners of war.
28 See: OCS 383.6 (29 Sep 43) (S). DRB, TAG.
No shipping was to be specifically diverted to delivery of the prisoners of war into U. S. custody.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Prisoner of War Planning}

The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated specific activity for prisoner of war policy, plans, and operations as distinguished from that for interned aliens.\textsuperscript{30} Plans were made for the necessary construction, for the security of the prisoners, and for their employment.

\textbf{The Construction Program}

In September 1942 The Provost Marshal General submitted the required plans. The construction plan, of necessity, was divided into two parts. The first part determined the method of distribution of the 50,000 prisoners of war (who were to arrive in 30 days) to existing facilities. The PMG planned to house approximately 75 percent in unused camps in the Southwest (Eighth Service Command) which had been constructed or were under construction for enemy aliens. At this time, existing temporary camps in the corps areas and the completed permanent camps in the Southwest could accommodate only 32,000 prisoners since approximately 175 PW's and 4,000 enemy aliens were already in confinement. To provide for the 6,000 additional civilian aliens who were expected after 16 September and for the balance of the prisoners of war, the PMG requested that the completion date of the facilities under construction be advanced. This would add 22,500 spaces to the total capacity and would provide ample room for the expected first shipment. Because of the uncertainty of the construction program, the PMG also sought available sites on military installations where temporary housing (which would later be converted into permanent camps) could be quickly erected to care for approximately 20,000 more prisoners of war. \textsuperscript{[See table 1.]}  

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Completed, Under Construction, and Authorized Internment Camps in Zone of Interior, 15 Sept 1942 *}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Camp</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Clark, Mo.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence, Ariz.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Forrest, Tenn.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tab A, Memo, Maj Gen George Grunert, Ch, Adm. Svcs, SOS, to CG, SOS, 15 Sep 42, subj: Plan for acceptance of Custody of Prisoners of War Taken by the United Nations. Copy in OCS 383,6 (20 Sep 48) (S). DRB, TAG.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} Extract from Minutes, JCS 32d meeting, 8 Sep 42, Item 5; Report by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners, 7 Sep 42, subj: Acceptance of Custody of Prisoners of War Taken by the United Nations. JCS 64/2, All in OPD 383,6 (POW) Sec. I, Case 21 (S). DRB, TAG.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30} See entire file OCS 383,6 (29 Sep 43) (S) for details of this planning and correspondence pertaining thereto; see also: OPD 383,6 (POW) sec. I, Case 21 (S). DRB, TAG.
Table 1. Completed, Under Construction, and Authorized Internment Camps in Zone of Interior, 15 Sept. 1942—Continued

1. Permanent camps—Continued.
   (a) Completed—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huntsville, Tex.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Livingston, La</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lordsburg, N. Mex</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McAlistair, Okla.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roswell, N. Mex.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stringtown, Okla.</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (b) Under construction, completion expected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alva, Okla. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossville, Tenn. (11-15-42)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearne, Tex. (11-30-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford, Tex. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexia, Tex. (12-30-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monticello, Ark. (?)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruston, La. (?)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weingarten, Mo. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (c) Authorized 9 Sep. 42.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tonkawa, Okla. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLeon, Tex. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Como, Miss. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliceville, Ala. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordia, Kans. (12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence, Ariz. (increase, 12-15-42)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Temporary camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Blanding, Fla</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bliss, Tex.</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg, N. C.</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Devens, Mass</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Meade, Md.</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp McCoy, Wis.</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Oglethorpe, Ga</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Sam Houston, Tex.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shelby, Miss</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,318</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **Grand total** 78,218

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*Author’s note: These camps were provided by the corps areas and originally intended for the internment of civilian aliens pending the construction of the “permanent” internment facilities.*
In planning for the second incoming group of 100,000, The Provost Marshal General anticipated that the principal burden for PW housing would rest upon the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Service Commands in the South and Southwest. This was based on two factors: First, security regulations in coastal zones restricted the further selection of PW camp sites; second, the location of camps in mild climate areas would hold internment costs to a minimum. To accommodate this larger group, the PMG recommended construction of additional camps to provide for 144,000 prisoners of war. Emergency housing, such as tentage, was to provide for the 100,000; and the additional 44,000 spaces were to care for U.S.-captured prisoners of war and for normal increments from other sources. To provide sites for this housing, the War Department modified its policy that previously restricted construction to mild climate areas below 40° latitude.  

Guard Personnel

In 1942 only 36 military police escort companies had been activated. To guard the PW’s on hand and the 50,000 to be received, the PMG requested that 32 additional companies be activated immediately in the ratio of 1 company per 1,000 prisoners. He also requested that 100 additional units be authorized in the same ratio, so their training could commence at once. The Deputy Chief of Staff, however, approved only the requested 32 new escort guard companies and authorized the immediate assignment of limited service personnel from reception centers to the guard companies.

Employment Provisions

The PMG, in his plan for the British prisoners of war, stated:

9. The plan to utilize available areas within certain posts, camps and stations [the suggested emergency construction] contemplates the distribution of the prisoners through various cantonments where prisoner labor detachments may be used to relieve Service Troops. In addition, the Quartermaster has been requested to consider the employment of prisoners of war at Quartermaster Depots and Remount stations. I believe that, under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, 1929, prisoners of war may be used at posts, camps and stations for maintenance and repairs of roads and utilities, in handling Quartermaster supplies and in the maintenance of station facilities. A general program along these lines will be devised for dissemination among those concerned.  

The plan made no specific reference to the use of prisoners of war in agriculture; but the Chief of Administrative Services, in forwarding it to General Somervell, added, “The plan also envisages the utili-
zation of large numbers of these prisoners on agricultural and other projects not under War Department supervision where there is a recognized shortage in unskilled labor." The entire "plan for acceptance of custody of prisoners of war taken by the United Nations," as approved by General Somervell, concluded with, "Additional information as to work which may be performed by prisoners of war will be furnished at an early date."

In mid-September, the plan was referred to The Judge Advocate General for review. Col. Archibald King, Chief, War Plans Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, ruled the Alcan Highway was a military road undertaken in wartime for military reasons and specifically disapproved the employment of prisoners of war on it, basing his disapproval on the prohibition against work directly related to war operations as contained in the Geneva Convention. He commented: "The employment of prisoners of war for building a road to be used for transportation is within the spirit and purpose, if not the letter, of the foregoing prohibition; and is equally objectionable. It is work directly and greatly helping the war effort of the United States and the United Nations, in which our enemies should not be expected or required to engage." He cautioned further that the adoption of such a plan might cause the Axis powers to retaliate against American prisoners of war.

This interpretation of Article 31 would have limited PW employment on military installations in the Zone of the Interior or in the rear areas of combat theaters and would have negated many of the proposals made by The Provost Marshal General. General Gullion therefore protested vigorously and contended that Colonel King’s interpretation of Article 31 was incongruous with the interpretation given it by other belligerent nations as evidenced by their practices in the war. He further contended the Geneva Convention of 1929 and its precedents showed an intent on the part of the participating nations to authorize the extensive use of PW’s in time of war. The nations in their discussions at these conventions had refused to place too many restrictions on the use of such labor or to accept any rigid definitions of the few agreed upon. General Gullion argued that the attitude of the delegates inferred the intent to leave the matter of application, clarification, and, within reason, interpretation, to the discretion of the contracting powers.

Although he admitted interpretations of the labor provisions of the 1929 Convention were meager and scattered, General Gullion re-

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33 Memo, Maj Gen George Grunert, Ch, Adm Svc, SOS, to CG, SOS, 15 Sep 42, sub: Plan for acceptance of Custody of Prisoners of War taken by the United Nations. Ibid.
34 Memo, Col A. King, Ch, War Plans Div, JAGO, for TJAG, 25 Sep 42, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War. AG 302.6 (16–50–42) (1). DBB, TAG.
35 2d Ind, Maj Gen A. W. Gullion, to Ch, Adm Svc, 20 Oct 42, sub: Labor for Prisoners of War. Ibid.
emphasized that the import of the provisions was that an individual PW should not be compelled to do work unhealthful or dangerous to himself (Art. 32) or directly harmful to the state he was serving as a soldier (Art. 31). In view of the above, the PMG recommended a less restrictive view be adopted in interpreting Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. He wanted permissible work defined as "... any work not in a theater of operations and not concerned with the manufacture or transportation of arms or munitions or the transportation of any material intended for combatant units and not unhealthful, dangerous, degrading, menial, or beyond the particular prisoners capacity." This he stated, would conform to the convention and with the practices of other nations. In November, the War Department approved these recommendations.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified The Provost Marshal General that they had agreed to accept an additional 25,000 Italian prisoners of war then interned by the British in Kenya Colony, Africa. These were expected to arrive within 30 days. Although no notice had been received as to the shipment of the original 150,000 PW's, it now appeared that as many as 75,000 prisoners of war would arrive in the United States before the end of the year. General McNarney suggested that these PW's be employed in agriculture and directed that they be housed in localities where they could be used. In December 1942 Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, suggested that the incoming Italians be used within Army hospitals and cantonments in order to reduce the Army's demands upon civilian labor. Drawing upon his experience in France during World War I, General Marshall recalled their use as transient harvest labor and their employment in mines and on similar tasks. Referring to security, a factor always present in the handling of prisoners, he commented: "... the business of guarding could be carried out on a limited basis and the escape of a few prisoners would not be too bad in its effect." The general stated that very few guards were used with certain classes of German prisoners working on farms in France in 1918. Thus emphasis was again placed on the necessity for an employment program.

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88 Memo, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell, CG, SOS, for Sec. GS, 10 Jan 43, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War; memo, J. J. McCloy, ASW, for the ACoFS, OPD, 6 Nov 42; DR, Brig Gen I. H. Edwards, ACoFS, OPD, to CoS, 4 Nov 42, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War. Copies in ibid.
87 Memo, Col M. Pearson, Exec Off, Hq, SOS, for PMG, 20 Oct 42, sub: Prisoners of War. Ibid.
86 Memo, Marshall for Somervell, 1 Dec 42, sub: Employment of Italian Prisoners of War. PMGO 283.5 (1943). DRB, TAG.
The approved PMG plan and comments were then forwarded to the Secretary of State for comment on the appropriateness of the statement defining permissible work. At the same time a copy was also sent to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater. In reply, General Eisenhower thought the phrase “any work not in a theater of operations” as proposed by the PMG would prohibit the employment of prisoners of war in the European Theater. Therefore, he proposed the substitution of the words “any work not under fire in a combat zone.”  

On 10 December 1942 the Secretary of State replied, making several recommendations for improving the proposed policy statement, especially with reference to the requirements of the Geneva Convention. He suggested prohibiting prisoners of war from handling supplies or material unmistakably destined for combatant units, but not from handling commodities that might eventually be used by them. The Secretary also suggested that any words that implied the inclusion of work too closely related to war operations and which might subject the American Government to charges of violations of Article 31 of the convention be eliminated. The Department of State desired to be in a strong position to protest the nature of work given Americans who were in enemy custody should it become necessary.

The changes suggested by the Secretary of State and General Eisenhower were incorporated into the basic plan; and on 10 January 1943 an approved revised statement entitled “War Department Policy with Respect to Labor of Prisoners of War” was published. This directive stated that all PW employment articles of the convention be observed, and specified that:

Any work outside the combat zones not having a direct relation with war operations and not involving the manufacture or transportation of arms or munitions or the transportation of any material clearly intended for combatant units, and not unhealthful, dangerous, degrading, or beyond the particular prisoner's physical capacity, is allowable and desirable.

Thus the labor articles of the convention were interpreted as permitting PW's located outside the combat zone to transport and to load and unload supplies, other than arms or munitions, even though some of the commodities might eventually be used by combatant troops.

Permissible work suggested for the PW's, other than for self-maintenance, included: employment in War Department owned and operated laundries; brush clearance and construction of firebreaks; mosquito control; soil conservation and agricultural projects; con-
struction and repair of highways and drainage ditches; strip mining and quarrying; and other similar work. All questionable work that might violate the convention was to be referred to The Provost Marshal General for decision before it was undertaken.

The Prisoners Arrive

The expected influx of enemy aliens in 1942 never materialized, and before April 1943 less than 5,000 prisoners of war had reached the United States. By mid-August, however, the total exceeded 130,000. [See table 2.] The successful North African campaign had resulted in wholesale captures of prisoners of war by both American and British forces.43

Table 2. Monthly Census of Prisoners of War Interned in Continental United States*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of month</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>177</td>
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<td>October</td>
<td>183</td>
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<td></td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
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<td>512</td>
<td>1,317</td>
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<td>1943:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
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<td>2,444</td>
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<td>171,484</td>
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<td>123,440</td>
<td>49,323</td>
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<td>1944:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
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<td>124,880</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>186,368</td>
<td>135,796</td>
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</table>

*Source: ASF WD Monthly Progress Reports, sec. 11, Administration.

43 At the beginning of the North African campaign, it was agreed that all PW's captured in northwest Africa would be American-owned. See: Memo A, Hq, SHAEF, G-1 Div, 20 Sep 44, sub: Agreements and Policies on control of PW's captured in Joint British/US Operations. Misc. 383.6 (POW-ETO). OCMH, Gen Ref Office.
Table 2. Monthly Census of Prisoners of War Interned in Continental United States—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of month</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1944:</td>
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<td>248,781</td>
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<td>1,242</td>
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<td>306,856</td>
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<td>1945:</td>
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<td>365,954</td>
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<td>3,260</td>
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<tr>
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<td>425,871</td>
<td>371,683</td>
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<td>371,505</td>
<td>50,052</td>
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<td>422,130</td>
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<td>355,458</td>
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<td>March</td>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>37,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>June *</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There were 32,000 PW's on military and civilian work projects which terminated 15 June 1946. All PW's were repatriated by 30 June 1946 except 141 Germans, 20 Italians, and 1 Japanese serving sentences in U. S. penal institutions.

With the prisoners arriving in such numbers, the Provost Marshal General directed that they be segregated in different camps by nationality and category. Officer prisoners of war were interned in the same camps but in different compounds from the enlisted prisoners. To decentralize functions as much as possible, the PMG authorized the service commands concerned to transfer the PW's at their discre-

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44 PW camps were set up for the following categories:

a. German Army anti-Nazi prisoners.
b. The remaining German Army prisoners.
c. German Navy anti-Nazi prisoners.
d. The remaining German Navy prisoners.
e. Italian prisoners.
f. Japanese prisoners.

See: Ltr, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan to CG, 1st Svc Cmd, 8 Mar 43, sub: Transfer of Internees within Service Commands. PMGO 383.6 (S). DRB, TAG.
tion within the commands, provided the categories were not mixed. But any such transfers had to be reported. The PMG also reserved the right to designate and transfer those to be considered as anti-Nazis. (Russians, captured in German uniforms, were considered as German prisoners of war.)

The permanent PW inclosures could set up temporary branch camps, but no additional housing could be constructed. However, tents and former CCC buildings could be and were used.

The prior planning for the expected British-captured prisoners of war proved adequate for internment purposes for those received from northwest Africa, but employment policies were limited in scope. However, the plans made for prisoner of war employment in 1942 formed the groundwork for the extensive PW employment program which was soon to develop.

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45 Ibid.
46 Memo, AG, HQ, ASF, to CG's, 2d to 9th Svc Cmds, 22 Jul 43, sub: Temporary Prisoner of War Camps. OPD 383.6, Prisoners of War (Sec. Iva), Case 139 (S). DRG, TAG.
Chapter 8
The Italian Service Units

On 8 September 1943 Italy capitulated and soon thereafter declared war on the German Reich. Because of its stand, the Allied Governments accorded Italy the status of a cobelligerent. The surrender of Italy permitted the employment of its prisoners of war on work directly connected with military operations since it was interpreted as not harmful to the surrendered government. However, the Allied Governments continued in force those restrictions contained in the Geneva Convention that protected the personal safety, health, and well-being of the Italian prisoners of war.1

The Limited Parole System

Shortly after Italy was granted its cobelligerent status, the War Department permitted certain Italian prisoners to work, under a limited parole, on military installations or on certain projects that had been certified by the War Manpower Commission. The parole system was introduced gradually; the prisoners selected had been under observation for at least six months and were deemed trustworthy. The parole prisoners of war worked without guards, even when outside the PW camps. Each selected Italian prisoner signed a parole form and carried a PW identity card. Only a few prisoners were so employed under this system and the majority of these were later used in Italian service units.2

The Italian Service Unit Program

In October 1943 the Secretary of War suggested that Italian prisoners in the United States be used in labor companies to assist

1 Memo, Col A. King, Ch, Int Law Div, JAGO, for JAG, 24 May 45, sub: Effect of Unconditional Surrender on Employment of German Prisoners of War, G-1 383.6 Labor (1 Apr 43). DRB, TAG.
2 Memo, ACofS, G-1, to TAG, 17 Sep 43, sub: Parole of Italian Prisoners of War, OCS 383.6 (29 Sep 43) (S); see also: Ltr, TAG, to all Svc Cmds, 24 Sep 43, sub: Italian Prisoners of War. PMGO 253.5, Prisoners of War (Aug 44). DRB, TAG.
in the war effort, and requested plans for units similar to those of the defunct Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). In preparing the required plans, The Provost Marshal General worked on the following assumptions: all Italian prisoners of war in the United States would be released to the Italian Government; of these, all Fascist prisoners of war would be segregated and confined as military prisoners by the Italian Government; the remainder would be organized as Italian service units to be attached to and placed under the command of the U.S. Army. Therefore, the plan included these features:

1. Italian prisoners would be organized into numbered Italian service companies consisting of 5 officers and 177 enlisted men.
2. Pending release to the Italian Government the units would work under parole.
3. Approximately 20 companies would be activated progressively.
4. An Italian service unit headquarters would be established under ASF and would be commanded by an American officer.
5. Initially, the units would be employed to further the United States war effort, with work on military installations receiving first priority. The plan also included provisions for the chain of command, uniforms and equipment, pay and allowances, work schedules, and discipline.

When the Combined Chiefs of Staff submitted this plan to General Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa, for comment, he immediately objected to it. Both American and British forces in North Africa had already committed themselves to a policy of employing the Italians in a prisoner of war status. To keep the policy uniform, the War Department adopted a new plan similar to the one in effect in North Africa; that is, the prisoner of war status was retained. However, because of possible international complications, the War Department directed that the units be used only in the continental United States or in the Mediterranean Area.

Organization

The new plan provided for Italian service units (ISU's) to be organized from volunteer Italian PW officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men under approved tables of organization and equipment, less weapons. Initially two U.S. Army officers and ten enlisted men were to be attached to each unit for supervision; but

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[^3]: Ltr, TAG to CG, ASF, 11 Oct 43, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. G-1 383.6 (15 Jun 43), Italian Case 2; see also: OPD 383.6 (Sec. V-A) Case 105. DRB, TAG.
[^8]: For details concerning this decision see: OPD 383.6 (sec. VI) Case 218. DRB, TAG; see also: "Proclamation Issued by Marshal Badoglio on 11 October 1943." Copy in MS. "Headquarters Italian Service Units" (hereafter cited as "Hq, ISU's"). p. 2 and tab A. 4-4.1 CA. OCMH, Gen Ref Off.
these were to be reduced, consistent with efficiency and security, to a minimum of one officer and five enlisted men.

In mid-February 1944, preliminary steps were taken to organize the ISU program. Army Service Forces established Headquarters, Italian Service Units, at Fort Wadsworth, N. Y., under the command of Brig. Gen. J. M. Eager, from the office of the PMG. Training centers for the first group of volunteers were established at Pine Camp, N. Y., and Fort F. E. Warren, Wyo., for quartermaster companies; Camp Sutton, N. C., Camp Rucker, Ala., and Camp Claiborne, La., for engineer companies; at Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., for Transportation Corps companies; and at the Atlanta Ordnance Depot, Ga., for ordnance companies.

Army Service Forces retained the following responsibilities for ISU's: (1) the formulation of basic plans, policies, and procedures for the ISU's; (2) the designation and strength of the units to be activated; (3) the establishment of training doctrines; and (4) the preparation of training programs. The latter was later delegated to the technical services. Service commands were responsible for all other ISU functions and activities.

A progressive activation schedule was adopted which called for the organization of 600 PW's during the first week in March 1944; 1,000 for each of the first two weeks in April; 3,000 the third week; and 4,000 each succeeding week thereafter. Some military installations, which were already using Italian PA's, were designated to form volunteer units and to give on-the-job training. Those not designated were instructed to ship their PW's, as rapidly as work schedules permitted, to the training centers or to the other posts giving on-the-job training. The units formed and trained at the technical service centers were assigned to Headquarters, Italian Service Units, which then attached them to Class I or IV installations for work. On those posts where ISU's were to be formed, Army Service Forces issued activation orders for the units as soon as enough PW's volunteered for duty. Service commands and Class IV installations classified the PW's according to military occupation specialty (MOS) and main civilian occupation, and organized them into labor companies similar to American units. [See table 3.] This brought the labor companies to table of organization strength. Excess PW personnel were shipped to the training centers where they were used as fillers for new ISU units.

7 Lt. Hq, ASF, to DCofS for Svc Cdns.-Dir of Plans and Opns, etc., 13 Mar 44, sub: Italian Service Units. ASF 383.6, Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44) (S). DRB. TAG.
8 "Hq, ISU's," op. cit., pp. 5-6.
9 A Class I installation was under the command of a commanding general of a service command. A Class IV installation was under the command of the Army Air Forces. See: AR 170-10, 24 Dec 42.
### Table 3. Deployment of Italian Service Units, 30 June 1944 and 30 June 1945*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>On duty:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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* Source: WD, ASF Monthly Progress Reports, sec. 11, 31 Jul 44 and 31 Jul 45.
* Members of Enemy Section, Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
Units Organized

Between 25 March and 25 May 1944, Headquarters, Italian Service Units, organized the following units:

1. Headquarters and headquarters detachment, ISU
2. 15 ordnance medium automotive maintenance companies
3. 1 ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company
4. 98 quartermaster service companies
5. 5 quartermaster laundry companies
6. 2 quartermaster depot companies
7. 9 quartermaster salvage and repair companies
8. 24 headquarters and headquarters detachments, quartermaster battalions
9. 1 harbor craft company
10. 2 engineer general service regiments
11. 8 engineer dump truck companies
12. 1 special engineer battalion, together with five companies
13. 6 engineer maintenance companies
14. 2 engineer depot companies
15. 4 engineer petroleum distribution companies
16. 1 provisional mail and property detachment for The Provost Marshal General, at Fort George G. Meade, Md.

The 180 units had a table of organization strength of 1,041 officers and 33,828 enlisted men, although they actually consisted of 1,046 officers and 33,614 enlisted men. The attached American administrative detachments consisted of 234 officers and 1,221 enlisted men. Some of the ISU units were organized for shipment to the Hawaiian Islands and to clear maneuver areas; but by early summer 1944 they were no longer needed and were immediately reorganized for other work. By October 1944, after the reorganization, there were 195 Italian service units, with an actual strength of 954 officers and 32,898 enlisted men, working on 66 military installations—all doing work vital to the war effort. Approximately 12,000 ISU personnel worked at ports of embarkation; 8,500 in ordnance installations; 4,300 at quartermaster depots; and 5,900 at service command installations.

Screening and Security

Screening of Italian service unit personnel was a continuous process. An initial screening was done before an Italian prisoner of war was accepted into the program, and the units were continuously screened to weed out undesirables. All ISU personnel who expressed Fascist or pro-Nazi beliefs, showed studied or deliberate noncooperation, dis-
played subversive, recalcitrant or rebellious attitudes, or committed serious infractions of laws and regulations were returned to PW camps. Since suitable replacements were scarce, ISU commanders exhausted local punishment and reclassification procedures before returning them. If, after a reassignment, a prisoner of war was unsatisfactory due to physical or technical reasons, the commanding general of a service command could direct his return to a PW camp without prejudice.\(^{13}\)

**Pay**

Early in March 1944, the chief of staff, Army Service Forces, recommended a pay scale for ISU’s based on a percentage of the base pay of American troops for comparable grade or rank of the table of organization positions these men would occupy. The rank or grade in the Italian army held by these PW’s was disregarded. All pay was to be in American currency.\(^{14}\) In view of the differential that would have existed between the pay being given ISU’s in the Mediterranean Theater (the prisoner of war pay scale) and that recommended by Army Service Forces, the War Department on 31 March 1944 approved a uniform pay scale for all ISU personnel of $24 per month. This included the 10 cents a day gratuitous allowance for enlisted men but was in addition to the $20, $30, and $40 monthly allowance paid to officers whether they worked or not. One-third of the total amount was authorized to be paid in cash while two-thirds could be paid in coupons redeemable at post exchanges or deposited in Prisoners’ Trust Funds. In 1945, the gratuitous allowance of $3 a month for enlisted German, Italian Fascist, and Japanese prisoners of war was discontinued, but members of ISU’s continued to receive it as a reward for their voluntary services.\(^{15}\)

**Training**

Training programs for Italian service units included the same subjects, less tactics and weapons training, as were given to American personnel on similar jobs. Certain designated units were to be trained originally at appropriate technical service centers: Camp Claiborne, La., for engineer units; Pine Camp, N. Y., Camp Wallace, Tex., and Fort Lewis, Wash., for quartermaster units; and the Transportation Corps Unit Training Center, New Orleans, La., for transportation units. The chiefs of the services prepared ISU training schedules based on their own standard mobilization training programs. The

\(^{13}\) ASF Cir 236, 23 Jun 45, pt. II, Copy in AG 333.6 (25 Apr 45) (7). DRB, TAG.

\(^{14}\) Italian enlisted men, company officers, and warrant officers would have been paid 50 per cent of the equivalent U. S. Army rank, and field officers 45 per cent of the U. S. Army base pay.

\(^{15}\) "Hq, ISU's," op. cit., pp. 11-12; see also: Memo, ACOFS, G-1, to CofS, 7 Apr. 44, sub: Pay allowances for Italian Service Units; ASF 333.6, Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44). DRB, TAG.
length of instruction varied from 8 to 12 weeks depending upon the type of unit organized, and basic military subjects were taught along with specialized job training.

Approximately 44 percent of the volunteer Italian prisoners were instructed at the training centers under the technical service programs. The remainder were given on-the-job training at the posts where they were assigned. This also included 12 hours weekly training in basic military subjects. On many posts, however, the work demands interfered with the required military instruction, and in only a few instances was the required 12 hours given. Instruction for the assigned work was accomplished satisfactorily. ISU units technically trained at the Ordnance, Engineer, and Transportation Centers were considered more valuable and essential than those which had been given on-the-job training, since they had been given more specialized instruction. But since quartermaster work on the whole did not require as much technical skill, ISU's trained on the job at quartermaster installations were considered the equal to those trained at the Quartermaster Training Center.

Work demands forced Headquarters, Italian Service Units, to transfer many units to their ultimate destination before completion of their training program, and by 30 September 1944 the training centers were closed. All the ISU units had either completed their instruction or had been assigned to other posts for on-the-job training.16

Many difficulties had to be met and overcome in training ISU personnel. Graphic aids had to be devised; manuals translated; and, as a whole, the language barrier overcome. Progress was slow. Many commanders, to speed up their work program, resorted to makeshift and less formal methods—but with good results. Some started English courses but shortened them as the Italian prisoners quickly grasped a working knowledge of the English language through association with American civilians on the job. Many post commanders stressed on-the-job instruction in English from the start of the training program.17

Later Restrictions

The Geneva Convention restrictions on war work had been waived by the Badoglio proclamation, and ISU's were used on any type work that would further the war effort, subject to the following security restrictions: ISU's could not be used in combat; they could not be used on docks, wharves, piers, or on vessels at ports of embarkation within the United States; they could not handle explosives or other dangerous or classified materials, nor could they be employed where they

16 Rpt, 30 May 45, sub: Developments In the Program for Training and Employment of Italian Service Units in the Fiscal Year 1945. ASF Control Div, Management Br, ISU's, FY 1945. DRB, TAG.
might have access to them; and they could not be used on any project where other prisoners of war were available and could be used.\textsuperscript{18}

**Results of the Program**

The Italian service unit program remained unchanged during World War II and contributed materially to the successful conclusion of the war, releasing U. S. service personnel for overseas duties. During the period ending 31 December 1944, ISU's performed over 6,000,000 man-days of labor on military installations. The Transportation Corps used over 2,000,000 man-days at ports of embarkation and at holding and reconsigning points to expedite the dispatch of war material overseas.\textsuperscript{19} Ordinance Corps used 1,364,374 man-days at ordnance depots and arsenals to assist in the shipment of vital material to the ports. The Quartermaster Corps used nearly 800,000 man-days of this labor to prepare supplies for shipment, and the Engineer Corps nearly 333,000 man-days. Approximately 750,000 man-days of ISU labor were performed on military installations to recondition and prepare motor vehicles for overseas shipment. Others were used to salvage essential material and for general housekeeping and maintenance.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Ltr, Hq, ASF, to DCoS for Svc Cmds, etc., 23 Mar 44, sub: Italian Service Units. Copy in "Hq, ISU's," op. cit., tab C.
\textsuperscript{19} The New York Port of Embarkation alone used 585,352 man-days of ISU labor during this period.
\textsuperscript{20} Press Conference, Maj Gen A. L. Lerch, TPMG, 13 Feb 45. PMG Special File, Prisoner of War Labor (1945). DRB, TAG.
Chapter 9

Contract Labor: The Development of the War Department-War Manpower Commission Agreement, August 1943, and Implementing Directives

Since few prisoners of war were interned in the United States in 1942 and since manpower shortages in American industry or agriculture did not become critical until late 1942, during that year there was little opportunity to use prisoners of war in contract employment. Nevertheless, detailed planning was undertaken, and by mid-1943, when the first large-scale contract employment of the prisoners became possible, employment policies had been considerably refined and expanded.

In general, the early development of the contract policy was confined closely to the Office of The Provost Marshal General and was limited in scope. Security was paramount and the central aim was to prevent the prisoners from escaping and committing sabotage. The Provost Marshal General’s staff had little reason to contact industrial, agricultural, and labor personnel for expert advice in analyzing areas where manpower was needed, or to work out the details of contract pay scales and local labor adjustments. By late 1942, however, when receipt of the prisoners of war was imminent, the PMG sought the aid of the Industrial Personnel Division, SOS; the War Manpower Commission; and the Department of Agriculture in prisoner of war placement and employment.

In November 1942, The Provost Marshal General and The Judge Advocate General jointly issued a new standard contract form to assist PW camp commanders in their negotiations with private employers of prisoner of war labor. The new form developed more fully the issue of pay scales and contract costs, but this was difficult to resolve. The April 1942 manual had stipulated that the amount to be paid by employers was to be negotiated and that it could not be less than 80 cents a day per prisoner. But in the new contract as issued the employer was also required to pay the cost of rationing the PW’s while at work and of transporting them to and from the job.

Fearing that organized labor in the United States would openly resist any threat to the established pay rates or would be hostile to
any labor that might compete indiscriminately with free labor, the Director of the Civilian Personnel Division, SOS, emphasized that prisoners of war should not be hired out on contract where they would compete with free labor. He also contended that the new contract form should include the clause "the contractor agrees to pay for said labor in accordance with the minimum rates for similar labor in the locality or area." This would have prevented any employer from obtaining low-wage PW labor to the competitive disadvantage of free civilian labor. However, the Office of The Provost Marshal General, apparently making no distinction between the amount the contractor was to pay and the amount to be credited to the prisoner of war, contended that to pay the prevailing civilian wage rate to PW's would arouse public opinion and cause unfavorable repercussions, particularly since American prisoners overseas were not being paid high rates for the work they were doing. This issue was sidestepped in the November 1942 draft contract form instructions by not defining the amount to be paid—a temporary victory for those opposed to paying a prevailing wage rate.

In December 1942 the Office of The Provost Marshal General advised the camp commander of the Camp Wheeler (Ga.) internment camp that he was the PMGO's representative and could complete local prisoner of war labor contracts. This action indicated that in current planning, contract actions were to be decentralized to the using level, thus making it easier to employ PW labor.

The Employment Situation, Spring 1943

Critical manpower shortages developed in many areas and industries in early 1943, and to effectively allocate any incoming PW's to the critical areas The Provost Marshal General's Offices sought the cooperation of the War Manpower Commission and the Department of Agriculture. These agencies submitted lists of suggested work projects near established camps and suggested sites for new camps, with nearby projects on which PW's could be employed, or sites that might assist in filling seasonal farm labor demands. Although many of the service commands objected to the sites finally chosen, by

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1 Memo, James P. Mitchell, Dir, Civ Pers Div, SOS, to Ch, Adm Svs, SOS, 20 Nov 42, sub: Contracts for Internees and/or Prisoner of War Labor. PMGO 253.5 Gen PW #1 (4 Mar 42 thru 14 Jul 43). DRB, TAG.
2 Memo, Col B. M. Bryan, Dir, Aliens Div, PMGO, for Ch, Adm Svs, SOS, 30 Nov 42, sub: Contract for Civilian Internee and/or Prisoner of War Labor. Ibid.
3 Ltr and inds, Lt Col R. E. Patterson, Hq, Camp Wheeler, Ga., to CG, 4th Svc Cmd, 17 Dec 42, sub: Approval for Class II Labor. Camp Wheeler Internment Camp. PMGO 253.5 (1943). DRB, TAG.
5 For a discussion of those objections, see: "History of PMGO, WWII," op. cit., p. 393; see also: DF, Maj Gen Thos. Handy to CG, SOS, 3 Feb 43, sub: Location of Internment Camps. Case 60 in OPD 883.6 (Prisoners of War) Sec II (Cases 40-60) (8). DRB, TAG.
March, 37 prisoner of war camps had been completed on or near military installations and 21 more were either under construction or were authorized.6

The Issue of Contract Pay in Agricultural Work

The issue of whether employers would pay the prevailing wage rate for PW labor again flared into the open in March 1943. At a meeting between Brig. Gen. B. M. Bryan, Office of The Provost Marshal General, and representatives of the Industrial Personnel Division of the Army Service Forces, General Bryan stated that he was skeptical as to whether employers would pay prevailing wage rates for PW labor since certain “nuisance factors” were involved. These “nuisance factors” he explained, would be the result of using prisoners of war instead of free workers and were as follows:

- a. The adjustment of work schedules and working conditions to conform with the security requirements for the employment of prisoners of war.
- b. The possible cost of additional supervision to instruct and to direct the prisoners in their work, in addition to the guards provided by the Government for security purposes.
- c. The language problem which necessitates communication with the prisoners through interpreters.
- d. The possibility of attempts by the prisoners to sabotage the work being done.
- e. The danger to the employer, free employees, and the citizens of the community which arise from:
  1. Possible attempts by the prisoners themselves to escape.
  2. Action by the guards to prevent the escape of prisoners.7

On the other hand, the Industrial Personnel Division recommended that PW’s be used only when free workers could not be recruited at going rates; and that the PW’s be paid the prevailing wage rate received by free workers, less that caused by differences in efficiency and “nuisance factors.” It indicated that the employer would then enjoy the advantages of an available labor supply; advance planning for the labor at prevailing wage rates; and the elimination of the problem of labor turnover.8

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6 The War Department and the Department of Justice had agreed that all enemy aliens held by the Army would be transferred to the Department of Justice. To avoid possible confusion, the name of the Army installations was changed from internment camps to prisoner of war camps and 3,725 enemy aliens were returned to the Department of Justice. See: 1944 Regional Conference, Prisoner of War Commanders, “Put Prisoners on Organized Well Planned Work,” p. 5; memo, Col J. M. Roamer, Ch, Security Svcs Div, SOS, for Ch, Admin Svcs, 10 Mar 43, sub: Interned Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War. PMGO 383.6. DRB, TAG.

7 See: Memo, Maj J. E. Bartoccini, Actg Exec, Ind Pers Div, for SW, 15 Mar 43, sub: Recommendations concerning Payments by Employers for Services of Prisoners of War. ASF File, Prisoners of War (1942 to April 1944). DRB, TAG.

8 Memo, Jas. P. Mitchell, Dir, Ind Pers Div, for TPMG, 10 Mar 43, sub: Recommendations concerning payments by employers for Services of Prisoners of War. Ibid.
Meanwhile, before the issue was settled, an acute shortage of agricultural labor forced the Deputy Chief of Staff to terminate PW employment on "nonessential work" and to transfer them to agricultural work. The PMG, in carrying out this order, granted PW camp commanders the authority to negotiate and complete arrangements locally for this employment, subject to the approval of the commanding general of the service command. Portions of the PMG's directive immediately ran into opposition from the War Manpower Commission, the Department of Agriculture, and the Industrial Personnel Division. The new instructions met general approval when they specified that PW's were to be used only to meet labor requirements that could not be filled at standard wage rates, and that employers should pay an amount equivalent to the labor cost normally incurred in using civilian labor.

The instructions of The Provost Marshal General contained a controversial provision which stated that the cost of PW labor should be estimated at 50 to 75 percent of the normal costs of free labor, because of the "nuisance factors." The Industrial Personnel Division contended that the prevailing piece or hourly rate should be used, and that deductions for sabotage or other losses should be made after they arose and before final payment to the employer. To this The Provost Marshal General replied that "forced labor" performed by prisoners of war could not be the equivalent of American free labor. Furthermore, he stated that the farmer employer would probably want to estimate his labor costs in advance and would probably reject any procedure which would subject him to the expense and uncertainty of subsequent adjustments and claims. The Provost Marshal General felt the cost of adjusting contracts, especially small contracts, would be prohibitive.

At this point, in view of the sharp differences of opinion over the procedure for determining compensation, Maj. Gen. James L. Collins, the chief of Administrative Services of Army Service Forces, suggested that the percentage of deduction might be revised as information became available on prisoners of war working on agricultural projects. He therefore recommended, and the War Department subsequently published on 19 May 1943, The Provost Marshal General's original draft of instructions to the camp commanders which included the advance reduction in labor costs to the employer.

After the directive had been published, Mr. James P. Mitchell, the director of the Industrial Personnel Division, resumed his criticism.

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9 Ltr, TPMG to CG's, all service commands, 13 Apr 43, sub: Agricultural Employment of Prisoners of War; ltr, Dep Admin, WFA, to CG's, all service commands, 15 Jun 43, sub: Agricultural Employment for Prisoners of War. G-1 383.6 Labor (14 May 43), "In Agriculture and Food Processing." DRB, TAG.

10 2d Ind, Col John E. O'Gara, Ch, Labor Br, Ind Pers Div, to Ch, Admin Svcs, 1 May 43, sub: Agricultural Employment of Prisoners of War. Ibid.
of this principle. He commented that a policy offering the services
of PW’s to private employers at less than the going wage would be
dangerous for the following reasons:

a. There would be tremendous pressure to employ prisoners of war in
preference to free labor in areas where supplies of free labor are available.

b. The War Department would be open to the charge of favoritism in
making available prisoners of war to certain employers who would gain
an advantage over their competitors by employing lower labor costs. Under
these circumstances, it would be charged that prisoners of war were being
distributed on the basis of political and personal influence rather than on
the basis of shortages of labor.

c. Serious labor relation problems would be created and the favorable
attitude of organized labor toward the War Department would be undermined
by the charge that prisoners of war were competing with free labor at
substandard costs to the contractor.23

At this juncture, General Collins, who had initially waved aside the
objections of Mr. Mitchell, now reversed himself on the grounds that
Mr. Mitchell was labor’s representative in the War Department. In
the event of labor trouble, he stated, labor might claim the War De-
partment would not accept the recommendations of its representative.
General Collins now urged that unless the reasons were “overwhelm-
ing,” the War Department should support Mr. Mitchell’s position.

Another big factor in the reversal of position was a protest from
the War Manpower Commission chairman, Paul V. McNutt. In his
protest, he attached a memorandum from the Eighth Service Com-
mand which embodied the policy that had been suggested in The
Provost Marshal General’s April directive. Chairman McNutt
argued that where piece rates were paid or unskilled labor was used,
payment for PW labor should be at the full prevailing rate for civil-
ian workers in the locality. He felt it was desirable to defer any
adjustment for “inefficiency” until some experience could be obtained
to provide a reasonable basis for necessary discounting.24

While the policy was being debated, the Industrial Personnel Divi-
sion was compiling evidence that showed that the contract price of
prisoner of war labor had, in a great majority of cases, been set very
low. There was no correlation between the man-days called for in
the contracts and the wage rate upon which the contract prices had
been based.25 But by the time the PMG’s directive was rewritten to

23 Memo, James P. Mitchell, Dir, Ind Pers Div, for CofS, ASF, 24 May 43, sub: Policy
Statement on Employment of Prisoners of War. ASF File, Prisoners of War (1942 to
April 1944). DRB, TAG.
24 Ltr, Paul V. McNutt, Chm, WMC, to SW, 29 May 43. G-1 385.6 Labor (14 May 43),
“In Agriculture and Food Processing.” DRB, TAG.
25 A representative sample of 41 cases was taken from the total group of 386 PW
contracts operative in June and July 1943. About 70 per cent of the farm contracts
called for a wage of less than 20 cents per hour. In the case of nonfarm work, the per-
centage under 20 cents per hour was about 50 percent. In both types of employment
the rates under 20 cents per hour were mainly 14 and 15 cents. See: DF, Maj Sutfin
to James P. Mitchell, Ind Pers Div, ASF, 17 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Prisoners of
War. ASF File, Prisoners of War (1942 to April 1944). DRB, TAG.
incorporate the position advocated by the Industrial Personnel Division, the farm labor shortage had eased.\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, the labor supply in many industries in which PW's could be employed was dwindling. Therefore, the amended PMG directive was not approved because a broader program was contemplated.

The War Department-War Manpower Commission Agreement

In May 1943, the chairman of the War Manpower Commission suggested to the Secretary of War that prisoners of war be used within the food processing, lumber, and railroad industries since recruitment in nonagricultural work was lagging.\textsuperscript{15} He also suggested a closer relationship between the War Department and the War Manpower Commission whereby the prisoners could be more fully and more economically used. (At this time only six established prisoner of war camps were located in areas with a continued demand for agricultural labor.) One month later General Somervell also suggested the same thing.\textsuperscript{16} As a result of these suggestions and an exchange of correspondence between the two agencies, a formal agreement was reached on 14 August 1943, to become effective 17 September, establishing the final determination of channels in which prisoner of war labor was to be directed. This agreement existed throughout the war and governed all prisoner of war employment in the continental United States, other than that performed by the military services.\textsuperscript{17}

The Secretary of War had acknowledged the inability of the War Department’s field personnel to weigh and determine the economic and social complications presented by demands for the expansion of prisoner of war employment into new areas and industries. He also recognized that the War Manpower Commission was the only civilian agency fully equipped and organized to carry out this task.\textsuperscript{18} Mr. Stimson, therefore, proposed a joint operation with the Commission. The War Department’s proposal anticipated that the War Manpower Commission would sign the PW labor contract, collect the money from

\textsuperscript{14}New selective service deferment regulations and the importation of workers from Mexico, Jamaica, and the Bahamas to relieve peak seasonal demands had helped the manpower situation of the farms. Chester C. Davis, War Foods Administrator, stated in May 1943: “A current appraisal of the farm labor situation indicates there is an available labor supply sufficient to produce and harvest a 1943 crop up to the levels of the announced goals. If the potential is fully used, farm production need not suffer from lack of labor in 1943.” See: Memo, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell, CG, ASF, for DCofS, 10 Jun 43, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War. AG 383.6. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{15}Ltr, Paul V. McNutt, Chm, WMC, to SW, 24 May 43. PMGO 383.6, Labor P/W. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{16}See: Memo, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell for CofS, 10 Jun 43, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War. G-1 383.6, Gen Policies, Procedures, and Regulations. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{17}Ltrs, McNutt to Stimson, 7 Jun 43 and 9 Jun 43; ltr, Stimson to McNutt, 18 Jun 43. Copies in \textit{ibid}; a copy of War Manpower Commission-War Department agreement is filed in War Manpower Commission Central Files, Labor, Mobilization and Utilization 4-41, Records of the War Manpower Commission. National Archives.

\textsuperscript{18}Ltr, Stimson to McNutt, 6 Jul 43. PMGO 383.6. DRB, TAG.
the employer, certify to the labor need, and establish work priorities. The Commission, on the other hand, agreed to the proposal but refused to accept the responsibility of entering into the contracts and collecting from the employer; thereupon the War Department retained these responsibilities.

On 12 August, two days before the agreement was concluded, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, informed Mr. McNutt that a proposed joint procedure for hiring out PW's had been completed between the agencies, and that he was prepared to put it into effect for the War Department. But, he continued, the adoption of this proposed new procedure was not to prevent the War Department from carrying out its existing contracts, nor from making new contracts under the present procedure, if necessary, while both agencies were making plans to put the agreement into effect. Mr. Patterson then emphasized that the procedure was not to limit the types of work where the War Manpower Commission certified that free labor was unobtainable at prevailing wages and working conditions. This limitation, he stated, might unduly restrict the use of PW labor and therefore make the proposed arrangement unacceptable.

The War Manpower Commission then issued to its field personnel the following instructions for hiring out prisoners of war:

A. Prisoners of war will be employed only when other labor is not available and cannot be recruited from other areas within a reasonable length of time.

B. Before the War Manpower Commission certifies to the need for using prisoners of war, all supplies of labor, including secondary sources, within the area from which workers normally come to perform work of this type must be exhausted.

C. Prisoners of war shall not be used in any way which will impair the wages, working conditions, and employment opportunities of resident labor or displace employed workers.

D. As evidence of the fact that the use of prisoners of war will not affect local conditions of employment adversely, the employer must place a bona fide order for the workers needed with the local employment office. It is advisable to allow the local office a reasonable time to fill the order before preparing a certification of the need for prisoners of war. This order must meet the following conditions:

1. Contain no discriminatory specifications.
2. Wage rates must not be less than the rate prevailing in the locality for similar work.
3. Working conditions must be equivalent to those prevailing in the locality for civilian workers performing similar jobs.

Under the new agreement, the employer was required to place his order with the local employment office and specify that his wage rates

1 Ltr, R. P. Patterson, USW, to Paul V. McNutt, Chin, WMC, 12 Aug 43, G-1 283.6 Labor (1 Apr 43), "General Policies, Procedures, Regulations" (8). DRB, TAG.
and working conditions were equivalent to those prevailing for civilian workers in the same area. The War Manpower Commission (the local office of the employment service) was then to determine if the normal sources of labor were exhausted before certifying to the need for prisoner of war labor. If the certificate was granted, it was reviewed by state and regional directors of WMC who granted a priority rating based on the urgency of the need for all employers in the region. The regional director then forwarded the certificate to the PW camp or to the service command for action.

When a request was made for PW labor for agriculture, the state extension director, Department of Agriculture, prepared and transmitted the certificate of need to the state War Manpower Commission director. The same procedure was then followed in the assignment of priority and in the handling of the certificate by the regional director of the War Manpower Commission.

The Commission could also recommend sites for labor camps that would assist in providing prisoners of war for necessary work.

The War Department was charged with determining whether the projects conformed to its security regulations and to the Geneva Convention. If it was feasible to make the prisoners available under the terms of the War Manpower Commission certification, the War Department made the contract with the employer and collected the amount specified in the contract. It also issued to the employer detailed instructions on how to avoid prisoner of war labor problems.²¹

The August Directives

While the War Department-War Manpower Commission agreement was being negotiated, The Provost Marshal General and the commanding general of the Army Service Forces were becoming legitimately impatient over the delay. Many prisoners of war were arriving in the United States, and military and civilian users of PW labor needed definite employment instructions. To provide these, Army Service Forces issued a new directive on 14 August 1943 which stressed maximum employment and embodied specific procedures to be followed.²² Three prisoner of war work priorities were established: Priority I was essential work for the maintenance and operation of military installations as distinguished from that of improvement and beautification. Priority II was contract labor (certified as necessary labor by the War Manpower Commission or the War Foods Administration) for private employers. Priority III was useful but nonessential work on or connected with military installations.

²¹ Ltr, AG to CG’s, all service commands, 24 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War off Reservations. G-1 383.6 Labor (1 Apr 43), “General Policies, Procedures, Regulations” (S). DRB, TAG.
²² Ltr, AG to CG’s, all service commands, 14 Aug 43, sub: Labor of Prisoners of War. PMGO 233.5. Gen P/W#5 (1 May–31 May 44). DRB, TAG.
The directive also listed specific requirements for PW employment on military installations: (1) PW's were to do work which would replace service troops, or work which if undertaken would normally have been performed by the service troops. (2) PW's could also fill vacant jobs, normally performed by civilians, provided an authorized recruiting agency certified to a civilian labor shortage. (3) If free labor were available, the PW's could still fill vacant civilian-type jobs provided other necessary work was available for the civilians in the vicinity. This would then contribute to the conservation and use of manpower in the area. (4) PW's could displace civilian workers on military posts provided other essential employment was available in the area and if the displacement would contribute to the overall effective use of manpower. But if a civilian were displaced, the service commander was required to explain why and to inform the former employee that recruiting agencies were ready, able, and willing to secure him other employment in the area.

With reference to contract work, service commands were directed to clear with the Department of Agriculture (in the cases of agricultural work and food processing) or with the War Manpower Commission before entering into any contract with private employers.

On the same day the directive was published, the War Department-War Manpower Commission agreement was announced, to be effective 17 September. On 24 August the War Department directive was revised and reissued to contain the joint statement of policy. The basic feature was that requests for PW labor would be channeled to military authorities through the War Manpower Commission, while contracts for this labor would be executed and administered by the War Department. This did not affect post, camp, and station employment as defined by the 14 August directive.

The revised directive did go into greater detail on the compensation to be paid by employers. In particular, it provided that certain monetary adjustments would be made in the contract if the employer had agreed to supply transportation and it later turned out that the Government had to furnish it. Likewise, monetary adjustments were provided in case the employer might later supply other considerations than those specified in the contract. These adjustments might appear to be only common sense and fair play, yet they were detailed specifically. Every precaution was taken to see that compensation equaled the prevailing wage of free labor in the locality. The War Department directive specifically stated that no deviations were to be made from the contract that would impair those provisions guaranteeing a compensation equal to that received by free labor in

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22 Ltr, AG to CG's, all service commands, 24 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War off Reservations. G-1 385.6 Labor (1 Apr 43), “General Policies, Procedures, Regulations.” (S). DRB, TAG.
the vicinity. In case of any doubt or question regarding compensation, the PW camp commander was required to consult with the War Manpower Commission before making any changes. If a material deviation appeared necessary, the camp commander had to obtain advance approval from the commanding general of the service command; and where the service command felt a new policy decision was involved, it had to be submitted to The Provost Marshal General.

Following the War Department-War Manpower Commission agreement in August 1943, prisoner of war employment showed a marked increase. At the time of the agreement, approximately 131,000 prisoners of war were in the United States, and small groups were working under contract in 25 states. Other small groups were employed on military installations. This increase was due, not only to the greater number available and to the Italian Service Unit program, but also to increased efforts by the War Department to stimulate the PW employment program. More PW information was made available to employers; the number of jobs on which PW's could be employed was increased; a large number of side camps were made available in areas where there were no PW camps; and better cooperation existed between the War Department and the United States Employment Service. Despite these steps, the program still lagged. As of February 1944, only 59.7 percent of the prisoners of war were employed.

The employment instructions issued by the War Department in August 1943, which delegated the responsibility for full employment to the service commands, contained a paragraph that weakened its effect and confused those in the field. It stated that if the employment of prisoners of war conflicted with their safeguarding, "The safeguarding... is considered paramount." This resulted in a tendency to overguard any working PW's; consequently, field commanders refused work opportunities to those remaining, fearing disciplinary punishment if the prisoners escaped from their custody. Other officers were outspoken in their opposition to PW employment. One commanding general of an infantry replacement training center said: "... we must treat the German prisoners of war interned at military stations as a brutal, treacherous group, or we should keep them out of sight of our trainees."
To clarify the existing policy and to stimulate further employment, the Chief of Staff delegated the responsibility for securing and for the location of the PW camps to the commanding general, Army Service Forces. He in turn delegated the discharge of these functions to the respective service commands—a step which definitely stimulated the program.\textsuperscript{28} The service commands immediately instituted surveys to determine where housing was available and where the PW's could best be employed. [See charts 4 and 6.] Camp commanders were ordered to convert vacant troop housing for prisoner occupancy. Where troop housing was not available, camp commanders secured buildings from former CCC posts and had them erected to provide the necessary facilities. PW labor was used to dismantle and reerect the buildings. As the demand for workers in agriculture and industry increased, branch camps were also established in the critical areas.\textsuperscript{29} For security reasons, and at the request of the Army Air Force and the Navy, a restricted zone was established around sensitive Air Force and naval installations. If a PW camp was established or if prisoners of war were used within a 10-mile radius of these installations, special security precautions had to be provided.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{Chart 4. Distribution of Base and Branch Prisoner of War Camps as of 1 August 1943}

\textsuperscript{28} Ltr, ASP to CG's, all service commands, and MDW, 2 Oct 43, sub: Prisoner of War Camps. PMGO 533.6 Labor PW. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{29} By 31 Aug 43, there were 72 PW camps in the United States; by 1 Jun 44, approximately 300 camps; and by Apr 45, 150 base camps and 340 branch camps—all located in various sections of the United States. The camps varied in capacity (from 250 to 3,000 men) and served military, agricultural, and industrial needs. See: Statement, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, Jr., Asst PMG, before HMAC, 26 Apr 45, on Enemy Prisoners of War in the United States. In "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. II of tabs.

Policy Clarification

In September 1943, the War Department published the first of a series of PW circulars (later incorporated in Training Manual 19-500) designed to further increase PW employment and to clarify its basic January 1943 policy. Specifically, a determination had to be made on—what constituted work directly connected with war operations; what constituted dangerous or unhealthful work; and what was degrading work.

In regard to the first, the War Department defined the work on which PW's could not be employed. They could not handle or work on explosives, ammunition, aircraft, tanks, or other lethal weapons of war, nor could they handle any supplies destined for "combatant units." However, it defined "combatant units" as "... units actually engaged or about to engage, in operations against the enemy." 31

Dangerous or unhealthful work was construed from three aspects: (1) the inherent nature of the job; (2) the particular conditions under which the job was to be performed; and (3) the individual capacity of the prisoner of war. Proper safety devices, the training and experience of the PW, and the particular task involved, rather than the overall complexion of the industry, were also considered. The

31 TJAG had defined "munitions" as including communications, provisions, and any military stores, but his definition was not accepted. See: Memo, Maj Gen H. G. White, ACofS, for CofS, 6 Jan 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. G-1 383.6 Labor (18 May 43), Types of Work on Which POW May Be Employed. Item 2. DRB, TAG; see also: PW CIR 5, 18 Jan 44, p. 2; TM 19-500, ch. 5, 31 May 45.
War Department directed appropriate American officers at the using level to determine the suitability of the task for the PW's, taking into consideration the three factors. It also directed the responsible commander (usually the PW camp commander or his delegate) to make periodic inspections to insure satisfactory working conditions. The PW was to be allowed to complain for his own protection to the Protecting Power, when in theaters of operations, or by direct appeal to the Office of The Provost Marshal General, when in the United States.32

"Degrading" work, as defined by the early labor policy, was the basis whereby prisoners of war could not work as orderlies for other than their own officers. The Geneva Convention did not specifically prohibit degrading work, but implied it. The War Department explained it as being a "well defined rule of the customary law of nations . . .," and directed U. S. troops to avoid using PW's on any work that could be considered degrading. PW's could not work within civilian prisons nor in close proximity to convicts; as bartenders in officers' clubs; or as entertainers for United States military or civilian personnel. But they could be used on any work connected with the administration, management, and maintenance of PW camps.33

The Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board

The War Department had directed early in 1943 that any case of substantial doubt or questionable employment be immediately referred to The Provost Marshal General for specific instructions.34 After consultation with G-1 and The Judge Advocate General it was decided that prisoners would not be permitted to volunteer for labor specifically prohibited by War Department policy or by the Geneva Convention. The Judge Advocate General had ruled that Article 32 of the convention which prohibited the employment of prisoners of war on unhealthful or dangerous work had been made to protect the prisoner. Therefore, it was mandatory upon the captor state. The consent of an individual prisoner did not relieve the captor state of its obligation to protect him; the only proper method to relieve the state of its responsibility would be by international agreement.35

Eventually, in December 1943, at the suggestion of The Judge Advocate General and G-1, the War Department established the

32 PW Cir 5, 18 Jan 44, sec. 4, pp. 2–3; TM 19–500, pp. 5.4–5.5; see also: G–1 883.6 Labor (18 May 43), Types of Work on Which POW May Be Employed. DRB, TAG.
33 TM 19–500, 31 May 45, par. 12, p. 5.5 and par. 18 (6), p. 5.8; PW Cir 38, 15 Jul 44, sec. III; PW Cir 5, 18 Jan 44, par. 6.
34 Memo, Lt Gen J. T. McNarney for ACofS, OPD, 3 Apr 43, sub: Prisoners of War. OPD 383.6 Prisoners of War (S). Sec. 2. Case 77. DRB, TAG; see also: PW Cir 1, 24 Sep 43, p. 35.
Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board with authority to make final decisions in all doubtful employment cases. It ruled on the conformity of the cases to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and "the practice of nations." The board was established: (1) to relieve the burden on camp commanders or the service commands involved; (2) to establish a uniformity of interpretation; and (3) to prevent possible enemy reprisals against interned American personnel. The board, as established, was composed of a special assistant to the Secretary of War and representatives of The Judge Advocate General and The Provost Marshal General.

The board made the following formal decisions for prisoners of war as distinguished from ISU personnel:

**a. Permissible Work.**

1. Maintenance and repair work on any vehicle designed to carry cargo or personnel as distinguished from those designed to carry combat weapons.
2. Scraping operations primarily on any type of military vehicle or equipment. Minor incidental salvage did not prohibit this type of employment.
3. Salvage work to recover parts for reissue on those vehicles on which the PW's might work.
4. Work on gas masks.
5. Work connected with the shipment of hydrogen-filled cylinders.

**b. Prohibited Work:**

2. Work on the organic transportation equipment of a unit alerted for overseas shipment.
3. Steam cleaning tanks and their motors.
4. Work connected with rifle ranges or bayonet courses, or work on any aids used to train personnel in combat weapons.
5. Work connected with guns of any kind.

The board also permitted PW's to work in the manufacture of dry cell batteries, cloth from water-repellent material, and automobile tires, all of which were interchangeable between military and civilian vehicles.

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56 PW Cir 13, 2 Mar 44, sec. II; TM 19-560, 31 May 45, pp. 5.7–5.8.

57 Minutes of 3d Meeting of the Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board, 12 Oct 44; memo for record, M. C. B. (Bernays), 4 Aug 44. G–1 383.6 Labor (18 May 43), Types of Work on Which POW May Be Employed. DRB, TAG.
Chapter 10
Application of the Contract Policy

Security vs. Full Employment

Despite the steps taken to clarify policy and to stimulate prisoner employment, the program lagged. The universal tendency on the part of those responsible was to overguard the captured enemy personnel. By September 1943, the ratio between American troops used as guard personnel and working prisoners of war was as high as one to one and one-half, all of which resulted in reduced employment due to the exhaustion of available guard personnel.¹

In August 1943, Army Service Forces had directed the service commands to decentralize control and employment procedures to the level of the post commanders who were familiar with immediate labor requirements. The Eighth Service Command, however, retained centralized control of the PW camps at Class II² and Class IV installations except for such functions as medical service, courts-martial jurisdiction, and other administrative details. Since it was unable to determine the work to be done, it reported 48 percent of its prisoners of war unemployed for the reason of “no work available” as compared to the average of 33 percent reported by the other service commands.³

In late 1943, The Inspector General surveyed the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Service Commands to determine the effectiveness of the PW labor program. In summation, he said: “... prisoners of war are not being used to do enough of the ordinary work of the station complements. Better utilization of prisoners of war is indicated. . . .”⁴

The public, particularly potential employers, resented the idleness of these prisoners, especially in the light of the manpower shortage. On 15 January 1944, the Under Secretary of War, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, stated that he had received numerous letters

¹ Memo, Maj Gen W. D. Styer for Dir of Admin, ASF (Maj Gen J. L. Collins), 23 Sep 43, sub: Utilization of Prisoners of War. CofS, ASF, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
² A Class II installation was one under the command of a commanding general of a service command with certain activities exempted from such command, such as AGF camps, schools, training centers, etc. See: AR 170–10, 24 Dec 42.
³ Memo, Maj Gen James L. Collins for DCofS for Svc Cords, 7 Aug 43, sub: Decentralization and Prisoner of War Labor. PMGO 583.6 Labor, P/W. DRB, TAG.
and inquiries relating to the alleged idleness of and failure to make effective use of German and Italian prisoners of war as a source of labor supply. He suggested that The Inspector General make a thorough survey of the entire prisoner of war situation.5

The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that such a survey be made, despite the fact that G-1 reported progress on a number of measures to increase utilization. Employment opportunities had been resurveyed, resulting in the shifting of prisoners to camps with higher employment opportunities. Furthermore, the shift in emphasis from employment exclusively in agriculture to employment as year-round industrial labor was also increasing the utilization of the prisoners.

The Inspector General's Report 6

On the basis of this survey, The Inspector General reported that only about 40 to 60 percent of the prisoners of war who were available and required to work were actually being employed on any type of work. Only a small percentage of these were being employed on essential or useful work. Of those working approximately one-third were employed on maintenance of posts, camps, and stations; one-third on self-maintenance; one-sixth on agriculture; and the remaining one-sixth on other miscellaneous work projects.

The main reason for the low percentage of employment on essential projects was the fact that security considerations had dictated the construction of large camps in relatively isolated areas, making it difficult to obtain nearby employment except for seasonal agricultural projects. The report also noted that there had been some initial slowness on the part of both War Department and War Manpower Commission officials in appraising the possibilities for prisoner of war employment and in estimating local manpower needs.

There had been certain notable exceptions in the cases of smaller camps where an above average percentage of prisoners had been placed in long-term and profitable work in civilian industry. A leading example was the situation at Pine Camp, N. Y., where 417 of a total of 992 prisoners of war had been so utilized in the period from October 1943 to March 1944. These 417 prisoners had earned, through January 1944, $120,708.67 over and above the costs to the Government of providing side camp facilities.

One of the investigating officers on a visit to Chicago found that War Manpower Commission officials in that region, comprising Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, complained of what they termed the

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5 Memo, USW to CofS, 15 Jan 44. G-1 383.6 Labor (1 Apr 43) “General Policies, Procedures and Regulations,” DRB, TAG.
"arbitrary and irreconcilable attitude" displayed by the commanding general of the Sixth Service Command toward the use of prisoners on civilian work projects in the Chicago area. Numerous instances were cited where the service commander had disapproved certifications of the regional director for the employment of prisoners of war, despite the fact that such certifications conformed with existing War Department policies and instructions. It appeared that in disapproving requests for the PW employment, the commanding general of the Sixth Service Command was influenced by the requests of the mayor and other prominent Chicago citizens that PW's not be employed in the area because of unions and other opposition. In the opinion of the investigating office, the service commander under the circumstances did not act arbitrarily, but had sought to maintain harmonious relations between the Army and the civilian community. A later visit verified the fact that there was full cooperation between the service commander and the regional director. The latter stated that at the later date he felt that it would indeed be undesirable under the circumstances to employ prisoners of war in the Chicago area, unless Chicago became an area of critical labor shortage.7

The Inspector General's report concluded that prisoner of war camps with few exceptions were too large, too elaborately constructed, and poorly located with regard to fuller utilization of prisoners as labor; that control of prisoners of war had been characterized by extravagant use of guard personnel at the expense of labor opportunities; that full exploitation of the possibilities of using prisoners in both military and civilian labor had not been made, nor had regional and local officials of the War Manpower Commission explored fully the civilian labor possibilities for the employment of prisoners; that generally satisfactory cooperation existed between officials of the Army, War Manpower Commission, local labor recruiting agencies, and the employers.8

The Dallas Conference

In February 1944 the commanding generals of the service commands met at Dallas, Tex., to discuss the seriousness of the manpower situation in the Zone of the Interior and other problems relating to prisoners of war. At the conference, Brig. Gen. B. M. Bryan, the Assistant Provost Marshal General, stressed the necessity of maximum PW utilization by stating: "By effectively using the labor of these prisoners of war, additional soldiers can be made available to participate in combat, and the acute labor shortage for civilian work can be alleviated."9

7 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
8 Ibid., p. 16.
9 Minutes, Conference of Commanding Generals of Service Commands, 17–19 Feb 44, Dallas, Tex., p. 96. ASF Control Div File. DRB, TAG.
General Somervell reemphasized the need for maximum effort, stating: "My office has been emphasizing the necessity for maximum utilization of prisoners of war in essential work . . . find the essential jobs and put the prisoners of war to work on them. . . . Essential work is work that would have to be done whether or not there were any prisoners of war; in other words work every prisoner of war you have." To stimulate employment he urged the service commands to move the PW's from the isolated large camps to smaller inclosures on military installations and to establish branch work camps in critical areas so the PW's could supplement civilian labor.

The Inspector General also stressed the urgency of the matter by stating that the confinement of large groups of 3,000 or more unemployed, inactive PW's together was loaded with "dynamite." Smaller PW camps and a larger number of PW's working outside the inclosures meant an increased security hazard due to a lack of guard personnel, and General Somervell anticipated the possible protests of the service commands. But he still ordered them to assign as few guards as possible. At the same time, he emphasized that assistance could be obtained from the ground forces if service personnel had already been used to the utmost and if the work to be done by the PW's would free more men for military training. General Somervell then ordered all concerned to take a "calculated risk," i.e., to balance the risk of prisoner escape against the value of the work to be done. Thus, with this order, security was no longer the paramount factor: the new policy was to balance security with productivity. The last major obstacle to full PW employment had been removed.

Results of the Conference

The service command conference resulted in a flurry of activity. PW's were interned in areas having essential employment possibilities and in areas having year-round employment opportunities. Increased use was made of existing housing at Army installations in or near essential labor areas. Advance detachments of PW's, living under field conditions, prepared the sites; built the necessary roads and fences; and performed the many other common and semiskilled labor details incident to the establishment of branch PW work camps. When these camps were no longer needed, the PW's dismantled them. The majority of the larger PW camps, particularly those which were

10 Ibid., p. 335.
11 Gen Somervell suggested a guard ratio of 1 guard for every 10 prisoners. By late 44, the recommended ratio was 1 to every 8 PW's in noncooperative camps; 1 to 10 in cooperative working camps; and 1 to 15 in cooperative nonworking camps. Further, the employment of cooperative PW's without guards on military installations was advocated and authorized in situations where they worked under American supervisors or in the presence of American troops. See: Minutes, Sixth Conference of Service Commanders, ASF, Edgewater Park, Miss., 1-3 Feb 45. ASF Control Div File. DRB, TAG. See also: "History of the PMGO, WWII," op. cit., p. 418.
APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT POLICY

not located on existing Army installations, were abandoned or reduced in size. In addition to the above, each service command attempted to explore possible PW needs on civilian projects by making labor surveys.\(^{12}\)

Since an intensive displacement of civilian labor by prisoners of war failed to materialize, Army Service Forces removed all restrictions on the replacement of civilian employees, except veterans, at Army installations. A certification by an authorized recruiting agency that civilian labor was not available was no longer required. However, the new policy change did prohibit the replacement of civilians in Group IV (surplus labor) areas.\(^{13}\)

Army Service Forces investigated all cases that showed a lack of cooperation between a local PW camp and the local agency of the War Manpower Commission. Teams consisting of representatives from the War Manpower Commission, The Provost Marshal General's Office, and the service command conferred locally with the regional director of the War Manpower Commission to iron out the difficulties. Both the War Department and the War Manpower Commission repeatedly stressed that a decentralized procedure was a primary goal and that the ideal situation was one in which the area director and the PW camp commander handled the problem locally.

Early in May 1944, the War Manpower Commission revised its instructions in an effort to increase the use of prisoners of war. The new instructions also reemphasized the necessity for decentralization of responsibilities. A War Manpower Commission field representative was required to maintain liaison with each PW camp commander; to examine the need for and the availability of the PW's; to speed up the certification process; to help establish PW branch camps; to suggest work methods that would reduce the number of guards; to arrange for PW job training; and to recommend necessary shifts of the PW's to critical labor areas.\(^{14}\)

Concurrently, Army Service Forces directed each PW base or branch camp commander to submit his PW labor report direct to The Provost Marshal General. In this way, the service commands would be relieved of the responsibility and labor of preparing consolidated labor reports, and an effective check could be made on all PW labor activities, both on military installations and in contract employment.\(^{15}\)

\(^{12}\) Rpt, Col Carl L. Restine, et al, to Actg IG, 9 Mar 44, sub: Investigation of the situation obtaining on housing, controlling and utilizing in productive work on prisoners of war in continental United States. G-1 583.6 Labor (1 Apr 43), "General Policies, Procedures, Regulations" (S). DRB, TAG.


The Works Project Branch

Midway in 1944, Army Service Forces established a Works Project Branch in The Provost Marshal General's Office [see chart 6] to effect full and efficient PW employment. A similar section was established in the Security and Intelligence Division of each service command headquarters, and in each post, camp, and station, with a full-time officer of appropriate grade at the head. He maintained liaison with the service command's labor, engineer, and quartermaster officers and others concerned with PW employment and labor, and worked closely with representatives of the Works Project Branch of The Provost Marshal General's Office.15

Expansion of the Contract Policy

The Incentive Pay and Task Systems

In certain types of contract work, PW labor was measurably less efficient than free labor, and in these circumstances serious hardships resulted to the employers when payment was on a man-hour or man-day basis. To alleviate the situation, the War Department and the War Manpower Commission allowed adjustments to be made in such cases.17 To permanently overcome this deficiency and to achieve maximum effort from the PW labor, a system of incentive pay was instituted in the spring of 1944.

On 26 April 1944, the Secretary of War approved an incentive pay plan for piecework which compensated the PW's according to the number of units completed, up to a maximum of $1.20 per day. The objectives of this plan were to reward hard workers; to penalize laggards; and to encourage a greater degree of teamwork among PW laborers.18 When payment was to be made at piecework rates, the War Manpower Commission, in certifying the need for PW employment, stated the number of units which the average free worker could complete in a normal day. To determine the amount to be paid the PW for each unit, 80 cents (the amount paid for a normal day's work) was divided by the number of units an average free worker could complete daily. For example, if 10 units constituted the norm, the PW was compensated 8 cents per unit completed. His daily pay was then 96 cents if he completed 12 units, but only 64

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15 Ltr, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell to Ch, Transportation, 22 Dec 44. PMGO 253.5, Gen P/W #9 (17 Nov 44 thru 3 Jan 45). DRB, TAG. A copy of this letter was sent to all service commands and to all technical service chiefs.

17 Memo, Maj Gen Jas. L. Collins, Dir of Admin, ASF, to ACofS, G-1, 16 Jun 43, sub: Agricultural Employment for Prisoners of War. G-1 383.6 Labor (14 May 43), "In Agriculture and Food Processing." DRB, TAG.

18 DF, Col H. E. Kessinger, Exec, G-1, to CoFS, 24 Aug 44, sub: Incentive Pay for Prisoners of War. G-1 383.6 Labor (8 Jun 43), "Pay." DRB, TAG.
cents if he completed 8 units. The normal production rate of free labor was subject to review and change at the request of the PW camp commander.\textsuperscript{19} To encourage more efficient teamwork, the work units completed by a PW group were totaled, and each group member was paid an equal share of the total. Whenever possible, PW's compensated on the piecework basis were assigned in as small groups as practicable (usually not more than 25 prisoners).

The task system was another measure adopted to achieve greater work production from among the prisoners of war. Under this system, each PW or group of PW's was assigned a definite amount of work which might reasonably be completed within a specified period. The prisoners were informed of the amount of work to be completed each day and of the action that would be taken for fast or slow work: disciplinary action was taken for habitual failure to complete the assigned work; and as a reward for high-speed completion of the task, the PW's could be returned to their camp before the end of the working day.\textsuperscript{20} Under the task system, the War Manpower Commission determined the amount of work the average, inexperienced free laborer could perform in a day, and set the amount of work so the PW's could earn 80 cents for a normal day's work.

\textsuperscript{19} This was done by the contracting officer at the PW camp and the local representative of the War Manpower Commission. See: PW Cir 29, 13 May 44, sub: Compensation for Paid Work. Copy in "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. I of Tabs.

The task system, along with the incentive pay system, effectively combined the age-old economic and supervisory inducements of reward and punishment. At first, however, the PW’s showed considerable resistance, particularly towards the task system. PW camp commanders, by placing the recalcitrant PW’s who refused the work orders on a reduced diet (if an examination found the PW’s to be physically able to sustain themselves on a reduced diet), soon brought about the desired adjustment, and the work was performed satisfactorily.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Decentralization of Control and Contract Simplification}

Early in the PW contract labor program, much time was lost because the Prisoner of War Division in The Provost Marshal General’s Office supervised all contract procedures and collection practices. But on 9 September 1944 the direct responsibility to negotiate and prepare PW labor contracts and to promptly collect accounts was transferred to the commanding generals of the service commands. The Office of The Provost Marshal General continued to exercise staff supervision through periodic visits to the service commands and to the PW installations.\textsuperscript{22}

In early 1945, the PW labor contract was again revised and simplified, the most notable changes being provisions for security for payment and a penalty for not using the PW labor. Under the new contract, the employer was required to furnish a cash deposit, a bank guarantee, or a surety bond as security for payment. The amount of the security was fixed at 50 percent of the gross wage cost to the contractor. If the PW’s were housed in a branch camp where the employer paid the costs of the camp, the amount of the security was partially offset by the amount of the employer’s expenditures.\textsuperscript{23}

To prevent the establishment of pools of idle PW labor and to require the contractor to estimate his labor needs more carefully, the War Department inserted a penalty clause for nonuse of the prisoners. If an employer did not use the PW’s the number of man-days indicated in the contract, he had to pay $1.50 a day for each prisoner not used, unless the nonuse was caused by unusually severe weather, acts of God, or other unforeseeable things clearly beyond the control of the em-

\textsuperscript{21} Ltr, Capt Wm. J. Bridges, Jr., Prod Div, ASF, to Col C. S. Urwiller, Asst Dir, PW Div, 23 Jun 44, sub: Memorandum on Prisoner of War pulpwood operations in Lufkin, Tex., area. FMGO 253.5 Gen. P/W #2, Lumbering (4 Apr 44 thru 5 Mar 45). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{22} PW Cir 43, 9 Sep 44, sub: Contracts for Prisoner of War Labor. Copy in “Prisoner of War Operations,” op. cit., vol I of Tabs.

\textsuperscript{23} TM 19-500, p. 61B. For the requirements that had to be met before a branch PW labor camp was established, see: Lecture, Ch, Works Project Br, PW Div, Ho 9th Svc Div, 9 Jan 45, sub: Prisoner of War Labor in the Ninth Service Command, pp. 5–6. File in California Agricultural Extension Service, “1944 Annual Narrative Report Emergency Farm Labor Project,” Exhibit 2. Extension, Div of Field Studies and Training, Dept of Agriculture; see also: Ltr, Maj Gen A. L. Lerch, TPMG, to Hon. Frank Carlson, HR, 13 Jul 45. FMGO 253.5 Gen P/W Contracts (1 Jul–31 Aug 45). DRB, TAG.
ployer. The penalty provision caused much dissatisfaction among the farmers because of the weather hazards, but The Provost Marshal General indicated that it was not intended to penalize the conscientious contract employer who had planned his work carefully and who had used reasonable care in the operation of his business or farm. Each employer could appeal a decision on the penalty provision from the PW camp commander to the commanding general of the service command.24

The Opposition of Organized Labor

Organized labor necessarily had a continuing interest in the way and extent that PW labor was employed. Under War Manpower Commission regulations the union was consulted in areas where labor agreements were in effect, and it was given every opportunity to help recruit free labor before the PW labor certification was submitted. When a local labor organization had a collective bargaining agreement with the employer and objected to the employer's use of prisoners of war, the local War Manpower Commission representative tried to dissuade the union from objecting. If he were unsuccessful, a full statement of the reasons for the objection was transmitted with the certification.25 Neither the Army nor the War Manpower Commission pursued a policy of forcing through PW labor contracts over the protests of local labor unions, lest serious labor relations problems be incurred. Rather, a policy of information and cooperation was followed. The approach, as expressed in the February 1944 conference of service commanders, was that organized labor should be persuaded that PW labor was a necessary wartime expedient; that this labor pool would not be retained after hostilities had ended; that PW's would be used only when free labor was not available; and that the use of PW's would in no way endanger the civilian wage scale because the cost to any employer was the same for both.

Despite this approach to the labor situation, the attitude of organized labor often impeded the development of the PW employment program, especially on military installations. Even though post commanders found it impossible to hire sufficient civilian workers from the ranks of organized labor and had contacted local unions in efforts to obtain the needed workers, some unions frequently objected to the use of prisoners of war. Organized labor failed to recognize the fact that PW labor alleviated the manpower shortage and contributed materially to the successful pursuit of victory. Great pressure was

exerted on The Provost Marshal General to stop the employment of all PW's on military installations.

An attempt was made by the Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, early in 1944 to curtail the use of PW's on military installations, possibly in view of labor's protests. As an alternative, it suggested that they be used in private industry—a step that aroused the immediate opposition of The Provost Marshal General. He quickly pointed out that the shortage of available civilian labor, the lack of service troops, and the greater labor costs of civilian employees warranted the use of prisoners of war on the military establishments. Consequently, military work by the PW's continued as before despite the flow of complaints. But these persisted to the extent that in the spring of 1945 Congressman Jennings Randolph of West Virginia introduced a bill in Congress (H. R. 2833) that would have prohibited any Federal agency from using prisoners of war on any skilled work. To offset any public agitation for a similar bill restricting PW employment on semiskilled and unskilled work, ASF proposed that PW's be used only when local recruiting agencies certified there was no available civilian labor, regardless of whether funds were available to pay civilian labor or not.26

Finally in April 1945 representatives from the Office of the Provost Marshal General met with representatives of the American Federation of Labor Building Trades Department and with Mr. William Green, President of the Federation, to discuss the use of prisoners of war on construction and nonrecurring or extraordinary maintenance work.27 As a result of these meetings, Army Service Forces issued Circular No. 142 which restated its policy that PW's would not be used on construction work if civilian labor was available. It further stated that if they were used, prevailing wages or costs per unit would be charged against the appropriate cost account although they would not be charged to appropriated funds. At the same time, the American Federation of Labor issued the following statement to all its local chapters:

It is understood between the representatives of labor and the representatives of the War Department when a request is made to supply workmen that if they are not available in the numbers necessary to carry out the construction project contemplated, the War Department or their agent will employ prisoners of war until such time as the necessary number of workmen can be supplied.28

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26 Routing slip, Lt Ming to files, 5 Apr 45, sub: Use of Prisoner of War Labor on Military Installations; routing slip, Lt Col Sufrin to Col Brennan, 6 Apr 45, sub: Proposed Changes in Policy on Use of Prisoner of War Labor. Copies of both in ASP Prisoners of War (1 May 44–May 45). DRB, TAG.
27 Memo, Col R. F. Gow, Dir, Ind Pers Div, for DCofS for Svc Cmds, 5 May 45, sub: TM 19–500, Enemy Prisoners of War. Ibid.
28 Ltr, Building and Construction Trades Dept., AF of L, to Presidents, National and International Unions, etc., 25 Apr 45. Ibid.
APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT POLICY

Figure 3. Nazi prisoners of war arriving in New York.

This policy statement applied only to the Army Service Forces installations in question and did not cover labor unions other than building tradesmen. It did, nevertheless, serve as a buffer against other labor complaints, which slackened considerably after the letter was distributed.

The Rise in Prisoner Employment

As a result of the efforts to obtain maximum PW employment, the overall percentage of available prisoners of war who were actually working rose to 72.8 percent by 31 May 1944, as compared to about 60 percent in February 1944. This was due largely to the shifting of the prisoners within and among service commands in accordance with military and civilian needs as indicated by the labor surveys, and to the activation of many new branch work camps, particularly those used for agricultural employment. By 26 April 1945, the percentage of available prisoners of war actually working reached 91.3 percent. By the end of the war in Europe the demand for PW labor was so great that it was impossible for the War Department to fill all the needs. Altogether, the prisoners worked a total of 851,994 man-months from

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PMGO, Prisoner of War Monthly Labor Reports, 1944 (31 May 44). DRB, TAG.


Summary Sheet, Brig Gen J. F. Battley, 13 Jun 45, sub: Allocation to the Navy of Prisoners of War for Labor; ltr, USW to Sec of Navy, 21 Jun 45; ltr, Sec of Navy to SW, 6 Jun 45. All in CofS 385.6 sec. V, cases, 350-400. DRB, TAG. Numerous requests for prisoner labor during this period are contained in files PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (1945-1946) and PMGO 253.5 Gen, P/W Agriculture (1945-1946). DRB, TAG.
June 1944 to August 1945 in various industries, broken down as follows: ³²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>439,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulpwood, lumber</td>
<td>165,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, quarrying</td>
<td>2,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>9,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food processing</td>
<td>110,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>46,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>8,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nongovernmental work</td>
<td>11,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>50,931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Agriculture

More prisoners of war were used on farms in the United States than in any other form of PW contract labor during World War II. They filled the gap in the domestic supply caused by inductions into the armed forces, employment in war industries, and rising wartime demands for additional food and fiber. Their work not only prevented crop loss but increased production.

To secure acceptance of prisoners of war as a source of labor within agricultural communities, a well-developed education program was conducted. Even with such a program, some communities refused at first to permit PW employment on the farms because of high feeling against the enemy. ³³ The opposition dwindled as experience with the use of PW’s increased, but the basic antagonisms always remained to create problems which continued to confront the program.

In March 1943 the Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the PW’s be shifted from “nonessential work” to agriculture. But even after this shift in policy and the importation of Mexican and Jamaican workers, the agricultural demands for prisoners of war constantly exceeded the supply—a situation that existed until the end of the war. From late 1943 to early 1946, prisoners of war were employed in nearly every major agricultural section of the United States on many different types of farm work. At first, they were used most frequently in the southern and central states, but by 1944 they were used in almost every state in the union. At that time work opportunities for 149,000 PW’s existed in agriculture and only about 101,000 were available for labor in the United States. ³⁴ Thus it became necessary to plan

³⁴ Ltr, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell to A. N. Hardin, Pres, Univ of Arkansas (Jan 44). PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Agriculture). DRE, TAG.
for their use during seasonal peaks of demand. On 6 May 1944 the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, directed the service commands to plan timetables for the establishment and discontinuance of PW branch labor camps, and to set up tent camps that would allow speedy movement from one site to another to meet peak seasonal demands in agriculture. Under the new procedure, local representatives of the War Manpower Commission or the War Foods Administration were to give priority ratings to work projects after the need for PW labor had been ascertained. Other measures were also taken to increase the productivity of the PW's by training them for the tasks in demand and by improving supervision.25

In 1946, repatriation of some 14,000 PW's was postponed at the request of the Secretary of Agriculture so that they could be used on essential farm work during the spring months. The Department of Agriculture had to pay the costs of transporting the prisoners from the PW camps to the areas of employment, primarily in the western states where they were used to thin and block sugar beets.26

Crops Worked by Prisoners of War [see chart 7]

From October to December 1943, PW's picked over 6,675,000 pounds of seed cotton in Mississippi. The cotton had opened about 30 days early throughout the state and caused a great strain on the normal labor supply. To meet the situation, the county agent, along with the county executive committee of the emergency farm labor program, shifted the PW's according to the needs of the individual farmers so that no group of farmers fell very far behind on their picking.

* Source: Annual Reports of the Farm Labor Program of the various States. Filed in Extension, Division of Field Studies and Training. Department of Agriculture.

In Missouri, prisoners of war were used to harvest potatoes and to shock oats and wheat. PW work in Maryland was quite satisfactory, especially in the harvesting of fruit, hay, grain, corn, tobacco, and in

25 Ltr, Maj Gen W. D. Styer, CofS, ASF, to CG's, all Svc Cmds, 6 May 44, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War During the Peak Agricultural and Food Processing Season. 164.
general farm work. However, they were not as efficient where considerable handwork and "stoop labor" was involved, such as in picking string beans and tomatoes. In Kansas, PW's were used extensively in the east and southwest portions of the state on large ranches where surplus food was produced. In Ellis County, for example, they harvested wheat and seed crops, shocked corn, and built fences. In Nebraska, PW's were used primarily in the sugar beet and potato harvest. They also harvested other crops and did general farm work. In Arkansas, too, PW's worked on all farm chores.

In Georgia, first priority was given to the harvesting of peanuts, and during the harvest season all PW's within the state who could possibly be used were placed on farms to do the job. In 1944 these prisoners harvested 1,075,000 stacks of peanuts on 58,000 acres, which was more than double the output of the PW labor in 1943. This was the result of the establishment of a daily task system by the Fourth Service Command.

California used prisoners of war primarily in harvesting. In Pennsylvania, they were used for nursery and orchard work; harvesting; and repairing farm machinery. In Maine, during 1945, PW's harvested over 4,880,000 bushels of potatoes. In Texas, in 1945, PW's chopped and picked cotton; harvested corn, hay, rice, peanuts, potatoes, figs, and small grains; and picked peaches. In Idaho, PW's harvested not only sugar beets but also other fruits and vegetables. During 1946 the work in most western states was confined mainly to thinning sugar beets. 37

Work Problems

Training 38

In many areas, the effective use of prisoners of war was hindered by their lack of skill, aptitude, and experience for the type of work demanded. The prisoners performed most effectively on jobs which required a minimum of training and skills, and where the routine of the job did not require repeated explanation and interpretation. In many cases training courses and training techniques were used to enhance output and minimize the problem of supervision.

In Scottsbluff County, Nebr., pictures were prepared and used in PW training for sugar beet work; while in Indianola, Nebr., PW group leaders were given a day's instruction on how to pick corn. They in turn instructed the other prisoners of war. Considerable training was carried out by farm associations in Arkansas, aided by the county extension agents and by farm labor field assistants. In
Illinois, PW job training was handled by employers through interpreters supplied by the Army. An illustrated mimeographed leaflet entitled "Snap Sweet Corn Easier and Faster" was translated into German and distributed to all sweet corn growers using PW labor; motion pictures illustrating sweet corn snapping were shown at several special meetings for the prisoners. In Utah, the Extension Service conducted training schools for the PW's to instruct them in the proper thinning of sugar beets, the picking of fruit and tomatoes, and in the harvesting of sugar beets. During these instruction periods, extra supervisory personnel and interpreters were hired in counties where PW labor was used. Instruction cards, printed in German, were distributed to the PW's to enable them to improve their performance on the job.

In Idaho, the Army provided a one-day training period for prisoners of war which permitted the Extension Service to organize a coordinated training period. With the assistance of sugar beet field men and fruit inspectors, the Service gave the PW's intensive on-the-job instruction in the fields or orchards. The sugar companies also provided a film with a foreign language sound track depicting the production of sugar from beets and including all phases of beet culture.

Such training efforts paid rich dividends in increasing the productivity and skill of the workers as well as in reducing the needed amount of supervision and on-the-job instruction.

**Work Procedures**

In July 1943, the War Foods Administration published a tentative procedure that allowed a farmer to apply to his local county agent for PW labor. It also prescribed a more direct relationship between the Department of Agriculture Extension Service representative and the PW camp commander—a step that proved most satisfactory. Consequently when the War Department-War Manpower Commission agreement of August 1943 directed that all requests for PW labor for agriculture be channeled through the War Manpower Commission, farm leaders and agricultural officials were quick to object. They stated the new procedure was too slow and restrictive.

To correct this situation, Congress passed a bill which permitted the War Foods Administration, through its administrator and the agricultural extension service of land grant colleges, to negotiate directly with the War Department for PW labor for agriculture.
And in March 1944, the War Department allowed the Director of Extension to make his requests for PW labor direct to the service command after the priority of the farm projects had been certified by the state director of the War Manpower Commission.42

Under the new procedure, the farm program gained impetus.43 In many States, the farmers banded together to make group contracts for the employment of prisoners of war on their farms. This eliminated both paperwork and the necessity of contracts with individual farmers. In Maryland and New York, for example, existing farm organizations made the group contracts; and in those counties not covered, new associations were formed to make the contracts. The associations subcontracted the PW's to individual farmers, arranged for their transportation, made collections from the farmers, and financed the construction of the PW branch camps.

In Nebraska, State supervisors met with interested farm groups, businessmen, and Army officials to arrange for the employment of PW's in those counties requesting PW labor. At these meetings, the regulations and requirements, as well as the methods of using and supervising this labor, were discussed. Farm labor organizations contracted for the PW labor, but in most Nebraska counties new organizations had to be formed as the existing farm groups would not assume responsibility for the prisoners.

In Arizona, a coordinator of PW labor, appointed in 1944, allotted the PW's to different branch PW labor camps at the request of the State Extension Service. Within the county the Agricultural Extension Service assigned the prisoners to the farmers according to the size of the cotton acreage. The system used in Pinal County, Ariz., was typical—each PW camp in the county divided its prisoners into five 150-man work details. A detail was assigned to each farmer serviced by the camp for a period of one week according to the size of the cotton acreage. Those with larger acreages were allowed to keep the details for a longer period.

In Utah, the State Extension Service maintained a full-time labor dispatcher at each PW camp to place the prisoners in farm work. The labor dispatcher received orders from the farmers and made arrangements with Army officials to dispatch PW crews to the critical areas. Although the Farm Labor Association in Utah acted as the contracting agent in obtaining prisoners of war for farm employment, the Extension Service actually placed the prisoners. This achieved a wider and a more efficient use of the PW labor.

42 Ltr, H. L. Stimson, SW, to Marvin Jones, WFA, 13 Mar 44. G-1 383.6 Labor (14 May 43), "In Agriculture and Food Processing." DRB, TAG; see also: WFA, EPL Cir 13, Rev. 2, 1 Jun 45, sub: Policy and Procedure to be Followed in Arranging for the Use of Prisoners of War in Agricultural Work. Copy in author's file.

43 See: Annual Reports of the Farm Labor Program of the various States. Extension, Division of Field Studies and Training. Department of Agriculture,
Other Problems

Even with the training programs, the problem of supervision proved difficult. In some cases, the farmer-employer erroneously assumed the guard to be a PW work supervisor. Language difficulties also added to the supervisory problems. Where employers used supervisors who spoke German or Italian, the difficulties were greatly minimized.

Nebraska's 1944 extension farm labor program report listed many problems connected with the use of PW's on farms: the lack of facilities for branch PW labor camps; transportation; the reluctance of farmers to use PW's at the beginning of the program; the refusal of some Army officials to allow PW's to work in details of less than 10; and a shortage of equipment. These problems were typical of those in other states, but time corrected most of them. Farmers came to realize the value of prisoners of war, and the PW's themselves derived new skills from which they earned more money and received fair treatment. PW training and educational programs among the farmers (which taught them to use the prisoners more efficiently) aided the program. Kansas reported that such an educational campaign, along with the withdrawal of guards from PW work details, increased PW efficiency from 50 percent in 1943 to equality with free labor in 1944. Arizona's State Extension Service published a useful pamphlet which included the following suggestions for the management of prisoner of war labor:

- Have everything in readiness so that prisoner labor can go to work immediately.
- Have drinking water easily available to all workers.
- Explain the job thoroughly, showing them how you want it done. Work with them until they fully understand exactly what is wanted.
- Encourage them in their work. Treat them firmly, but considerately at all times.
- The secret of success with prisoner of war labor is good supervision. The supervisor should have the job well planned. He should also understand fully the handling of men.
- Army guards are responsible for guarding the men and do not supervise them in their field work.

But even the best-laid plans for training and supervision would not function unless the farmer-employer was fully aware of his responsibility for the prisoners of war and was willing to do his part. For example, in California in 1944, 110 prisoners of war were assigned to a cotton-picking detail without a supervisor, nor did anyone check on them for an entire day. The weight boss, upon checking the work in late afternoon, found that the cotton pick was 56 pounds. In the same locality on the very next day, a crew of 70 PW's with a field foreman, who worked along and helped individual prisoners, picked 127 pounds. The cotton gin reports showed that trash ran...
only 3 percent on the second day as against 5 percent on the first. Good supervision in this case paid dividends.

Logging and Lumbering

When prisoners of war first became available for labor in the summer of 1943, there was some question as to whether the Geneva Convention would permit their use in cutting and harvesting pulp wood. Initially, The Judge Advocate General felt that the provision which prohibited the use of PW’s on dangerous work forbade their use in harvesting wood pulp. But when facts showed that the wood growths were small (6 to 8 inches in diameter), that the work was quite different from heavy logging, and that close supervision would be exercised to eliminate dangerous working conditions, the War Department authorized the use of PW labor on 1 September 1943.44 Thenceforth the use of PW’s in this industry increased rapidly, and the average daily employment reached a high of 22,000 in June 1945.45

The Fourth Service Command had the heaviest employment of prisoners of war in pulp wood production.46 Nearly 20 percent of its pulpwood was produced by PWs. After attempting various methods

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44 Memo, Lt Col M. C. Bernays, G–1, to Col G. A. Miller, ACoFS, G–1, 31 Aug 43. G–1 383.6 Labor (26 Jun 43), “In Other Industries (other than Agriculture).” DRB, TAG.
45 Ltr, Brig Gen H. M. Bryan, TPMG, to Sen. Robert F. Wagner, 4 Feb 46, PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W, Lumbering (1 Apr 45–Feb 46), DRE, TAG.
46 Ltr, Col C. S. Urwiller, Asst Dir, PW Div., PMGO, to CG, 1st Svc Cmd, 1 Jun 44, sub: Experience of 4th Service Command in using prisoners of war for cutting pulpwood. Ibid.
of training, this command determined that best results were obtained
when representatives of the United States Forest Service, Timber
Production War Project, supervised the initial instruction. The
Forest Service detailed a trained forester to instruct PW noncommis-
sioned officers in the methods to be used. These NCO's then superv-
ised the other prisoners in the woods, but the contractor furnished
the technical assistance.

In upper Michigan, prisoners of war were given a two-hour training
session in safety, demonstrated with tools and with illustrated German
charts. PW NCO's attended the session first and when the entire
group later attended, the NCO's were available to explain to the men
near them any points that needed clarification. Immediately after the
safety program, job training commenced. First, a local woodsman
did the job with the PW's observing; following this, groups of four
PW noncommissioned officers were actually shown how to do the job.
A trainer was assigned to each group. Of the four learners, two
worked and two watched. In this way, bad habits were spotted and
broken at the start. After half a day's instruction for the PW non-
commissioned officers, the remaining PW's were trained with the help
of the noncoms. Each trainer taught eight PW privates a day. Ideal
groups, which included two local experienced woodsmen, six woods
foremen, and other experienced personnel, could train about sixty
prisoners a day. Usually a minimum of four days was necessary for
the training of a group.

After their initial instruction, the PW's were put to work in crews
of about 25 men, under 2 German NCO's and an American foreman.
Within three or four days they became fairly familiar with chemical
wood and wood pulp cutting, although some details, such as choosing
the general direction to fell a tree, what trees to cut, where to locate
skid roads, and what wood was suitable for chemical and pulp wood,
required further experience.

The best results were achieved when advance preparations had been
made. Camp morale suffered when some PW's worked and the rest
remained idle. The assistant area forester in Michigan listed the
following tips to those using PW's: (1) The political situation was
never to be discussed with them or in their presence; (2) Good fore-
manship was extremely important and was always to be substituted
for verbal abuse. He pointed out that PW's naturally resented having
a product rejected when counted for pay purposes, and then later
seeing it loaded on the truck with forest products accepted as being
suitable.47

47 Rpt, Ralph H. Ahlshlog, Asst Area Forester, Mich., to Area Forester, Mich., 17 Apr
44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. Attached to ltr, Thos. F. Grayson, Pulpwood Consultant,
Paper Div, WPB, to Col C. S. Urwiller, PMGO, 11 May 44. PMGO 253.5 Gen. (War Pro-
duction Board, 1943-44). DRB, TAG.
The task system proved successful in increasing the efficiency of PW labor. The application of the task system, plus good training and supervision, resulted in an increase in wood pulp cutting from .3 cord per day to approximately .9 cord per day in all areas where PW labor was used. Lower production resulted from insufficient supervision by the pulpwood user; a lack of understanding of the functions of the guards (who were sometimes thought to be supervisors); improperly cared-for tools; and necessary shifting of personnel caused by Army requirements.

Despite the urgent need for lumber products and an acute shortage of workers, some unions opposed the use of prisoners of war, particularly in the Pacific northwest. In this area, all labor certifications were approved or disapproved at the regional level (as the result of the agreement between the regional director of the War Manpower Commission and the Regional Labor-Management Committee), but the labor members of the regional committee opposed the use of any German PW's in lumbering operations.

In Minnesota, union opposition increased to a point where a strike was threatened if PW's were used in logging. When the War Manpower Commission certified the use of 600 PW's for logging work in Minnesota, the local union objected and stated that free labor could be hired. The president of the union had previously stated that there was a shortage of 4,000 men in the Minnesota forests and that the union could not supply this number; but he claimed that by the proper use of labor in other industries, sufficient men could be made available for the forests. The union also cited the danger of sabotage and waste if unskilled PW labor were used. The regional director of the War Manpower Commission considered the union's position unjustified and recommended certification; the need for supplementary labor was clear, and PW's had been worked successfully in the lumber industry on the east coast without sabotage. On 17 December 1943, the certification was approved, and the PW's were used without incident.

In 1945 the pulpwood industry alone employed approximately 17,500 prisoners of war, largely in the southern wood-producing states, the Appalachian region, and in northern Michigan and Minnesota. Mr. J. A. Krug, chairman of the War Production Board, emphasized

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48 Ltr, Hon Zebulon Weaver to Col C. S. Urwiller, Asst Dir, PW Div, PMGO, 16 Aug 44. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Lumbering). DRB, TAG.
50 Memo, Maj Gen M. G. White, ACOFS, G-1, for CofS, 5 Dec 45, sub: Prisoner of War Labor in Minnesota; Lt, F. M. Raug, Jr., Regional Dir, WMC, to Maj W. L. Wolcott, Ch, PW Br, 7th Svc Cnd, 23 Nov 45, w/attachd memo; DF, Lt Col G. B. Waller, Asst Mgr, G-1, to PMGO, 17 Dec 45, sub: Prisoner of War Labor in Minnesota. G-1 388.6 Labor (26 Jun 43), "In Other Industries (other than Agriculture)." DRB, TAG.
that prisoners of war produced approximately one-third of all pulpwood in the southern and Appalachian states.\textsuperscript{51}

**Food Processing**

Prisoners of war were as valuable a source of labor for the food processing industry as for agriculture.\textsuperscript{52} In numerous instances, crops would not have been properly canned or preserved had it not been for PW labor. The nature of PW employment in food processing work varied from State to State, but the usefulness of the prisoners as well as their problems proved to be remarkably uniform. In Indiana, PW's were used in tomato canning and were adept as retort (distilling) operators and as operators of receiving, packing, and closing machines. Had PW's not been used, tons of tomatoes would have spoiled in the fields due to an inadequate supply of free labor.

During the 1944 season, a group of seven canners reported the use of PW's had made possible the saving and processing of greater quantities of asparagus, tomatoes, and other vegetables than in 1943. And in 1944, the Association of New York State Canners passed a resolution recommending highly the use of PW's in both agriculture and food processing.

As in other fields, good training and supervision produced effective results in increasing the efficiency of prisoner of war work. The main problems arose from fear of sabotage and food poisoning: PW's who worked in canning factories were under military guard, and every possible precaution was taken to prevent sabotage. Army Veterinary Corps inspectors, in plants where PW labor was used, inspected food products for possible damage. Where possible, the prisoners were not assigned to any work that would give them access to food products that would not be cooked or sterilized after each contact.\textsuperscript{53}

Many complaints of PW inefficiency and damage proved, after investigation, to be exaggerated. In the summer of 1944, the Hoopeston Canning Company of Illinois alleged that German prisoners of war employed in asparagus production had trampled asparagus beds and had refused to work. The company also alleged that Army authorities would not cooperate to prevent such practices.\textsuperscript{54} A subsequent investigation revealed that out of 48 working days satisfactory work had

\textsuperscript{51} Ltr, J. A. Krug, Chm, WPB, to H. L. Stimson, SW, 6 Aug 45; memo, Maj Gen A. L. Leres, TPMG, to CG, ASF, 13 Aug 45, sub: Use of Prisoners of War in Forest Employment. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Lumbering). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{52} The U. S. Employment Service estimated that approximately 75 percent of the jobs in canning factories could be manned by PW's.

\textsuperscript{53} Ltr, Brig Gen H. H. Dunlop, Actg TAG, to CG's, all Svc Cnds, etc., 13 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Prisoners of War in Food Processing Plants. PMGO 253.5 Gen (cfr Mar 45). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{54} DF, Brig Gen J. F. Battley, CofS for Svc Cnds, to CofS, ASF, 25 Aug 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor in Hoopeston Canning Company, Hoopeston, Ill. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Canners). DRB, TAG.
been performed by the prisoners on 39 days. Work was unsatisfactory on only 4 days. The field manager of the canning company stated: "Taking into consideration all of the angles of the cutting of the asparagus, I would say that the prisoners of war are doing as good if not a little better work than civilians would do. I only hope that they will work out as well during our corn pack season as they have in our asparagus pack." A report from the commanding general of the Sixth Service Command also stated that the PW camp commander called numerous meetings with the canning officials during the course of this work and did everything within reason to cooperate. Thus, it appeared that the statement made by the Hoopeston Canning Company was without foundation.55

**Meatpacking**

As in other work, the hectic days of World War II with its drains on manpower and its demands for increased production produced a labor crisis within the meat packing industry. Available civilian labor preferred the advantages and comfort of defense work to the unpleasant working conditions associated with slaughter houses and stockyards. And promises of increased pay failed to attract the needed workers. Yet the industry faced an abnormal situation. The demands for meat and meat products forced the cattle grower to ship his herds direct to the stockyards, foregoing the normal fattening periods on Illinois farms. Lend-lease shipments of meat plus the needs of our armed forces had to be met, and a critical shortage of labor existed. Consequently, the meatpacking industry turned its eyes to the manpower pool offered by prisoners of war. But only about 100 were used in this field.56

In October 1943, the regional director of the War Manpower Commission requested the War Department to build a PW labor camp near the Chicago area (Region VI) to house prisoners needed for labor purposes within the meatpacking industry, but this request met with considerable opposition. Both Maj. Gen. H. S. Aurand, Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Col. J. F. Battley, opposed the request on the grounds of its being unsound and uneconomical. "All things considered it will take more manpower hours to handle the prisoners, including the construction that will be required, than the prisoners would perform at work," General Aurand stated.57

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55 Ltr, SW to Hon. Louis Ludlow, HR, 25 Aug 44. Copy in *ibid*.
56 See: G-1 388.3 Labor (14 May 43), "In Agriculture and Food Processing." DRB, TAG.
57 1st Ind, Maj Gen H. S. Aurand, CG, 6th Svc Cnd, to CG, ASF, 7 Oct 43; 2d Ind, Col J. F. Battley, Asst DCofS for Svc Cnds, ASF, to TPMG, 12 Oct 43. Both filed in *ibid*; see also: Telephone Conversation, Gen Aurand to Gen B. M. Bryan, 12 Oct 43, Transcript filed in PM Br, Security & Intell Div, 6th Svc Cnd, 253.5 Employment of Prisoners of War (vol. II). DPRB, TAG.
In addition, The Surgeon General, upon being consulted, recommended that PW labor not be used inside the meatpacking plants because of the possible danger to the meat products: "... to do so would be a hazardous risk jeopardizing the food supply the Medical Department is exercising all possible care to protect." (At this time the disease rate among prisoners of war was much higher than among civilian workers.) The Surgeon General recommended further that if PW's were to be used, they be given work only in the yards or in fertilizer and hide plants where they would have no possible contact with edible meats.

Although The Provost Marshal General agreed with the recommendations of The Surgeon General, G-1 did not consider such wide restraints necessary, especially in the light of the critical manpower situation, if the necessary health, security, and housing arrangements for the PW's could be made. Therefore, he postponed any immediate action on the request of the War Manpower Commission for the camp and directed The Provost Marshal General and The Surgeon General to investigate the meatpacking industry and determine the practicability of using prisoners of war. Meanwhile, the War Department studied the possibility of using Italian prisoners in the industry.

Before the investigation of the meatpacking industry was completed, the manpower crisis forced a decision. Mr. James Byrnes (then head of the War Mobilization Board), acting on the advice of Mr. Marvin Jones of the War Foods Administration who viewed the critical meatpacking industry with alarm and as one having the greatest need for labor, urged the Under Secretary of War to expedite the use of prisoners of war. Accordingly, the War Department authorized The Provost Marshal General to use German prisoners of war on this work. The Chicago Meat Institute, representing the meatpacking industry, had estimated its PW needs to be 15,000; therefore, the Office of The Provost Marshal General authorized the immediate use of 7,000 available PW's in the meatpacking plants. These prisoners had to pass a physical examination before they could be employed, and an adequate inspection service had to be provided to insure that the meat products were free from contamination by the prisoners.
Meanwhile, the investigating team in Chicago reported that the local meatpacking industry needed only 785 prisoners of war, and that it had been unable to reach an agreement with the labor unions as to the use of these prisoners. In addition, on 27 November 1943, Mr. James P. Mitchell, Director, Industrial Personnel Division, wrote the Under Secretary of War that he thought it unwise to use prisoners in the Chicago meatpacking industry. He reiterated the reasons advanced earlier by The Surgeon General and by the commanding general of the Sixth Service Command. However, he added the significant point that the War Manpower Commission, after discussions with some important packers, had not made the formal certification of the need for PW’s in the industry. He also stated that employer opinion was divided and that labor opposition was inevitable. Mr. Mitchell therefore proposed that no further action be taken until additional consideration had been given the problem by the War Manpower Commission.62

Based on the findings of the War Manpower Commission as revealed in Mr. Mitchell’s memorandum and coupled with the objections of The Surgeon General and the commanding general of the Sixth Service Command, the Chief of Staff, ASF, ordered The Provost Marshal General “. . . to take no further action with respect to the use of prisoners of war in the Chicago meatpacking plants.”63

Meanwhile, the War Manpower Commission, by the use of a large recruiting program induced women, farmers, farm workers who had completed their season’s operations, high school students, soldiers on temporary passes, and others to secure employment in the industry. By mid-December 1943, all packinghouse requirements were met and clearance orders for additional workers were canceled. Plans had been made, however, to use Italian PW’s if the labor need could not be met from civilian channels.64 Italian prisoners of war were subsequently used in cold storage plants in the Omaha-Council Bluffs area to haul frozen meats and fowl, but the number used never exceeded 100.

No mention is made in the PW files of the Sixth Service Command of the use of prisoner of war contract labor in any meatpacking plants in Chicago or East St. Louis—two of the principal meatpacking centers. Therefore, it must be assumed that the use of such prisoners in the meatpacking industry was slight, although their use was later

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63 Memo, Maj Gen W. D. Styer for TPMG, 8 Dec 43, sub: Use of Prisoners of War in Meat Packing Industry. PMGO 252.5 Gen, P/W (Meat Packing). DRB, TAG.
64 Ltr, W. H. Spencer, Regional Dir, Region VL, to Exec Dir, WMC, 1 Mar 44, sub: Discussion Between Charlotte Carr . . . and Regional Rural Industries Representative on Manpower Shortage of Meat Packers, 26 Feb 44; Ltr, United Packinghouse Workers of America to all local Unions, etc. 4 Feb 44. Meat Packing Industries (1944). Records of War Manpower Commission. National Archives.
permitted, and considerable use was made of their services in other phases of food processing.\footnote{5}

**Fertilizer Plants**

The use of prisoner of war labor in the fertilizer industry was small but important because of the vital link between the industry and agriculture. This was best illustrated by the experience of 16 fertilizer manufacturing companies in the vicinity of Norfolk, Va. These companies, which served farmers in Virginia and North Carolina, faced sharp curtailments in production if they could not secure additional labor, and free labor was unobtainable.

In 1944, prisoner of war employment was initially delayed because of a lack of housing and camp facilities. Fertilizer manufacturers could not construct nor could they make housing available in time to permit PW labor to be used during the manufacturing season. Army Service Forces alleviated the situation by converting sufficient housing and facilities at Camp Ashby, Va., to accommodate 650 PW’s who were used effectively in the fertilizer plants.\footnote{5}

In 1945, the fertilizer industry in the Norfolk, Va., area again suffered from a manpower shortage, but this time, unlike 1944, the problem was not one of facilities. No prisoners of war were available for this or for any other type of work. This problem was overcome when the War Manpower Commission assigned a sufficiently high priority to the fertilizer project to allow the transfer of 300 PW’s to the Third Service Command.\footnote{7}

**Mining and Quarrying**

As early as May 1943, mining companies requested permission to employ PW’s in mines because of labor shortages, but the total number actually employed was not high. The Judge Advocate General had ruled that PW employment in open pit mining would violate Article 32 of the Geneva Convention since blasting was involved, and that was classified as dangerous work.\footnote{8} However, in July 1943, he reversed his decision and stated that the PW’s could be used in open pit surface operations without violating the Geneva Convention, provided the prisoners who handled heavy materials wore hardtoe shoes and goggles and specific safety precautions were taken.

\footnote{5 Ltr, AG, ASF, to CG’s, all Svc Cnds, 18 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Prisoners of War in Food Processing Plants. PW File, 2d Svc Cnd, Labor Policies and Directives. DPRB, TAG.}

\footnote{6 Ltr, Col C. S. Urwiller, Asst Dir, PW Div, PMGO, to Sen. M. E. Tydings, 9 Mar 44. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Fertilizer). DRB, TAG.}

\footnote{7 Ltr, Col A. M. Tollison, Dir, PW Open Div, PMGO, to CG, 3d Svc Cnd, 2 Mar 46, sub: Additional Prisoners of War for Fertilizer Industry; ltr, John W. Collins, Dir, Bureau of Placement, WMC, to Col C. S. Urwiller, 27 Feb 45. Copies in ibid.}

\footnote{8 Memo, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, Dir, Aliens Div, PMGO, for ACofS, G-1, 13 May 43, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. PMGO 253.5 Gen. P/W (Mines). DRB, TAG.}
Because of the limitations imposed by this ruling and by the Geneva Convention, only about one to three thousand PW's were employed on this work at any one time—the percentage employed ranged from one-tenth of 1 percent to about 1 percent of the total number of PW's employed elsewhere.69

**Foundry Work**

Very few prisoners of war were employed in foundry work. However, the quality of the work performed was reported generally as being very good, and, as in other industries, the demand for PW labor far exceeded the supply. At one time when only 1,065 PW foundry workers were available, requests for paroled Italian PW's alone totaled over 12,000. Even with those having a related experience the total available was only approximately 4,000.70

Despite the limited supply, good use was made of their services. A report from the Toledo, Ohio, area indicated that prisoners of war shoveled sand; carried, cleaned, and ground castings; loaded and unloaded cars; and aided in ladlepouring. Others worked as molders' helpers and did semiskilled work. The caliber of PW work was very satisfactory. In one factory (Brown Industries, Sandusky, Ohio), the enthusiastic employers upgraded German PW workers as rapidly as possible because they demonstrated sufficient knowledge and a capacity to perform more highly skilled jobs.

**Railroads**

The use of PW labor on railroad maintenance was very limited throughout the war because of labor opposition. Prisoners of war performed only 1,469 manpower months of work in all forms of transportation during World War II.71 Railroad labor unions strongly opposed PW employment, and a frustrating series of negotiations among various Federal agencies failed to produce a workable agreement surmounting the unions' objections.

In the spring of 1943, J. J. Pelley, president of the Association of American Railroads, suggested that PW's be used on railroad maintenance. In reply, the Under Secretary of War, in June 1943, stated that the Geneva Convention permitted the use of PW's on track maintenance; but the matter did not rest with this simple ruling.72 Within

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69 PMGO, "Prisoner of War Monthly Labor Reports, 1944." DRB, TAG.
72 Ltr, SW Stimson to Mr. J. J. Pelley, Pres, Assoc of American Railroads, 28 Jun 43; ltr, USW Robt. P. Patterson to Wm. F. Jeffers, Off of Rubber Div, WPB, 25 Jun 43. G-1 883.6 Labor (26 Jun 43), "In Other Industries (other than agriculture)." DRB, TAG.
a few weeks a controversy over the specific use of PW's flared up, and as a result very few prisoners of war ever worked on the railroads.

A test case arose in July 1943 when the PW camp at Camp Clark, Mo., contracted to supply the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad with 250 prisoners of war for about 150 days. These were to help construct a railroad switching yard at Lincoln, Nebr. The contract had the necessary approvals and certifications from local agents of the War Manpower Commission, and the railroad company already had completed 50 percent of a temporary PW camp on the site. But the local labor union strongly objected. In July 1943 the Railway Labor Executives' Association (the union) adopted a resolution opposing the use of PW labor in any line of railway work for the following reasons: (1) They feared possible sabotage; (2) they thought such work by the prisoners would violate the Geneva Convention; and (3) they maintained the use of PW labor would have an adverse effect upon the morale and efficiency of free railroad labor thereby causing labor troubles.

The War Department contended that the union's fear of sabotage was unfounded and forwarded the case to the Office of War Mobilization with the request that the protest be overruled. The prisoners had been segregated, and all security requirements had been met. In addition, the PW's were to work in a portion of the yard where there was no opportunity for sabotage. Furthermore, since the yard was used for general traffic, no violation of the Geneva Convention was involved. The Secretary of War indicated that if the union's protests were upheld, it would not only preclude the use of PW's in any capacity on railroads, but it might well set a precedent against their use in any other industrial employment.

The director of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes, overruled the union's protest but stated that the case should not be regarded as a precedent for future cases. He recommended a general policy be formulated to assure railroad workers that PW's would not be used on any work that would endanger the workers' safety. Victory for the railroad was rather hollow, however, for while the decision was pending, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy found it necessary to complete the project before cold weather and so hired free labor, withdrawing completely from the prisoner of war negotiations.

To comply with the recommendation of the War Mobilization director for a general policy statement covering sabotage and safety, the War Department required all contracts for PW employment on railroad maintenance to contain the following clause:

The railroad recognizes and assumes the responsibility for the safety of its movements and of its employees. All railroad maintenance work performed

73 For correspondence on this case, see: G-1 383.6 Labor (28 Jun 43), "In other industries (other than agriculture)." DRB, TAG.
in whole or in part by prisoners of war will be inspected by competent and technically-equipped representatives of the railroads to insure that the quality of such work is at least equal to or greater than existing standards of safety and as high as necessary to meet existing federal requirements and as high as would be enacted by the railroad with respect to work performed by free labor. Adequate provision will be made through inspection by competent and qualified representatives of the railroad for the purpose of affording protection, against acts of sabotage by war prisoners, given access in connection with their work for the railroad.7

Although the War Manpower Commission chairman appeared to accept this new policy, other major difficulties in getting PW's on the job were never solved.70 In November 1943 another test case 76 arose when the Pittsburg and Shawmut Railroad Company was stymied in its efforts to obtain PW labor. The area director of the War Manpower Commission contended that the safety terms of the Geneva Convention were violated by the use of PW's on railroads and it was not long before the issue was before the top level of the War Department. Secretary of War Stimson informed Chairman McNutt of the War Manpower Commission of the War Department's ruling that railroad maintenance work was appropriate for prisoners of war within the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and called the immediate issue a “misunderstanding.” Secretary Stimson indicated further that if it was not corrected it would result in a failure to employ PW's in a field where the manpower shortage was critical.

Chairman McNutt responded that the field units of the War Manpower Commission had been instructed in October 1943 not to certify PW's for railroad employment without the specific approval of the Washington headquarters. He stated that this did not involve interpretation of the Geneva Convention but merely reflected “operating policy.” Chairman McNutt further added that if railroad maintenance problems and the needs for manpower became so serious that PW's represented the only source of recruitment, the matter would then be discussed again with the Management-Labor Policy Committee for policy determination—thus apparently a reversal of the War Manpower Commission's earlier policy.

Lack of maintenance which was directly attributable to shortages of labor brought about further deterioration of the railroads and caused the commanding general of the Army Service Forces in February 1944 to survey the extent that PW labor would be needed to maintain the roads in the condition necessary to carry out the war effort. General Somervell's survey recommended the immediate use

79 Memo, Maj Gen A. W. Gullion, TPMG, to CofS, 18 Sep 43, sub: Prisoner of War Labor on Railroads; memo, Maj Gen M. C. White, ACofS, G-1, for CofS, 22 Sep 43; sub: Prisoner of War Labor on Railroads. Ibid.
80 Ltr, P. V. McNutt, Chm, WMC, to Hon. Robert Lovett, Actg SW, 15 Sep. 43. Ibid.
81 For correspondence on this case, see: G-1 385.6 Labor (26 Jun 43), "In other industries (other than agriculture)." DRB, TAG.
of 50,000 prisoners of war as required, and the use of 45,000 PW's within the following six months to maintain commercial railroad properties and to avert impairment of efficiency. At the time of General Somervell's report, G-1 recommended that no action be taken until strong support could be received from the Office of Defense Transportation and until labor resistance had been "broken down." The accomplishment of these two steps, it felt, would then place the War Department in a better position to ask the War Manpower Commission to change its attitude. But apparently neither of these two developments occurred, for the 50,000 prisoners which General Somervell recommended were never made available for railroad maintenance work.

The War Manpower Commission did certify a few PW's to work on railroads in isolated instances. For instance, in April 1945, prisoners of war were used in Texas to repair tracks damaged by a flood. But PW employment by the railroads was the exception rather than the rule. Although many requests were made by railroads, evidence is lacking to show whether these requests were approved by the chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

The War Department apparently did not press the issue further because of strong labor opposition, the need for PW labor in other occupations, and the importation of Mexican labor for use on the railroads.

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7 Memo, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell for CoS, 21 Feb 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor on Railroads. Ibid.
8 Memo for Record, Lt Col N. C. Bernays, Legislative and Special Projects Br, G-1, 25 Feb 44. Apparently in view of the existence of the total number of prisoners available this issue was pursued no farther. See: Memo, Lt Col Bernays, Legislative and Special Projects Br, G-1, for Exec, G-1, 31 May 44. Ibid.
9 See: PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W (Railroads). DRB, TAG; see also: WMC General File; and Regions I thru XII. Records of the War Manpower Commission. National Archives.
Chapter 11
Governmental Employment of Prisoners of War

Military Installations

The adoption of the "calculated risk" policy gave impetus to the PW employment program, especially at the service command and PW camp level. When wholesale escapes and sabotage by the prisoners did not materialize, even the most reluctant commanders adjusted to the modified security measures.

The employment of prisoners of war on military installations was one of the most important phases of the prisoner of war program in the United States, yet a uniform employment procedure was not followed. Each service command was allowed a degree of flexibility in administering the PW labor program in its area, and each adopted its own measures suitable for carrying out the basic War Department policies.

Requisition and Allocation of Prisoners

Service commands estimated their labor requirements according to War Department labor priorities and submitted their PW requests to The Provost Marshal General. When the prisoners were received at incoming centers or at military installations, they were tested and classified according to intelligence and aptitude. The special technical skills and past records of the prisoners, as well as all types of work done and any new skills required, were duly entered on the records.

At first, PW distribution was based almost entirely on housing and security conditions. By 31 August 1945, the only area in which the camps were restricted was the Military District of Washington. In this area, no general prisoners of war could be located or employed within a 10-mile radius of the White House, except at Andrews Field.

1 For examples, see: Ltr Order, Hq, 2d Svc Cmd, 25 Mar 44, sub: Outline of duties, etc., in connection with handling of prisoners of war on labor projects; PW Memo 22, Hq, 2d Svc Cmd, 1 Nov 44, sec. III. Both in PMGO 253.5 (2d Svc Cmd) P/W; see also: Ltr, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, APMG, to DCofS for Svc Cmds, ASF, 20 Apr 44, sub: Utilization of PW's in the Sixth Service Command. PMGO 253.5, Gen P/W #5 (2 Mar-29 Apr 44); Minutes, ASF Conference, Service Command Personnel Control Units, 19-21 Mar 45, Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio. ASF Control Div. DRB, TAG; Ninth Service Command Manual 3-5, 1 Nov 44, sub: Organizations; Seventh Service Command Publication 7110-2, 1 Oct 44, sub: Organization and Functional Manual, Service Command Headquarters. Both in ASF Army "A's." DRB, TAG.
Later, labor needs fashioned the criteria. Insofar as housing permitted, allocations were made in proportion to the total ASF operating personnel, military and civilian, authorized to each service command. The service command concerned controlled the local disposition and use of the PW's, except those of certain categories such as noncooperators. Usually the PW camps requisitioned PW labor by job and skill specification numbers and reported periodically any excess prisoners who had special skills.

Late in 1944 the Ninth Service Command allocated the same percentage of prisoners of war to all Class I, II, and IV installations—a step that led to confusion. The service command headquarters based its authorizations on the previous use made of PW's by certain installation commanders, but failed to inform other commanders of the basis for the authorization and on what specific jobs the PW's could be used. And, as the directive stood, the PW's could be transferred anywhere and at any time that agricultural needs arose. Under these conditions, it was impossible to make effective employment plans.

In January 1945 the commanding general, Ninth Service Command, corrected this situation by designating the types of work and by fixing responsibility. He divided all prisoners of war within the service command into three categories:

Type IA—those assigned to Class III and IV installations for employment in essential military work for which the Army Air Forces or chief of technical service was responsible.

Type IB—those assigned to Class I, II, or IV installations for military work for which the Ninth Service Command was responsible.

Type II—those assigned to agriculture or other contract projects.

Type III—those available for useful, but not necessarily essential, military work.

The director of personnel, together with the director of security and intelligence, determined the number of PW's to be allocated to Type IB work and reserved this group for distribution to clean Class I, II, or IV installations. Simultaneously, other categories of military and civilian personnel were reduced proportionately, if the PW camp commanders did not effectively use the authorized PW's on Type IB work. Requests for additional PW's for this type work had to be justified as for any other personnel.

The Personnel Control Unit of the Fourth Service Command was responsible for its PW distribution, basing this distribution on activity

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2 Memo, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan for DCofS for Svc Cmds, 17 May 44, sub: Allocation of Prisoners of War to Service Commands; memo, PMGO for USW, 19 May 44. Both in PMGO 253.5 (en P/W #5 (1 May—31 May 44). DRB, TAG.
3 Minutes, ASF Conference, Service Command Personnel Control Units, 19-21 Mar 45, Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio, p. 255. ASF Control Div. DRB, TAG; see also: PW Cir 54, 16 Dec 44, sec. II. Copy in "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. I of Tabs.
4 Minutes, ASF Conference, Service Command Personnel Control Units, 19-21 Mar 45, Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio, p. 228. ASF Control Div. DRB, TAG.
5 Ibid.
reports submitted by Class I and II posts and by each general and convalescent hospital. The report listed every activity or subactivity at the installation according to standard organization charts, the total number of American personnel engaged in each activity, the number of PW's used on the activity, and the number of additional prisoners needed.  

Some service commands assigned prisoners of war to companies, platoons, or sections according to the PW work classification in order to avoid mixing personnel or splitting units. Others were assigned to individual jobs. On many military installations, the post or camp commander appointed a priority board or a Prisoner of War Action Committee to regulate the use of PW's by the many military agencies. The board or committee, which consisted of representatives of the using services and the PW camp commander, received and investigated requests for PW assignments to specific work tasks. The essential nature of the work as well as the availability of the prisoners determined the assignment. Thus the post commander was kept informed of all PW employment. On other posts, the PW camp commander allotted the prisoners to the technical services on a day-by-day basis rather than for long-sustained periods to avoid any possible tieups of the prisoners during slack periods of work.  

At the direction of the War Department, the technical services and the service commands recommended specific types of essential work for the prisoners of war to those responsible for the PW labor. PW camp commanders, together with works projects officers, continuously surveyed all employment possibilities in an effort to place the prisoners on the suggested work.

The following list of permissible work projects is indicative of the scope of PW utilization on military installations by 1945:

- Administrative clerks.
- Agricultural projects.
- Bakers.
- Blacksmiths.
- Barbers.
- Brick and stone masons.
- Butchers.
- Canvas and cot repair.
- Care of animals.
- Carpentry and repairs.

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6 Ibid., pp. 222-25.
7 The PMG had advocated a direct line of responsibility from the service command headquarters to the base PW camp commander and from him to the branch camp commander, independent of the district commander except for advice on security matters. See: Ltr, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, APMG, to DCS, for Svc Cmnds, ASF, 20 Apr 44, sub: Utilization of prisoners of war in the Sixth Service Command. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W #5 (2 Mar-29 Apr 44). DRB, TAG; see also: Ltr, Hq, 4th Svc Cmnd, to CO's, Class I and II posts, etc., 7 Feb 45, sub: Utilization of Prisoners of War. PW File, 4th Service Command, Use of Prisoners of War, vol. VI (9 Nov 44-19 Feb 45). DPRB, TAG.
9 This consisted of work that would have had to be done even if PW labor were not available. See: Ltr, Hq, 8th Svc Cmnd, 5 May 44, sub: Utilization of Prisoner of War Labor. PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W #5 (1 May-31 May 44). DRB, TAG.
Clearing brush and other fire hazards.
Clothing and equipment repair shops.
Coal handling.
Concrete block construction.
Construction and repairs.
Construction of athletic facilities.
Cooks and cooks' helpers.
Dam construction.
Dental brace makers.
Dental mechanics and helpers.
Draftsmen.
Drainage control.
Dry cleaning.
Electricians and helpers.
Experimental QM work tests.
Fire fighting.
Flood control works and dams.
Food processing.
Fencing.
Firing boilers and water heaters.
Forestry and reforestation.
Fruit growing.
Furnace and heater repairs.
Furniture and cabinet makers.
Garbage can cleaning plants.
Gardening.
Grounds maintenance.
Hauling.
Hospital orderlies and technicians.
Hospital ward service.
Incinerator operator.
Interpreters and clerks.
Janitors.
Kitchen police for station units.
Labor in post exchange warehouses.
Laundry operations.
Locksmiths.
Lumber sorting.
Lumbering.
Machinists.
Maintenance of grounds.
Maintenance of runways and taxiways.
Masonry work.
Mechanics.
Medical instrument repairs.
Mosquito control.
Motor repair shops, and parts reclamation shops.
Office equipment repair.
Operating wash and grease racks, except for weapon carriers.
Packers and craters.
Painters and decorators.
Plumbers and helpers.
Post police.
Pressers.
Quarrying.
Railroad maintenance.
Repair work of all kinds.
Road building.
Road maintenance.
Salvage and reclamation.
Sanitary fills.
Service station attendants.
Sewage disposal plants.
Sheet metal workers.
Shoe repairing.
Sidewalks.
Sign painters.
Snow removal.
Soil erosion control.
Stable police.
Storekeepers and stock clerks.
Tailoring and pressing.
Teamsters.
Tinsmiths.
Tractor operators.
Truck drivers.
Typewriter repair.
Upholsterers.
Utility maintenance.
Waiters.
Warehousing.
Watch and clock repairing.
Wood cutting.
X-ray technicians and assistants.

With the adoption of the Army reeducation program, certain selected German prisoners of war worked in special camps as translators, editors, and counselors for the program. They edited a newspaper for distribution among the internment camps; reviewed films as to suitability for prisoner showings; offered a commentary on the

Footnote: "Projects on which Prisoners of War can be Employed." PMGO Policy Book III, POWO Dir, Legal Br. DRB, TAG; "History of the PMGO, WWII," op. cit., p. 426; compilation from PMGO and other pertinent prisoner of war files.
films when they were shown; translated pamphlets for distribution to the other prisoners of war; and reviewed camp newspapers for detrimental material. A similar program, but on a lesser scale, was also established for Italian and Japanese PW's.14

German and Noncooperative Italian Prisoners of War

German and noncooperative Italian prisoners of war were used mainly on military installations, although some were hired out on contract work. When the Italian Service Units were formed and assigned to work directly connected with the war effort, the German and noncooperative Italian PW's took their place, but they could not be used on any work that was directly connected with war operations.

On arrival at the PW camps, these prisoners were assigned to labor companies commanded by an American officer and five U. S. enlisted men, each labor company consisting of 250 to 400 prisoners of war. As the PW personnel became competent enough to assume the duties of the U. S. enlisted men, only one U. S. supply sergeant was retained. Job assignments within the PW labor companies adhered to the occupational classification of the prisoners as much as possible.12

Russian Prisoners of War

During the early stages of the war, before segregation was possible, thousands of German prisoners were brought to the United States for custody. Among these were found to be approximately 4,300 prisoners of war who later claimed Soviet citizenship. As soon as the presence of these persons became known, they were segregated from the other German PW's and sent to special camps for screening by Soviet representatives in the United States with a view to repatriation. At first, however, the Soviet Union disclaimed these prisoners; hence, they were treated as ordinary prisoners of war. Later, Russia asked that they be treated as Soviet nationals. These persons were returned to the Soviet Union as rapidly as shipping was made available by Russian authorities.13

Japanese Prisoners of War

Only 569 Japanese prisoners of war were interned in the United States during World War II. These were employed on work similar to that performed by the German and noncooperative Italian personnel. Most of the Japanese PW's were former rice farmers and fishermen and possessed few skills. For this reason and because of the

12 For complete information on the reeducation program, see: MS, Maj George E. McCracken, "The Prisoner of War Reeducation Program in the Years 1943-1946." 2-37, FE. OCMH, Gen Ref Off.
13 "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., p. 60; PW Memo 1, Hq, 8th Svc Cmd, 22 Jan 46. Copy in PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W #17 (Jun 45). DRB, TAG.
Chart 8. Typical Functional Chart, Base Prisoner of War Camp

SPENIAL PROJECTS OFFICE

COMMANDING OFFICER

BRANCH CAMPS

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ADJUTANT BRANCH
General supervision and coordination of all operations, control, and personnel
Handles all administrative and office functions and maintenance of the camp, including the opration of the camp
Maintains all files and records and is in charge of all equipment and personnel

CHAPLAIN BRANCH
Responsible for all religious activities of POW camps
Prepares and conducts all religious services and maintains all religious records

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Secures and analyzes all information relative to the POW camps
Maintains liaison with the Inter-Branch Intelligence Center

PROVOST MARSHAL BRANCH
Maintains all personnel and POW camps
Coordinates with Department of Justice and the War Department for the enforcement of all regulations

MEDICAL BRANCH
Cares for the health and well-being of the POWs
Responsible for the sanitary and medical aspects of the POW camps

SPECIAL CONCERN: BASE
Aid to the POW camps in providing medical and dental care

MAIL SECTION
Operations of Prisoner of War Postal Services and Correspondence
Maintenance of POW Correspondence Center

POSTAL SECTION
Operations of Prisoner of War Postal Services and Correspondence
Maintenance of POW Correspondence Center

OPTICAL SECTION
Responsible for all supplies and maintenance of camp
Responsible for the maintenance of all supplies and equipment

DENTAL SECTION
Under the direction of the Chief Medical Officer, medical and dental care

WASH SECTION
Supervises all services in the area of supply, delivery, and reception of food

SANITARY SECTION
Responsible for all supplies and maintenance of camp

LIFE SECTION
Responsible for all supplies and maintenance of camp

TRANSPORTATION SECTION
Responsible for the operation of POW camps

SPECIAL RECREATIONAL SECTION
Responsible for all supplies and maintenance of camp

Garrison Details

*Prepared by Prisoners of War Camp, Fort Oglethorpe, Chattanooga, 1944.
hostility of the American public, they were eliminated from priority II work (contract labor) and were restricted to priority I work (work directly connected with military installations). When priority I work failed to keep the Japanese prisoners occupied, priority III work (nonessential work on military installations) was increased materially. Japanese prisoners of war repaired and rebuilt outpost and range roads, constructed fire lanes; cut pulp wood; and worked on soil erosion, stream conservation, and the salvage of materials for reuse.\textsuperscript{14}

To obtain the best work from the Japanese prisoners, American commanders learned early that they had to be given 10-minute rest periods in the middle of the forenoon and afternoon. The Japanese followed instructions best when their own straw bosses (PW work supervisors) transmitted the orders to them. They preferred to work together in groups, and their output lagged when separated. As a whole, the Japanese were anxious to make a good impression, but became sullen when urged on or hurried in their work.\textsuperscript{15}

The "Administrative Pressure" Policy

Steps were taken to allow PW camp commanders more leeway in disciplining prisoners of war, especially in compelling them to work. Before August 1943, The Provost Marshal General had experienced little difficulty with the few prisoners of war already interned; consequently little attention was paid to disciplinary measures should they become necessary. With the rapid influx of PW's during the summer months, the War Department adopted a policy whereby the captured enemy would be subject to the same rules and regulations as American soldiers. As a result, before October 1943 the PW camp commander could only admonish, reprimand, or withhold the privileges of the prisoners of war (or restrict an officer PW) for failure either to work or to comply with regulations. These were mostly useless gestures. For more serious offenses, the camp commander was empowered, after three weeks' notice to the protecting power, to use a general court for PW officers; a special court for NCO's; and a summary court for privates. This policy resulted in many difficulties in attempting to impose effective disciplinary measures for minor infractions. Prisoners of war, normally confined within a restricted area, had only a few privileges and did not regard admonitions and restrictions in


\textsuperscript{15} "Remunerative Work Done by Prisoners of War." PMGO 350 (Japanese) Program. DRB, TAG.
Experience proved that the only effective disciplinary measures were those that affected the PW’s food and pay. In October 1943, The Provost Marshal General’s Office interpreted Article 27 of the Geneva Convention as permitting the detaining power to work prisoners of war and to use reasonable means to force them to comply with a work order. It, therefore, adopted an “administrative pressure” policy. “Administrative pressure” authorized the camp commander to withdraw certain privileges from and to impose a restricted diet on those PW’s who refused to obey a lawful order, including a work order. The theory behind this policy was that it was not punishment for any act but was merely an inducement to make the PW’s comply with a lawful order or regulation. It was not imposed for a definite period but only as long as the PW’s refused to obey a proper command. The PW’s could therefore terminate the pressure simply by complying with the order that they had violated.

In applying the “no work, no eat” policy, camp commanders did not consider compliance had been obtained until the PW’s actually engaged in the required work. If a strike disrupted the normal work program to the extent that it was impractical to resume work immediately, restrictions on their diet continued for 72 hours or until work was resumed, whichever period was shorter. If a PW refused to work, the PW camp commander immediately ordered him on a restricted diet of not less than 18 ounces of bread a day and all the water he desired, and this continued until he was willing to work. There was no time limit on the restricted diet period and it could be continued indefinitely provided medical inspections warranted the continuation. Thus the PW could be given a full meal or a day’s ration or more and then placed again on the restricted diet, provided the conditions which warranted its imposition continued to exist. But this could be done only under the administrative pressure policy.17

PW camp commanders could also withhold pay and allowances due a prisoner of war during the period of administrative pressure. Labor pay due for work already completed could be withheld as well as $2 of the $3 monthly gratuitous allowance. The other $1 a month had to be paid, even during administrative pressure periods, to allow the PW to purchase certain necessities.18

In a practical sense, administrative pressure by verbal reprimands, the withholding of privileges, or the imposition of other restrictions

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GRS, Reference Collection. DRB, TAG.
17 Ibid.; ltr, WD to CG’s, all Svc Cmnds, 27 Oct 43, sub: Admin & Disciplinary Measures.
18 TM 19–500, par. 59.
proved to be inadequate. They were rarely used except with the restricted diet or with the withholding of pay and allowances. Since administrative pressure was only a persuasive measure and not a punishment for past actions, its extent could not be determined in advance, but remained of indefinite duration.

Prisoners of war were also disciplined in other ways. The non-workers and the recalcitrant, along with those mentally incompetent, were segregated and transferred to separate camps or compounds where they worked for their own self-maintenance. The system of courts-martial was also liberalized. The Judge Advocate General ruled that a summary court was not a judicial court within the meaning of the Geneva Convention and therefore could be held without notifying the protecting power. He also ruled that a summary court was a disciplinary punishment as used by Articles 54 and 59 of the Geneva Convention and could apply to PW officers and noncommissioned officers as well as to PW privates. Restricted diet could be given as an additional punishment by the summary court, and the PW's could be given 30 days confinement without right of appeal or further trial. If the PW was unruly, he could also be placed on bread and water for 14 of his 30 days confinement.19 [See chart 9.]

Prisoner of War Training

As early as 1943, the service commands had begun training and instructional programs for all prisoners of war, other than members of ISU's. Experienced PW's and U. S. interpreters were used as instructors, and the trades in demand were taught through the use of illustrated charts and translated field manuals. Other PW's were trained by rotation on the job. This proved unfeasible, however, as an experienced group could not be developed; consequently, in most cases, production was subordinated to PW training.20 Schools were established to train the prisoners in laundry work, cooking, clothing and shoe repairing, and in other trades. After being trained, the PW's were transferred to camps to replace civilian laborers or to fill vacancies.

Supervision

Each post commander appointed a senior PW work supervisor for each group or shift of prisoners and through him maintained contact
with the prisoners of war. Subordinate PW work supervisors, in the ratio of 1 to 10, also assisted the senior PW supervisor in carrying out a work project.\footnote{Ltr, AG, 8th Svc Cmd, to CO's, all Posts, Camps, and Stations, 8th Svc Cmd, 1 Oct 43, sub: Plan for Employment of Prisoners of War on Class II Labor, at Posts, Camps, and Stations, Eighth Service Command. ASF Misc PW's, Various Service Commands, Labor and Employment (Misc Folder) (S), DRE, TAG.}

Many German PW work supervisors, although pretending to be cooperative, actually organized work stoppages and slowdowns or staged other acts of discontent and violence. Most of these offenders were noncommissioned officers, thoroughly indoctrinated with the Nazi ideology and its theory of discipline. In some instances, threats of "kangaroo courts," violence, and family reprisals caused the PW's to fear these supervisors more than they respected the orders of the American PW camp commander. To correct the situation, PW camp commanders replaced all undesirable PW supervisors with capable cooperative PW administrative personnel, regardless of rank.\footnote{Ltr, AG, ASP, to all Svc Cmds, 24 Mar 44, sub: German Prisoners of War Spokesmen and Supervisors. Copy in "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. II of Tabs.}

Maximum prisoner of war effort was obtained only by competent American supervision. (PW's were quick to spot those who were not qualified for the job to be performed.) To accomplish this American male civilian supervisors and instructors were provided, where necessary, in such ratio as the local available labor supply would permit.\footnote{To aid the supervisors, the WD published ASF Manual M-811, "Handbook for Work Supervisors of Prisoner of War Labor,"}

In some early cases, PW camp commanders attempted to have guards act as supervisors, but this was quickly discouraged when the PW labor output lagged. As the war progressed in the Allies' favor, civilian supervisors were often the lone overseers of a PW work project.

Segregation

Initially, PW camp commanders inclosed laundries, dry-cleaning establishments, and other facilities on military installations, with barbed wire to prevent escape; when security restrictions were later relaxed, they largely dispensed with such measures. On the job, PW's were separated from civilian employees for a two-fold reason: to prevent fraternization, and to produce maximum efficiency from the prisoners. In laundry operations, especially shirt ironing, PW's disliked the operation when required to work in the presence of civilian female workers; but during a shift when PW's were used almost exclusively, the dislike lessened and production increased. PW employers also restricted prisoners of war to a definite route going to and from water fountains and latrines. Guards inspected the water
**Chart 9. Disciplinary and Control Measures Applicable to Prisoners of War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Reprimand, etc.</th>
<th>Withholding privileges</th>
<th>Guardhouse or restricted limits</th>
<th>Hard labor without pay</th>
<th>Restricted diet</th>
<th>Withholding pay and allowances</th>
<th>Forfeiture of pay and allowances</th>
<th>Use of physical force</th>
<th>Responsibility for imposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATIVE PRESSURE (all POW's).</strong></td>
<td>Indefinite (until compliance).</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>No...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes (all pay and allowances)</td>
<td>Discontinuance of $2 of allowance of EM only (prorated).</td>
<td>No...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISCIPLINARY 10TH ARTICLE OF WAR (all POW's).</strong></td>
<td>7 days...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>EM—Yes, NCO's —Supervisory only, officers— No.</td>
<td>No...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>No...</td>
<td>No...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL (EM only).</strong></td>
<td>30 days...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes (including NCO's).</td>
<td>No (AR 600-275 par. 25 applies).</td>
<td>Yes (5%)</td>
<td>Yes (5%)</td>
<td>No...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARTICLES 54-59 GENEVA CONVENTION (all POW's).</strong></td>
<td>do...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>Yes...</td>
<td>EM—Yes, NCO's —Supervisory only, officers— No.</td>
<td>14 days only...</td>
<td>Yes (all pay and allowances).</td>
<td>$2 of monthly allowance of EM only.</td>
<td>No...</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JUDICIAL SUITS:**

1. **SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL (EM only).**
2. **GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL (all POW's).**

As Provided by the Articles of War, Army Regulations, Geneva Convention, Manual of Court-Martial.

**Note.** The Geneva Convention requires notice to be given to protecting power in all judicial suits, notice transmitted through PMGO, notice must be given more than 3 weeks prior to trial. Also of action of reviewing authority and of confirming authority.

Other pertinent requirements: Choice of defense counsel and competent interpreter furnished to prisoner.

**NO PRISONER OF WAR MAY BE REDUCED IN RANK OR GRADE, BY COURT-MARTIAL OR OTHERWISE.**
DEFINITIONS

A. Withhold—hold back, or place in the trust account of the Prisoner of War Amounts Due.

B. Allowance—for officers $30, $30, $40 per month, $3 per month for enlisted men.

C. Pay—work compensation (for officers in addition to their allowances of $30, $30, $40) (for enlisted men in addition to their allowance of $3 per month).

GENERAL NOTES

1. The Use of AW 104 or summary court-martial is not recommended, since the powers of the camp commander under Art. 54-59, Geneva Convention, include his powers under these provisions, however, summary court-martial is necessary when a forfeiture of pay is desired or to impose hard labor on a noncommissioned officer prisoner of war.

2. Par. 25, AR 600-375 is applicable to POW's to the same extent as to American military personnel. It permits imposition of a restricted diet as punishment for an additional offense by prisoners of war who have been placed in the custody of a guard in the manner prescribed by AR 600-355 and who has not been set at liberty by proper authority. However, a camp commander, taking action under the provisions of Art. 54-59, Geneva Convention, may impose a restricted diet as an initial punishment.

3. Restricted diet—the minimum food allowance, bread and water diet, will include 18 ounces of bread each day, and as much water as the prisoners may desire. Except for administrative pressure, it will not exceed 14 days at any one period, and will not be repeated until an interval of 14 days shall have elapsed, nor will it exceed 84 days in 1 year.
closets on schedule to prevent undue loitering or damage to the building or fixtures.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Work Procedures}

The measured task system was also an effective measure in obtaining maximum work from prisoners of war. Generally, PW's worked the same hours as similar U. S. personnel, although they could be required to work 12 hours a day including transportation time. Supervisors saw that the PW's performed a full task and worked the full time required. No undue loitering, unauthorized or extended rest periods, or other forms of wasted time were allowed.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Compensation for Injuries}

A prisoner of war hospitalized in the line of duty on assigned work was paid at the rate of 40 cents a day, subject to the following limitations: (a) no payment was made for the first three days of disability or for Sundays; (b) no payment was made if the injury was caused by the PW's willful misconduct, by his intention to cause injury or death to himself or to others, or by his voluntary intoxication; (c) compensation for the injury was terminated when the PW was able to work, or was repatriated, or died.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Use of Prisoners of War Officers and Noncommissioned Officers}

PW camp commanders, in an attempt to obtain maximum effort from the prisoners, permitted PW officers and noncoms to volunteer for work. Early in the internment program, PW camp commanders carefully considered the use of ranking prisoners as spokesmen and leaders and in other subadministrative work in the enlisted prisoners' compounds. Those who volunteered for this work were paid at the usual rate. When some officer volunteers refused pay for their labor, they were required to sign a statement to that effect.\textsuperscript{27} If the PW officer refused to sign, the camp commander noted in the individual's record that work was requested and was assigned, but that the prisoner refused compensation.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1944 prisoner of war NCO's were permitted to volunteer for any nonsupervisory labor for which they had special mechanical skills or...
aptitudes. This volunteer work was limited to a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of 90 days, and, if undertaken, the volunteer had to work the entire period. By 1945 labor demands were at the peak and the PW's could volunteer for any job for the duration of their captivity provided they waived their rights to supervisory work. A signed statement to this effect was placed in their 201 files.

When American authorities discovered that many German prisoners of war could not substantiate their NCO status with official German documents, they were treated as PW privates and as such were required to perform unrestricted labor. This resulted in approximately 40,000 more PW's being made available for general labor.

Noncooperative enemy NCO's were segregated from the other prisoners of war and were used to replace able-bodied enemy privates in performing services at camps housing enemy officers. This work was without pay. However, any enemy NCO could be reinstated to remunerative work at any time subsequent to three months after his date of segregation, provided the PW camp commander and the service command commander approved.

Types of Paid and Unpaid Work

By January 1944, paid work connected with the administration, management, and maintenance of PW labor camps had to meet the following conditions: (1) The work had to require special training and qualifications on the part of the PW's; (2) the prisoner had to be employed full time on the work, thereby being prevented from doing other paid labor; and (3) the number of PW's for any particular type of paid work could not exceed the number allowed by any directive, present or future, which governed the organization of PW labor camps or companies. Certain housekeeping jobs which represented only irregular or occasional work were cited as typical unpaid labor. Clerks, cooks' helpers, tailors, cobblers, and barbers were among those listed.

Experience demonstrated the need for a paid PW cadre for such skilled work within the PW compounds as cooks, interpreters, com-

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30 TM 19-500, par 4c, pp. 5.1-5.2; ltr, 3991 SCU Prisoner of War Camp, QM sub-depot, to CG, 9th Svc Cnd, 17 Jul 45, sub: Report of Volunteer Prisoners of War, Non-Commissioned Officers. PMGO 253.5 Gen. P/W #19 (Jul 49). DRB, TAG.
31 It was later proved that many German privates had been promoted just prior to their capture to insure preferential treatment. See: Memo, Col C. S. Urwiller, PW Opns Div, for Dir, PW Opns Div, PMGO, 10 Jul 45. PMGO 282.5, Gen. P/W #17 (Jan 49). DRB, TAG.
32 This requirement was compatible with the provisions of Arts. 22, 27, and 34 of the 1929 Geneva PW Convention. See: ltr, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, APMG, to CG, 8th Svc Cnd, 29 May 45, sub: Personnel to Provide Service in Prisoner of War Officer Camps. PMGO 253.5, Gen. P/W #16 (May 45). DRB, TAG.
pany leaders, clerks, typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, accountants, warehouse supply clerks, warehousemen, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and mechanics. Formerly, the PW's were rotated on these jobs so that everyone would have a chance to earn an equal wage. The permanent cadre resulted in a more efficient camp administration, overall savings, and an economical distribution of manpower.

On PW work projects, both for the military and for civilian contractors, PW officer or NCO volunteers worked as paid interpreters and work detail leaders. They were furnished by the PW camp commander in excess of the number contracted and were considered as working for the benefit of the other PW's and in the interest of the United States. Since they did not work directly for the contractor, he did not pay for their services. The civilian supervisors were supplied by the contractor.

Within the camp, the working PW's were denied access to classified information and to the files of both the prisoners of war and members of the armed forces. They could not use the telephone except in connection with the internal administration of the stockade or to convey official messages to American personnel.

In most PW camps, prisoners of war also staffed the attached U. S. enlisted and officers' messes under minimum supervision. In isolated areas where PW camps were authorized a bakery, qualified prisoners did the baking. The employment of prisoners of war in army messes made an important contribution to the war effort. From 1 June to 31 December 1944, prisoners of war performed 1,639,271 man-days of labor in connection with the handling of food for American military personnel. In December 1944, however, a problem arose which threatened to curtail the work. The Director of Intelligence, ASF, warned the service commands that certain PW's were forming "hara-kiari" (suicide) clubs on some military installations with the purpose of committing mass murder and sabotage. Some camp commanders immediately withdrew the PW's from the messes. By stressing the importance of PW labor and the remote possibility of sabotage, The Provost Marshal General successfully persuaded those concerned to reinstate the prisoners on the work.

Orderlies were assigned to PW officers on a paid basis in the ratio of one per general officer, one per six field grade officers, and one per

36 Ltr, TAG to CG's, all Svc Cads, 24 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War off Reservations. Copy in ibid., vol. II of Tabs.
38 Memo, PMGO, ASF, for CG, ASF, Feb 45. PMGO 253.5 Gen. P/W #3 (thru Mar 45). DRB, TAG.
39 In attempting this, the PW's knew they would be put to death if apprehended, hence the name.
40 Memo, PMGO, ASF, for CG, ASF, Feb. 45. PMGO 253.5 Gen. P/W #3 (thru Mar 45). DRB, TAG.
twelve company grade officers. Only those incapable of performing a full day's work were assigned.

The normal administrative duties of a PW camp could not be paid for from government funds, accumulated surplus canteen profits, or from PW funds. Therefore, the daily fatigue details within the PW compound and about the grounds surrounding the quarters of the attached American personnel were performed by PW privates and NCO's. Other unpaid PW's maintained and repaired barracks, walks, sewers, and fences within the PW camp area. To accomplish this work, PW camp commanders, by the use of a company roster, rotated the prisoners on the jobs. Camp commanders could select certain PW's for administrative details within the compound even though paid work was available elsewhere. But if the outside work had priority, the PW camp commander could assign the camp details to other prisoners less qualified. In this case, all the PW's on paid work contributed canteen coupons toward the wages of those detailed to the administrative duties. The camp commander collected the coupons and paid those on detail the standard rate of 80 cents a day for their labor. In this way all the prisoners benefited.\(^3\)

Many prisoners performed volunteer work without pay. Some engaged in part-time teaching; others engaged in entertaining or in activities connected with recreational or welfare projects. Some built furniture for the recreation rooms; others built and decorated the chapels. Others constructed and tended the athletic fields; and still others planted flower gardens to decorate the grounds of the PW camps.\(^4\)

**Protected Personnel**

The War Department confined all captured protected personnel in PW camps, but in separate compounds from the other prisoners of war. While awaiting exchange, the protected personnel attended to sick and wounded PW's and ministered to their spiritual needs. In addition to their pay and allowances, they were paid 80 cents a day for their labor.\(^4\) Protected personnel skilled or experienced as physicians, surgeons, dentists, X-ray; pharmaceutical, or other laboratory technicians replaced U. S. medical personnel and prisoners of war for duty elsewhere. This was done after proper screening and security checks.

Very few bona fide chaplains were among the PW's captured by allied forces. Some members of special police organizations were

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\(^3\) TM 19-500, pp. 5.14-5.15.  
disguised as chaplains and could not be used; others, who were ministers but who lacked the necessary identifying documents, were used as chaplains but were treated as prisoners of war. As such they were not entitled to the extra privileges accorded protected personnel. They did receive 80 cents a day for their labor from accumulated canteen profits.\(^4\)

Other protected personnel did the necessary work connected with their compounds and served as cooks and orderlies for officer protected personnel. Payment for this labor was governed by the same directives that applied to prisoners of war.

**Canteen Work**

PW canteens were operated as far as possible with PW labor. The prisoners were supplied to the canteen on a contract basis, and the canteen paid the U. S. Treasury 80 cents a day per prisoner. The War Department, in turn, paid the PW’s. Although the canteen was a government agency, it was not operated entirely with appropriated funds and the profits did not accrue to the Treasury. Instead, and in accordance with Article 12 of the Geneva Convention, they accrued for the benefit of the prisoners of war.\(^4\) PW’s were also employed by canteen-operated barber shops and hobby shops on a contract basis, but work in the hobby shops was not allowed to interfere with employment on essential labor. No War Manpower Commission certification was needed for canteens.

**Educational and Recreational Work**

The War Department encouraged the PW’s to organize formal study courses and allowed them to select a director of studies from their group to organize and promote educational and recreational activities.\(^4\) The PW’s also selected qualified teachers and instructors who were given sufficient free time to carry out their educational work. These were paid the standard rate for their educational duties when the work excluded them from other paid labor. The expenses of the educational program, including the pay of the director and teachers, came from the PW fund of the camp served.

Prisoner of war camps in the United States were supplied with motion picture programs for morale and reorientation purposes. Experienced or trained PW’s who were considered canteen employees were used as projectionists or as film technicians. Their pay came


\(^4\) Art. 17, Geneva PW Convention, requires “So far as possible belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war.”
from admission receipts paid by the PW audience. In effect, the prisoners directly paid the operators for their services.

**Prisoner of War Postal Units**

Not all labor for the prisoners benefit was successful, especially that connected with the redirecting and forwarding of prisoner mail. In March 1944, two prisoner of war postal units were established to relieve a serious backlog of undelivered PW mail held by the New York District Postal Censor. This was done in cooperation with the Office of Censorship.

An Italian postal unit, manned by Italian service unit personnel, was established at Fort George G. Meade, Md., where it operated until October 1945. Noncooperative German noncommissioned officers, under the supervision of 2 American officers and 10 enlisted men, operated a German postal unit at Camp Hearne, Tex. Noncommissioned officers were used because the work was of an administrative nature, and, therefore, they could be used; and German PW privates were to be used elsewhere.

Although the backlog of mail was eliminated, trouble resulted. The noncooperative Germans used the mails to maintain an intelligence system directed against cooperative prisoners of war in the United States. They obtained censorship-identified covers for reuse; they observed the routing and mail delivery system as well as the camp censorship and postal markings; they checked the prisoners' names through rosters; they manufactured unauthorized censorship and postmark stamps; and they removed the U. S. examiners' label tape for their own use. In addition, they knew the significance of the camps at Fort Devens, Mass., and Camp Campbell, Ky., where anti-Nazi prisoners were kept, and they gained access to the camp rosters. It became necessary to discontinue the German unit at Camp Hearne and to transfer its activity to Fort Meade where Italian Service Unit personnel were used until their repatriation. Cooperative German prisoners of war then relieved the Italian personnel.45

**The Farm Program on Military Installations**

An increasing number of prisoners of war arrived in the United States at a time when the country was faced with a growing shortage of civilian agricultural workers. Consequently, the American public felt that these prisoners should raise as much of their own food as possible, thereby reducing the burden of their support. This feeling was reflected in War Department policy. In September 1943, shortly after the arrival of the first large group of PW's, the War Department directed that the prisoners be "encouraged" to raise their own vegetables. If their labor improved the ground under cultivation, thereby

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increasing its value to the United States, they would be paid. Otherwise they would not. In January 1944, this policy was modified. PW’s were required to raise their own vegetables and were paid for their labor.

The produce of the camp gardens was used by the PW’s and by personnel of the armed forces. When it was used exclusively by the prisoners, their quartermaster ration was reduced proportionately. The quartermaster service supplied the necessary seeds, fertilizers, and hand tools, and if these were not available the quartermaster furnished funds for their local purchase. Where immediate action was required, PW camp commanders could purchase needed supplies with the camps’ PW fund.

In 1945, the Ogden, Utah, PW camp used only Italians of Slavic descent on paid work in their garden. These PW’s were antagonistic to the native Italians and to the Italian Fascist government. Thus productive labor was secured and an effective segregation was accomplished. All produce was turned over to the local quartermaster depot for distribution among the military installations.

The same camp engaged in a novel unpaid work program. An owner of a nearby orchard invited the PW camp commander to harvest all fallen apricot fruit for military consumption. PW’s unable or unwilling to do regular work gathered the fruit and took it to the camp where it was cleaned, sun-dried on simple prisoner-constructed

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46 PW Cir 1, 24 Sep 43. Copy in Ibid., vol. I of Tabs.
racks, treated with sulphur, and packaged. The finished product was
turned over to the quartermaster warehouse for local military use.47

The farm program proved effective in all camps. During the spring
and summer of 1944, PW's at Camp Ellis, Ill., harvested garden
produce valued at $13,000. PW's at Camp Atterbury, Ind., grew
vegetables valued at $8,384.79 and other crops estimated at $5,000.
The prisoner of war farm at Camp Campbell, Ky., yielded $9,441.41
in produce. PW's at other camps raised similar valuable crops.48

The Interservice Use of Prisoners of War

Army Air Forces

In 1943 both the Army Air Forces and the Navy objected to the use
of prisoners of war, but by 1944 the manpower shortage forced them
to change their stand. The AAF overcame its fear of sabotage and
requested the use of any prisoners of war. PW camps were estab-
lished on Air Forces installations on request, but operational control
of the camps was retained by the service command in which the
Air Force installations were located.49

Navy

Because of increasing demands for manpower by the military
services, together with the physical requirements of heavy work which
negated the use of women, the Navy Department removed its restric-
tions on PW employment at naval installations, and on 15 May 1944
the War Department approved the Navy's request for use of PW labor.

At the request of the naval installation, the service command in
which the work was located furnished the PW's when they were avail-
able. Administrative control, including the right of work inspection,
was retained by the service command, but the Navy controlled the
PW's during periods of actual employment. Although the naval
installation furnished the housing and fed the PW's, the War Depart-
ment paid the enemy personnel. If a PW camp was located on a
naval installation, the service command provided the necessary over-
head personnel, and the Navy provided the guards for work details.
The Army officer in charge of the camp conformed to local naval
regulations applicable to the PW camp; but internal administration,
including court-martial jurisdiction and other disciplinary action,
remained with the PW camp commander. Liaison was maintained
between the service command headquarters and the naval establish-
ment.

47 Interview, Lt Col B. I. Lawrence by Lt Col Geo. Lewis. Author's file.
on Military Affairs," 31 Nov 44, pp. 11, 12, 15, 19.
49 Ltr, CG, ASF, to CG, 4th Svc Cmd, 9 Apr 45, sub: Prisoners of War Housed at Air
Force Stations. PMGO 253.5, Gen. P/W #13 (Apr 45). DRB, TAG.
The work performed by prisoners of war on naval installations was similar to that performed on Army installations, and was governed by existing War Department and service command regulations. Memorandum agreements, signed by appropriate contracting officers, formed the basis of the work details furnished to the naval activity and stated the conditions of employment, such as, nature of the work, number of prisoners needed, the approximate period of employment, and the working hours of the prisoners.

**The Technical Services**

Prisoners of war were first used in technical service depot operations in late 1942 at the Ogden Army Service Forces Depot, Ogden, Utah. When Italy surrendered, many volunteer Italian PW's were formed into Italian service units at the depot, and several units were retained to do both skilled and unskilled work. Later, German PW's replaced the Italian service units. The use of prisoners of war at base depots at this time was the exception rather than the general rule as many of the services were reluctant to use them for fear of sabotage. Gradually this reluctancy disappeared and PW's were used efficiently at all technical service installations. The use of PW labor by the technical services can best be illustrated by their use in fourth and fifth echelon shops. In February 1944, only 7,132 PW's were employed, but by July 1945, this had increased over 300 percent to 21,418 employed.

In March 1944, Army Service Forces suggested a minimum use of units of 1,000 PW's each at technical service depots. Since this estimate was too large and was impractical for full employment, the groups were scaled to 200 or 300 each. The service command in which the activity was located furnished the PW's and the technical service supervised and established the PW work operations. To guide the service commands in the use of PW's on technical service activities on military installations, the chiefs of the technical services furnished proposed guides listing certain jobs. [See chart 10 for the jobs actually performed.]

**The Effectiveness of Prisoner of War Labor at Military Installations**

The relative work efficiency of civilian workers and prisoners of war varied because of widely different conditions under which each type of labor lived and was employed. In comparing the PW with
GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

the average unskilled civilian laborer, camp commanders stated that the average PW was at least equal to or of greater value than the civilian. In depot operations and other work, the value of PW labor was attested to in the following statements:

Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger, Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, stated that the performance of Italian service units "... has assisted in relieving a critical manpower shortage and has assisted in the continuance of an unbroken life of efficient operations at this port." The commanding officer of the Boston Quartermaster Depot said the performance of prisoner labor was "more than satisfactory." The commanding officer of the Seattle Army Service Forces Depot stated: "The Quartermaster section would not be able to perform its overseas supply mission if it were not for the additional labor obtained from the assignment of Italian Service Units here. On a number of occasions they have willingly and cheerfully stayed extra hours to get urgent work done." This attitude was again reflected in a statement made by the commanding officer of the Sioux Ordnance Depot: "These men have done excellent work at the depot in the past and have worked much overtime on a voluntary basis when the load was heavy. Without them, it would have been impossible for the depot to have performed its mission due to the shortage of civilian personnel in this community." Although these statements mention Italian service units, other prisoners of war worked at the same installations and were equally as efficient.

Other Federal Agencies

Early War Department policies provided for the use of prisoners of war by Federal agencies, but as the employment program developed such use was limited in scope. Funds were not appropriated to Federal agencies to pay for this labor.

By December 1943, free labor was scarce in many sections of the United States, particularly in the West. To relieve the situation, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes proposed using PW labor on projects of national importance located on lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. The Grazing Service could use the PW's to construct access roads to strategic mineral deposits on public lands, and the Bureau of Reclamation wanted to use them to construct irrigation and reclamation facilities.

Chart 10. Services Performed by Prisoners of War at Technical Service Depots*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Quartermaster</th>
<th>Ordnance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loading and unloading of material and equipment.</td>
<td>Operation of: fork lift trucks, tractors, cranes, trucks; graders and rollers; baling machines; tire pressing stands; mowing machines; power saws; graders and buffers; helmet D-ring devices; bar tack machines.</td>
<td>Railroad and grounds maintenance. Storage division: freight handlers, car unloaders and checkers on incoming material; handlers of warehouse receipts and issues; packing and processing of export shipments; material handlers in processing and packing sections; box manufacturers; lumber and dammage reclaim; scrap metal salvage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry in connection with the fabrication of boxes, crates, and pallets.</td>
<td>Performance of skilled and unskilled operations: electrician; painter; carpenter; welder; blacksmith; auto mechanic; railroad brakeman; draftsman; mason; plumber and general helpers; animal care and maintenance; cooks, waiters, etc.</td>
<td>Transportation division: freight handlers and car loaders; truck drivers; multihitch, tractor, crane, and Goring Operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive maintenance on equipment in storage.</td>
<td>Reclamation, repair and salvage of: tarpage and webbing; clothing and shoes; canoee and mess gear; field ranges; wire, paper, glass and metals; &quot;E&quot; rations; materials handling equipment; fire units; small tools.</td>
<td>5th Ethlon shop: LVT disassembly; general machine work; letter operators; tank engine mechanics; small arms and artillery repairmen; watermakers; brass renovators and operators of popping plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet metal work on crane cabs, auto bodies and fenders, and fabrication of tool boxes.</td>
<td>Shipping and receiving: box, crate and pallet fabrication; dunnage cars; packing and crating supplies; processing supplies for overseas shipment; loading and unloading cars; stocking and grading lumber; stock piling.</td>
<td>Repair and Utilities division: electricians; plumbers; carpenters; engineer draftsman; automotive repairmen; welders; typewriter repairmen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam cleaning of equipment.</td>
<td>Clerical work: stencilling and marking; typing; checking and cycle inventorying; carrying messages.</td>
<td>Stock Control division: card pullers on tub files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welding.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery proof testing; placing guns in firing positions; stacking ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spray painting.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loading and unloading and renovation of ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad yard clerks.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repairing and patching roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving and shipping of troop stock.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Railroad laborers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing and packing for overseas shipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operation of post salvage yard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving and handling of equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operation of crate and box factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber salvage.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mosquito control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical repairs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking and bracing freight in cars.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stencil cutting and stencilling of boxes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock picking of items from broken lots.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of fork lift trucks and tow cars.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorting, repair, and processing of shovels, axes, mallets, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous drafting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layout, design of proper car loading and blocking according to specifications.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welding, blacksmithing, body work, upholstery, painting, electrical, mechanic, grossers, typewriter repair, surveying, plumbing, transmission, carpentry, filing, truck repairs, mimeographing, and firefighting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of Class C items of kitchen equipment and fire equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Warfare</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad and grounds maintenance</td>
<td>Bagging mattresses and textiles.</td>
<td>Processing and preventive maintenance: cleaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation and maintenance of vehicles</td>
<td>Overcrating and overboxing of cartons.</td>
<td>parts and assemblies; application of preservatives;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and materials handling equipment</td>
<td>Car loading and unloading.</td>
<td>wrapping parts and assemblies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry operation.</td>
<td>Packing and crating.</td>
<td>Shipping: packing, marking, strapping, weighing;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading and unloading inert materials.</td>
<td>Operation of fork lift trucks.</td>
<td>blocking and checking carload shipments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarehousing and repackaging.</td>
<td>Repair of technical medical equipment.</td>
<td>Rewarehousing: Labor in handling material, stocking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning salvage lumber.</td>
<td>Waterproofing packages.</td>
<td>and binning. Classification and reclamaiton of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing fire and personnel hazards.</td>
<td>Operation of conveyor lines in unit assembly.</td>
<td>returned material. Tractor and fork lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing pallets, gates boxes and</td>
<td>Sealing bag liners.</td>
<td>operators. Unit assembly: segregate parts making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waterproof liners.</td>
<td>Painting.</td>
<td>up units and assemblies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber salvage.</td>
<td>Repacking.</td>
<td>Carpenters and carpenters' helper in central box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shop. Assembling and setting up bins. Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and mechanics' helpers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Loading and unloading cars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Washing motor vehicles.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Janitorial services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operation of fire department.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Railroad maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operation of heating plant, electrical shop, gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>station. Maintenance work including tire changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and greasing. Reclamation of tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Setting salvaged material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of pallets, containers, boxes, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Servicing and repairing cranes and hoists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*German prisoners of war performed no work connected with combat operations.

Source.—Compiled from PMGO files RG 309, 233.5, Gen. PW, Jan & Jul 45. DRB, T.A.G.
Mr. Ickes questioned the propriety of paying the PW's at the then established prevailing free labor rate and stated that there was "... little or no difference between the work of the Corps of the Engineers engaged in construction of levees ... for flood control and the work of the Bureau of Reclamation engaged in the construction of canals ... for irrigation purposes. Both agencies in peacetime would employ free labor at prevailing rates of pay." Mr. Ickes proposed that all PW's employed on projects of national importance, whether for the War Department or for other Federal agencies, and for which the War Manpower Commission would issue a certificate of nonavailability of free labor, be paid the same wage rate.

The Secretary of War agreed to this, but stated that the War Department would have to be reimbursed if it furnished the prisoners' daily compensation, subsistence, and transportation. In addition, the War Department was to pass upon each proposed project on the basis of the special facts applicable to the case. The Secretary of War also stipulated that all PW's assigned to government-sponsored projects under this policy would be subject to withdrawal any time the War Department needed them, or if any project certified by the War Manpower Commission had greater importance.

The War Manpower Commission, upon being consulted, concurred with this policy, but further suggested that permission to purchase critical materials for the projects first be obtained from the War Production Board. Thus, a government agency sponsoring a construction project had to obtain the approval of the Facilities Committee of the War Production Board before the War Manpower Commission would approve the use of prisoners of war.

The Department of the Interior, upon being informed of the new policy, abandoned any further plans to use prisoners of war and used conscientious objectors instead. The Department had no available funds to cover the costs of the PW labor (and Congress refused any further appropriations), and conscientious objectors were maintained from funds supplied by the Selective Service Act. The Interior Department employed just four prisoners of war in a fish hatchery in the southwestern part of the United States.

Other governmental agencies used only a small number of prisoners of war, although the Timber Production War Project of the Department of Agriculture trained approximately 30,000 PW's in woodcut-
ting and other forestry work. These were later employed by private employers.\footnote{Contrary to the statement in Federal Records of WWII, I, p. 889, the Timber Production War Project did not employ these PW's. See: Howard Hopkins, “Accomplishments of the Timber Production War Project,” reprinted from Journal of Forestry, XLIV (1946), p. 331. Mr. Hopkins, now with the Forestry Branch, Dept of Agriculture, confirmed this by telephone on 8 Jan 53. For a transcript of this telephone conversation, see author's file.}

In securing PW's for labor the agencies followed a procedure similar to that used by private employers. They applied to the local office of the United States Employment Service who certified or disapproved the request by the authority of the War Manpower Commission. The Employment Service forwarded the request, if approved, to the nearest service command headquarters. Whenever the work project was within daily trucking distance of a PW camp, the service command headquarters forwarded the certificate to the camp where the camp commander, upon application of the employer, negotiated the contract. When the project was beyond the normal trucking distance, the contract was negotiated by the service command headquarters. Provisions for the required housing was included in this contract, and it was then forwarded to a PW camp for execution.\footnote{Ltr, Hq, 1st Svc Cmd, to CO's, Posts, Camps, & Stations, 1st Svc Cmd, 6 Apr 44, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War. PW File, 1st Svc Cmd, Policy. DPRB, TAG.}

The War Department invoiced Federal agencies who contracted for PW labor at the rate of 10 cents a day per man for housing, and 5 cents a day per man for utilities. The labor charge of 80 cents a day per man was additional. These charges were made for each man-day of work performed by the PW's for the using agencies.\footnote{PW Bull 14, Hq, 3d Svc Cmd, 27 Jul 44. Prisoner of War Bulletins, 3d Svc Cmd. DPRB, TAG.}

War and Navy Department agencies that used PW labor on operations not entirely supported by appropriated funds and whose profits did not accrue to the Treasury of the United States were also required to have labor contracts. In late 1943, PW's were used in officers' messes and clubs and enlisted men's service clubs only after a contract had been made between the mess officers or other reponsible officials and the PW camp commander. The activities located on military installations did not need a War Manpower Commission certification, and they paid the free labor wage rate of the community. If the activity was located off the military reservation, a War Manpower Commission certification that civilian labor was not available was needed before PW's could be employed.\footnote{“Kitchen Police and Waiters.” Policy Book III, POWO DIV, PMGO, Legal Br. DRB, TAG.}

At first, because of the lack of an established policy, the Army Exchange Service did not need a PW labor contract, and it paid the PW's 80 cents a day directly from its profits. In February 1944, however, the War Department required the Exchange Service to have a con-
tract. Under the new procedure, the post exchange reimbursed the U. S. Treasury at the prevailing free labor wage rate, and the War Department paid the prisoners the standard PW labor rate.\(^6\)

In August 1944, the War Department further broadened its PW labor contract policy for military installations. PW canteens, post exchanges, and other branches of the Army Exchange Service, officers’ clubs and messes, enlisted men’s service clubs, and similar organizations on Navy installations did not require a War Manpower Commission certification. Further, they had to pay the U. S. Treasury only 80 cents a day per PW for labor.\(^6\)

On one occasion, contract labor was performed for a Federal agency by prisoners of war on a military installation. In February 1944, the Foreign Economic Administration proposed that PW’s on certain Army installations be used to reclaim salvaged U. S. Army clothing for distribution among the liberated areas of Sicily, North Africa, and Italy. The agency agreed to pay the prevailing PW wage rate and the costs of subsistence, and, on the insistence of the War Department, to furnish the necessary supervisory personnel as well as the transportation needed for handling the materials. It was not necessary to observe the usual labor clearance procedures in this case since the project operated within the confines of an established PW camp and did not conflict in any way with the employment opportunities of free labor.\(^5\)

Although the use of prisoners of war by Federal agencies was limited in scope, it proved of value to the overall PW utilization program.

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\(^6\) Ltr, Col C. S. Urwiller, Asst Dir, PW Div, ASF, to CO, PW Camp, Camp Butner, N. C., 14 Feb 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor Contracts. PMGO Reading File, “B” Series, I (Jan-Feb 44), DRB, TAG.


\(^4\) Ltr, Paul V. McNutt, Chm, WMC, to SW, 4 Feb 44. PMGO Reading File (Jan-Feb 44), “B” Series, I, DRB, TAG.
By 1945, 95.6 out of each 100 prisoners of war who could be employed under the terms of the Geneva Convention were working for private employers or on various military establishments. On 8 May 1945, organized resistance in Europe ended, and plans were made to return the prisoners of war in the United States to their native countries as soon as possible. Existing policies and directives were clarified and brought to date, and on 31 May 1945 the War Department published its final policy governing PW employment. The new policy considered the cessation of hostilities in Europe; the preparations for the repatriation of the PW's to their homelands; and the prospective increases in the U. S. civilian labor supply from industrial and military demobilization. Therefore it directed:

a. Prisoners will be employed in so far as possible, for all work necessary for the administration, management, and maintenance of prisoner of war camps.

b. Prisoners will be employed on essential and unskilled work of the type permitted by the Geneva Convention, . . . other than that defined in (a) above, only when qualified civilian labor is not obtainable.

To be consistent with the policies governing PW allocation, it also directed that the PW's be used on military and contract work until repatriation.

The cessation of hostilities in Europe, together with Japan's denunciation of the September 1940 Tripartite Alliance, made the prohibitions of the Geneva Convention against the use of German and Italian Fascist PW's on work directly related to military operations no longer applicable. Since only a few Japanese PW's were interned in the United States to whom Article 31 of the Convention could still

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2 WD TM 19-500 "Employment and Compensation," ch. 5. This consolidated and superseded all previous prisoner of war employment instructions.
3 Japan was no longer an ally of the defeated governments. See: ASF Cir 250, 6 Jul 45, sec. I. Copy in "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. II of Tabs; see also: Memo, Col Archibald King, Ch, International Law Div, JAGD, for JAG, 24 May 45, sub: Effect of Unconditional Surrender on Employment of German Prisoners of War. G-1 383.6 Labor (1 Apr 43). DRB, TAG.
be applied, the War Department terminated the services of the Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board. German and Italian PW's were then used on work connected with war operations, but only if it were a temporary expedient. ⁴

**Repatriation as It Affected Prisoner of War Employment**

By the end of May 1945, all shipments of German and Italian prisoners of war to the United States had ceased, and the War Department announced its policy of returning all PW's in America to Europe at the earliest possible date consistent with labor needs. ⁵ The Italian service units were to be repatriated first as a reward for their voluntary service. The following factors were considered essential in controlling PW repatriation: (1) the availability of civilians to assume the work performed by the prisoners; (2) the total reduction in labor demands due to the capitulation of Japan; and (3) the availability of shipping to transport the prisoners back to Europe.

Early in 1945, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion requested the Secretary of War to make 140,000 PW's available for use in agriculture and industry. It was initially planned to transfer 150,000 prisoners from Europe to fulfill this request, but on V-E Day all PW shipments were terminated. Despite the fact that only 25,000 of the 150,000 prisoners had been shipped, the War Department fulfilled its commitments and made the full number available. To do this, Army Service Forces closed many military installations, whose needs had been curtailed, and distributed the PW labor where it was most needed. ⁶

By an agreement between the War Manpower Commission and the War Foods Administration, 85,000 PW's were allocated to agriculture and 55,000 to nonagriculture projects. ⁷ Distribution of the PW's was made to the nine service commands by The Provost Marshal General on the basis of recommendations from the War Manpower Commission and the Agricultural Extension Service. The service command then distributed the PW's among the states comprising the service command.

With the coming of V-E Day, it became apparent that there would be immediate war production cutbacks, and the War Department emphasized that no civilian would be denied work opportunities

⁵ ASF Cir 191, 29 May 45, sec. III. Copy in *ibid.*, vol. II of Tabs.
⁷ In the light of seasonal requirements, the number of PW's allocated to agriculture was staggered from 82,000 on 1 Aug to 100,000 during Oct and Nov and approximately 78,000 in Dec 45. See: Ltr, Maj Gen Archer L. Leech, TPMG, to Hon. John H. Kerr, HR, 13 Aug 45, PMGO 283.5 Gen. P/W #29 (1 Aug-21 Aug 45), DRB, TAG; Hr, Brig Gen B. M. Bryan, APMG, to Paul V. McNutt, Chm, WMC, 5 Jul 45, w/tabulation of labor requirements. PMGO Gen P/W, Contracts (1 Jul–31 Aug 45), DRB, TAG.
through the use of PW labor. To forestall any criticism that PW's were being retained on jobs at the expense of returning servicemen, The Provost Marshal General urged the War Department to take the initiative in demanding that industry and agriculture employ to the maximum those veterans who had already returned. The Acting Secretary of War also suggested to the chairman of the War Manpower Commission and to the Secretary of Agriculture that employers be urged to replace PW's with free labor, particularly since the War Department planned to return all German and Italian prisoners of war to Europe at the earliest practicable moment.

Positive steps were also taken to reduce PW employment. The War Department, in cooperation with the War Manpower Commission and the Department of Agriculture, conducted monthly surveys of the labor situation throughout the United States to determine the requirements for PW labor. From these surveys it was predicted in August 1945 that sufficient free labor would be available in early 1946 to replace PW labor. The War Department also requested the certifying agencies to review all PW labor certifications to determine those which could be terminated. It further directed the service commands to execute PW labor contracts only on a 30-day basis.8

In late 1945, the Secretary of Agriculture and some members of Congress insisted that the War Department retain prisoners of war for use in harvesting crops.9 The pressure became so great that in January 1946 the President of the United States announced, after consultation with the War Department, a deferment of 60 days in the return of contract PW's to alleviate the temporary labor shortage in the sugar beet, cotton, and pulp wood industries. Following the President's statement, the Secretary of War informed the Secretary of Agriculture that 20,300 PW's would be available for agricultural labor in April; 10,150 in May; and 10,420 from 1 to 20 June 1946.10

Some members of Congress still desired to retain the PW's beyond the 60-day extension period, but President Truman refused to interfere with the schedule of having all German PW's out of the United States by the end of June 1946. He stated that free labor was available and that many veterans were seeking employment; therefore, a further extension was not justified.11 This statement by President Truman led to the conclusion of the prisoner of war employment program in the United States.

9 See entire file PMGO 253.5 Gen P/W #6, Agriculture (From 1 Sep 45). DRB, TAG.
10 Ltr, SW to Sec of Agriculture, 25 Feb 46. G-1 333.6 Labor (14 May 45), "In Agriculture and Food Processing." DRB, TAG.
11 Ltrs, President Harry S. Truman to Senators Willis, Kilgore, Wheeler, and Millikin, 11 Apr 46. Copies in ibid.
Map 1. Outline map showing theaters of operations.
On 8 November 1942, the Allied offensive in the West began with simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers in North Africa. Within three days French opposition had ceased and the French prisoners of war were disarmed and released; but on 9 November, Axis troops entered the Tunisian conflict. After the fighting progressed, supply bases were established at Oran (Mediterranean Base Section) on 10 November 1942 to support the Center Task Force; at Casablanca (Atlantic Base Section) on 30 December 1942 to support the Western Task Force; and on 13 February 1943 at Constantine (Eastern Base Section) to support the Tunisian campaign. Each operated separately at first and reported directly to Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA); but on 15 February 1943, Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA was activated and given “command of all U.S. army supply activities in the Theater,” including the base sections.

On 16 December 1942 a theater headquarters (Allied Forces Headquarters, North Africa [AFHQ]) was established in North Africa and included in its organization was an American Provost Marshal Section. This section took over the general supervision of prisoner of war inclosures from the headquarters commandant, AFHQ, who had previously handled all PW matters. It also supervised all American provost marshal functions in the theater and advised the Allied Commander in Chief on all such matters. On 4 February 1943, NATOUSA was established as a separate theater, and a few months later, the AFHQ Provost Marshal Section functions were transferred.

1 "Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA" p. 11. WAR-10, 2-THEA-NATOUSA-LOG. OCMH, Gen Ref Off; see also: Interview, Brig Gen P. M. Robinett (Ret.), 2 Mar 54. Author's file; Dr. George F. Howe, "Operations in Northwest Africa, 1942-1943" forthcoming in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. XIII, pp. 7-8. MS in OCMH, Gen Ref Off.

2 Despite this apparent authority, SOS still had to go to Hq, NATOUSA, for all policy decisions. See: MS, "History of Communications Zone, NATOUSA—November 1942—November 1944" (hereafter cited as "History of Com Z, NATOUSA"), vol. I, pp. 1, 11. 8-4 BA VI C1. OCMH, Gen Ref Off; see also: MS, "History of Allied Forces Headquarters and Headquarters, NATOUSA, December 1942—December 1943" (hereafter cited as "History of ADSEC"), sec. I (Pt. 2), pp. 165-69, 174. 8-4 ADZ. OCMH, Gen Ref Off; MS, "Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA," op. cit., p. 23.
Early Use of PW Labor in North Africa

The invasion plans for North Africa had not provided for the use of prisoner of war labor. In September 1942, General Eisenhower recommended “that all Axis prisoners of war who are Europeans captured in the special operations now in prospect be sent direct to the United States in American ships and be held by the United States acting as the detaining power.” This policy was carried out by the three task forces involved in the North Africa landings. During the initial stages a shortage of service troops greatly hindered the combat operations. Some units, who urgently needed equipment that had not been landed, had to divert combat troops to aid in the unloading opera-

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4CM-OUT 2106, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42, sub: Prisoners of War; AFHQ Cir 5, 15 Oct 42, sub: Prisoners of War. Both on AFHQ, AG File R-82D (8). DRB, TAG.
5 G-1 Annex to Admin. Order 1, Center Task Force, p. 5. 0100/21 AFHQ AG Sec. 381 (TORCH), National Defense, col. IV, 12 Oct 42 (24 S1D) Serial 337. Records of Allied Forces Headquarters. DRB, TAG; see also: 1st Div After-action report, Nov 42 w/incl. Center Task Force and Eastern Task Force Preparations in UK Movement to Theater (8). DRB, TAG.
tions. Arab and French civilians also had to be pressed into service, but the language barrier reduced the effectiveness of this labor. As the advance into Tunisia spread the lines of communications, more labor was needed; consequently, prisoners of war had to be used to ease the situation.6

In January 1943, NATOUSA authorized the employment of PW’s on ordinary inclosure duties while awaiting evacuation but did not pay them for this labor. Many Italian PW’s, who volunteered for work, were drawn from the stockades on a day-to-day basis and were used as common labor. The types of work on which they could be used and the payment provisions were governed by War Department directives.7

During the final phases of the North African campaign and with the ultimate surrender of Italian and German forces at Tunisia in May 1943, 252,415 Axis prisoners of war were taken. Consequently, Allied prisoner of war installations became overtaxed. To alleviate the situation, PW processing was increased to segregate those who could be retained for labor.8 German PW’s were evacuated to the United States, but the Italian PW’s were segregated into secure (good security risk) and insecure (poor security risk) classes—the secure classes to be retained in North Africa for labor. Thus, NATOUSA used only Italian prisoners of war for labor in North Africa and Sicily. In addition 15,000 Italian and 5,000 German PW’s were transferred to the cooperating French authorities for labor purposes.9

As in the United States, fears of sabotage and escape initially hindered the prisoner of war employment program. Many of the technical services objected to their use; but as the need for labor increased, the PW’s were used for warehouse work, transportation work, road construction, and as general laborers. The Engineer Corps formed 16 PW engineer labor companies with 153 men to a company.


7 After war was declared, a copy of tentative manual "Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War," dtd 22 Apr 42, was sent to all theater commanders as a guide for the treatment, internment, and employment of prisoners of war. Copy filed in "Prisoner of War Operations," op. cit., vol. 1 of tabs; see also: "Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA," op. cit., p. 283; WD Cir 10, 5 Jan 43; ltr, Ch Admin Officer, AFIHQ, to Hq. LoSC, Tunisian Dist, 1 Jun 43, sub: Employment of Prisoner of War Labour. AFIHQ A. A. I. "A" Film R 196-F. DRB, TAG; Hq, NATOUSA, "Administrative Instructions for U. S. Enclosures in NATOUSA," sec. X, 28 Mar. 43. Peninsular Base Sec, AG 383.6 Policy, 1 Jan 43–31 Dec 44. DRRB, TAG.

8 The Mediterranean Base Section in Oran alone processed 9,316 Italian and 39,171 German PW’s between May and Jun 43. See: MS, "History of the Mediterranean Base Section, September 1942–May 1944," p. 34. 8–4 BSM (vol. I) ACC. 210–11. OCMH, Gen Ref Off.

9 Memo, Brig Gen B. M. Sawbridge for CofS, AFIHQ, 25 May 43, sub: Transfer of Prisoners of War to French. AFIHQ AG Film R 124-D; ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Smith, CofS, AFIHQ, to Gen H. Giraud, 29 May 43, sub: Prisoners of War. Supreme Allied Commander’s Secretariat Film R-73 Special (S). DRB, TAG.
The Invasion of Sicily

After a brief period of regrouping and reequipping, Allied forces invaded the key island of Sicily on 10 July 1943. The need for labor was soon felt, and on 13 July AFHQ instructed the U.S. Seventh Army and the British Eighth Army to retain the maximum number of PW’s who would be administratively useful and yet would be harmless to operations. German PW’s, Italian Fascists, and all officers (other than medical officers and chaplains) were to be evacuated. A few weeks later, in order to benefit Sicilian agriculture and construction, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized the release of local farmers and laborers of Sicilian origin on parole to their officers. Each PW was furnished a certificate which showed that he had been examined and dismissed on good behavior; but he was warned that he was subject to reimprisonment if found to be vagrant, unemployed, or undesirable. Thus 61,638 Italian officers and enlisted men were paroled by United States forces. All paroled officers had to be protected personnel—doctors, medical technicians, etc.

The Italian Surrender

On 8 September 1943, the Italian Government surrendered to Allied forces and expressed the desire to cooperate with them in every way possible in driving the Germans out of Italy. Accordingly, AFHQ authorized the commanding general of the Allied forces in Italy to release, parole, or detain at his discretion, depending solely upon which status most aided the war effort, Italian prisoners of war taken in Italy before the armistice and who had not been evacuated from the country. However, the number to be released was to be kept to a minimum, with each case being fully justified by essential war requirements.

With the surrender of Italy and its new government being accorded the status of a cobelligerent, five different categories of Italian military personnel existed: (1) naval and military personnel who as units or stragglers fled from German-controlled areas at the armistice and who presented themselves to the Allies (these were not interned but

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18 This was also done for the propaganda value and psychological effect it would have on Italian troops in the Italian mainland and in the Balkans. See CM-IN 0801, G-2, AFHQ, to 7th Army, 8th Army, AFHQ, 28 Jul 43; CM-IN Allied Force Hq 3332, TAG to Eisenhower, 25 Jul 43. Both in AFHQ AG Film R 125-D. DRB, TAG.

19 CM-IN 0801, G-2, AFHQ, to 7th Army, 8th Army, AFHQ, 28 Jul 43. AFHQ AG Film R 125-D; CM-OUT 81216, CG, NATOUSA, for info CG, AAI, etc., 10 Aug 44. AFHQ G-5 Film 276-B; DF, Hq, NATOUSA, PMG, SOS, to G-1, 20 May 44, sub: Prisoners of War Liberated in Sicily (S). AFHQ AG Film R 74-C. DRB, TAG; DF, Maj Gen Thos. T. Handy to G-1, 23 Jun 44, sub: Proposed Release of Italian Prisoners of War in Sicily. ASF 383.6 Italians (27 Jun 44). DRB, TAG.
were released on parole); 13 (2) the interned prisoners of war on Sicily who were paroled and later released altogether; (3) pro-Fascist prisoners of war who were formed into PW labor companies; (4) cooperative prisoners of war (volunteers to the Allied cause) from which Italian service units were formed; and (5) Italian soldiers on active duty with Italian Army units.14

In Sicily certain problems arose relative to the paroled prisoners of war. Local police refrained from arresting suspected criminals or released them if they had parole forms. On the other hand, some Italian officers ordered parolees of specific military classes to report for duty with the Italian Army and in some instances ordered the arrest of those who failed to do so. The Italian officers ignored the paroled status of the PW’s giving the reason that the parole form “is not in effect because Sicily was returned to the Kingdom of Italy.” Because of the problems attendant upon the status of Italy as a cobelligerant, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean recommended that these prisoners be released outright when Sicily was returned to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.15 As a matter of military expediency coincident with the closing of the Island Base Section on Sicily in July 1944, the Headquarters, Allied Command, relieved the PW’s from their parole and released them outright on the authority of the following instructions:

When informing the Italian Government of the intended release of these paroled Italian prisoners of war you should not (repeat not) go into the question of Italy’s right as cobelligerent or its jurisdiction in the territory concerned. You should merely state that this action is being taken as an earnest indication of the desire of the United States and the British Commonwealth Governments to do everything compatible with their responsibilities for the successful conclusion of the war against the common enemy to alleviate the situation of Italian military personnel.16

The Italian Service Unit Program in North Africa

In September 1943, United States forces in North Africa and Sicily held approximately 82,000 Italian PW’s; the British, 40,000; and the French about 50,000. Allied commanders found it impracticable to release or parole these and then use them as civilians for labor purposes. If this had been done, the released prisoners would have had

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13 AFHQ Coordinating Routing Slip, Mil Govt Sec to PMG and G-1, 27 Apr 44, sub: Status of Paroled Prisoners of War (C). AFHQ AG Film R 74-C. DRB, TAG.
14 Ltr, Col A. N. Stubblebine, Hq, IBS & 10th Port, to CG, SOS, NATOUSA, 7 Apr 44, sub: Status of Paroled Prisoners of War. Ibid.; ltr, Col Chas. W. Spofford, Mil Govt Sec, AFHQ, to Hq, Allied Control Com, 27 Apr 44, sub: Paroled Prisoners of War. AFHQ G-5 Policy and Control Film R 376-B (C). DRB, TAG.
16 COM-IN 54700, TAG to Wilson, 22 Jun 44 (S). Cited in Ibid.; see also: Ltr, Lt Col J. A. Campbell to Italian High Commissioner, 12 Oct 44, sub: Release of Italian Prisoners of War in Sicily. ACC 10000/120/89, Italian Mil. Personnel Prisoners of War (Sep–Dec 44). DRB, TAG.
to maintain themselves from civilian stocks. Also, Allied commanders were afraid that the French populace in North Africa might think Italy would go unpunished for its role as an Axis partner. On the other hand, Allied forces wanted to employ these prisoners of war at ports and depots on work that was ordinarily prohibited by the 1929 Geneva Convention. When Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the capitulated government, issued a proclamation subsequent to the armistice inviting all Italians "to resist and obstruct the operations of the German forces in every way possible as long as they remain on Italian soil," Allied commanders considered they had full authority to use any Italian PW's who had voluntarily acceded to the new Italian government. Thus, AFHQ considered Article 31 of the Geneva Convention which prohibited PW employment on work directly connected with war operations as not applicable, but it did consider Article 32 which prohibited dangerous work as applicable to Italian personnel in a PW status.\(^1\)

### The Badoglio Proclamations

Under the Italian penal code, Italian officers and NCO's could not command prisoners of war, and the Geneva PW Convention prohibited PW employment on work directly connected with war operations. To bypass these possible restrictions on full employment, the Allied Forces Headquarters suggested that Marshal Badoglio urge all prisoners of war to cooperate. In answer to this suggestion Badoglio issued the following proclamation on 11 October 1943, which was posted in all prisoner of war camps:

To the Officers, Warrant Officers, and enlisted personnel comprising Italian war prisoners of the Anglo-Americans.

In the new political-military situation, arisen because of the attitude and hostile German action towards Italy, it is our intention to proffer the Allies all possible, active collaboration in order to achieve the common objective of ridding our country of the residue of German troops still occupying a large section of our nation.

It is therefore our duty to help the Allies in every possible way, excepting in actual combat. We are to be linked together closely in bellicose activities constituting special services and in work under the command of officers to be designated.

In that manner you will collaborate efficaciously from now on in the fight for our redemption from the century-old enemy as the very populace in ITALY is now doing alongside the Anglo-American forces for the liberation of the Homeland.

Signed: The Marshal of Italy: BADOGLIO.\(^2\)

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1 Memo, Brig Gen B. M. Sawbridge, G-1, NATOUSA, to WD ACoS, G-1, 8 Apr 44, sub: U.S.-British-Italian Agreement regarding Italian PW Service Units. ASF 383.6 Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44); Routing Slip, JAG, NATOUSA, to G-1, NATOUSA, 17 Sep 43, sub: Present Status of Italian Prisoners of War. Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat Film B 78 Special, DRB, TAG.

2 CM-OUT NATOUSA W-2902, Eisenhower to TAG, 19 Oct 43 (S). ACC 10000/101/447,383.6 Prisoners of War (TS); see also: Memo, Brig Gen B. M. Sawbridge, G-1, NATOUSA to WD, G-1, 8 Apr 44, sub: U.S.-British-Italian Agreement regarding Italian Prisoner of War Service Units. ASF 383.6, Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44). DRB, TAG.
In January 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (representing both the American and British Governments) directed General Eisenhower to obtain a written military agreement with the Italian Government which would confirm the earlier oral pronouncement of Marshal Badoglio. In essence, the proposed agreement stated that all captured Italians would retain their PW status but would be permitted to volunteer for service in units to be employed by the United States, Great Britain, or other United Nations commands. It also proposed that the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to employment on dangerous work and to the location of the PW's be suspended. It further suggested that the functions of the Protecting Power be replaced with direct relations between the Allied governments and Italy.\(^{19}\)

Marshal Badoglio, however, refused repeatedly to sign such an agreement stating:

> The consent in general terms given by me to General Eisenhower and my first brief message to the prisoners of war on October 11, 1943, did not authorize at all the formation of units without the agreement of the Italian Command in the determination of procedures of formation, command, dependency, and namely, without due regard for the natural rights of the Italian Nation and for those granted to the Nation's signatories of the Geneva Convention.\(^{20}\)

He, in turn, proposed that Italian PW's be released from their status without recourse to a volunteer system which, he stated, was contrary to basic Italian military law. He further proposed the formation of battalion-size Italian units, under command of Italian officers and noncommissioned officers and subject to the rules of Italian discipline, and the liberation of all Italian prisoners of war in Italy.

When further attempts to conclude the proposed agreement ended in failure, representatives of the United States and British Governments prepared a letter, in lieu of a formal agreement, for exchange between the commander in chief, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), and Marshal Badoglio. This letter limited the previous provisions to waiver by the Italian Government of Articles 9, 31, and 32 of the Geneva Convention insofar as they restricted the location and nature of employment of prisoners of war. It also contained an agreement that the Italian Government instead of a neutral power would exercise the protective functions.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{19}\) CM-IN 6384, TAG to Eisenhower, 5 Jan 44 (S). AFHQ G-5 Film R-276-B (TS). DRB, TAG.

\(^{20}\) Ltr, Marshal Badoglio to Lt Gen Noel Mason MacFarlane, Ch, Allied Control Commission, 10 May 44. ASF 383.6 Italian (27 Jun 44). DRB, TAG.

\(^{21}\) DFP, Maj Gen Theo. T. Handy to G-1, 13 Mar 44, subj: Treatment of Italian Prisoners of War under the Italian Government's Co-Belligerent Status. ASF 383.6 Italian (27 Jun 44); CM-IN AFHQ 2067, CCS to Wilson, 13 Mar 44 (S). AFHQ G-5 Film R-276-B. DRB, TAG.
Badoglio refused to exchange letters and reiterated his earlier proposal that Italian PW's be released to Italian control. As a counter-offer he proposed that the units, when released, be subject to the military law of the government to whose troops the Italian units were attached.

With the negotiations apparently stalled, the Allied representative to the Italian Government, Lt. Gen. Noel Mason MacFarlane, suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff go ahead with the employment of volunteer Italian prisoners of war, stating: "If the plan is adopted on a volunteer basis to meet immediate needs, we have good reason for hoping there will be no serious political repercussions. Badoglio might well be willing to adopt the negative attitude of leaving us to shoulder the responsibility for our own decisions." 22

In face of the Italian Government's repeated refusals to acknowledge the right of the Allied governments to use Italian prisoners of war in service units as they saw fit, the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 5 May 1944 authorized the commanding general, AFHQ, "to continue actively to organize, train and utilize Italian Prisoner of War Service Units in war work against Germany, excepting in actual combat." As a result, organization of the units proceeded on the basis of the earlier Badoglio pronouncement in which he waived the prohibitions of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention on work directly connected with military operations against Germany. A further contract was not considered essential. 22

Establishment of Service Units

Beginning in October 1943, NATOUSA organized volunteer Italian prisoners of war into service units using tables of organization (TOE's) patterned after appropriate War Department TOE's. 24 Needed specialist units were organized first, and the remaining unskilled PW's were organized into labor companies of 250 men each. Each unit was staffed with Italian officers and NCO's (supervised by an American or Allied officer), who were responsible for administration and discipline. Each labor company was required to perform any labor required by the base section.

At first, it was planned that unit organization would be concurrent with screening; however, the urgent need for PW labor precluded any intensive screening. The PW's had previously been classified in one of

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22 CM-OUT M 137, Allied Mil Mission to Allied Forces Hq, 5 Apr 44 (TS). ACC 10006/101/448 888.6 Prisoners of War (Mar-May 44) (TS). DRB, TAG.
23 CM-IN 32513, CCS to Wilson, 5 May 44 (S). AFHQ G-5 Film 276-B (S). DRB, TAG.
24 These tentative TO’s were subject to War Department approval. See: Msg 290905A, CG, NATOUSA, to CO, IBS. Copy in MS, "History of Island Base Section, United States Army," MP Sec, pp. 12-14. File 8-4 FA. OCMH, Gen Ref Off. For tentative TO’s used by Eq, Atlantic Base Section, see: AG Atlantic Base Sec 383.6, Prisoners of War (9-8-43 to 11-50-43). DPRB, TAG.
three categories: A—secure, B—doubtful, or C—insecure. Class C prisoners were held in close confinement until transportation was available for evacuation. Under the new setup, Allied commanders simply examined one or two Italian officers for each unit, and if they were satisfactory held them responsible for the security control of the PW's in their company. The Italian officers could recommend the removal of any undesirable prisoners. Meanwhile, American personnel continuously observed each unit to detect any insecure personnel. Later, G–2 security teams went to all main PW camps and subcamps and interrogated each prisoner of war separately. Approximately 11,000 Italian PW's were screened in the Eastern Base Section alone, from Constantine, Algeria, to Tunis, Tunisia.25

Each PW was given the opportunity to execute a "Declaration of Italian Prisoner of War," in which he agreed to cooperate fully with the Allied Forces in the furtherance of the war effort. He was not compelled to sign. In fact, the attitude of cooperation was so widespread among Italian PW's that many volunteered to assist the Allies even before the Italian capitulation.26

Early ISU Employment Plans

When subordinate units received the order to activate the Italian service units (ISU), they proceeded as they saw fit. Definite instructions were not issued by NATOUSA until January 1944.27 In the Mediterranean Base Section, two Italian generals, who were anti-Fascist and anti-German, supervised the organization of the Italian service units.28 At the request of the technical services in the base sections, who estimated the number of units necessary for their work, Headquarters, Mediterranean Base Section, organized the units following War Department tables of organization and basic allowances.

On 6 January 1944 the Eastern Base Section issued the following rules for the Italian prisoners within its confines and in the 8th Port Area:

1. Italian PW's would be treated as prisoners of war regardless of cobelligerent status.

2. The commanding officer of the using service was responsible for discipline, training, housing, clothing, and feeding ISU personnel.


26 Copy of declaration is in author's file. See also: Ltr, CG, Br Supply Dist, 8th Army, to "A", 16 Army Gp, 14 Sep 43, sub: Italian applications for service with Allied Forces. AFHQ A. A. I. Film R 100–17; ltr, Hq, NATOUSA, to CG's, SOS, NATOUSA, Twelfth Air Force, etc., 16 Oct 43, sub: Organization of Italian Prisoners of War for Labor. G–1 385.6 Italian (15 Jun 43). DBB, TAG.


28 Brig Gen Angelo Agro, Commandant, Territorial Defense, Zone of Palermo, and Brig Gen Antonio Sodero, Commandant, Port of Trapani.
3. PW’s were to be kept busy 16 hours a day.

4. ISU training requirements were to be the same as for U. S. troops, with a minimum of six hours weekly devoted to such disciplinary training as inspections, physical training, and close order drill.

5. Italian PW guards were to be armed only with a club and were to be denied access to arms and ammunition.

6. Italian PW’s could not be placed on sentry duty outside any camp or inclosure, nor could they have authority over any groups other than fellow Italian prisoners.

7. Violations of orders, regulations, and laws were to be punished in the following order of severity: loss of privileges, extra fatigue, movement into a shelter tent camp, segregation from other Italian prisoners, and trial by court-martial.29

A few weeks later, the Eastern Base Section organized an Italian service unit section under the supervision of its adjutant general. This new unit facilitated transmission of orders and information and aided in the formation of PW labor units for the technical services. It also organized English classes for the prisoners; had technical material translated so the units could function properly; and published a biweekly paper in the Italian language.30 Other base sections activated provisional prisoner of war administrative companies to handle administrative and supply functions for the Italian service units.

Within a base section, ISU’s worked under the direction of the base section commander and performed any and all work required by the using services. American PW administrative companies directed those units located outside the territorial limits of a base section. The base sections classified the Italian prisoners according to principal and secondary skills and kept a record of this information. When the prisoners were transferred to another area, the classification cards accompanied them.

Italian PW company, battalion, and separate unit commanders requisitioned, received, and signed for property issued to them as did American unit commanders. Generally, ISU’s worked 6 days a week, 10 hours a day, under the same conditions as U. S. service troops and on the same type work. When possible, they were given the same type living quarters and were issued a modified American ration with more starches, more palatable to Italians. The Italian PW’s were also allowed passes and special privileges.31

29 MS, “History Eastern Base Section,” 1 Jan–1 May 44, AG Sec, pp. 255–57. 8–4 EA vol. 7, OCMH, Gen Ref Off.
30 Ibid., Italian Service Unit Sec, pp. 263–65.
31 Ltr, G-5 Sec, AFHQ, to Hq, Allied Control Commission, 24 Sep 44, sub: Italian Prisoners of War—General Policy. AFHQ G-5, Film 278-B. DRB, TAG.
Supervision and Use of Italian Service Units

Allied commanders used two methods to supervise Italian service units. One method was the buddy system in which Italian PW's worked side by side with American soldiers and under American foremen. The second method was to work an Italian PW unit independently under its own command, with American supervision coming through technical channels. The latter method was more advantageous as it facilitated direct control without the difficulty of a language barrier and national habits. Both methods or combinations of both were used satisfactorily depending upon local conditions, types of work, and the intelligence and training of the prisoners involved.\textsuperscript{32}

Training

American units, the counterparts of the Italian PW companies, supervised and trained those Italian service units assigned to their branch of service. When this was not possible, competent U. S. personnel was detailed to supervise the prisoners' technical training. In the Mediterranean Base Section, a motor school was operated continuously to train Italian PW's in the use and care of American vehicles.\textsuperscript{33} In 1944, an Italian PW military police center was activated in the Adriatic Base Section at Bari, Italy, to alleviate a shortage of military police personnel. American commanders sent selected Italian PW volunteers to the center where they were organized and trained under the same program as were American military police units.\textsuperscript{34} After three months' training, they were assigned to security duties and to guard German prisoners of war.

Pay

Italian PW's serving in ISU's were paid at the standard rate of 80 cents a day for labor, and 40 cents a day when hospitalized in the line of duty. They were also allowed the 10 cents a day personal allowance, less deductions such as the value of PX items issued during the month. A payroll was kept and the total amount of the payroll was deposited in U. S. Treasury Fund 218915—a fund solely for money due prisoners of war. Each PW had his record credited with the total amount due him, and he received one-third of his monthly labor pay in cash and the balance in post exchange coupons.\textsuperscript{35} Italian

\textsuperscript{32} "Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA," op. cit., p. 284.
\textsuperscript{33} Monthly Narrative Rpt 10, Hq, Mediterranean Base Sec, 30 Nov 44, p. 6. DRB, TAG.
\textsuperscript{34} The PW units were activated under TOE 19-57.
\textsuperscript{35} The amount could be placed to his credit in the trust fund if he so desired. See: WD Press Release, 7 May 44, sub: Service Units Formed for Italian Prisoners of War. ASF 383.6 Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44). DRB, TAG; ltr, G-5 Sec, AFRHQ, to Hq, Allied Control Commission, 24 Sep. 44, sub: Italian Prisoners of War—General Policy. AFRHQ G-5 Film 276-B. DRB, TAG.
PW officers, when employed as supervisors, received 80 cents a day for their services.

Discipline

In the Eastern Base Section, Italian officers assigned to command positions in the ISU’s were responsible for the internal organization as well as for the administration and discipline of the units. American administrative liaison officers designated by the provost marshal supervised and approved their decisions. ISU personnel were subject to the punitive Articles of War which were read to them in the Italian language. PW officers administered punishment under Article of War 104 which was limited to reprimand, withholding of privileges, extra fatigue, or restriction of not more than seven days. Trial by summary court was authorized, but the punishment imposed could not be greater than 30 days imprisonment. Graver offenses were referred to higher headquarters for suitable action.

Accomplishments of ISU’s

Generally, Italian service units performed work similar to that done by their American counterpart. Ports of embarkation units, stevedoring units, quartermaster depot units, laundry and bakery units, ordnance and automotive maintenance units, signal construction units, and others performed labor normally at a premium in an active theater of operations.

As to competency, an Italian PW laundry unit approached to within 2 percent of the production figure maintained by similar U.S. laundry units. The 7620th Ordnance Ammunition Company (Italian) became so proficient in the renovation of ammunition that the Ordnance Section, NATOUSA, requested that it be retained by the American Army as one of the few thoroughly trained ammunition renovation companies available. Another PW unit trained in bomb disposal operations became proficient in the handling of enemy duds. Skilled workmen, such as carpenters and plumbers, helped in the utilities section of the Peninsular Base Section. Tank truck platoons and gasoline supply companies were also organized from Italian prisoners of war. The Chemical Warfare Branch used PW’s at depots and dumps where they proved so efficient that depot operations at several installations needed only one American service company. PW military police companies, as well as quartermaster truck companies, also operated in the Mediterranean theater.

By May 1945, Italian volunteer PW guard units were employed at such U.S. inclosures and static installations as port facilities,

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36 Ltr, Hq, NATOUSA, to CG’s, SOS, NATOUSA, 12th Air Force, etc., 10 Oct 43, sub: Organization of Italian Prisoners of War for Labor, G-1 383.6 Italian (15 Jun 43). DRB, TAG.

37 Cir 9, Hq, Eastern Base and 8th Port, 22 Feb 44, sub: Discipline among Italian Service Units. AFRHQ G-2 CH Film R 78-1 (TS). DRB, TAG.
dumps, and warehouses in military areas and vehicular parks. They also directed traffic and acted as guards at passenger terminals and air fields. The PW’s were armed, in accordance with applicable tables of organization and equipment, only while on duty, and necessary measures were taken to prevent them from having unauthorized access to arms and ammunition.

NATOUSA Manpower Board

To use all available manpower more efficiently, including prisoners of war, NATOUSA created a manpower board in July 1944, consisting of the inspectors general of NATOUSA; SOS, NATOUSA; and the Army Air Force, MTO. This board conducted constant surveys of all units and installations in the theater to determine if they were essential and if they were being used for the purpose intended. It also determined if the authorized personnel was excessive; which part could be eliminated; and if maximum use was made of available limited assignment personnel. The board submitted monthly progress reports to NATOUSA which took the corrective action. An ad hoc committee, NATOUSA, later assumed the responsibilities of the manpower board.

Italian PW Labor on the Italian Mainland

During the early days of fighting in Italy, Allied commanders evacuated prisoners of war as quickly as possible to North Africa and used civilians for essential labor. This was done to preclude any possible political repercussions. An early Allied policy also stated that no “Italian Prisoners of War, either as individuals or in units, be taken to the Italian mainland either for duty or for transshipment.” But NATOUSA did allow subordinate commands to release individual PW’s so they could be hired as civilians and taken to Italy. As the war progressed up the Italian boot and as new technical service centers were opened in the summer of 1944 at Rome, Piombino, Leghorn, and Florence, U. S. service troops were transferred from North Africa to provide the needed labor.

To support the invasion of southern France (Operation DRAGOON) in August 1944, NATOUSA assigned the best trained Amer-

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38 Hq, MTOUSA, “Administrative Instructions for United States Prisoner of War Enclosures in MTOUSA,” 3 May 45, ch. X., G-2, 15th Army Gp Film R 164-F. DRB, TAG.
40 CM-IN 70365, NATOUSA for SOS, NATOUSA, 7th Army, etc., 11 Jul 44 (S). AFHQ G-2 (H) Film R 452-F (S). DRB, TAG.
41 In July 44, British troops used Italian PW’s in Italy. See: Note by Sec, AFHQ, 17 Jul 44, sub: Political Committee—Status and Employment of Italian Prisoners of War. AFHQ G-5 Film R 276-B. DRB, TAG.
ican and Italian service units in Italy and North Africa and thereby
lost them for use in the Mediterranean theater. By October 1944, ap-
proximately 28,000 Italian PW’s in American custody were already in
France or were being moved from North Africa for use in service units
supporting the operation. To justify their use, Allied authorities in-
formed the French administration that such a move was a military
necessity to assist in the liberation of France. The Italian PW units
were not used forward of the communication zone nor were they used
directly in the rear of the attacking armies. For security reasons, the
Italian Government was not notified of the invasion plans nor of the
use of Italian service units in France. Meanwhile, in North Africa
new units were formed to replace those which had departed.42

In Italy, the demand for service troops to support military opera-
tions constantly exceeded the supply, and the withdrawal of service
troops to support the DRAGOON forces also added to the logistical
problem. Because it was necessary to use PW labor in Italy, the Com-
manding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U. S. Army
(MTOUSA) 43 ordered approximately 15,000 ISU troops to the Italian
mainland. This matter had been broached verbally to the Italian
prime minister who raised no objections. Thereupon, in November
1944, the first Italian service units arrived in Italy.44

During this time the State Department pressed the War Depart-
ment continuously for the complete release and repatriation of all Ital-
ian prisoners of war in the Mediterranean theater, but the War De-
partment resisted on the grounds of operational necessity. Since
day 1944, the British had used Italian prisoners on the Italian main-
land without receiving a formal protest from the Italian Government.
And Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, commanding the U. S. Fifth Army, warned
that any formal discussions by the State Department regarding Amer-
ican-controlled prisoners of war in Italy might jeopardize the British-
controlled PW’s, not only in Italy, but in other theaters such as India.
Military considerations prevailed, and members of Italian service units
retained their PW status.45

42AFHQ Note 34, Col J. H. Lascelles, Sec, Political Committee, AFHQ, 2 Oct 44, sub:
Political Committee—Use of Italian Prisoners of War in Southern France. AFHQ G-5 film
277-B; see also: Ltr, AG, HQ, SOS, NatoUSA, to CG, NatoUSA, 11 Apr 44, sub: For-
eign Manpower: Prisoners of War (Italian, Yugo-slav and German). AFHQ G-2 CHI Film
432-F (S). DRB, TAG.
43N ATOUSA was inactivated 1 Nov 44, the same date that MTOUSA was activated.
44Ltr, Commodore Ellery W. Stone, Actg Ch Commissioner, Hq, Allied Commission, to
G-5, AFHQ, 6 Nov 44 (TS). AFHQ G-5 Film R 276-B; Note 40, G-1 (A), AFHQ, 8 Nov
44, sub: Political Committee—Use of Italian Prisoners of War in United Status Custody as
Service Units in Italy (S). AFHQ Secretariat Film R 340-C (TS). DRB, TAG.
45AFHQ Notes 40 and 41, G-5, Political Committee, 7 and 13 Nov 44, sub: Status of
Italian Prisoners of War (S). Ibid.
Italian Army Service Units (ITI)

Some service units, formed from Italian Army personnel who were not prisoners of war, were called U. S.-ITI's and British-ITI's when attached to British or American forces. The Italian headquarters of these units was subordinate to the American headquarters, but orders were transmitted through appropriate Italian channels of command.46

In February 1944, a cobelligerent ITI unit was sent to Libya to work with volunteer PW units in salvaging airplane engines. Dissention arose when the ITI unit claimed special privileges not accorded the volunteer prisoners of war. After the dispute was settled, it was ruled that in the future no cobelligerents would be sent to Libya or other English-held territory without prior consent of the British. It was further decided that both Italian service units and ITI's would be given the same privileges when possible.47

Release of Individual Prisoners of War to Italian Government

When NATOUSA first decided to organize Italian service units, it also agreed to release individual PW specialists to the Italian Government upon request. In the spring of 1944 this policy was changed. The need for skilled labor had so increased that NATOUSA ordered any request by the Italian Government for prisoners of war to be "discouraged." Instructions issued at the time stated: "hold all Italian prisoners not formed into service units at this time in order that their formation into units may be considered."48

The Release of Italian Service Units

In March 1945 MTOUSA proposed that all Italian service units either be returned to the control of the Italian Government and used by the United States as ITI units or be released outright. The technical services objected to this proposal for the following reasons: (1) Italian Army units (ITI's) did not measure up to the standards of efficiency and discipline obtained from PW service units; (2) PW units were trained by U. S. personnel and were accustomed to American methods of work; (3) The effectiveness of the ISU's was due in part to the scale of issue of clothes, organizational equipment, PX rations, and subsistence. It was thought that if they were maintained

46 Ltr, AG, AFIHQ, to all concerned, 16 Nov 44, sub: Command and Administration of Italian Army. Ibid.
47 Ltr, G-5 Sec, AFIHQ, to Hq, Allied Commission 15 Feb 45, sub: Italian Belligerents. AFIHQ G-5 Film B 317-C. DRB, TAG.
48 Ltr, G-1 (A) to G-1 (D), G-3, AF etc., Hq, NATOUSA, 18 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower (S). AFIHQ G-5 Film B 276-B. DRB, TAG.
on the lower scale of the ITI's, morale would drop and unsatisfactory work would result.\textsuperscript{40}

The Engineers considered the conversion of PW units to U. S.–ITI's more desirable than their release to civilian status: the organized units could be shifted from job to job with greater ease; they could be authorized organizational equipment; and they could be controlled more easily than civilian units. All the technical services requested that Allied headquarters retain command authority if the PW units were released.\textsuperscript{40}

On 1 July 1945, all Italian cooperator prisoners of war (British-held) and U. S. Italian service units in Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily were released from PW status and were turned over to the Italian Government on the following conditions: (1) All PW's released to the Italian Government were to be retained in units similar in formation and strength to those they formerly belonged to. (2) The Allies reserved the right to attach supervisory and technical personnel to the Italian units as necessary. (3) Personnel were not to be demobilized or transferred without Allied consent. On the request of the Allied authorities, however, the Italian Government was to demobilize certain selected personnel for voluntary employment with the Allies outside the Italian armed forces.\textsuperscript{51} U. S.–ITI's, other than guard, truck, and specifically authorized units, were also reduced gradually and were replaced with German prisoners of war and civilian labor.\textsuperscript{52}

**Employment Policies in Regard to German and Pro-Fascist Prisoners of War**

German and insecure Italian prisoners of war were not used on paid labor in the Mediterranean theater before the cessation of hostilities, but were evacuated to the United States. By August 1944, when the labor situation became acute, NATOUSA anticipated their possible use and directed: "... under proper guard and security safeguards, they [Germans and insecure Italian prisoners] may be required to perform any and all work consistent with their rank, status, and physical condition, and in accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Convention." There is no record, however, that these pris-

\textsuperscript{40} Memo, AFHQ G–1 to AFHQ G–5, 13 Mar 45, sub: Proposed Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War in Italy (S); Coordinating Route Slip, AFHQ QM to AFHQ G–5 thru G–4, 13 Mar 45, sub: Status of Italian PW's in United States Custody and of Italian Co-operators in British Custody Serving in Italy. Both in AFHQ G–3 Film R 317–C. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.; Informal Routing Slip, Engr Sec to Hq, MTOUSA, 15 Mar 45, sub: Italian Prisoners of War in U. S. Custody in Italy (S). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} GM–OUT 71071, Alexander to TAG for CCS, 7 May 45 (S). AFHQ G–5 Film 318–C. DRB, TAG.
oners were ever employed in Italy before the German surrender.58 Thus, when MTOUSA was activated in November 1944, it was primarily concerned with German prisoners of war and plans had to be made accordingly.

By late 1944, MTOUSA anticipated the surrender of the opposing enemy forces. To make full use of surrendered German service units and subunits, it authorized its subordinate commands to use them and as much of their equipment, less arms, as was necessary for their proper functioning and as was consistent with the Geneva Convention. The using command was to furnish adequate guards if large-scale employment was anticipated and if screening and division into cooperative PW units could not be accomplished before they were used.54

On 2 May 1945, all enemy forces in Italy surrendered, and the U. S. Fifth Army became responsible for guarding and administering approximately 300,000 PW’s and surrendered enemy personnel. As a general uniform principle the Allies agreed that enemy personnel in army areas who were disorganized and who could not be regrouped into their original units would be treated as prisoners of war. Others, together with organized units, were to be classified as surrendered enemy personnel and placed in final concentration camps. Since this would have involved separate administrations, it was finally ruled that all disarmed Germans and German PW’s would be treated as disarmed personnel.55 Since many of the Italian and German PW’s were intermixed, it was decided that any PW who claimed German nationality and who was wearing an Italian uniform when captured would be treated and registered as an Italian PW. Those who wore German uniforms when captured and who served in pro-Fascist Italian units would be treated as German PW’s. The surrendered enemy forces constituted a large labor potential, employable under the terms of their unconditional surrender on any task desired by Allied authorities. This included the preparation and packing of equipment for redeployment to the Pacific.56

Shortly after the surrender, the commanding general, MTOUSA, directed that all able-bodied German PW’s be employed to the maxi-

54 Ltr, G-2, AFRHQ to Hq, AAI, Hq, III Corps, etc., 12 Oct 44, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War. AFRHQ G-2 CII Civil Security Sec Film R 500-C. DRB, TAG.
55 Minutes, Conference, 15th Army Gp, 12 May 45, sub: Disposition of Surrendered Enemy Forces. AFRHQ Film R 455-F (S); msg 55247, TROOPERS to SHAPE’ AFRHQ, 19 Jun 45 (S). AFRHQ Ch Admin Off Film 315-A (TS). DRB, TAG.
56 AFRHQ, Admin. Instructions, 21 May 45, sub: Returns and Status—Prisoners of War. AFRHQ G-2 CII, Civil Security Sec Film R 432-F; Cir 64, Hq, Com Z, 13 May 45, sec IV. G-1 333.6/3-18, Employment of Enemy Prisoners of War (S). DRB, TAG.
mum. Those suspected to be war criminals and security risks were not to be employed, but recalcitrants (SS troops and rabid Nazis) who had been screened from the other prisoners of war could be worked under close guard. The manpower situation was critical; men and supplies were needed in the Far East, and many American soldiers had been returned to the United States for discharge. After the release of the Italian service units, two sources of labor were available—prisoners of war and civilians. Since the labor had to be mobile, subject to discipline, and able to operate with a minimum of Allied supervision, prisoner of war labor was preferable.

Establishment of MTOUSA PW Command

To facilitate PW employment, MTOUSA directed the U. S. Fifth Army to organize a MTOUSA prisoner of war command (MTOUSA PW Command) to screen, classify, administer, organize, and guard all German and Italian Fascist PW's and surrendered units. It was also to survey, initiate, and organize projects to insure maximum use of all available PW labor. Fifth Army designated the U. S. 88th Division (reinforced) as the MTOUSA PW Command, and the division organized and dispatched German PW service units to the major commands upon request.

At first, German service units, who were already organized under German tables of organization and who were suitable for employment, were left intact and were brought to strength with replacements from former combat units that had been disbanded. When the manpower requirements for the base sections and the Army Air Force Service Command, MTO, far exceeded the number of units available, Fifth Army permitted the PW Command to form new service companies from former enemy combat personnel. War Department tables of organization were used.

Repatriation Problems

In addition to forming new German PW service units, the MTOUSA PW Command also had the task of repatriating a minimum of 100,000 German PW's and surrendered personnel to the U. S., British-, and French-occupied zones of Germany. On 10 August 1945, MTOUSA ordered the PW Command to interchange (within the German service units) prisoners from the Russian Zone with those

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68 Notes, Hq, MTOUSA, 24 Sep 45, sub: Conference Re: Italian Labor Dispute; Draft, GHQ, CMP, to Ch Commissioneer, Hq, Allied Commission (undated), sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War. Both in AFFHQ G-5 Film 818-C. DRB, TAG.
from the other zones. This was a slow and tedious process. The units had been formed initially without regard to the locality which the PW personnel represented, and many units had no records of the prisoners' geographical locations. Also, some skilled workers or specialists were involved, which required a definite overlap of time for on-the-job training of the new unit members. To ease the processing for interchange, subcommands sent representatives among the German service units to screen the prisoners. When the interchange was completed, the PW's from the Russian Zone were kept in an unemployable status.

**Equipment of German Service Units**

The new German service units were equipped as much as possible from captured German stocks. Where necessary, U. S. equipment, formerly used by the Italian service units, was transferred to the Germans. MTOUSA also froze all equipment in the theater which belonged to American units being inactivated or redeployed indirectly to the Far East and turned it over to the new German service units. Because the MTOUSA PW Command was responsible for the property issued to the German units, it was designated as the "parent unit."

**Command Responsibility**

A major command which was assigned a German service unit by the PW Command was designated as the "supervisory unit." It assumed responsibility for the supervision and administration of the PW's or surrendered personnel. The major command also furnished transportation and escort guard to and from the MTOUSA PW Command inclosures, which were established within the various base sections, and procured and issued supplies to the surrendered enemy forces. The "using service," a unit within the major command, issued the work orders and supplied the German units with nonexpendable items. It was always an Army Service Unit or an Army technical service. All matters pertaining to German PW units and work parties were referred to the PW Command through liaison officers, and major

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60 Note, DCofS, Hq, MTOUSA PW Cmd, 7 Jun 45, sub: Repatriation of Prisoners of War and on Problems Attended Thereto; ltr, Hq, MTOUSA to CG, PBS, CG, 5th Army, etc., 10 Aug 45, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War/Surrendered Personnel in Italy. Copies in AFHQ G-2 CIII, Civil Security Sec Film R 435-F. DRB, TAG.


62 CM-OUT 75812, CG, MTOUSA to Fifth Army, 21 May 45 (S). AFHQ G-3 Opn Div Film R 108-F; CM-IN 2192, Fifth Army to MTOUSA, 24 May 45 (S). AFHQ G-5 Film 16-L. DRB, TAG; Adm Dir 10, Hq, Fifth Army, 24 Jul 45, sub: 2695th Technical Supervision Regiment and German Service Units. Labor—German—German Service Units (Jun 45—Aug 45). MTOUSA, AG Prisoner Labor File. DPRB, TAG.

63 Adm Dir 10, Hq, Fifth Army, 24 Jul 45, sub: 2695th Technical Supervision Regiment and German Service Units. Labor—German—German Service Units (Jun 45—Aug 45). MTOUSA, AG Prisoner Labor File. DPRB, TAG.
commands could not transfer German service units between one another without specific approval of the MTOUSA PW Command.\textsuperscript{64}

**Civilian vs. PW Labor**

Although it was the AFHQ policy to make full use of German PW's and surrendered personnel, due consideration was also given to its effect on the Italian civilian economy and employment situation. To prevent any undue hardship, AFHQ instructed its major commands to retain all civilians then on the job but to fill any new vacancies with PW's or surrendered personnel. Civilian labor only was to be used in any Italian business, factory, or other facility used for or operated by the Allies, but the civilian labor could be augmented with PW labor if necessary.

Prisoners of war and civilian labor were not intermingled in work gangs. They did work on the same jobs, but only where close contact could be avoided. On new projects, such as depots and rest areas, prisoners of war and surrendered personnel were generally used, but only where it did not affect the local civilian employment situation. However, Allied authorities were not obliged to hire local civilian labor simply because it was available.\textsuperscript{65}

**Guards**

German services units worked under token guards, sufficient enough to prevent fraternization with civilians and to prevent the PW's from taking unauthorized privileges. During daylight hours surrendered enemy personnel worked without guards if American work supervisors were present. The guards simply made head counts and inspected the work at irregular intervals.\textsuperscript{66}

**Paroles**

Rapid redeployment of U. S. Army personnel created a scarcity of guards for prisoners of war. To offset this, MTOUSA instituted a system of parole in September 1945 for PW officers and enlisted men.\textsuperscript{67} The paroled PW's drove vehicles on assigned missions without guards, and paroled enemy officers, also without guards, patrolled the routes used by the drivers. For over two months, U. S. military police

\textsuperscript{64} Ltr, Hq, Peninsular Base Sec, to distribution, 23 Jun 45, sub: Requests for German Prisoner of War Units and Work Parties. AG, Peninsular Base Section, 282/6 Policy (1 Jan–31 Dec 45). DPRB, TAG; ltr, Hq, MTOUSA, to CG, PBS, CG, Fifth Army, etc., 19 Aug 45, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War/Surrendered Personnel in Italy. AFHQ G–2 CII Civil Security Sec Film R 455-E. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{65} AFHQ Adm Memo 35, 1 Jul 45, sub: Use of German Prisoners'of War and Surrendered Personnel. ACC 10000/180/805 Conditions of Surrender, German Forces and Post Surrender—Disposal and Treatment as Prisoners of War, vol. I (Mar–Oct 45). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{66} Ltr, Hq, MTOUSA, to CG, PBS, CG, Fifth Army, etc., 10 Aug 45, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War/Surrendered Personnel in Italy. AFHQ G–2 CII Civil Security Sec Film R 455-E. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{67} The using services also authorized limited paroles for work purposes. For a copy of the parole form used, see author's file.
watched for any incident of annoyance to civilians or lack of discipline on the part of the prisoners, but not one violation was reported.68

Recalcitrant Prisoners of War

Certain PW's (both German and Italian pro-Fascists) who were troublemakers and who on occasions refused to work were classified as insecure personnel or "recalcitrants." After the surrender, these PW's were employed, under adequate guard, only on projects that were not technical in nature or which did not afford opportunity for sabotage. American commanders could demote certain recalcitrant Italian prisoners to enlisted grades in order to compel them to do useful work. This was done administratively through Italian military channels.69

Pay

Initially, Allied forces did not pay surrendered enemy personnel for labor but reimbursed them with Wehrsold, a simulated form of German Army currency. In July 1946, however, the War Department approved payment of 80 cents a day for labor of American-held surrendered enemy personnel. Shortly thereafter, as an incentive for better work, American authorities permitted the PW's in the Mediterranean theater to transfer credits to their families in the British and American Zones of Germany.70

Rehabilitation Work

In May 1945, Allied authorities offered the Italian Government the use of German prisoners of war and surrendered personnel for rehabilitation work under the following terms: the Germans were to continue to be prisoners of the United States and the United Kingdom; they were to be administered in large concentration areas by the Allies and were to be guarded by Italians; Italians were to guard the PW's on work projects and were to have full supervision of the job; and the Italians were to furnish the material and tools to be used.71 The Italian Government accepted these conditions and used German PW's in

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69 CM-IN W14611, TAG to AFHQ, 9 Jun 45 (C). AFHQ G-5 Film 318-C. DBR, TAG; ltr, AG, AFHQ, to all concerned, 30 Jul 45, sub: 'Recalcitrant' Enemy Personnel—Classification and Conditions of Employment. AFHQ G-2 Civil Security Sec Film R 455-F. DBR, TAG.
70 Ltr, AG, AFHQ, to all concerned, 8 Aug 45, sub: Organization and Administration of German Service Units in Italy and Austria. AFHQ Secretariat Film R 340-C (TS). DBR, TAG; msg, CM-OUT, "A" GHQ, CMF to TROOPERS, 6 Jul 46 (S). CAO Film R 317-A (TS). DBR, TAG; ltr, CinC, GHQ, CME, to Under Sec State, 5 Nov 46 (S). AFHQ Secretariat Film 457-1E (TS). DBR, TAG.
71 Memo, G-5, AFHQ, to Adm Ellery W. Stone, Ch Commissioner, Hq, Allied Commission, 13 May 45. AFHQ G-5 Film R 318-C. DBR, TAG.
reconstruction work in Italy, principally to clear minefields, to excavate and repair canals, and to work in various mines.\textsuperscript{72}

In June 1945, the War Department extended the area in which German PW's and surrendered personnel could be employed on reconstruction work. Although this new area included the entire Mediterranean area plus France, the United Kingdom, and the Channel Islands, the enemy personnel could be transferred only under the condition that they remained prisoners of war as defined by the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{73}

**Labor Troubles**

With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, shipments of material from Italy decreased sharply. Consequently, civilian employment was curtailed and unemployment became a serious problem. The civilian populace resented the continued use of German PW's on jobs that could be done by Italian labor; and Italian labor units charged the Allies with exploiting the cheap labor of prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{74}

Faced with demonstrations among the civilian populace caused by the continued and growing unemployment situation, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney restated his policy with respect to the employment of German personnel:

\textasciitilde{} German Prisoner of War Units were organized for the purpose—primarily for the purpose of replacing Italian Military and Service Units who were assisting United States Armed Forces. It was the desire of the Italian Government that the large proportion of these Italian Military Service Units be released. It was essential that I continue my mission as given me by our Government, which was the redeployment of American Units in this Theater and the shipment of large amounts of materials and units to the Far East. Therefore in order to permit the release of Italian Military Units, I took the available German Prisoners of War and organized them into units to replace Italian labor units. At that time I announced the policy that these German Service Units were not being organized or authorized for the purpose of displacing Italian civilian workers. However, it is possible that in certain instances this policy has not been fully carried out. However, it remains my policy, and I will continue to see that German Prisoners of War are not used to replace civilian labor.\textsuperscript{75}

To alleviate the critical situation, Allied commanders moved German

\textsuperscript{72}Ltr, Hq, Allied Commission to G-5, AFHQ, 20 May 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War on Italian Rehabilitation. AFHQ G-5, Film 318-C. DRB, TAG; ltr, Ch Commissioner, Allied Commission, to G-5, AFHQ, 18 Jun 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War. ACC 10000/136/305, Conditions of Surrender, German Forces and Post Surrender—Disposal and Treatment as Prisoners of War (vol I) (Mar–Oct 45). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{73}CM-IN 12726, TAG to AFHQ, 6 Jun 45 (S). AFHQ CAO Film 315-A (TS). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{74}Ltr, Brig Gen E. B. McKinley, Actg VP, Hq, Allied Commission, Economic Sec, to G-5, AFHQ, Sep 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War. ACC 10000/146/250 Prisoners of War and Italian Labor. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{75}Notes, Hq, MTOUSA, 24 Sep 45, sub: Conference Re: Italian Labor Dispute. AFHQ G-5 Film R 318-C. DRB, TAG.
service units from more populated areas and replaced them with local civilian labor. In addition, Allied authorities increased the rate of repatriation of the German prisoners of war to their homeland. 

**Labor Performed**

United States agencies in the MTO used a maximum of 119,074 German and Italian Fascist prisoners of war. The base sections employed approximately 65,000; the U.S. Fifth Army, 28,000; and the Air Forces and Military Railway Services, 9,500 each. Types of work performed by the German PW's varied from the highly skilled jobs of repairing and packing radios and motor equipment to such unskilled tasks as serving as waiters and attendants in barracks.

Under the surrender terms agreed to by the German authorities, enemy forces were to "make available for the Supreme Allied Commander such military personnel with the necessary equipment, as he may require, for the clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement; and such labor as he may require for any purpose." [Author's italics.] Besides being used in mine clearance, the PW's worked on railway reconstruction, in the reactivation of industrial establishments, and in the repair of machinery. They also worked in footwear establishments and at such service installations as ordnance and quartermaster depots. German service units also worked as truck battalions, stevedores, and military police and in the rehabilitation of utilities and airfield construction in Italy.

The quality of the work performed by the German service units was outstanding. In comparison with the American soldiers in the Mediterranean theater it was said that the German prisoner of war was an equal workman; the Italian half the American; and the Arab an ineffective laborer.

**Discontinuation of MTOUSA PW Command**

As more United States troops were redeployed, the 88th Division was reassigned to occupational duties in Venezia Giulia. On 24 September 1945, the MTOUSA PW Command was discontinued, and the using commands assumed control of all German service units; the

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67 Ltr, CG, Peninsular Base Sec, to CG MTOUSA, 4 Oct 45, sub: Conference re Labor Situation at Leghorn. Ibid.; ltr, Hq, MTOUSA to CG, PBS, 24 Sep 45, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War. AFHQ G-2 CHI, Civil Security Sec Film R 456-2. DRB, TAG.  
77 This total does not include U. S.-ITI's who were not prisoners of war.  
79 Document, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff, AFHQ, 7 Apr 45, sub: Machinery for Enforcement of Enemy Surrender in Italy. ACC 10000/136/305. Conditions of Surrender, German Forces and Post Surrender—Disposal and Treatment as Prisoners of War (vol. I) (Mar-Oct 45). DRB, TAG.  
80 Ltr, G-5, AFHQ, to Hq, Allied Commission, 10 Jul 45, sub: Use of German Prisoners of War and Surrendered Personnel. AFHQ G-5 Film R 318-C. DRB, TAG; ltr, Brig Gen E. R. McKinley to G-5, AFHQ, Sep 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War. ACC 10000/146/250 Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG. For other jobs see: AFHQ G-5 Film R 318-C and AFHQ Supreme Secretariat Film R 340-C (TS). DRB, TAG.  
Peninsular Base Section at Naples was responsible for repatriating surplus Germans released by the using commands. With the closing of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, The European Theater of Operations became responsible for all remaining MTOUSA-held prisoners of war and surrendered enemy personnel.82

**Other Nationals**

During the war many soldiers of a state of origin other than Germany were found in German uniform among German prisoners of war. Therefore when Allied forces captured these prisoners they segregated them by nationalities. The individual PW was then interrogated by representatives of his country's government in exile. If acceptable to that government and if he was willing, the PW was sent to Great Britain for service in an army unit of his national government. If the PW was rejected, he was treated in all respects as a German prisoner of war.83

With the surrender of German forces and with the close of the European war, former units of the Czechoslovakian and Austrian Armies and other such troops found serving in the German Army became available for labor. They were used, after screening and on a volunteer basis, on railway reconstruction work, military police work, and as interpreters and clerks.84

It soon became necessary to reverse the policy of full employment of German PW's and surrendered personnel in labor units. Repatriation quotas had to be met; the theater work load was reduced; and the objections of Italian civilians to PW employment were increasing. Ceilings were set on the number of prisoners of war to be retained for labor, and from a peak employment of 114,000, a ceiling of 80,000 was set for 1 October 1945 and 45,000 by 1 December 1945. The reduction was accomplished principally by transferring surplus units to the newly activated United States Forces European Theater (USFET), which eventually assumed responsibility for all prisoners of war.85

**Summary**

Throughout the Mediterranean campaign, there was a definite shortage of service troops. With the landing in North Africa, a lack

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82 Ibid.; msg, CM-IN 13427, APHQ to Hq, Com 2, NATOUS A, 27 Jun 45. SGS 388.6/6, vol. 2, No. 35638 (C). DRB, TAG; CM-OUT 30902, COMGENMED to PBS, Fifth Army, etc., 1 Aug 45. APHQ G-2 CHI Civil Security Sec Film R 455-F. DRB, TAG.
83 Ltr, AG, Hq, SOS, NATOUS A, to CG, NATOUS A, 11 Apr 44, sub: Foreign Manpower: Prisoners of War (Italian, Yugoslav and German); APHQ Admin Memo 60, 14 Dec 44, sub: Disposal of Prisoners of War of Non-German Nationality. Both in APHQ G-2 CHI Film 452-F (S). DRB, TAG.
84 Conference Minutes, Hq, 15th Army Gp, 12 May 45, sub: Disposition of Surrendered Enemy Forces. APHQ G-2 CHI, Civil Security Sec Film R 455-F (S). DRB, TAG; see also: APHQ G-5 Film R 318-C. Employment of Austrian Prisoners of War (S). DRB, TAG.
of service personnel made it necessary to use combat troops and ineffective local labor to handle supplies. A limited number of prisoners of war were also used to ease the situation. With the surrender of the enemy at Tunisia, the policy of evacuating all PW's from the theater was changed to that of using some Italian prisoners where needed.

When Italy changed from an enemy to a cobelligerent, a policy of using Italian PW's to further aid in the war against Germany was adopted. Allied authorities permitted them to volunteer for service in units organized along U. S. service troop lines, but staffed with Italian officers and noncommissioned officers. Marshal Badoglio, head of the provisional Italian Government, by proclamation approved and encouraged this action; and this proclamation ultimately formed the basis of allied use of such labor in operations directly connected with the pursuit of the war, not only in North Africa but in Italy and southern France as well.

As a general practice during the African campaign, U. S. combat forces operated with their own service troops, and the communications zone used what was left, supplemented with civilian labor and PW units.

Italian PW units helped to support the invasion of southern France. This, in turn, created a shortage of service personnel in the Mediterranean theater, which necessitated the formation of new PW service units. The invasion of southern France also caused another policy change. Initially, Italian service units were not used on the Italian mainland; but to support Allied combat forces in Italy and to replace service units ordered to southern France, 15,000 Italian PW's had to be ordered to Italy. These were returned to the control of the Italian Government on 1 July 1945.

Before Germany surrendered in May 1945, only a few German prisoners of war were employed. With the surrender, German service units were kept intact, and new service units were formed from the personnel of former combat units. To govern and control all German personnel, a MTOUSA PW Command was activated. Under the surrender terms, German PW's and surrendered personnel were used on all labor desired by the Allied supreme commander.

Generally the work performed by the Italian and German service units corresponded to that of their American counterparts. Ports of embarkation units, stevedoring units, QM depot units, laundry and bakery units, and others normally at a premium in a combat theater were formed from the prisoners of war. All in all, approximately 438 Italian, German, and service units of other nationalities were used in the Mediterranean Theater.

It is possible that the effective use of PW labor in the Mediterranean Theater hastened the fall of Germany. Without the use of Italian service units, American troops, eventually used in the invasion of
France, would have had to be diverted to North Africa and Italy. Without the use of such units, it would have been impossible to sustain both the Italian campaign and the invasion of southern France at the same time. Without the use of German prisoner of war units, valuable material and troops could not have been deployed to the Far East as rapidly as it was. And without the use of PW units, rehabilitation of war-torn countries would have been delayed.
Chapter 14
The Middle East

Prisoner of war operations were of minor significance in the Middle East since it was not a combat area for American forces. U. S. installations, however, did become the using agencies for British-held prisoners of war.

At the beginning, the Office of the Provost Marshal, United States Armed Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), at Cairo, Egypt, handled all PW matters. In early 1943, USAFIME did not anticipate the capture of many prisoners of war in this area and did not build any PW inclosures. Instead, arrangements were made with the British Forces in the Middle East (MEF) whereby all PW's captured by American forces would be turned over to British control, subject to the limits of their capacity.

In August 1943, the War Department notified USAFIME of the new War Department policy regarding the custody and responsibility for prisoners of war. In operations involving joint British and American forces, the party initially capturing the PW's was to notify the protecting power and the International Red Cross according to the Geneva Convention. Each nation, after the initial documentation, was to assume responsibility for one-half the total number of prisoners of war captured, after the deduction of any PW's captured by a third ally. All U. S.-captured PW's, less those retained for labor were to be shipped to the Zone of the Interior. This initial processing and notification of the protecting power was not to hinder a subsequent interstate transfer of the PW's for permanent custody nor the fixing of permanent responsibility.

Use of Prisoner of War Labor

Shortly thereafter the War Department authorized the retention of prisoners of war for labor, and American authorities informally ar-

1 MS, "History of Africa-Middle East Theater, United States Army (including USMNAM and USAFIME), to 1 Jan 1946," secs. III-PM-e (subject: Prisoners of War), e and p. 8-7.1 AAv.4. OCMH, Gen Ref Off. Unless otherwise cited, all material can be found in this text and inclosures. For the organization of USAFIME, see: T. H. Vail Motter, The Middle East Theater: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952), chart 1, appendix B.
ranged with the British to use certain British-held Italian PW's at Camp Ataka and Deversoir Air Depot, U. S. installations in Egypt. These arrangements were necessary because the American forces did not have their own inclosures and the United States did not have an agreement with the Egyptian Government which would permit American-captured PW's to be imported into Egypt from another theater. The borrowed prisoners were to be paid by American forces at the British wage scale for PW labor.

In December 1943, when it was determined that additional British-held PW's would not be available, USAFIME attempted to obtain PW labor from U. S. bases in North Africa, and after much effort, the Island Base Section, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, promised to deliver 250 Italian prisoners of war. The USAFIME provost marshal proposed to use these prisoners as needed, restricting their freedom of movement to the limits of the American PW camps until a final policy ruling could be determined. He also proposed that they be paid the American wage rate of 80 cents a day, credited to their account.

When the British were notified of the proposed plan for the incoming prisoners, they objected to the payment of the American wage standard, and since the United States did not have an agreement with Egypt which would permit the importation of prisoners of war, complications arose. American forces had to transfer PW's first to British control, and they in turn brought them in under an existing agreement between Egypt and Great Britain. U. S. forces then requested the prisoners from the British.

USAFIME asked the American minister to Egypt, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to obtain a treaty agreement with the Egyptian Government, similar to the one the British had, that would permit American-held PW's and ISU's to enter the country. The American minister, in his cable to the State Department, objected to the proposal for the following reasons: (1) the Egyptian Government might consider such a move directed toward the reduction in native labor employed by the U. S. Army; (2) possible international complications might result if the PW's escaped; and (3) Mr. Kirk doubted the propriety of using prisoners of war in a nonbelligerent country which was occupied by permission and not by request. As a result of Mr. Kirk's objections, the War Department notified the commanding general, USAFIME, that any Italian service units sent to the theater would replace corresponding U. S. units. Since USAFIME did not desire to lose any troops but only wanted supplemental labor, it was agreed that the Italian PW's would be transferred to the British for administrative control and supply, a step which would permit the War Department replacement regulation to be bypassed. No further diplomatic ac-
tion was taken with the Egyptian Government with regard to the importation of prisoners of war.  

Subsequently, on 12 April 1944, 251 Italian prisoners of war arrived at Port Said, Egypt, from the Island Base Section and were immediately turned over to British control. American units then obtained the PW's for labor and, since they were under British administrative control, paid them the desired British scale.  

On 3 June 1944, the British announced a new policy, effective 1 June 1944, that increased the basic pay rate for Italian PW "Cooperators" (prisoners with a status similar to Italian service unit personnel employed by the American forces in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations) and abolished a separate labor pay for such prisoners. The Cooperators were paid by the British. PW's who refused to volunteer as Cooperators continued to be paid as before by the United States at the existing British labor wage scale. The pay policy change that applied to the Cooperators did not affect their retention for employment by the American command.  

Generally, prisoners of war used for labor by American forces in the Middle East were located in Egypt. In July 1944, the Persian Gulf Command proposed to import Italian PW's into Iran. Since they would have replaced certain Negro service units, the War Department rejected the proposal because it violated the policy which required each theater commander to maintain a certain percentage of Negro troops in proportion to all other troops. Therefore the Gulf Command did not use prisoner of war labor.  

The types of labor performed by American-employed prisoners of war in USAFIME included the following:

- Bakers
- Barbers
- Blacksmiths
- Boiler operators
- Bricklayers
- Cabinet makers
- Cable splicers
- Carpenters
- Cement finishers
- Cobblers
- Cooks
- Crane operators
- Dental clinic helpers
- Draftsmen
- Drivers
- Electricians
- Fire mechanics
- General utility workers
- General laborers
- Hospital orderlies
- Kitchen help
- Laundry workers
- Machinists
- Mechanics
- Medical attendants
- Optical repairmen
- Painters
- Pipe fitters
- Plasterers
- Plumbers
- PX details
- Road construction workers
- Spray and sign painters
- Storekeepers
- Tailors
- Tent repairmen
- Tinsmiths
- Upholsterers
- Waiters
- Welders

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2 DF, WD G-1 to CofS, 22 Apr 44, sub: Assigning Italian prisoner of war service units to Middle East-Central Africa Theater (C). ASF 383.6 Italian Service Units (1 Feb 44). DRB, TAG; see also: Case 218, OPD 383.6 (sec. VI) (S). DRB, TAG.  
3 Motter, op. cit., p. 246.  
4 See: Weekly Prisoner of War Labor Reports. AG 383.6 Prisoners of War (1944) Africa–Middle East Theater. DPRB, TAG.
Establishment of the Africa-Middle East Theater

Effective 1 March 1945, USAFIME was redesignated the Africa-Middle East Theater (AMET), and the territory formerly known as Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) was added. This newly acquired territory was soon designated as the North African Service Command (NASCA).

With the addition of MBS, many American-held prisoners of war, mainly personnel of Italian service units, were acquired and became the responsibility of the AMET provost marshal. He, in turn, delegated the authority for all routine PW matters, including repatriation, to the commanding officer of the newly designated North African Service Command. To continue the employment of the newly acquired prisoners of war, AMET adopted the existing “Administrative Instructions on U. S. Prisoner of War Enclosures in NATOUSA,” as amended by MTOUSA through 28 February 1945.

The new Africa-Middle East Theater also reiterated the acceptance of British policy in respect to the American employment of British-held prisoners of war.

In June 1945, Italy and the governments of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations reached an agreement whereby all U. S.-held Italian service unit personnel and British-held Italian Cooperatoris would be released to the Italian Government on 1 July 1945 provided that such units would not be demobilized without the approval of the Allied governments. In July 1945, Great Britain assumed responsibility for repatriating British-held noncooperative PW's employed by the American forces. These prisoners, as they became surplus to U. S. labor requirements, were picked up by the British forces. By 31 August 1945, the British had completed arrangements to release all cooperating prisoners of war in the Middle East. Consummation of these two steps ended the employment of prisoners of war, as such, by the United States forces in the Africa-Middle East Theater.

Summary

United States forces operating in the Middle East turned all captured enemy personnel over to the British for control. When the War Department authorized the retention of prisoners of war for labor, USAFIME obtained them from the British, paying them according to the British scale for labor.

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5 CM-OUT 7/27/43, AFHQ to AG, WD, for CCS, 7 May 45 (S); Ist, Hq, MTOUSA, to CG's, 15th Army Gp, Fifth Army, etc., 21 Jun 45, sub: Administrative Instructions on Change of Status of Italian Prisoners of War in Italy (C). Both in AFHQ G-5 Film R 318-C (S). DRB, TAG.
In 1945, the Mediterranean Base Section was added to the Middle East Theater, and the entire area was redesignated the Africa-Middle East Theater. With the acquisition of this base the U. S. forces assumed responsibility for many prisoners of war, mainly organized Italian service units. American-held prisoners thus acquired were employed under existing NATOUSA-MTOUSA regulations which were adopted by the Africa-Middle East Theater. In other parts of the Middle East, after the establishment of the new theater, British-held prisoners of war used for labor by U. S. forces were employed as before under the British regulations.

PW employment in the Middle East was restricted in general to Egypt. All cooperative Italian PW's in the theater were returned to the control of the Italian government on 1 July 1945, and the non-cooperators were released approximately two months later.
Chapter 15
The European Theater

The Planning Period

Shortly after withdrawing its troops from France in 1940, Great Britain began to plan for a return to the Continent. But this planning lagged until a combined British-American organization, COSSAC, was formed in April 1943. COSSAC’s principal mission was to create a plan for a “full scale assault against the Continent in 1944.”

With respect to prisoners of war, COSSAC planned to evacuate all captured enemy personnel to the United Kingdom during the initial stages of the invasion, for at least 30 days. When PW camps were opened in the theater of operations (sometime after D + 30) some PW’s would then be retained for labor. This was the earliest preinvasion plan for prisoner of war labor on the Continent.

With the creation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in January 1944, the COSSAC plans were absorbed into the final plans used in June 1944 — operation OVERLORD.

Prisoner of War Planning for OVERLORD

Organización

The objective of operation OVERLORD was not to defeat the enemy in northwest Europe but to seize and develop an administrative base from which final offensive operations could be launched. The provost marshal, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), directed the establishment of a Provost Marshal Section, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (Com Z) to develop, in liaison with the provost marshal, 21 Army Group (British), a practical plan for

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1 COSSAC derived its name from the title of its commander—the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Command (Designate).
3 War Office, ltr 22, 8 Dec 43, sub: COSSAC Movement (UK) Committee. Opn Rpts, Staff Provost Marshal, PI 113 (S). DRB, TAG.
4 The code name OVERLORD eventually came to apply only to a general concept of the Continental invasion. For security reasons, an additional code name NEPTUNE was adopted to refer to the specific operation. See: Ruppenthal, op. cit., p. 175.
provost marshal operations and activities for the first 90 days of the operation. The theater provost marshal, however, was responsible for the U. S. overall planning and for special supervision in the handling of prisoners of war. [See chart 11] The development of the plan involved effective and constant liaison with the provost marshal of an advance section of the Communications Zone (ADSEC) and the base sections that were to move to the Continent.


In early 1944, representatives of the PM Section, ADSEC, proceeded on an observer mission to the North Africa theater and to the U. S. Fifth Army to study policies and procedures used in military police activities. Based on the information received, provision was

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5 Despite broad grants of authority to 21 Army Group which was to control the assault phase of OVERLORD, SHAEF reserved a large number of administrative duties for itself, among which was the coordination of policy for prisoners of war. ETOUSA assumed the role of an administrative headquarters for U. S. forces on the Continent. See: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 65; see also: Kupperthal, op. cit., p. 201; MS, “History of the Theater Provost Marshal, ETOUSA, 31 Dec 43–1 Oct 44” (hereafter cited as “History . . . PM, ETOUSA”), sec Forward Echelon, p. 1 (S). Adm File, Provost Marshal History. DRB, TAG.

made for escort guard companies. Plans were also made for three types of prisoner of war inclosures on the Continent: central inclosures, branch labor inclosures of 500 capacity, and evacuation inclosures.\footnote{7}

To determine the size of the labor inclosures, the technical service branch chiefs were asked to study the matter of PW employment and to make an estimate of their need for prisoner labor in the period D-day to D + 90. Paragraph 104 of Filed Manual 27-10 was to govern the enemy employment: "Work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct relations with the war operations. It is prohibited both to employ prisoners for manufacturing or transporting arms and ammunition of any kind or for transporting material intended for combat units. . . ."

Some services estimated that they would have no use for this labor in France until base section PW installations were established to process and administer the captured enemy personnel. Because of this and because Allied commanders concluded that the necessity for military mobility would make elaborate handling of prisoners of war unfeasible, the invasion plan adopted the principle of evacuation in the first phase and the use of civilian labor on the Continent during this period. In conformity with this policy, the Prisoner of War Division, Provost Marshal Section, ADSEC, was initially assigned only enough personnel to carry out the evacuation program, although it was responsible for the ultimate supervision of security, administration, and employment of prisoners of war.\footnote{8}

The PW plan adopted for U. S. forces in operation OVERLORD contained briefly the following basic policies:

1. During the period D to D + 30, phase I, the PW's would be evacuated to the United Kingdom on LST's. Initially this was to be through beach inclosures established by the U. S. First Army and later through evacuation enclosures to be constructed in the vicinity of St. Malo and Cherbourg.

2. During the period D + 31 to D + 90, phases II and III, those PW's who were not retained for labor would be evacuated.

3. The determination of PW ownership was to be accomplished at that step in the processing when a permanent prisoner of war number was assigned.

4. PW's shipped directly to the United States or retained for labor on the Continent were to be processed at Communications Zone section inclosures. Those shipped to the United Kingdom would be processed there.

\footnote{7}{"History . . . PM, ETOUSA," sub-sec ADSEC, pp. 1 and 2; and PW Div.}
\footnote{8}{Ibid., PW Div, p. 29; see also: MS "Operations History of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, ETOUSA" (hereafter cited as "Operations History, ADSEC, Com. Z"), p. 236. Opns Rpts Adm 583 Sec B. DRB, TAG.}
5. The commanding general, Forward Echelon, Com Z, was to designate the number of PW's to be retained on the Continent for labor and the date from which they might be retained. The commanding general of the Forward Echelon, Com Z, was also responsible to direct "... the proper reception, guarding, processing, and evacuation of prisoners of war retained within the Communications Zone on the Continent and their evacuation to either the UK or US." The provost marshal of the Forward Echelon was to maintain technical supervision over the prisoners and the PW inclosures on the Continent. The provost marshals of the Com Z sections (base sections) were to exercise technical supervision over those prisoners of war and inclosures located within their respective section.

Since ADSEC would be the active logistical headquarters in phases I and II, D to D+40, it was responsible for the PW evacuation program, and, in conformity with this policy, was assigned only such personnel as was necessary to carry it out. On 14 May 1944, with the publication of the PW program for the Communications Zone, ADSEC received the first suggestion that it might be necessary to retain prisoners of war for labor in its area. The plan indicated three 1,000-man labor camps would be established in the GRANVILLE-MORTAIN-AVRANCHES area. At no previous time had there been an indication that a large number would be required.

ADSEC immediately requested that Com Z provide the necessary processing personnel. In turn Com Z was notified that the first processing personnel would be phased in at D+48 after Com Z became operative on the Continent. Com Z also instructed ADSEC to send the PW's back to a base section for processing or Com Z would attach processing personnel temporarily to screen the contemplated 3,000 prisoners.

Since it had not expected to use prisoners of war at such an early date, ADSEC had given little consideration to the quantities of supplies and subsistence needed to maintain the PW's on a scale required by the Geneva Convention. It did not have access to existing stocks of record forms; and, more important, shipping schedules in the first phase of operations did not allow for changes in the shipment of supplies should new conditions create the need for them.

**Employment Policies**

In April 1944, SHAEF issued its policy governing the employment of prisoners of war in operation OVERLORD: PW's were not

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9 Annex 19 to Com Z Plan, Hq, Fwd Ech, Com Z, ETOUSA, sub: Communications Zone Prisoners of War Plan, pp. 3-4 (S). AG 370.2, 12th Army Group, DRB, TAG.  
11 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.
to be employed within 12 miles of the nearest organized enemy forces, nor at any establishment within the Communications Zone which would constitute a legitimate military objective for hostile aircraft. They could be used at military establishments within the Communications Zone on the types of work permitted by the Geneva Convention, provided adequate provision was made for their protection from enemy air attacks. It prohibited compulsory degrading work, and employment on menial tasks except when incidental to the operation of a PW camp.

Certain types of work were recommended for the prisoners of war:
1. Construction, maintenance, and repair of roads, railroads, public utilities, and other projects not used primarily for active military operations.
2. Construction and repair of buildings not employed directly in support of active military operations.
3. Employment in factories, provided the products were not "arms and munitions of any kind."
4. Employment in agriculture, forestry, mines, quarries, and similar industries.
5. Any labor required for the internal administration of a prisoner of war camp.
6. Street cleaning, demolition clearance, and other public services.
7. Employment as mechanics on vehicles or equipment not destined for combatant use.

This list was not all-inclusive and was only intended as a guide for those responsible for PW employment. These provisions were incorporated into the prisoner of war program for the Communications Zone.

Use of Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom

A shortage of common labor forced U. S. troops to employ a limited number of PW's in the United Kingdom prior to D-day, but only after permission had been secured from British authorities. On 28 June 1944, however, Maj. Gen. E. C. Gepp, Director of Prisoners of War, British War Office, informed the theater provost marshal that the British Government had no objection to unlimited U. S. Army employment of prisoners of war in the United Kingdom provided:
First, British security regulations were complied with; second, German prisoners falling within the category of ardent Nazis, members of submarine crews, and Luftwaffe personnel were not used; and third,
prisoners of war were kept in a base camp surrounded by wire when not at work and were guarded while at work.\textsuperscript{16} Meanwhile, the labor situation in the United Kingdom became more acute as D-day approached. A shortage of civilian and military manpower hampered the performance of the many routine tasks connected with the preparation of an invasion force. Boxcars had to be unloaded; supplies uncrated and stacked in warehouses; and salvaged material reclaimed. And a definite shortage of service troops existed. Service units bound for France to support combat units were unable to perform useful service during the period they were in staging areas or en route, and many units from the United States did not arrive in time to help with the invasion.\textsuperscript{17}

**Italian Service Units in the United Kingdom**

By May 1944, the quartermaster service greatly needed an increase of nonmilitary labor; but out of a needed 8,000 men, the British Ministry of Labor could furnish only approximately one-half. In view of this, the chief quartermaster proposed to make up the difference with Italian PW service units, a source of labor not originally included in the plans of the European theater although the North African theater had formed many such units and had employed them successfully.\textsuperscript{18} G-1 concurred, and on 16 May 1944, following a conference with the theater provost marshal, ETOUSA dispatched a cable to the War Department requesting advice as to whether NATOUSA could supply 7,000 Italian PW's to relieve the manpower shortage in the European Theater.\textsuperscript{19} On 27 May, the War Department approved and stated that PW units could be organized, trained, and used in war work against Germany except for actual combat. It further stated that such Italian service units could be used in any service capacity, except employment in the combat zone.\textsuperscript{20}

In June 1944, the two headquarters concerned made arrangements for movement of the units; and on 5 July 1944, the first group of 16 Italian officers and 1,113 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men arrived in England where they were assigned to the Southern Base Section. By the end of July, 36 Italian service units, comprising 5,004 men, were in England performing tasks that otherwise would have


\textsuperscript{17} "Administrative and Logistical History of ETO," op. cit., p. 267; "History . . . PM, ETOUSA," PW Div, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{18} "Administrative and Logistical History of ETO," op. cit., p. 268.

\textsuperscript{19} Memo, DepACofS, G-1, to ACofS, OPD, 18 May 44. Sub: Italian Service Units for UK (Reference CM-IN-11978 [16 May 44]). (S). Copy in Case 256, OPD 383.3 (Sec. VIII) (Cases 251–274). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{20} CM-IN W-43261, TAG to ETOUSA, 27 May 44 (S). No. 35619 in SHAPE SGS 386.6/2 Employment of Prisoners of War Regulations and Policy. DRB, TAG.
required the services of American troops. By November 1944, 44 Italian service units were in the United Kingdom.\(^{21}\)

With the acquisition of Italian service units, the War Department did not require the European theater to reduce the overall strength of American units. Instead, it permitted an increase in the theater troop ceiling as well as in the ratio of service troops. When an Italian service unit became capable of performing the duties of a similar American unit, the War Department granted permission to deactivate the U. S. unit to permit the formation of another type unit from the personnel released.\(^{22}\)

Italian service units proved more desirable than ordinary PW units as they could be employed more widely. However, there were four specific prohibitions on their employment in the European theater: (1) They could not be employed in actual combat; (2) they could not be placed near ordinary prisoners of war; (3) they could not work with classified materials; (4) they could not be employed where there was a threat of capture by the enemy.\(^{23}\)

When they arrived in the United Kingdom, Italian service units became the responsibility of the commanding general, Communications Zone, who assigned them to base sections in the same manner as U. S. units. The PW's were designated cooperators and were accorded more privileges than were given ordinary prisoners of war. All matters pertaining to such Italian cooperators came under the charge of ETOUSA, G–I. Only if a cooperator was relegated to the status of an ordinary PW by the commanding general, Communications Zone (acting on a recommendation of a U. S. unit commander and approved by the base section commander concerned) did the theater provost marshal enter into the handling or custody of such personnel. If this were done, the using service delivered the former cooperator to a Com Z PW enclosure where the theater provost marshal assumed custody and responsibility.\(^{24}\)

Prisoners of war in Italian service units in the United Kingdom received the same labor pay as that received by similar units in the United States and in the North African Theater of Operations—a fact that later brought U. S. forces into conflict with British authorities. Using services were more than satisfied with the performance of the Italian service units and sought to have still more of them transferred to the United Kingdom. Later, however, at the request of the British Government, American forces removed all Italian units from the United Kingdom because of a conflict over pay rates.\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 270; CM–IN W–48874, TAG to SHAEF, 10 Jun 44 (S). No. 35608 in SHAEF SG 383.6/2 Employment of Prisoners of War Regulations and Policy. DRB, TAG.
\(^{23}\) "Administrative and Logistical History of ETO," op. cit., p. 269.
\(^{24}\) "History . . . PM, ETOUSA," PW Div, p. 32.
\(^{25}\) See: Case 324, OPD 383.6 (Sec. X). DRB, TAG.
The Invasion of France

On 6 June 1944, the invasion of France began. ADSEC, attached to and in support of the U. S. First Army, began evacuating the PW's with a view to complete clearance of such personnel from the beach enclosures every 24 hours. On Utah Beach, a temporary PW inclosure was established and evacuation began on the first evening. One corporal and four privates, none of them trained for the task, ran the inclosure throughout the night. On Omaha Beach, ADSEC established a temporary PW inclosure to hold the 66 prisoners captured on D-day, but moved them on 8 June to a permanent inclosure safe from enemy attack while awaiting outshipment.

ADSEC was responsible for the prisoners of war not only for the invasion but also until the establishment of a rear boundary by First Army. At such time, Forward Echelon, Com Z, was to assume responsibility. Although this was originally planned to happen between D + 15 or 20, First Army never declared an army rear boundary because of crowded conditions. Consequently, ADSEC retained responsibility for PW's until Com Z landed on 7 August.

Beachhead Employment of Prisoners of War

After the fighting had moved inland, First Army commanders employed as many PW's as possible on labor details within and without the enclosures while awaiting their evacuation. These were placed under the control of their own noncommissioned officers. Because of the constant need for the collection and burial of the dead, PW's worked at the American Cemetery No. 1 near Omaha Beach. Details of prisoners, frequently furnished to the First Army medical battalions at evacuation hospitals, acted as litter bearers and as trench diggers to bury waste. Approximately 40 PW's were also assigned to each evacuation hospital. These were guarded by two armed guards furnished by the provost marshal.

At first, U. S. commanders filled PW labor requisitions from their inclosure only when the period for labor was 12 hours or less, as First Army desired to hold PW's at army level only for a minimum length of time after reception until facilities permitted their evacuation to the Communications Zone. An exception was made to this rule at the request of the army surgeon, and PW's were provided for labor in hospitals for periods up to one month. Later, First Army was author-

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ized to retain prisoners of war, including enemy medical personnel, for a temporary period not to exceed seven days. Permanent PW labor was to be requisitioned from Communications Zone inclosures. However, First Army's policy was to employ a group of prisoners for a week and then to evacuate it, substituting another group in its place.²⁹ Between the period 9 June–26 June 1944, 4,455 prisoners of war were employed on work details:

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The tactical situation provided the basic reason why prisoners of war were not employed more freely. Until the fall of St. Lo, the small Allied area contained both the First Army and ADSEC; the retention of prisoners would have further congested the area and would have constituted a possible threat in the rear of the combat troops. In addition, regulations contained in the Geneva Convention specified that prisoners of war would be evacuated to a place of relative safety as soon as possible.

**Paramilitary Organizations**

As the beach dumps grew, the need for labor increased. The French Government organized mobile labor companies of semimilitary nature similar to quartermaster service companies and furnished them with salvaged or substandard equipment. Former members of the Organization Todt³⁰ were used in the units, but they were commanded by French officers and were under French control. American units employed these labor companies extensively on the beaches.

To avoid giving the German Government grounds for complaint for alleged violations of the Geneva Convention by the United States and to avoid any possible reprisals against captured Allied personnel, SHAEF ordered all former Organization Todt members captured by Allied forces to be carefully screened to determine whether they were actually in a prisoner of war status.

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³⁰ Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht. Named after its founder, Dr. Todt.
On 14 July 1944, SHAEF stated "so long as all Prisoners of War are evacuated to UK, the existing instructions stand, but as soon as screening can be carried out on the Continent, the procedure to be adopted is summarized below:

All personnel in uniform will initially be treated as Prisoners of War. They will be screened and treated as follows:

1. ALL GERMANS will be treated as Prisoners of War.
2. FRENCHMEN who are classed as suitable and who are willing to serve with the FRENCH forces may be handed over to the FRENCH authorities for incorporation in the FRENCH forces or organized into Pioneer Battalions under FRENCH control.
3. Other foreigners, with the exception of RUSSIANS, POLES and DUTCH, who are found suitable and who volunteer may be organized into labor units, but will remain under BRITISH or U. S. control. They will NOT be placed under FRENCH control.

Exceptions:

1. RUSSIANS will all be treated as Prisoners of War pending instructions from MOSCOW.
2. DUTCH will be retained or evacuated as Prisoners of War.
3. POLES will be evacuated as Prisoners of War to the UNITED KINGDOM for screening with a view to incorporation in the POLISH forces.

ALL FRENCH or foreign personnel not considered reliable will be treated as Prisoners of War and not handed over to their indigenous authorities.

Persons NOT in uniform. After screening those who are found suitable and who volunteer may be employed for labor purposes. Those who are suspect, unless they can produce evidence to prove that they have the right to treatment as Prisoners of War, will be detained as civilian suspects. Those of FRENCH nationality may be handed over to the FRENCH while those of other nationalities will be retained in custody of BRITISH and U. S."

This last provision dealt with personnel of paramilitary formations. Allied personnel captured in enemy military formations, who after screening were found to be suitable and who volunteered, were handed over to the indigenous authorities for incorporation within their national forces. In this connection, the same exceptions in respect to Russians, Dutch, and Poles as in the case of paramilitary units applied. All unreliable Allied personnel remained as prisoners of war.

Labor Policies on the Continent During the Lodgment Period
(6 June–25 July)

Because of the tactical situation, by 25 July only 1,570 square miles of France, less than the size of the State of Delaware and only one-tenth of the area estimated for this period, were in Allied hands.

32 Ltr, SHAEF to Cinc, 21 Army Gp, CG, 1st U. S. Army, 14 Jul 44, sub: Para Military Formations. 12th Army Group AG 383.6—Prisoners of War (vol. I), DRB, TAG
33 Ibid.
Nevertheless, with the fall of Cherbourg on 27 June, attention was focused again on the question of PW labor on the Continent, especially with the anticipated need of rehabilitation work in the port area. On 1 July 1944, the ADSEC provost marshal advised G–4, ADSEC, that certain provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding prisoner of war employment might of necessity be balanced with other provisions while the PW's were in evacuation channels. Thus, Allied commanders might use PW's to unload trucks containing war materials so they could be evacuated from the combat zone more quickly. They could also be used to evacuate their own wounded. However, it was pointed out to these commanders that holding prisoners of war for extended labor would involve full compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.33

On 15 July 1944 SHAEF published a letter of instructions for the employment of prisoners of war in the United Kingdom, and later on the Continent, on paid labor projects.34 In essence it incorporated all previous policy decisions and the British prohibitions on PW employment. It also complied with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 and the 1929 Geneva Red Cross Convention. Adhering to the April 1942 Manual prepared by The Provost Marshal General, SHAEF defined two classes of PW labor: Class I labor was that employed within the PW inclosure for maintenance, repair, and housekeeping. Class II labor was any other labor not prohibited by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Generally prisoners of war were paid for only Class II labor.

Under this new directive, all base commands in which PW inclosures were located were responsible for the safeguarding of enemy personnel. When the PW's were not working, they were to be kept in confinement behind barbed wire, and the using service was responsible for supplying adequate guards and overhead personnel for the prisoners on work projects. Also the chief of the using service was responsible for the technical supervision and use of the German PW's in a manner identical to that applied to U. S. personnel.

The pay of German PW's engaged in Class II labor (and those engaged in Class I labor to the extent that their assigned work precluded them from Class II labor) was based on their German Army rank. Their accounts were credited monthly with the amount due them for labor, including both pay and allowances, as indicated below:

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24 "History . . . PM, ETOUSA," p. 27.
The Breakout and Pursuit Period

The fall of St. Lo on 14 July, the launching of Operation COBRA, and the Third Army's drive into Brittany broadened the boundaries of the Allied areas. ADSEC, as planned, followed the advancing armies. Various base sections, each having a certain geographical area of responsibility, were established to furnish additional logistical support. This tended to increase the demand for labor which was already critical. SHAPE recognized the value of prisoner of war labor and, prodded by the manpower shortage in France, ordered the full utilization of this labor supply.

About mid-July, the Communications Zone (which was still in England) inquired if it were possible to retain PW's for labor in ADSEC. ADSEC immediately protested against PW employment at this time and stated that the area was full of abandoned weapons and ammunition and it did not have adequate guards for the prisoners. Furthermore, it protested that PW labor "has been unsatisfactory whenever tried in other theaters according to reports believed reliable," and that the Army commander did not desire PW's to be employed in the area under his command or in the area close to the rear of his command. ADSEC also stated that it was semimobile and closely followed the First Army in its advance; therefore it did not have the transportation necessary to move the prisoners from place to place.

Nevertheless, the Communications Zone saw the advantages of using prisoner of war labor and directed their employment in the rear areas of the combat zone, subject to the restrictions contained in SHEAF and ETOUSA directives governing PW employment in the
HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION

United Kingdom. ADSEC was authorized to interpret the Geneva Convention as it saw fit and to secure PW's for labor direct from the First Army without previous reference to the theater provost marshal.

The commanding general of ADSEC therefore reluctantly approved the initial use of 2,000 prisoners of war, and made G-1 responsible for the establishment and operation of a 2,000-man PW continental labor inclosure. The provost marshal, under the supervision of G-1, was to organize the PW's into labor companies at the inclosure, and G-2 was to screen the PW's to determine those desirable for labor. All services under ADSEC were responsible for the construction of facilities to house, shelter, and care for the work units. They were also responsible for guarding, work supervision, and administration of the labor companies. G-4 was responsible for determining the priority of allocation of the units.

The Allied breakout of the lodgment resulted in a sudden influx of prisoners of war; and many service troops which normally supported combat operation had to be diverted to guard the prisoners and certain vital installations. To release these troops for combat operations, ADSEC, on 5 August 1944, ordered the technical services to use PW labor companies but to comply with existing directives and with FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare." Before this directive, there had been no coordinated policy for PW employment in ADSEC. The ADSEC provost marshal immediately ordered the organization of prisoners of war into labor companies, and the Engineer Section, ADSEC, pioneered in this move, developing methods and principles that were later adopted generally as a standard operating procedure throughout ADSEC. By the end of July, there were 1,250 PW's attached to engineer units. A few days after the order to the technical services, the ADSEC provost marshal was swamped with requests for PW labor: he was directed to deliver 25,500 PW's within 16 days (25 August). The provost marshal section and units under its control had been thrust into a dual program of full-scale evacuation and of deliv-
ering PW's for labor, and the suddenness of this demand for PW labor found the section unprepared.

Headquarters, Communications Zone, Arrives on the Continent

On 7 August 1944, Headquarters, Communication Zone, arrived in France and assumed supervisory control of all prisoners of war employed in the base sections. ADSEC then followed behind the advancing Allied armies which were moving rapidly across France. In late August, SHAEF ordered the retention of all PW's on the Continent except those who were physically unfit or those whose political philosophy made them uncooperative for labor. These were evacuated to England and to the United States.

At first, the newly activated base sections which had been established as ADSEC advanced acquired PW's for labor direct from army evacuation channels. These prisoners were neither processed nor reported through authorized channels to the protecting power, a condition which was not corrected until late September 1944. With the arrival of HQ, Com Z, the procedure for requisitioning PW labor was changed. The using services or the base sections were required to initiate the requests for PW labor. If the request came from a base section, HQ, Com Z, referred it to possible using services within the base section for comment and concurrence. If it was from a using service, it was coordinated first through technical channels with the base section commander concerned.

Labor Performed by PW's During the Breakout and Pursuit

The number of prisoners of war and the methods of employment varied with the different using services during this period. Medical hospitals and depots used them for general labor. Engineers used them for construction work; to maintain and repair roads and railways; in public utilities; and to rehabilitate port areas, especially the port of Cherbourg in France. The first prisoner of war used for labor in Cherbourg arrived on 14 August 1944, and by the end of the month 4,000 a day were working. They were organized into 250-man PW companies, and 12 guards were assigned to every 100 prisoners of war.

44 After the Allied forces broke out of the lodgment, HQ, Com Z, desired to be near the stage of action to guide the development of the rear areas. It assumed command of the rear area; therefore, Forward Echelon never came into actual being on the Continent. See: Ruppenthal, op. cit., p. 436.
42 "History . . . PW, ETOUSA," PW Div, p. 29.
45 For examples, see: "Operations History, ADSEC, Com Z," op. cit., p. 82; MS, "History of the 54th QM Base Depot, August 1944-January 1945," pt. III; and QM Opn. Study 11, 1 Nov 45. The latter two are filed in Hist Sec, OQMG.
On the job, they were segregated from civilians and did not handle munitions.\textsuperscript{47}

The Quartermaster Corps first employed prisoners of war in August 1944 in cemeteries operated by ADSEC. Shortly thereafter they used them for salvage and laundry work, to cut fuel and in the harvesting of crops, and for depot work. The Quartermaster Corps classified its prisoners according to skills in order to achieve more efficient utilization.

In late August 1944, representatives from SHAPE inspected PW camps in France to determine if the enemy personnel was being worked properly and was not being pampered. The subsequent inspection revealed that the work hours for the PW's varied, but in all camps inspected the length of the workday did not exceed 12 hours. In some cases, the prisoners of war failed to work a full day because of a lack of transportation to move them from the PW inclosures to the work site—a condition that was overcome by "farming out" the prisoners to the unit responsible for the work. The effectiveness of PW labor varied according to the type of work performed. Often the using unit did not obtain maximum effort because of a lack of proper planning, and the using service had the tendency to requisition more prisoner of war labor than was necessary for the job or for the number of tools available.\textsuperscript{48}

Meanwhile, Hq, ETOUSA, requested the Communications Zone services to reestimate their PW labor requirements through March 1945, taking into consideration the then existent policy of retaining the maximum number of prisoners on the continent. On 24 August 1944, it received the following estimates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>September 1944</th>
<th>December 1944</th>
<th>March 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112,750</td>
<td>165,500</td>
<td>193,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>17,750</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>52,500</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{47} MS, "Cherbourg—Gateway to France, Rehabilitation and Operation of the First Major Port," ch. VII, 8-3.1 AE. OCMH, Gen Ref Off; memo w/incl., Col R. H. Shard to Maj Gen R. W. Barker, Sep 44, sub: German Prisoners of War. Copy in G-1 SHAPE CALA File (vol. II), 254 PW and Internment Camps. DRB, TAG; see also: Ltr, Hq, Cherbourg Base Cmd, to Chs of Svcs, 3 Aug 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. AG, Western Base Sec 383.6, Prisoners of War. DPRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{48} Memo w/incl., Col R. H. Shard to Maj Gen R. W. Barker, Sep 44, sub: German prisoners of War, G-1 SHAPE CALA File (vol. II) 254 PW and Internment Camps. DRB, TAG.
Prisoners of war were then sent to central inclosures within the section or base section concerned according to the estimated requirements of the technical services. But the rapid movement of the Allied combat arms prevented the supporting services from using the number of prisoners previously anticipated. They found it impossible to guard, train, and use the PW’s and at the same time keep supplies abreast of the combat troops. Also, some services were allotted work other than what they had expected and which was unsuitable for prisoners of war. For example, most engineer general service regiments were placed on railroad construction and other jobs that required trained, skilled workmen rather than mass labor. Because of this and due to the lack of transportation, PW’s could not be used; therefore, many were returned to the central inclosures.49

Of the estimated 112,750 PW requirements for September 1944, the number actually employed as of 1 October 1944 was: 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number of PW's Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>20,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>24,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>2,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWS</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>1,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>11,597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Including 220 Organization Todt workers.
b Including 964 Organization Todt workers.

Consequently the central inclosures were overcrowded.

To compensate for the influx at the central inclosures, the theater provost marshal ordered each section or base section to establish “one or more continental central inclosures and many ‘branch labor inclosures.’” He also issued a plan for the evacuating, handling, and working prisoners of war. Following the plan, U. S. commanders evacuated PW’s from the combat zone into Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC), where Allied nationals were segregated from the other prisoners at temporary PW camps. From here the PW’s were forwarded to a section or base section central inclosure where they were either held for distribution to branch labor inclosures; held in confinement; or evacuated to the United States or the United Kingdom. If possible, all PW’s except German Army officers and those who were physically or politically unfit for labor were retained. All Allied nationals, except Russian prisoners of war, were evacuated to the United Kingdom.51

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49 “Operational History, ADSEC, Com Z,” op. cit., p. 82.
51 Ltr, Office of Theater Provost Marshal, Hq, ETOUSA, to all concerned, 6 Sep 44, sub: Instructions Relative to Reception, Handling, Labor, etc., of Enemy Prisoners of War Moving from the Combat Zone into Com Z (S). Copy in ibid., app. I.
Hq, ETOUSA, took further steps to alleviate the overcrowded conditions in U. S.-operated PW installations by again evacuating prisoners of war to the United States. It also shipped 41,500 PW's to the British at Southampton, and others to the French and other Allies.  

In the combat zone, 12th Army Group authorized the U. S. First Army to grant immediate paroles to German anti-Nazi deserters whose families lived in towns and communities in the First Army Sector. Permission was also granted to use certain paroled German technicians to aid the American forces. It was desired to use selected deserters as informers to solve counterintelligence problems and to apprehend Nazi party members. The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) was to control the parolees.  

When the rapid advance of the Allies halted at the German border in September 1944, emphasis was again placed on prisoner of war employment. As hope grew in the rear areas that VE-Day was not far off, Allied commanders feared a serious labor shortage would accompany any future redeployment of troops to the Pacific. Consequently they accelerated the organization and training of PW technical units. Emphasis was placed on the 100 percent substitution of PW labor for soldier labor.  

In the Normandy Base Section, district commanders were directed to establish PW labor pools where units within walking distance could draw and use daily one or more PW labor companies. The using units were to guard, discipline, and feed the PW's during employment and were required to submit their requests for labor to the base section twice daily. Based on the experiences of the using services, ETOUSA in October 1944 issued a standard operating procedure (SOP) that governed PW employment throughout France and Germany. It incorporated all existing directives, but made no new changes.  

**Forward Movement of ADSEC**  

As Advance Section, Communications Zone, moved forward, it took with it 8 to 10 thousand PW's who were already organized into labor companies, adding others at different stages. All surplus PW's, less those to be turned over to the British under existing agreements, were sent to the rear to the base sections. ADSEC also allotted and ad-
ministered the PW's requested by the combat armies—a step that was necessary because all PW documentation and processing was done in the Advance Section and not in the Army areas. Although the PW's could be used in army areas, regulations prohibited their use at any site within 12 miles of organized enemy resistance or at any site that would be a legitimate objective for enemy air attack. Also the PW's could not be moved to railheads forward of the army rear boundary without the consent of ADSEC.

The general employment policy followed by ADSEC was to use PW labor whenever possible, within the limits permitted, to relieve U. S. enlisted personnel for duty elsewhere. Section chiefs and unit commanders examined work assignments continuously for group tasks on which small as well as large groups of PW's could be substituted.

Employment of Italian and Russian PW's

Meanwhile, two new problems confronted the prisoner of war employment program. The first concerned the use of Italian service units and American-held prisoners of war in England. The second was in conjunction with Russians captured while serving in the German Army. The British Chief of Staff requested that all Italian PW's in the United Kingdom, either British or U. S. controlled, be paid at the British rate for labor. The British anticipated difficulty if the English public learned that ex-enemies were paid more than British soldiers. American authorities recognized the problem and quickly pointed out that the rates of pay were merely bookkeeping and that no cash payments were involved. The British, however, remained adamant that the pay scale for Italian prisoners be reduced and proposed further that the PW's be released to British control. United States officials refused and stated that their control of such personnel was essential to the war effort. This argument continued until 14 October 1944 when General Eisenhower replied that unless the British furnished American troops with equivalent labor, he could not remove the Italians in question until the port of Antwerp, Belgium, was opened and in operation. This solved the problem in Great Britain; but the British then asked that the Italian units not be employed in Antwerp or in any other British-controlled area lest the same objections arise. In reply to this, General Eisenhower said: "Orderly removal of Italian Service Units will begin when Antwerp port is open and in operation. Italian units will not be employed in British-controlled areas, but this headquarters must reserve the right

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Letter, Hq, ADSEC, Con Z, to Co's, all units and installations, 1 Nov 44, subl: Employment of German Prisoners of War (SOP) (S). No. 189 in 12th Army Group, AG 383.6, Prisoners of War (vol. II). DRB, TAG; see also: "Operations History, ADSEC, Con Z," op. cit., p. 242.
to use units without regard to area limitations when military ex-
gencies demand same."57

The second problem arose in conjunction with the employment of
Russian nationals who had been impounded as prisoners of war.
Before 1 October 1944, Allied officials understood that the Russian
Government was not interested in its nationals who had served in
the German army. Lacking any definite information from the Rus-
sian Government, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed they be con-
sidered as enemy prisoners of war. PW camp commanders therefore
seggregated the Russians from other German PWs, screened and or-
ganized them into labor units according to their qualifications, and
employed them on appropriate work projects. American officers,
assigned to these labor units, supervised their work.58

In late October, the Soviet Union requested that its nationals in
Allied custody be regarded as "liberated Soviet citizens." A Russian
mission then visited all PW installations that contained Soviet
nationals. This mission often made statements to the Russian inmates
that conflicted with SHAEF instructions, thus hindering the using

57 CM-IN 860671, Hq, Com Z to WD, 5 Nov 44 (S); memo for Record, OPD, 1 Oct 44,
sub: Payment of Italians Employed in the UK (S). Both filed in Case 324, OPD 383.6
(Sec. X). DRB, TAG.
58 Ltr, Hq, SHAEB to CG, Com Z, ETO, 18 Oct 44, sub: Russian Nationals, Captured
While Serving in German Armed Forces (S). Copy in "History . . . PM, ETOUSA, 1 Oct
1944–8 May 1945," sec. VII (sub-sec. 5).
services’ PW employment program. After the camps were visited by Russian officers, labor strikes occurred with increasing frequency as did daily disturbances within the camps. The Russians had come to feel that they deserved better treatment and consideration than that given to ordinary prisoners of war.59

Finally in February 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement at Yalta as to the care, maintenance, and repatriation of prisoners of war and other citizens of each country liberated by Soviet and U. S. forces. Each PW was to be segregated, screened, and treated as a national of his respective country, and was to be repatriated as soon as possible.60

The Military Labor Service and PW Employment

After the Italian service units in the United Kingdom were moved to the Continent, ETOUSA established the Military Labor Service to coordinate the activities of all labor units. It was made a special staff section and counterparts were established with various headquarters down to and including base sections. [See chart 12.] 61 On 8 December 1944, Col. Donald J. Leahey, an officer who had worked with Italian service units in Southern France, was named chief and was given the following mission and functions of the Military Labor Service:

Effective this date, the Military Labor Service ... is established ... for the overall staff coordination and supervision of organization, recommended allocation, administration, and procedure for the operational employment of Italian Service Units, German PW Work Units, and all other formally organized labor elements utilized by the US forces in the theater, exclusive of US Service units and Continental civilian nationals.62

Before the Military Labor Service was established, ETOUSA had planned to establish separate military labor supervision regiments in each Communications Zone section that employed PW labor units, especially in the Channel Base, Normandy Base, and Advance Sections. The aim was to relieve provost marshals, at all levels, of responsibility for labor service units after their organization. Each service regiment was to provide the military labor staff at base section headquarters and was to staff each employed German PW labor company with one U. S. company grade officer and at least two U. S. non-commissioned officers for command and work supervision. In addi-

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60 Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, to CG’s, etc, 8 Apr 45, sub: Liberated Citizens of the Soviet Union. Copy in ibid.
61 Hq, ETOUSA, GO 123, 8 Dec 44, sub: Establishment of Military Labor Service. No. 231143 in SHAEF PWD 383.6, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
tion, it was to similarly staff any other organized PW labor units, such as Russian or Polish, that were assigned to the section. The service regiment was also to supervise guard forces, whether United States or French, assigned to German labor companies.62

In December 1944, General Eisenhower proposed a more elaborate plan, stating:

Experience here and in NATOUSA has shown that proper utility can be obtained from prisoner of war units only when such are under command and supervision of US cadres assigned to and integral with those units. Present necessity of operating labor units merely by attachment to organic units is very unsatisfactory and inefficient and wasteful of both the labor resources and the U. S. units involved.64

He proposed a larger cadre than that allotted for Italian service units in the Mediterranean theater since the Italian units had a full quota of Italian officers and NCO’s, whereas in the European theater no German officer or NCO above the grade of corporal would be used. Furthermore, no equivalent persons were available in liberated manpower units.

In January 1945, the War Department approved the plan and the Military Labor Service was formed. ETOUSA established 10 labor supervision units,65 comprised of 1,160 cells of U. S. officers and noncommissioned officers, and distributed them among labor supervision areas or with each communications zone base section as a labor supervision headquarters; among labor supervision centers for camp and area headquarters in the field; in labor supervision companies for cadres with individual 250-man PW companies; and for labor supervision platoon headquarters.66

The Supervisory Headquarters [See chart 13]

Headquarters, Labor Supervision Area

This headquarters, with an authorized strength of eight U. S. officers and eight enlisted men, was activated with each Communications Zone section and served as a special staff group to the section commander. It exercised staff supervision and control of all military labor elements within the section, including their administration, housekeeping, guarding, and other requirements. If the section commander desired, this headquarters was also used for the supervisory command of such labor elements.

64 CM-IN EX-80290, Com Z to TAG, 20 Dec 44 (S). SHAED SGS 383.6/2, Employment of Prisoners of War Regulations & Policy. DRB, TAG.
65 The 10 units were organized under TO 20–20T, dtd 9 Jan 45, and contained 2,480 U. S. officers and 7,980 noncommissioned officers.
Chart 12. ETOUSA—Military Labor Service, Proposed Organization Within Communications Zone

THE EUROPEAN THEATER

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"Refer to other sections. Source: NS, "Labor Services and Industrial Police in the European Command, 1945-50" (5)."
Headquarters, Labor Supervision Center

This unit, consisting of four officers and enlisted men, operate at major command or subordinate command levels and provided field overhead supervision at all camps, field inclosures, or detached areas. It supervised the functions of labor supervision company headquarters and its attached labor units.

Headquarters, Labor Supervision Company

The labor supervision company headquarters was the key link in the supervisory chain. It consisted of two U. S. officers and seven enlisted men for one or two military labor service units (made up generally of from 250 to 500 men) assigned to Com Z sections.67

Before 15 March 1945, Headquarters, Labor Supervision Center, assigned and allotted labor supervision companies freely on the request of Com Z section commanders. No requests were refused nor were any references made to the allocations of the PW labor companies among the technical services. This was done on the theory that the most active sections which employed and organized PW units should be favored. If the program became unbalanced as a result, the supervision center planned to transfer the labor units to alleviate situations as they occurred. This policy resulted in some base sections having a surplus of supervisory units while others suffered from a shortage.

Each labor supervision company commander was directly responsible for the administration and supply of his supervisory units and for the attached PW labor service companies. When a labor supervision company was attached to an installation or troop unit for duty, the installation commander, at his discretion, could assign operational duties to the labor supervision company officers as long as they did not interfere with the administration of the PW company. However, the operational use of German labor companies was to be as directed by the using service or installation. The labor supervision company commander advised or rendered any assistance that would facilitate or aid PW employment on specified tasks.

Headquarters, Labor Supervision Platoon (Separate)

This headquarters, which consisted of one U. S. officer and four enlisted men, was employed occasionally when the size or type of PW labor unit or teams of PW workers did not warrant the use of a labor supervision company.68

67 This included all Italian service units, all formally organized German PW labor units, and all organized civilian mobile labor units.

68 "Labor Services and Industrial Police in the European Command 1943–50," op. cit., pp. 26–28; see also: Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, to Sec Cmdrs, Com Z; CG, UK Base, etc., 19 Feb 45, sub: Organization of Military Labor Service Units. SHAEF A 49–70, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
Chart 13. Command Structure of Military Labor Units Within Theater Major Commands

LEGEND

Command and Administrative Channels (Note 1).

Technical Channels.

Operational Control (Note 2).

Note 1. Where supervision units are assigned to subordinate commands, the labor supervision command channel becomes a technical channel.

Note 2. Labor Supervision Centers and Companies, Labor Service Companies and Guard elements working in service installations are employed under the operational control and technical supervision of the chief of service of the major command concerned.

Source: Hq. USFET S.O.P. No. 80, 20 May 1946.

Military personnel for the supervisory units was obtained from sources available to the command concerned. Like the PW labor units, the major command could assign the supervisory units to subordinate commands as it saw fit. To get the organization moving, each base section commander appointed a capable, energetic officer in the grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel to act as an overall labor coordinator for the section and to serve as the staff advisor to the base section commander. Other personnel was drawn from theater or the base section overhead.

The Military Labor Service assumed control of PW work operations as soon as the provost marshals completed screening, processing,
and organizing the prisoners into work units. The section also co-
ordinated all labor matters between the staff sections of the appro-
priate command. It primarily coordinated and clarified measures
involving PW work units, but it did not handle measures involving
operational control which remained in the hands of the using service.69

Two months after its inception, ETOUSA placed the Military
Labor Service under the supervision of G-3, ETOUSA, for general
staff coordination. In March 1945, the Military Labor Service lost
its status as a special staff section and its functions were taken over
completely by the ETOUSA G-3.70 In August 1945, the Labor
Service was transferred to the Office of G-3, Theater Service Forces,
European Theater (TSFET) ; and in November 1945, the Service was
inactivated and its duties were absorbed by the Troops and Labor
Branch, G-4 Section, United States Forces in the European Theater
(USFET). From its inception to its inactivation, the functions of
the Military Labor Service remained essentially the same.71

German Prisoner of War Labor Companies

Most early German prisoner of war labor companies were formed
informally to meet the requirements and needs of the using services.
The Military Labor Service formally organized and designated those
PW labor units already in existence and formed new service com-
panies as well.72 Under the new system, the appropriate provost mar-
shal grouped 250 to 300 prisoners into a labor company, according to
their requisite skills and capabilities, following modified TOE com-
parable to those used for similar American units. The Military Labor
Service attached U. S. soldiers to the PW labor companies for admin-
istration and supervision.73 The program proceeded so well that by 31
May 1945, 890 prisoner of war units, employing 318,120 men,74 and 228
Italian service units, totaling 39,137 Italian PW's were in use. [See
table 4.]

pp. 11, 61.
pp. 68, 70–71.
72 Ltr, Hq, Com Z, ETO, to CG, UK Base, Com Z, sec. cmdrs.; etc., 9 Mar 45, sub: De-
velopment of Prisoners of War into Technical Service Units. No. 431068 in G-4 SHEAF
Control Files (vol. II), 383.6, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
73 ETOUSA SOP 49, 9 May 45; see also: "Labor Services and Industrial Police in the
European Command 1945–50," op. cit., pp. 23–24; and MS, "History of Provost Marshal
Section, Normandy Base Section," pp. 10–15. Adm. 596c, Normandy Base Section–His-
tory. DRB, TAG.
74 As of 7 Jun 45, 332 German PW units had been organized in the Normandy Base Section
alone. Of these 274 (76 percent) were technical units and 88 (24 percent) were general
labor companies. See: Ltr, Hq, Normandy Base Sec. to CG, Com Z, ETOUSA, 7 Jun 45,
sub: Prisoner of War Units in Normandy Base Section. AG, Western Base Sec. 383.6,
Prisoner of War Enclosure. DPRB, TAG.
Table 4. Development of military labor service units and overhead units, ETOUSA, February-May 1945*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Supervision areas</th>
<th>Supervision centers</th>
<th>Labor supervision companies</th>
<th>U.S. personnel</th>
<th>PW Strength</th>
<th>ISU Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>191</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
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<td>(*)</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>885</td>
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<tr>
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<td>81</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>8,593</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>318,120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Information not available.

*Source: Data for 30 Apr and 31 May from Progress Reports, Hq, ETOUSA, Apr and May 45. All other information from Military Labor Bulletins, Hq, Comm Z, 26 Feb to 17 Apr 45. Cited in MS “Administrative and Logistical History of ETO,” pt. IX, p. 301.

Equipment

The organized PW units were equipped according to TOE 20-20T, which provided for the necessary housekeeping equipment, and thus were self-sustaining, although they lacked the necessary organizational equipment. As a result, they could only be used on general labor tasks or to augment and supplement the work output of companion American units. This was done by sharing or double-shifting the equipment, or by borrowing equipment from U.S. units on a memorandum receipt basis. Other PW units drew equipment on a temporary issue basis from existing theater stocks. When ETOUSA first proposed the formation of German PW technical units in early 1945 and suggested that the War Department furnish the necessary equipment, the War Department favored the plan but objected to the quantities of supplies and equipment desired. At this time, General Eisenhower was also requesting supplies and equipment for contemplated French field divisions. However, ETOUSA did obtain permission to begin on an experimental basis using the equipment it had on hand.75

Security of German PW Units

The using services were responsible for the operational control of the German labor companies assigned to them, as distinct from com-

75 DF, ACOFS, OPD, for WD G-1 and CoS, 6 Apr 45, sub: Proposal to Equip German Prisoners of War as Technical Service Units (S). Filed in Case 274, OCS 383.6 (Sec. V) (Cases 350-400). DRB, TAG; see also: “Administrative and Logistical History of ETO,” op. cit., pt. IX, pp. 298-99.
mand, and all security regulations and existing directives governing prisoner of war employment were in force. The furnishing of guards for work details constituted a major hurdle to be surpassed by the using services. This was caused by several factors: first, the difficulty of furnishing supplies during the period of rapid movement placed a strain on the technical services; second, a shortage of service personnel existed as a result of furnishing guards for the prisoners of war and for various depots; and third, a theater directive initially prohibited the movement of Italian nationals, French civilians, or German PW's into the enemy's homeland. Therefore, it was necessary for ETOUSA to use Italian service units and German PW labor companies in the rear areas so that American service troops could be released for duty in the combat zone.

To replace the American units on guard duty, the technical services used guard companies of approximately 300 men recruited from among displaced persons (DP's). After training by the using services, these units were provided in the ratio of 1 nontechnical guard company of 1,500 German PW's. The ratio fluctuated with the distance of the labor service units from the combat area; the density of population in the work area; and the type of work to be performed. Guards were not provided for the Italian service units.

Training

To bring the PW units up to the desired efficiency, the Military Labor Service transferred U. S. personnel, with adequate and appropriate technical qualifications, to the using services within the base sections to train and supervise the German PW labor units. The Delta Base Section operated 23 schools to train different PW units and used experienced American technicians as instructors. The section also used the apprentice-type training in which German technicians trained their helpers while at work.

Discipline

The using services were permitted to take disciplinary action against those German PW's who refused to work or who violated any rules and regulations. The PW's were subject to all orders in force in the U. S. Army as well as to the Articles of War, but arrest was the most severe summary punishment that could be imposed. The

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76 Ltr, Hq, Com Z, ETO, to CG, UK Base, Com Z, etc., 5 Mar 45, sub: Guarding and Handling of German Prisoners of War. SHAEF 383.6, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.

77 Irving Cheslaw, "The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany," forthcoming in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. VII, p. 128. MS filed in Hist Sec, OQMG.

78 "Labor Services and Industrial Police in the European Command, 1945-50," op. cit., p. 29; see also: Documents 80213 to 80218 in G-I SHAEF CALA file 230-5, Civilian Labor (Use of Civilians to Guard Enemy PW's) (C). DRB, TAG.

duration of a single punishment could not exceed 30 days, nor could this limit be exceeded when a PW underwent punishment at one time for several offenses. Army Regulations 600–375 permitted food restrictions to be imposed as increased punishment. Also, certain privileges such as the delivery of packages during any punishment period could be withheld. Other punishments imposed were the same as those given to enlisted personnel in the United States Army.

On the job, the prisoners were assigned a given amount of work to be completed during the day; and if in the opinion of the using service the output of a prisoner was less than average, it could recommend a reduction in the PW's daily per diem rate. This resulted in few disciplinary problems.

Types of Organization

The internal organization of PW labor units was in keeping with the work tasks to be done. For example, one quartermaster depot organized and placed into operation a provisional PW bakery company which used experienced bakers and technicians screened from lists of PW specialists compiled by Allied authorities. These were assigned by the depot to a specialist company to furnish the working platoons for a stationary bakery. One U. S. officer and five U. S. enlisted men supervised the prisoners. The table of organization for the PW bakery company provided for two platoons, one for day work and one for the night shift. It was capable of assuming any normal baking operation performed by regular quartermaster baking companies in the theater.

Another typical example can be cited in port work. At a key port in western Europe, the using service organized four PW labor companies to unload barges. At first, barge platoons, which consisted of 41 to 48 PW's trained to operate power conveyors, gravity conveyors, and fixed and mobile cranes, were organized at each unloading point. A few English-speaking prisoners were included in each platoon to receive and transmit instructions and orders to the PW noncommissioned officers.

Shortly after the PW barge units were organized, U. S. military units in the port area were alerted and were shipped from the depot. It was necessary to use the PW units to shoulder practically the entire burden of operations. Only a few American troops were retained to supervise their activities. After the war ended, the using service

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8 Ltr, Hq, Channel Base Sec, Com Z, ETO, for distribution, 15 Jun 45, sub: Conduct and Treatment of Prisoners of War. Hq, Channel Base Sec, Com Z, AG 383.6, Prisoners of War (vol. II—1 Jun 45). DRB, TAG; see also: Ltr, Hq, Adv Sec, Com Z, to CO's, all units and installations, 1 Nov 44, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War (vol. II). DRB, TAG.
81 The 8067 Labor Service Company (Bakery) under the 1156 Labor Supervision Company.
perfected the organization of the port platoons by forming four PW companies, staffing them with German officer personnel. Subsequently, these companies carried out all receiving and unloading operations through their own organization on orders from the using agency. Besides replacing all but a handful of U. S. supervisory personnel, the continued work of the PW’s proved consistently satisfactory.

Tasks Performed

A great variety of PW technical units were ultimately formed, such as:

- Engineer construction companies.
- Engineer depot companies.
- Engineer forestry companies.
- Medical sanitation companies.
- Ordnance evacuation companies.
- Ordnance maintenance companies.
- Ordnance depot companies.
- Quartermaster laundry companies.
- Quartermaster bakery companies.
- Quartermaster salvage companies.
- Quartermaster gas supply companies.
- Quartermaster depot companies.
- Staging area companies.
- Port marine maintenance companies.
- Boiler and smith shop companies.

German prisoners often performed many different jobs at the same installation. At the 62d Quartermaster Base Depot at Rheims, France, they worked as clerks, fumigators, general maintenance men, drivers, and in salvage collecting, laundry work, warehouse and railhead work, shoe and clothing repair, and in shower units. In another depot, a shortage of qualified clerical and typing help in early 1946 necessitated the training and use of prisoners of war to do the required work. Also in 1946, the Ordnance Division, United States Forces in the European Theater, employed several hundred PW labor companies throughout France and the American Zone of Germany on ordnance and maintenance work, on vehicle assembly and repair, and on depot and general work. The medical corps used German PW labor companies on the same general duties as were performed for them by civilian employees, that is, primarily as manual labor and on such jobs as litter-bearing, waste disposal, and the cultivation of the hospitals’ gardens.

84 Cpl Alan M. White, "Medical Department Utilization of Civilian and Prisoner of War Labor Overseas in World War II," Jun 52. Filed in Hist Unit, Army Medical Service, OSG.
Use of Italian Service Units in Forward Areas and in Germany

Although early policy prevented the employment of Italian service units in Germany, the critical need for labor in support of the combat armies forced a change. SHAEF first ruled that army rear boundaries would remain fixed at the Franco-German border and would not move forward; but in January 1945, it reversed its policy and established forward and district commands within Germany under control of the Communications Zone.\(^5\) ETOUSA based its employment of Italian service units in Germany on the interpretation of existing directives that the units could be employed anywhere within Com Z except in the combat area. The noncombat areas in Germany were considered safe, and the capture of the Italian PW's by the Nazis was not imminent. The use of Italian service units in the Communications Zone, particularly in ADSEC, made it capable of fulfilling its mission.\(^5\)

Use of German Prisoners in Germany

The shortage of labor was also the deciding factor in changing the policy that prohibited the use of German PW's in Germany proper. On 23 January 1945, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, authorized ADSEC to use PW's in Germany subject to the existing regulations governing prisoner labor. At first, this action had to be coordinated with the commander having immediate area responsibility, and only a minimum number of German prisoners could be employed. Also, as other labor became available, the PW's had to be replaced and removed from Germany.\(^7\) By April 1945, ETOUSA lifted the restrictions which limited the number of PW's and their ultimate removal from the German homeland, and made the using service or agency administratively responsible for all PW's so employed.\(^8\) Earlier SHAEF had ruled that PW's could be used at installations that constituted a legitimate air target, provided adequate shelter was furnished.\(^9\)

On 17 April 1945, General Eisenhower estimated his German prisoner of war labor requirements as:

\[
\begin{align*}
V-E & \text{ Day to } V-E+90 & \quad 487,000 \\
V-E+90 & \text{ to } V-E+180 & \quad 468,000 \\
V-E+180 & \text{ to } V-E+360 & \quad 434,000 \\
V-E+360 & \text{ and on} & \quad 366,000
\end{align*}
\]

\(^5\) Memo, AComS, G-3, Hq, ETOUSA, to AComS, G-3, SHAEF, 3 Mar 45, sub: Employment of Italian Service Units (ISU's) in Germany (S). SHAEF 1945, 091.711 Italian. DRB, TAG.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ltr, Hq, 12th Army Gp, to CG, Adv Sec, Com Z, 23 Jan 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War in Germany (S). 12th Army Gp, Prisoner of War 65, drawer 391. DRB, TAG.
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ltr, Hq, 12th Army Gp, to CG, Adv Sec, Com Z, 25 Apr 45, sub: Employment of German Prisoners of War in Germany (S). G-1 Misc Branch #102 Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
\(^10\) Ltr, SHAEF to CG's (distribution), 21 Mar 45, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. No. 231046 in SHAEF PWD 388.6 Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
He requested that all Italian service units which totaled approximately 37,000 Italian prisoners, be retained until V-E Day +360. If not, he wanted his prisoner of war estimate increased by 37,000. Because it would be necessary to feed the anticipated prisoners, he also requested that all enemy personnel after the surrender be given the status of "military detainees" rather than prisoners of war. The War Department, however, specified that those captured before the cessation of hostilities would still be treated as prisoners of war. It did agree to declare all members of the German armed forces, other than those considered poor security risks and who were captured after the declaration of ECLIPSE conditions or the cessation of hostilities, as disarmed enemy forces. As such they would be required to support and feed themselves.

As early as April 1945, labor was needed to set the wheels of German economy in motion again. In the critical category were coal miners, agricultural workers, and transportation workers. To meet the anticipated labor demands for these occupations, SHAEF considered three methods of releasing prisoners of war for these jobs: First, it considered releasing the prisoners on parole, but since this was contrary to existing War Department instructions, it was not used. Second, it contemplated giving the PW's their unconditional release. This was not favorably considered because of the adverse effect it might have on the morale of other Allies who still had troops in enemy captivity. Third, and the one finally adopted, it considered their release in the vicinity of their homes on a semiparole, prisoner of war status.

Allied authorities paid the PW's thus released a civilian rate for labor, out of which they maintained themselves. Those engaged in heavy labor which required a higher standard of nutrition received a food augmentation from German sources. This release of German prisoners was substantially on a parole basis. Each prisoner was provided with an identity certificate which he presented for indorsement to the military government officer nearest his work, and he had to report to Allied authorities at given intervals.
The capitulation of Germany on 8 May 1945 placed the surrendered German forces at the disposal of the Allies.\textsuperscript{55} SHAEF designated these units as “Disarmed German Forces,” according to the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender for Germany which stated: “... there is no obligation on any of the three Allied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel of the German armed forces prisoners of war. ... Such a decision may or may-not be taken depending on the discretion of the respective commander in chief.”\textsuperscript{56}

The German troops thus held were organizationally intact and were kept under army group control for labor. They were not transferred to the control of the Communications Zone. Meanwhile, the Allies were absolved of the responsibility of providing rations, accommodations, and medical care which were accorded to enemy prisoners of war. SHAEF left the disarmed enemy units under army group control to provide labor where it was badly needed, and to permit the Germans to sustain themselves from their own resources as far as possible. It also lessened transportation problems since it was easier to move the reduced scale of necessary maintenance forward than to move the surrendered forces to the rear. Also, the presence of these forces in the Allied rear areas was undesirable, as there were no labor needs and the surrendered forces would have had to be supported entirely from Allied resources. American commanders segregated, confined, and treated all SS and other dangerous elements within the German Army as prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{97}

**German Service Units**

All German Army service units were kept intact, under the operational control of company grade German officers but under American supervision, and were allocated for labor between the field armies and the Communications Zone.\textsuperscript{98} Initially, ETOUSA would not permit German field grade officers to exercise operational control of these units, but later used some with special qualifications under conditions approved by the commanding general of the U. S. forces concerned. Other German field grade officers were used in the internal administrative supply of the compounds and to control certain concentration areas. German general officers, who were willing to cooperate and

\textsuperscript{55}On V-E Day, 4,005,732 German PW’s were held by SHAEF. Of these, 516,418 were captured by 21 Army Group (British); 2,608,621 by the 12th Army Group (American) and 876,446 by the 6th Army Group (French and American). An additional three million German troops fell into Allied hands at V-E Day. See Frederiksen, op cit., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{56} WD DF w/attached memo for Planning Committee, 27 Oct 44, sub: Status and Employment of German Prisoners of War on Collapse of Germany (TS). CAD 383.6 (5-29-43) (1). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{97}Memo, Ch, O&E Sec, SHAEF, to ACoffs, G-3, SHAEF, 7 May 45, sub: Disposition of Captured German Forces (C). No. 871355 in SHAEF G-3 O&E (vol. 1) 383.6 Germany, Disarmed German Forces. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{98}CM-OUT 23617, SHAEF Fwd to 12th Army Gp, 7 Jun 45. SHAEF AG 383.6-12. DRB, TAG.
who volunteered, prepared detailed reports of actions in which they participated and engaged in other historical work.\textsuperscript{99}

German units larger than company size were not employed by the army groups unless authorized by competent authorities, and they were maintained to the maximum extent possible from German resources. U. S. commanders furnished equipment to the German companies as far as possible from captured and indigenous stocks, and the remainder from American stores.

The number of available German service units was insufficient to meet U. S. labor commitments necessary for redeployment and occupation; SHAEF, therefore, in June 1945, permitted ETOUSA to form new provisional German units, under U. S. TOE, from available German PW's who would volunteer for such duty. U. S. Army personnel supervised and administered these new units the same as the other German units.\textsuperscript{100}

**Pay**

German authorities under Allied supervision paid German service units, composed of disarmed enemy forces, a monthly payment of \textit{Wehrsold} (German army currency) in the form of Reichmarks and Rentenmarks only. German PW units were paid according to existing regulations.

**Work Performed**

German engineer regiments were employed on the construction of military bridges over the Danube River and achieved excellent results. The U. S. XII Corps kept German signal troops in their area intact with equipment, less arms, and worked them on the rehabilitation, construction, repair, and operation of signal installations. Other U. S. units formed prisoners of war (formerly in combat units) into transportation regiments, engineer regiments, service companies, ammunition companies, or ordnance units for general labor in their locale.\textsuperscript{101} Later German units were employed on work connected with war operations against Japan after the unconditional surrender of Germany and the denunciation by Japan of the Tripartite Pact of 2
September 1940. In addition, other PW's and disarmed personnel worked in coal mining, in graves registration, and in military government work. German PW's employed in U. S. military government work had to be selected civil servants or persons in the age group of 40 or over with special professional or business qualifications. They retained their PW status and had their movements restricted, especially at night and when off duty. The number used in each town were limited.

The use of PW's in coal mines presented a type of contract labor in the European theater. In November 1945, the Office of the Quartermaster, XXII Corps, agreed to furnish the National Administration, West-Bohemian Mining Company of Zbuch, Czechoslovakia, 100 PW's to work as miners. In turn, the U. S. Army was to get 40 tons of coal daily.

Certain German units, both prisoner of war and disarmed personnel, removed minefields and other dangerous obstacles in accordance with the surrender agreement; but in all but a few isolated instances, the employment of prisoners of war was in accord with the Geneva PW Convention. ETOUSA prohibited PW employment in the coal mining industry if the work was dangerous and unhealthful. It also permitted the commander concerned to determine if such employment actually violated the Convention, and his decision governed the use made of prisoners of war on the project.

Allied Nationals

The term "Allied Nationals" had become so general in usage as to January 1945 as to no longer clearly indicate any specific group of

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102 Memo for Record, OPD, 30 May 45, sub: Effect of Unconditional Surrender of Germany on Types of Permission Labor by German Prisoners of War. Case 448 in OPD 383.6 (sec. VI), Cases 410-461 (S). DRB, TAG.
103 Ltr, Hq, 12th Army Gp, to Supreme Cmdr, SHAEF Main, 18 Dec 44, sub: German Prisoners of War in Military Government; ltr, Supreme Cmdr, SHAEF to CG, 12th Army Gp, 14 Mar 45, sub: German Prisoners of War in Military Government. Both in Nos. 51677 and 51679, SHAEF/65/2849, Displaced Persons Br, Special Categories—Enemies PW's. DRB, TAG.
105 Ltr, OQM, Hq, XXII Corps, to Nat'l Admin., West-Bohemian Mining Co., Zbuch, Czechoslovakia, 5 Nov 45. XXII Corps 383.6, Prisoners of War. DPRB, TAG.
106 Art 7 (B) of the declaration of 5 June at Berlin stated:

Complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, air and sea safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked. All mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will be as far as possible rendered safe and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied representative.

Since this declaration was signed by German army representatives it did not violate the provisions of the Geneva PW Convention. See CM-OUT 17309, CG, U. S. Forces, ETO Main, to WD, 13 Aug 45. OCS 383.6 (Sec. VIII) (Cases 496-574) (S). DRB, TAG; see also: CM-IN 87557, SHAEF Main to 6th Army Gp, 10 May 45 (S). 6th Army Gp AG 383.6-4 (May). DRB, TAG.
persons taken by American forces. Therefore, on 13 January the theater provost marshal designated that the prisoners of war of the following countries would be referred to as "Special Nationals": Belgium, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and the British Empire. These "Special Nationals" were concentrated at designated camps where authorized officers of their respective governments visited, with the approval of Allied authorities, and screened them to determine which were suitable for repatriation or for inclusion into their own military forces. Those deemed not suitable were treated as enemy prisoners of war. Still others were used in labor units.¹⁰⁶

Both British and U. S. forces could employ Polish prisoners of war for any purpose whatsoever if they had not been selected for enrollment in the armed forces of the Polish Government in exile. These units, which consisted of 5 officers and 250 enlisted men, were organized and employed under direct control of the Allied technical services and were paid according to the Polish Army pay scale. Certain Polish officers, who possessed special skills such as engineers and chemists, were employed as civilians and were paid according to civilian labor regulations.¹⁰⁷

**PW Transfers to Other Governments for Labor**

As early as December 1944, ETOUSA permitted Com Z units to loan prisoners of war to municipalities, cities, and other political subdivisions for rehabilitation work, but not to private individuals, firms, or business enterprises. The borrowing agency agreed to comply with the Geneva Convention, to provide the necessary guards, and to conform with any standing instructions for PW employment.¹⁰⁸ Before the borrowing agency received the PW's, it had to contract with the military for the amount to be paid for the PW labor as required by existing instructions. The U. S. military authorities credited the PW accounts with the amount stipulated in the instructions irrespective of the amount received from the employer.¹⁰⁹

In 1945 both before and after the end of the European war, SHAEF negotiated with certain western nations to turn some U. S.- and

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¹⁰⁷ Ltr, SHAEF to Hq, 21 Army Gp, CG, 12th Army Gp, etc., 24 June 45, sub: Payment of Polish Personnel Employed by US/British Forces. No. 105 in 12th Army Gp, AG, 383.6 Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
¹⁰⁸ Ltr, Hq, Com Z, ETO, to CG, So. Line of Communications, Sec. CO's, etc., 2 Dec 44, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. SHAEF 383.6 (19), Employment of Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.
¹⁰⁹ Ltr, SHAEF to Hq, 21 Army Gp, CG, 12 Army Gp, etc., 10 Mar 45, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War. No. 431066 in G–4, SHAEF, Central File, 383.6 Prisoners of War (vol. II). DRB, TAG.
British-captured prisoners of war over to their control for agriculture and rehabilitation work. The United States’ commitment was to Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. The total to be transferred to France was tentatively set at 1,300,000, but only approximately 700,000 PW's were actually transferred. The French agreed to maintain all PW's according to the standards of the Geneva Convention.

In late 1945 and again in 1946, the International Red Cross lodged strong protests against the treatment of the prisoners of war in French custody. Although France had accepted responsibility, the Red Cross still looked on the United States as the capturing power. To settle the complaints, American authorities temporarily terminated the transfers to the French, furnished clothing and equipment to the PW's in French hands, and repatriated those who were physically unfit for work. Although some further transfers were made, they were on a reduced scale.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Repatriation and Discharge}

Feeding and maintaining the large number of prisoners of war and disarmed German forces became an acute problem by early summer 1945. The redeployment of U. S. troops also increased the problem of providing guards in the Communications Zone in France. In May 1945, Com Z proposed to parole the prisoners, but SHAPE would not concur due to possible political repercussions that might occur.\textsuperscript{11} It was necessary, therefore, to begin a general disbandment of German forces at the earliest possible moment. Such disbandment had to allow for the Allied forces’ labor requirements for construction work outside of Germany.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition to the agricultural workers, coal miners, and transport workers already released on a semiparoled basis, women members of the German armed forces, youths under 18 years of age, and all persons over 50 years of age who were prisoners of war were released outright. But these releases were soon to cease.\textsuperscript{13}

On 15 August 1945, for fear that the rate of discharge might hamper fulfillment of the transfer of the 1,800,000 PW’s to the French, SHAPE directed that further discharges of prisoners of war be halted temporarily. It was also recognized that rapid redeployment of American troops from the Continent and budget controls com-

\textsuperscript{10} Memo, Lt Col H. J. Lemley, Jr, GSC, to Mr. Kenneth D. Johnson, OSA, 2 Oct 47, sub: U. S. Captured Prisoners of War turned over to France as Rehabilitation Labor. Case 32 in P&O 383.6 (sec II), Cases 31–48. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{11} CM-OUT 23233, SHAPE Fwd to Com Z, 29 May 45; CM-IN 50925, Com Z to SHAPE Fwd, 29 May 45. Both in SHAPE G-1 383.6/3 Enemy Prisoners of War (vol. I). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{12} Ltr, ACoS, G-1, SHAPE, to CoS, 30 May 45, sub: Disbandment of German Armed Forces (S). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} CM-IN 87557, SHAPE Main to 6th Army Gp, 10 May 45 (S). 6th Army Gp AG 383.6–4 (May). DRB, TAG.
pelled commanding officers to depend more and more upon German prisoners and disarmed personnel to fill urgent labor needs. Therefore, until November 1945, it was the theater policy to refuse discharge of prisoners of war in all doubtful cases and to utilize them wherever possible. August saw the peak exploitation of PW labor.\textsuperscript{114}

In November, the War Department notified SHAEF that 360,000 prisoners of war in the United States would be returned to Europe. At this time over a million enemy troops were in U. S. custody on the Continent, and the 400,000 PW's already in confinement filled the prison camps to capacity.\textsuperscript{115} To provide for the expected influx, SHAEF discharged all members of the surrendered enemy forces under 18 years of age and over 50 years, except war criminals, security threats, and officers with a grade of lieutenant colonel or above. All of those released had to be residents of the U. S. Zone. Unskilled workers could be included provided they were not needed and were otherwise dischargeable.\textsuperscript{116} The repatriation of Italian service units, which had begun in August when ample German PW's were available, was increased and was to be completed by the end of November.\textsuperscript{117}

In November 1945, a ruling of the Allied Control Council officially settled the question of returning prisoners of war to any of the occupied zones of Germany. Military and affiliated paramilitary forces were to be released except as needed for labor and were to be allowed to return to their residences regardless of where located. Criminals, members of Waffen-SS, and other poor security risks were to be held pending investigation.\textsuperscript{118}

In February 1946, a large-scale discharge of prisoners of war and members of disarmed enemy forces was ordered. Essential PW labor, certain high officers of the armed forces and enlisted men of the Waffen-SS who had entered that organization before 1 August 1944 continued to be detained as prisoners of war. Criminals and those suspected of war crimes were discharged, rearrested, and then held as civilian internees in war criminal or civilian internment camps.\textsuperscript{119}

On 20 March SHAEF outlined a dual policy to satisfy the needs of the occupation forces and to meet the labor requirements of the German nation. Since it would be necessary to retain all PW's essential to specific jobs, SHAEF prescribed a system whereby they would be retained on the basis of suitability for the job in hand, attitude, dependability, and high standard of past work. At the same

\textsuperscript{114} "Labor Services and Industrial Police in the European Command 1945-50," op cit., p. 13; see also: Frederiksen, op. cit., p. 53.

\textsuperscript{115} Frederiksen, op. cit., p. 90.

\textsuperscript{116} Memo, Hq, 12th Corps, to 4th Arm Div, 83d Inf Div, etc., 13 Oct 45, sub: Prisoners of War. AG, XII Corps, 383.6, Prisoners of War. DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{117} Summary Sheet, Col R. MacDonald Gray, Exec Spec Gp, G-l, 12 Sep 45, (S). OCS 383.6 (sec. VIII). DRB, TAG.

\textsuperscript{118} Frederiksen, op. cit., p. 90.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
time, it stated that henceforth the theater policy would be to dispose of all theater PW holdings, save those regarded as essential to military labor service requirements. The completion date was set for 30 June 1946. SHAEF also recognized that some PW's would have to be retained beyond the completion date to help meet certain contracts and projects, but it insisted that all prisoners so retained were to be discharged as soon as possible.\(^\text{120}\)

During the summer of 1946, USFET directed that PW labor be used in liberated areas only when civilian labor was not available. It scheduled a complete close-out of PW holdings by 30 June 1947 so that trained manpower in a civilian status would be available to help increase Ruhr coal production. SHAEF also took action to secure the return of German PW miners who were working in the mines of France and Belgium for employment in occupied Germany.

By autumn 1946, the theater policy was to employ organized prisoner of war companies only where the mission could not be performed by static civilian labor in the area. Major commands used labor supervision companies and labor service companies only when the mission could not be supervised by the using unit or by local civilian labor. Of the hundreds of thousands of PW's employed by U. S. forces in late 1945, only 31,000 remained as a labor force on 31 December 1946.\(^\text{121}\)

Regarding the continued employment of prisoners of war, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney stated:

> Our unpublicized policy has been to keep the best qualified and most willing workers of the PW [sic] held. Many of these have been held for a long time while many PW [sic] captured later in the war and not moved from Germany have been discharged. As a reward for faithful endeavor we have tried to return best units to Germany when they became surplus to our needs in liberated countries if we needed them in Occupied Zone. However, most of the best units have not become surplus and are therefore still in France. The PW usually understands that he has been kept by the United States because he was a good worker even though he has not been so informed.\(^\text{122}\)

In order to release the remaining prisoners and yet retain an effective labor force, a single mobile discharge team separated large numbers of PW's in the Continental Base Section without interrupting the work in progress. The Base Section, in turn, rehired them as civilian workers. Throughout 1947, the discharges of prisoners of war proceeded rapidly and efficiently, and the last American-held prisoner of war was released on 30 June 1947.\(^\text{123}\)


\(^{121}\) Ibid., p. 17.

\(^{122}\) CM-IN 7018, CG, USFET, sg'd McNarney, to WD, 8 Jul 46 (S). CAD 383.6, Sec. II (11 Jun 46–31 May 47). DRB, TAG.

**Evaluation of Prisoner of War Labor**

Perhaps the true value of prisoner of war labor can best be emphasized by the use of statistics. At the cessation of hostilities with Germany, 52 percent of all personnel used by the Quartermaster Corps in the Communications Zone, European Theater, were in Italian service units (6 percent) or were German prisoners of war (46 percent).  

A breakdown of the number of PW's used for labor in the Communications Zone from 1 October 1944 to 1 May 1945 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Oct 1944</td>
<td>64,525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 1944</td>
<td>93,765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dec 1944</td>
<td>113,011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1945</td>
<td>119,799</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 1945</td>
<td>165,144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar 1945</td>
<td>184,587</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 1945</td>
<td>213,670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1945</td>
<td>284,697</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the end of hostilities, U. S. forces had in custody approximately two million enemy soldiers, of which 750,000 had been formed into technical company-size units along semimilitary lines in accordance with modified TOE approved by the War Department on a provisional basis. At individual quartermaster bases, prisoners of war composed from 66.4 percent to 84.6 percent of the entire labor force used in January and February 1945.

Italian PW service units were also used widely on the Continent as well as in the United Kingdom. The strength and disposition of Italian units from 31 July 1944 to 31 May 1945 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 1944</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 1944</td>
<td>6,830</td>
<td>6,830</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept 1944</td>
<td>6,829</td>
<td>6,829</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 1944</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 1944</td>
<td>34,761</td>
<td>7,173</td>
<td>27,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1944</td>
<td>36,091</td>
<td>6,912</td>
<td>29,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1945</td>
<td>37,505</td>
<td>6,135</td>
<td>31,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb 1945</td>
<td>35,862</td>
<td>3,087</td>
<td>32,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1945</td>
<td>36,905</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>35,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1945</td>
<td>37,638</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 1945</td>
<td>39,365</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39,365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximately 28,000 Italians, formed into Italian service units, were part of the DRAGOON forces which entered Southern France in August. ETOUSA Progress Reports did not include them until November.


* Includes 25 Slav Units formed by the Italians and transferred to ETOUSA.

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124 QM Opns Study 11, 1 Nov 45.
125 "History ... PM, ETOUSA, 1 Oct 1944-8 May 1945," pt. VII (sub-sec. 6).
The performance of all prisoners of war during 1945 was so satisfactory that commanders felt they were no threat to military security. PW units organized in the late summer of 1945 operated independently of any American unit; and during the close-out of PW camps in France and Belgium, German prisoners, with only a small force of guards and non-German supervisors, operated technical service depots. In December 1945, individual prisoners of war acted as security guards inside inclosed warehouses and open storage areas in order to reduce American personnel.

The ultimate value of prisoners of war was summed up by the historian of the Quartermaster Corps when he wrote: "Without the proper organization and training of prisoners of war it would have been impossible for the Quartermaster to carry out its mission." 128

In a letter dated October 1945 Maj. Gen. Carter Bowie Magruder, Chief of Staff, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, attested to the efficiency of prisoner of war units:

Although no exact records have been maintained, experience in liberated areas has indicated the type units, as laundry companies, bakery companies, gas supply companies, service companies, etc., where pure technical skill is involved, can produce 100% as efficiently as equivalent U. S. type units. In type units such as depot supply companies and railhead companies where a good part of the work involved distribution and "paper" type operations they can produce about 80% as much as comparable U. S.-type unit. 129

During the three years, 1944 to 1947, that prisoners of war were used in Europe by United States forces, they filled the manpower needs of the Allied forces. German prisoners who comprised the mass of enemy personnel used in the European theater, were the most satisfactory workers and proved to be equal to most American military personnel. The PW's were efficient, reliable, and fairly well-disciplined. Counterbalancing the advantages of PW labor were the necessity of guarding and close supervision, the limitations imposed by the Geneva Convention, and their mediocre performance when used in large groups.130 In general, Italian service units proved less satisfactory than any other type of similar labor used in the European theater, being rated by American commanders as only approximately one-half as efficient as a comparable American military unit. 131

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129 Ibid.
130 Ibid. QM Ops Study 11, 1 Nov 45, p. 5; Periodic Rpt, Trans Br, Ops Div, Off of Chief Surgeon, HQ, ETOUSA, 1 Jan-30 Jun 45, p. 36. Copy in Hist Unit, AMS, OSG; see also: Frederiksep, op. cit., p. 53.
131 QM Ops Study 11, 1 Nov 45, p. 5.
Summary

The European campaign, with respect to prisoner of war labor, can be roughly divided into four phases: (1) the staging in England; (2) the lodgment area in France; (3) the breakout and pursuit into Germany; and (4) the defeat of Germany. In phase one, prisoners of war were used to supplement U. S. service troops staging for the invasion. All employment was subject to British security restrictions. During phase two, prisoners of war were evacuated to England as planned, and few were employed. The breakout and pursuit into Germany, phase three, was characterized by the large number of prisoners of war captured and employed. At first, the situation was confused due to a lack of proper planning; later PW labor companies were formed which abetted labor requirements and released U. S. personnel for duty elsewhere. Others were released on parole to provide the manpower necessary to set the wheels of German economy into motion again.

With the surrender of Germany in 1945, many German troops were placed at the disposal of the Allied armies. SHAEF designated them as “Disarmed German Forces,” thereby relieving itself of the necessity of feeding and supporting them. They were employed on the same work as were prisoners of war.

The bulk of prisoner of war employment in Europe by U. S. forces did not exceed three years, 1944 to 1947, yet it hastened the successful conclusion of the war. Their performance of routine duties enabled U. S. military personnel to be released for combat operations and still keep the needed supplies rolling. Without them, the war might have been lengthened and a serious strain placed on U. S. manpower which was essentially needed for other war work.
Chapter 16
The Pacific Area and the China–Burma–India Theater

In comparison with the war in Europe, the Pacific conflict was characterized by the capture of few prisoners of war. Unlike the German or Italian prisoner of war, who had been schooled in the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the average Japanese soldier was thoroughly indoctrinated to prefer death to surrender. For example, in August 1943, Australian authorities held only 160 enemy PW's for American forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), and U. S. forces had evacuated only 10 selected PW's to the United States. The Allied success on New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago brought only a slow increase, from approximately 604 at the end of 1943 to 4,435 at the beginning of the Philippine campaigns in October 1944.

Since U. S. forces lacked both rear area facilities in Australia and the personnel necessary to detain prisoners of war, an agreement was reached with the Commonwealth of Australia in September 1942 whereby the provost marshal, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), turned all PW's over to the Commonwealth for detention and administration. In turn, the United States assumed a proportionate share of the costs of PW maintenance through reciprocal lend-lease and reserved the right of final disposition of the prisoners. When it became evident in early 1944 that an invasion of the Philippines was imminent, the Australian Department of Prisoners of War and Internees verbally extended the agreement to include custody of all PW's taken by U. S. forces south of 5° N.

Until the recapture of the Philippines, there may have been isolated cases where prisoners of war were temporarily employed, but in the main U. S. forces evacuated the few captured as rapidly as possible to Australia along lines of communication. It was not until the sur-

1 WD MIS, “Intelligence Bulletins,” 1943–45.
4 Standing orders for working Japanese PW's in SWPA called for their employment only on work connected with the administration and maintenance of the PW camps. However, on Guadalcanal a permanent PW cadre was retained to facilitate the shipment of other prisoners. These worked as interpreters, cooks, medical corpsmen, gardeners, and carpenters. See: Ltr, Officer in Charge, Combat Int Ctr, 50 Pacific Force, to CO, Svc Cmd, APO 700, 29 May 44. AG, USF, New Caledonia, 383. 6 Prisoners of War, Instructions & Misc., 1942–45. DPRB, TAG; see also; Standing Orders for Prisoner of War Camps, Hq, Svc Cmd, APO 502. Off of the PW Officer, 6 Jun 43, sec II, pp. 5–8. Mil Police Cmd, AFWESPAC, 383.6, Prisoners of War. Bk. 3. DPRB, TAG.
render of Japan that prisoners of war were widely used for labor in the Pacific theaters of operations.

Elsewhere in the Pacific, prisoners of war, captured by U.S. forces, were sent to a processing center in the Hawaiian Islands, and thence to interrogation centers and PW camps in the United States. Some were kept in the Mariannas, but no large groups were detained in the Hawaiian Islands until June 1944 when 1,000 Italian prisoners of war were transferred from the continental United States for labor.5

During April 1945, a team from the War Department Inspector General’s Office inspected the PW camps in the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) and made the following report:

Aside from Italians, there were only 1,229 prisoners of war in the Pacific Ocean Areas at the time of this survey. Of these, 1,105 were confined on the Island of Oahu; 1,075 of which were Koreans, 17 were Japanese or Formosans, and 15 were civilian internees from several Japanese possessions. The remaining 124 prisoners were on Saipan in a prisoner of war camp, on a peculiar status. This camp was established at the request of the State Department, with a view to negotiating an exchange of prisoners with the Japanese Government. However, up until April of this year [1945] Tokyo had not seen fit to enter into any agreement for the exchange of these prisoners of war.6

The Pacific Ocean Areas Theater

In December 1943, G-1, War Department, considered sending both German and Italian prisoners of war to Hawaii to alleviate the labor shortage, but the Secretary of War ruled that only Italian PW’s could be sent under the granted cobelligerent status.7 The matter rested until June 1944, when, after an appeal by Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Commanding General, Central Pacific Area (USAFCPA),8 1,000 Italian Fascist prisoners of war were sent to Hawaii. At first the War Department contemplated sending cooperative Italian PW volunteers to the Islands with the intention of later forming them into Italian service units; but with the adoption of the policy of employing Italian service units only in operations directed against Germany, only noncooperative Italian Fascist PW’s were sent.9

The American commander in Hawaii was also authorized to retain incoming Korean prisoners of war for use on Army labor projects.10

7 Memo, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, Actig IG, for DCofS, 16 May 45, sub: Prisoner of War Contract Labor and Limited Service Personnel, Pacific Ocean Areas. G-1 383.6 Labor (31 Dec 43). DRB, TAG.
8 USAFCPA was later redesignated Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC).
9 See entire file, OPD 383.6, Hawaii (sec. I) (S). DRB, TAG.
10 The majority of Korean PW’s had been impressed into Japanese service. Formerly they had been evacuated to the United States.
The Koreans were cooperative and willing workers and were allowed to work on labor projects outside the PW camps, a privilege resented by the few Japanese PW's retained in the Islands.\footnote{U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific and Predecessor Commands, "op. cit., vol. 45, incl. 9B; see also: MS, "History of Central Base Command During World War II," History of G-1, Sec. pp. 5-5. 7-5.7AA v. 1. OCMH, Gen Ref Off.}

The Commanding General, AFMIDPAC, prescribed the general labor missions for prisoners of war; but the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command, was responsible for the method of utilization. The latter authorized PW camp commanders to approve requests for prisoner labor.\footnote{HQ, AFMIDPAC, Unnumbered Cir. sec. II, sub: Employment of Prisoners of War. PW Camp, APO 95, Interrogation Report on Prisoners of War. G-2, POA, Reorganization History, Inactivation of Unit. DPRB, TAG.}

When the Italian PW's first arrived in the Hawaiian Islands, the war was in full progress and security was paramount. Camp commanders appointed guards for PW labor details in the ratio of 1 guard for every 10 prisoners. But as Allied advances met with success in the Pacific, the guarding of the PW's relaxed to where, near the end of hostilities, prisoners at Schofield Barracks worked without guards on an honor system. In general, one escort guard company, consisting of 3 officers and 135 enlisted men was provided for each 1,000 prisoners. Very few prisoners of war escaped.\footnote{MS, "History of PW Base Camp, APO 950, July 1944-December 1946," in History of 481st MP's. DPRB, TAG.}

PW camp commanders divided the prisoners into two categories: A (trustworthy) and B (untrustworthy). The majority of Japanese PW's were almost completely dominated or influenced by their own company and compound leaders in making decisions; thus they were considered untrustworthy. All PW compounds were inspected every 60 days, and a detailed report was made to the responsible headquarters. This included such items as classification and segregation of the prisoners, conditions of the premises, working hours, and types of work performed.

Many Korean and Italian prisoners of war had the tendency to overuse sick call. To rectify the situation, PW's who were on sick call three or more times in one week and who were returned to duty each time were given disciplinary punishment by the PW base camp commander upon the recommendation of the compound commander. Later, when sick call was held in the evening, the problem was solved. To combat loafing, camp commanders checked the PW time cards. If the prisoner completed 75 percent or less of his assigned work on three consecutive days, he was given a physical examination. If he was pronounced physically fit, he was given disciplinary punishment. Thus with the use of the task system plus adequate supervision and guarding, maximum effort was obtained from the prisoners of war.\footnote{MS, "History of PW Base Camp, APO 950, July 1944-December 1946," in History of 481st MP's. DPRB, TAG.}
The War Department established a “token” prisoner of war camp on Saipan during the summer 1944 which contained 50 Japanese prisoners of war and an undetermined number of Korean laborers (probably not more than 70) captured in the defense of the island. The Koreans, who had been in Japanese labor units, were employed while awaiting repatriation and proved to be “willing and efficient laborers.” The 50 Japanese prisoners were also employed and worked so well that Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman, Commanding General, Western Pacific Base Command, requested and was authorized an additional 200 PW's for labor. By the end of the war, this number had increased to 600.

Based on the experience of the island commander at Saipan, the commander at Guam also established a similar PW camp which eventually included 600 prisoners of war. Both the compounds on Saipan and on Guam were constructed and operated in accordance with War Department TM 19–500.15

In the Hawaiian Islands, prisoners of war were employed at army and airforce installations on the following types of work:

- Landscaping.
- Removing barb wire and tank obstacles.
- Carpentry.
- Laundry work.
- Maintenance of grounds and buildings.
- Shop work by blacksmiths, machinists, and mechanics.
- Painting quarters and barracks.
- Disposal of trash and garbage.
- Construction of walks, roadways, curbs, and culverts.
- Construction of volley ball, basketball, paddle, and tennis courts.
- Rodent and mosquito control.
- Supplying KP's and cooks' helpers.
- Painting murals.
- Loading, unloading, baling, packing, crating, segregating, and warehousing supplies and merchandise.
- Salvaging material.
- Restoration of real estate property.
- Building stone and coral retaining walls.
- Janitoring.
- Dismantling barracks.
- Repairing and manufacturing of furniture.
- Nursery work.
- Manufacturing liquid soap and paint remover.
- Hauling, sorting, and stacking lumber.
- Shoe repairing.
- Masonry.
- Cement finishing and bricklaying.

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Japanese prisoners of war in the Hawaiian Islands were largely of low caliber and were employed only on work details within their compounds. Generally the work performed by all the PW's was satisfactory, but occasionally small groups became uncooperative for short periods of time. In all such cases, local commanders meted out punishment in strict accordance with the Geneva PW Convention. Disciplining of a prisoner of war by fellow prisoners was not permitted.

The Southwest Pacific Theater

On 20 October 1944, the main invasion of the Philippine Islands began. Plans had been in the making for some time. Among these was the plan for the evacuation of prisoners of war. The task forces were
to establish temporary PW stockades where the prisoners were to be screened and safeguarded while awaiting evacuation. They were then to be transferred to the custody of the Services of Supply, Army Forces in the Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), as soon as it established bases.

As the Allied troops pushed inland, Services of Supply selected certain stockades, which had been constructed by the task forces on routes of communication and supply and on favorable terrain, as permanent PW camps. Other permanent camps were constructed where existing housing was unavailable. Owing to moderate climatic conditions, all construction was of a temporary nature, but the camps were equipped with the same sanitation facilities and general convenience afforded U.S. troop installations. Tentage, mostly of the squad type, was used for shelter with prefabricated buildings for administration. But until the surrender of the Japanese forces at Baguio on Luzon, very few prisoners of war were received. The total number held on 20 August 1945 did not exceed 20,000.17

The Japanese Surrender

On 2 September 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally. The surrender pact agreed to by the Japanese forces formed the basis for retaining certain prisoners of war for labor in places other than Japan. The terms were as follows:

Pending return to Japan, such elements of the Japanese armed forces and Japanese controlled armed forces as the designated commander may elect may be retained in any areas . . . for such purposes as he may direct, including among others, the following:

a. Destruction of fortifications, military installations, any enemy equipment;
b. Reconstruction and rehabilitation within areas which have been overrun or damaged as a result of war;
c. Safeguarding and maintenance of Japanese armament and equipment pending its final disposal;
d. Manning and maintenance of naval and merchant craft and equipment;
e. Explanation and demonstration of research and development projects and new or unique items of equipment;
f. Repair, operation and maintenance of military transportation of communication facilities;
g. Removal of mines, minefields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea, and air.18

18 JCS 1228/5, 19 Sep 45, pp. 21-27 (TS). Filed in Case 8 in P&O 382.8 (sec. I) (Cases 1 thru 20 except case 7) (TS). DRB, TAG. For other instructions, see: Ltr, Hq, USAFWESPAC to CG, Luzon Area Com. (P.), etc., 8 Nov 45, sub: Prisoner of War Branch Labor Camps. SCAP Legal Sec, Prisoner of War Policy File. DRB, TAG.
Classification of the Prisoners

The unconditional surrender of Japan resulted in a great influx of over 260,000 prisoners of war in the Philippines, and new camps had to be constructed. As each new camp was built, it was divided into segregated areas and compounds to house the various classes of prisoners—officers, enlisted men, prisoner-patients, and civilian enemy aliens. As soon as these PW’s reached base inclosures, they were segregated, and certain prisoners were designated as leaders of respective squads, platoons, companies, and PW camps. Since the PW’s were required to perform their own housekeeping the leaders were responsible for the maintenance and cleanliness of quarters of their respective units. They also relayed orders and performed other assigned duties.

PW officers were segregated from enlisted men according to the Geneva PW Convention, but special privileges as protected personnel were not given to any Japanese prisoners of war. Although the Japanese Government had ratified the International Red Cross Convention, it had not given its medical personnel necessary documentary papers. Nevertheless, those PW’s who were found to be medical personnel were assigned to care for the Japanese sick and wounded under the direction of U. S. medical personnel. But they worked as prisoners of war and not as protected personnel.

All Japanese PW’s were divided into two classes after screening—processed and categorized. A processed prisoner of war was one who had been questioned and found not to be connected with any war crime. His name was recorded, a serial number assigned, and he was sent to a branch PW labor camp pending repatriation. A categorized prisoner of war was one held as a war criminal or as a material witness to atrocities committed by members of the Japanese forces. These were segregated from the other prisoners, but were eligible for use as laborers under adequate security.

The Labor Directive

To overcome the initial reluctance of some commanders to use prisoner of war labor, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General, AFWESESPAC, ordered maximum utilization. "We must overcome the psychology that you cannot do this or that," he said. "... I want to see these prisoners work like 'p___ ants'.... Get rid of the idea that this place was built by heavy equipment. The pyramids and

19 This was done according to the relative rank of the prisoners.
21 The Convention required medical personnel to be documented.
22 Ltr, Henry L. Stimson, SW, to Sec of State, 7 Sep 45. Filed In Case 464, OCS 383.4 (Sec. VIII). (Cases 496-574) (S). DRB, TAG.
23 Ltr, Hq, USAFWE ESPAC, to CG, Base X; CG, Base M; etc, 1 Dec 45, sub: Prisoner of War Branch Labor Camps. SCAP Legal Sec, Prisoner of War Policy File. DRB, TAG.
the Appian Way were built by hand. I can’t understand why we cannot get some of these people to work. In the States, POW’s were considered best in work habits followed by civilians and then soldiers. If they do not work, put them on bread and water,” General Styer ordered.25

To comply with General Styer’s orders, American commanders built branch PW labor camps near work area sites to facilitate the work and to eliminate excessive transporting of the prisoners. The using organization constructed the camp, maintained the standards of cleanliness and sanitation, and complied with all provisions of the Geneva Convention. An American officer, responsible for PW security, commanded each branch camp.26

Two types of labor camps were established. Type 1 branch camp consisted of PW working groups approximately the size of an infantry company. This group provided its own cooks and housekeeping personnel. A minimum number of Japanese noncommissioned officers who supervised the camp housekeeping and internal duties and acted as overseers on labor projects was assigned to the group. The type 2 base camp consisted of working groups of 1,000 to 1,500 PW’s or more located in areas within walking distance of labor projects. This permitted full and profitable employment of the maximum number available. An overhead of only 5 percent of the Japanese PW’s could be retained within a branch labor camp during normal working hours.

The base or area command that furnished the PW’s controlled and administered the branch labor camps. If a branch camp was located outside the area of the supplying base camp, the base camp commander transferred the prisoners to a base camp within the new command concerned. All reports, records, and other administrative matters for the branch PW camp were handled by the base camp commander. If a branch camp worked for agencies not under the jurisdiction of the commander of the area or the base camp commander. In this case, the PW’s were attached to the service that requested them. The service was then responsible to the base commander for the security, administration, supply, medical service, and the supervision of the prisoners of war.27
The base camp furnished administrative personnel to the branch PW camps as follows: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of prisoners</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Medical officers</th>
<th>Aid men</th>
<th>Interpreters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-299</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-599</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-1,499</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the base camp furnished a liaison officer to each PW labor camp with 500 or more prisoners. He advised the camp commander on PW affairs, coordinated administrative work connected with the prisoners, and reported any continued violations of the Geneva PW Convention. In some areas, he also coordinated all requests for prisoner of war labor. 29

**Labor Policies**

To secure prisoners of war for labor, units or services in the Philippines usually submitted requests 72 hours in advance to the Prisoner of War Division, Theater Provost Marshal’s Office. When the request was approved, guards (furnished by the using unit) picked up the prisoners at the nearest PW branch labor camp. The nature of the work project determined the number of guards employed, and often a supervisor, who made spot checks, was the only guard used. No hard and fast rule governed the type of transportation used in moving the Japanese prisoners of war. Initially, vehicular transportation was not used due to its scarcity; however, the distances to some work sites and the hostility of the civilian populace toward the Japanese prisoners made it necessary to transport the prisoners to the work. 30

AFWESPAC commanded the using service to obtain maximum effort from the prisoners of war. It prescribed a 12-hour labor day that included in-transit time and a minimum of 8 hours straight work. Rest periods, other than for the midday lunch period, were not permitted. Night shift work was authorized, but the PW’s could not be used in excess of 6 consecutive days without a 24-hour rest period.

There were very few jobs on which prisoners of war could not be employed. The policy adopted stipulated that they might be used

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28 SOP, Hq, USAFWESPAC, 17 Oct 45, sub: Prisoner of War Work Camps. SCAP Legal Sec, Prisoner of War Labor. DRB, TAG.
29 Ltr, Hq, Base X, for distribution, 21 Nov 45, sub: Prisoner of War Labor. Filed in ibid.; see also: Ltr, Hq, AFWESPAC, to CG, Luzon Area Cmd, etc., 8 Nov 45, sub: Prisoner of War Branch Labor Camps. SCAP Legal Sec, PW Policy File. DRB, TAG.
30 "The Provost Marshal’s History, Campaigns of the Pacific," op. cit., ch. VI, p. 25; see also: Memo 24, Hq, Base M, AFWESPAC, 4 Sep 46, sub: Use of Prisoners of War. Misc Correspondence, Luzon #2, SCAP. DRB, TAG.
on the same work on which U. S. personnel might be employed, provided adequate safeguards against injury and health were supplied. AFWESPAC, for the security of the prisoners, did prohibit their use on the docks in Manila and in other densely populated sections. However, it permitted them to be used in the areas immediately behind the docks, such as in storage and warehouse areas.

A theater directive established the following priority of uses for prisoner of war labor:

1. Essential projects at posts, camps, and stations;
2. Essential military projects outside of posts, camps, and stations;
3. Essential civilian projects;
4. Useful but nonessential projects at posts, camps, and stations;
5. Useful but nonessential projects outside of posts, camps, and stations;
6. Useful but nonessential civilian projects.

Under AFWESPAC regulations, only prisoners of war could be employed on paid work. Common PW labor was paid 6 cents a day (12 centavos) and skilled labor 9 cents a day (18 centavos). The latter included the work of PW carpenters, plumbers, vehicular mechanics and painters, artists, foremen, and labor bosses. In some cases, certain administrative offices paid PW interpreters and translators the skilled labor rate. The labor pay for prisoners of war was based upon normal civilian and trade customs in the area. It was possible to adopt this rational basis since Japan did not ratify the Geneva Convention, and the obligations of the Convention between the United States and Japan existed on the *mutatis mutandis* basis agreed upon in 1942. On this basis necessary practical adjustments could be made, and nonessential features of the Convention could be modified.

Adequate supervision was necessary for good work returns. On 13 December 1945, Maj. Gen. Ewart G. Plank, Commanding General, Base X, after inspecting PW labor projects in the Philippines, stated:

*Recent inspections have established indelibly in my mind the considered opinion that the American officer and enlisted man in Base X is rapidly ruining the demonstrated value of the Japanese Prisoner of War for labor. With increasing frequency I now observe Japanese POWs physically at a work site but not working. . . . I believe all concerned have recognized the real value of Japanese labor and I now serve this warning in the most emphatic way at my disposal that unless Japanese POW labor is properly supervised on the basis of real work in accordance with well-understood and clear instructions, retrogression in accomplishment will set in and most likely will stick . . . .*
compliance. Improper supervision on the part of American officers and enlisted men was dealt with immediately.\textsuperscript{33} Subordinate commands were instructed that under the terms of the Geneva Convention prisoners of war could be compelled to work, and in emergencies they were to take advantage of this provision.

With the redeployment of American troops, AFWESPAC instituted a program to make able-bodied prisoners of war more accessible to using agencies. To accomplish this, by the end of December 1945 it established 24 new branch PW labor camps throughout the Philippine Islands and on Okinawa.\textsuperscript{34} With the growing need for labor, camp commanders relaxed certain policies governing PW employment. For example, at first prisoners of war could not be used to prepare or to handle food; but on 8 January 1946 this ruling was rescinded, and the prisoners could be used after they were given the regular food handler’s medical inspection required for United States troops. PW camp commanders distributed skilled and unskilled workers to the different services according to the needs presented by them and the technical services used Japanese PW’s in service units organized under U.S. tables of organization and equipment. All in all, American troops employed approximately 80,000 prisoners of war in the Philippines at the peak.\textsuperscript{35}

**Types of Labor Performed**

In AFWESPAC, the prisoners were employed on both skilled and unskilled labor tasks. At a Signal Corps depot, they crated and packaged signal supplies; segregated stock; worked in warehouses and shipping areas; took inventories of equipment; and maintained signal power generators, motors, and trucks. For the quartermaster, they constructed and operated reefers; operated laundries and sawmills; loaded creosote poles; marked surplus property; and outloaded supplies. Other prisoners of war handled PX supplies; worked on company trash details; repaired and maintained gas lines; did general construction work; worked in salvage yards and in public utilities used for the armed forces; operated Red Cross canteens and PW medical dispensaries; repaired ships; and operated various pieces of mechanical equipment.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Ltr, Maj Gen Ewart G. Plank, Cmg. Tq. Base X, to Cofs, Sections and Services, etc., 13 Dec 45. Filed in SCAP Legal Br, Prisoner of War Labor. DRB, TAG.
\textsuperscript{34} Ltr, PM Svc, Base X, USAFWESPAC to CG, Base X, 5 Jan 46, sub: Military History of Base X. Opn Rpt, USAFISPA, Off of the PM, Base X (1 Sep 45). DRB, TAG.
\textsuperscript{35} "The Provost Marshal's History, Campaigns of the Pacific," op. cit., ch. VI, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{36} Ltr, Office of PM, Prison Div (Leyte Detention Center), to CG, AFWESPAC, 6 Aug 46, sub: Projects in which Prisoner of War Labor is Utilized; ltr, CO, Hq, 31st Hospital Center, to CG, Hq, Base X, 19 Dec 45, sub: Retention of Prisoners of War for Labor; ltr, Hq, Base M, USAFWESPAC, to CG, AFWESPAC, 22 Aug 46, sub: Civilian and Prisoner of War Labor Policies and Procedures. All in SCAP Legal Sec, PW Labor. DRB, TAG.
Installation commanders armed certain PW’s with clubs and flashlights and used them to police and maintain civilian areas and to guard U.S. property. They were most efficient and prevented many thefts by local inhabitants. There was no escape hazard as the PW preferred the security of the U.S. installation to encounters with the Filipinos. Prisoners of war who were incapable of doing sustained work were usually detailed to garden, road, and area maintenance for two or three hours daily.\(^{37}\)

Labor troubles also occurred in the Pacific theater. Filipino labor unions, which were well established in port areas, objected to the use of Japanese PW’s at harbor and dock installations, especially at Manila, and urged that Philippine nationals be employed instead. To satisfy the labor unions, AFWESPAC directed that Japanese PW’s would not be used on any projects that would tend to displace existing Filipino labor.\(^{38}\)

**Repatriation**\(^{39}\)

After the surrender of the Japanese on 2 September 1945, the United States planned to repatriate the Japanese prisoners of war to their homeland at the earliest possible date. This was based on two decisions. The first was the Potsdam Declaration which stated that after being disarmed, prisoners of war would be permitted to return to their homes. Second was a War Department ruling that PW’s would be returned to Japan as promptly as shipping permitted.\(^{40}\)

Consequently in October 1945, the War Department made arrangements for the rapid repatriation of all PW’s to Japan, Korea, or Formosa. From 12 October 1945, when the first prisoner of war was shipped to his homeland, to 31 December 1945, more than 90,000 were repatriated.\(^{41}\)

Pursuant to the governing policy of using able-bodied prisoners of war as long as they were available, the majority of the earlier repatriated PW’s and internees were physically unfit for labor. The Supreme Commander Allied Forces Pacific (SCAP) established priority for repatriation in the following order:


\(^{40}\) Memo for Record, Lt Col Kunzig, 18 Jun 46, sub: Retention of Japanese Prisoners of War in the Pacific Areas (TS). Filed in Case 8, P&O 383.6 (sec. I) (Cases 1 thru 20 except case 7) (TS). DBB, TAG.

The value and usefulness of Japanese prisoners of war for labor became well established, and the redeployment of American troops increased the dependency on their continued use. When a shortage of American personnel threatened to curtail maintenance and repair of essential installations in the Philippines, SCAP suspended repatriation from 1 January 1946 to 31 March 1946. The commanding generals of Army Forces in the Western Pacific, Pacific Air Command, U. S. Army, and Army Forces in the Middle Pacific, requested a further retention of the efficient Japanese labor until 1 July 1946. Later they submitted an additional request to retain some prisoners until January 1947. These commanders considered that a more rapid repatriation would seriously disrupt the processing of excess and surplus property, depot operations, base close-outs, and necessary construction.

Since the U. S. policy required that PW's be returned to Japan as promptly as shipping priorities permitted and that retention depended entirely on the availability of shipping, the Commander in Chief, Far East Command, directed that a low priority on shipping be assigned when the United States would benefit by delaying the

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a. Sick and wounded;
b. Female internees and children (in cases of families, the male accompanied his family);
c. Male civilians;
d. Male military personnel.

return of the prisoners. In turn, he increased repatriation from the Southeast Asia Command. This adjustment in policy was approved by the War Department on the basis of military necessity. However, on 8 August 1946, SCAP announced plans to return all Japanese PW's and displaced personnel of the U.S.-controlled areas by the end of the year. This affected some 45,000 in the Philippines, 5,000 in Hawaii, 7,000 in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and 12,000 in Okinawa. These were duly evacuated in three equal increments from each of the above areas during October, November, and December.

**China-Burma-India Theater**

Very few prisoners of war were captured by American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Because so few were taken, no provision was made for PW enclosures nor for the use of military police escort guard companies. Instead, a policy was established whereby all prisoners of war taken by American forces (and Chinese troops under American command) operating in and from India would be turned over to the nearest British headquarters. PW's taken in China were to be turned over to the Chinese Government.

Allied forces in the China-Burma-India Theater captured approximately 100 prisoners of war. British forces interned them near New Delhi, India, where they interrogated them for intelligence purposes. They were not used for labor.

**Summary**

Throughout the entire Pacific area, U.S. forces captured only a few prisoners of war before the capitulation of the Japanese Army. Consequently, prisoner of war employment constituted a very minor detail. Before the surrender, American commanders evacuated prisoners of war captured south of 5°N. to Australia where the Australian Government assumed charge in return for lend-lease aid from the United States. Those captured in the China-Burma-India Theater were turned over to the nearest British headquarters. Elsewhere, they were evacuated through the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

Shortly before the war ended, a few prisoners of war were used successfully in the Hawaiian Islands and on Guam and Saipan. With the surrender of Japan, however, a large group of cooperative pris-
oners became available for labor. The bulk of these were employed in the Philippine Islands, on Okinawa, and in the Marianas.

U. S. forces established permanent base and branch labor camps from which the using services drew the prisoners for labor purposes. Labor problems were few, and the prisoners were most cooperative. The labor performed was excellent in quality and greatly assisted in the rapid repatriation of American troops and equipment.
Almost from its inception the United States Army has employed captured enemy personnel in times of war. And almost without exception the United States Army has entered each war without adequate plans for their employment. From the Revolutionary War through the War of the Rebellion there was no definite policy for using prisoners of war in productive labor. For the most part, the prisoners were used in exchange—to regain men for the military service. Some were used for retaliation, but this was the exception rather than the rule. The Spanish-American War saw the efforts of one commander to make plans before battle for the use of the labor of prisoners of war, but his suggestions were not accepted. World War I emphasized the broadened scope of modern warfare with its large armies and all-out industrial mobilization; but above all, it emphasized the fact that in modern warfare manpower is at a premium. The United States was actually involved in World War I before adequate plans were made for prisoner of war employment and for an agency vested with their control. Yet despite the experiences learned in this conflict, the agencies that would normally be responsible for future PW planning were disbanded when the conflict ended. It was on the eve of involvement in World War II that definitive plans were again made for prisoners of war and that an agency was reactivated for their control.

The outbreak of World War II caught the United States in the middle of feverish planning for enemy aliens and prisoners of war. Only general plans had been made between World War I and World War II, particularly for prisoner of war employment. The prewar industrial mobilization plans did not include provisions for their labor, and only limited provisions for their internment and use had been included in military mobilization plans. The plans had to be developed as the war progressed: because of limited guidance, overseas commanders had to develop their own policies and procedures to solve the problems connected with prisoner of war employment.

At first, a very stringent interpretation of the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 pertaining to prisoner of war employment was taken; but as the war progressed and the prac-
tices of the other belligerents became known, a more liberal interpretation was adopted. All provisions protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the prisoners were closely followed.

The World War II prisoner of war labor program provides many valuable lessons for future planners:

1. The success of the program plus the cooperation and productivity of the prisoners far outweighed the security risks that had to be taken. The "calculated risk" program proved its worth. The employment of the prisoners resulted in a conservation of civilian labor and enabled military personnel to be transferred to combat units. In paid work on military reservations alone, the prisoners performed 90,629,233 man-days of labor during the period from early 1943 to 31 December 1945.1

Using $4 per day as the average rate of pay for civilian unskilled workers on military reservations, it is estimated that in 1943 the prisoner labor performed on military installations had a value of approximately $14,000,000.2 During 1944 when prisoner labor was materially expanded at military installations, including the technical service depots, the records indicate that the labor performed by the prisoners was worth approximately $70,000,000.3 All in all, the use of prisoners of war in lieu of civilians or American soldiers at military establishments resulted in a government savings of more than $131,000,000 while the collections from PW contract work netted a total of $39,000,000.4 The net total derived from both military and contract employment of prisoners of war has been estimated as high as $230,000,000.5 This amount cannot be considered as a complete reimbursement to the United States for the costs involved (housing, food, guards, transportation, etc.) from the time of their capture to their release. In addition when the prisoners of war and civilian enemy aliens were freed in their homelands, they were given $274,771,389.60 in occupation currency for pay and allowances.6 But the labor performed by the PW's made a valuable contribution toward the settlement of the costs involved.

Not only was the use of the prisoners profitable, but they successfully offset the critical manpower shortage. Both agriculture and industry suffered initially from a shortage of labor due to the security program adopted by the War Department, a program which in time proved to be wholly unnecessary. Security violations and sabotage failed to materialize after the prisoners were more widely used. In future planning, steps must be taken to locate small prisoner of war

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2 No doubt some of this work was for post beautification and for "deluxe" policing, but no breakdown between essential and luxury work is available.
3 "History of the PMGO in WW II," op. cit., p. 430.
5 "History of the PMGO in WW II," op. cit., p. 480.
6 DA Master General Ledgers. F & A, Off, C of F.
HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION

camps in areas where labor shortages are most likely to occur, regardless of the apparent risks involved.

2. The hostility of both civilian and military personnel toward the use of PW labor must be overcome in order to achieve maximum utilization. During World War II, as many as 95.6 out of each 100 prisoners of war worked for private contractors and in military establishments with only a minimum of disciplinary problems.\(^7\) Organized labor, especially, must be acquainted with the basic fact that in time of all-out mobilization all labor, including that of prisoners of war, is essential. Provision must be made to avoid the labor disputes that arose during World War II over the use of PW labor.

3. All types of work must be taken into consideration in planning for PW employment. Planning before World War II did not consider the possibility of using captured enemy personnel as contract labor even though prisoners of war had been used by private employers during World War I. Only the acute shortage of civilian labor forced the adoption of this type of employment; consequently, the program had to develop as it went along. Despite this, the contract employment of the prisoners in the United States proved a beneficial wartime expedient. In the period from 1943 through 1945, approximately 34 million man-days of work were performed by prisoners of war on farms and in industry. The following figures show the man-days of prisoner labor in the major fields of contract work:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Forest operations</th>
<th>Food processing</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,882,852</td>
<td>5,047,867</td>
<td>4,229,588</td>
<td>4,058,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,466,080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5,621,849</td>
<td>1,247,812</td>
<td>1,253,064</td>
<td>771,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>13,794,923</td>
<td>3,800,055</td>
<td>2,976,524</td>
<td>3,287,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total: 34,219,185 man-days.\(^a\)


Contract labor constituted slightly over 25 percent of the total prisoner of war labor. The majority of the prisoners were used on military establishments.

4. Field commanders must be acquainted with the labor possibilities offered by captured enemy personnel as well as with the limitations on their use. Detailed employment plans providing for adequate guards, permissible work, and the scope of work must be made in advance. In the event of a sudden collapse of an opposing army,

a standard operating procedure for prisoners of war employment or for the use of disarmed enemy personnel must be ready to be placed into immediate effect.

5. To best provide for a prisoner of war employment program in the event of future hostilities, a comprehensive field manual should be provided. This manual should contain the policies and practices of World War II and should include improved tables of organization and equipment for the formation of prisoner of war labor units both at home and in the field. In this way, the labor units could be considered as a part of the regular troop basis with regard to mobilization assignment and movement. This would reduce the necessity for parallel command channels. Appropriate staff sections could be charged with the responsibilities for implementing policies and procedures established in the field manual.

6. The most important lesson of all to be remembered is that the use of prisoners of war during World War II was essential to the welfare and economy of our nation. U. S. military personnel were released for combat duty, and civilians were transferred to essential work. Crops vital to the economy of our nation were harvested that otherwise would have spoiled, and war industries were able to continue operations in the face of the civilian manpower shortage. Both civil and military authorities have stated that they could not have performed their functions except for the use of prisoner of war labor.

Every consideration must therefore be given to the employment of prisoners of war in the event of a future war, especially with a belligerent who may be numerically superior to our forces. International law permits their use, and the interpretation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 will depend on the practices adopted by the other nations of the world. The use of prisoners of war has proved feasible in the past and should prove to be just as effective and profitable in the future should hostilities occur again.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACofS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADSEC</td>
<td>Advance Section, Communications Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Forces Headquarters North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMIDPAO</td>
<td>Army Forces in the Middle Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFWESPAC</td>
<td>Army Forces in Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Army Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMET</td>
<td>Africa-Middle East Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Army Service Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Army of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British-ITI</td>
<td>Service unit formed from Italian army personnel and attached to a British unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>China-Burma-India Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAFPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cir</td>
<td>Circular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Classified Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA</td>
<td>Code name for the plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment along the St. Lo-Periers road west of St. Lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com Z</td>
<td>Communications Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Code name for the earliest preinvasion plans of France. Derived its name from the title of its commander—the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Command (Designate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCoS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-day</td>
<td>Invasion Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Disposition Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRB</td>
<td>Demobilized Personnel Records Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRB</td>
<td>Departmental Records Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Personnel Division of Divisional or Higher Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Supply Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>General Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl</td>
<td>Inclosure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Italian Service Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPS</td>
<td>Joint Staff Planners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBS</td>
<td>Mediterranean Base Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>British Forces in the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupation Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Mobilization Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Manuscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO</td>
<td>Mediterranean Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOUSA</td>
<td>Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASCO</td>
<td>North African Service Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATOUSA</td>
<td>North African Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPTUNE</td>
<td>Code name for the actual invasion plan of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCMH</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Military History</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Operations Division, War Department</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>OSW</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVERLORD</td>
<td>Code name for the general concept of the invasion of France</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;A</td>
<td>Personnel and Administrative Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>F&amp;O</td>
<td>Plans and Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Public Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Provost Marshal General</td>
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<td>PMOG</td>
<td>The Office of The Provost Marshal General</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QM</td>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
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<td>QMG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rp</td>
<td>Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen Doc</td>
<td>Senate Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAFF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Services of Supply</td>
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<td>Sub</td>
<td>Subject</td>
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<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPA</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM</td>
<td>Technical Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Tables of Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Tables of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPMG</td>
<td>The Provost Marshal General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSFET</td>
<td>Theater Service Forces, European Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UK - United Kingdom
USA - United States Army
USAF - United States Air Force
USAFCPA - United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
USAFIA - United States Army Forces in Australia
USAFIME - United States Army Forces in the Middle East
USES - United States Extension Service
USFET - United States Forces, European Theater
U.S.-ITI - Service Unit formed from Italian Army personnel and attached to a U. S. unit
USMNAM - United States Military North African Mission
USW - Under Secretary of War
V-E Day - 8 May 1945
V-J Day - 2 September 1945
WCD - War College Division
WD - War Department
WDAGO - War Department Adjutant General's Office
WDSS - War Department Special Staff
WFA - War Foods Administration
WMC - War Manpower Commission
WPD - War Plans Division
ZI - Zone of the Interior
Bibliography

The bibliography that follows does not include the Department of the Army records that comprise the source for much of this study. Most of these documents can be found in the Departmental Records Branch of The Adjutant General's Office. Other primary source material can be found in the National Archives. An examination of the citations will best indicate the principal records and their locations.


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## Appendix

### Service Units Utilizing Indigenous and PW Labor in the Mediterranean Theater—November 1945*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total utilized</th>
<th>U. S. strength supported per unit</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Chemical Service Co. (Receives stores and issues CW equipment in support of 5,000 to 10,000 troops)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Chemical Service Co. Decontamination—30,000 to 50,000 troops.</td>
<td>3–500</td>
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<td>15 Dec 44</td>
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<td>Engineer General Service Regt.</td>
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* Not computed.

*Source: "Digest of Principal Type Service Units Utilized on Mediterranean Theater of Operations" revised Nov 45, G-4 Sec, MTOUSA. Geog L Mediterranean 320 (Service Units) Nov 45. OOMH, Gen Ref Off.
### Service Units Utilizing Indigenous and PW Labor in the Mediterranean Theater—November 1945—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>TO</th>
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Service Units Utilizing Indigenous and PW Labor in the Mediterranean Theater—November 1945—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total utilized</th>
<th>U.S. strength supported per unit</th>
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<td>Col. 10</td>
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<td>C 3, C 4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C 3, C 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ordnance**

<p>| Ordnance Depot Co                         | 9–57          | 6     | 1,373          | 0                               | 91,000                           |
|                                          | 1 Jun 43      |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Hq &amp; Hq Det, Ord. Bn                     | 9–76          | 10    | 46             | 0                               | 54,600                           |
|                                          | 9 Nov 44      |       |                |                                 |                                 |
|                                          | 19 May 44     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Evacuation Co                       | 9–187         | 3     | 96             | 55                              | 182,000                          |
|                                          | 2 Oct 42      |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Heavy Auto Maint. Co               | 9–197         | 5     | 2,713          | 690                             | 109,200                          |
|                                          | 27 May 44     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
|                                          | 30 Sep 44     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Heavy Maint. Co (FA)               | 9–9           | 3     | 380            | 0                               | 69,300                           |
|                                          | 3 Jul 43      |       |                |                                 |                                 |
|                                          | C 1           |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Hq and Hq Det. Ord. Grp                 | 9–12          | 2     | 0              | 27                              | 182,000                          |
|                                          | 15 Apr 44     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Ammo. Co                           | 9–17          | 13    | 2,577          | 2,646                           | 42,000                           |
|                                          | 17 Feb 45     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Hvy. Maint. Co (tank)             | 9–37          | 2     | 764            | 0                               | 273,000                          |
|                                          | 18 May 45     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Maint. Co (AA)                     | 9–217         | 1     | 26             | 0                               | 546,000                          |
|                                          | 28 Mar 44     |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Ord. Base Armament Maint. Bn           | 9–315         | 3     | 6,124          | 548                             | 182,000                          |
|                                          | 4 May 45      |       |                |                                 |                                 |
| Hq and Serv Co Ord Base Armament Maint. Bn or Ord Base Auto Maint. Bn | 9–316 | 4 | 2,510 | 595 | 136,500 |</p>
<table>
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<th>Designation</th>
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<th>Civilian</th>
<th>PW</th>
<th>U.S. strength supported per unit</th>
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<td>6½</td>
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<td>310</td>
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</table>

* Not computed.
## Service Units Utilizing Indigenous and PW Labor in the Mediterranean Theater—November 1945—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total utilized</th>
<th>U. S. strength supported per unit</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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### Signal

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### Service Units Utilizing Indigenous and PW Labor in the Mediterranean Theater—November 1945—Con.

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