

CHINA'S PACIFIC POLICY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 17-06-2005		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug 2004 - Jun 2005	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CHINA'S PACIFIC POLICY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENIUM				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTOR(S) CAPTAIN CLAU AKSEL WAMMEN				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Based on Barry Buzan's theory, the study concludes that today China cannot be said unequivocally to be performing as a player in a mature anarchy. It shows that there has been a change in the Chinese perception of the outside world and in China's security policy throughout the 1990s. The movement toward a more mature performance has become more marked the past seven to eight years. This research sought to determine the development and status in China's Pacific policy over the past two decades. The research used a theoretical approach provided by Buzan to analyze and determine factors relevant to security policy. Buzan recommends a broadening of the security concept both horizontally and vertically. On the horizontal axis, security is dependent on political democracy and a culture of human rights; social and economic development; environmental sustainability; and military stability. Buzan identifies five dimensions of security: political, societal, economic, environmental, and military, which serve as analytical tools. The research analyzes the five security dimensions against the various levels in the international system. The research points out a method and mechanics which ideally can give a good hint about a country's progress within the international system.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS China and Taiwan, China and Japan, China and the Spratly Islands, Pacific policy, Security policy, International System, Pacific Relations, Mature Anarchy, Immature Anarchy					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU	139	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

CHINA'S PACIFIC POLICY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM. by CAPT Claus A. Wammen, 139 pages.

Based on Barry Buzan's theory, the study concludes that today China cannot be said unequivocally to be performing as a player in a mature anarchy. It shows that there has been a change in the Chinese perception of the outside world and in China's security policy throughout the 1990s. The movement toward a more mature performance has become more marked the past seven to eight years.

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The research analyzes the five security dimensions against the various levels in the international system.

The research points out a method and mechanics which ideally can give a good hint about a country's progress within the international system.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe many thanks to a number of people who have shared in the completion of this work. My appreciation goes to each member of my advisory committee, Dr. Jerold Brown, Dr. Gary Bjorge and LTC (Retired) Joseph G. D. Babb, for their insightful assistance along the way; and for helping me to maximize the benefits of my MMAS experience.

Thanks to the members of my seminar group for their questions, challenges, and overall input, as well as for sharing in the process.

I also owe lots of appreciation to my excellent proofreader, Rhea Chuber. Without her help it would definitely have been hard to express such complex issues.

Finally, my greatest thanks to my wife, Tine, for her constant support, understanding and love throughout this experience, and to my children--Alma and Conrad--for making each day fun and exiting, and helping me keep my true priorities in order.

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ACRONYMS

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Community
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
C4I	Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
IMF	International Monetary Fund
CCP	China's Communist Party
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NMD/TMD	National Missile Defense/Theater Missile Defense
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SLOC	Sea-Line of Communication
START	Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
WAPA	The Warsaw Pact
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This thesis's main concern is Modern China, but since China as a country has its foundation more than 2,000 years ago, it is not enough just to focus on the conditions within the past 25 years in order to fully understand China's situation in the Pacific area.¹ The Chinese culture was the dominant culture in East Asia through the past 2,500 years, and even now China is marked by the idea that it remains "The Central Kingdom," which has historically been its self-image. As a result of the Chinese civil war, which was fought after the Second World War, China was divided into the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan. In 1949 the Communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, took victory on the mainland, the main part of the country, and transformed it into a communist state, the PRC. The losers of the battle for the mainland, the ROC government, led by President Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan where they maintained political control, promoted a market-based economy, and encouraged traditional Chinese values. In the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a socialist republic with a planned economy. The CCP also worked to eliminate many traditional Chinese values. In the late 1970s the PRC began moving toward liberalization and at the same time began to regulate the population growth.²

Through the 1980s China experienced massive economical growth, which was necessary to support the world's largest population. As the country developed from an agrarian society to an industrial society, it demanded greater resources and better connections to the outside world.

Background

The dominant theory in international policy is that the international system belongs to the traditional theory--or, as it is also called, the realistic school.³ The realist school rests on two fundamental assumptions regarding the international system. Both are assumed to be true or substantiated in a broader connection of philosophy of life.⁴ These assumptions are:

1. The international system is a decentralized system of free and equal states.

A decentralized international system is one with no central governing authority. No authority issues laws and binding resolutions to the states, as known from the individual's involvement in the domestic policy. Within states legislative, practicing and judging authorities are found, which are not to be found in an international system. This is the reason the international system is decentralized or as it is also called in this connection, anarchic.

2. The individual states are left with their own means to secure survival as a part of the international system.

When the states are left with their own means to secure survival, they are left to their own military means. This is not to say that economic and other resources are of no importance--they are; but the states as units in the international system only possess significance if they display military capacities (principle of self-help).

One can say that these two fundamental assumptions lay out minimum attributes that are common to the realistic school's different variations.

When these minimum attributes are tied to other assumptions, two different sub-schools within the realistic school occur. These two subschools include two very different

schools--and then a mixture of the two. Each involves a different understanding of the phenomenon “international organization” yet is relevant to the employment of any international organization.

1. The Hobbesian Tradition (The Immature Anarchy)

According to the Hobbesian tradition, the international system is a system of states in a permanent state of war, where everybody is in constant struggle with each other. In this state of war any states’ interests are in direct contradiction to any other state – so, the gain of one state is the loss of another state (zero-sum-game). War is the normal activity while peace, in Hedley Bull’s words, is “a period of recuperation from the last war and preparation for the next.”⁵ Any state has the liberty to follow its goals without moral or legal bindings. Morality and law make sense within a society, but such is only to be found within the states – not among them. If the states anyway should commit to limitations by rules, principles, or arrangements with other states, it will only happen as long as the states find it beneficial or smart.

2. The Grotian Tradition (The Mature Anarchy)⁶

According to the Grotian tradition it makes sense to talk about an international society of states. This is why the Grotian tradition views international policy as an area where the states bind themselves by accepting to follow rules, norms, and moral principles; not only because it is smart or beneficial in the actual situation, but because it is necessary to be able to exist side by side and cooperate in the international society. As such, it is normal in the international society that in the relationships between states elements of both conflict and cooperation occur. According to the Grotians, these conflicts do not ordinarily make a zero sum-relationship, in which one’s gain is another’s

loss. In contradiction to the Hobbesians the relationship between states is viewed as a growing relationship, where everybody can gain although everybody might not gain equally.⁷ In contrast to the Hobbesians, war is looked upon as something out of the ordinary, which could be avoided--and only occurs in very special occasions.

Referring to the realistic school's two minimum-assumptions, we can characterize the Hobbesian tradition by saying that it occurs by combining the two minimum-assumptions with the assumption that the structural characteristics of the international system makes war between states a structural necessity. Thereby, war becomes normal and peace abnormal--a pause in between wars. The Grotian tradition, on the contrary, occurs by combining the two minimum assumptions with the structural characteristics that peace is normal and war, from a structural viewpoint is unnecessary. The relationship between the states is a growing relationship where everybody gains at the same time, however, not necessarily equally.

A special variant of this growing relationship is found within the international system in the highly developed subsystem within the international system. Here there is high interdependence economically due to the economical division of labor and specialization at the security political area due to weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, that only allows common security or common destruction.⁸

The two school directions' different understanding of the structural necessities in the international system is of special and important value to the decisions makers, especially in crisis situations. That is, the understanding of the international system decides the expectations of the decisions by other players. So, self-fulfilling prophecies are hidden within the different understandings. If conflict, even armed, is expected, one

can provoke it unintentionally--the same goes for cooperation. So, a relationship between understandings and practical consequences are established.

It can thus be seen that the realistic school varies from the Hobbesian understanding of war as an inexorable necessity to the Grotian understanding of an international society of states where war can occur--but only in the event of structural necessity. It is also vital to point out that in the Grotian tradition, international organizations are not valued in a way that they can be compared with the states as players in the international system. An international organization is no stronger than its member states or at least no stronger than the most important member states wants it to be.⁹

As mentioned earlier, apart from the two main directions, there also exists a mixture of the two. Barry Buzan describes the difference between the Hobbesians and the Grotians from a developmental perspective: the Hobbesian “traditional” anarchy is an expression of an immature, “earlier” development stage of the international system, while the Grotian “mature” anarchy is a “later” stage of development.¹⁰ Buzan views the immature anarchy as one end of a spectrum in which, at the other end, we have the mature anarchy.¹¹ In between these two ends, there exist various levels of maturity which reflect different stages of development of the international system and various subsystems. The maturity, as such, does not have to pass off equally at all places within the international system, which normally, and at the same time consists of mature and immature subsystems.

China’s growth as an economic and military power--and its increasing significance in the region around the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea have created security concerns in many countries.

This thesis examines the validity of these concerns using a theoretical framework developed by Barry Buzan. Buzan, professor of international studies at The University of Warwick and project director at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen, recommends a broadening of the security concept both horizontally and vertically. On the horizontal axis, security is seen as dependent on political democracy and a culture of human rights, social and economic development, environmental sustainability, as well as military stability. In this regard Buzan identifies five dimensions of security, namely political, societal, economic, environmental and military, which serve as analytical tools or “ordering priorities . . . woven together in a strong web of linkages.”¹² The environmental sector, in particular, is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. The vertical hierarchy of analytical levels (from individual, state, and regional to international) is an enabler to see how the referent objects of security have evolved to include both state and nonstate players. State or national security is redefined to encompass human security.

The main purpose of this thesis is to reveal which factors on Buzan’s horizontal and vertical axes have influenced Chinese security policy over the past fifteen years.¹³ Buzan’s work has been chosen since he is internationally recognized for looking forward to a new field of international security studies as a necessary framework for understanding the politics of the post-Cold War international system.

Buzan’s five dimensions will be used to discuss whether or not China currently is performing as if she is a player in a mature anarchy; a structure described by Buzan in which benefits of fragmentation can be enjoyed without the costs of continuous armed struggle and instability; or if China continues to conduct security policy as if she belongs

to the immature anarchy, defined by Buzan as one in which units, as an example, are held together by a force of élite leadership. A determination will be made of whether or not Chinese security policy has changed over the past fifteen years, and if so, which factors have changed it. Since the thesis is based on theories, It is realized that it will be hard to come up with a solid answer. As described earlier, the maturity of the international system is a fluid phenomenon, which only exists in theory. However, the project will point out a method and mechanics, which ideally can give a good hint about a country's relationship to the international system.

Over the past twenty-five years, China has gone from a communistic state to a current one-party state with a communistic ideological foundation, open to outside contact and influence. China's current economic policy seems to be a mixture of traditional Chinese views and liberal influences. This particular economic policy is believed to have been some kind of a lever to crack the Chinese wall of standoffish ness and, over the past ten to twelve years, a number of areas have been opened. Because China has acquired a growing role regionally and globally, an attempt is made to assess if China currently is performing as if a player within the mature anarchy.

It is fully intentional that the focus is on the mature anarchy. Today, most industrial countries cannot afford to view the world from a narrow perspective as to security since the majority of crises between countries are solved through political or economic measures.¹⁴ The believe is that China cannot be characterized as a fully active player within the mature anarchy. However, a number of sources seem to suggest that China is progressing and acts like a player within the mature anarchy or even performs as a mature anarchy. The development in the region around the Yellow Sea and the South

China Sea is of significant importance in the near future, since a growing part of the world's economy is centered in that area. Even though the USA is still the largest economy in the world, the economies of China and Japan are growing, and together appear to be quickly approaching that of the USA. As of today, the economy of China is growing faster than the economy of the USA.

In an analysis of a country's security policy it is not sufficient to look only at the country's relationships at the state level. Other conditions also influence events, that is, the structure of the international system and the relationship between the Great Powers. For those reasons China's security policy will have to be seen at the system level. In order to follow Buzan's theory on the mature anarchy, a hybrid between the state level and the system level will be considered. It is at the regional level that China plays an increasingly important part.

Although in Western opinion China is a dictatorship, without many rights for the individual, there are factors within the security of the individual, which also are of importance to the security of the state level. However, since this research refers to the state as a player, the state's influence on the individual is not discussed.¹⁵

Definitions

Since Buzan is providing the framework for this thesis, it is important to understand how he uses the terminology. Buzan describes the international political system as states interacting in an anarchical environment where both actors and the system mutually create the settings. Because states are sovereign the association of such entities will hence be anarchic since its members must reject an overarching government.

Buzan argues that states by defining and defending themselves construct and maintain an anarchic system. Only if and when a world state takes over will this process ever cease to pull towards the most anarchic end of the spectrum. Buzan points to the character of the individual and sovereign state rather than that of the international system as the effective force. This is currently well illustrated by the difficulty facing EU in implementing the new EU Constitution when individual states have to pledge full compliance--by either national election or parliamentary vote.

Applying the systemic perspective of international security helps to identify a number of features, such as density, polarity, the character of states and the nature of international society, which mediate the condition of anarchy. Interdependence between national security and the international system is derived from this perspective and according to Buzan weak states should be less likely to generate and support international society than strong ones.

Buzan describes a continuous spectrum ranging from the most immature anarchic system of completely independent states amongst who any order, if it existed at all, would reflect only deference to superior power. It would be unstable in the long run.


The other end of the spectrum would logically be the very mature anarchy in which states could both consolidate their own identity and legitimacy, and recognize and accept each other's sovereign equality and territorial boundaries. An important prerequisite would be very stable and coherent individual states, meaning that maturity stems from the stability of the individual actor state.

Buzan describes the current level of anarchy somewhere in the middle of the continuum. This involves some unavoidable conflicts but also avoids the complete anarchic chaos.¹⁶

A mature anarchy requires members that are firm in their own definition, and can project their own inner coherence and stability out into the community of states. Only on that basis can a solid foundation be created for the promulgation and observance of mature anarchic norms based on the mutual respect of units. If all states had developed internally as nation-states or state-nations, then a Wilsonian-type norm of mutual respect for nations as self-determining cultural political entities could easily become a part of international society.¹⁷ This would have an enormous moderating impact on fragmentation, in that it would associate the political pattern of states with much deeper and more durable patterns of societal and territorial organization. The state as a purely institutional entity has no natural boundaries, and a system composed of such units is likely to be conflict prone and power oriented. But if the notion of the state is broadened to include specified national and territorial criteria, then the state becomes at least potentially a much more fixed and defined object, with fewer grounds for posing threats to its neighbors.

Between these two rather unlikely extremes lies a whole range of possible international anarchies, including the current. The present anarchy lies somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, for if it is obviously a long way from the calm and stable realms and maturity, it is just as obviously well removed from unbridled chaos.¹⁸

If the process was to be depicted graphically, it would look like this:



Thesis Statement

The thesis will use Buzan’s theory on the development of the mature anarchy and the comprehensive security consideration to analyze the development of China’s security policy. In brief, the purpose of this thesis is to carry out an analysis of China’s supposed position as a player in the mature anarchy, looked upon from a comprehensive security consideration. I will balance the analysis so that all five of Buzan’s security dimensions are discussed.

Limitations

No clear set of official, measurable criteria is available to assess the maturity of a country’s political performance. Many articles have been written on that exact subject, but often the criteria are valued differently. In order to adequately answer the primary thesis question, the paragraph “Theory Methodical Considerations” and appendix 2, will outline the methods used to overcome this limitation.

Delimitations

This thesis deals with the period from 1989, when the East-West conflict was terminated, the Warsaw Pact (WAPA) fell apart and the massacre on Tiananmen Square

in Beijing took place, up until the elections in Taiwan in 2000. The quote below is underlining the choice of the beginning of the period.

“The student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere, many believed, represented the wave of the future; few doubted that Chinese society, in contrast to the government, favored liberalism and democracy. China, it was assumed, would soon resume its trajectory toward democratic transition, and those who formulated policy toward China in the early Clinton administration wanted to be on the right side of history.”¹⁹

The main effort of my analysis will concern the period from approximately 1992 to 1997/98. This will cover events from when most sanctions put into effect as a result of the massacre on Tiananmen Square were being cancelled to the period after the Asian crisis.²⁰

It is China’s cooperation with other countries that is interesting when analyzing China’s behavior under the mature anarchy. The mature anarchy’s continuous progress in Europe will be of considerable importance to the future development of mature anarchies. It was not until after the abolishment of WAPA and the expansion of authority of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that Europe began moving towards a mature anarchy.

The thesis will deal predominantly with China’s relationship to the countries around the Yellow Sea and not become deeply engaged with the relationship between China and the Superpower, the USA. The USA in relation to China’s role at the system level and the USA’s influence in the region around China will just simply be referred to.

In this thesis the world is considered to have only one Superpower (the USA), that is, a single polar world and not a hegemonic world, under which a number of superpowers are present, each as the strongest power in their region. In addition, this thesis considers the United Nations' (UN) obligations to all countries from an idealistic point of view.

The regional level will also be discussed. Here the main focus will be on the areas around the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea. The complex problems regarding Korea will not be discussed since that would be a thesis in itself. Regarding China's relationship to other countries at the state and the regional level, the primary focus will be on Japan and Taiwan. Japan because it is the only regional competitor and Taiwan because of its long-lasting conflict with China. Russia will only be dealt with if considered relevant to China or any of the other countries around the Yellow Sea or the South China Sea. Hong Kong and Macau will not be dealt with independently, but will be mentioned where of relevancy to China's security policy.

The environmental dimension will only be discussed to the extent that the sources can document that it is of influence and relevance to the other dimensions. Additionally it should mention that the subject does not figure separately in Barry Buzan's "People, States and Fear," but considering the separation of particularly the economical and the environmental security, all five dimensions will be discussed. The same assertions apply to the societal dimension on the system and the regional levels. The dimension will not be discussed at the state level.

Furthermore, the influence of the state from the individual level within the military dimension will not be discussed because no sources that demonstrate an

influence of China's security policy within the military dimension from the individual level have been found.

Since the influence of the state towards the individual level is not being discussed, conditions concerning the minorities of Tibet and Xinjiang will be excluded. They will not be discussed in context of the individual level although it is acknowledged that they can influence the security of the state. However, my assessment concludes that they do not have greater influence on the external relationships of the state because of the focus on Taiwan and on maritime territorial conflicts.

Theory Methodical Considerations

The jumping-off point for this thesis is the theory of the mature anarchy. As the main source of this theory Barry Buzan's work *People, States and Fear*, which describes the elements within the mature anarchy as well as the division of levels, is applied. Buzan's book provides a good model for analyzing inter-state relations because it adds more versions and variables to the perception of what seems to make up a threat. That is in contrast to the traditional understanding, which has been applied in numerous analyses during the Cold War. One of the main reasons that a broad security consideration is very useful today is that the military threat in a lot of evolving countries has faded. When threats fade, others usually arise in the wake. This is when the broad security consideration comes into its own, since a country's security policy today will have to build on numerous factors that will correspond to foreseeable threats. In my view, the theory of the mature anarchy also provides a solid, pragmatic solution to the great distance between realists and idealists since the world can no longer be defined solely as run by values belonging to a realistic interpretation of the situation. In addition to the

mentioned delimitations, the theory will be applied in full and out of the same assumption that China appears as a player in an anarchistic system.

Galtung's theory on peace and the influence of the globalization on even oppressed Chinese are both views which are magnifying for China's behavior within the different levels.²¹ Johan Galtung is a Norwegian academic, who is universally hailed as one of the most influential thinkers in the field of peace research and conflict resolution.

According to the general Western opinion, China is probably still a semi-dictatorship. Because of that, the foundation of the state and the behavior of the state are left with the control of the citizens and the ability to protect the citizens against impulses from other countries, regions, organizations and others. Next, when the relationship between the citizen and the state is analyzed according to the break-up of the mature anarchy (dimensions), it is relevant to come to conclusions on possibilities and limitations for the state outwardly. Here it is most relevant to start with the global organizations and the USA. They are probably most important to China and have some influence on China's role at the regional and the state level.²²

Analysis Considerations

The content of Appendix 1 is conclusions from the initial research, which I will briefly explain here.

The analysis applies the different levels of the international system to the previously mentioned security dimensions. The levels are: the global system level, the regional level, the state level, and the individual level.

The global system level: An important issue in the analysis is China's view of the rest of the world and the importance of the regular seat in the Security Council. It is of

significance to distinguish between facts and the Chinese understanding of the situation. The Chinese view on the surrounding world can be related to the military development on the strategic level, which will be explored in the analysis. The Chinese role on the global stage from an economic point of view is bound to be explored. Here G8 and WTO are obvious as benchmarks, since China is a potential competitor of the USA. Part of the dispute regarding China's admission in the WTO was human rights which is why the society model also will have to be included in the analysis.

The state and the regional level: Through the research a couple of important areas when it comes to China's interaction with other states in the region have been identified. The issues that are dealt with are displayed in Appendix A but, in general, they are issues where a certain attitude will have a spin-off effect towards the region--or to a particular country in the region.

The individual level: An analysis of the structure of the state is important in order to conclude whether or not we are dealing with a strong state. This will have an impact at the other levels.

Summary

The progressive development of China's economy, the large population and the central geographical position demand a closer look at how security policy is implemented and if there is any change or development in that field. This is of great importance to the region and to the world as a whole.

¹Jane's, "Security Assessment" *Jane's Sentinel Files*, (1997): 1.7.1.

²Since the 1970s, especially since its introduction of the reform and opening program, China has formulated a basic state policy to promote family planning in an all-

around way so as to slow-down population growth and improve its quality in terms of health and education. The Government encourages late marriage and late childbearing, and advocates the practice of “one couple, one child” and of “having a second child with proper spacing in accordance with the law regulations.” Family planning is also advocated among the ethnic minorities. Various provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government have formulated their own policies and regulations according to local conditions.

The Chinese Government pays great attention to the issue of population and development and has placed it on the agenda as an important part of the overall plan of its national economic and social development. The Government consistently emphasizes that population growth should be compatible with socio-economic development and be concerted with resource utilization and environmental protection. Since the 1990s, the Central Government has convened a National Summit Meeting on the issue of population and development once a year for the sake of adopting important decisions and measures based upon discussion and analysis of the major problems. The Government organizes and coordinates the relevant departments and mass organizations to implement the population and family planning program, striving to integrate the family planning program with economic development, poverty eradication, protection of ecological environment, rational resource utilization, universal education, advancement of public health and social security, and improvement of women's status. This is aimed at seeking a thorough solution to the problem of population and development.

³James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971), 30f, 65-101.

⁴P. Savigear, *European Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations* (Suffolk: Longman Publishers, 1978), 32-53.

⁵Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 25.

⁶*Ibid.*, 19

⁷*Ibid.*, 26f.

⁸David Owen, *Common Security, 'A Program for Disarmament'* (London & Sidney: Pan Books, 1982), p.1f.

⁹Inis L. Claude Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd rev. ed.(London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1964), 8–11.

¹⁰Barry Buzan is a professor of international studies at the University of Warwick and project director at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen.

¹¹Hans Branner, *Det ny Europa - international politik i forandring*. 3rd ed. (Viborg: Columbus, 1996), 20.

¹²Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 20.

¹³The dimensions are: political, military, economical, societal, and environmental.

¹⁴Buzan, 368.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 368.

¹⁶“Because states are essentially political constructs, the international political system is the most important part of the environment of states. Indeed, the political connection between states and system is so intimate that one is at risk of introducing serious misperception even by speaking of states *and* the international system as if they were distinct entities. Although they are distinguishable for some analytical purposes, states and the international system represent opposite ends of a continuous political phenomenon. The international political system is an anarchy, which is to say that its principal defining characteristic is the absence of overarching government. The principal defining feature of states is their sovereignty, or their refusal to acknowledge any political authority higher than themselves. The essential character of states thus defines the nature of the international political system, and the essential character of the political system reflects the nature of states. If units are sovereign, their system of association must be anarchy, and if the system is anarchic, its members must reject overarching government.” Buzan, 146-147.

Buzan argues that states by defining and defending themselves construct and maintain an anarchic system.

“This link is much more than a glib tautology. It means that the state and system levels are inextricably associated with each other, and that problems which appear to arise from the anarchic nature of the system cannot be treated purely as systemic matters. If the international anarchy is to be criticized as a system, then one cannot avoid extending the critique to the basic character of the states which comprise the system. If states are thought desirable as the main form of human political organization, then anarchy is the necessary and inevitable systemic consequence. In historical perspective, sovereign states and international anarchy are mutually constitutive in that each generates and shapes the other. By defining and defending themselves, states construct and maintain an anarchic system. The anarchic system in turn sets the structure that defines the competitive, self-help, political environment within which states have to operate. This dynamic interplay begins from the point at which alien human communities first make

contact with each other, which is when the idea of system comes into play. It only ends when the international anarchy gives way to a world state, a point still set in the rather remote future. In between these two points, the mutually constitutive dynamic between state and system structure sustains the durability of anarchy.” Buzan, 174-175.

“The international anarchy does not constitute a single form with relatively fixed features, but rather a single condition within which many variations can be arranged. Some configurations of anarchy heighten the problem of international security, whereas others migrates it. The systemic perspective enables one to take a broader and more contextual view of national security itself. It helps to identify a number of features, such as density, polarity, the character of states and the nature of international society, which mediate the condition of anarchy. Some of these offer potential targets for national policy in as much as they represent opportunities to manipulate the system into forms more conducive to the enjoyment of national security. The systemic view emphasizes the indivisible side of security, i.e., interdependence, because it highlights relational patterns and general structures. But it also ties this aspect into the divisible side, i.e., national security, by revealing the link between the individual character of states and the character of the system as a whole. It is obvious, for example, that weak states will find it more difficult to generate and support international society than strong ones. State and system are so closely interconnected that security policies based only on the former must be both irrational and inefficient.” Buzan, 174-175.

“One way of dealing with the complexities of the system approach is to hypothesize a spectrum of anarchies which can be labeled immature at one end and mature at the other. An extreme case of immature anarchy would be one in which the units themselves were held together only by the force of elite leadership, with each state recognizing no other legitimate sovereign unit except itself, and where the relations among the states took the form of a continuous struggle for dominance. Such a system would approximate chaos. The struggle for dominance would generate endless warfare, and would not be moderated by any sense among the units of the legitimacy or rights of others. The stability of units would depend on their success in the struggle for power. Insecurity would be endemic, and relations among states would be like the automatic and unthinking struggle of natural enemies such as ants and termites. The ethic of such a system would be survival of the fittest, and nothing other than the distribution of power and the level of capability available would prevent the unification of the system under the strongest actor. An anarchy of this sort would be ‘immature’ because it had not developed any form of international society to moderate the effects of political fragmentation. Its members would share no norms, rules or conventions among themselves, and their relationships would be dominated by fear, distrust, disdain, hatred, envy, contempt and serious differences. Order, if it existed at all, would reflect only deference to superior power. In the long run, an immature anarchy would be unstable, both because of the risk of general exhaustion and collapse, and because of the risk of one actor transcending the balance of power and unifying the system under its control.” Buzan, 174-175.

“At the other end of the spectrum, an extremely mature anarchy would have developed as a society to the point where the benefits of fragmentation could be enjoyed without the costs of continuous armed struggle and instability. The mechanism behind this would be the development of criteria by which states could both consolidate their own identity and legitimacy, and recognize and accept each other’s. In a very mature anarchy, all states would have to be strong as states: in other words, the idea of the state, its territory and its institutions will have to be well-developed and stable, regardless of its relative power as a state in the system. On this basis, a strong international society could be built on the foundations of mutual recognition and acceptance. Mutual recognition of sovereign equality and territorial boundaries alone would make a substantial modification to the hazards of immature anarchy.” Buzan, 176.

¹⁷Referring to Woodrow Wilson’s and Franklin Roosevelt’s struggles against isolationists’ opinion in the United States in the mid-war period.

¹⁸Buzan, 177.

¹⁹Joseph Fewsmith, “America and China: Back from the Brink,” *Current History* 584 (September 1994): 2.

²⁰The Asian financial crisis was a financial crisis that started in July 1997 in Thailand, and affected currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices of several Asian countries, many part of the East Asian Tigers. It is also commonly referred to as the Asian currency crisis. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also hit by the slump. Mainland China, Republic of China (Taiwan), and Singapore were relatively unaffected. Japan was not affected much by this crisis but was going through its own long-term economic difficulties.

²¹Johan Galtung is founder and Director of TRANSCEND - A Peace and Development Network for Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means, with more than 300 members from over 80 countries around the world and Rector of TRANSCEND Peace University (TPU).

“To work for peace is to work against violence; by analyzing its forms and causes, predicting in order to prevent, and then acting preventively and curatively since peace relates to violence like health relates to illness. Of particular concern is genocide or massive category killing, across the fault-lines in human society: nature (between humans and their environment), gender, generation, race, class, exclusion, nation, state. Whether as direct violence or as the indirect slow, grinding violence of social structures that does not deliver sufficient nutrition and health at the bottom of world society, enormous suffering is the effect. To work for peace is to build liberation, well-ness in a world with peace with nature, between genders, generations and races, where the excluded are included but not by force, and where classes, nations and states serve neither direct, structural nor cultural violence. In such a world they would all pull together for better livelihood for all. That would be true globalization, unlike the present reduction of that

term to represent only state and corporate elites in a handful countries.” TRANCEND homepage: www.trancend.org.

“Providing a wide-ranging panorama of the ideas, theories, and assumptions on which the study of peace is based, *Peace by Peaceful Means* gives a theoretical foundation for peace research, peace education, and peace action. This incisive volume is organized into four parts, each of which studies one of the four major theoretical approaches to peace. Peace Theory explores the epistemological assumptions of peace studies as well as the nature of violence. Conflict Theory examines the nonviolent and creative handling of conflict, emphasizing the importance of the culture of conflict. Development Theory looks at structural violence, particularly in the economic field, together with a consideration of the ways of overcoming that violence. Civilization Theory is an exploration of cultural violence focusing on cosmologies, codes, and programs. Finally, in the conclusion the threads of these approaches are drawn together with a focus on peace action: peace by peaceful means. *Peace by Peaceful Means* is a comprehensive examination of peace that will serve as an invaluable resource to professionals and academics in the fields of peace studies, international affairs, comparative politics, and political science.” TRANCEND homepage: www.trancend.org.

²²Explanation of appendix 2.

CHAPTER 2

ACCOUNT OF CHINA'S POLITICAL SECURITY SITUATION IN 1989 AND 1990

Introduction

The purpose of this account is to introduce the reader to the subject of China's situation as it was in 1989 and 1990 as a framework for the rest of this project. This account builds in levels starting with an account of the domestic political situation, then the regional situation, and finally the global situation. The whole account will generally view China from a wide security consideration. This is deliberate as China's political security situation can be difficult to cover by only looking at China from a factual perspective, that is, a narrower security consideration. However, it must be recognized that in this period China behaved exactly like a superpower, acting from a realistic thought process but in order to set a suitable framework for the later analyses, I have chosen to adapt the wider security consideration for this account.

The Domestic Political Situation in China

In 1989 China was a country characterized by large domestic political problems. Until the end of the 1980s, China had undergone an economic reconstruction that had started with Deng Xiaoping's takeover of power at the end of the 1970s. Deng's goal was to make China into a global economic power by the turn of the millennium. In the 1980s China had opened up to the rest of the world, as China found it necessary to carry out economic reconstruction and transform itself from an agrarian society to an industrial society. Throughout the 1980s many foreign investments were made and research projects were carried out in China, and at the same time China also received quite

considerable funds in development aid from the developed countries. The particular issue about China's opening up was that it did not bring about any political reforms as the CCP still remained in power. What was introduced was the model of economically aware communism, pursuing economic like that in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.

China had also managed to slow down its great population explosion during the 1980s and had experienced in urbanization as many young people fled to the towns seeking education, training and career opportunities. At the same time as the economic reform and the country's opening-up, Deng tried to secure his reputation and influence by getting some of his protégées into the Political Bureau (Politburo). Of the CCP, however, even at the top of the party there was unrest because of, among other things, an inconsistent generational change. There were still politicians in the central leadership that had helped to topple the "Gang of Four" fifteen years earlier and also many new men had arrived who were making a career of the Party instead of striving for an elevated goal. However, there were also reform friendly people who shared power with the old orthodoxy.¹

In 1988, China already had economic problems because the country was about to be strangled by its own success. A success which had in thirteen years increased China's external trade nearly sevenfold and had sent China up into the super league with the Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand in terms of annual growth.² In the middle of the 1980s the first signs of inflation began to appear; an inflation that would reach over 40 percent in the towns (however, the official figure was 18.5 percent) in 1988.³ Salaries did not increase at the same rate, which meant that most people on a fixed income, such as state employees and students, experienced a real drop

in salary leading to great dissatisfaction with the leadership of the country. This also meant that corruption returned for the first time since the communists came to power.

To help each other by bartering services is an old Chinese tradition that had been used at all levels, and it was almost the established custom to give civil servants something under the table if their help was needed with something.⁴ This did not have to be criminal, but when everyone started to do it at all levels because of a lack of income, it affected the state's methods of operating. It is in the light of this economic crisis that the Tiananmen Square demonstrations should be viewed. There were three main reasons for the demonstrations: demands for more democracy, improved combating of corruption and better conditions for students.⁵

The leadership in China now discovered that the process that had been in place for over a decade suddenly could not be turned around even if the leadership of the Party was being questioned. At the same time as the economic "boom," an increasing wish by people for more political influence was being experienced. The CCP leadership feared that this would mean that China would be totally taken over by economic development and placed outside political influence as the foreign investments were so large and the Chinese already were dependent on them in 1989.⁶

During these disturbances, the Chinese army came into the picture. Like the rest of China, the army had undergone a rapid development after many years' stagnation. At the end of the 1980s, China's armed forces were in the process of changing strategy from the whole concept of conducting a localized defense of the whole state in case of a total war to the concept prevalent in the West today, where reliance is on an active/mobile

defense and the ability to fight wars, limited in strength and scale. Such a change does not occur from one day to the next; rather it is a process on which China is still working.⁷

The ties with -and thereby the political control over the armed forces are very close (Deng was commander-in-chief of the military in 1989). Just as in the Party, in the army there were also both leaders and units that thought that they should give in to the Tiananmen Square demonstrators' demands and go further in the reforms. When the order for suppression was made, the commander in Beijing refused to send forces to Tiananmen Square which meant that units had to be sent in from the surrounding provinces and since then a large number of officers have fallen from grace.⁸ The uprising also led to the People's Army no longer having the same support from the population because of the hard-hitting suppression and the uncompromising obedience to the Party. In addition to the fall in the people's support, the leadership of the armed forces also had problems with corruption amongst the forces, and with the personnel increasingly operating small enterprises on the side or even integrated in the armed forces.⁹

Immediately after the uprising in Tiananmen Square, China bore the effects of the world's condemnation in the form of a further reduction in the economy so that its annual growth fell to 3-4 percent which, compared to the West, is high but not nearly high enough because of the enormous sums needed to feed the population and to continue the economic development. Deng introduced a strategy stating that China, first and foremost, should create inward and outward stability for the first few years after the uprising.¹⁰ This was combined with a strict economic policy as Deng believed that Socialism could only be justified and maintained only by continuing economic growth.

The Regional Situation in China

China's perception of the regional situation originates from several points. Historically and culturally, China has perceived itself as superior and, in that context, as a country to which all others should try to adapt. This attitude reflects China's vision of the region up to the present day. Moreover until the end of the 1800s China had de facto control over the whole of East Asia apart from Japan, either through vassal states or by direct control.

In the period around 1989, China believed that most of East Asia was still a Chinese interest area. It should also be mentioned that during the Cold War, China carried out policies, which played the two superpowers against each other in order to achieve political and economic benefits in the region.

Politically, China stood as a self-sufficient country which, when necessary, had used its military capabilities, for instance in Vietnam in a disagreement about oil resources and the extent of territorial waters. Following the uprising in Tiananmen Square, China sought greater contact with the other states in the region as a response to the massive criticism from the West. Most of the countries in the region reacted carefully, partly out of fear of the reaction of the West and partly because of the Chinese military reforms that had enabled China to operate militarily in the greater part of the region. From a regional perspective, China was worried only about a potential American-Japanese dominance in the area. This was due to both an historical reason, namely an old grudge against the Japanese caused by their behavior during the Second World War and a current reason that the Chinese did not want to see the Americans using Japan as a springboard to keep the regional great powers down.

Economically, the region around China was the key area as it was China's primary sales market. This included those countries that had invested most in China's economic reforms. This resulted in China being hit hard when Japan withdrew a number of promised loans as a result of the Tiananmen Square massacre.¹¹ At that time the economical center of China consisted of a number of zones that had a kind of free trade status. These were designed to function as levers for an economic upswing by attracting foreign investments as all of these areas lay along the coast and near Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan. These three areas were already economic dynamos accepted by both the USA and Japan, which at that time were the world's two largest economies.¹²

It was already apparent in 1989 that China's access to resources could be a problem because the consumption of energy also increased in line with the economic development. Even though, at that time China was still self-sufficient in the area of energy, the problem was big enough however, for China to begin looking for resources at the edges of its territorial waters, which brought about the border disputes with Vietnam.¹³

The Global Situation in China

From a global perspective, China has been the object of a great deal of polemics since the communists came to power in 1949. During the Cold War, a political struggle was waged between the superpowers to have China on their side. This meant that China achieved proportionately larger influence in, for instance, the UN but also in other organizations, despite the fact that the country was "only" one of the poorest superpowers.¹⁴ Politically, China was in a strong position in most of the international

organizations and took part in their work, especially where the UN had priority, probably because of its seat on the Security Council from the beginning of the 1970s.

Militarily, China was one of the few declared nuclear powers and had the capacity for nuclear weapons reaching large parts of the world. China did not have many nuclear weapons, but enough for the country to participate in most disarmament negotiations during a period when both superpowers obliged with Chinese security issues. Therefore, China had no direct opposition. China had only nuclear weapons, which could be used globally, as the country's armed forces were built up for national defense and not for "Power Projection." China had never had a tradition for that. In 1989 China was in the process of reforming its armed forces where the requirement was to have weapons that could be deployed either regionally or, in the long term, globally.

At this time, from the point of view of the global economy, China did not play an important role as most of its economic connections (approximately 60 percent) were at the regional level.¹⁵ The leadership in China had had misgivings about opening up to the West as they were afraid that young Chinese would start to subscribe to Western attitudes, including demands for political freedom.¹⁶

For China the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War meant primarily that the possibility of betting on two horses and making itself more important than it was disappeared. So, China lost its influence, but in return other opportunities such as for exporting weapons to a number of former Soviet customers appeared.¹⁷

¹Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy after Tiananmen," *Current History* 548 (1990): 245.

²William E. Odom, *Trial After Triumph: East Asia After the Gold War* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Hudson Institute, 1992), 36.

³Chu-Yuan Cheng, "China's Economy in Retrenchment," *Current History* 548 (1990): 253.

⁴David Shambaugh, "Losing Control: The Erosion of State Authority in China," *Current History* 575 (September 1993): 256.

⁵Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, *Kina efter Deng*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 47.

⁶John W. Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Damage Control," *Current History* 557 (September 1991): 244.

⁷Brødsgaard, 157.

⁸*Ibid.*, 48; and June Teufel Dreyer, "The Military in China" *Current History* 548, (1990): 262.

⁹Brødsgaard, 166.

¹⁰Garver, 242.

¹¹Cheng, 254.

¹²Brødsgaard, 128; and Gerald Segal, "China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy," *Adelphi Paper* 287, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1994): 12ff.

¹³Mamdouh G. Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict," *Survival* 37 (winter 1995-96): 133-146.

¹⁴Kim, 246.

¹⁵Brødsgaard, 120.

¹⁶Odom, 40.

¹⁷Brødsgaard, 239.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S INFLUENCE ON CHINA'S SECURITY POLICY

Introduction

The state's effect on the ordinary Chinese citizen and the consequences of this effect may be seen in connection with the above-mentioned Tiananmen Square massacre. In this chapter the influence of China's security policy on the individual Chinese will be analyzed with the purpose of making a partial conclusion of how the individual Chinese citizen pushes the state in the direction of a mature anarchy or influences it towards an immature anarchy. This is done realizing that the level is not the important factor in this project but it is judged to be significant in itself in an authoritarian controlled state like China.¹ Some of the reasons for this can be found in the resumption of reforms and the creation of an education system with contacts with the outside world, bringing about increasing "free thought" in relation to the communist ideology. However, there is a problem when discussing the individual's influence on the state's security policy in a country like China. China could be designated as a maximal state in which the state forms more than the sum of the citizens' interests that is, the state has its own interests, which it pursues. This may sound as if the whole chapter will collapse, but there are still areas where an individual can have an influence on the State's security policy. For instance Buzan names four areas on which the individual can have an effect.² Some of these areas are also valid for China today which will be referred to later in this chapter.

The Political Dimension

The focus of this part of the chapter will be on the political system and the individual's possibilities to affect it, either through internal or external pressure. The reason for this becoming interesting over the last 10 years is that the creation of the political system was maintained, despite extensive reforms including decentralization of the economic influence, which meant that more possibilities for influence appeared.³ Today China is controlled by a central government in which there is a formal government chosen by the National People's Congress. However, the CCP controlled by the Politburo runs things, which leave the NPC with a puppet status. Formally, China was divided into an executive, a legislative and a judicial power, but there was also the CCP which in reality decided the composition of the abovementioned bodies.

The National People's Congress meets once a year. In the intervening period the work of the Congress is performed by a number of committees. In principle the State Council (the government) is chosen by the National People's Congress. In practice it is based on input by the CCP. The State Council carries out the daily governing of China led by the Prime Minister with a number of ministers and advisors to help him.⁴ The Prime Minister is always a highly placed member of the CCP. Furthermore, the People's Congress chooses China's President, which is a post without any real political power. The post of President only has power as a result of the present President's other titles, as an example, Chairman of the CCP. On the same footing, formally there is CCP which consist of the National Party Congress, the Central Disciplinary Committee and the Central Committee. The latter runs the Military Commission. The National Party Congress only meets every five years and decides on the main lines for China's

development towards true Communism and chooses the members of the Central Committee, the Party's Military Commission and the Central Disciplinary Committee. The Central Committee consists of approximately 200 members and the members of the Politburo, China's actual rulers, are chosen from these. The Politburo then chooses a standing committee with the Party's General Secretary in charge. This Committee constitutes the daily power elite of China and they are also the ones influencing the State Council.

The CCP's Military Commission is China's second most important body after the Politburo. This forum has total control of all of China's armed forces, the world's largest in numbers and it is here that the military and civil top leaders meet and plan China's strategy. Since 1989 the Chairman of the Military Commission has been the same person as the Party's General Secretary. From the central government and the Party, the State administration spreads out like rings in water with provincial departments, county departments and finally the local departments. There are often parallels between the Party departments and the provincial, county and locally governed departments. It is within the locally governed departments that the first proper elections have been attempted. The elections have not been democratically sound in comparison with Western standards, but there has at least been one election in which the local populations could take part. Most often those candidates that, in the eyes of the population, will defend the interests of the local government best were elected, despite the fact that they were not members of the CCP and even beat the CCP candidates in the elections.⁵ However, there have been many problems as it is easy to persuade people to vote for a particular candidate or persuade a candidate to withdraw.⁶ One of the reasons for withdrawal taking place was that the CCP

was afraid to have a Tiananmen uprising in the country provinces where the Party's powerbase originally was, and partly still is, which would have ruined the Party's monopoly of power.

The reforming powers in the CCP are now gradually working to spread this electoral system to the larger towns and eventually to counties and provinces.⁷ This may have an effect on China's Security Policy as increasingly there will be influence from those leaders that are "elected" to carry on with a promised policy. As long as the Central Government maintains its monopoly, which it will do in the foreseeable future, it means that the State's interests, being increasingly more than the sum of the citizens' interests, will be undermined as the Central Government is affected by elected politicians who have made political promises and provincial interests that have had to be considered. On this point the characteristics of the Maximal State would shift towards the prevailing characteristics of the Minimal State. However, this would not mean that the individual within the political dimension will automatically influence China in the direction of being able to perform as a player in the mature anarchy, but rather that the individuals' opinions and attitudes would increasingly be considered in the formation of the Chinese security policy. This means that the Central Government's guarding of power could be dependent in the future on the support of elected provincial politicians who as an example were responsible for tax collection for the Central Government. The provincial politicians would be elected on the basis of the people's support.

During the last ten years, there has been a shift in China's ideological foundation in line with the economical reforms and comprehensive decentralization so that a great deal of China's moral and ideological concepts today derive partly from Mao's writings

and partly from Confucius' philosophy together with an increasing degree of nationalism.⁸ However, it must be mentioned that one source does not believe that Confucius has had any influence on the development of China.⁹ Confucius has not had any conclusive influence, but he cannot be overlooked based on the cultural historical significance that the philosopher had in China.¹⁰

This means that the Chinese today wish to be regarded as a superpower with a highly developed culture or at least as a superpower that should have input in all decisions about security, as a minimum regionally and especially with regard to traditional Chinese enemies. The population's idea of an enemy picture is especially found in recent Chinese history where China was subjugated by Japan several times and in more recent times where the USA, in particular, has appeared to be ready to put pressure on China. This has reinforced the anti-American attitudes in China, as the Chinese perceive the USA's actions in the region as an unnecessary interference within China's area.¹¹

The Economic Dimension

The economic dimension will be discussed despite the fact that capitalism is one of the main foundations to discuss in the subject of economic security. Capitalism, free market forces, and economic relationships are what makes a country have insight into other countries and possibly indirectly can influence other countries via economic relationships. China is a communist country so this theory would not seem appropriate here, but because of the economic reforms in China during the last fifteen years, China today is not a country that has carried out a planned economy. Today China's economy is a mixture of a planned economy and a market economy with restrictions. China's

economic dimension will be discussed because of the country's current economic development. The influence of the individual level on the country's security policy will be examined because even a maximal state, like China, will be required to meet some of the inhabitants' needs for the State to realize its own goals, as these often require a contribution from the inhabitants.¹² All inhabitants of a country have some basic needs that the country must meet in order to form the basis of, for example, social unity.¹³ Meeting these needs have been a goal for China's reforms and they also seem to have been successful even if it has led to a class-divided society, similar to that which can be seen in most capitalist countries, where there is a large difference between rich and poor.¹⁴ Some threats to the individual's safety have also arisen but this will not be discussed any further. However, some Chinese have experienced an improvement in their standard of living and it is this improvement that the CCP feels it must maintain in order to maintain power and in this way the individual can effect the State's policies.¹⁵ Based only on the individual's economic security dimension, it is difficult to judge if the State performs as a player in the mature anarchy. The state must obtain economic security for the individual in order to avoid threats against the state from the individual. For the individual it is therefore irrelevant whether the State does this by performing as a player in a mature or immature anarchy.

Certainly the proponents of the reforms have experienced the reverse side of the coin as China's dominating power is not an independent unit. The administration of the law is quite different from one province to the next.¹⁶ Bad administration of the legislation has meant that business owners and managers have been exposed to attacks, which have led to a natural hesitation by foreign companies to establish themselves and

for Chinese businesses to spread out to other provinces.¹⁷ This could be one of the reasons for the division between the countryside and the towns becoming even more noticeable over the last ten years and similarly the difference between the richest and poorest provinces has increased.¹⁸ There has also been a division between employees in the state and private sectors. It must be said that many state employees have private businesses outside or in connection with their jobs, and in this way they obtain a higher standard of living, just like many state employees earn extra income by claiming illegal taxes or by allowing themselves to be bribed by businesses.¹⁹

Entrepreneurs in the special economic zones have found it difficult to advance and establish businesses in rural areas in the country's interior. The customer-base is not nearly as good as in the coastal regions where the reforms have had the greatest effect.²⁰ This has also meant a regular population migration towards the towns and the coastal regions, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, the mass movement of labor from the countryside to the towns has meant that China has experienced unemployment. At the same time the government has lowered or removed many of the contributions to the state-owned mostly unprofitable enterprises. The enterprises had to fire employees as the State could no longer guarantee them work and thus an income. With the introduction of the market economy, unemployment became even more critical because China had not set up a social security system.²¹ This had the direct consequence for China's economic security policies that the country (CCP) had to maintain a number of monopolies and raise taxes on foreign goods in order to keep as many state-owned enterprises as possible in operation and try to adapt these gradually to a market economy.²² This has also been significant for China's negotiations to join the WTO, an organization under which one

clearly demonstrates a participating role belonging to a mature anarchy, both within economy and trade.²³ This was done to avoid mass unemployment and the subsequent social unrest and increasing criminality, which again might lead to dissatisfaction within the wider population and which, in all likelihood, would end the CCP's hold on power.²⁴

The Societal Dimension

As mentioned earlier, corruption has been one of China's largest problems with the shift to a market economy and the shift of the population's values away from Communism towards "everyone for himself". Therefore, corruption will be discussed as a tendency in the societal security whereby the individual can gain influence on the State's security policies. Otherwise one could wonder how the individual entered into this apparatus, but the possibility of influencing parts of the apparatus is present as China has an old tradition of cultivating mutual and client relationships in all parts of society.²⁵ This concept is called *guanxi*. It is a tradition that originates from the time of China's Emperors and has survived 50 years of Communism. Briefly, *guanxi* is the concept that everyone should have a network of personal relationships created throughout their lives, where favors are exchanged relating to one's job and influence. *Guanxi* goes through all trades (horizontally) and levels (vertically) so that import licenses can be exchanged for luxury goods and influence can be exchanged for support for a chosen policy-attitude.²⁶ *Guanxi* does not need to be synonymous with corruption if everyone in principal has the same moral values--Confucianism or Communism in its purest form.²⁷ However, in reality, today China is one of the East Asian countries with the most corruption at nearly every level, from the official administrators who issue driving licenses, to the highest levels of the Politburo who, for example, support their own enterprises rather than other

Chinese or foreign ones.²⁸ The fight against corruption has also been part of the political agenda over the last decade in order to avoid riot similar to the one in Tiananmen Square, although it has not been a wholehearted affair.²⁹ In addition the effect of corruption on the power base is great.

Corruption has such a large significance for China that some researchers believe that it costs China up to 4 percent of the GDP in the form of lack of revenue and distortion of competition.³⁰ Therefore, it may be concluded that corruption has a direct impact on the Chinese security policy as those in power are caught in a dilemma between carrying out an effective fight in order to achieve more from the annual growth in GDP, which is necessary to remain in power, against continuing without making any changes and hoping to stay in power by using corruption and the unofficial networks that are created from it. Nevertheless, China must take a stand on this problem, as the attracting of foreign investments is also important for China's continued economic development. This means that under the societal dimension the individual will influence the state to perform as a player in a traditional anarchy, especially if corruption is not fought, as the State just has to ensure its own growth and preferably at the expense of other players' growth ("an economic zero-sum game"). If corruption were effectively controlled, it is likely that China would open up even more to the rest of the world and thereby increase its vulnerability to other countries. In return China would increasingly be mutually dependent on other countries (interdependence) and thereby be interested in these other countries also having continued growth ("an economic plus-sum game"). The thing that speaks for an increased impact on the State by the individual is that many Chinese today are not monopolized by the media influence as many can receive other TV channels than

the State's own and thereby get other input than those that the State necessarily would wish. It should be mentioned here that TV is a large opinion former in China partly because TV is a status symbol that many Chinese today have available (amongst others both the BBC and CNN broadcast in Chinese).³¹ The Internet is also beginning to be widespread, especially in institutions of higher education, and many Chinese are going abroad to be educated thereby bringing new attitudes and ideas home.³²

Conclusion of Chapter 3

In this chapter an attempt has been made to analyze the individual's influence on the State's security policy. For the rest of the project it will be interesting to compare this with whether or not the individual can/will influence the State to perform as a player in a mature anarchy.

In order for a state to perform as a player in a mature anarchy, it needs to be a strong state.³³ A strong state is a state with solidarity,³⁴ not necessarily a superpower.³⁴ Having the previous assumptions in mind, China does not count as a strong state because it still has a monopoly of power. A power maintained by a politically controlled power system can in itself be a threat to the individual. But I believe it is also incorrect to go to the other extreme and say that China today is a weak state and that national security for China concerns only China's internal affairs.³⁵ If you look at the Chinese perception of China as a country, there is a high degree of solidarity and China is a well established nation with a long history. The threat to China, today anyway, is not that China will be divided into a number of smaller countries but rather a shift from a centrally governed nation to a federation. Therefore I would describe China as a strong state with some

weaknesses, such as doubts about the governing ideology, no democratic control of the power apparatus and attempts to control the media.³⁶

However, the main message is that China as a state does not concentrate on purely internal security interests but equally demonstrates external orientations. China can be considered a player in a mature anarchy, though with inclusion of the above-mentioned weaknesses in the State. Viewed from the political security dimension, it seems that the individual will influence the State in the direction of performing as a player in an immature anarchy, especially in line with the decline of ideology and the blossoming of nationalism in China because the Chinese would not like China to be vulnerable to other countries. The same applies to the societal security dimension, in which especially the effect of corruption should not be underestimated and that, in its current form, it is also moving in the direction of a traditional perception of the system and China's role therein. Contrary to this, there is the economic security dimension. China seeks a formulation of a regime, such as the WTO, initially not only to consider interior relations but also to take part in global development and thereby create continued growth. Furthermore, the business environment in China, together with the growing trade across borders, increasingly affects the State to be subject to -or to accept others' standards of economy and thereby ensure that all achieve growth. Briefly, the individual will affect the State in the direction of a traditional performer within both the political and the societal structure. In contrast to this, there is the economic dimension, in which the State will be effected in the direction of performing as a player in a mature anarchy.

¹Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 348.

- ²Ibid., 52.
- ³Tony Saich, "The Search for Civil Society and Democracy in China," *Current History* 584 (September 1994): 260-264.
- ⁴Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, *Kina efter Deng*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 131ff.
- ⁵Tyrene White, "Village Elections: Democracy from Bottom Up?" *Current History* 620 (September 1998): 263-267.
- ⁶Ibid., 267.
- ⁷Ibid., 267.
- ⁸Brødsgaard, 239ff; and Michael Dutton, "An All-Consuming Nationalism" *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 279.
- ⁹Meredith Woo-Cummings, "The 'New Authoritarianism' in East Asia" *Current History* 587 (December 1994): 414ff.
- ¹⁰Michael Dutton, "An All-Consuming Nationalism." *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 276ff.
- ¹¹Brødsgaard, 239ff.
- ¹²Buzan, 51.
- ¹³Ibid., 237.
- ¹⁴Maurice Meisner, "The Other China," *Current History* 611 (September 1997): 264-269.
- ¹⁵The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The end of China's era of Growth" *Strategic Comment*, January 1999, 2.
- ¹⁶Minxin Pei, "Will China Become another Indonesia?" *Foreign Policy* 116 (fall 1999): 102.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 103.
- ¹⁸See appendix C.
- ¹⁹Michael Johnston, "The Vices-and Virtues of Corruption," *Current History* 611, (September 1997): 270-273.
- ²⁰Ibid., 6.

²¹Edward S. Steinfeld, "Beyond the Transition: China's Economy at Century's End," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 271-275.

²²*Ibid.*, 274

²³IISS, "China and the World Trade Organisation," *Strategic Comment* 3 (April 2000): 1ff.

²⁴IISS, "The End of China's Era of Growth," *Strategic Comment* 1 (January 1999): 1.

²⁵Johnston, 271.

²⁶Brødsgaard, 142ff.

²⁷Johnston, 273.

²⁸Pei, 94-109.

²⁹Jane's, "Security Assessment," *Jane's Sentinel Files*, (1997): 1.7.4.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 96.

³¹Brødsgaard, 93.

³²Gregory D. Foster, "China's Environmental Threat: Crafting a Strategic Response," *Comparative Strategy* 19, no. 2 (April-June 2000):

³³Buzan, 176.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 97.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 102.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 98.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF CHINA'S SECURITY POLICY AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL AND CHINA'S ROLE THEREIN, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE UN, THE WTO, AND THE USA

Introduction

In this chapter the thesis will move away from the influences on the state from below to the influences on the state from above (see Appendix 3). According to Buzan, when analyzing a country's security it is necessary to touch on a number of levels at which a state is influenced or at which it can bring its influence to bear.¹ In this chapter the international system will be considered from the perspective of the relationships between its players and its development related to China's security policy. The international system is considered to be an anarchic system without any overall executive power. This means that the anarchic system is not considered as China's problem but rather as the framework within which China operates. Within the international system there are a number of subsystems/security complexes. These will not be discussed separately in this chapter as the focus will be on China's main players in the total international system; whilst the regional level will be discussed in chapter 5.

The most important players for China within the international system are the USA, the UN and its suborganizations and the WTO. For this reason they will be the focus of China's role at the system level. The USA is the most important state player at the system level for China because today the USA is the world's only superpower and a country with huge influence on other nations' global operations, including China's. The UN, its suborganizations and the WTO will be discussed because China's participation in

and attitude toward, play a part in showing an essential proportion about the maturity of China's performance at the system level.

The Political Security Dimension

In this part of the chapter the focus will be on China's relationships within the international system; primarily the relationship to the USA and those organizations in which China and the USA interact. China's view of the structure of the international system in contrast to the views of objective sources will be discussed in order to analyze China's security policy with reference to the theory of a mature anarchy. Today China regards the international system as a system moving in the direction of a multipolar system as opposed to the bipolar system of the Cold War.²

In this system China considers itself as one of the poles, with the USA, Russia, Japan and the EU as the other poles. In practice, however, it should be emphasized that all the powers, with the USA to a minor extent, have limits to their capabilities within some areas. Therefore it could be argued that the multipolar system is layered or maybe is a system with one large pole and four subsidiary poles of equal importance.³

Since the end of the Cold War, China has attempted, with the help of its own economic growth, to increase its political influence on the system. However, it was not until the removal of the restrictions caused by Tiananmen Square at the start of the 1990s, that China could begin to operate on the international scene at a larger extent.

Presumably, according to a Chinese Embassy website, China does not regard the other great powers as natural opponents unless they strive towards hegemony.⁴ Hegemony, however, would be a hindrance to China's development and global influence and to other countries' recognition of China as a great power. Here the USA is the primary power

which must be prevented from exercising hegemony in the system, especially in the locality of China.

During the last decade, the relationship between the USA and China has been in constant flux between cool disassociation and careful advances because the USA currently is the only superpower and, after the end of the Cold War, the USA has monitored the capabilities of all great powers and their development.⁵ Naturally, China was monitored since it is the last meaningful Communist country.⁶ Because of its economic reforms China had grown in nearly all areas and obviously simply by virtue of its land areas and its large population.⁷ China is so important to the USA that the country is a domestic political theme, as a number of conservatives in the USA believe that China, like the Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War, and at the start of the 1980s, is the new enemy for the USA.⁸ Because of these influences, the USA aim is to clip China's wings before it becomes too powerful partly by stemming its strong military presence in the region around China, and using a great American influence on its neighbors. This is a contributory reason for the rulers in China viewing USA with deep mistrust because the Chinese are not accustomed to an open debate of an enemy image.⁹ Therefore, the conservatives' attitudes in the USA are often seen as the USA's official attitude, which is not always the case. The mistrust has not lessened particularly after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.¹⁰

Nevertheless, today China and the USA cooperate within a number of areas (illegal drug control, organized crime control and environmental issues) and both the USA and China wish to strengthen this cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally.¹¹ In addition, the USA has adopted a foreign policy that includes China instead of isolating

it.¹² The recognition of China's need for multilateral agreements demonstrates a shift in China's attitude from one, which held bilateral agreements a priority to one, which views bilateral and multilateral agreements of equal importance.¹³ It was not until 1996 that China entered into its first truly multilateral agreement with Russia and the new Central Asian countries.¹⁴ Here the UN enter the scene since China in the UN, have had opportunities to limit the USA's freedom of action through its permanent seat on the Security Council. There has been a change in China's behavior as previously China refused to commit itself on most matters in the Security Council and definitely did not join like-minded nations.¹⁵ Today China has entered into agreements with all the permanent members of the Security Council as well as Japan and Germany. China considers these loose agreements as fundamental for a multipolar world wherein the UN has a key function through the Security Council by being able to slow down the great powers' attempts to create hegemony.¹⁶ In extension to the partnership agreements, China has introduced a policy called "the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence" which demonstrates its intention of being a player in a mature anarchy.¹⁷ However, not everyone agrees with this. Michael Yahuda believes that there is a great difference between intentions and real politics.¹⁸ During the last decade, China has increased its political support to UN peace missions but still has a significant difference of opinion with most other UN members with regard to the right to intervene against interference in nations' internal affairs.¹⁹ In this context China's problem is that it does not want interference in the Taiwan Conflict, which China regards as an internal affair.

To summarize, it appears that since the removal of certain sanctions at the start of the 1990s, China has carried out policies at the system level that are indicative of a player

performing in an immature anarchy. For example, most of China's arguments for multipolarity are based on China countering American dominance and consequently gaining influence at the system level. With regard to the Taiwan conflict, China has also shown a clear tendency to be able to resist pressure from the rest of the world and thereby create global insecurity. However, it should be added that the USA has treated China equally. Also, amongst the decision makers in the USA there is a clear tendency not to allow a mutual growth and influence if the influence of the USA is not the greater.

During the last few years there has been a shift towards a more mature behavior, not least in the UN and the other multilateral organizations (the ARF and the APEC). As this time when China is being recognized as a great power, the other countries also want China to accept the responsibilities that go with being a great power such as ensuring peace and understanding. This should be viewed with China's policy on peaceful coexistence which must be a goal that China will achieve globally within the political security dimension.

The Military Security Dimension

In this section China's military role from the global perspective will be analyzed in order to assess whether China is performing as a player in a mature anarchy. The focus will be on the capacity and proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements and NMD/TMD with any military dependencies.

From the global perspective, China's military role is very limited as the country does not possess any conventional means that can be employed globally. China does not have any ships or aircraft that can operate globally. Neither does it have bases anywhere permitting longer stays. Except for a base established in Myanmar as part of an exchange deal. Myanmar was given weapons in exchange for making a base available so that China

is able to monitor parts of the Indian Ocean and the sea approach to the Malacca Strait.²⁰ With China's insufficient capabilities to employ conventional forces globally, the country is dependent on the USA and its capabilities to secure open sea routes between the Middle East and East Asia.²¹ Today China imports crude oil as a result of its increased energy requirements and needs an increasing amount of oil from the Middle East in order to maintain growth.²²

China is significant with regard to weapons of mass destruction as China possesses weapons that can be employed globally. China's stated strategy for nuclear weapons is simple; the country will not use nuclear weapons first but will respond at any time with nuclear weapons if it is attacked with nuclear weapons.²³ Today China possesses approximately 20 land-based intercontinental missiles and a nuclear powered submarine with midrange rockets although this is not operational.²⁴ The missiles are all so old that they each have only one warhead. Currently, China is developing more advanced nuclear weapons in the form of mobile land-based missiles and a new submarine with intercontinental missiles. Additionally, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) are being developed for the new missiles.²⁵ This is a very expensive and long-term process, which is why China is not expected to increase its arsenal, as China's starting point is still to maintain an economic growth. However, China's defense budget in general has been growing rapidly over the past decade.

One thing that could cause China to escalate its nuclear weapon program is the setting up of the National Missile Defense/Theater Missile Defense (NMD/TMD) for which the USA has started trials. China regards this project as a threat to the country's nuclear strategy as the aim of the system is that it should be able to shoot down a small

number of rockets aimed at USA or its allies (probably less than 50).²⁶ This would make China's nuclear deterrent against the USA and its allies worthless.²⁷ Furthermore, it is probable that Russia will try to establish a similar system if the American one works, which will further undermine China's deterrent strategy.²⁸ If the NMD/TMD is set up and China wishes to maintain a nuclear strategy, it will have to have enough nuclear weapons to be able to "saturate" a single country's NMD/TMD.²⁹ In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to an arms race and a balance of power game between the USA and all the other nuclear powers. This will also mean that China could expect significant increases in military expenditure if the country wanted to maintain its current nuclear deterrent capabilities.³⁰ Also this could mean that China would terminate some of the agreements it has made with different governments regarding the control of nuclear weapons, nuclear test bans, etc.³¹

In order to try to stop this, the USA and others have entered into an agreement with China to establish a "red hotline" between Beijing and Washington, with an agreement for not directing nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles towards each other. Similarly, the USA has been considering to inviting China to be a party to future START agreements.³² The above-mentioned agreements cover the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) agreement that bans nuclear testing and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which should control the number of chemical and biological weapons.³³

During the Cold War and in the period immediately after, China was a large exporter of all types of weapons. China is responsible for a large part of Pakistan's nuclear program and for spreading chemical and biological weapons programs to Libya,

and selling missiles to Iran and Saudi Arabia.³⁴ As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is regarded as one of the biggest dangers for the escalation of conflicts today, there has been pressure, especially from the USA, on China to accept some mutual standards and codes of conduct for the control of weapons of mass destruction.³⁵ During the 1990s China entered into a number of security agreements for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their production components. China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and also intimated that it would observe the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) even though it did not ratify the agreement.³⁶ China is not expected to sign the agreement, as it would then have a “hold” on the USA if the USA continued to export high technology weapons to Taiwan.³⁷

To summarize; in the last half of the 1990s China showed a willingness to comply with mutual standards regarding weapons of mass destruction, that is, a movement towards performing as a player in a mature anarchy. Additionally, the establishment of a firm connection between Washington and Beijing should be emphasized. Against this can be counted China’s attempts to spread its military influence to the Indian Ocean as this is done only to create advantages for itself and monitor the Indian territorial waters. There is one threat to China’s more mature performance regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction, that is, the NMD/TMD. It will inevitably lead to China losing its status as a great military power along with its deterrent factor and thereby force China to start an arms race which will be synonymous with creating a security dilemma in the Pacific region. If China increases its nuclear arsenal because of the NMD/TMD, then the security of the Pacific region as a whole will decrease even if it increases for each of the individual countries.

The Economic Security Dimension

Economic security is one of the dimensions found under the wider security consideration, and it is one of the security dimensions, which are most significant today. In many places economic development is regarded as more important than the development of a traditional security policy.³⁸ In this section China's economic influence on the world's economy will be discussed: China and the WTO and the importance of China's admission into the WTO.

China's official understanding of the importance of the economy is completely in line with Buzan's theory.³⁹ China regards economic development as a way of creating stability in Asia. Certainly Asia is also where China has the greatest economic influence, as 60 percent of China's total exports are to Asia, with the rest divided mainly between North America and the EU countries.⁴⁰ The most important countries are Japan and the USA and, up until 1997, Hong Kong. Regarding Hong Kong's share of trade, it should be mentioned that the majority of the exports to Hong Kong are re-exported to other countries, including the USA.⁴¹ The goods that China export are mainly manufactured low technology goods whereas imported goods, on the whole, are high technology goods and machinery.⁴² There is a large difference between how various sources judge China's impact on world trade, from the negative ones, in which China accounts for just 3.5 percent of the world's GDP, to the more positive ones who judge China today as the world's second largest economy on the way to overtaking the USA.⁴³ As world trade develops, China's greatest problem will be that the country still has many state-owned enterprises. These enterprises are not commercially run and they survive with state subsidies. The subsidies are believed to take up 75 percent annually of the state's total

industrial investments in the country.⁴⁴ Chinese bankers do not operate commercially either as a large part of their loans go towards covering losses in businesses and are not investments.⁴⁵

If China privatized all the enterprises, the ensuing mass unemployment and economic recession would remove the basis for the CCP remaining in power.⁴⁶ On the other hand, China cannot just leave the enterprises as they are, as continuing economic growth requires contact with the outside world.⁴⁷ Unfortunately for China, the outside world makes demands on China in order to trade with it. A good example is the USA, which in return for granting China most favored nation (MFN) status, demands that American companies should be able to penetrate the Chinese market, the removal of unrealistic tariff rates on American goods and also insight into China's economic conditions.⁴⁸ These are conditions, which in a Chinese view, increases the country's vulnerability to economic pressure but also give a number of advantages such as maintaining a trade deficit with the USA of a certain size.⁴⁹ This is one of the reasons China worked for so long to be accepted into the WTO. The WTO was created as a successor to GATT, that is, an organization to promote economic trade across borders.⁵⁰ In order to become a member of the WTO, a country must, deliver detailed papers regarding the country's economic structure and its trade with other countries. Furthermore, the country's economic policies must be in keeping with the joint decisions in the WTO or must be brought into line with the WTO during the admission negotiations.⁵¹ With this, the country must enter into bilateral agreements with the largest members of the WTO. That meant that China had to enter into bilateral trade agreements

with Japan, the USA and the EU while making its economy open to other countries and publicizing all details of the country's economic structure and economic capacity.

China began trying to enter the WTO in 1986, but it was not until around 2000 that China spoke realistically about admission in the near future (<1 year).⁵² The reasons for this are that China initially had the attitude that the country just needed to join in order to benefit from the prospect of economic growth, but that it did not need to subject itself to the mutual regulations of the WTO.⁵³ The most influential countries in the WTO (the USA, Japan, and the EU) were opposed to this attitude.⁵⁴ Around 1990 one of China's economic considerations was that the state-owned enterprises still accounted for most of the nation's production. The enterprises could not survive in a market that, at one go, would become open to free competition without subsidies. That would lead to internal problems for China.

If the country became dependent on foreign companies, the possibility of resisting the rest of the world would be limited.⁵⁵ Today, the share of production of the state-owned enterprises has fallen to approx. 25 percent.⁵⁶ The rest of manufacturing comes from competitive companies established particularly in the Special Economic Zones. But the leading politicians around 1990 were not in favor of widespread reforms. These politicians continued to put pressure on the government but thanks to the large support of the population for the reforming politicians, the adaptation into the WTO was completed.⁵⁷ Acceptance by the WTO was of great importance for China as a significant number of quotas and special duties imposed on Chinese export goods were removed instantly.⁵⁸ This naturally, gave rise to an increase in exports, jobs and influence via China's increased trade connections. The disadvantage has been a significant reduction in

the number of state-owned enterprises resulting in unemployment in that area. In addition, the Chinese market is to be open to everyone. This means that China's economic security will be more closely linked to other countries', including the Asiatic countries where 60 percent of China's trade exists. Consequently, China's freedom of action within the economic area is not unlimited as many other players can be affected by decisions regarding the Chinese economy, so that in the long term a mutual dependence can develop into interdependence.⁵⁹ The cause of change in China's economic security policy is closely related to the requirement for continued growth and an increased willingness to subject China to mutual regulations and standards for a possible economic gain, that is, a kind of carrot method from the WTO.

Subsequently, China has also noticed that trade disputes do not go away and there are regularly conflicts within the WTO about the degree of compliance with the WTO regulations.⁶⁰ Within global economic security, China experienced a clear step in the direction of performing as a player in a mature anarchy during the last decade, although this was strongest after the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998.⁶¹

The Societal Security Dimension

The paradox of this security dimension is that the subject matter often covers several levels with regard to a country's security policy. This section will deal with China's handling of human rights and the Chinese social model seen from a global perspective. The primary focus with regard to human rights will be how China's compliance with human rights issues effects the relationships at the system level. Initially, it is important to establish that China and a number of third world countries do not perceive the concept of human rights in the same way as western civilizations. China

holds the creation of a welfare system ensuring housing, food and safety for all, higher than the individual having religious liberty, free speech and the right to vote for particular politicians.⁶² In the West it is believed that all rights should have equal priority and that there is no sense in creating welfare for the society without freedom for the individual.⁶³ But as the West, especially the USA is very good at spreading its lifestyle in the form of consumer goods to third world countries; attitudes regarding the perception of individual rights follow naturally.

With this established, it is now possible to see why during the last decade China has often had periods of bad relations with the West, especially with the USA. China's record regarding human rights has been far from acceptable.⁶⁴ Basically, China does not believe that other countries should interfere in these issues, as this is meddling in a country's internal affairs.⁶⁵ Therefore China has been working continuously in the belief that the West should not link the human rights problem with, for example, economic relations. China has almost succeeded in doing this as even the USA has separated human rights from the granting of MFN status.⁶⁶ However, there have been some cases in which China has had to modify strong standpoints e.g. by the expulsions of previously imprisoned student leaders who have been granted asylum in USA.⁶⁷ During the last half of the 1990s China modified some individual rights, for example, in the form of holding proper elections and joining some conventions for human rights in the UN, without necessarily complying with them.⁶⁸ On each occasion when proposals for condemning resolutions in the UN Human Rights Commission have arisen, China has tried to turn the debate so that a deferred resolution is made with support from third world countries using a rich against poor argument.⁶⁹

The solidarity between poor countries is one of the things that China often exploits in its activities, for example in the UN. This is despite the fact that the idea of the Chinese social model, socialist capitalism/capitalist socialism in reality has not rubbed off on other countries.⁷⁰ Additionally the Chinese civilization does not have great attraction outside of East Asia; conversely the American civilization and Islam constantly have new supporters.⁷¹ This is also the case with the spreading of Chinese culture with regard to the import of, for example, Western culture. In this context China imports significantly more than it exports.⁷² It should be mentioned that China, officially, has no desire to spread its social model to others, as it does not want others to interfere in its social model because this would also be interference in internal affairs.⁷³

To summarize, it should be said that within the societal security dimension, China does not perform as a player in a mature anarchy because China prefers that there is no interference in affairs below the state level, a kind of black-box perception, which could be said to belong to a realistic understanding of the world. However, there has been a small movement within the area of human rights as China, at least politically, has signed a resolution on the compliance with human rights. If China had been a player in a pure mature anarchy the discussion would probably not have arisen, as China would then have been a strong state with a certain degree of democracy and compliance with human rights.

Conclusion of Chapter 4

To judge whether China performs as a player in a mature anarchy at the system level, it is necessary to establish whether there is a mature anarchy at this level in which China can perform. It is difficult to decide this, as there is a large difference in the

individual dimensions and indeed the subject matter within the dimensions. In considering the possibility that China performs as a player in a mature anarchy, it is maintained that currently the system level is a mature anarchy, although not all the requirements are met for this to be so.⁷⁴

In this chapter it can be shown that generally speaking, at the turn of the Millennium, China performed as a player in a mature anarchy with the above-mentioned assumptions. Those factors, which act towards a mature performance, are the recognition and adoption of nonproliferation agreements and other agreements, in regard to weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, China's whole economic development points towards a mature performance, especially the recent recognition of trading requirements in the WTO. It should be emphasized that China's recognition of a form of mutual dependence moving towards interdependence, at least in the region around China, indicates an awareness of a mature anarchy.

There are however also areas where China clearly has a policy belonging to an immature anarchy. These include the human rights issue and China's reactions to references to these at the system level. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that China continues to maintain the state's sovereignty and reject all outside interference in internal affairs. In addition, with its agreements on establishing bases in Myanmar on the western side of the Malacca Strait, China increases its security at the cost of increasing instability in the neighboring region. There is also the danger that establishing the NMD/TMD, which China regards as being directed against it, will pressure China back to being a pure player in an immature anarchy.

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³Ibid., 1.

⁴www.chinaembassy.dk, *Part I: The International Security Situation*, 2.

⁵Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, vol. 1 (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 169.

⁶Clemens Stubbe Østergaard, "NordØstasien efter Den Kolde Krig" *Udenrigs 2* (2000): 65.

⁷Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Strategy for East Asia and the U.S. -Japan Security Alliance*, 5.

⁸Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, *Kina efter Deng*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 202ff.

⁹Elizabeth Economy, "Getting China Right," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 255.

¹⁰Ibid., 13.

¹¹Østergaard, 70.

¹²Economy, 254.

¹³Østergaard, 79.

¹⁴Michael Yuhada, "China's Search for a Global Role," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 269.

¹⁵Jonathan Reynold, "China's Cautious New Pragmatism in the Middle East" 38, no. 3 *Survival* (autumn 1996): 112 and 268.

¹⁶Ibid., 269.

¹⁷www.chinaembassy.dk, *Part I, The International Security Situation*, 2.

¹⁸Yuhada, 269.

¹⁹Gill Bates and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival* vol. 42, no. 3 (autumn 2000): 23

- ²⁰Jane's, "Security Assessment" *Jane's Sentinel Files*, (1997): 1.8.22.
- ²¹Evan Feigenbaum, "China's Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics," *Survival* vol. 412, no. 78 (summer 1999): 78.
- ²²Bates, 135ff.
- ²³Paul H. B. Godwin "Uncertainty, Insecurity and China's Military Power" *Current History* 611 (September 1997): 257
- ²⁴Godwin, 260.
- ²⁵David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival* vol. 42, no. 1 (spring 2000): 104.
- ²⁶Østergaard, 69.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, 112.
- ²⁸Godwin, 262.
- ²⁹Østergaard, 69.
- ³⁰Godwin, 265.
- ³¹Østergaard, 112.
- ³²Godwin, 265.
- ³³Østergaard, 112.
- ³⁴William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster 1994), 383ff.
- ³⁵Shambaugh, 102ff.
- ³⁶Østergaard, 112.
- ³⁷Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "A Precarious Balance, Clinton and China," *Current History* 620 (September 1998): 247.
- ³⁸Buzan, 369ff.
- ³⁹Reynold, 112
- ⁴⁰Brødsgaard, 120ff.

- ⁴¹Ibid., 121
- ⁴²Ibid., 125
- ⁴³Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 78, 5 (September/October 1999): 1.
- ⁴⁴Edward S. Steinfeld, "Beyond the Transition: China's Economy at Century's End," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 275.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., 275.
- ⁴⁶James Shinn, "Engaging China, Exploiting the Fissures in the Façade," *Current History* 602 (September 1996): 243.
- ⁴⁷Barry Naughton, "China's Economy, Buffeted from Within and Without," *Current History* 620 (September 1998): 277f.
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- ⁵⁰Ibid., 277.
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- ⁵³Steinfeld, 271.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., 245.
- ⁵⁵IISS, "China and the World Trade Organisation," *Strategic Comment* 3 (April 2000): 2.
- ⁵⁶Steinfeld, 274.
- ⁵⁷Østergaard, 63.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., 1.
- ⁵⁹Bates, 43.
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⁶²James D. Seymour, “Human Rights, Repression, and Stability,” *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 281.

⁶³Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, *A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific*, vol. 1, Adelphi Paper no. 299 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 26f.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 30.

⁶⁵Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “A Precarious Balance: Clinton and China,” *Current History* 620 (September 1998): 244.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 244.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 245.

⁶⁸www.FMPRC.gov.cn, *China's Independent Foreign Policy*, 3.

⁶⁹Brødsgaard, 226ff.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 228

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 231.

⁷²Segal, 7.

⁷³www.chinaembassy.dk, *Part I, The International Security Situation*, 2.

⁷⁴Buzan, 177f.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S ROLE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL.

Introduction

China's role at the regional level will be analyzed in this chapter. China's activities at a level below the global system level place it in what Buzan defines as the regional level.¹ His focus regarding the regional level is on security complexes. This project is deliberately including China at a regional level because an analysis of China's security policy only at the global system or the state level can include all the relationships affecting China's security policy.

It would appear that only one superpower and other great powers could be a threat to China, although during the last decade in East Asia, where the idea of a world war has disappeared due to a mutual dependence, this no longer applies.² Along with China's needs for resources, this means that smaller countries can suddenly become a threat to China, which is why China's role at the regional level is relevant. Today China is not a country that can project power and influence globally, with the single exception of weapons of mass destruction.

On the other hand, China can influence the region within a number of areas. China maintains its traditionally interest in the ASEAN region whereas China's global interest areas are less important because it is not able to influence those. Therefore this project regards Buzan's security complex in South-East Asia (ASEAN), Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China, as a region with some subregions: China-Korea-Japan, China-ASEAN-Taiwan. China-Taiwan is not regarded as a region but as belonging to the state level, and the same is true of China-Japan.³ Starting with the China-ASEAN-(Taiwan) region, this

chapter will cover China's influence in the region and how China handles this influence within the framework of wider security consideration.

The Political Security Dimension

In this part of the chapter China's political influence in the region will be discussed and a definition of China's interest areas and territorial claims will be mentioned. Furthermore, the relationship between China and ASEAN and its suborganizations will be discussed in relation to the above. The USA's influence in the region in relation to China will be analyzed in order to assess whether it has an influence on China's behavior in the region.

From the historical perspective, China has always had a large area of influence.⁴ During the last 20 years, China has experienced great growth in all areas and as a consequence of the Chinese population's wish to restore some of the respect and greatness of earlier times, China now is involving itself more and more in the surrounding region.⁵ Today China has a number of unresolved territorial issues, mainly in the sea areas around China and Taiwan.⁶ Since 1992 China has laid claim to a group of atolls and reefs, called the Spratly Islands.⁷ However, a number of other countries have disputed this claim. These medium-sized countries are members of the multilateral organization ASEAN which is comprised of most of the South East Asian countries. The purpose of the organization is to create cooperation between the small and medium-sized countries in East Asia and to use this forum to settle disputes.⁸ Traditionally, the ASEAN countries have been supported financially and militarily by the USA and a number of them have also hosted US bases during the Cold War.

However, during the last decade this has changed as the USA has withdrawn from all bases in South East Asia but maintains a military presence in the area, which is part of Japan's strategic security. The US Navy also still has a close relationship with Singapore. Japan is completely dependent on open sea routes to the Indian Ocean and no state in East Asia is currently interested in seeing Japan increase its strategic interests, nor China's strategic interests for that matter.⁹ Today China's most important political goal in the region is to gain as much influence as possible and preferably at the expense of American influence in the region, thereby creating a framework for continued economic growth. Furthermore, official Chinese documents state that any conflicts with China will be resolved by peaceful means.¹⁰ First and foremost, China wants to avoid any country in the region recommencing or starting military alliances with other great powers, that is, the USA.¹¹ This counts clearly against China resolving its disagreements by military power as ASEAN is a purely political organization without any common military means available and, as such, poses no threat to China.¹² In 1994, a new organization was created by the ASEAN countries: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).¹³ The ARF is a forum for all countries with interests in the Pacific area. It is also an organization whose primary work is at the idea-political level and as such it is not useful for resolving conflicts but rather for improving the relationships between the countries.¹⁴ China participates as an observer in the ARF and consequently has some political influence. This shows that China's influence in the region is increasing but this is primarily much due to closer economic ties in East Asia.

China's largest problem has been the above-mentioned territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, where China, in addition to looking after its internal political relations,

has seen an opportunity for extracting oil as well as a possibility of creating increased safety for its oil deliveries from the Middle East.¹⁵ Initially, China claimed full rights over all of the islands with special economic zones in the surrounding seas, but after negotiations with the ASEAN it agreed to claim only a part of the islands and furthermore withdrew its extensive claims over the surrounding waters.¹⁶ The claim was followed by the stationing of Chinese military on an atoll in 1995.¹⁷ One of the reasons for this could be that China did not want to risk an open conflict with one or more of the ASEAN countries which might have resulted in interference from the USA in the event China posed a threat to free passage of shipping through the area.¹⁸

Next it should also be emphasized that it is very expensive for a single country to prospect for oil, which is why it was advantageous for China to be able to make “joint ventures” with other interested parties, resulting in mutual financial rewards from the project and minimizing initial costs for each individual country.¹⁹ Whether China performs as a player in a mature anarchy within this dimension does not seem proven, as China, despite its declared intentions, has not shown a great willingness to subject itself to the ARF’s standards and confidence-building measures.²⁰ It should be added that, based on the effect of the other dimensions, China has not been willing to start an open conflict as this would have immeasurable consequences for China’s economy and reputation²¹. With regard to the USA, China wants to avoid acting from a war interest perception as China would like to create an area around itself, free from USA influence, which would then be open to Chinese influence.²²

The Military Security Dimension

It is interesting to view the Chinese military from a regional perspective. China itself has recognized that it does not have enough military means, apart from its relatively few nuclear weapons, to justify it being regarded as a global power.²³ In this part of the chapter I will try to answer the question of whether China is having a “power struggle” or a “security struggle.”²⁴ These designations can illustrate whether China is performing as an immature or a mature player. In the regional context, it is important to be aware that it is not only a question of China’s perception of the military development but also equally how the countries in the region perceive the development.

First it must be established that, numerically speaking, China is the world’s greatest military power in relation to conventional weapons of all types. Compared with the other large countries in the region (Japan, Taiwan, Korea), it should be noted that the Chinese military generally is out of date by at least 20 years.²⁵ As mentioned previously, China has undergone a total change in its doctrine without, however, making the necessary funding available to implement the doctrine seriously. Through the 1970s, 1980s and part of the 1990s, China had an army of 2¼ million men wearing sneakers, an air force consisting of copies of old Russian aircraft from the 1960s and a navy that, despite its size, could hardly enforce China’s right over their territorial waters, and this is before the claims in the South China Sea. Consequently, it is not a defense that can be taken seriously by the other great powers.²⁶ During the 1990s China recognized the problem of the military not being adequate. However, China maintains that it is not a question of arms buildup but of a reduction in the number of forces, by approximately ½ million from 1997 to 2000 (16 percent), and it is not financed by the economic surplus.²⁷

China maintains that it is carrying out a security struggle in order to secure its sovereignty and integrity which could be plausible, when taking into account that today China's "Centre of Gravity" (COG) is along China's east coast due to the economic development of these areas, whereas before it was in the heart of China.²⁸ Given China's military potential, it means that China has no depth to its defense of its COG against Naval threats. Regardless of the maturity of an anarchy, a great power will always try to maintain freedom of action for its COG militarily and politically. Viewed in this light, China's attempts at modernization, especially of its navy and air force, can be seen as a logical step for an up and coming superpower, particularly when the age and capacity of the current material is considered.²⁹ During the 1990s China acquired SU-27 and SU-30 FLANKER aircraft, diesel submarines (KILO class) and a destroyer (Sovremenny) from Russia.³⁰ All were purchased with clauses on the transfer of technology regarding China's own production of the models. All units are nearly at the same level as Western equipment and the best from the Russian defense industry.

The aircraft in particular should be mentioned as they are regarded equal to the best Western aircraft. All of the aircrafts will increase the distance over which China can have military influence. The reason that China purchases Russian equipment is that most Western countries have restrictions on the sale of weapons to China.³¹ Russian technology today is far behind Western technology which is the reason why China would rather have Western equipment and in the long term be dependent on the supply of Western technology.³² China has set itself modest goals with regard to catching up with the technological difference between the countries of the region as it is also necessary for the other countries in the region to modernize their defense, particularly since China's

modernization has become known and China has made its increased territorial claims.³³ It is precisely because of the schism in the region that none of the countries are convinced that China is only modernizing in order to maintain a credible deterrent and enforce its sovereignty due to historical experiences.³⁴ This is why these countries are modernizing in order to maintain a technological advantage over China as none can match China numerically.³⁵ China's modernization is perceived by the countries in the region as a "power struggle." However, China denies this. There is no doubt that China, purely from a military point of view, performs as a revisionist power as the country clearly wants to be recognized as a superpower in the region.³⁶ It wants to be a superpower that should be taken seriously and that can exercise its influence and project its power over the whole region.³⁷ This is confusing as China claims that it is undergoing a "security struggle" as the revisionist performance is closely linked to a performance as a player in an immature anarchy. The projection of power is one of the capacities signifying a superpower. This is a capacity China does not yet have but is working to achieve by purchases from Russia.

Furthermore, China wants to have the facility for air-refueling, and better C4I capacity.³⁸ This, combined with a navy that can operate away from the coastal areas, would give China the desired ability for power projection.³⁹ Some sources claim that the Spratly Islands will be used as a springboard in this development by enlarging them to support aircraft and ships.⁴⁰ However, it is questionable whether this is realistic as primarily the atolls are not large enough to contain a landing strip for SU-27 aircraft without reclaiming large areas of land. Moreover, the whole area consists of low lying coral islands and reefs making it difficult for large ships to navigate. The size of the islands and the coral atolls means that the establishing of a harbor for a high sea navy of

carrier-ship size is probably unrealistic, at least not a new Guam or Diego Garcia.⁴¹ By positioning, for example, radar on the islands they could, however, help to provide China with the desired strategic depth. Another reason for China making a claim on the islands could be that China has recognized that, in practice, neither the Philippines nor Vietnam could claim territorial rights to the islands.⁴² In addition, the islands have some rich resources that are also attractive. Thus China performs mainly as a player in an immature anarchy in relation to the military dimension at this level. This is consistent with the conflict between China's own perception of what kind of player it is and the other countries' perception of China. China, according to Buzan, clearly performs as a revisionist with regard to the modernization of its military and its increased territorial claims.⁴³ Diplomatically, China has been pressured to publicize part of its defense budget. This however, is so impenetrable that it has not increased the trust of the other countries in the region. China will have to open itself up to a much wider scrutiny of the country's defense budget and policies. It would also have to build up confidence in the South China Sea in a similar way to what it did in Central Asia and with India.⁴⁴ This would, hopefully, influence the other countries' perception of China undergoing a "security struggle" and not having any aggressive intentions.⁴⁵

The Economic Security Dimension

The economic security dimension in the region will be dealt with next. According to Buzan, economic security is not usually greatly affected at the regional level as today many countries' economic security is based outside the region.⁴⁶ This makes the defined region something of a paradox as most of the economies are dependent on each other and

they are competing within the same parameters and with the same goods on the world market.⁴⁷

Therefore, the analysis will focus on China's economic goals in relation to the region, including the Tiger Economies and China's development during the last decade. Furthermore, the importance of the degree of interdependence for China and the Asian crisis will be analyzed. The Asian Tigers refers primarily to Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Korea but also to countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. During the last 30 years, all of these countries have undergone rapid economic development based on the establishment of large exports and great attraction of foreign capital. This has led to the countries' growth being 5 to 10 percent per year; a figure which in reality means that the countries have undergone a faster development than both the USA and the United Kingdom when they were industrializing.⁴⁸ China's development has followed the Tiger Economies and has used nearly the same model in an attempt to change the economy from a planned economy to a managed market economy. China's opening of its economy also provided new opportunities for investments and countries in East Asia and Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea are amongst the largest investors in China.⁴⁹ China's high growth over the last 20 years is largely due, in part, to these countries and the decentralization in China; a growth upon which China is totally dependent and which is China's immediate goal.⁵⁰

The regional goal in the long term is a reunification with Taiwan but not necessarily a complete economic reunification.⁵¹ Reunification is completely conditional on China's successful assimilation of Hong Kong and Macau and on China becoming politically acceptable to both Taiwan and the rest of the world. This does not mean that

China necessarily must become democratic in the Western sense but there is no doubt that there needs to be a significant change in China's handling of human rights as well as greater openness throughout China. This means that China will have to subject itself to some of the surrounding world's standards and regulations and comply with these. China has already modified a large part of its economy to fit in with the rest of the East Asian economy and today there are close trade links between China and Hong Kong especially and onwards from Hong Kong to Taiwan.⁵² Today much of the regulation of the Chinese economy has been decentralized from the central government, and this has meant that the Chinese regions have acquired more power and independence from Beijing.⁵³

This means that there cannot be a question of interdependence in a restricted way but there is still contact with people and companies regarding trade and economy between China and particularly Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and Taiwan (through Hong Kong).⁵⁴ There are hardly any real contacts between organizations in China and the outside world, apart from the economic ones, because of the construction of the system and the government's opposition to interdependence in China.⁵⁵ These contacts can be judged very important for China as they can be a lever to establishing even more contacts. The severing of these contacts due to, for instance, a military conflict would have serious consequences for the Chinese economy as today China's foreign trade amounts to 43 percent of the GDP, which is in line with other trade nations.⁵⁶ This indicates that economic links in the region alone can force China, economically, to perform more closely to a mature anarchy. The strong economic links to East Asia are also a weakness for China as the East Asian economies are very similar and therefore the

sensitivity to China is also greater when a large part of trade and investments are bound up with the other East Asian economies.

This is one of the reasons for the economic crisis in East Asia in 1997 and 1998, when there were actually three separate crises which were connected in the regional economic crisis.⁵⁷ It started in Thailand with a financial crisis because of stagnating export and over-lending banks which meant that the Thai currency lost so much value in relation to the U.S. dollar to which it was tied that the national bank of Thailand had to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy on which the country's development was based, as the majority of the loans in the country were not covered for foreign exchange risks. This meant that the Thai currency fell by 30 percent in relation to the dollar and the confidence in the other East Asian currencies was undermined, leading elsewhere to similar problems. The problems spread like rings in water as many of the countries' investments were made in other countries having the same type of economies which were also hit by financial and currency crises. Initially, China managed to escape the economic crisis unharmed because as it is not possible to speculate in the Chinese currency, it could hold its value, despite the close contact with/dependence on the Hong Kong dollar. Additionally, China had very large currency reserves which could be immediately released.⁵⁸

Generally, the "Chinese" countries managed to escape the crisis which helped to move the economic influence in the region towards those that many called Greater China, that is, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.⁵⁹ Economically, the countries had also become closer with the help of joint ventures, for example increased investments in China. China was not affected by the crisis until the end of 1998 when there was a

catastrophic flood and the now missing markets for China's products meant that the annual growth in China's GDP became less than expected.⁶⁰ China tried to avoid this fall in growth by increasing its exports to the EU and the USA. China then complained of a trade balance deficit which needed to be improved by easing import restrictions through increased investments in the improvement of the infrastructure.⁶¹ All measures implemented were to keep China's economy from continuing to decline and thereby avoid social unrest and failures of the unprofitable banks and the state-owned enterprises.⁶² China had concentrated on keeping its head above water during the crisis which is logical when taking China's political conditions into account. In the handling of the crisis, China took care of its own interests before helping others. By maintaining its contacts with Greater China, China showed a willingness to perform as a player in an economic mature anarchy.

The Societal Security Dimension

The greatest societal threats to a state occur within that state via cultural influences, through the cultural influences of language and the degree of freedom etc. In this section societal possibilities for China in the region will be considered, as a large number of countries in South East Asia have relatively large Chinese minorities.

From the historical perspective, China has had great influence in South East Asia, which also has resulted in many Chinese settling outside China's borders. Furthermore, there have been internal clashes in China causing emigration of Chinese people to surrounding countries. The largest collective emigration was the movement to Taiwan after the communist victory in 1949.⁶³ Today Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are also countries with a majority of ethnic Chinese.

There are also significant Chinese minorities in Malaysia and Thailand where they make up 30% and 10% of the population respectively.⁶⁴ Outside Asia the Chinese minorities do not amount to large groups, and are often well integrated. During the last decade, China has not done a great deal to support these ethnic Chinese during, for example, outbreaks of unrest in the countries.⁶⁵ This should be viewed in the context of China's own attitudes and its prioritizing of other countries' nonintervention in internal affairs. For example, the mass slaughter of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia did not bring about any sanctions from China, apart from supporting the UN's resolutions.⁶⁶ Additionally, it should be mentioned that today the ethnic Chinese are very important to China and obviously will become of even greater importance in the future if China changes its political system and takes on the role of a superpower in the region or globally, as many ethnic Chinese will then be able to identify with a strong China in preference to an aging communist power.⁶⁷

It is estimated that until 1995 up to 80 percent of total foreign investments in China had ethnic Chinese as backers, although one source does not believe this is significant as ethnic Chinese only invest where the opportunities are most favorable.⁶⁸ There can also be cultural reasons for China attracting many investments from ethnic Chinese. As an example there is a similarity between China's Special Economic Zones on the East coast and those areas, from where many ethnic Chinese originate.⁶⁹ Because of the Chinese traditions of networking and clientism, it is natural that business links are established with the old region. The ethnic Chinese, therefore, are of great importance for China's security policy because of their economic links and their desires to utilize the opportunities in a China that is in the process of developing a market economy. It would

be logical to assume that China would want to look after the ethnic Chinese as they form a vulnerable base for China. Because of China's internal political conditions, however, it is not possible for China, apart from using international organizations, to look after the rights of the ethnic Chinese even though the ethnic Chinese are of significant importance for most of the other countries in the region.⁷⁰ So no country will have any long term wish to persecute/dislodge them. The ethnic Chinese are, without doubt, some of the most important players in the form of economic interdependence in East Asia and because of this interdependence; China performs as a mature player. But because China is still a closed country in every way except the economy, the attitude of noninterference pulls in the direction of an immature player performance. Here the economic links carry greater weight as they are judged to be so important for China that a threat of cutting these off could lead to a gradual reform of the Chinese system, unless China were able to build up a network of other investors which could be of equal importance.⁷¹

The Environmental Security Dimension

In this part of the chapter the focus will be on China's energy consumption and its need for resources. The consequences of the region will be analyzed to reveal China's performance as a player. In this context environmental security is regarded as both the impact that the security policy has on the country's resource requirements, and the rub-off effect on the environment of the implementation of the country's energy policy.

China's economic development in the last 20 years has resulted in an increase in China's energy demands so great that since 1993, China has gone from being an exporter of crude oil to being an importer.⁷² This even despite that the country is the world's 6th largest oil producer. This has influenced China to develop a high sea navy as currently

the country is dependent on the delivery of crude oil by sea routes.⁷³ Thus China is vulnerable as the country does not have nearly enough developed energy sources to replace crude oil.⁷⁴ China has tried to reduce this vulnerability partly by laying claim to sea areas where it is believed there are large oil reserves and partly by negotiating with the central Asian countries to install a pipeline for natural gas-oil over land as well as prioritizing the development of water energy.⁷⁵ Today China's energy sources are mainly of coal (approximately 2/3), oil, nuclear power, and water.

The burning of coal from plants without filters causes problems for China and is responsible for a large part of the acid rain and air pollution over South Korea and Japan.⁷⁶ In the long term this pollution could lead to diplomatic problems if China rejects to participate in a resolution. As long as China's energy consumption continues to grow, it cannot be expected that the need for coal will decrease to any great extent. China has very large oil fields in Xinjiang province but in order to use these China is completely dependent on Western oil companies as they are the only ones who have the technology to extract the oil.⁷⁷ Until now China has not wanted to grant concessions to these fields. Compared to other countries today China makes great use of water energy and is continuing to construct water power installations along all large rivers. China has also commenced energy extraction from the Mekong River which could have consequences for all of the countries in South East Asia as China will not sign to cooperative agreements on the regulation of water levels and the course of the river. China believes that its exploitation of the Mekong River is an internal issue, despite the fact that this could cause the drying out of rice fields in several countries, flooding in other places, and possibly a change in the vegetation in the lower reaches of the Mekong. Because the

population growth and the rise in living standards in China, food such as grain and fish could also be an environmental problem for China and the rest of the region. Today China has to import grain from abroad in order to meet its needs due to a combination of bad management of agricultural land and growth.⁷⁸ One could anticipate that China will speculate on the price of agricultural goods on the world market. On the other hand this would provide an opportunity to tie China closer to a system of mutual dependence. Fish makes up an important protein contribution for much of China's and Asia's.⁷⁹ Because of pollution and over fishing of fresh and coastal water China has had to fish in the open sea.⁸⁰ The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is one of the largest areas remaining with completely undisturbed fish stocks in East Asia.⁸¹ The fish stocks in the remaining areas are almost exhausted and it is necessary to fish further out into the Pacific because of pollution. This is another reason China is laying claim to the Spratly Islands, as China would like to establish economically exclusive zones around the area.⁸² Full extraction of the oil in this area is one of the key points that the countries are disputing in the Spratly Islands, as this would threaten the fish stocks in the area. Consequently, the countries must agree on what is to be done with the area and also establish a quota system for fishing so as to conserve the natural environment thus securing future food sources.

There is every indication that China's security policy does not include the environmental aspect apart from any connection with the economy in order to secure enough resources to reduce China's vulnerability to other nations.⁸³ This would also explain China's opposition to engaging in cooperation over the Mekong particularly, despite the fact that the government states otherwise.⁸⁴ With respect to environmental security within the region, China definitely performs as a player who follows its own

goals and preferably at the expense of other countries' gains. China performs as a player in an immature anarchy and the future prospects will not be much better, unless China is persuaded economically or from below (green awareness) to do something about the environmental problems.

Conclusion of Chapter 5

The starting point for this chapter has been the region defined as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and China with a focus on China-ASEAN-(Taiwan). In considering the region and its players, a number of problems has been raised effecting several levels.⁸⁵ The USA for instance has a large influence on the players' performance at the regional level. However, there are a number of problems with the USA's relationship with China at the regional level that are directly derived from or effected by their relationship at the system level, whereas the USA's relationship with ASEAN cannot be judged as linked to others at several levels. Similarly, it can be shown that China's resource requirements have an impact on the relationships at other regional levels, for example China's possible agreement with Kazakhstan regarding a pipeline could have a direct impact on Kazakhstan's relationship with Russia. Influence at several levels will also have been valid downwards provided that all countries in the region have been strong countries, which were mutually dependent and had systems that were open to each other. When assessing the country's security policy, it would have been relevant to take into account China's influence on the ethnic Chinese in other countries as their influence would be possible and visa versa, for example, in multinational companies' influence on China's security policy in the region.

Furthermore, it is ascertained that a discussion of China's security policy in the region alone is not possible as it has an influence on the other players' security policy and in a dynamic process vice versa. This section allows no opportunity for describing the total process within the given framework; but just to mention the conditions around China. There are no countries in the region that can unambiguously be categorized as strong countries. However, there are a number of countries with many of the characteristics of strong countries but also with some characteristics of weak countries. China is one of those with very great weaknesses in relation to the other countries in the region. China is a country undergoing great changes in its foreign political profile and maturity. This appears to be a partial conclusion that can be derived from this chapter, as there is great difference between the country's methods of performing within the different security dimensions. The country performs in a normal immature way in relation to environmental issues but there is a form of interdependence within the economic security dimension where it has a relatively mature performance. The relationship between the USA and China in the region has shown to encounter several aspects. The USA is working as a stabilizer in the region through its military presence to balance the relationship between China and the ASEAN countries. It also is an opposition/competitor by exerting influence on the perception of China in its neighborhood and also by delivering weapons and technology to Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines. The USA is also working as a strategic partner within various areas by guaranteeing open SLOCs to the Middle East, which is also a global system level problem. It has a security agreement with Japan to discourage the remilitarization of Japan, China's nearest competitor in the region. At the regional level China can only be thought of as performing as a mature

player within the economic and societal security dimensions. In the other dimensions China has not yet reached far enough to adopt a more mature attitude to its role at the regional level.

¹Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 194ff.

²Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 252.

³Buzan, 209ff.

⁴Appendix 3.

⁵Michael Yahuda, "China's Search for a Global Role," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 268.

⁶Appendix 4,5 & 9.

⁷In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region. China has occupied some of those islands. In 1976, China enforced its claim upon the Paracel Islands by seizing them from Vietnam. China refers to the Paracel Islands as the Xisha Islands, and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province.

⁸Michael Leifel, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, vol. 1, Adelphi Paper no. 302, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 10ff.

⁹Evan A. Feigenbaum, "China: Resources and Security: China's Military posture and the New Economic Geopolitics," *Survival* vol. 41, no. 2 (summer 1999): 50f.

¹⁰www.chinaembassy.dk, *Part I, The International Security Situation*, 3.

¹¹Douglas T. Stuart; and William T Tow. *A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific*. Vol. 1, Adelphi Paper no. 299. (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 42f.

¹²Willfried A. Herrmann und Peter Krause, Strategische Tendenzen im Pazifischen Raum, " *Europäische Sicherheit* 49. Jahrgang, no. 6 (June 2000): 50.

¹³ASEAN regional Forum.

¹⁴Leifel, 53ff.

- ¹⁵Jane's, "Security Assessment," *Jane's Sentinel Files*, (1997): 1.8.6.
- ¹⁶Jusuf Wanadi "ASEAN's China Strategy, Towards Deeper Engagement", *Survival* vol. 38, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 122f.
- ¹⁷Jane's, "Security Assessment," *Jane's Sentinel Files* (1997): 1.8.4.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*
- ¹⁹*Ibid.*
- ²⁰www.FMPRC.gov.cn, *The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)*, 4.
- ²¹Yahuda, 270.
- ²²Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, vol 1 (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 156f.
- ²³Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," *Current History* 611 (September 1997): 248.
- ²⁴Buzan, 295f.
- ²⁵Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," *Current History* 611 (September 1997): 248.
- ²⁶Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, *Kina efter Deng*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997) 156ff.
- ²⁷Herrmann; and Krause, 49.
- ²⁸Military term: The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. ; A. James Gregor, *East Asian Stability and the Defense of the Republic of China of Taiwan*, 325.
- ²⁹Kim, *China as a Great Power*, 248.
- ³⁰Herrmann; and Krause, 49.
- ³¹Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 255.
- ³²*Ibid.*, 257.
- ³³*Ibid.*, 260.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, 261.

- ³⁵Jane's, "Security Assessment" *Jane's Sentinel Files*, (1997): 1.8.4.
- ³⁶Buzan, 303ff.
- ³⁷Brødsgaard, 166.
- ³⁸Ibid., 170.
- ³⁹Ibid., 173.
- ⁴⁰Feigenbaum, 75.
- ⁴¹Ibid., 79.
- ⁴²Hermann; and Krause, 15.
- ⁴³Ibid., 20.
- ⁴⁴Wanadi, 123f.
- ⁴⁵Buzan, 322.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., 201f.
- ⁴⁷Wanadi, 119.
- ⁴⁸Brzezinski, 153; and Ibid., 203.
- ⁴⁹Brzezinski, 153.
- ⁵⁰www.chinaembassy.dk, *Part I, The International Security Situation*, 2.
- ⁵¹Brzezinski, 159.
- ⁵²Peter A. Petri, "Trading with the Dynamos," *Current History* 587 (December 1994): 409.
- ⁵³Ibid., 413.
- ⁵⁴Henning Duus, *Interdependens*, (HO.STAT HD) May 94/10.9.96/23.9.97.
- ⁵⁵James Shinn, "Engaging China, Exploiting Fissures in the Façade," *Current History* 602 (September 1996): 244f.
- ⁵⁶Brødsgaard, 119.
- ⁵⁷Stig Tenold, "Asiatisk drama-tre, kriser i Asien," *International Politikk* 3 (1998): 339ff.

- ⁵⁸Ibid., 341.
- ⁵⁹Stein Tønnesson “Asia-krisens politikk,” *International Politikk* 3 (1998): 379ff.
- ⁶⁰IISS, “The End of China's Era of Growth,” *Strategic Comment*, vol. 5, (January 1999): 2.
- ⁶¹IISS, “China: Problems Increase as Economy Slows,” *Strategic Survey* (1998/99): 181.
- ⁶²Ibid., 181.
- ⁶³Brødsgaard, 172.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., 175.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., 177.
- ⁶⁶Brødsgaard, 177.
- ⁶⁷Brezinski, 167.
- ⁶⁸Wanadi, 126f.
- ⁶⁹Brødsgaard, 172ff.
- ⁷⁰Brzezinski, 167f.
- ⁷¹Duus.
- ⁷²Brødsgaard, 90.
- ⁷³Ibid., 82.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., 90. Reynold, 110.
- ⁷⁵Salameh, 142f.
- ⁷⁶David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” *Survival* 42, no. 1 (spring 2000): 427.
- ⁷⁷See appendix 6.
- ⁷⁸Salameh, 145.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., 50.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., 65.

⁸¹Ibid., 54.

⁸²Rasmus Amer, *Spratlykonflikten* (Stockholm: KalmarBooks, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, KalmarSund Tryck 1996), 20.

⁸³Salameh, 150.

⁸⁴www.FMPRC.gov.cn, *The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)*, p.4.

⁸⁵Buzan, 222ff.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S ROLE AT THE STATE LEVEL

Introduction

After considering China's possible performance as a player in a mature anarchy from the individual level to the system level and further to the regional level, this chapter will consider China from the state level. This level is the connection between the individual level and the regional and system level respectively and therefore it is also the natural focal point for the state as a player.¹ National security for the state is "the ability of states to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity."² This makes national security relevant both with regard to internal and external relationships.

This connection is indicated by the decision makers' assumptions to make decisions, which will always be effected from above and below. In this section the relationships between the decision makers will not be dealt with specifically. Security policy for the state is a question of reducing its vulnerability to threats and this will eventually lead to an international security strategy, which sets out to remove or reduce the causes of the threats.³ Normally, it would be difficult for a state to have only one security policy or an international security strategy as these are conflicting but also complement each other. This chapter will in part focus on the section of the Chinese security policy which is concerned with reducing its own vulnerability and partly on the bilateral relationships with Japan and Taiwan. Hong Kong and Macau will also be included, even though today they belong to China and as such should be included in the interior relationships. However, they are treated not as independent players but as spearheads to China's economy and contacts in East Asia. Taiwan is treated as an

independent player, despite the fact that the Chinese and some Taiwanese believe that it belongs to China. However, as Taiwan has its own foreign policy and its own executive, legislative and judicial powers and their own military, it can be regarded as an independent player regardless of the given political conditions. Japan is treated as the second bilateral relationship as, today, Japan and China are the two greatest powers in the region and both are continuing to develop.

The Political Security Dimension

Today China's connections with Japan are one of the most important bilateral relationships in East Asia. First, China and Japan are equally important to East Asia and they have a historical relationship as opposite poles in the balance of East Asia.

Today China and Japan are not direct political competitors but there are a number of areas where the countries have different political interests. Japan has worked toward becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which China has opposed, as this would mean less influence for China. However, this is an area that probably could change if China could see an advantage in having a second Asian country as a permanent member. China views Japan as the only political threat in East Asia. This is because of the history of the last centuries and the important role of two Japanese victories in the Japan-China wars resulting in large losses to China.

Currently, Japan perceives two political dangers connected with China. First, Japan wants a stable China that would not risk being split up with a civil war as in Yugoslavia, which would bring about immeasurable consequences including, possibly, a mass influx of refugees to Japan.⁴ Second, Japan does not want a reunification between China and Taiwan as a Greater China would then be clearly dominant both politically and

economically and have territorial waters directly up to Japan's connecting routes to the Middle East and the West.⁵ This leads Japan, to China's great dissatisfaction, to politically support Taiwan's independence or at least its current status. Territorial claims are also one of the present disputes between Japan and China as both countries claim the right to the Diaoyutai Islands, where it is believed there are deposits of oil. Until recently this dispute has been only political but with a nationalistic wave in both countries, it could lead to open conflict. Over the last decade Japan has accepted a larger responsibility internationally, for example in the UN operations and in economic politics, which China has viewed with distrust as China still wants a passive Japan which should remember its atrocities during the Second World War. Along with the generational change among the top Japanese politicians this has resulted in political tensions as Japan desires to set the past behind it and to engage more at both the global system and regional levels.⁶ Despite these disagreements Japan has become one of China's most important trading partners and a financial support to China through the last decade. Similarly, the Chinese market has become more important to Japan after the economic crisis and declining sales in Europe and the USA.⁷ Looking at the above-mentioned problems a picture is drawn of a political relationship closely based on a kind of zero sum game, where it is important not to give the other party anything that would allow them to grow unless you can also grow at the same time.⁸ Coupled with the weight of historical experience, this indicates that China is performing in an immature anarchy.

The political relationship between Taiwan and China is not only very important for both countries but for the whole region and in part also for the USA, which makes the development of this relationship important. Over the last decade the political climate

between these countries has swung between almost open hostility to almost peaceful co-existence. The reunification of Taiwan and China is one of China's most important political goals for the future. This goal helps to guide China's behavior towards Taiwan and the rest of the region. China's goal of reunification with Taiwan has affected its reunification with Hong Kong and Macau. China altered very little in the way the two former colonies run because they could then function as a form of spearhead for China's development. Also, it is the intention of the Chinese government to make China politically attractive to Taiwan by undertaking a successful reunification with Hong Kong and Macau.⁹ For Taiwan a reunification with China could happen only under specially defined conditions. As an example Taiwan would only negotiate with a China that was at a similar level of democratic development as Taiwan itself.¹⁰ In Taiwan today there is large support behind Taiwanese independence, as many feel that Taiwan can look after itself.¹¹ However, many also believe that a reunification is natural in the long term. China will not, under any circumstances, accept Taiwan's independence.¹² This is why China is pressurizing Taiwan each time the country tries to be accepted by international organizations or attempts to establish bilateral agreements. Several times China has threatened military action even though this would damage China so badly, both politically and economically, that the CCP would lose power and China would then be isolated like North Korea.¹³ China's heavy handling of Taiwan is one of the reasons that Taiwan's foreign policy is primarily focused on what China is doing, so that even the USA's attempts at improving relations and a reunification, in the long term, is ignored by Taiwan.¹⁴ One aspect of the view of the relationship between China and Taiwan is that China will not deal with this relationship as belonging to the state level but as an internal

affair. This is why China states that other countries should not interfere with China and Taiwan's mutual relationship. On the other hand Taiwan is working as far as possible to make the subject an international issue.¹⁵ This is one of the reasons why in the UN today, where currently the prevailing trend is for more and more involvement in issues by the international community, China is emphasizing on a its right to refuse international interference in internal affairs.¹⁶

There have also been positive developments in the relationship between China and Taiwan. China has been opened up to Taiwanese tourists and for cultural links, which has led to approximately 2.5 million Taiwanese visiting China annually.¹⁷ However, this has neither changed Taiwan's desire to set conditions on an eventual reunification with China nor its wish for possible independence. In the last few years a number of suggestions for a gradual reunification between Taiwan and China have been proposed in the form of establishing a confederation in order to create a federation in the long term.¹⁸ This is not an idea which would be immediately acceptable to China because of the internal political conditions regarding nationalism and the CCP's "hardline."¹⁹ Given the political and economic ties and frameworks at the higher levels today and the pressure from beneath to continue the economic development, it could end up that both China and Taiwan need to work towards this kind of solution. From the Chinese point of view a mature anarchic performance will not come from the relationship between China and Taiwan. Apart from the given assumptions, China is a long way from performing as a player in a mature anarchy seen in relation to Taiwan because of China's reluctance regarding other countries' interference/control of the conflict on political grounds and because of the CCP's unequivocal attitude to Taiwan as just a rebellious region.²⁰ In

order to be a mature performer, China would have to allow the UN or the ARF to mediate and would also have to recognize Taiwan's rights as an equal negotiating partner. One must remember how much the relationship is shaped by threats from China against Taiwan's independence. If there had not been any threats, then Taiwan would have declared its independence during the 1990s. The whole problem lies in China's insistence that all political relations must happen on China's terms. There are obviously no common standards or rules for connections between the countries on a purely political level.

The Military Security Dimension

The two countries in the region that China keeps a close eye on are Japan and Taiwan which China uses as a measure for its own military and technological development. The reason for this is that Japan is the only power in East Asia that can measure up to China. In regard to Taiwan, China wants to be able to pressurize the country militarily at any time and have the capacity to occupy the country if necessary. In this section of the chapter China's, Japan's and Taiwan's capabilities and their understanding of each other's capabilities will be dealt with, partly to discover how much of a mature performance there is, and partly to show any differences in the understanding of each other's imagined capabilities and their actual capabilities.

Japan has Asia's most modern military apparatus, although it is purely for self-defense.²¹ Japan only uses approximately 1 percent of its annual GDP on the military. This 1 percent is equivalent to the world's second highest total military spending because of Japan's high GDP.²² Japan does not command a numerically large force, approximately 250,000 men. However, it has high technological standards of equipment. Japan has a navy and an air force, which are technologically equivalent to all European

countries, and only lacks Stealth technology before it matches the USA. Today Japan can operate continuously up to 1000 sea miles from the Japanese islands with integrated navy and air force units, which clearly exceeds China's level both operationally and technically.²³ Japan has fully integrated C4I systems based on the newest American technology, which have been further developed in Japan.²⁴ Furthermore, Japan has a civil space industry with a technological level that shortly will produce highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles.²⁵ Japan has the expertise to build an aircraft carrier, which would increase Japan's "power projection" capacity even further.²⁶ The ship has not been built because the alliance with the USA has solved Japan's strategic goals by securing the delivery of resources. Therefore, Japan is the country in Asia that has best made use of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and, with its increased capabilities, can handle much bigger opponents if they are technologically inferior.²⁷ Japan sees China as a potential destabilizer and threat to Japan's access to resources, which is why it is closely monitoring China's military modernization.²⁸ Japan views China as technologically backward and currently not a threat to Japan apart from the possession of nuclear weapons.²⁹ Most Chinese ships are not equipped with Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), close air defense weapons or antisubmarine weapons, which makes them an easy target for submarines and antiship missiles.³⁰ Additionally, China does not have units that are used to working a long way from the country and neither does it have a fully developed C4I system, which is a profound weakness when faced with a technologically advanced opponent. Japan is following China's modernization in order to maintain its current advantage, which at the moment is about twenty years. This Japanese viewpoint is assessed as not too far from reality regarding China's military capabilities.

China perceives Japan as having been a possible threat to peace in Asia for a number of years and expects Japan to become remilitarized and governed in the same way as Japan was in the 1930s.³¹ China also believes that Japan is a future nuclear power as the country, according to China, has the possibility of producing between 1000 and 2000 nuclear weapons in the short term, which would make Japan the world's third largest nuclear power.³² China also sees Japan's participation in the UN's peacekeeping operations as ignoring the Japanese constitution.³³ Similarly, Japan's decision to deploy a "coast watch" in the Malacca Strait to prevent pirating of the international sea routes has also been noted.³⁴ China would rather see a Japan that continues to focus on the defense of the Japanese islands within the framework of the Japanese constitution. China is so distrustful of Japan that it sees Japan's strategy as aiming to make the USA into China's opponent while Japan builds itself up to be Asia's regional hegemony. Actually, the Chinese military's ideas about Japan are similar to the American military's ideas of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, that is, the threat seems to be somewhat overstated.³⁵ Furthermore, China is worried that Japan's security guarantee or cooperation with Taiwan is something that will reduce China's strategic depth with regard to its COG and bring the other countries' influence to within a distance of 150 kilometers of China.³⁶

Taiwan is one of the other technologically well developed countries in East Asia, although the country is nowhere near on a par with Japan. During the last decade Taiwan's doctrine has been a defensive one, whose main elements are to have a strong enough defense to upset China's plans to carry out an invasion of the country. Taiwan is also numerically very inferior to China as the country has a strength of approximately 400,000 men divided between the three forces.³⁷

Taiwan has completed an ongoing modernization of its forces with emphasis on acquiring weapons systems that are regarded as standard in the West, either by purchasing them or by producing them. All of Taiwan's newest weapons systems are bought for integration in a C4I environment and most of the systems have gone to the navy and air force respectively. However, Taiwan is much more dependent on outside support in case of a crisis with China than Japan is, so the country has reached an agreement with the USA, the TRA, which the USA promises to defend Taiwan against an invasion from China.³⁸ Today Taiwan has a navy that is technologically superior to China's, but inferior in number of vessels. The same applies to the air force; Taiwan's aircraft are generally of a newer generation than the Chinese apart from the operational SU-27 FLANKER. However, the balance can be tipped in China's favor with the licensed production of SU-27 aircraft.³⁹ Another aspect in comparison of China and Taiwan is that there is only one part of the total Chinese force that could be used against Taiwan.⁴⁰ The technological superiority, combined with Taiwan's geography, means that in Taiwan the Chinese invasion of the main island is not seen as a real possibility, although they believe it is more likely that China could take over the smaller islands close to the mainland.⁴¹ Actually the only threat that Taiwan sees as a problem is in dealing with the threat of a massive attack with ballistic and cruise missiles which Taiwan, despite an effective air defense, would not be able to deal with in the long term.⁴² China is aware of the technological difference, which could be the reason China is trying to develop its technology in particular areas, such as missiles, aircraft, larger ships and submarines.⁴³ China constantly wants to be able to pressurize Taiwan militarily whilst preventing Japan from matching China militarily. This indicates a very traditional

performance as a player viewed from the military security dimension, as China only values its own security and does not recognize others' needs but sees these as a threat to China or its interests.

The Economic Security Dimension

This section of the chapter will deal with the economic relations between China, Japan and Taiwan respectively from the theory of the mature anarchy and will include the importance of Hong Kong and Macau.

Japan and China are East Asia's strongest economies and currently are seen as the only economies that can compete with the USA. Japan and China are also extensive trading partners. The export from Japan to China has been dominated by the Japanese car industry until recently. After Hong Kong's reunification with China, Japan has become China's most important trading partner regarding imports to and investments in China. However, the Japanese investments in China have been marked with caution due to the political and historical relationships between the countries.⁴⁴ As the Chinese market develops, Japan sees great opportunities in China for gaining profit. Today the Chinese market is large, but because of the still relatively low living standards among a large number of Chinese, the market is not yet fully developed. During the last decade the Japanese economy has experienced stagnation, which is why Japan is observing the economic development, especially in the dynamic coastal areas, wishing to profit from this growth area.⁴⁵ After the economic crisis of Japan, it began a number of large investments in China because of China's role during the crisis and to prevent a worsening of the current economic conditions in China. The big difference between the two economies is that China is still completely dependent on foreign investments, whereas

Japan has reached a level in its economic development when the country uses its profits to invest in other countries. This means that currently Japan is the only country in East Asia that can go and support other economies and thereby also affect the countries' politics. Japan has chosen only to use its money via the IMF, which is why Japan's effective political role in East Asia today lacks significant importance.⁴⁶

In contrast to the relatively small connection between the Japanese and Chinese economies, there are many connections between Taiwan and China. Because of the political conditions in China and Taiwan, there are no direct links at an official level between the countries. All the economic bilateral negotiations take place via Hong Kong. Furthermore, today there is an especially close network of connections between individuals and businesses in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which help to create a growth centre believed by many to be the driving force behind China's economy.⁴⁷ These connections are so important that in reality they give Guangdong and Fujian especially, certain political interests that differ from those of the central government; and Taiwan sees these as giving it greater independence and security.⁴⁸ Taiwan reasons that a conflict with China would sever the connection between it and the Guangdong and Fujian provinces, which, although having serious economic consequences for Taiwan, would have even worse consequences for the provinces and therefore also for China. Since Hong Kong's reunification with China, it has had a form of self-government in which military security and foreign policy are controlled by the central government, whilst all other issues are controlled by the local government in Hong Kong.⁴⁹ So far this has not had any influence on the economic development of Hong Kong.

In recent years there has been an increasingly greater merging of businesses in Hong Kong and China, which again has contributed to linking a large part of the Chinese economy to the Taiwan economy.⁵⁰ These are so closely linked that Taiwan's government several times has requested Taiwanese businesses to restrain from investing in mainland China as Taiwan's economic vulnerability to China was increasing too much because of the one-sided investments.⁵¹ Seen from an import/export perspective, it should be noted that Taiwan's economic vulnerability to China is larger than China's to Taiwan. However, the opposite is the case if you take into account the investment situation when Taiwan today makes most of the foreign investments in China. After Hong Kong's reunification with China, a form of interdependence between China and Taiwan can be identified. And usually countries that have interdependence do not go to war with each other. This has not been the case in the China-Taiwan relationship where China had repeatedly threatened Taiwan when the latter has discussed declaring itself independent. Consequently, it is not a pure interdependence, even though it is common agreed that it would be political suicide for the central government to attempt to invade Taiwan.⁵² Because of the domestic political/party political situation today, it would also be political suicide to allow Taiwan to declare independence.

Because of its own push towards nationalism and the uncertain situation of how China should be governed; the central government has placed itself in a "no win" situation. China must ensure that Taiwan does not declare itself independent using all nonmilitary means and yet the government must still appear strong and dynamic to the population.⁵³ There are no formal agreements at the state level between China and Japan;

similarly there is nothing to indicate a performance as a player in a mature anarchy apart from the described relationship between Taiwan and China.

The Environmental Security Dimension

Taiwan and Japan are not the main interests in this section of the chapter, as the focus will be on what China can do to reduce its vulnerability to its increased energy needs and the environmental consequences, including the bilateral relationships to the other countries around China.

As previously mentioned, China has an increasing need for energy, which it is trying to meet not only by importing resources but also through developing its own resources. An example of this is the dam project The Three Gorges, where China has started building the world's largest dam.⁵⁴ It will dam the Yangtze River in order to make use of the enormous energy opportunities in water power. Furthermore with this project, China is also trying to improve the control of the river, which last caused problems in the summer of 1998, when China experienced catastrophic flooding which had such enormous consequences that they could be seen in the subsequent state budgets in the form of a decreasing growth in several regions. Seen in isolation, the idea to increase the percentage of water power in China is good, particularly if it can replace some of the use of coal, but this project is so enormous that its critics are worried that the creation of the 632 square-kilometers lake will lead to an increased risk of earthquakes, which would have a direct security political influence on China's neighboring countries to the south as the dam could be perceived as a threat to these states' citizens and their economic development.⁵⁵ In addition there is the threat to the many Chinese who live downstream if the dam were to break during an earthquake. Other problems that have arisen with the

project are an expected short lifetime of the dam because of the large silt content in the river and the use of poor materials as a result of the bribery of responsible officials.⁵⁶ Taking all factors together, the dam project could be perceived as being as much an internal and external threat as helping to reduce China's vulnerability in the energy area. Finally, it also means the disruption of a traditionally important trade route between the interior of China and the coastal regions.

Water is also very important for food production, as China's rice production is dependent on water. Pollutions caused by fertilizers, has eliminated approximately 1/6 of China's water to an extent that the water is not usable for irrigation of crops.⁵⁷ This indicates that China could become dependent on the supply of "know-how" for the improvement of rice varieties with greater yields and less water requirements in order to reduce food imports. China is trying to remedy the lack of water by establishing desalination plants in coastal regions, although not in a sufficient quantity proportionate to the amount of polluted water.

There are also plans in China to establish a number of fish farms in the Yellow Sea in order to alleviate the problems of declining fish stocks and smaller catches of "wild" fish in China's coastal waters. This is another example of trying to move production to another area when production in one area comes to a halt for example due to pollution, without apparently considering the environmental consequences this might have. A large number of fish farms need to be constructed in order to meet the requirements of normal population growth and increasing living standards. The problem with fish farms is that they use a large amount of energy to produce fish and therefore increase China's energy requirements even more.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the fish farms cause

water pollution in the surrounding area. If the country begins to establish a large number of fish farms in the Yellow Sea, this could have a negative influence on China's relations with its neighbors. Further pollution of this area will obviously go against both Taiwan's and Japan's environmental political interest. Again this indicates that China does not regard the environmental situation as a part of the country's security political spectrum, which means that within this dimension China cannot be said to perform as a player in a mature anarchy.

Conclusion of Chapter 6

A picture of China has now been drawn showing that it is not performing maturely at the state level. It is only in certain areas, within the economic dimension in China's relationship with Taiwan, that parts of a mature anarchy are apparent. Within the other dimensions everything points towards China performing as a player in an immature anarchy. The performance of Japan and Taiwan could also be perceived as the same. This unequivocal conclusion is in sharp contrast to China's declared goals for its foreign policy, which emphasizes the importance of having good and trusting relations with its neighbors.⁵⁹

This could mean that China only wants to develop these relationships in as much as they lead to recognition of China as the dominant partner. Otherwise the declared policy is clearly China's intention that it is prevented from carrying out or which is obstructed by a number of other factors from other levels, which come into play. This will be further discussed in the next chapter.

¹Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 329.

- ²Ibid., 116.
- ³Ibid., 331.
- ⁴David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival* vol. 42, no. 1 (spring 2000): 426.
- ⁵Clemens S. Østergaard, "Nordøstasien efter Den Kolde Krig," *Udenrigs 2* (2000): 66.
- ⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*. vol 1, (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 178.
- ⁷Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, *Kina efter Deng*, vol. 1. 1st ed., (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 212.
- ⁸Ibid., 212f.
- ⁹Brzezinski, 171.
- ¹⁰Ibid, 175.
- ¹¹Shelley Rigger, "Tinding Opportunity in Crisis," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 290.
- ¹²Denny Roy, "Tensions in the Taiwan Strai,t" *Survival* vol. 42, no. 1 (spring 2000): 77.
- ¹³Flemming Ytzen, "Taiwans håb for Kina," *Udenrigs 2* (2000): 72.
- ¹⁴Rigger, 290.
- ¹⁵Ibid., 291.
- ¹⁶IISS, "Taiwan's Presidential Elections," *Strategic Comment* vol. 6, no. 2 (March 2000): 2.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 4.
- ¹⁸Rigger, 273.
- ¹⁹Buzan, 175ff.
- ²⁰Ibid., 175ff.
- ²¹Wilfried A. Herrmann; and Peter Krause, "Strategische Tendenzen im Pazifischen Raum," *Europäische Sicherheit* 49. Jahrgang, no. 6 (June 2000): 52.

²²Ibid., 55.

²³Østergaard, 66.

²⁴Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment," *Current History* 620 (September 1999): 253.

²⁵Tim Huxley; and Susan Willett. *Arming East Asia*, vol. 1, Adelphi Paper no. 329 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 55ff.

²⁶Ibid., 68.

²⁷Ibid., 66.

²⁸Brzezinski, 175.

²⁹Østergaard, 63.

³⁰Godwin, 256.

³¹Herrmann; and Krause, 57.

³²Ibid., 59.

³³Ibid., 60.

³⁴Ibid., 62.

³⁵Østergaard, 66.

³⁶Ibid., 67.

³⁷Ibid., 69.

³⁸Herrmann und Krause, 50. TRA is in contrast with an agreement which the USA has with the People's Republic. In accordance with this, the support to Taiwan from the USA in peace time is always conditional on the actual political issues between the USA and the People's Republic.

³⁹IISS, "Taiwan's presidential elections-Towards crisis with Beijing?" *Strategic Comment* 6, no. 2 (March 2000): 2.

⁴⁰Østergaard, 71.

⁴¹Harold J. Kearsley, "Military Threat Across the Taiwan Strait," *Comparative Strategy* 19, no. 210 (April-June 2000): 7f.

⁴²Ibid., 21.

- ⁴³Østergaard, 74.
- ⁴⁴Brødsgaard, 212f.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., 216.
- ⁴⁶Østergaard, 66f.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., 70.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., 72.
- ⁴⁹Robert G. Sutter, “Taiwan Rising,” *Current History* 584 (September 1994): 282.
- ⁵⁰Brødsgaard, 188.
- ⁵¹Ibid., 217.
- ⁵²Ytzen, 72.
- ⁵³Østergaard, 67.
- ⁵⁴Erling V. Jacobsen, “Kina frygter våbenkapløb,” *Jyllandsposten* (14 July 2000):
- 2.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., 4.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., 4.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., 6.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., 8.
- ⁵⁹www.FMPRC.gov.cn, *China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace*, 2

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The purpose of this study has been to identify whether or not China today is conducting a security policy which can be characterized as belonging to a mature anarchy, or if the country continues to conduct a security policy belonging to an immature anarchy. Initially this chapter will give as precise an answer to the given problem as possible and subsequently argue for this answer by deepening the characteristics of the dimensions at the single level, how these influence each other and finally assess the importance of the levels and their influence upon each other.

Assessment

When assessing whether or not China is performing as a player in a mature anarchy, it is important to keep in mind that such an assessment must also concern the degree of anarchy in the system in which China is operating. The degree of anarchy in the system influences how countries can operate together and how the behavior of each country is perceived by other players.

As previously established, the international system is not a fully developed mature anarchy and the same applies to the regional level discussed. This means that if China does not perform as a mature player in the current partially mature anarchy, then the country is far from being a mature player in the theoretical fully developed mature anarchy. China cannot be said to be performing as a mature player in relation to the theoretically fully developed anarchy. In this case China's security policy can be

characterized as belonging to the immature anarchy. However, if China's security policy is seen in relation to the actual level of development in the international anarchical system, in relation to several other players, it is close to a mature anarchy policy. The one factor that especially makes China more of a mature anarchy player is the country's economic engagements and contacts relating to this, and the country's increased participation in international organizations.

It can be concluded that China does not perform as a player in a mature anarchy; but that in a number of areas initiatives have been made to move the country in that direction. At the individual level, the influence of the security policy can be recognized as the monopoly of power. The decline in ideology together with increased nationalism and corruption as a result, are closely linked and both influence in the direction of a realistic performance, whereas the business world, is trying to influence an economic security policy in the direction of a more mature performance within the limitations allowed in a maximal state.

The experiments with local elections and the consequences of the economic decentralization are factors, which, in the long term, could be influencing China in the direction of a mature player performance. This could lead to a breakdown of the CCP's power monopolies at the higher levels rather than only in the local government departments, as the holders of power would then be responsible for their actions at the next election.

A desire by the people for greater democracy and increasing amounts of information from outside pressure the CCP from both above and below. China is also influenced at the global system level because within several dimensions it has accepted

the influence and has ascribed to international attitudes and standards. This can be seen in the control of weapons of mass destruction, the WTO negotiations and partly within China's activities in the UN. However, the activities in the UN show China going in two directions because it places greater emphasis on Article 2, which calls for the nonintervention in internal affairs, over nearly all other UN pacts. China's attitude to noninterference and its reluctance to discuss human rights at the system level indicate a Chinese 'black box' perception or at least a desire that other players should regard China as a black box. Despite China's adoption of a number of regimes within the military dimension, the NMD/TMD development program is a factor that influences Chinese security policy in the direction of an immature performance.

Politically, China has also set goals for its foreign policy in the form of "The Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence". These principles clearly indicate a performance as a player in a mature anarchy but China still fails to fully live up to its own principles. Militarily and politically, China is seen at the system level to be split between an immature and a mature performance; a clearly immature performance in the societal dimension, a mainly mature performance in the economic dimension which, however, is also caused by a number of domestic political situations. The societal dimension at the regional level is, contrary to the system level, a dimension in which China has a mature performance just like in the economic dimension, which again pulls the rest of the dimensions in the direction of a performance in a mature anarchy. The economic dimension is so important at this level that actually there is a kind of interdependence between China and other countries in the region regarding economic development. The political, military and environmental dimensions pull in the other direction, where China

has shown a clearly realistic attitude to its role in the region, despite the fact that the country has declared otherwise. Here it is important to note that China believes that it is undergoing a kind of “security struggle” which all other players perceive as a “power struggle”, and this contributes to explaining China’s often contradictory behavior with regard to its regional role. It is estimated that the dimensions pull equally in each their direction.

At the state level some of the tendencies from the individual level can be seen to show through as there is only one dimension at this level within which China can be said to be performing maturely, that is, the economic one, as China has a kind of interdependence with Taiwan. It is questionable whether China would go to war with Taiwan at the expense of the continued development of China. This is why different forms of boycotts and the possible shelling of the smaller islands by China is assessed as China’s only realistic means of exerting pressure on Taiwan. The economic dimension is assessed to be the one carrying the greatest weight at this level, but as the other four all pull in the direction of an immature performance, it seems that, at the state level, China performs mainly as a player in an immature anarchy.

According to Buzan, the starting point for the state’s security policy is the state level. The state level influences the other levels, which is why the state level will be used as the starting point. Given China’s current political construction, the level which affects China’s security policy the most is the regional one. It is here that China has the most interaction with other countries and organizations. However, the military and idea-political influence from the global system level can also be seen as essential both with regard to the state level in China and at the individual level. The individual level is

assessed as being of least importance for the state level but given the previously mentioned possible changes in China's internal conditions, this level could have a much greater influence on China's security policy.

This study has demonstrated that today China cannot be said unequivocally to be performing as a player in a mature anarchy. It has shown that there has been a change in the Chinese perception of the outside world, as well as in China's security policy throughout the 1990s, and that the movement toward a more mature performance became more marked after the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. It will be exciting to follow China's development and participation in its relations to the outside world over the next 5-10 years as it will then become clear whether a fully developed mature anarchy will be seen in East Asia or a kind of Cold War.

Predictions about the Future

At the moment the rapid economic growth and content in China is likely to keep Beijing from escalating issues to either national crisis with international spill over or direct international confrontations at the state level. The huge international PR event of the 2008 Olympics is an example of multinational relations at stake if China goes head on in any of the potential regional conflicts be it: Taiwan, North Korea, Japanese territorial waters, or Tibet. I think China cannot and will not run the risk of a boycott like the Moscow 1980 games. But as the economic slow down has been argued to be an important cause for the 1989 crackdown one could argue that once the present financial growth slows--and every economic experience shows that it will--or the need for oil and other energy too urgent then the government of PRC may choose to unite and distract its population with a foreign and common problem. That could very well be the unsettled

case like Taiwan. There is no clear evidence that Beijing is backing down from the claim on reuniting Taiwan with the PRC. At the contrary antiseccession law in 2005, stating China's right to use “non peaceful means” against Taiwan if it tried to secede from China was recently adopted at the CCP congress and made it possible to stamp Taiwan’s independence as illegal. The outcome is also very dependent on the development away or towards formal independence in Taiwan which is the other important actor in the potential conflict. One development making it less likely that Taipei will stir the government in Beijing is that although while political progress has been slow, links between the two peoples and economies have grown sharply. Taiwanese companies have invested more than \$50bn in China, and up to 1m Taiwanese now live there, many running Taiwanese factories.

On the other hand pro independence political forces in Taiwan could speculate to act in an event like the role of China hosting the Olympics when PRC needs to act very diplomatic.

Another reason for China to take offensive steps (not necessarily by force) in pursuing its security policy is the unsettled matter over territorial waters with Japan and some unhealed historical wounds from the Japanese atrocities in mainland China during the Japanese occupation during WWII. During the most recent debacle on these issues with civil Chinese demonstrations in March and April 2005 the Chinese government did not do a lot to curb the unrest compared to how it normally handle internal protesters. It seems China can be ready to use the moment now that the economic power balance between the two states has tipped to its favor to change the position of the two in the region.

It is also interesting whether China will keep refraining from ever contributing military forces in UN peacekeeping missions. The scene would change if suddenly China offered troops to a conflict like East Timor or similar Asian hot spots. I think traditional powers like the US, Australia and Japan would not know exactly what to say.

The final assessment of the next 5 to 10 years is that China would prefer to subdue by the threat of force. Chinese military philosophy is the same today as it was 2,000 years ago. It is to win without fighting.

APPENDIX A

MODEL OF ANALYSIS


Chapter	Dimensions	Political Dimension	Military Dimension	Economical Dimension	Societal Dimension	Environmental Dimension
	Levels					
4	System Level	China's attitude towards single polarity. China and UN	China's role within the system? China and Nuclear Weapons? -dissemination and balance of terror. China and the Missile Shield?	China's economical role in the World Market. China and WTO.	Human Rights and the Chinese Society Model. The Global importance of the population increase.	Is not being discussed.
5	Regional Level	China and ASEAN. China's influence within the Region. China's Territorial interpretation. China's area of interest and "area of responsibility". China's relationship towards other Superpowers' influence in the area. Is the Region "Crowded"?	China's ability of Power Projection. China - development of Missiles. Power Security struggle? Technological ability in relation to the Region.	China and the Asiatic wonder. China's economical objective. The Collapse - relevance to China? Interdependency?	The Bamboo Network.	China's need of resources/ consumption, heartiness and the consequences for the Region. Interdependency?
6	State Level	China and Japan - a conflict of Superpowers? China and Taiwan--China Policy, the admission of Hong-Kong and Macaus--importance to the Region?	China's estimate of Japan and Taiwan and wishes in those relations.	Taiwan and Japan's economical influence on China including Chinas Special Economic Zones and Hong-Kong vulnerability >< profit	Is not being discussed.	Pollution and damming - influence on relations to other Countries.
3	Individual Level	Elections in Local Areas and the importance for the Single Party State. Solidarity in creating a weak or strong State?	Is not being discussed.	Lopsided distribution of resources between land, city and provinces.	Corruption, the internet and education. Chinese enemy images and the handling of these.	Is not being discussed.

The following questions will be answered in order to tie the chapters together:

1. What characterize the security dimensions at every level?
2. How do these dimensions influence each other? Are there conflicts and are these identical?
3. How is the individual level weighed in relation to the whole Chinese Security Policy?

APPENDIX B

MODEL OF METHODOLOGY (PROCES)



The chronological sequence in making the Thesis.




Influence under:

- Military Security.
- Political Security.
- Societal Security.
- Economical Security.
- Environmental Security.

APPENDIX C


CHINA'S HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS FOR ITS DEMANDS

Competing Claims in the South China Sea




APPENDIX D

CHINA'S TERRITORIAL DEMANDS




APPENDIX E

AREAS OF DISPUTE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE PHILIPPINES



APPENDIX F


MAIN AREAS IN CHINA'S ENERGY PRODUCTION



APPENDIX G

POPULATION CENTER OF GRAVITY


CHINA: Population Density.



APPENDIX H


CHINA'S IMPORTANT ECONOMICAL AREAS

Figure 3. China: Special Economic Zones



APPENDIX I

CHINA'S TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS



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The book describes Chinese conditions after the death of Deng. A lot of aspects are included. It is written by a professor from the University of Copenhagen. The source is primary and it is used in all chapters.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard*. Vol. 1, New York: BasicBooks, 1997.

The book is written by former a Security Advisor for, among others, Jimmy Carter. The source has been used in chapters 4 and 5 as a secondary source, since its primary focus is the USA's goals and interests. The map in appendix 9 is out of the book.

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The thesis' primary source. The book is written shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The book argues the implementation of the broader security consideration and analyses this on all levels. The book is looked upon as one of the main sources regarding the mature anarchy. For this thesis the choice stood between this book and Morgenthau's book regarding the immature anarchy.

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