THE ROLE OF THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER
IN TRAINING THE FUTURE FORCE

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Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
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General Studies

by

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The Role of the Joint Readiness Training Center in Training the Future Force

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The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has been the Army’s primary trainer for contingency forces since 1987, providing exceptionally realistic and relevant training to prepare units and develop leaders for the challenge of combat. However, changes at the JRTC may be in order to adjust to the Army's training requirements as the Army transforms its combat formations into the Future Force.

The purpose of this thesis is to provoke a discussion on how the JRTC can assist the Army in training the Future Force brigade combat teams as the Army transitions to meet the threats of the contemporary operating environment. This study is a qualitative research project that analyzes what changes are necessary for the JRTC to remain an important training tool of the US Army.

The thesis examines several areas within the JRTC that may require adjustment including operations group manning, battlespace requirements, types of rotations, live-fire exercises, and situational training exercises. Finally, the thesis recommends specific changes to the JRTC, so that it continues to fulfill the US Army’s training needs.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).
ABSTRACT


The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has been the Army’s primary trainer for contingency forces since 1987, providing exceptionally realistic and relevant training to prepare units and develop leaders for the challenge of combat operations. However, changes at the JRTC may be in order to adjust to the Army’s training requirements as the Army transforms its combat formations into the Future Force.

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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-Action Review</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<td>BLUFOR</td>
<td>Blue Force</td>
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<td>BOS</td>
<td>Battlefield Operating System</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Combined Arms Command</td>
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<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Combat Maneuver Training Center</td>
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<td>COB</td>
<td>Civilians on the Battlefield</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operational Environment</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Commander, Operations Group</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>DTC</td>
<td>Deployed Training Capability</td>
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<td>FOE</td>
<td>Future Operational Environment</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>(United States Army) Forces Command</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>HBCT</td>
<td>Heavy Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>HIC</td>
<td>High-Intensity Combat</td>
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<td>IBCT</td>
<td>Infantry Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>(United States) Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JNTC</td>
<td>Joint National Training Capability</td>
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<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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<td>JSTC</td>
<td>Joint Services Training Center</td>
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<td>LFX</td>
<td>Live-Fire Exercise</td>
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<td>LVC</td>
<td>Live, Virtual, and Constructive</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Instrumentation System</td>
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<td>MOUT</td>
<td>Military Operations on Urban Terrain</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mission Readiness Exercise</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
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<td>OC</td>
<td>Observer-Controller</td>
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<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>Opposing Force</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>SOSO</td>
<td>Stability Operations and Support Operations</td>
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<td>STX</td>
<td>Situational Training Exercise</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>(United States Army) Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>TTPs</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<td>UO</td>
<td>Urban Operations</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Our training exercises, particularly the (combat training centers), drive the culture of the Army. If it’s going to be in BCTP or (Joint Readiness Training Center), you’re going to train up for it, right? Doesn’t that drive some of your home-station training programs? It’s got to be done right at the CTC; it’s got to be done like we plan to fight, because then we’re going to train to that and we’re going to get a lot of (after-action review) feedback, and that will drive our follow-on training program in peacetime. And it has to look like where we’re fighting right now. You have to have that 360-degree piece; you have to have urban ops. (TRADOC PAO 2004, TRADOC Website)

The Changing Environment

The purpose of this study is to initiate a dialogue on how the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) can support the United States (US) Army in training the Future Force war-fighting units as the Army transitions to meet the threats of the contemporary operational environment (COE). The Soviet-based “Cold-War” security environment is now a distant memory, and the Army is undergoing a transformation to become more capable in meeting the threats of potential adversaries. The former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General (GEN) Eric Shinseki outlined his vision for the Objective Force (now referred to as the Future Force) by defining future US Army tactical success as “Seeing First, Understanding First, Acting First, and Finishing Decisively” (2001, 6). As the Army rapidly moves forward to establishing the Future Force, adjustments may be necessary in how it trains. This research will explore possible changes necessary within the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), specifically the JRTC.
Why Research the Joint Readiness Training Center?

The JRTC is one of three CTCs in the US Army that focuses on the training of Army units in a live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) force-on-force environment. The other two CTCs are the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Since the inception of the CTC concept in the early 1980s, US Army units have been the beneficiaries of unparalleled opportunities to train their collective skills in a tough, realistic setting against a professional opposing force (OPFOr). The Army is now undergoing a strategic transformation in order to prepare for the twenty-first century COE. The current CSA, GEN Peter Schoomaker, outlined seventeen immediate areas to focus Army efforts in order for the Army to remain relevant and ready to meet the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). One of the areas concerns the CTCs. It is the CSA’s intent for the CTCs to meet the joint and expeditionary armed forces team training requirements (Schoomaker 2003, Army Focus Areas Website). The JRTC clearly has the task of remaining pertinent in support of the Army’s training needs.

This study will be a qualitative research project to analyze the JRTC’s role in training the Future Force. To support the Army’s transformation and meet the CSA’s intent, this research will analyze what changes are necessary for the JRTC to stay relevant and ready for the Army. The JRTC must ensure its mission remains consistent in supporting the Army’s training needs. The JRTC has the following mission:

The Joint Readiness Training Center provides highly realistic, stressful, joint and combined arms training across the full spectrum of current and future conflict. We provide doctrinally based feedback and observations to rotational units, the Army as a whole, and the joint community in order to develop competent, adaptive leaders and improve unit readiness. (Smart 2004b)
This study intends to analyze what the JRTC’s role will be in training the Future Force. It will look at the JRTC from several points of view to include the JRTC’s historical establishments and how it has evolved, how it currently trains Army units, and what purpose it will serve to support the Army’s needs with regards to the COE in providing training for the Future Force’s Infantry, Stryker, and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). This thesis takes on particular significance due to the fact the JRTC had been operating on the assumption the Army would begin fielding the Future Force in 2010 (USA CAC 2004a, 6-3). However, the Army transformation is moving ahead of schedule, forcing the JRTC to adapt on a shortened timeline.

The Joint Readiness Training Center’s Past and Present Role

The creation of the CTCs has been one of the Army’s most successful training concepts and provides the premier training and leader development experience the Army offers (FM 7-0 2002, 1-11). Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established the NTC, the Army’s first CTC, in 1981. The NTC was developed to emulate the Air Force’s Red Flag program, by forcing units to leave their garrison facilities and train in a combat experience that closely replicated combat (USA CAC 2004a, 1-3). The NTC’s success led Army leaders to develop another continental US-based (CONUS) CTC, one that would focus its training efforts on the light, air assault, airborne, and special operations contingency forces in the Army. Thus, the JRTC was originally established at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, in 1986 on an interim basis. The JRTC’s initial mission was “to provide an advanced level of joint training for Air Force and Army active and reserve contingency forces in deployment and tactical operations under realistic conditions at low to mid intensity conflict” (USA CAC 1990, 213).
The JRTC initially provided training for one maneuver battalion per rotation and served four functions in executing these missions. It conducted joint deployment exercises, controlled the exercise objectives set forth by participating unit commanders, fielded a professional OPFOR, and provided observer-controllers (OCs) to give feedback to client units (USA CAC 1990, 214). The JRTC also provided live-fire exercise (LFX) training for client units and a Leaders Training Program (LTP) to provide brigade-level and battalion-level staff training. The JRTC executed its first two-battalion rotation in July 1992. Two-battalion rotations became the norm from this point forward and continued up to 2003. In support of this, the JRTC Operations Group tailored its organizational structure to provide training for these rotation types.

To this day, the JRTC is structured to provide OC coverage and feedback for a brigade headquarters, two maneuver battalions, an artillery battalion, an aviation battalion, a forward support battalion, a Special Forces battalion, and the other battlefield operating systems (BOS) that have habitually supported a brigade task force. The JRTC Operations Group is currently transforming its internal support structure--to include facilities, civilian manning, role-play personnel and civilians on the battlefield (COBs) support, and operating budget--which is still organized to support this two-battalion model as opposed to the three- and four-battalion rotations that will likely be required to train the Future Force.

The JRTC moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana in March 1993. Its mission now included all services to “provide an advanced level of joint training for Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and reserve contingency forces in deployment and tactical operations under realistic conditions of low to mid intensity conflict” (USA CAC 1995, 59).
The JRTC continued to focus its training on light, air assault, airborne, and special operations forces throughout the 1990s by providing an eleven-day force-on-force free-play training exercise against an OPFOR comprised of the 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment and augmented by the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The JRTC retained the ability to tailor its exercises to meet Army needs and executed several Mission Readiness/Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) for units deploying to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq in recent years. The JRTC is now executing three-battalion rotations as the norm and has supported special rotations, such as the Joint Contingency Force (JCF) Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE), two Stryker Brigade Certification Exercises, three Heavy BCT MREs, and two Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) rotations.

As the Army evolved over the past seventeen years, so has the JRTC. Its current vision outlines a plan for internally remaining an adaptive and robust organization which maintains its status as the “Army’s premier combat training center for contingency forces--providing exceptionally realistic and relevant training to prepare units and develop leaders for the challenge of full-spectrum operations” (USA CAC 2004a, 6-1).

One central feature of the JRTC, like the NTC, is its complex relationship with higher headquarters, most notably Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC. Because it is a CTC, the JRTC receives its resource allocations from TRADOC, but FORSCOM commands and controls the rotations (FC 350-50-2 1998, 6). While TRADOC is responsible to ensure the JRTC has the facilities, personnel, and equipment to provide doctrinally sound training, FORSCOM is responsible for the training schedule with respect to training units and rotation dates. Both FORSCOM and TRADOC share responsibilities in determining the JRTC funding, augmentation, and the Table of
Distribution and Allowance (TDA) authorizations. This relationship ensures the Army’s training requirements are balanced with the Army’s resourcing capability.

**The Research Question**

The primary question to be answered in this research is, What role will the JRTC fill for the US military in the training of the Future Force?

**Subordinate Questions**

Several secondary and tertiary questions naturally follow from this. What internal changes does the JRTC Operations Group require, in the form of OC and OPFOR manning, to support the Future Force BCT structure? Other questions need to be answered with respect to training area. The JRTC presently shares its training area with the 4th BCT (Infantry), 10th Mountain Division and other tenant units at Fort Polk. Because the JRTC has predominantly provided training for two-battalion rotations from light, airborne, and air assault units, the training area footprint historically allowed for de-confliction with the tenant unit training requirements. This may be more difficult in the future since the JRTC is currently scheduled to provide an increased number of MREs for three- and four-battalion units. Because MREs have historically required a larger footprint than conventional rotations, does the JRTC need to develop an exportable training capability, does the Army need to move the JRTC or the 4th BCT to another installation, or does the Army need to acquire more training land in the Fort Polk area? What types of rotations (force-on-force and MREs, for example) does the JRTC need to provide for the Future Force? Does the JRTC need to continue to provide LFX training and situational training exercises (STX) lane training for the Future Force?
Assumptions

This research began with a few underlying assumptions. First, the COE is a valid model for future warfare; the JRTC will continue to exist as a CTC for the foreseeable future; the JRTC will continue to provide training for BCTs and BCT-equivalent size forces; reduction of an Army forward presence in Europe will lead to increased CONUS CTC usage; and the JRTC will continue to provide training exercises for more joint units, as part of the JNTC. These assumptions were accepted in order to begin research.

Key Terms and Concepts

There are some key terms that are integral to this research. The following terms and definitions will be applied throughout the study.

Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The Future Force equivalent to the current brigade task force, BCTs will be the primary organizations for fighting tactical engagements and battles. BCTs will have one of three standard designs: heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), and Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). These BCTs include organic battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistic subunits (Modularity Guide 2004, 1-13).

Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). The composite set of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect military operations. The environment that exists today, and for the clearly foreseeable future, is the environment US forces can expect to face when conducting operations in various parts of the world. It is contemporary in the sense it does not represent conditions that existed only in the past or might exist only in the distant, hardly envisionable future, but rather those conditions that exist today and in the clearly foreseeable near future (FM 7-100 2003, iv).
**Exportable Training Capability.** Formerly referred to as Deployable Training Capability, it is a concept which dictates some combination of CTC Pillars (training units, the CTC Operations Groups, the CTC OPFOR, the CTC facilities, and the CTC Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS)) is sent to where the training is needed (away from the CTC) in order to fix throughput and capacity problems at the CTCs. An exportable training capability--though not as complete as an experience at the CTCs--is sufficient to train a Future Force BCT (Totleben 2005).

**Future Force.** Formerly referred to as the Objective Force, it is the Army’s plan to restructure to more modular, capabilities-based forces to better meet combatant commanders’ requirements. The Future Force will be the future full-spectrum force--organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations (Army Future Force 2003, 2).

**Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT).** A balanced combat organization built around a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), two combined arms maneuver battalions, a fires battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, and a brigade support battalion (BSB). HBCTs are optimized for high-tempo offensive operations against all forces in mixed and open terrain and are highly capable in defensive operations, urban combat, screen, guard, and cover missions and in most stability operations, with the possible exception of stability operations in mountainous jungle environment (Modularity Guide 2004, 8-1). Figure 1 highlights the HBCT task organization.
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). A balanced combat organization built around a BSTB, two infantry battalions, a fires battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, and a BSB. While optimized for high-tempo offensive operations against all forces in rugged terrain, its design also makes the IBCT capable in mixed terrain defense, urban combat, mobile security missions, and stability operations (Modularity Guide 2004, 8-1). Figure 2 highlights the IBCT task organization.
Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). A capability established by the Secretary of Defense which will significantly improve joint training by embedding joint tactical tasks into service training events. As one of three capabilities identified in the Department of Defense's training transformation plan, this effort broadens and deepens the reach of joint force training (JFCOM 2004, JNTC).

JRTC Operations Group. The Operations Group is the executing agency for the JRTC rotations. The Operations Group is responsible for planning, executing, and observing and controlling each JRTC rotation. The Operations Group is organized into
divisions consisting of Brigade Command and Control, Battalion Task Forces 1 and 2, Fire Support, Intelligence, Aviation, Combat Service and Support, Special Operations Training Detachment, Live-Fire, and Plans Exercise Maneuver Control (EMC). This organization allows the JRTC to focus on the training and support of each BOS element individually, and as a Combined Arms Team. The Operations Group provides realistic training to refine doctrine and training focus for units not only in the US military, but for Allied forces around the world. The main technique for doing this is the use of OCs and their after-action reviews (AARs) (JRTC 2004b, Introduction).

**Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) Environments.** The three training environment types provided for player units at the JRTC. The live training environment includes training that consists of real people and real systems in a live environment. Soldiers in an infantry battalion conducting training with their organic equipment are live training examples. The virtual training environment includes real people using simulated systems in a simulated environment. A pilot using a flight simulator is a virtual training example. The constructive training environment includes simulated people in a simulated environment. A computer war game is a constructive training environment example (JFCOM 2004, JNTC).

**Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE).** Also known as Mission Rehearsal Exercises, these training exercises at the CTCs attempt to closely simulate the conditions the rotational unit will face in future operations. An MRE is an equivalent to an Army field training exercise (FTX), but is normally accomplished as part of a unit's train-up in preparation for a stability and support mission. Training is focused on stability operations and support operations (SOSO) and includes training in deployment and redeployment.
actions, rehearsal and execution of contingency plans and staff battle drills, establishment and refinement of staff activities, and reporting processes (European Command 2004, MREs). Figure 3 shows some major activities and story lines used in planning and executing a CTC MRE.

Figure 3. Mission Rehearsal Exercise Construct, 11 February 2005
Source: CTC-D Brief “Adapting to Support a Transformed Army at War” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 6.

Observer-Controller (OC). Army Soldiers selected to provide feedback to CTC rotational units and have a duty to the training unit and the Army to observe unit performance, control engagements and operations, teach doctrine, coach to improve unit
performance, monitor safety and conduct professional AARs. OCs are required to have successfully performed their counterparts’ duties. They constantly strive for personal and professional development and are well versed in current doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) (JRTC 2004b, Introduction).

**Opposing Forces (OPFOR).** Professional Army organizational unit which conducts combat training operations as an opposing force to provide realistic, stressful, and challenging combat conditions for Army units at the CTCs. The OPFOR is an uncompromising threat unit that provides the challenge of a real-world conflict by using doctrinally generic tactics and provides a level of realistic collective training, which cannot be duplicated at a unit’s home-station. The OPFOR is a dedicated, permanently stationed US Army unit that is highly skilled, both individually and collectively, at executing threat force doctrine and TTPs (JRTC 2004a, Scenario).

**Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).** A balanced combat organization built around a BSTB, three infantry battalions, a fires battalion, a cavalry squadron, and a BSB. The SBCT is a full-spectrum combat force that provides division, corps, or joint task force commanders a unique capability across the spectrum of conflict. The SBCT balances lethality, mobility, and survivability against the requirements for rapid strategic deployability (FM 3.21.31 2003, 1-1). Figure 4 highlights the SBCT task organization with requisite augmentation.
POSSIBLE DIV / CORPS AUGMENTATION

Figure 4. Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 10 December 2004. Source: CTC-D Brief “CTC Way-Ahead Review” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 21.

Limitations

A study’s limitations are those weaknesses imposed by constraints or restrictions beyond the researcher’s control. The most significant limitation or weakness of the research is time. There is a limited amount of literature about the JRTC available, although the author had success finding material that supports the research.

Delimitations

A study’s delimitations are those constraints the researcher imposes on the scope or content of the study in order to make that research feasible. The only delimitation the
author imposed was to focus research on the JRTC only, and not evaluate similar conditions at the other CTCs. Though the NTC and the CMTC both have similar missions and are undergoing many of the same noteworthy transitions as the JRTC, this research is limited to only the JRTC to meet the requirements for this study within the prescribed time period. Though the JRTC largely operates in an unclassified environment, the organization does work with emerging TTPs and their doctrinal application on the battlefield. For the purpose of the author’s research, classified materials were not used in this research.

**Conclusion**

The study’s purpose is to provoke a discussion on how the JRTC can assist the US Army in training the Future Force war-fighting units as the Army transitions to meet the threats of the COE. As the current security environment changes, the Army is transforming to stand up to these new challenges. As the Army moves forward to the Future Force, changes to Army training may be necessary. Thus, the JRTC’s future is a significant Army issue and one worthy of research. Determining the JRTC’s role will have an impact on the Army’s Future Force collective training and will impact the Army’s collective ability to “See First, Understand First, Act First, and Win Decisively” on the tactical level.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

JRTC is way ahead; they have that 360-degree environment, but we’ve got to do it smarter. (TRADOC PAO 2004, TRADOC Website)

Introduction

To truly understand the concepts that support this thesis, one must have a basic appreciation for the literature, which relates to this topic. This literature review will provide the framework for further analysis and can be divided into three broad categories. These categories are Future Force concepts, CTC-related works, and transforming the JRTC. This chapter will explore each of these areas and discuss them chronologically. It will also identify information gaps in extant knowledge about the JRTC’s future in order to provide a basis for devising a research methodology.

Future Force Concepts

Much has been written about the Future Force concepts that will drive the training methodology for the Army’s war-fighting units. The author will highlight some of the key works devoted to the Future Force in order to demonstrate the possible implications for the JRTC in training the transformed Army BCTs.

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Gary Griffin published a 1991 Combat Studies Institute work entitled, “The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command.” LTC Griffin discusses the historical relationship commanders have had between their staff officers and the systems and techniques they utilized to command and control their units. The author makes a strong case commanders in every era attempted to better understand the battlefield conditions they faced in an effort to make informed decisions.
based on certainty. LTC Griffin stated advancement in technologies would increase the flow of combat information in the future and make the efficient use of systems even more important for commanders to respond rapidly and decisively on the battlefield. LTC Griffin’s work emphasizes the need for agile leaders and trained staff officers in what has evolved into today’s Future Force concepts (Griffin 1991, 21).

Years later, Major General (MG) Robert Scales expressed his thoughts on the future of war in a 2001 book entitled *Future Warfare: Anthology*. As the title suggests, he analyzes what he felt would be the FOE for the US military. MG Scales concludes the US military success will be dependent upon commanders issuing detailed guidance and empowering junior leaders to execute decentralized operations. Because of the rapid combat information flow and increased mobility of small-level units, agile leaders will be required at all levels to dominate across the full spectrum of operations (Scales 2001, 189).

An Army white paper was distributed at a 2002 Council of Colonels (COC) Conference entitled, “Role of the CTCs in Army Transformation.” It looked at how TRADOC could assist in producing capable war-fighting units against the FOE backdrop. It contends the US faces a strategic landscape typified by a multi-polar world with several nation-states emerging as potential adversaries. By 2015, the paper suggests, some of these potential adversaries may be real threats to US security. As these nation-states attempt to upset the global balance of power in the FOE, the white paper argues the US must fight across the full spectrum of conflict to be successful. Tomorrow’s enemies will try to offset the US edge in war-fighting capability by using force-oriented doctrine that targets perceived US weaknesses (USA CAC 2002, 1-3).
The white paper offers recommendations to offset this emerging threat. It explains the US must train across the full spectrum of conflict if it is to achieve success on the battlefield. Of most importance to this training is that leaders are put into conditions where they must routinely exercise several traits including agility, critical and creative thinking, adaptability, ability to synthesize information, and judgment. Unit training also must change to ensure the fighting formations can integrate into combined arms organizations without “stove piping,” control the tempo of the fight, and control extended battlespace. To achieve these desired outcomes for the future leaders and units, the paper argues the CTCs must develop training scenarios, which contain essential variables that are the essence of the COE. Finally, it says the future OPFOR must be less predictable and capable of stressing all of the BOS they face (USA CAC 2002, 4-6).

GEN Shinseki publicly discussed his vision for how the Army would face the future operational environment (FOE) at an Association for the United States Army (AUSA) meeting in 2003. To deal with an unpredictable enemy and a more asymmetric threat, the CSA described an Objective Force that would be strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. His intent was for the Army to become lighter and dominate across the full spectrum of operations (Shinseki 2003, 60). In 2001, the Army published Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-0, *Operations*, which together with the former CSA’s vision combined to lay the groundwork for how the Army would convert into the Objective Force.

As discussed in chapter 1, GEN Schoomaker continued with the Objective Force (now called Future Force) concepts started by GEN Shinseki and outlined seventeen areas to focus Army efforts to meet the needs of the GWOT. The CSA provided a clear
mandate for the JRTC to make the necessary changes, if needed, to meet the Army
BCTs’ training requirements in support of the joint and expeditionary military
(Schoomaker 2003, Army Focus Areas Website). The model in Figure 5 summarizes the
Army’s transformation from a division-centric to a brigade-centric force.

**Figure 5.** From Division to Brigade-Centric, 1 December 2004
*Source: COL Mike Hoffpauir, JFCOM Brief “Primer on Army Modularity” (Fort
Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 16.*
development, TRADOC released a document entitled *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0* on 8 October 2004. This document explains why the Army is transforming and prescribes how it is going to do it. The modularity guide is divided into three sections. Section one discusses the relationship between the Army and the other services and outlines the transforming operational concepts, which lie at the heart of the modular Army. Section two explains the organization and operations of the unit of employment (UE) and its two echelons, the UEy and the UEx. Section three is devoted to the BCT. It explains the organization and operations of the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT. In conjunction with Army Field Manual (FM) 3-21.31, *Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, the modularity guide is the current doctrine for the Future Force BCTs (Modularity Guide 2004, vi). Figure 6 gives a summary of the BCT’s capabilities.

Figure 6. Brigade Combat Team Capabilities, 29 July 2004
*Source: JRTC Brief “Future Rotational Strategy” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 7.*
Combat Training Center-Related Works

Much has been written by and about the CTCs over the years. As the centerpiece of the Army training program, the CTCs have been the focus of numerous works in military journals and hundreds of Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) articles. Yet, these articles tend to focus on lessons learned, observations, and experiences from those involved in a CTC rotation. Almost all of these articles deal with the units participating and extraordinarily few actually approach the topic of the CTCs as a training tool and how to improve them. This section will look at some of the prominent works about the CTC Program, from the program’s historical evolution, individual research efforts on the CTCs, and official documents within the TRADOC and CTC community. This section will provide the reader with a background of the authoritative works in CTC-related literature and establish a foundation for the topic’s research.

Brigadier General (BG) Daniel Bolger wrote two candid books about his experiences at the CTCs. The first book, *Dragons at War, Land Battle in the Desert*, details his first rotation as a company commander in a 1983 NTC rotation. While describing in detail the missions that his company conducted and the many mistakes that were made, he also made it clear the NTC was an extremely valuable institution for the Army (Bolger, Dragons 1986, ix).

Anne Chapman, a TRADOC command historian, wrote two books about the development and sustainment of the NTC and the role it serves for the Army training requirements. The first book was published in 1992 and is entitled, *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center 1976-1984*. The book’s purpose is to tell the story of how the CTC concept evolved from an idea through implementation to its
early years. The book shows how the NTC trained primarily heavy units in a European-based scenario against a professional OPFOR. The NTC showcased the Army’s first large-scale employment of several systems, which would become cornerstones of the CTCs. These tools included the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) for live force-on-force training, large-scale LFXs, a professional OPFOR, OCs, the AAR process to capture lessons learned, an instrumentation system (IS) to analyze data, and take home packages (THPs) for units to plan follow-on home-station training. Though the NTC would prove to be a costly training tool, it received rave reviews from senior leaders because of its capability to provide leader development and doctrine testing through the application of a realistic, stressful training environment. The author points out the CTC Program’s true validation occurred in Operation Desert Storm due to the Army’s tactical units’ resounding success (Chapman 1992, 1-3).

In 1993, the US Army Research Institute released a study entitled, “How Well Did the Combat Training Centers Prepare Units for Combat?” This work used questionnaire results from Operation Desert Storm veterans to examine the CTCs’ effectiveness in preparing them for the war. The findings were broken down into twelve categories. While the study did uncover perceived CTC shortcomings, the overall survey results found the CTCs provided an invaluable training experience that paid dividends for units deployed to the war (Keene 1993, 1-18).

Eight US Army War College students, all former senior OCs from each of the CTCs, produced a study in 1995 called “Combat Training Centers, The 21st Century Schools for the Application of Military Art and Science.” Its purpose was to analyze how the CTCs may evolve in the future. After conducting a series of interviews with the
commanders from the CTCs and across the Army, the authors chose thirteen topics they felt would impact the future of the CTCs. For each of the CTC-related topics, the authors made a current status assessment for each issue, discussed the implications for their findings, and in most cases, made recommendations for the Army’s senior leaders. While acknowledging there were areas they thought required change, the authors made it clear the CTCs were an important investment and they should continue to play a significant role in training the Army’s war-fighting units (Herbert 1995a, i-iv).

Following are the thirteen topics examined in the study.

1. Are We Getting Any Better?
2. Training to Standard
3. Leader Development
4. CTCs and Home-station Training
5. Forward Support Battalion Logistics Training
6. Joint Training
7. CTCs and Experimentation
8. CTCs and Adaptive Training
9. Battlestaff Proficiency
10. Force Projection Training
11. Doctrine Development
12. Training FORCE XXI
13. Live-Fire Training

These same eight US Army War College Students published another study called, “Notes from the Box: A Collection of Papers by Former Senior Observer-Controllers
from the Combat Training Centers.” In this work, each student wrote about one focused topic (Herbert 1995b, A-F). LTC John Rosenberger assessed poor unit performances at the CTCs were a direct result of the brigade and battalion commanders’ incompetence. LTC Rosenberger argued that officers, as a whole, are not trained to conduct their wartime tasks, such as synchronizing the effects of their subordinate units. The author made several proposals to fix the perceived problem. He offered changes in the Officer Education System (OES) to better train commanders and staff officers. He stated the Army may want to re-evaluate how it selects officers to command positions and says a culture change in the Army may be needed (1995, 1-40). LTC Glenn Webster wrote about a future, digitized Force XXI battlefield. He recommended the Army adopt digitized technology so Soldiers would not have to waste time conducting tasks that computers can do for them, while allowing commanders more time to lead, decide, and supervise execution. LTC Webster concluded digital technology, if reliable, could provide commanders and staffs with a better battlefield visualization (1995, 1-25).

The General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report to the US House of Representatives in 1995 entitled, *Military Training, Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped*. While the report focused on the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps inability to capture lessons learned and apply it to their doctrine, the Army’s knack to capture lessons learned through the AAR process was seen as the standard to which the other services should strive to achieve. The CTC Program was an essential part in capturing lessons learned for the Army and sending these to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) (GAO 1995, 18). This report was not fully supported by Jon Grossman, who conducted a TRADOC-sponsored report for RAND in 1995.
entitled *Conducting Warfighting Experiments at the National Training Center*.

Grossman’s finding was the Army was not successful in gathering lessons learned and concluded the CTCs could better capture lessons by having RAND conduct research through the use of Focused Rotations (FRs) and AWEs (Grossman 1995, v). Both FRs and AWEs have occurred on an irregular basis since 1995 at the NTC and the JRTC.

Anne Chapman’s second book, published in 1997, was titled, *The National Training Center Matures 1985-1993*. It picks up where the first volume left off and tracks the NTC’s evolution over the next nine years. The author notes that as the NTC matured, so did its systems as the OPFOR and OCs better defined their roles within the program and the IS became increasingly more sophisticated. She discusses how the NTC’s success led to the establishment of the JRTC and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) in 1987 and the CMTC in 1989. While the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC became known as the “dirt” CTCs because they primarily focused on training in the live force-on-force environment, the BCTP’s purpose was to train senior Army leaders and staffs on war-fighting skills at Fort Leavenworth or at home-station (Chapman 1997, 14-26).

The book also discusses the implementation of more defined planning and regulations to provide a framework for the CTC Program. The first CTC Master Plan was developed in 1987 and was implemented to ensure coordinated growth would occur across the entire CTC Program. Army Regulation (AR) 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*, was first published in 1980 and continued to be refined throughout this period. FORSCOM Circular 350-84-10, *Combat Training Center Circular*, outlined FORSCOM’s role in the CTC Program and evolved into FC Reg 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*, in 1991. Unlike the first volume, Chapman’s second book is
not a chronological history of the NTC. Instead it focuses on key developments over these nine years and provides a detailed look at how the NTC evolved to meet the Army’s training requirements (Chapman 1997, 14-26).

Colonel (COL) Briscoe published a 1998 US Army War College study entitled “Trained and Ready--Are We Really?” The author’s thesis is Army battalion- and brigade-level commanders were not competent to execute their combat tasks. COL Briscoe blames this on the inadequate management of operational tempo (OPTEMPO), which detracts from unit training time. The author concludes that unless changes are made, the US Army is risking failure to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) or may have unacceptable casualty numbers while trying to execute the NMS. He states four ways to correct the perceived deficiencies. Among COL Briscoe’s recommendations is the Army should standardize training conditions and unit participation at the CTCs. The author notes the Army’s training methodology is sound and the CTCs are the best way to measure the combat effectiveness of the war-fighting units (Briscoe 1998, 1-23).

The GAO published a 1999 report to Congress entitled, “Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Recognized.” The report found that although the CTCs themselves were favorably assessed, the units were not maximizing full training benefits for several reasons. It found units were arriving at the CTCs ill-prepared for training, training was not as realistic as it could be, the condition of the CTC equipment adversely affected training, and the Army was not fully capitalizing on the lessons learned during the training (GAO 1999, 17).

The report compared the CTCs and found the JRTC more completely portrayed the complex environment than the others because of the experience it gained from its past
support for special operations and light forces training. This finding was based upon five measures of effectiveness, which included operations in urban terrain, terrorist activities, COBs, dealings with local officials, and media on the battlefield (GAO 1999, 17). Figure 7 highlights the CTC attempt to replicate the environment.

Figure 7. The Operational Environment, 11 February 2005
Source: CTC-D Brief “Adapting to Support a Transformed Army at War” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 4.

LTC Ronald Bertha, as part of a 1999 US Army War College research project, published a document entitled, “The Future of the Combat Training Centers to Meet the
National Military Strategy.” He offered the CTCs have historically been essential in providing training exercises that ensured the Army maintains combat readiness among its war-fighting units. While acknowledging changes at the CTCs were a natural process that would evolve over time, LTC Bertha argued revolutionary changes, such as STX training as a component of each CTC rotation, would detract from the basic purpose of the CTCs and would actually be detrimental to the Army. Using the 1997 NMS as a basis for his research, LTC Bertha argued that only a sweeping change in the NMS would cause the CTCs to drastically alter their fundamental purpose (Bertha 1999, 1-22).

The Army released the 2003 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) report based upon officer beliefs of the current state of the Army. Though the report cited wide-ranging criticism of Army systems, the report did find that the officer corps whole-heartedly felt the CTCs provided a superb training and leader development experience that should be sustained (ATLDP 2003, OS-2).

Major (MAJ) Joseph McLamb, who has experience with the NTC OPFOR and as a JRTC OC, wrote a 2003 monograph at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) entitled “Transforming the Combat Training Centers.” He discusses four courses of action the CTCs could take to provide training for the Objective Force (Future Force). MAJ McLamb’s work suggested major changes to the CTCs and resulted in five recommendations to better train the Future Force. The study concluded the CTCs collectively needed to make more adjustments in order to support the Future Force requirements (McLamb 2003, iii). Following are MAJ McLamb’s five recommendations.

1. CTCs should alter their training methods to focus on the rapid deployment of the rotational unit directly into the training environment.
2. CTC rotations should take place as part of a larger joint exercise--involving each of the LVC training environments.

3. Units should deploy to the CTCs prior to going into a deployable status, and just after a progressive collective training period.

4. CTC rotations should use integrated stability and support operations (SASO).

5. CTCs should take the appropriate measures to ensure the OPFOR can replicate the emerging threats for likely contingency operations.

Lieutenant General (LTG) William Wallace, Brigadier General (BG) Timothy Livsey, and LTC Richard Totleben published an article in the September-October 2004 edition of *Military Review* entitled, “A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers.” This work’s purpose was to establish a framework to examine the CTC Program’s evolution of joint training. The authors argued the CTCs must establish the right conditions where key interdependencies between the Army and the joint team are realized. The key areas are joint battle command, joint fires, joint air and missile defense, joint logistics, and joint force projection. The authors added joint SOF integration to the group as an area the CTCs needed to train. While acknowledging the CTCs had a history of adapting to the Army’s requirements, the group stressed changes were necessary to support the CSA’s guidance to increase joint training at the CTCs (Wallace 2004a, 4-11).

The Transforming Joint Readiness Training Center

Despite the abundance of information produced about the CTC Program, surprisingly little has actually been written about the JRTC’s role in supporting the Future Force other than official documentation within the TRADOC and FORSCOM communities. This section will examine these works to show what has been written and
LTC Michael Hess published a US Army War College study project in 1989 titled, “Joint Readiness Training Center: What do the Lessons Learned Tell Us?” The work was published at the end of the two-year test phase of the JRTC and focused on whether or not the JRTC provided the right training for the Army’s light forces. The author concluded that the JRTC was a success as it provided realistic training for the Army’s light, airborne, air assault, ranger, and special operations forces. This project was based upon the first two years of JRTC training, when the JRTC supported one-battalion force-on-force training at Fort Chaffee (Hess 1989, 1-2).

The US Army Combined Arms Command (CAC) published command histories of the JRTC that detailed the JRTC’s early years at Fort Chaffee and its subsequent move to Fort Polk. As discussed in chapter 1, these command histories detailed the initial inception of the JRTC concept to its evolvement as the premier light CTC in the Army. Both AR 350-50 and FORSCOM (FC) 350-50-2 played an important role in regulating and coordinating the execution and support of the JRTC with the CTC Program. These documents evolved through the years in an effort to keep up with the Army’s changing requirements.

BG Bolger’s second CTC-related book was entitled, *The Battle for Hunger Hill*. BG Bolger shares his personal experiences in two different rotations at the JRTC in 1994 and 1995 as an infantry battalion commander with the First Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment. Again, he candidly shares his experiences at a CTC, but this time his book focuses on comparing and contrasting his two JRTC experiences. BG Bolger’s unit went
to the JRTC two times within a few months and he describes the changes his unit made in preparation for the rotation and the positive results these changes led to for his unit. In both books, he speaks positively of the CTCs and stresses they provide a great venue for Army leaders to gain valuable lessons (Bolger 1997, 338-348).

Other than the CTC-centric works listed earlier, little else has been written about the JRTC other than official documentation within the JRTC and its higher headquarters. In accordance with the CTC Master Plan, the JRTC participates in the CTC Conference on a semi-annual basis at Fort Leavenworth and the quarterly CTC Quarter Review (QR)/COC Conference which is held at varying locations. These conferences provide the framework for the JRTC to have a dialogue with the other CTC Program members and discuss current issues. At the September 2004 CTC Conference, COL Jon Smart, the JRTC Deputy Commander of Operations Group (DCOG), presented two significant briefings.

The first briefing explained the results of the August 2004 3rd HBCT, 3rd Infantry Division MRE at the JRTC. This rotation was important because it was both the first JNTO rotation and the first Future Force rotation at the JRTC, involving LVC personnel and systems from the Army, Air Force, and Marines. This rotation tested the concept and set the stage for future JNTO rotations (Smart 2004a).

The second briefing was entitled, “Impact of Training the Modular BCTs at JRTC and Fort Polk” and highlighted some of the issues the JRTC Operations Group faces in the future in providing training for the Future Force. The largest issue centered on the JRTC’s throughput necessities against other installation requirements. For fiscal year (FY) 2005, the JRTC is scheduled to train fifteen brigade equivalent forces, most of
which include three- and four-battalion rotations. With such a full schedule, the JRTC will have to adapt to several resourcing strains. The increased rotational usage of Fort Polk will compete for battlespace with other Fort Polk requirements, as it remains a power projection platform for Army units in support of ongoing operations. Increased usage also requires a larger budget to support rotations, and will give the Operations Group less time to prepare for rotations and provide feedback to the Army. Lastly, the increased usage of the JRTC will cause an added, and unprepared for, strain on the infrastructure that supports the rotations (Smart 2004b).

This level of throughput is scheduled to continue for the foreseeable future as the Army transformation calls for the thirty-three Active Component (AC) maneuver brigades to transform to forty-three AC BCTs over the next three years. Figure 8 highlights the impact of transforming from a combined forty-eight AC and NG brigades to seventy-seven AC and NG total BCTs in the next three years.
The issues highlighted by COL Smart at the September 2004 CTC Conference reference many of the same issues that form the basis of this thesis’ research questions. With little prior study conducted in this area combined with the JRTC’s important role in training the Future Force, the need for further research of the JRTC is clearly required.

Conclusion

Three important patterns emerged in chapter 2, “Literature Review.” First, the CTCs are at the very core of the Army training program and will continue to serve an important role for the Future Force. Second, the future battlefield will have an increased
flow of combat information, requiring combat leaders who are agile, able to synthesize large amounts of information, and make decisions in an ambiguous environment. Third, the Future Force will increase the Army brigade-level formations by twenty-nine in the next three years. This chapter also provided the framework for further analysis because it showed that there are some gaps in existing knowledge of this thesis topic—the JRTC has not been the subject of extensive research. The author will use the gap in present knowledge for the thesis’ research methodology.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Research can be defined as a “scientific or scholarly investigation” (Landoll 1995, 355). Chapter 3’s purpose is to present the research design method utilized in the conduct of this study. The methodology is qualitative and will incorporate the interviewing technique to gather information and help define the JRTC’s role in training the Future Force.

Methodology
Qualitative analysis involves studying a problem by collecting data from a variety of sources and focusing on primary and secondary materials to the greatest extent as possible. The researcher conducts an analysis of the materials to determine the significance of the information to the problem. Based on the interpretation of the collected data, the researcher develops a broader conclusion as the information is examined against the problem’s larger context. The qualitative format to be used during the conduct of this research will be categorized into three phases--assessment, collection of data, and analysis and synthesis of data. The research methodology’s three sequential phases will lead to relevant solutions that could enhance the JRTC’s effectiveness in meeting the Future Force BCTs’ training requirements.

Assessment Phase
During this phase the researcher will examine the effects the Future Force transformation will have on the JRTC. Specifically, this phase will analyze how changes in the transformed BCTs may potentially impact the JRTC in terms of Operations Group
structure and organization, training area usage, training requirements, and rotational throughput. Information on the BCTs will be collected primarily from what has been published by the Army in the form of two documents, *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0*; and *Field Manual 3-21.31, Stryker Brigade Combat Team*; and other official documentation from within TRADOC.

Collection of Data Phase

During this phase the researcher will collect data, using a questionnaire as part of the interviewing technique, from primary sources to answer the thesis’ primary question. The questionnaires will be distributed through electronic messages and interviews with present and former commanders of the JRTC, the NTC, and the CMTC. Chapter 2, “Literature Review,” demonstrated a gap in existing knowledge is present in the research of the JRTC. The researcher will attempt to partially fill this gap by sending questionnaires to those primary sources with the best understanding of the situation facing the JRTC as it prepares for the Future Force BCTs--the present and former CTC commanders. The CTC Commanding Generals (CGs) and Commanders, Operations Group (COGs) have all shared similar experiences during their commands to ensure their CTC responded to the Army training requirements. Furthermore, these senior Army leaders may have the best collective capability of any group to describe the best way for the JRTC to train the Future Force BCTs.

Interview Technique

There are strengths and weaknesses associated with any interviewing technique for collecting data. Interviewing allows the researcher to identify patterns and themes from the responses. It also allows the researcher to gather large amounts of data and
immediate analysis from those being interviewed. Finally, interviewing gives the researcher the ability to conduct validity checks and triangulation on the data received. Triangulation of the data, if established, can provide confirmation of the research’s dependability and credibility. Some of the inherent interviewing weaknesses are that the creditability of the data gathered is directly related to the size of the population being interviewed, opinions of those being interviewed may display a certain level of bias or subjectivity, and the researcher could misinterpret the data collected.

Finally, the researcher has an ethical responsibility to objectively search for and accurately portray the findings against any personal pre-conceived bias on the subject. In this case, the author spent four years working within the JRTC and participated in thirty-one rotations as either an OC or as part of the installation staff.

Interview Process

The purpose of the interview process will be to answer the thesis’ primary question. The instrument for data collection will involve sending questionnaires to and setting up interviews with each NTC, JRTC, and CMTC former and current commander that can be notified and is willing to participate. The CTC CGs and COGs will be given as much time as needed to answer any or all of the research questions and respond with feedback. The questions below will be sent to the CGs and COGs.

Primary Question. What role will the Joint Readiness Training Center fill for the United States military in the training of the Future Force?

Secondary and Tertiary Questions.

1. What internal changes does the JRTC Operations Group require, in the form of OC and OPFOR manning, to support the Future Force BCT structure?
2. Does the JRTC need to develop an exportable training capability? If so, how?

3. Does the Army need to move the JRTC or the 4th BCT (tenant unit at Fort Polk) to another installation? If so, how?

4. Does the Army need to acquire more training land in the Fort Polk area? If so, how?

5. What types of rotations (Force-on-force and MREs, for example) does the JRTC need to provide for the Future Force?

6. Does the JRTC need to provide LFX and STX lane training for the Future Force?

**Analysis and Synthesis of Data Phase**

During this phase, the results of the collection of data phase will be analyzed and synthesized based upon the total population of the responses. Of note, this phase will overlap with the previous one in order to allow the researcher to begin analysis of results as they arrive. Analysis of the questionnaires will assist in providing the information needed to understand the JRTC’s role in training the Future Force.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, the method of research and analysis necessary to understand this study was determined. The methodology is qualitative and will incorporate the interviewing technique for gathering information and answering the primary and subordinate questions for this research and helping frame the JRTC’s role in training the Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs of the Future Force. These results will be shown in chapter 4, “Analysis.”
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The combat training centers are the main culture drivers in the Army,” [GEN] Schoomaker told the AUSA audience. “How we train there dictates how people think when they get on the real battlefield,” he later told reporters. (Naylor 2003, 14-18)

Introduction

Thus far in this thesis, chapter 1 provided background on the problem under study, chapter 2 examined the theory and literature surrounding the subject, and chapter 3 outlined the framework for conducting analysis and developing recommendations. Chapter 4 will provide the specific examination needed to answer the primary and subordinate questions. Using direct feedback from four former NTC CGs (GEN Leon Laporte, LTG William Wallace--served as both the COG and CG at the NTC, Major General (MG) James Thurman, and BG Robert Cone), two JRTC COGs (BG Mick Bednarek and BG James Terry), three NTC COGs (BG Mark Hertling, BG Joseph Martz, and BG William West), and one former CMTC COG (COL William Blankmeyer), this chapter will help determine how the JRTC can train US Army war-fighting units of the Future Force. In conjunction with a summary of the ongoing CTC efforts to make changes within the scope of the CTC Way-Ahead Conference in December 2004, the primary and subordinate questions will be answered. This examination, in turn, will help explain how the JRTC can best provide a quality training experience for the Future Force BCTs.
The Primary Question Feedback

When posed with the primary question, What role will the JRTC fill for the US military in training the Future Force BCTs?, the CTC commanders offered many views. But the former commanders gave their answer with the same theme--the JRTC will play an integral role in training the Future Force.

GEN Laporte believes the JRTC will not only remain a vital component of the CTC family, but will maintain its status as the premier training environment for light forces. As the Army transitions, he thinks it will focus its training on IBCTs while continuing to be highly adaptive to new training requirements, such as MREs and Special Operations Forces training rotations. As the Army transforms and new training requirements are identified, he is certain the JRTC will transform with it (Laporte 2004).

He feels there is a direct linkage between the primary research question and each of the subordinate questions. He sees there are clearly several things, which must be done to determine how the JRTC will support the Army as it transforms and he personally knows those things are currently being done. First and most importantly, he stated TRADOC must determine which units will be trained at the JRTC and what those unit training requirements will be based upon their structure, capabilities, and training needs. The JRTC can then do an analysis of their current resources to ensure they can execute the mission outlined by TRADOC and identify additional resources that will be necessary to support the new units as they train. Any mismatch of resources can then be passed back to TRADOC and the Army staff for approval and resolution. At that point, the Army staff will decide to meet the requirement or will downgrade the training support based upon worldwide missions and resources available (Laporte 2004).
BG West feels strongly the use of the JRTC is limited only by the imagination of those making decisions for its continued implementation in training the Army’s forces. He said there are barriers, which have prevented the Army from expanding the CTCs’ use, and the Army must tear them down. He feels the area of joint operations is the one requiring the most emphasis and attention. He acknowledges that is not as easy as it sounds, because he knows other services are sometimes only willing to participate if the Army provides funding. He offered a couple of recommendations to get past this hurdle. He suggested the US military makes the Army program a true joint training program, using all the centers and services. He suggested another way would be to establish a new joint training center, in addition to the Army’s CTCs (West 2004).

BG Hertling believes the CTC Program has significantly contributed to the Army’s “first battle” success. Though the US Army has a long history of struggles in opening battles, from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, the CTCs have been instrumental in reversing this trend recently because they gave units the opportunity to train realistically for war prior to being tested on the battlefield. BG Hertling feels it is important for the CTCs to make necessary adjustments to better prepare units for the FOE. Some changes he recommends are in the areas of adjusting to the COE, better incorporating other services, and leader development (Hertling 2004).

He believes the CTCs can more accurately replicate the COE if they continue to expand urban operations (UO)--including urban sprawl and LFXs, gain more allied and joint participation, and conduct large-scale humanitarian operations as a normal part of the rotations. He also feels it is important the Army CTCs, in conjunction with JFCOM, continue to play a significant function in the JNTC program. Finally, he offered the CTCs
could have an increased role in leader development by adding programs such as new assistant division commanders conducting “ride-alongs” with the COG, DCOG, or other senior OCs (Hertling 2004).

LTG Wallace believes there are several answers to the primary question of the role of the JRTC in training the Future Force. His first perspective is that as the Army becomes modular, this will increase the number of maneuver brigades. In the process of increasing the number of maneuver brigades, the Army has, whether consciously or unconsciously, increased the throughput requirements associated with the CTCs. Because the Army has increased the JRTC throughput requirements, it will need to accommodate some fraction of that requirement or the Army will have to come up with different ways of utilizing CTC assets to meet the Future Force requirements (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace emphasized many of the questions of this thesis could be more easily answered if the Army had a clear training strategy, which he believes it currently does not. He thinks the Army can resource that strategy once it is developed. The strategy he envisions, in addition to the unit’s home-station training and individual qualification type training, is one that allows the Army’s training institution to have five inject points into the life-cycle of an organization (Wallace 2004).

While accepting these five inject points may not be entirely the right answer, he feels strongly they are not absolutely wrong either. LTG Wallace thinks TRADOC has a responsibility to develop the most relevant and current enemy and friendly tactics, and TTPs for those most common operations that are being currently conducted in theater. He believes the first inject point would be to develop the ability of a mobile training team (MTT) to go to units at home-station and provide a type of train the trainer exercise at
some point in their unit life-cycle, with the purpose of training those unit leaders to the
level of expertise in place at the CTC. This will allow those trainers to train their troops
on the best, most current practices and techniques (Wallace 2004).

Though TRADOC provides hundreds of MTTs all across the Army, LTG Wallace
said it is for the most part “hit-or-miss.” He believes TRADOC can better institutionalize
this in a way similar to what the British Army has been doing for years, based on its
experience in Northern Ireland, with its Operation Training Advisory Group (OPTAG).
When a unit gets ready to deploy, the trainers in a battalion or brigade size organization
come to OPTAG and receives an exceptionally intense train the trainer program for about
two weeks on the most current TTPs and threats. Those leaders then go back to their unit
and conduct a training program based on that knowledge. LTG Wallace strongly feels the
US Army should adapt a similar method within TRADOC (Wallace 2004).

COL James Murray-Playfair, CAC’s British liaison officer, confirmed this
technique with the researcher in an interview. He has extensive experience as a British
combat arms officer working with the OPTAG and believes strongly this method has paid
dividends for the British Army in OIF. By establishing a strong base of knowledge
among the unit leadership early in its unit life-cycle, those unit leaders are better prepared
to plan and execute the training necessary to prepare their forces. Because members of
OPTAG are personnel who have just completed a deployment as a part of OIF, these
individuals are collectively the most qualified in the British Army to train the next units
for deployment (Murray-Playfair 2005).

LTG Wallace’s second inject point is, when considering the Future Force and the
life-cycle of the unit, at the end of the “reset” period and beginning of the “train” period
when the unit will need to build a team of new leaders and conduct an exercise. Figure 9 shows a proposed three-year unit life-cycle for the Future Force BCTs. This inject point would be a BCTP-like exercise at the brigade level using a venue that already exists called the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Program (BCBST). Right now this program has been used exclusively for the SBCTs, brigades in Korea, and the NG enhanced brigades, but he said the Army needs to expand it to all the maneuver brigades as they transition to the Future Force (Wallace 2004).

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Figure 9. Active Component Brigade Combat Team, 2 January 2005
Source: Senior Leaders Conference Brief “Sustaining Training Superiority” (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 11.
LTG Wallace’s third intervention point would be a standard CTC rotation early in the life-cycle of the unit. The unit gets certified as proficient and goes back to home-station. If the unit is alerted to deploy, it will then go back to a CTC for an MRE and this would be the fourth intervention point. If the unit has conducted major combat operations earlier, the MRE phase can probably be an abbreviated version of a standard CTC rotation. But, if the unit is going to deploy early in the life-cycle, then the major combat operations and the MRE may be combined into a single, large exercise so the unit can execute all the right training objectives (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace proposed a fifth intervention point, which he referred to as “over the shoulder” training. He said the US Army is the best in the world at training and conducting AARs in a training environment, but it is not especially good at conducting AARs while in contact with the enemy. This would entail deploying an OC element, maybe ten to fifteen personnel, and move them into the theater of operations to observe organizations going through physical operations against a real live enemy. The OC team would then provide the unit a formal process of data collection and AARs and give the commander some tips on how to better employ his unit (Wallace 2004).

He describes the benefits as three-fold. It would help the unit get better, it would help the OCs be current in UO, and it would allow the OCs to bring that knowledge back and enhance the replication at the CTCs. He believes these five intervention points from a strategic perspective, and development of an Army training strategy, would be useful. The JRTC will play a big role in each of those (Wallace 2004). Figure 10 depicts LTG Wallace’s vision for TRADOC’s five inject points into a unit’s three-year life-cycle.
BG Terry proposed an extremely similar concept, which he labeled “coaches in contact.” He believes the JRTC should deploy OCs, either between rotations or during months that have no rotations, forward into theater to provide coverage for deployed units. He stressed the benefit from this would be twofold. One, it would give necessary feedback to those units deployed forward and would provide much needed experience for the OCs so they could better provide coverage for upcoming rotational units. However, one issue BG Terry noted with this concept is the JRTC OCs are entirely too busy because of the increased amount of rotations they are supporting (Terry 2004).
LTG Wallace thinks the JRTC has been the UO nexus for the Army for a number of years and the Army must find a way to share that UO experience and excellence in UO training across the other CTCs and with the rest of the Army. He stated Shughart-Gordon, the JRTC MOUT facility, is a great place to train UO, but believes Shughart-Gordon is drastically different than the UO the Army is facing in theater. He believes this is something the Army leadership should take a serious look at. LTG Wallace also thinks the Army leadership needs to think about how it exports those UO techniques and procedures to avoid the trap of equating UO with MOUT. While describing MOUT as a localized small unit operation that can occur at the unit level in terms of training, he characterized UO as much more sophisticated in terms of complexity and command and control (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace stated the opportunities to make a strategic blunder are much greater in UO and the Army leadership must be careful to differentiate between the two types of operations. While LTG Wallace feels confident about the US Army’s collective ability to proficiently train its small-level units in MOUT, he does not have the same confidence for UO when the units have to deal with multiple city blocks. He believes this is a significant topic for the Army leadership and one that may impact how the CTCs train the Future Force (Wallace 2004).

When posed with the primary question, MG Thurman said the JRTC would continue to serve the Future Force as it has for years, as one of the Army's premier collective training grounds for platoon- through BCT-level formations. He stressed the JRTC will continue to serve to validate and refine doctrine, force structure, training, leader development, and equipment capabilities at the BCT-level and below. The CTCs
will allow Division and Corps commanders to focus on training the BCTs in an operational environment. That environment will become increasingly complex over the next few years as the Army continues to transform, field significant amounts of new equipment, and maintain a considerable deployed presence as it conducts the global war on terrorism (Thurman 2004).

BG Bednarek believes the primary research question is a key issue for all the CTCs, including the JRTC. He said both the JRTC and the NTC would clearly maintain the mission for preparing and training Army and Joint Force BCTs and Regiments to win the fight. To accomplish this, he stressed the CTCs must remain flexible enough to provide the impetus to stress the training unit, regardless of type organization. The JRTC also needs to expand the capability to provide sufficient coverage and the expertise to train, mentor, and coach the multiple “BCTs, Units of Action, and Regiments” of all the service ground forces. He added the JRTC has already begun this process with a Marine reconnaissance battalion training in the spring of 2004, the first JNTC rotation in August 2004, and the second JNTC rotation in March 2005 (Bednarek 2004).

Regardless of the BCT structure, BG Bednarek believes the Army CTCs require additional capabilities to make the JRTC more joint-enabled. He said the JRTC requires the capabilities, plug-and-play, to link in with other services and help the military better understand how the services can tie in with each other (Bednarek 2004).

BG Bednarek thinks the JRTC has historically done an excellent job of stressing both systems and processes within a unit and provided a quality training experience for the leaders and Soldiers. Whether it was a conventional rotation or an MRE in preparation for a deployment, the JRTC has been agile enough to adjust to the training
requirements needed by the units. He believes the JRTC will be able to provide the same quality training for the Future Force (Bednarek 2004).

BG Terry agrees the JRTC will have a central role in training the Future Force, just as it has trained units for the past eighteen years. Though changes may be required for the JRTC to meet the new training requirements, it is important for the Army leadership to remember the most important purpose of the JRTC--leader development. The JRTC serves an incredibly important function because it grows leaders from team leader to BCT commander with good feedback from qualified OCs (Terry 2004).

BG Terry believes one option for improving the leader development function at the JRTC is to look at the possibility of establishing 360-degree evaluations as part of the process. He also offered he strongly believes the CTC OCs, due to their tactical expertise, should be the personnel tasked with writing combined arms doctrine in an effort to better prepare the US Army for the FOE. Once written in draft form, he said the doctrine could then be sent to the TRADOC proponent for any follow up required. However, he pointed out the OCs are too busy to do this because of the number of rotations they are conducting. This leaves the problem of having personnel in the TRADOC buildings writing doctrine instead of the Army Soldiers who are the experts because of their experiences observing this doctrine in action (Terry 2004).

BG Martz, a former COG at the NTC, believes no change is necessary at the JRTC with respect to training focus as defined in FC Reg 350-50-2. He believes the Army’s capability to provide the transformed force with distinctly different training areas (some with trees, some with congested roads, etc.) provides great options to prepare units for deployments worldwide. He also strongly believes the COE is the appropriate
OPFOR model for the CTCs with the key word being "contemporary." During his 22 months as the NTC COG, he saw the COE continually change and the NTC adjusted each time. He believes this will continue to happen and the CTCs will continue to adjust with the changing operational environment (Martz 2005).

BG Cone feels this research is just as applicable to the NTC as it is the JRTC since the two are increasingly filling the same role from two locations. He stressed teamwork is more important now than ever before. Because the CTCs are linked in terms of resources, numbers of rotations, and unit training needs, it is important the CTCs work together to train the Future Force. He emphasized the NTC and the JRTC now work together closely on exchanging OC teams, sharing TTPs, and training methodologies as they confront a transforming Army that is also at war. In the midst of training the AC and RC force as they simultaneously modularize, BG Cone fully understands the training base will require an increased amount of CTC rotations by the time the Army has fully transformed, requiring a coordinated CTC solution (Cone 2004).

BG West also feels strongly this topic is appropriate for all the CTCs and believes the key to success will be the CTCs flexibility to portray a wide range of battlefield environments. Though he acknowledged the CTCs have exceptional capability to stand alone as single entity training centers, portraying numerous areas of operation, he feels their real value has not been captured. BG West thinks the CTC community should seize the opportunity to expand their capability with that of the other services. He is of the opinion the military has never truly developed a joint training center regardless of the name we applied to JRTC (West 2004).
He emphasized joint training is like synchronization and most commanders have subscribed to the idea that it seldom occurs below brigade level. He thinks that may be true for the conventional fight, but in the unconventional application of forces in the past four years the military has moved that level down so company commanders are often the synchronizer of all BOS and joint systems which are added to the fight. He believes the military must move forward to establish a true training center, which can maximize the capabilities of the Army CTCs with those of the other services in a way the military has never before experienced (West 2004).

**Operations Group Manning**

The thesis’ first subordinate question scrutinized what internal changes the JRTC Operations Group required, in the form of OC and OPFOR manning, to support the Future Force BCT structure? This question was posed to the CTC commanders and was met with a variety of responses. However, the consistent themes were OC manning would have to transform to meet the changing structure of the Future Force BCTs and the OPFOR needs to have some form of full-time, professional structure.

**Observer-Controller Structure**

BG Bednarek, the JRTC COG from 2004 to 2005, was clear in his belief the JRTC will be required to expand its OC structure to meet the Future Force manning structure requirements. In an interview with the researcher, BG Bednarek stated “the bottom line is, if we are serious about war-fighting preparation, the JRTC and the NTC will need a slight growth in OCs to ensure we have the capability to provide the quality coaching, teaching, mentoring our Army has come to expect” (Bednarek 2004). This statement supports the belief, alluded to throughout chapter 2, the Army expects the
CTCs to provide quality training for its combat formations, but he also makes it clear changes are necessary within the JRTC to keep up with changes in the MTOE units. Figure 11 suggests areas the JRTC may want to adjust its OC structure by highlighting the major differences between the older light brigades and the Future Force IBCTs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Units</th>
<th>Removed Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BTB</strong></td>
<td><strong>RSTA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA HHC (167)</td>
<td>HHC (114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- C2 Enhancements</td>
<td>- 3 Recon Troops (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deputy Cdr</td>
<td>- 2 x Plts w/ 3 sections w/1 x M2LRSAS (30 x 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- JFIRES (ECOORD, NLEC, JTACP)</td>
<td>- Mortars (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MP Plt</td>
<td>- SUAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SUAV</td>
<td>- Surveillance Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Co (68)</td>
<td>- Multi Sensor Plt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TDC NODAL Plt</td>
<td>- (PHOReET, QSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SIG SPT Plt</td>
<td>- NBC Recon Plt (2 x FOX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NET OPS TM</td>
<td>• Surveillance Troop now part of BTB (MI Co)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI Co (118)</td>
<td>• FSC now in SPT BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ISR Analysis Plt</td>
<td>• Surveillance Troop now part of BTB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ISR Integration Plt</td>
<td>• Now part of RSTA SQN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HUMINT Sec</td>
<td>• Now only NBC Recon Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 Common Ground Station</td>
<td>• Now only NBC Recon Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN Co</td>
<td>• May still exist in AASLT BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ENPlts x 2</td>
<td>• FSC now in SPT BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Equip Section</td>
<td>• Transformed SPT BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signal Co, MI Co now part of BTB</td>
<td>• FSCs no longer forward with the maneuver BNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Surveillance Troop from RSTA now part of BTB</td>
<td>• Now a RSTA SQN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. Light Brigade and Brigade Combat Team Comparison, 22 November 2004


MG Thurman, the current 4th Infantry Division CG, believes the JRTC should reconfigure its OC structure to meet the changing organization of BLUFOR (Blue Force) units (Thurman 2004). MG Thurman understands the changes the modular HBCTs will undergo as his unit is currently transforming. MG Thurman also believes lessons from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) proved OC coverage for “non-kinetic” assets that conduct information operations, psychological operations, and civil-military operations is just as important as those capabilities used to observe traditional combat power functions (Thurman 2004). Figure 12 highlights the primary differences between the older heavy brigades and the Future Force HBCTs.

**Figure 12. Heavy Brigade and Heavy BCT Comparison, 22 November 2004**  
*Source: CTC-D Brief “CTC Way Ahead TLGOSC”, CAC-T (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 18.*

BG West, a former COG at the NTC, echoed these same thoughts in an email message to the researcher and emphasized the staffing of the JRTC OC structure should
be as robust as those of the BCTs they are responsible for training and would require changes beyond anything the JRTC has ever experienced. He also questioned whether the Army was willing to “pay the price in OCs” that would be necessary to make this process work effectively (West 2004).

In a telephone interview with BG Terry, a former JRTC COG and current Assistant Division Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, he agreed the OC organization must evolve to meet the changing BCT structure. BG Terry believes the personnel end strength must increase, primarily for two reasons--safety and junior leader development (Terry 2004).

Due to the complex nature of light and heavy force integration during night maneuvers, BG Terry feels it is imperative the JRTC OC structure be fully manned to mitigate the risk present on the training battlefield. Secondly, he stressed the future leaders of tomorrow are the junior enlisted Soldiers of today, making it even more important these Soldiers receive the invaluable OC mentoring and coaching that has historically been provided by the JRTC. While acknowledging the JRTC has required significant OC augmentation in the past from across the Army just to get its OC structure fully manned for previous rotations, BG Terry offered the Army may want to leverage other means, such as the Army’s Training Support Brigades (TSBs), to augment the JRTC and establish a habitual relationship in support of rotations (Terry 2004). There are eighteen of the Army TSBs BG Terry referred to and they are comprised of Active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers who are charged with the duty of supporting Reserve Component training at several locations across the US.
LTG Wallace, a former CG and COG at the NTC and the current CAC Commander, had several ideas on the JRTC manning structure and laid these out in an interview. LTG Wallace felt the JRTC, as well as the NTC, needed to determine how to reorganize its existing structure to train the modular army with the knowledge it was expected to provide the necessary coverage for any Future Force BCT that came to the CTC. LTG Wallace believed the JRTC would no longer specialize in training primarily light forces because the near-term Army operational tempo did not allow it the capability of funneling a single type of unit to the CTCs (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace went on to state the CONUS CTCs, the JRTC and the NTC, should strive to become similar in structure in order to assure they could support any of the Future Force BCTs. One way LTG Wallace believed change may be required was in terms of what level of OC coverage was necessary for the Army’s combat formations. He felt the Army leadership should scrutinize the JRTC’s historical philosophy of providing OCs down to the squad-level, as opposed to the NTC’s method of providing platoon-level OC coverage, with emphasis on the fact both CTCs needed to look similar to one another in order to meet the same requirement for the Future Force. He said this problem was compounded by the Army wishes to reduce the size of the TDA Army while increasing the size of the operational Army (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace stated there were other considerations the JRTC may have to scrutinize since future OC Manning would probably not be greatly increased although the size of the Future Force BCTs certainly would. He proposed the JRTC might be forced to reevaluate its method for providing OC coverage and that it may want to focus on providing coverage for events, as opposed to the organizations that trained at the JRTC.
He felt, because the OCs generally control the scenario and major activities within the noncontiguous training area, the JRTC Operations Group may want to relinquish more control and responsibility back to the training unit in between major events while focusing OC coverage and AARs on only the major events. This method would require a more detached OC function than the JRTC has historically used, though still requiring the same detailed OC function for the major activities. LTG Wallace acknowledged there were clearly drawbacks to this method as the training unit would not get the one on one coverage and feedback the JRTC has provided in the past (Wallace 2004).

The final area LTG Wallace discussed, though it relates to his previous discussion, had to do with the amount of OC augmentation that has frequently been required at the JRTC and his intent to reduce this number. Because the JRTC OC structure was originally developed to support a two-battalion force-on-force training exercise and has not drastically increased in terms of raw personnel numbers to meet the three- and four-battalion rotations of the Future Force, the OC structure will need to either be increased or augmented with Soldiers to provide the necessary OC functions. This has been an ongoing problem for the JRTC, as well as the rest of the Army, since 2002 when these larger combat formations began regularly training at Fort Polk. LTG Wallace believes the JRTC’s goal should be to reduce the augmentation requirements from its high-water mark of 200 to 250 Soldiers down to a more manageable 25 to 30 Soldiers (Wallace 2004).

Though he acknowledged there might be some level of professional development for the Soldiers providing the augmentation, he did not feel this development was worth the price of taking these Soldiers, who are generally leaders, away from their parent units
and the Soldiers they are responsible for training. He thought the JRTC might need to restyle its OC structure to the function that is required. One way he proposed to do this was to change the augmentation requirements such that there were more opportunities for combat experienced NCOs, though they may be of less rank than has historically been used, to provide the compulsory augmentation (Wallace 2004).

Opposing Force Manning

MG Thurman emphasized the OPFOR should continue to evolve to accurately portray a realistic range of current and short-term opponents. This includes replicating the variety of techniques and capabilities of all the potential enemies the US will face over the next five years, both in high-intensity combat (HIC) scenarios and SOSO. He believes the Army must continue to focus on a balanced approach to HIC and SOSO because conventional combined arms combat is such a complex condition in which to operate, trained combat skills are extremely perishable, and because the military cannot continue to rely on historical and contemporary experiences of conflict to alone shape the OPFOR. Thus, MG Thurman believes the JRTC OPFOR must also retain the capability to portray a robust future conventional threat with peer-like capabilities (Thurman 2004).

MG Thurman explained the performance expectation of the JRTC OPFOR, but the current standard of excellence may be hard to meet in the future if the OPFOR battalion is a deployable unit. The OPFOR’s two rifle companies are currently deployed in support of OIF. This deployment caused the Army to activate a National Guard battalion to serve as the OPFOR in an effort to make up for the loss of personnel. This short-term fix may not be the best way to solve the long-term requirement to have a full-time, standing OPFOR that can replicate the adversarial threat of the COE.
LTG Wallace framed the OPFOR manning issue by stating the Army leadership needs to determine what kind of OPFOR the JRTC needs to man— one that is a deployable unit or one which is solely responsible for full-time, professional OPFOR duties. Until this question is answered, he believes the Army will continue to resort to near-term fixes that may not be in the Army’s best interest (Wallace 2004).

BG Terry and BG Bednarek, the last two JRTC COGs, feel it is important to man the OPFOR battalion with a full-time, standing force and BG Terry further questioned whether or not having this same unit in a deployable status serves the Army in the best way it could (Terry 2004). BG Bednarek strongly believes the JRTC cannot field a “pick-up team” and expect to provide the quality opposing force the Army expects, which is consistent with MG Thurman’s comments. He elaborated by stressing the nation’s adversaries are enlightened and always looking to strike at perceived weaknesses in the military by fighting a tough, asymmetrical type of warfare. A professional, freethinking adversary has always been a hallmark of the CTCs and BG Bednarek feels this capability will be increasingly difficult to sustain if the contemporary conditions continue to exist. He did acknowledge the senior Army leadership was currently looking at several options to ensure all of the CTCs have the requisite OPFOR (Bednarek 2004). LTG Wallace agreed some type of professional, full-time OPFOR cadre is required at the CTCs, but felt the senior leadership needed to evaluate the need for an entire standing OPFOR unit (Wallace 2004).

Other Manning Requirements

In addition to OCs and the OPFOR, the JRTC has always had another player on the battlefield that has played an invaluable role in training the BLUFOR. This other
player is the civilian on the battlefield (COB). BG Bednarek believes the senior leadership of the Army must address this issue in addition to the OCs and OPFOR. He stated that civilians are represented in large numbers on the modern battlefield--UO anywhere in the world--and must be present at the CTCs. The JRTC has always replicated COBs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for years, and BG Bednarek believes the JRTC will certainly need to replicate them for the Future Force. He also feels interagency personnel, contractors, foreign language speakers, and other personnel require replication as friendly, neutral, and hostile elements and must be intermixed on the JRTC battlefield. To execute this, the JRTC will need additional personnel and subject matter experts to provide the quality replication and training tool needed by the BCT commanders (Bednarek 2004).

One point BG Bednarek made clear is this replication is becoming increasingly difficult because of the way the JRTC is funded. The JRTC has a baseline amount of money for ten conventional, two-battalion rotations a year. This equates to about a $2,200,000 sunk cost for each rotation. Current ground truth is the JRTC conducted eleven rotations last year and has fifteen Brigade equivalent rotations scheduled in FY 2005. Because the preponderance of current rotations has been, and will continue to be MREs for the foreseeable future, this has caused an increased cost associated with their execution. The GWOT has picked up the tab for this mission essential requirement but he feels it is not a reliable funding source to sustain future rotations (Bednarek 2004).

The Joint Readiness Training Center’s Battlespace Requirements

The next set of subordinate questions examined the JRTC’s battlespace needs and how the Future Force BCTs may affect them. Specifically, this section will analyze
several options to optimize training space, including an exportable training capability, the possibility of re-locating the JRTC or another Fort Polk tenant unit, and the prospect of acquiring more land in the Fort Polk area. Again, these questions were posed to the former CTC commanders and were received with a mix of responses. As discussed in chapter 1, Fort Polk is the home to several units in addition to the JRTC and is also one of the Army’s power projection platforms in support of ongoing operations. Because the JRTC is increasing its “footprint” in the Fort Polk maneuver training area, in terms of land usage and amount of time, there will certainly be training space requirements requiring de-confliction in order to ensure each unit’s training mission is accomplished.

Exportable Training Capability

LTG Wallace believes the Army needs the CTCs, but he also feels the current CTCs need to be augmented with an exportable training capability. Though he was not sure each of the CTCs should have their own exportable capability, he was clear in his belief it was needed to increase the throughput capability of the CTCs. His vision is an exportable Operations Group, smaller than the current CTC Operations Groups, with an exportable OPFOR cadre and the other requisite pieces needed to deploy and OC an organization. One of these vital parts is some form of a rudimentary exportable IS capability, much less robust than at the current CTCs, but complex enough to gather data and provide feedback for the BLUFOR unit. He believes a professional, full-time OPFOR cadre, with a solid understanding of the processes required for the CTC training and the threat role, can both prepare another organization to be the OPFOR and can be the training aid for the BLUFOR unit (Wallace 2004).
BG Terry agreed an exportable training capability is needed at the CTCs as one way to alleviate requirements for increased Future Force CTC rotations. He also offered another way to increase the CTCs’ throughput capability, including the JRTC, is to begin conducting larger rotations such as two-brigade rotations, maybe as part of a larger joint exercise (Terry 2004).

BG Terry added the CTCs might need to look at greater UEx (Division) participation in the command and control of the rotational BLUFOR unit. He suggested this could be accomplished by utilizing a forward Tactical Command Post and linking it in a distributed manner within the JNTC Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN) (Terry 2004). The JTEN is the JNTC’s reconfigurable communications network and its utilization is critical to the success of the program because of the JNTC’s dependence upon a high bandwidth network infrastructure that links services, combatant commands, agencies, and other facilities worldwide. Figure 13 highlights potential connectivity requirements and capabilities of a deployed CTC.
While LTG Wallace and BG Terry asserted an exportable training capability was needed, others offered dissenting views. BG West, while recognizing the idea of exportable CTCs has been around for some time, said his opinion was an exportable CTC was not needed, though commanders needed the capability to prepare their forces in a manner similar to the way BLUFOR units train at the CTC. He went on to say a US company has developed a system which gives commanders at home-station the IS capability that is available at the JRTC. He asserted it can instrument each Soldier and weapon system, track them using global positioning system (GPS) technology, transmit the data (position location and weapon activity) to a small mobile van or trailer, and

Figure 13. Deployed Combat Training Center and The Big Picture, 10 December 2004 Source: CTC-D Brief “CTC Way-Ahead Review” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC), 144.
capture CTC-like data on a computer. He feels the US Army is reluctant to procure the system because of the acquisition community’s lack of understanding of the commander’s training needs. BG West stated there are numerous ways this system could be employed from equipment sets at each installation to a roving system, which could potentially provide support to more than one installation (West 2004).

GEN Laporte also questioned the notion an exportable training capability would alleviate the stress on the throughput capacity of the CTCs. While acknowledging there would probably be a CTC throughput problem facing the Army when significant numbers of Soldiers redeploy from forward-based units and OIF, he expects an exportable training capability would only provide marginal relief to the problem. GEN Laporte believes the primary problem would be many installations do not have large enough training areas available to conduct BCT level training exercises. A secondary problem he asserts is the fact most installations do not have the IS capability to provide the fidelity for the required AARs. However, GEN Laporte feels it is safe to assume the increase to forty-three or forty-eight BCTs will force the Army leadership to decide if an additional CONUS CTC is needed or an increased capability (new time models, more land, more condensed operations, or changes in OPFOR methods) at the already existing facilities is required. Finally, he asserts Army senior leaders will need to determine what the objective frequency of CTC rotations are for each BCT and create the resources to accomplish this goal (Laporte 2004).

Unit Relocation

Fort Polk is the home to the JRTC Operations Group, the 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division, and a composite group of combat support and combat service support units that
make up the Warrior Brigade. Besides providing training space for these tenant units, Fort Polk is also utilized by National Guard and Reserve Component units (such as the Louisiana NG’s 256th BCT) and for mobilization and demobilization training in support of ongoing operations. None of the CTC commanders thought the JRTC Operations Group was going to move away from Fort Polk, while some felt other units at the installation should move.

BG Bednarek believes the JRTC is going to stay at Fort Polk and his staff worked to find solutions that optimized training space available against his unit’s mission. BG Bednarek stated the existing land could easily consume a BCT when one takes into consideration the “troops to tasks” that a unit has to execute for HIC and SOSO training. However, he went on to say there are measures the JRTC can take to “shrink” the battlespace required and is something the JRTC Operations Group has done in the past. He said the Operations Group will work closely with the Fort Polk installation staff and other tenant units in a delicate balancing act to ensure each unit can accomplish its mission (Bednarek 2004).

This will require each of the units to scrutinize their training requirements in order to maximize the training space available. BG Bednarek also is looking at other ways to alleviate some of the stress on the land and facilities at Fort Polk. He believes noncontiguous training, something the JRTC has done at a limited level in the past and something that comes at an increased cost, will probably be increased in the future (Bednarek 2004).

BG West believes the JRTC should and will stay at Fort Polk and thought it might be wise for other tenant units at Fort Polk to relocate. Based on his experience at the
NTC, BG West endorses the idea the CTC be the sole focus of the installation support. BG West understands space is always a factor in realistic training and tenant units training space usage could potentially degrade the mission of the JRTC. He stated one of the NTC’s major benefits was its single purpose organization. Until recently the NTC installation staff had one mission—to support the rotation (West 2004).

GEN Laporte believes relocating the JRTC Operations Group or any other unit at Fort Polk is something that should be left to the base realignment and closure (BRAC) commission for examination. He offered a better solution might be to keep the JRTC and the NTC at their present locations and to add another third CONUS CTC with perhaps a new focus such as UO. GEN Laporte also believed having other Army units co-located with the JRTC might have minimal impact on the rotational schedule (Laporte 2004).

Acquiring Land

Another possibility to ensure Fort Polk has adequate training area to support Future Force BCTs may be to acquire more land. This may be an option that is worth spending the resources to investigate further. An additional training area would not have to be in especially close proximity to Fort Polk as it could be utilized as a noncontiguous training area much like the Peason Ridge Training Area already is to Fort Polk. BG Bednarek believes additional battlespace is a consideration and could be used to provide out-of-sector missions for BLUFOR (Bednarek 2004). Figures 14 shows the contiguous and noncontiguous battlespace normally used in support of the JRTC rotations.
COL Blankmeyer, as a former CMTC commander, understands full well the problems with conducting large operations in limited amounts of space. His focus at the CMTC was to optimize the use of the available terrain at the training center and expand it on occasion through temporary maneuver rights. Of course, the CMTC is located in Germany and permanent expansion was not an option. COL Blankmeyer suggested there might be other avenues, which have a better payoff as opposed to increasing the physical land space at the JRTC. He is a strong advocate of computer simulations to train brigade and higher staffs--everyone does not have to be in the “box” at the same time. COL Blankmeyer said the CMTC accomplished this with scenarios that allowed a battalion or...
two in the box while one or two adjacent battalions were fighting in simulations. This was transparent to the brigade staff as it fought a seamless coordinated fight within its own tactical operations center (TOC). He stressed there are an unlimited number of ways to get at the required training without putting every Soldier in the training area at the same time for force-on-force training (Blankmeyer 2004).

General Laporte echoed some of COL Blankmeyer’s thoughts by explaining that before considering a physical expansion of Fort Polk, a serious discussion should occur in relation to what BCT training objectives can be accomplished through virtual and constructive training in concert with the live scenarios during the rotation. He also explained, from his experience as the NTC CG, the process of installation expansion from concept to reality requires a long lead time (five years at a very minimum due to constraints imposed by the military construction authority (MCA) funding cycle) and is certainly not a near-term solution. He also emphasized significant congressional and community support would certainly be required to execute any expansion. He believes training space is obviously a critical factor in this process, but feels it would be premature to speculate about land acquisition until TRADOC determines the kinds of units and type of training these units require at the JRTC (Laporte 2004).

Meeting the Future Force Requirements

The next set of subordinate questions examined the training support required by the JRTC for the Future Force BCTs. Specifically, these questions looked at what type of rotations should the JRTC be prepared to provide for rotational units and what other type of training, such as LFXs and STX lane training, should the JRTC expect to be able to offer. Again the responses were mixed, but most of the CTC commanders felt the JRTC
should continue to provide MRE rotations for units deploying to real-world operations while maintaining a capability to provide for more conventional rotations for units not deploying. Each of the CTC commanders felt the JRTC should provide LFXs for rotational units and most believed, at least in the near term, the JRTC should maintain the capability to provide STX lane training for the Future Force BCTs.

**Types of Rotations**

BG Bednarek stated “the JRTC can do it all” was the easy answer. However, he was clear in asserting the bigger point is the CTCs need to be adaptable and flexible enough to provide a quality-training event for any joint formation that comes through, regardless of the type of rotation. He believes the Army CTCs must be able to stress any unit and provide training for whatever they require. This is what both the JRTC and the NTC have done in the past and both will clearly be expected to do in the future (Bednarek 2004). BG Terry asserted the type of rotation does not matter as long as it meets the unit’s training needs. He believes the JRTC’s most important function is to provide leader development for the leaders within the rotational unit, from BCT Commander down to the junior leaders (Terry 2004).

MG Thurman feels strongly the JRTC must continue to focus on a balanced approach to HIC and SOSO scenarios, and to rely too heavily on one or the other would be a disservice to the Future Force tactical leaders and Soldiers. Because the Future Force BCTs must be able to perform across the full spectrum of conflict, their success in combat requires them to be well practiced and disciplined in their war-fighting capabilities. MG Thurman referred to former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak often-quoted article about the “strategic corporal and the three-block war”
when stressing the Future Force BCTs must be trained to quickly adapt from HIC to SOSO in an incredibly short continuum of space and time (Thurman 2004).

LTG Wallace believes the JRTC, as well as the other CTCs, needs to come to grips with the notion that preparing a unit for an MRE is different than the obligation to train a unit for general-purpose warfare. In his mind, this means the JRTC must be sufficiently flexible to conduct an exercise like those the JRTC has been supporting for years, but also be able to adjust to the training requirements of the unit to do a certain amount of STX-type training, all within the context of a normal rotation. He believes this is a different way from what has been done previously (Wallace 2004).

**Live-Fire Exercise Training**

Each of the CTC commanders believed the JRTC LFX capability is one that must be sustained for the Future Force BCTs. BG Bednarek believes LFX training is an important training opportunity at the JRTC and one, which cannot be replicated by most of the training units and many installations and he feels they should clearly remain an available training event at all the CTCs. The JRTC has several LFX-unique capabilities that have been improved over time to provide a very realistic training environment for units. Not only is the realism of the LFXs unique, but also the JRTC has the ability to provide “throughput” at a rate that cannot be done elsewhere. By employing time-proven standards and the experience of multiple iterations, the JRTC LFX division personnel execute safe, realistic LFXs (Bednarek 2004).

BG Terry assessed the LFX capability must stay at the JRTC as he believes they are the most realistic in the Army and much better than can be executed by units during home-station training. He believes another important factor that makes the JRTC LFXs
important, along with the OC feedback and the safety mechanism, is the ability to provide realistic battlefield effects (Terry 2004).

BG West and BG Joseph Martz, both former NTC COGs, believe realistic LFX training is a necessary component of the CTC Program. BG West stressed quality LFX maneuver training is the key to learning combat safety and minimizing risk to the forces by friendly fire (West 2004). BG Martz stressed CTC LFXs are important because battlefield effects are a significant part of the battlespace that only LFX training can closely replicate (Martz 2005).

MG Thurman believes LFX training is an integral part of the CTCs and a capability that should be preserved. MG Thurman stressed the JRTC should continue to train units collectively in LFX conditions due to constraints that many of these same units are imposed with during home-station LFX training (Thurman 2004).

LTG Wallace shares the view that LFXs are an important JRTC capability that must be kept, but believes the LFXs should focus on company and smaller units. He stated the JRTC approach to LFXs, focusing on the small-unit level, should be sustained and should be the direction for the other CTCs. But he also feels the JRTC needs to find a way to do it for virtually all of the small units participating in the rotation. Because the JRTC has traditionally only provided LFX training for a sampling of units, many leaders and Soldiers in the training unit never get a LFX opportunity. This is an area LTG Wallace would like to see changed. He feels LFX training is even more important when the unit is conducting an MRE. As stated by others, LTG Wallace said the difference in CTC LFXs is they provide the experienced mentoring, expertise, and battlefield complexities that cannot be achieved through home-station training. He also offered the
BLUFOR units might be able to conduct improved home-station LFX training if it is part of the exportable CTC concept (Wallace 2004).

**Situational Training Exercise Lane Training**

Reaction to STX lane training at the CTCs was mixed. BG Bednarek offered the JRTC does have this capability and probably executes STX training better than the rest of the Army. He felt the experience, structure, and facilities in the form of the JRTC’s role-play division, battlefield effects, AAR process, OPFOR, and OCs allowed for the JRTC to provide unparalleled STX lane-training events. He believes the JRTC has probably become a victim of its own success in this regard. However, he feels it is important to point out STX lane training is clearly not the strength of the JRTC or a capability that should overshadow the BLUFOR unit’s force-on-force training. He believes the true strength of the JRTC is its ability to provide a realistic, force-on-force training environment when units go out into the “Box” on D-Day (Bednarek 2004).

BG Terry, with extensive experience at conducting STX lanes from a BLUFOR and JRTC perspective, believes it should be continued at the JRTC for the short term. Until units have the time to fix the home-station training, which he believes is especially hard to provide while units are undergoing a significant transformation, he believes the JRTC should continue to provide STX training (Terry 2004). MG Thurman feels the JRTC should not focus its efforts on STX lane training and thinks this should be left for commanders as a part of their home-station training. However, he believes the division commanders should have the flexibility, if they deem it necessary, to conduct STX lane training as a part of the CTC rotation (Thurman 2004).
LTG Wallace supports STX lane training at the JRTC and feels strongly it is a current necessity for BLUFOR units. His thoughts are a reflection of what he has seen from unit commanders that are deploying to the CTCs and demanding STX lanes to be part of the training. Like BG Terry alluded to above, he thinks units cannot conduct the quality home-station training they would like because they are too busy reforming into modular organizations. Again like BG Terry, he believes this may be a temporary need that will not be utilized once units have completed transformation. Another point LTG Wallace made is the complexity of the current battlefield is much better represented at the JRTC than it is in home-station training. With the JRTC’s capability to offer hundreds of COBs, IED replication, and the numerous other battlefield intricacies supported by OCs, he believes STX lanes are becoming more and more a mainstream CTC requirement (Wallace 2004).

BG West had a differing view on the use of the JRTC to provide STX lane training for the Future Force BCTs. He is of the opinion STX lane training at a CTC is a waste of the CTC capability and commanders should do it as a part of home-station training. Though he believes STX lane training is important and may be the best method to prepare units for complex missions, he does not feel it is the responsibility of any CTC, no matter how well they can provide the training. He feels all too often commanders at each level perceive it as the role of the CTC to train their units for them and he emphasized this is probably an abrogation of command responsibility in it worst form (West 2004).

BG Bednarek may have summed up the thoughts of most of the CTC commanders when he stated the JRTC has both STX lane and LFX capabilities in its kit
bag. He went on to say both of these training tools affect the cost of a rotation and the amount of time spent by the training unit at the JRTC and impacts the “throughput” capability of the JRTC. BG Bednarek believes this will be an increasingly larger concern for the Army as it transitions to forty-three or possibly forty-eight BCTs in the years ahead (Bednarek 2004).

**Combat Training Center Way-Ahead Conference**

In December 2004, the TRADOC’s CAC hosted a one-week CTC Way-Ahead Conference to coordinate a holistic CTC Program review in order to adjust the CTC pillars in order to mitigate program erosion and accommodate modular unit training. The CTC pillars are the training units, the CTC Operations Groups, the CTC OPFOR, the CTC facilities, and the CTC Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) (USA CAC 2004b, Notes).

LTG Wallace issued guidance for the each of the working groups. In summary, his guidance focused on the following: re-baseline the CTC Program to mitigate resource erosion and to accommodate modular Army training; ensure each issue is brought forward and discussed; use lessons learned from and be informed of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) transformation; take what information is given and frame the issues in more detail; consider combat experience as a potential, temporary solution to fill OC vacancies with a junior grade combat veteran; maneuver CTC Operations Groups should have a similar structure; identify requirements for supplemental funding; and prepare this data for a comprehensive CTC Program update for the CSA (USA CAC 2004b, Notes).
The conference members divided into four working groups. TRADOC led Working Group 1, and it focused on the training unit. TRADOC led Working Group 2, and it focused on the CTC Operations Group. FORSCOM led Working Group 3, and it focused on the CTC OPFOR. United States Army Europe (USAREUR) led Working Group 4, and it focused on TADSS and facilities for each of the CTCs. Each working group looked at the Army’s transformation and assessed the impact the transformation would have on its area of focus and the issues that would need to be resolved in order for the CTC Program to better train the Future Force BCTs. Though the results of the conference are currently pending or still under review, this conference demonstrated the CTC Program is taking prudent measures to ensure the Army CTCs are well prepared for the Future Force BCTs and the training they will require. Another key point of this conference is it focused on many of the same issues addressed in this thesis (USA CAC 2004b, Notes).

Summary

The JRTC will certainly play a key role in training the Future Force BCTs, as reaffirmed by each of the CTC commanders who contributed their ideas. How this role will be specifically defined is yet to be seen, but it will continue to transform internally to meet the challenges of a transformed Army. LTG Wallace offered his thoughts on what major changes he thought might be happening, though he was clear no decisions have been made, to the CTC Program. He believes there is a good possibility the CMTC would no longer serve as a CTC in its current configuration, but instead would become an OCONUS exportable training capability based out of Europe. LTG Wallace believes both the JRTC and the NTC will continue to be the primary CONUS CTCs and at least one
exportable training capability would evolve from them in some capacity. This would leave the Army with a throughput capability of four “dirt” CTCs—one OCONUS exportable, two CONUS fixed, and one CONUS exportable. He believes this is the “hand-writing on the wall” and will happen in a method similar to the way he described (Wallace 2004).

LTG Wallace thinks this is the direction the Army should take because resources are going down and requirements are going up, and this is a way to meet the emerging requirement. He stressed the US has the best trained Army in the world and much of that is due to the training revolution in the 1970s that launched the CTC Program. He is also concerned the US Army could lose the training edge it has over the rest of the world if the Army leadership is not careful in the way it allocates resources to support training. He strongly believes training superiority is more important than technical superiority and the Army needs to make whatever adjustments are necessary to fund it appropriately (Wallace 2004).

By incorporating the qualitative research technique of interviewing, this chapter provided the specific investigation required answering the primary and subordinate questions. In chapter 5, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” the researcher will provide conclusions and make recommendations for this study.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This isn’t your Daddy’s JRTC.

Introduction

This final chapter concludes the project by providing recommendations on the primary and subordinate questions that were analyzed in chapter 4, “Analysis.” Specifically, chapter 5 will make recommendations for changes the JRTC should undertake in regards to Operations Group manning, battlespace requirements, types of rotations, and other areas requiring adjustment. The following recommendations reflect the author’s belief an investment in the JRTC is one that will directly enhance the war-fighting capability of the Army’s combat formations.

The Primary Question

The JRTC will continue to have a considerable role in preparing the Army’s combat formations for their war-fighting tasks. The JRTC, while maintaining the capability, will slowly move away from being the Army’s premier CTC for light forces to become one of the multi-capable CTCs able to train brigade-size formations from across the services. But, the JRTC cannot train the Future Force in a vacuum. Both General Laporte and LTG Wallace made this point in chapter 4, “Analysis,” and it holds true for the JRTC as it confronts its requirements. As the Army makes some significant force structure changes as a part of its transformation, the senior Army leadership must make some hard decisions on the best way to train this force. As the executor of many of the CTC-related training tasks, the JRTC must have clear guidance, in the form of an Army Training Strategy, to understand its role and fulfill its obligations.
Senior Army leaders must identify their expectations for the JRTC so TRADOC and FORSCOM can properly resource it to execute its mission. These expectations must be in the form of training capabilities required, number and type (MRE versus conventional and level of live, virtual, and constructive) training missions to support, which units will be trained at the JRTC (Army BCTs versus other services), and what those training requirements will be based upon the Future Force BCTs’ structure, capabilities, and training needs. Once this requirement is directed, the JRTC can then analyze what it is able to support based upon its current capability and resources available. If there are shortfalls in meeting this requirement, the JRTC can identify the additional resources required so TRADOC and FORSCOM can either resource the requirement or pass the issue to the Army staff for decision. Just as GEN Laporte described, the Army staff can then decide to meet the requirement or reduce the training support required by the JRTC. Finally, the JRTC must have a realistic training budget to meet whatever requirements its higher headquarters directs.

The largest issue the Army senior leadership will have to address in describing its expectations for the JRTC has to do with CTC throughput. The CTCs are currently resourced, if conducting rotations continuously, to execute no more than thirty-two rotations in one year. Yet, the Future Force BCT requirement for CTC rotations will be forty-two rotations a year, leaving an annual shortfall of ten rotations. This capability deficit will potentially pose a tremendous challenge for the Army to provide collective training for the force. Figure 15 shows the current insufficient throughput capability of the maneuver CTCs. With the addition of twenty-nine added BCTs in the Future Force, something will have to change in order for the JRTC, and other CTCs, to provide a
collective and leader training opportunity for each unit. Ultimately, the senior military leadership must evaluate the prospect of adding a Joint Services Training Center (JSTC).

Figure 15. Current Capacity versus Requirements, 2 January 2005

Source: Senior Leaders Conference Brief “Sustaining Training Superiority” (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 26.

The only way to properly address the throughput problem is by adding an additional fixed CTC to CONUS. If the senior military leadership does not add the JSTC, as the author recommends, the Army must evaluate the prospect of internally adding an additional fixed CTC to CONUS. The added fixed CTC, if deemed necessary and cost feasible, should be specialized in UO, as suggested by GEN Laporte. By adding a UO-
specialized CTC, the Army would be able to better portray the UO threat to the Army’s BCTs and would add another unique CTC to its inventory.

The US military leadership may be better able to export the UO expertise that exists within the Army and the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense proponent for UO, and achieve the “jointness” it desires across the services by establishing the JSTC. This concept is similar to the original JNTC concept when the JNTC stood for the Joint National Training Center. The JSTC would not only leverage UO expertise across the services, but it would also alleviate the impending CTC throughput problem the Army currently faces and prevent the Army from having to create an additional maneuver CTC. The obvious setting of the JSTC would be with a UO focus and would require the facilities to support this concept. Each service would be required to provide support to the JSTC under the direction of the JFCOM, with the majority of the support probably coming from the Army and Marine Corps. Though there is a cost associated in establishing and operating a new CTC, this concept should be evaluated as a tool to support the long-term training objectives of the military.

The cost of adding a maneuver CTC would come as a tremendous expense to the Army and taxpayers. If the Army senior leadership is going to support the expansion of the Army structure from forty-eight to seventy-seven BCTs and maintain a training requirement that is consistent with what presently exists, additional CTCs will have to be considered as one course of action. However, if the senior leadership deems it is not feasible to add another fixed CTC, then it will have to decide what changes are necessary for CTC training rotations. If additional CTCs are not approved, there are at least three things the Army can do to meet the CTC training requirements of the Future Force.
First, the CTC rotations can be shorter. Instead of the 26-day footprint that a unit normally uses when deployed to the JRTC, this number can decrease to whatever is necessary to meet the throughput requirements of the Army. Second, CTC rotations can involve larger units, perhaps up to two BCTs at a time for one rotation. By increasing the amount of virtual and constructive training utilized during the rotation, the CTC rotations may be able to support larger organizations. The third technique that can be implemented is by making CTC rotations less frequent for units. For example, AC units may be restricted to going to a CTC at a maximum of once in a unit life-cycle and RC units may be restricted to only going once each six to eight years. However, not adding a CTC and increasing the usage of the current CTCs will have a detrimental effect on the current CTC installations in terms of wear on facilities, equipment, and land resources. This long-term negative impact, which would require study beyond the scope of this research to quantify, must be considered with whatever the Army senior level leaders decide.

If an additional maneuver CTC--either the JSTC or another Army CTC--is put into the inventory, the Army would no longer have the throughput problem it is currently faced with and the Future Force BCTs would be able to train at a CTC on a regular basis. This added capability would allow the military to provide the necessary collective and leader training exercise for the Future Force AC and RC units. AC units could expect to deploy to a CTC almost twice in its three-year life-cycle and an RC BCT could expect to deploy to a CTC about every three years. These numbers could be adjusted several ways, but the consistent theme is the CTCs would have a much better capability to provide CTC rotations for the Army’s combat formations.
In chapter 4, LTG Wallace identified a possible training strategy that describes how the Army can inject the CTCs within a unit’s life-cycle. These points were described in Figure 10 on page 45. While this strategy is largely appropriate in describing the JRTC’s role, a few modifications may better allow the JRTC to train the Future Force while enabling the combat formations to better train their units at home-station. This strategy is shown in Figure 16 and focuses solely on the AC units.

![Diagram of combat training center injections into future force life-cycle](image)

**Figure 16. Combat Training Center Injects Into Future Force Life-Cycle**

The JRTC, as well as the other CTCs, can inject itself four times in the life-cycle of an AC unit; unlike LTG Wallace’s five inject points. The biggest difference is the
MTTs are moved to much earlier in the training unit’s life-cycle, during its first year (reset period) and before its first CTC training event, and combine the MTTs with a LFX, STX, and BCBST capability. The focus of these MTTs would be to deploy a small package of Operations Group personnel (OCs and OPFOR) for a short period of time of up to two weeks and train the unit leadership on how to best train units on the current threat TTPs and techniques, LFX training, and STX lane training while providing the staffs with a BCBST training package. The unit leadership could then build upon this expertise and leverage the resources available at its home-station to train their own troops against the most current enemy practices. Not only would this better influence unit home-station training and arm the unit leaders with the expertise to train their troops, but it would allow the JRTC to focus a greater part of the rotations on force-on-force training and allow for greater throughput. Both STX lane training and LFX training will be discussed in more detail later in chapter 5.

The second inject point would be a CTC rotation early in the life-cycle of the unit. If the unit has been alerted to deploy, it will conduct an MRE at the JRTC. If it has not been alerted, it will conduct a standard JRTC rotation. The unit gets certified as proficient and goes back to home-station. If, after the first CTC rotation, the unit is alerted, it will then go back to the CTC for an MRE. This would be the CTC’s third inject. The training plan for the second rotation would be modified to meet the unit’s experience and training requirements.

Finally, the CTC’s fourth inject point would be called a Deployed Training Capability (DTC) as described by both LTG Wallace and BG Terry in their concept of deploying OCs forward in theater to provide feedback for units in contact. The CTC
would deploy a small OC element to observe combat formations as they operate in theater for a short duration of time and provide the necessary feedback to the unit through the use of formal AARs.

This training strategy, if adopted, would allow the JRTC, and other CTCs, to resource the training requirements of the Future Force BCTs and it would also better equip the unit leadership with the tools necessary to provide the required training at home-station. The JRTC, as well as the other CTCs, will surely play a significant role in training US military combat formations in the future. Based upon guidance from FORSCOM on the units it will train and guidance from TRADOC on the exact structure, capabilities, and training needs of the Future Force, the JRTC will do what it always has done. It will use the expertise of its Operations Group to develop a concept for coaching, teaching, and mentoring the BLUFOR Soldiers and leaders in a training environment that will improve the unit. However, if the senior level leadership of the Army does not develop a training strategy, the JRTC and other CTCs will continue to train the Future Force units in a react mode, with a limited budget and limited guidance.

Observer-Controller Structure

The Army senior level leadership must also make some hard decisions on the OC structure at the JRTC and other CTCs. The JRTC should make the necessary OC personnel changes to allow it to provide coverage to each of the Future Force BCT key leaders down to the Squad Leader level. This is a capability the JRTC has successfully employed since its development in 1987.

The future JRTC should continue to model its squad level OC structure so it is fully manned to support an SBCT. Because the SBCT has the greatest number of combat
units and requires the most in terms of raw numbers of OCs, the JRTC should model its OC structure to meet this requirement. Though the SBCTs only participate in a small number of the JRTC rotations, these modifications would assist the Army in at least five measurable ways—leader development, risk mitigation, MTT capability and DTC OC coverage, combined arms doctrine, and OC augmentation requirements.

The first reason for providing squad level OC coverage to the SBCTs has to do with leader development. The JRTC, like all of the CTCs, is a leadership development training exercise. As stated in chapter 1, the JRTC currently has the following mission.

The Joint Readiness Training Center provides highly realistic, stressful, joint and combined arms training across the full spectrum of current and future conflict. We provide doctrinally based feedback and observations to rotational units, the Army as a whole, and the joint community in order to develop competent, adaptive leaders and improve unit readiness. (Smart 2004b)

This description demonstrates the JRTC is tasked with developing competent, adaptive leaders. If leader development is truly a JRTC responsibility, then the leader development should incorporate the lowest level leaders—the team, section, and squad leaders. Lessons learned from OIF emphasize over and over the battles of Iraq are being fought at the squad and platoon level, requiring leaders of these small units to be agile enough to make timely decisions in an ambiguous environment. If these leaders are the ones making hard decisions in combat, they should also receive the training feedback that is allotted to the company and field grade NCOs and officers. Furthermore, leader development at the lowest level is imperative to ensuring future senior leaders of the Army’s formations are equipped early in their career to lead larger organizations later on.

The second, and maybe the nonnegotiable, reason the JRTC should be manned to provide squad level OC coverage is for risk mitigation. The JRTC battlespace is almost
entirely what can be considered complex battlespace. Whether in one of the
approximately 20 villages and small towns that are scattered throughout Fort Polk or in
the wooded areas and multiple streams that cover the landscape, the ability of an OC to
control an exercise requires a physical presence. Other than the two major drop zones and
two multi-purpose gunnery ranges on Fort Polk, the line of sight capability across the
training area is usually less than 300 meters and much less in most cases.

Given this geographic backdrop, the nature of the JRTC training exercises makes
it imperative to man the OCs down to the squad level. There is no more complex training
exercise than one that requires light and heavy force integration, at night, in complex
terrain. This is exactly the type of event the JRTC conducts many times throughout the
duration of a rotation. It is physically impossible for one OC to provide coverage to a
platoon of individuals operating in this environment. Not only can one OC not provide
feedback to what happened on the battlefield, he is unable to instill the necessary control
measures that are frequently applied to all platoons during each rotation. Furthermore, the
squads within a platoon often operate independently from one another, intensifying the
need for squad level OCs. As long as the term OC stands for observer-controller, the OCs
must be allowed the opportunity to accomplish their responsibilities and “control” the
exercise.

The third measurable way that providing squad level OC manning to support an
SBCT is the fact this would allow the JRTC the ability to support an Army Training
Strategy of deploying small numbers of OCs to conduct home-station MTTs and to
provide DTC OC coverage to deployed units. By having a robust OC structure, the JRTC
can better support the Army by having the ability to conduct a rotation at the JRTC while simultaneously supporting MTTs and/or DTC OC coverage.

The fourth measurable way this would benefit the Army is the JRTC would be better able to provide focused assistance to TRADOC’s Combined Arms Doctrine Division by providing feedback for combined arms doctrine at the BCT level and below. The JRTC, as well as the other CTCs, already support this requirement. However, this assistance currently does not efficiently leverage the doctrinal expertise housed within the JRTC. For example, the JRTC OCs who are primarily responsible for providing OC coverage to units deployed to Fort Polk also receive taskings from the JRTC Operations Group Operations Section to provide written feedback on current doctrine. Because an OC has a primary responsibility requiring a great deal of energy and time, the tasking to provide doctrinal feedback rarely gets the mental vigor it deserves. The author has witnessed this first hand and believes the JRTC could better support this requirement if its OC structure was more robust to handle this requirement.

The fifth way this would benefit the Army is it would greatly alleviate the OC augmentation requirements the JRTC rotations have frequently imposed on the rest of the Army. FORSCOM units would no longer be responsible for taking up to 250 unit leaders away from their Soldiers and sending them to JRTC for rotational support.

In order to support the need for squad level OC coverage, the JRTC Operations Group will probably be required to change the method it uses to select and man its OC structure. A large percentage of the positions at the JRTC currently call for the OC to be Ranger School-qualified. This is especially true for the infantry positions. Because there is a limited amount of these Soldiers in the Army, the JRTC should change its OC
selection criteria from accepting only Ranger School-qualified OCs to include more qualified leaders such as combat veterans. Because OCs come from line units as part of a normal PCS move and all of the Army’s major units have been deployed to combat operations recently, the ability to get combat experienced OCs to fill the JRTC structure would be much easier than the present situation. Of course, the requirement for combat veterans at the JRTC would be a short-term solution since the current tempo of the Army and its operational deployments may slow down in the future.

If the JRTC is intended to provide for what could be termed a capstone exercise for the training unit and its leaders, then OC coverage should reflect this initiative and focus on all the leadership of the Future Force BCTs. All leaders are vital on the contemporary battlefield that the Army is conducting operations. In the US Army of the 1990s and prior, expert opinion and Army doctrine stated squad and platoon leader decisions impacted solely tactical level operations. Yet, the battles of Iraq and Afghanistan have validated the idea squad and platoon level actions are increasingly impacting the operational and strategic levels of war. Arguably, these junior level leaders deserve the most in terms of doctrinal and expertise feedback by the OCs because they are the least experienced Soldiers. Though there is a cost associated with continuing to man the JRTC to this level, the second and third order effects of training the junior leaders of today and future leaders of the Army are immeasurable and one the senior leadership should support.

**Opposing Force Manning**

The JRTC OPFOR must be capable of portraying a realistic range of adversarial threats present in the COE and into the foreseeable future. To do this, the JRTC OPFOR
cannot be a deployable unit and must be a full-time, standing force capable of providing the necessary threat against any of the Future Force BCTs using a wide range of scenarios. Furthermore, this OPFOR unit should not have to habitually rely on external units for augmentation.

The JRTC OPFOR, just like the other CTC OPFOR units, has always portrayed a tough adversary for BLUFOR units because the Soldiers became experts in the doctrine and TTPs of the foe they represented. This expertise is something developed over time through a system of indoctrination, training, and repeated battles against the BLUFOR. Each Soldier entering the OPFOR had to learn his role and the doctrine and TTPs that best supported it. In order to ensure OPFOR Soldiers could still meet the readiness requirements of other MTOE Army units, they also had the additional responsibility of maintaining their normal deployability requirements including weapons qualification and other individual and collective training requirements.

Although the OPFOR is comprised of US Army Soldiers who come from BLUFOR units and are destined to return to BLUFOR units, there is always an expertise in the unit that is passed down from the senior members of the unit to the newer members. If this capability is to be maintained within the OPFOR and if the expectation, alluded to by BG Bednarek, the OPFOR stays a hallmark of the CTCs, then the unit cannot be deployable. The Army cannot simply deploy the JRTC OPFOR to war and replace it with “a pickup team” and expect the same results.

The argument for a standing OPFOR may lead the reader to draw some other conclusions on the feasibility of doing this. First, the OPFOR is like any other Army unit in that it is comprised of Soldiers who conduct a permanent change of station (PCS)
move from another unit. Therefore, the OPFOR can and will inject plenty of combat experience within its ranks just through the normal process of PCS moves from other units. Second, one may believe the CTC OPFOR units may be able to be shared among the CTCs with all the OPFOR being permanently stationed at one location. In fact, this is probably not feasible due to the fact each CTC frequently conducts rotations simultaneously and this requirement will only worsen as the Army expands to seventy-seven AC and RC BCTs. The additional BCTs in the Army and increased rotational requirements would make it even more necessary than in the past of having a permanently stationed OPFOR at each of the CTCs.

**Exportable Training Capability**

The Army may well need an exportable training capability to alleviate some of the throughput problems of a 77-BCT (AC and RC) Future Force structure. However, this is an issue much larger than the JRTC and one the Army senior leadership must decide in conjunction with critical decisions made by the senior leadership of the military. If the JRTC is selected to provide an exportable capability and it is determined the JRTC is to provide the same level of support currently used to support a Fort Polk rotation, the resources allocated to support this capability must be above and beyond its current capacity. Adding an exportable capability would not satisfactorily attend to the CTC throughput issue. The CTC throughput issue can only be addressed by adding an additional maneuver CTC and the optimal solution would be the JSTC. However, if the Army senior leaders believe an exportable capability is necessary, this capability should become the CMTC core mission. With the downsizing of the forward deployed units in
Europe—the core of the CMTC’s client units—the CMTC would better serve the Army as an exportable capability.

**Unit Relocation**

The JRTC should not relocate from Fort Polk. Fort Polk has the infrastructure and capabilities to provide the contiguous and noncontiguous battlespace required to train any of the Future Force BCTs. Relocating the tenant units on Fort Polk, as well as any other units, is a decision best left to the BRAC. However, it may be in the best interest of the Army to relocate the 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division to the home of its UEx headquarters at Fort Drum, New York and replace it with another brigade-sized unit that has less field training requirements. For example, another combat support or combat service support unit in the Army such as the Fort Polk’s Warrior Brigade may be better suited at Fort Polk. It could have the flexibility to train on the margins of the CTC rotations while still rely on the installation’s resources to provide for its other requirements.

**Acquiring Land**

Acquiring more land in the Fort Polk area is not a short-term solution to any of the JRTC’s issues. However, any contiguous or noncontiguous battlespace that can be added at Fort Polk would better help alleviate the strain of supporting a rotation against the installation’s requirements as a force projection platform and the Fort Polk tenant units’ training needs. Adding battlespace that is not physically connected to the current Fort Polk training area would also allow for the JRTC to further leverage the noncontiguous training opportunities prevalent with the COE. Constructive and virtual linkages have been invaluable in helping to expand the JRTC battlespace (most notably
with the JNTC rotations), but there may still be a requirement for the JRTC to add to its physical space to support live training. Because of this possible requirement, the Fort Polk installation should conduct a low-cost study of the possibilities of adding more maneuver space as a long-term solution.

The JRTC and Fort Polk consists of approximately 100,000 acres in west-central Louisiana. Of this, almost 98,000 acres is within the Kisatchie National Forest and is used by Fort Polk in a temporary agreement with the US Forestry Service. During a typical training rotation for a conventional force, the JRTC uses three primary training areas: the Fullerton Training Area, Peason Ridge Training Area, and the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) at Alexandria Airport. One avenue the JRTC and Fort Polk staff may want to explore is to gain approval for extensive maneuver training rights to even more of the Kisatchie National Forest in the west-central Louisiana region. To successfully make this a viable option may require the approval of the US Forestry Service, the State Legislature, and the local populace. While this would undoubtedly require much coordination, political support, and time, it would likely be more feasible than acquiring or purchasing land that would displace people from their private homes and land. Again, obtaining additional land in the west-central Louisiana area is certainly not a short-term fix, but it may be a long-term solution that would satisfactorily alleviate the installation’s problems in supporting each of its subordinate unit missions.

**Types of Rotations**

The JRTC has historically been able to conduct whatever type of rotation it has been tasked to support and there is no logical reason to believe this will change in the future. More importantly, there are three goals the JRTC should strive to meet when
developing the concept for a rotation and devising the plan to support it. Because the JRTC is an expert in achieving each of these goals, it should have no problem sustaining this capability in the future.

First, the JRTC should strive to replicate as closely as possible the operational environment the unit is expected to function in when developing the concept of the rotation. Whether this is the fictitious JRTC Cortinian environment of the 1990s or a real-world replication such as the Balkan or CENTCOM theater MREs of late, the JRTC Operations Group must strive to realistically portray the threat desired by the training unit. As long as the JRTC is tasked with being a training executor, as opposed to a training developer, the JRTC Operations Group will continue to have this task.

Second, the JRTC must maintain the flexibility to provide whatever training the Future Force BCTs require. To do this, the JRTC must ensure the type of rotation fits the unit’s needs and the rotation should strive to stress the systems within the training unit. By fitting the training to the unit’s needs and providing the impetus to stress the unit’s systems, the JRTC will be able to provide the quality training experience necessary for the BCT. This atmosphere is essential in allowing the unit to gather lessons learned and improve those processes that are required to become better.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the JRTC must ensure each rotation is a leader development exercise, from the lowest leader up to the BCT commander. By providing 24-hour a day one-on-one coaching and mentoring throughout the rotation, the JRTC can ensure each leader in the BCT has the opportunity to learn. Critical to this effort is the JRTC OCs must continue coverage to each of the unit’s leaders. This critical
component of leader development is a strong argument for the need to retain OC coverage down to the squad level.

**Live-Fire Exercise Training**

Clearly, the LFX is a keystone capability the CTC commanders believe should be sustained at the JRTC, as affirmed in chapter 4. While the author acknowledges LFX training is a crucial part of any unit’s training plan and the JRTC LFXs are among the best in the Army, he questions whether the LFX training is a critical CTC capability that must be sustained at its present level.

The purpose of developing a LFX capability at the JRTC in 1987 was two-fold. First, it was developed to provide a realistic LFX replication that home-stations could not equal. However, almost every major installation across the Army has a capability, in terms of technology, space, and ability to produce effects to develop realistic LFXs. Furthermore, each Army unit has large numbers of experienced Soldiers and leaders in executing the most dangerous LFX possible, against a live, determined enemy.

The second reason for developing a LFX capability at the JRTC was to use it as a forcing function to ensure BLUFOR units were conducting LFX training home-station. The JRTC LFXs were meant to gauge the unit’s capability by randomly selecting platoons and companies to conduct LFXs upon their arrival at the JRTC. Because units did not know which platoon or company would be conducting the JRTC LFX, senior leaders believed each unit would prepare equally for LFXs during home-station training. With these two reasons in mind, the JRTC should reduce its LFX capability to support only RC units and those AC units who deem it necessary due to the challenges of training
while undergoing transformation. As noted in chapter 4, many of the units going to the JRTC do not have the opportunity to conduct a LFX anyway.

The JRTC would make better use of the available training time during the rotation by devoting resources primarily to the force-on-force portion of the exercise and allowing the units to conduct LFXs at home-station. The JRTC must maintain this capability, but significantly reduce it to support only RC units and the AC units requiring it during the short-term transformation process. The JRTC can assist the training units, as alluded to earlier in this chapter, by sending an MTT to home-station and train the leaders how to develop realistic LFX training plans. These home-station leaders would be equipped with the technical knowledge to set up, execute, and AAR realistic LFXs without relying on the JRTC to provide the land to do it. It would also allow the AC units to come to the JRTC and focus purely on the collective training tasks to be executed as part of the rotation force-on-force portion. Finally, by significantly reducing the amount of time a unit requires for JRTC LFXs, the JRTC can then help the Army by increasing its throughput capability.

Situational Training Exercise Lane Training

The JRTC should maintain this capability as it has served the Army well for the past ten years in preparing units for follow on operations in the Balkans and the Middle East, but should limit its execution to only units that must have this training. As the Army undergoes its transformation, most units will still require STX lane training. However, the division commanders, in conjunction with FORSCOM and CTC planners, must keep a close eye on MREs that are no longer needed or when they become “training that is just
nice to have.” Unit commanders’ training objectives can go a long way in focusing both home-station and JRTC efforts.

As the discussion above suggests, STX training is combined with the other training events at the JRTC to have a direct impact on the throughput capability of the CTC. There are a couple of primary reasons to limit STX training at the JRTC. First and foremost, STX training is doctrinally a unit commander responsibility and is the most basic collective Army training which exists. The fact the JRTC is better able to conduct the STX lanes does not make a good reason to conduct them at the JRTC. Secondly, many of the advantages associated with the JRTC STX lanes--civilian role players and foreign language speakers--drive the cost of the rotation up significantly. This is because STX lanes require supporting civilian personnel to be present for up to double the time required for the force-on-force portion of the rotation.

The JRTC should maintain the STX lane capability, but temper it against cost and other training needs and provide it only for RC units and those AC units undergoing transformation and deem it necessary. Like LFXs, the JRTC can assist the training units by sending an MTT early in the unit’s life-cycle to train the units how to set up, execute, and AAR realistic STX lanes without relying on the JRTC to provide the full complement of land and personnel. This would allow the AC units to come to the JRTC and focus on the collective training tasks to be executed as part of the rotation’s force-on-force portion. This would also help the JRTC to increase its throughput capability.

Other Recommendations

There are other recommendations, not specifically tied to any of the primary or subordinate questions, which are significant to the future role of the JRTC. First, as BG
Bednarek stated in his interview, the JRTC needs to expand its capability to provide COBs—in the form of interagency personnel, contractors, foreign language speakers, and others—to better replicate the contemporary threat associated in current operations. To do this, senior leaders of the Army must address this issue for each of the CTCs and determine the proper mix the Army is willing to fund. If the senior leadership of the Army deems this requirement is not essential when compared to the cost of supporting this expansion, it can make that decision. However, COBs at some level should be present on the battlefield if the JRTC is to be expected to closely replicate the COE.

Secondly, the Army leadership must leverage JFCOM to ensure an equitable amount of support and resources are provided from each of the Services for the JNTC. As the JNTC concept grows, it is apparent the JRTC will continue to comprise a major role in supporting this JFCOM-led program. The JRTC currently plans on setting aside at least two rotations each fiscal year to support a JNTC rotation. As these JNTC rotations mature and increased level of live forces are used from other Services, the JRTC should receive a proportionately similar amount of resources, in terms manpower and equipment augmentation, to provide the joint units with the expertise and mentoring Army units are accustomed to receiving. For example, if a Marine battalion comes to the JRTC to train as part of a JNTC rotation, then JFCOM must ensure the Marine Corps provide OC augmentation in support of the training event.

Thirdly, the JRTC is obligated to determine what its Operations Group requires to provide for a headquarters in support of a rotation. Traditionally, the JRTC has role played a division headquarters (the notional 21st Infantry Division) in support of rotations. As the UEx concept develops, the JRTC may need to adjust its manning to
properly man a UEx or Joint Task Force Headquarters that replicates the Army’s doctrinal command and control functions. The JRTC Operations Group has been evolving to meet the challenges of the transforming Army structure and further change may be required in terms of personnel and equipment means to resource this requirement. If the JRTC has a shortfall in capability, they can then pass this requirement back to FORSCOM and TRADOC for resourcing. If these organizations cannot meet the potential capability deficit, the issue can then be sent to the Army staff for decision.

Finally, the senior leaders of the Army must come to grips with CTC funding and ensure the JRTC can pay for what it is tasked to execute. While the JRTC is operating on a budget that supports ten rotations of two-maneuver battalions, it is being tasked to support units at a level well above this baseline. As stated by BG Bednarek, the GWOT is not a reliable future funding source to compensate for the difference in cost. The senior Army leaders should either reduce the tasking to something close to the baseline-funding amount, increase the budget, or transform the JRTC (and the entire CTC Program) training to critical specified training tasks.

The Joint Readiness Training Center as Part of the CTC Program

The JRTC is closely linked to the rest of the CTCs. Though each individual CTC has its own unique capabilities and history, each is also tasked to perform the same service to the Army’s combat formations. To sustain coordinated growth across the entire CTC Program, the CTCs must maintain their regularly scheduled series of conferences and leader meetings to ensure each of the CTCs are on the right glide path. By discussing emerging requirements and ways to mitigate the issues and costs across the program, the
use of working groups and other methods have proven to assist each of the CTCs. This will be an essential element in helping each of the CTCs prepare for the Future Force.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this study was to provoke a discussion on how the JRTC can assist the US Army in training the war-fighting units of the Future Force as the Army transitions to meet the threats of the COE. As the current security environment changes, the Army is transforming to meet these new challenges. As the Army moves forward to the Future Force, changes to Army training are necessary. The JRTC, as each of the CTCs, is a tremendously effective and essential institution for providing a quality collective training event and developing leaders from brigade-level down to the most junior team leaders in the BCT. As the Army transforms to seventy-seven AC and RC Future Force BCTs, the JRTC must adjust to provide these units with the necessary collective and leader training required in both the COE and FOE.

The recommendations listed in chapter 5 all point to a way the JRTC can move forward to train the Future Force. Most of these recommendations will not be easily implemented, due to the difficult senior leader decisions required and costs involved. However, failure to recognize and adapt to the issues pointed out in this study will cause the JRTC, as well as the entire CTC Program, to lose effectiveness in training the Army and joint formations and the leaders and Soldiers who fill their ranks. This would have a negative impact on the collective and leader training of the Future Force and the Army’s collective ability to “See First, Understand First, Act First, and Win Decisively” on the tactical level.
APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

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<td>3 personnel served in two different positions</td>
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<td>Total number of CTC CGs/COGs that provided feedback to the questionnaire via interview or email messages</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 conducted interviews; 7 provided email messages</td>
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