TO DEFEND THE ATLANTIC HOME

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**Report Documentation Page**

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**Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)**
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In 1989 and 1990 we have witnessed events which promise to change our basic assumptions about our security relationships. We have seen revolutions in Eastern Europe, the unstoppable march toward German reunification, and the general discrediting of Communism as a viable political and economic system. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our policy of containment has been successful and the West has prevailed. Some academics have gone so far as to declare "the end of history," the ultimate triumph of liberal western democracy.¹

If all this is true, then it is easy to make a case that U.S. armed forces should come home from Europe. Perhaps NATO has outlived its usefulness and is no longer needed. Even before the events of this year, the evidence was mounting that the alliance had become characterized by a European over-reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and U.S. over-extension.²

But a retreat from our involvement in Europe into a "fortress America" could be our worst possible reaction to the good news of the past year. We need to reflect on our own national interests and the interests of the Atlantic Community. My purpose in this paper is to examine NATO's future in light of the legitimate security interests of the member nations and the realities of the past year's events.

I will begin by questioning whether NATO really needs to change at all. I will argue that European reaction to the new world order will, by itself, put NATO in a must-change situation. It seems unlikely that Europeans will allow the United States to continue to
dominate the alliance if the threat of the Warsaw Pact is withdrawn.

At the same time, I will show that it is in Europe's interests for NATO to survive and prosper, just as it is in America's interests to be part of it. The way out of this apparent quandary is for the U.S. to step out of the leadership role sooner, rather than being forcibly ejected from it later. I will conclude that the primary obstacle to this evolution is NATO's nuclear policy, which must be changed.

The Soviet Union is hyping the concept of a "European Home," which naturally includes the Soviets but excludes the Americans. I would like to propose the concept of the "Atlantic Home," which can include us all. The heritage of the Americas is almost exclusively European; the close economic and political ties between North America and Western Europe reduce the Atlantic Ocean from the uncrossable barrier of seventy years ago to an inland bay today. Americans will benefit as dwellers in the Atlantic Home of the twenty-first century. However, if we insist on dominating it, we risk being on the outside of a European Home, looking in.

I will begin by providing a historical framework for my discussion.

HISTORY

NATO began as a stopgap measure to prevent the Soviet Union from overrunning Western Europe. After World War II, President Roosevelt wanted to believe that the Soviets were interested in peace and that America's occupying troops would remain for a couple of years to help restore order and then come home. This perception changed after
George Kennan wrote his famous telegram of February 1946, in which he shed light on the true nature of the Soviets' long term intentions. To pursue the resulting policy of containment, American troops stayed on, although the U.S. initially resisted the formation of NATO. Britain's Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was the spark in the creation. Militarily, the alliance was weak from the start, since the Western European democracies had demobilized at the end of the war. In fact, this weakness against a considerable Soviet threat was the stimulus for NATO's creation.

The NATO nations lacked the political will to field sufficient conventional forces to contain Soviet expansion, so the ultimate threat of the American strategic nuclear arsenal was called into play. This is a key point -- the requirement for a nuclear deterrent in Europe springs from conventional insufficiency. The Europeans have accepted the shadow of American nuclear weapons cast across their nations because that has been easier than finding the resources to build a credible conventional force.

This arrangement was awkward, at best, because it proclaimed that a successful conventional attack on Western Europe would be met by strategic nuclear weapons. The dilemma posed by this strategy was inherent in the geographic separation of the U.S. and Western Europe. Was it believable that the United States would start a nuclear war if American territory was not under attack? The strength of our deterrent rested on the belief that a "nuclear knot" held the alliance together at the national survival level, tying the partners to a mutual suicide pact. This strategy's success hinged on the credibility of the U.S. threat to the Soviets and its believability.
to the Europeans. As long as the U.S. maintained strategic nuclear superiority, the former condition was probably met, but from the beginning many Europeans doubted the U.S. would initiate a nuclear conflagration over somebody else's territory.

As the Soviets approached nuclear parity in the '60s, the U.S. and some allies became uncomfortable with a policy that seemed to guarantee all-out nuclear war if the Warsaw Pact were to attack. To resolve this discomfort, NATO adopted the current doctrine of flexible response in 1967 and it is maintained as of this writing. Theoretically, this doctrine provides the alliance (and the U.S. national command authorities) with a range of options below the level of the strategic exchange. More robust conventional forces can respond to a conventional attack, and theater nuclear forces can respond at the theater level if conventional forces fail. Whether or not this use of tactical nuclear weapons can be kept from escalating to an all-out strategic exchange has been debated. But the strategy succeeds because Europeans (and, apparently, the Soviets) see nuclear escalation linking the fate of Chicago to that of Munich, since the argument could be made that tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have lowered the threshold of nuclear use and make the escalation to strategic use more likely, not less. The Europeans see this as their insurance; this is why they asked us to deploy tactical nuclear weapons and this is why we deployed them.

The lesson to glean from this brief historical sketch is that NATO's strategy of flexible response evolved because of the inability (and/or unwillingness) of the alliance to field sufficient conventional forces to defeat a Soviet attack. The U.S. adopted
flexible response because it gives planners options below the strategic nuclear level; the Europeans have favored it because the potential for escalation makes the U.S. nuclear deterrent even more credible in the face of an overwhelming Soviet threat. The nuclear issue is critical to this discussion and I will return to it later.

WHY CHANGE NATO'S STRUCTURE OR STRATEGY AT ALL?

NATO's strategy of flexible response certainly seems to be successful. The member nations appear to be working in a spirit of cooperation, enjoying the challenges of managing Europe's new peace. On the surface, it would be easy to conclude that nothing is broken and no fixing is required. Why propose changing NATO?

NATO in its present form is dominated by the United States. There is evidence that many Europeans might stop tolerating this situation, with the result that NATO could crumble from within. This unhinging could be prompted by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from much of Eastern Europe, political sensitivities to a unified Germany, and/or the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance. All of these catalytic events are underway today.

What has held NATO together for these many years? The members haven't always agreed and controversy has been the norm. For example, the European nations did not take the steps we requested when our hostages were taken in Iran . . . when martial law was declared in Poland . . . when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan . . . our tactics over the Soviet gas pipeline were heavy-handed and contrary to Europeans' perceived interests. When we invaded Grenada, we met public opposition from West Germany, Great Britain and France.
We disagreed over the Middle-East and other out-of-theater areas. And the raging debate over burden sharing has left many of the allies feeling stung by our criticisms. Another factor is the U.S. domination of key command positions (SACEUR and SACLANT), which began causing concern to some Europeans as early as 1960.

But one thing has held the alliance together through many a crisis and disagreement: the threat of the Warsaw Pact. As the threat fades away and the perceived need for NATO declines, will these disagreements continue to be overshadowed by the greater good of the alliance? Let us look at the evidence.

Even before the events of the past year, it was apparent to many observers of the European scene that "...the transatlantic relationship in its present form is undergoing a gradual but palpable, predictable, and potentially disastrous deterioration." Why? I believe there are two reasons. First, Europe has matured since the end of World War II. When the alliance was founded, Europe was a postwar disaster, unable to defend herself, and in economic ruin. Europeans desperately needed a protector and were willing to defer to American policies to get it. Things are different now. The European economies are among the most powerful in the world and the prospects of European Community 1992 look even brighter. More and more, the U.S. domination of NATO looks like an anachronism -- like a parent unwilling to let a grown child leave home.

The second factor is that of conflicting national interests. For the last forty years it has been in the best interests of the NATO nations to have the protection and leadership of the United States. Perceptions of those national interests are changing.
Europeans are recognizing that the United States' view of the interests of the alliance is different from that of the Europeans'. This is nothing new. But since the past willingness of Europeans to defer to American preferences was based on political, economic and military weakness, why would the deference continue if the weakness goes away?

A study by Dr. Steve Szabo shows that the postwar generations of Europeans have a strong desire for European independence from both superpowers. This desire is kindled by their skepticism concerning the use of military force to resolve disputes and lesser deference to authority. Szabo warns that, particularly in Germany and Italy, the postwar idealization of the American model is in danger of giving way to a newer Europeanized model. Of course the greatest danger to American interests is the threat of overreaction to the realization that Americans do not have all of the answers, particularly in Germany. His conclusion is that rejection of America as a model could turn into rejection of the United States as an ally.

If the Soviet threat continues to recede in the minds of Western Europeans, I submit that the glue holding NATO together will crumble and the attitudes uncovered by Dr. Szabo's study will come to the fore. I would argue, in this scenario, that an American-dominated NATO will lose support and we will be invited to leave. The European Community will then develop its own alternative security arrangement under EC 92, or no security arrangement at all. Like the grown child, Europe is ready to strike out on her own and the American domination of NATO is an obstacle that must be overcome if NATO is to survive.
IS THIS THE END OF HISTORY?

An argument that is being heard these days is "why NATO at all?" Should the United States be concerned, in light of the diminishing threat, if NATO is disbanded? There are always political and economic forces at work in democracies that want to reduce defense expenditures in favor of social programs. Therefore, any improvement in the international climate has the effect of encouraging these forces and weakening the ties that hold security alliances together.15

In Francis Fukuyama's widely-quoted paper, Have We Reached the End of History?, he argues that we are witnessing the final triumph of western liberal democracy. However, most people who quote this paper do not realize that he is discussing a long-term socio-political process that was first identified by the German philosopher Georg Hegel following Napoleon's victory at Jena. This victory symbolized the triumphs of the ideals of the French Revolution. Ironically, Hegel's ideas were borrowed by Karl Marx to support his theories of the final victory of communism.16 This year's events in Europe and the U.S.S.R. might be milestones in the march toward world democracy -- as were the Magna Carta, the French Revolution, and our Declaration of Independence. But I would argue that they are not the final step and the euphoria sweeping the western world today could be premature.

The argument for dissolution continues: if the Soviets abandon Communism, and the Warsaw Pact dissolves, there is no threat. This
is a highly desirable situation -- If only there were a guarantee! But there is none. As a matter of fact, there is historical and political evidence that Europe's future will continue to be filled with turmoil. Therefore, we need to do whatever is necessary to preserve the alliance.

Evidence of potential turmoil is suggested by even a cursory reading of history. Indeed, most historians cringe when they hear the talk of ultimate peace in Europe. A similar euphoria swept Europe in the early nineteenth century -- the "triumph of democracy which would make wars impossible." The peace-loving people beat their swords into plowshares. Unfortunately, a few short decades later, they were plowing for the other nations who had kept their swords.

We can find cases of misplaced euphoria in our own century. World War I was billed as the "War to End All Wars." More recently, Nikita Kruschev's reforms in the '60s resulted in a survival crisis for NATO due to the perception that the threat had become benign. J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, said in 1965:

It is quite evident that the Soviet system . . . is now caught up in a series of extremely difficult theoretical and practical economic problems . . . Growth has in fact declined sharply. The result has been crisis within the leadership and bitter debate over ways to overcome the inherent inefficiencies of the traditional command economy centralized in Moscow . . . (The Soviet Union) is no longer a monolithic bloc.17

I do not mean to downplay the events of the past year -- they could well be the most significant of this century -- or of any century. But the similarity between this analysis from the 60s and the events of 1989 is startling. Furthermore, this so-called
"collapse" of the Soviet system in the 60s was followed by the massive military buildup of the Brezhnev years.

Eastern Europe can not go back now -- willingly. But it does not take a lot of imagination to envision ten or fifteen years of economic reform and recovery in the Soviet Union, combined with an influx of western technology, followed by an upsurge in Russian nationalism. The resulting state is potentially a powerful player on the world stage (especially if it is no longer weakened by the communist system). If there is any probability of this player having the traditional characteristics of historic Russia, the west needs dry powder and an intact alliance. Look again at the historical perspective:

Having come this far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen power will pause in its career?...The broken and undulating western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect of natural boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Danzig, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. ¹

The fact that Karl Marx made this statement in 1853 does not invalidate it, either as an observation on geopolitics or a description of Russian proclivities.

The tendency to mirror-image with regard to the Soviets is very strong. We want to believe that if the Soviets begin to turn toward democratic institutions and free markets, their entire view of the world and of history will change. That is a dangerous proposition, because they have continually demonstrated that they do not see the world the same way we do. While it is perfectly natural for us to think of nations working together in a spirit of peace and
cooperation, the only reason Russians have been "friendly" with other nations is in a military or political alliance of necessity. This principle was illustrated during a recent visit of the "60 Minutes" program to Moscow. Mike Wallace, in a flush of western-democratic exuberance, turned to Marshal Yazov, the Soviet Minister of Defense, and asked "wouldn't be nice if someday we could be allies?"

"Oh?" snorted Yazov in response... "against whom??" As George Kennan noted in his long telegram, there is a basic Russian instinct that "there can be no compromise with rival power..."

But perestroika is proceeding with enthusiastic support from all quarters. Ever-hopeful Americans believe that any nation trying to develop a free market economy will somehow turn its back on centuries of paranoia and develop a sense of international responsibility. We all hope there is truth in that, but recently discovered facts about perestroika have to give us pause. Five years before we ever heard the term from Gorbachev, it was used by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov.

When Soviet military planners are considering strategic options, they undertake a scientific analysis called a "correlation of forces." This analysis takes into account much more than traditional balances in troops and equipment. It calculates relative moral strength, political strength, and economic strength as well. Ogarkov's correlation of forces looked very bad for the future of the Soviet Union in the late 70s, not because of military vulnerabilities, but because of economic and political weaknesses. He called for "perestroika" of the Soviet military, and for a complete restructuring of "the entire economy [as well as] political,
societal, scientific, and other institutions." Unlikely as it might seem that the goals of the current restructuring are being set by the military, nevertheless, the stated goal of the Soviet military for perestroika is to "upgrade not only the material and technical foundation of the Army and Navy, but also the system of manning and training, as well as military art and science in general," so as "to boost performance by an order of magnitude." Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense, General V.M. Shubunov, stated on 23 February 1990 that "the main objective of Perestroika is the qualitative improvement of the Soviet armed forces." Again, I am not attempting to make dire predictions, I am merely pointing out uncertainties.

I agree with Fukuyama that the Soviets are at a fork in the road. They can join the West, or they can "realize their own uniqueness and remain stuck in history." The Soviets might not set out to rule the world in fifteen years, or ever . . . but just as we buy insurance against the unlikely eventuality of a house fire, we need to keep the successful NATO system and its machinery in place and viable.

EUROPE'S INTEREST IN NATO

It is not my intent to build a case for the future of NATO based solely on the Soviet threat -- I do not need to. NATO makes its own case, since its existence has helped produce the longest period of peace, economic growth, and stability in Europe's history. A noted analyst of European matters concludes that "today, when the Soviet Union is going through its greatest period of change since the death of Lenin, NATO's purposes and its raison d'être of stability and
peace remain as valid as they were when the treaty was signed in parlous times four decades ago. The reasons for NATO's success have two dimensions: military and political.

History tells us that civilization cannot long tolerate a power vacuum. I would argue that we have had peace in Europe since 1945 because the standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has not allowed a power vacuum. If we take away that standoff, will we not see the old-time factionalism, rivalries and border disputes once again? NATO will have a critical role of peace-keeping and enforcement in this environment. A united European armed force can fill a power vacuum where individual nations could not. NATO will be in the business of deterring aggression across the spectrum of conflict -- not necessarily a major war with the Soviet Union.

In a recent newspaper article, an American Senator expressed astonishment that NATO was considered anything more than a military organization. He stated that "...it was established for purely military purposes. and as its military purpose diminishes, you have to question how NATO would function." One could make the same argument about the European Community: it was established 30 years ago as a small customs union and free trade zone, but it has become the political base for a unified Western Europe. In the same way, NATO has become the political base for the Atlantic community.

It didn't take long for NATO to become more than a simple military alliance. Within two years of its creation, evidence began to surface that this united group of democracies was bound together as much by the ideals of freedom and self determination as it was by military necessity. NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, noted in 1952 that "... within the Atlantic Community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace -- a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration." It could also be said that NATO was not the unifying force of the community, but a manifestation of it. In 1957, the Princeton Conference on NATO concluded that "... the Atlantic Community was not dependent solely upon the existence of a predatory, expansionist Soviet Union. The desire for unity among nations comprising the western world transcended any specific set of institutions embodying it, including indeed NATO." But any community of nations seeking unity needs a forum for ironing out differences, in both military and political spheres. The political body which has evolved in the North Atlantic Council has proven to be uniquely successful in resolving political crises, such as the Berlin blockade.

A benchmark in the evolution of the alliance was the Harmel Report in 1967. The authors of this report analyzed the role of NATO and its impact on the history of Europe. They were particularly interested in why this unusual period of cooperation between European nations was taking place. Their conclusion was that consultation had been the key to peace and NATO's European Council was the forum which made this possible. The report summarized the two purposes of the alliance:

1. Deterrence through military strength and political solidarity, and
2. Pursuit of the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be
The crux of these findings is the relationship between military strength and political solidarity. The report concludes:

Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is a necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the alliance constructively in the interest of detente.

The findings of the Harmel Report were unanimously adopted in December, 1967, reflecting acceptance by the member nations that the military security and political stability of the Atlantic Community were intertwined and inseparable.

**AMERICA'S INTEREST IN NATO**

Without question, the linkage between security agreements and political stability makes it in Europe's interest for NATO to continue. But how would one answer those who feel it is time to end American presence on the European continent?

How would the opposing position be argued? One can start with emotional statements about our European heritage and our traditional role as leaders of the free world. But there is more. NATO's forum for consultation and crisis management is just as important to us as it is to our allies. NATO is our primary vehicle for cooperation with Europe — whether we agree or disagree, the communication process is critical to our continued cooperation.

The most compelling evidence of our interests in European defense is historical. The survival of the free European nations has proven so important to Americans that twice in this century we have paid for it with the blood of our sons. However, following World War
I, we brought our forces home in an attempt to dissociate ourselves from "entangling alliances." The lessons we learned are worth repeating: you can't make long term decisions in Europe based on today's political situation, because in a few years it will all be different. Once we leave, the only thing that will get us back is war. We can leave NATO now, or we can stay and help prevent that war.

In another vein, the alliance serves to extend the area and resource base in which we can promote our national objectives. When we look at NATO as a vehicle for economic cooperation, its importance to us becomes clearer. With the economic union of the European Community planned for 1992, we need to think about our future relations with Europe as a trading block. Also, the "European Home" concept, possibly including newly revived Eastern European nations and even Russia, has to make us wonder to what extent we will be included. NATO is our invitation to dinner in the European Home, and it has to stay open.

**NATO'S SECURITY MISSION - IN EVERYONE'S INTERESTS**

The bottom line, however, remains security. Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General has been quoted as saying that "NATO's role is to keep America in, Russia out, and Germany down." Germany is going to be unified and it is hard to be critical of those who remember two world wars with some concern. Europe's "normal" animosities and border disputes have been bottled up for forty-five years and the lid is now being taken off.

Already we have seen ethnic violence in the Soviet republics,
riots between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, and less-than-reassuring guarantees by Germans regarding the Polish borders. Yugoslavia has the potential to collapse in anarchy at any time, leaving its neighbors to contend for the ethnic "pieces." Greece and Turkey have restrained their ancient animosities because of an overwhelming Soviet threat. The list goes on. To me, the real danger is a return to the historical patterns that have held since the renaissance: balance-of-power politics, with blocks of nations exerting influence over their neighbors through political, economic, and military coercion. The last forty-five years of peace have been an aberration in the context of European history. Nonetheless, in our short-sighted way, we tend to see them as the norm.

How can the Atlantic Alliance prevent this backsliding into historical turmoil?

1. The military forces of the alliance can be used, with the consensus of its members, to police those nations who might want to act upon their enduring territorial aspirations. This role, much like a U.N. peacekeeping mission, would require regular armed forces of sufficient size to bring significant combat power to bear, either against an aggressor or between warring nations. The easy mistake to make in the employment of "peacekeeping" forces, such as the deployment of the U.S. Marines to Beirut, is to provide a small, symbolic force which is inadequate to enforce a peaceful solution. The use of overwhelming combat power, such as in the U.S. effort in Panama, minimizes casualties and provides for the most rapid resolution of combat or crisis. The presence of such a force in Europe, characterized by joint training, doctrine, and leadership,
and empowered by a consensus of the member nations, will serve as a powerful deterrent to anti-social behavior. More importantly, should that deterrence fail, it will have the capability to bring conflict to a prompt conclusion.

2. Additionally, NATO forces could play a role, when invited, in maintaining internal stability of nations threatened by political or ethnic strife. NATO forces would not intercede unless invited or without a consensus of the members. Therefore, this function could not be successfully invoked by an illegitimate regime or conspiracy. While the NATO armed forces would be establishing and maintaining order, the political arm of the alliance would be working toward a long term solution.

3. Ultimately, NATO's political forum is the key to stability in the Atlantic region. Once a nation calls for help from the NATO armed forces, they have involved the NATO political structure as well. With this charter, the political arm could determine the root causes of the conflict, be it inter-nation or intra-nation. If the conflict resulted from human-rights issues in the treatment of a national minority, for example, NATO could strongly suggest a course of action to the nation involved and provide mediation between government and opposition leaders. Also, border disputes could be negotiated by NATO's political apparatus and the agreed-upon solution could be enforced by the military arm.

4. Finally, and most importantly, the standing forces of NATO will continue to serve as a deterrent to those from outside the alliance who would threaten the individual members. This force will, no doubt, be smaller than it is today, but it will provide the core
from which to build if significant threats emerge in the decades ahead. As long as the command structure, doctrine, and a nucleus of a viable fighting force exist, the frame can be fleshed out in time of increasing threat. Would either world war have begun if the nations involved, including the United States, stood together from the beginning in a mutual defense pact? I would say no.

Who will NATO deter? It is useful to remember that many of the war plans written in the United States in the 1930's were predicated on Great Britain being the adversary. If the events of the past few months haven't trained us to "think the unthinkable" then nothing will. In twenty years, could we be concerned with the military ambitions of Japan? Of a south Asian alliance? A resurgent Soviet Union? An Arab union? The world has never been short of threats!

HOW CAN WE INSURE NATO'S FUTURE?

The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that NATO is unlikely to survive in its present form, due to resistance to continued American domination of the alliance. But we have also seen that NATO will have a role in maintaining the stability of the Atlantic Community and that it is in both Europe's and America's interests for it to flourish. These interests are jeopardized, however, by those on both sides of the Atlantic who would eliminate NATO tomorrow.

This combination of factors mitigates toward our preempting those who would tear NATO down (on both sides of the Atlantic). It is time now to take the lead in changing NATO -- and America's role in NATO -- to insure the future viability of the alliance.
To accomplish this, I would argue that the alliance needs to be "Europeanized." In order to Europeanize, the U.S. needs to step down from the critical leadership positions; it is time to be a member rather than the boss. I will show that a necessary step in accomplishing this goal is the elimination of nuclear weapons from within the NATO command structure. There is only one way that can happen -- and that is for NATO's conventional forces to have sufficient strength to deter aggression without resorting to nuclear weapons. If this condition can't be met, the whole discussion becomes moot. Thus the first order question becomes: how much conventional force is enough?

We need to take a leaf from the Soviets' book and conduct a detailed correlation of forces calculus. Although we are getting better in the development of analytical tools for determining relative combat power, we are still very prone to count exclusively troops, tanks, and airplanes. This approach is bankrupt, because it does not consider such factors as mobilization and reinforcement potential, and force/space ratio. The latter becomes critically important as we reduce troops to the point that they become widely scattered along a defensive perimeter, tempting a potential adversary to mass forces on a selected axis and achieve a breakthrough. For this reason, our investment strategy needs to include those tactical systems that provide a fusion of reconnaissance, command and control, and accurate day/night weapons delivery capability. These are the capabilities that can prevent -- and therefore deter -- the massing of forces necessary to take advantage of an adverse force/space ratio.
We also have to think about sustainability. If we can theoretically fight the Soviets to a standoff, a lack of bullets could compel us to surrender or use nuclear weapons a few weeks into the fight. The result would be the same as if we had been overrun in three days!

Is non-nuclear sufficiency too much to hope for? I do not think so. While the proposed troop reductions now on the table would probably not achieve this goal, there is a growing number of analysts who conclude that the Soviet military capability is in a downward spiral which will take many years (and an impressive economic recovery) to pull out of. These analysts feel that the unilateral Soviet troop reduction of 500,000 is just the beginning. Time will tell.

Why do we need conventional forces that can deter on their own merits? Because continued conventional inferiority will necessitate continued reliance on nuclear weapons for both deterrence and defense. This reliance, in turn, will undermine efforts to Europeanize the alliance.

THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR POLICY

I have established that Europeanization includes installing a European SACEUR. There are three good reasons why SACEUR has been an American: he has reflected the American dominance of the alliance, he has been a symbol of American responsibility for the alliance and he has been the critical link for command and control of nuclear weapons. The first two reasons become moot in the new framework, but nuclear weapons are an unavoidable issue. Let us examine the
implications of our present nuclear strategy, for both European and American interests.

If, as I have argued, European politicians yield to nationalistic pressures and ask the U.S. to withdraw from the leadership of NATO, why not have a European SACEUR exercising command and control of nuclear forces? It should be possible, but it probably isn't.

To understand why, it is necessary to understand why Europeans have lived with American-controlled nuclear weapons on their soil for several decades. Has this command relationship survived because the U.S. is above the petty differences of Europeans and is therefore capable of taking a broader, less parochial view? Doubtful. I think it is a pragmatic step, to insure survival, based on the need to counter the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. NATO nations have accepted whichever of the various imperfect command arrangements gives the best promise of insuring the coordinated use of their defensive power.\(^3\) As a symptom of Europe's reliance on the United States, most Europeans see nuclear deterrence as an obscure policy implemented by a small group of foreigners -- a policy whose intricacies are at least difficult to understand and which is dominated by American thinking.\(^4\) Now that the threat seems to be receding, this "American thinking" could provide more motivation for Europeans to reject U.S. leadership of the alliance, indeed, to reject the alliance itself as an American construct.

If an American SACEUR becomes a thing of the past, will the Europeans be willing to maintain a nuclear capability under a European SACEUR? It has been tried, without success. Under MC70, in
1957, the U.S. put nuclear weapons at the allies' disposal, but then, as now, we insisted on strict U.S. control, pending a decision by the President. We have always refused, for good reasons, to give another nation release authority over our nuclear weapons.

The "Multilateral Force" concept was proposed in the 1960s and would have had a fleet of 25 surface ships, each carrying eight nuclear missiles, manned by multinational crews under SACEUR. But again the concept didn't survive because the U.S. demanded to retain veto power over all employment decisions. The final death of this concept came when France objected to this apparent effort to get them to "mortgage" their nuclear future, as they perceived Britain had done with the Nassau Agreement in 1962.

We can take the argument one step further and present evidence that Europeans will never allow their nuclear weapons to be placed under the control of a European from another European nation. Andrew J. Pierre argues that, absent a single political authority which speaks for all of the NATO members, no European nation "...will be prepared to place its survival in the hands of another, since the use of the deterrent could invite the destruction of its homeland. . . . Only a President of Europe with full authority in a nuclear crisis could endow a European deterrent with credibility." There might be a President of Europe someday, but not in time to influence the immediate future of NATO.

The European view of national control versus consortium control of nuclear weapons was summed up very well by the well-known French strategist, André Beaufre, at the time of the French "revolt" from NATO in 1966:
All the artificial procedures such as committees with weighted voting based on arithmetical or proportional shares or a qualified majority are incapable of resolving this difficulty. If a nuclear power concludes it vital to make use of his own weapons, he will not allow himself to be prevented from so doing by another ally. The decision to use nuclear weapons is the highest expression of national sovereignty at a time when the country's survival is at stake; therefore it can only be a national decision.

This logic leads me to conclude that NATO's nuclear strategy should be revised. Again, if world events continue in the direction of a diminishing Soviet threat, NATO's nuclear strategy will not long endure, no matter how much we'd like to keep it unchanged. When NATO's nuclear weapons go, flexible response will not necessarily be abandoned, but it will certainly have to be revised.

WOULD A DENUCLEARIZED NATO BE DIFFERENT?

If nuclear weapons are used, how would escalation be prevented? If a nuclear weapon is used, we can assume it would be by a NATO country to thwart a successful Soviet advance. Once NATO uses a nuclear weapon, for the escalation to be controlled, NATO would have to surrender, or the Soviets would have to 1) not retaliate with nuclear weapons and 2) cease the military activity that prompted the nuclear strike in the first place (i.e., retreat). Frankly, I find any of these conditions unlikely.

Since escalation control seems unlikely now, would the strategy look any different if those weapons were removed from the NATO structure and left under national control? Probably not, since the
United Kingdom, France and the United States will still have the capability to use them when they feel their interests are sorely jeopardized. With France and Britain, this would probably occur when their nations were directly threatened.

When would the United States feel it necessary to go nuclear? As long as the United States maintains a significant troop presence, a successful Soviet attack would threaten those troops with very heavy casualties. If it seems unlikely that the U.S. would resort to nuclear weapons when our troops (rather than our homeland) are threatened with destruction, it is useful to recall that the only wartime use of nuclear weapons has been by the United States to save the large number of casualties that would have been sustained in an invasion of Japan. Of course there was no fear of escalation then, but the premise could hold.

It seems likely that the American decision process for use of nuclear weapons would be unchanged. Previously, if the U.S. national command authorities decided to go nuclear, this decision was passed to NATO through American command channels. In a denuclearized NATO, this decision would pass through the same channels, but the delivery platform would be long-range aircraft rather than artillery shells, and the NATO command structure would be consulted rather than directed.

Would this national deterrent be any less compelling to a potential adversary than an alliance-controlled deterrent? I could make the case that it is more believable. Many historical examples show that it is much easier for a nation to act decisively in its own interests than it is for an alliance to act decisively in the
collective interest of its members. Ideally, before a nation used nuclear weapons, they would discuss it with the allies. The North Atlantic Council would have the opportunity to reach a consensus. But even without a consensus, not much is changed, since the decision has always been a national decision.

We've thus come full circle. Flexible response under a Europeanized and denuclearized NATO looks a lot like it does now. The only major change is the fact that NATO no longer controls the weapons directly. The escalation continuum is still available to the National Command Authorities and, if anything, the decision process is simpler.

The remaining argument against denuclearization is that it is exactly what the Soviets want; therefore, it must be wrong. We have to ask whether they want tactical nuclear weapons removed because they're inherently dangerous? Or is it because the Soviets want to invade Western Europe and these weapons are obstacles? If it is the former, then we're all in agreement and let us get rid of them. If it is the latter, then my precondition of conventional sufficiency makes the argument moot.

Now, what is the absolute worst case? We miscalculate conventional sufficiency, the Soviets invade, and NATO fails to hold with conventional forces. Again, things look very much the same because there are three nuclear nations in the fight with thousands of warheads ready to protect their interests, hopefully in consultation with their allies, but not fettered by alliance indecision.

The ultimate deterrent to the Soviets continues to be the
American strategic nuclear arsenal. There has been much debate about the link between theater weapons in Europe and America's strategic weapons. This debate seems to center around what types of weapons and employment doctrines in Europe will make this link believable to both the Europeans and the Soviets. Most of this debate is irrelevant. Would we use our strategic arsenal when we have tried to stop an invasion with theater nuclear weapons and failed? No, because we have enough (and will continue to have enough) tactically-deliverable weapons to turn the battlefields of Europe into a wasteland. We would feel forced to use our strategic nuclear weapons only in response to a Soviet strategic nuclear attack on the United States. This is an important point — contrary to popular belief, the link to our strategic arsenal is not dependent on our use or non-use of theater nuclear weapons. It is dependent on Soviet use of strategic nuclear weapons. We have no control over that step in the escalation ladder now, and so nothing will be changed if the NATO command structure is denuclearized. I must conclude that the deterrent posture of a denuclearized NATO would be largely unchanged from today.

In some ways, denuclearization could strengthen rather than weaken. The United States is considered in some quarters to be above the alliance rather than part of the alliance. This perception is strengthened by the McMahon Act which formally reserves nuclear command and control for the U.S., thereby placing the U.S. outside the alliance in the eyes of some. As I stated, this perception has been downplayed in the interests of deterring the Soviet threat. But in the 90s, the removal of the nuclear command and control issue
could make the United States a *partner* in NATO rather than the boss.

**CONCLUSIONS**

There are forces at work which would dissolve NATO in favor of a European security arrangement or no security arrangement at all. American leadership of NATO is a concept whose time has passed and which is, in itself, a threat to the alliance's future. The concept of the European Home threatens to exclude us from this area of vital economic and security interests. Now is the time for the United States to foster the concept of an Atlantic Home, in which we are a partner rather than a leader. A restructured NATO is the forum under which the Atlantic Home will survive and prosper. In order to step out of our leadership position in the alliance, the stumbling block of nuclear weapons must be removed from the NATO framework. But first, NATO's long-standing conventional inferiority must be rectified, to remove the temptation for an aggressor to attack conventionally. Now, for the first time since 1945, we have the opportunity to achieve conventional parity, through ongoing arms reduction talks and the apparent political disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. We must take advantage of this opportunity. Finally, the greatest contribution to peace and stability in Western Europe and North America will be a strong sense of the Atlantic Home -- a group of nations whose fates are bound together by mutual interests which transcend national interests and threats to those interests.

The United States must take the initiative in this evolution, or a neo-Ostpolitik could lead to a European Home of the twenty-first century which excludes, or perhaps even opposes, the United States.
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