CAN THE USE OF IN-UNIT TRAINING INCREASE DUTY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY QUALIFICATION IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT?

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ABSTRACT

CAN THE USE OF IN-UNIT TRAINING IMPROVE DUTY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY QUALIFICATION IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT? by MAJ William P. Scott Jr., 72 pages.

Reserve Component (RC) soldiers often attend reclassification training. Reclassification training is required any time a soldier is assigned to a position for which he does not possess the correct Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ). Because RC soldiers often change assignments for a number of reasons, such as civilian job location changes or attendance at college, it generates significant reclassification requirements. The current program to train all these requirements has not yielded the appropriate training readiness levels.

This thesis will propose an additional method to assist in reclassification training. In-unit training is a method of training that would provide flexibility to unit commanders to schedule and conduct reclassification training to cover gaps in the current education system to more closely align with the yearly training schedule. In-unit training is conducted by the unit, with school certified instructors and with the oversight of accredited training institutions. This provides the commander the ability to radically increase duty MOSQ and better support the increasing reliance of the RC to activate and deploy in support of the operational needs of the Army.
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ACRONYMS

AC       Active Component
ADT      Active Duty for Training
ARNG     Army National Guard
ATRRS    Army Training Requirements and Resource System
BN       Battalion
CSA      Chief of Staff of the Army
DMOSQ    Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification
FORSCOM  Forces Command
IDT      Inactive Duty Training
IET      Initial Entry Training
IMT      Initial Military Training
MOSQ     Military Occupational Specialty Qualification
NCOES    Noncommissioned Officer Education System
NGB      National Guard Bureau
OJT      On-the-Job Training
POM      Program Objective Memorandum
RC       Reserve Component
RTI      Regional Training Institutions
SMDR     Structured Manning Decision Review
TACITS   Total Army Centralized Individual Training Survey
TASS     The Army School System
TASSD    The Army School System Directorate
TRADOC   Training and Doctrine Command
USARC United States Army Reserve Command
ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 150,000 Reserve Component (RC) soldiers are currently activated to support Active duty forces in multiple combat theaters. Because the demands are so great for US military forces in multiple theaters of operation, which spread the already thin personnel resources, it has become apparent that the RC soldiers will continue to augment the Active Component (AC) forces for the foreseeable future. Understanding this, one would have to ask, How ready is the RC to mobilize and deploy? There are many factors measured or evaluated to determine this. This thesis will focus on how to improve Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) through the use of In-unit training.

DMOSQ is the qualifier that identifies the trained status of unit personnel. This RC readiness status indicator is used in determining the overall readiness level of RC units. Recent DMOSQ rates have revealed that the RC is not comparable to the readiness of their AC counterparts from a training perspective, and as a result, this requires the RC to spend additional time preparing for deployment when called upon.

RC soldiers can get the required training when they enter National Guard through Basic Training and Advance Individual Training or through reclassification training. Because soldiers in the RC oftentimes move or transfer locations, it typically means the soldiers may not be trained in the appropriate specialty. When the soldiers only need the specific training of the new specialty, they attend reclassification training. During reclassification training, the soldiers get only the specific training necessary. For instance,
soldiers would not be expected to train on basic soldier skills that were already learned during basic training.

This thesis proposes that conducting reclassification training of soldiers at the battalion level could greatly increase DMOSQ rates, thereby reducing the train-up time for deployment and ultimately increasing interoperability with their Active Component counterparts, which improves efficiency in the entire system. In-unit training is a concept that would allow the scheduling and conduct of training to take place at the battalion level in addition to the methods currently used. Currently there are only a few options for attaining reclassification training. One option is attendance at resident facilities, or the proponent school (the infantry school at Fort Benning for 11 series Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)), training at one of the local RC training institutions, or in some cases through distributive learning or a combination of both. This thesis will review how reclassification training fits into the overall DMOSQ scenario.

In order to understand DMOSQ it must be clearly defined. DMOSQ is a RC specific term. The Army only uses MOS as an indicator of qualification. This means to be a qualified infantry platoon sergeant in the active Army a soldier only need to hold an MOS at any skill level, that is, 11B10. In the RC, it requires that the same platoon sergeant be thirty level qualified because it is specific to his duty assignment according to the Unit Manning Roster (UMR), that is, 11B30. The Army does not report personnel readiness relative to duty position; it only reports basic MOS qualifications. As one might imagine it is more difficult to ensure a soldier is DMOSQ versus simply MOSQ.

It is imperative to understand how DMOSQ is measured or computed. Forces Command (FORSCOM), appointed as the Department of the Army executive agent for
RC training and readiness oversight, determined it to be the number of DMOSQ personnel compared to number of personnel assigned. This is slightly different from how the Unit Status Report measures readiness for the active component. AC uses the number of Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) personnel compared to number authorized personnel. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) established a goal of 85 percent DMOSQ for the RC by 2005 (Dwyer 2003). At the time the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) were both well short of the 85 percent goal, only maintaining approximately 70 percent DMOSQ (Dwyer 2003). Both National Guard Bureau (NGB) and USARC established incremental objective goals to achieve the CSA target of 85 percent DMOSQ by FY05.

Although there are several elements that cumulatively determine DMOSQ rating, which are reclassification training, noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) training, and initial military training (IMT), this thesis will only focus on the reclassification mission. As of March 2005 approximately 16,000 ARNG and 7,000 USAR soldiers required reclassification training in order to become DMOSQ (FORSCOM Tiger Team Brief 2005). A large number of the soldiers requiring reclassification training were scheduled or were attending training, but they will not reflect as qualified until they complete training and the administrative process is complete. To put things in perspective, in March 2005 there were approximately 95,000 soldiers in the ARNG and USAR that were not DMOSQ (FORSCOM Tiger Team Brief 2005). In a time when there is such heavy reliance on the RC to augment the AC and to conduct independent operations, these startling numbers represent a significant problem.
NGB and USARC have the responsibility for reclassification training. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for Initial Military Training (IMT). Both TRADOC and the RC share responsibility to train NCOES. As a result, the RC has its own schools for conducting training called The Army School System (TASS) battalions, which can be found in the form of National Guard armories to local college campuses. These battalions teach a multitude of courses; however, their highest production is in the NCOES training and MOS reclassification training. These National Guard courses are predominantly taught at state training facilities called Regional Training Institutes (RTI). The classes are scheduled through the Army Training and Resource Requirements System (ATRRS). TRADOC controls IMT, which is conducted in resident mode (attendance at AC training installation) and includes basic training, advanced individual training, and officer basic and advanced courses. Although the AC conducts some reclassification in resident mode, the amount is negligible.

This thesis will identify the advantages and disadvantages of conducting the reclassification mission at the command level in the RC as compared to the reclassification training at the TASS battalion level. Currently there is an initiative under review called In-unit training. This concept utilizes instructors from the individual units, who are qualified to teach courses that are TRADOC approved. The major differences between In-unit training and training at the TASS battalions are the location of training and the timing and availability of needed courses. TASS battalions go through a very intensive scheduling process called Structured Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process, which plans for expected training requirements up to five years in advance. This process ties directly to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. In this way,
scheduling and resources are tied together and programmed for each training battalion. The end result of these processes yields a rigid schedule of training dates and locations in which the specific type of training that will take place. In-unit training would allow the command the flexibility to schedule training as requirements arise, and not be constrained to only the dates established during the SMDR process. In-unit training is an alternative, if the dates established through the SMDR do not coincide with the commander and soldier need, but is not intended to be the only source for the conduct of reclassification training in the ARNG.

This thesis will explore how transforming to modular forces will require more reclassification and the ability of the RC to process the anticipated increase. Based on projections there will be a substantial increase in the need for reclassification training in the combat service and combat service support areas. This places additional burden on a system that has not yielded satisfactory DMOSQ results to date. This thesis will not endeavor to determine potential cost savings as it would be difficult to track the flow of money as it is approved at DA level and apportioned through NGB to the states; however, it may have an impact. Additionally, this thesis will not address the administrative complications that are currently impacting the accuracy of reporting for DMOSQ to senior leaders. The financial and administrative issues are being addressed by a focus group at headquarters TRADOC. This thesis will focus solely on In-unit training as a viable option for the ARNG. However, this concept could be an option for USARC to train reclassification soldiers as well.

One of the biggest challenges to the current The Army school system (TASS) battalion instruction method is timing. Simply put, there does not seem to be enough start
dates to get soldiers enrolled into training in a timely manner. Some of the difficulty lies in the months which start dates are established. Typically, TASS BNs set the start dates for the months of September through December. It is important to note that most reclassification training is conducted in multiple phases and the follow-on phases are conducted during the months of April through July. If a soldier cannot enroll on a scheduled start date, it may take up to a year to get another opportunity to schedule another. When this happens, the soldier is reported as Non DMOSQ, and becomes one of the 95,000 plus soldiers identified earlier. By utilizing In-unit training, the command can effectively manage the incoming soldiers and provide the training necessary in a time that supports the commander’s needs. Because it is managed at the command level, and here we are focusing on battalion level, it also provides more flexible scheduling to accommodate the demands of the soldier’s civilian employer needs and the commander’s necessity to get the soldier qualified as soon as possible.

One important issue that must be addressed is the level of quality controls in place for In Unit Training? First of all, In-unit training requires all instructors to be qualified and certified in accordance with TRADOC regulation 350-70 and the specific MOS requirements of the proponent school. This standard applies equally to the active component as well. MOS producing courses have to be TRADOC approved. The term used to describe this is TATS-C, meaning The Army Training System Courseware. In order for a course to be considered TATS-C, the Army, ARNG and USAR must review it. All three components must agree or TRADOC must intercede for resolution. TRADOC manages the process whereby the respective proponent schools develop the course, and then NGB and USARC review for concurrence. Once all three components
agree the course becomes TATS-C and can be taught at the active army school or the RC training battalion. The final element is the oversight of the local TASS battalion of the unit. The TASS battalion or regional training institute (RTI) as it is also referred to, is responsible for monitoring the instruction, as well as the quality control of the course. The unit will coordinate with their associated TASS battalion for conduct of testing and end of course training events, typically referred to as Field Training Exercise (FTX). Just as the AC school has a main campus to satellite campus responsibility for the conduct of training at the TASS BN, so would the TASS BN have responsibility to the local units conducing In Unit Training.

In the ensuing chapters, the author will look at how In-unit training compares to current methods of reclassification training. The evidence will be analyzed and the effectiveness of In-unit training will be determined base on those finding.

Chapter 1 has provided a basic introduction. Improving Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) for the Reserve Component has been and continues to be a challenge. This chapter framed the problem, provided some background, and proposed a method to improve DMOSQ.

Chapter 2 will cover a basic review of the literature regarding the subject matter. Currently, there are not many literature references. I will focus on information from Depart of the Army Tiger Team briefs, TRADOC focus team briefs, and briefly on the RAND study conducted to determine the feasibility of Total Army School System training, which is now called The Army School System. The Tiger Team briefs will show what Department of the Army understands as the problem and what TRADOC, NGB, and USARC are doing to make adjustments. TRADOC focus team briefs will focus
specifically on DMOSQ issues. The group breaks down the DMOSQ challenge in an attempt to ascertain problem areas, trends, and possible solutions. CG TRADOC will use this information to resolve the areas in his control and to advise DA of the areas where their assistance is required.

The RAND study evaluated effectiveness of TASS, and will be used to develop background information for the comparison of the proposed In-unit training concept and the current system. It will concentrate on specific areas of DMOSQ. CSA established a goal of 85 percent DMOSQ by FY 05 for the RC. As of 1 September 2004, the DMOSQ rate was reported to FORSCOM as 79.4 percent (Dwyer 2005). This area continues to be an Achilles heel for the RC. Several factors contribute to overall DMOSQ status; they are IMT, officer basic training, noncommissioned officer training and MOS training; often referred to as reclassification training. This research will concentrate on MOS reclassification training. FORSCOM reports approximately 23,000 soldiers need reclassification training (FORSCOM G3/5/7 2005). This is significant because, today more than ever, the Army depends on the Reserve Component to participate in the high operational tempo of assignments. DMOSQ is a direct indication of training readiness. Reserve Component units need to be at high levels of readiness in order to provide support in a timely manner. This thesis will focus on the Army National Guard, and specifically the prospect of conducting reclassification at command level. In-unit training is a concept that has been proposed and piloted in Texas and Georgia ARNG. Texas ARNG conducted armor crewman or 19K reclassification training, while Georgia ARNG conducted infantryman or 11B reclassification training. This concept allows the command flexibility to manage the course start dates, and number of participants in
coordination with the current system controlled by the structured manning decision review (SMDR) process.

Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodology employed. The qualitative analysis method will be primary method used to compare and contrast the current reclassification system with the proposed In-unit training method; however, the quantitative method will also explore the trends for DMOSQ and potential implications of modularity for reclassification training. It will provide information on the identified shortfalls with the current system and ways the proposed system would improve reclassification training. It will explain the extremely complicated process used to establish training requirements and how specific training allocations are issued.

Chapter 4 will analyze the differences in the two systems and attempt to prove that In-unit training can contribute to increased readiness by increasing DMOSQ levels. It will identify any unexpected finding as a result of the study and provide relevance to the problem.

Chapter 5 will provide a summary of findings as they relate to the thesis. It will answer the thesis statement as well as provide recommendations based on the findings and discuss other areas for addition research based on the findings.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In order to understand how In-unit training can be a viable method to improve DMOSQ, we need to understand how the existing process for establishing training requirements works. Army Regulation 350-10, *Management of Army Individual Training Requirements and Resources*, dated 1990, thoroughly explains how this process works; however, it is quite detailed and difficult to comprehend without extensive explanation. The author will provide a general overview of the training requirements process as it relates to this subject. Training classes are determined through the Structured Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process. This process is conducted at the headquarters and Department of the Army level. It is managed by the DA operations or G3 office and is directly tied to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.

The POM is the resourcing document for planned activities. In effect, it ensures that the resources necessary for training are forecasted in the appropriate timelines to be funded. This SMDR process plans five years into the future and continually refines the projected training requirements until year of execution. Figure 1 illustrates how the POM cycle ties into the SMDR process and the events that take place along the way to establish initial requirements and then refine them over the course of time.

A computer program called Army readiness management system (ARMS) generates the base forecast for training requirements and is the first step in the process. This program takes into account the projected force structure changes, and historical allocations, to name a few areas of interest, and determines a baseline requirement or estimate of the number of individuals needing training, and these estimates are submitted
for the initial review. That projection is refined during the total Army centralized individual training survey (TACITS) review. The TACITS review is conducted yearly. It focuses on the long-range projections with the emphasis on refinement. Additionally, it reviews the near term projections. Throughout the TACITS review funding can flow with the changes because it is conducted in the same timeline as the POM process.

Figure 1. SMDR Cycle

The training requirements arbitration panel (TRAP) is the next step in the process and also becomes the final review of the training requirements prior to the year of execution. The TRAP allows DA and the schools to make fine tune adjustments such as movement of training allocations across multiple regions; however, no more money can be authorized at this point. The quota managers; who are individuals who manage and
distribute training allocations to their respective schools, take this forecast, compare to historical usage or other factors that could alter those requirements and refine as necessary during the TACITs review and the TRAP, which is typically conducted one after the TACITS review for convenience. Interestingly, the AC quota managers are part of the human resource command. In the RC each of the fifty-four states and territories, including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, has their own quota source manager. ARNG quota source managers work for their respective states and do not work for the training institutions.

Bear in mind this is still looking at projected requirements for five years in the future, so the requirements are rough planning estimates and will be modified and refined several more times as the actual training year approaches. Each teaching institution is responsible for updating their capabilities in the system so that as TACITs cycles through the analysis of the ARMS data it can allocate the appropriate requirements to each. In other words, the quota managers have submitted their forecast or requirements into ATRRS. The system then looks to see what assets it has available to teach based on the request. The schools simply have to ensure they have updated their information to indicate what they anticipate can be supported in the out years. When the review of TACITS data is conducted, it often times reveals that modifications must be made to the projections. This is the refinement process (TACITS/TRAP) which helps provide more accurate estimates for funding and is integral to the effectiveness of the system.

As the allocations are divided among the respective teaching entities, each must then determine how many course iterations must be run to teach the projected load. Each school must look at its available instructor base and ability to acquire the necessary
equipment to conduct the course. Once the number of class iterations has been
determined, the school must now establish start dates for each of the course iterations.
There is no set formula for determining these start dates. Coordination between the
school and the respective customers to determine the best start date is commonly utilized;
however, since this is still in the future the dates are commonly based on historical
information. As one might imagine, planning for a course start date two or more years in
the future usually does not take into consideration changes that occur prior to executing
the course. With this understanding of how the course start dates are determined, this
study will look at the impacts of start dates on the DMOSQ challenge.

Non-duty military occupational specialty qualification (NDOMSQ) occurs when a
soldier is identified on the unit manning roster (UMR) whose qualifications do not meet
the requirement of the position. The accuracy of NDMOSQ information provided to
higher headquarters has experienced some difficulties. Some of the challenge revolves
around accurate accounting of DMOSQ information and the management of the
personnel databases. The RC has a different personnel management database than the
AC. The information in these systems is typically updated by the weekend drilling
Reservist. This places a large amount of work on the shoulders of a young soldier during
a typical weekend drill. This may be an additional duty assignment that the soldier
endeavors to accomplish along with all other personnel actions that have to be performed.
Oftentimes this results in the information not being updated in a timely manner. Through
the studies of the DMOSQ task team at Fort Monroe, it was determined to be an error of
approximately 20 percent in the accuracy of the information contained in standard
installation/division personnel system (SIDPERS) and is negatively reflected in the accuracy of DMOSQ information reported to higher headquarters.

Another significant issue is how long it takes to process course completion information in the database. The DA form 1059, which is the course graduation document, is returned to the unit upon the soldiers return. It is then sent to the state headquarters for processing and then forwarded to human resources command, who is the awarding authority of the MOS. It must then be captured or updated in SIDPERS. This entire process may take several months, in which the soldier is identified and NDMOSQ. ATRRS is the system of record for training and not a personnel database which can only validate that a soldier has completed training. Granting of the MOS is a function of the DA personnel office or G-1, and finally the unit has the responsibility update the status change for each soldier upon notification from DA G-1.

In order to ascertain the units training qualifications a report is generated from SIDPERS, which identifies all the personnel who are assigned to a duty position that are not coded as qualified for that position. ATRRS is the system of record for all individual training. The database systems of SIDPERS and ATRRS are not interoperable and therefore, the trained status information in SIDPERS is not validated against ATRRS data. Because the systems operate independently and there is no redundancy check to ensure accuracy of information in SIDPERS, errors do occur. FORSCOM uses SIDPERS data as the baseline figure to determining the DMOSQ rate for the RC. The DMOSQ formula used is the number of DMOSQ soldiers divided by the number of soldiers assigned. This information is reported to the highest levels in the army as a force readiness indicator.
Additional accountability issues occur when soldiers are in the Officer Candidate program because they are assigned in vacant unit positions while attending the program. These soldiers will remain NDMOSQ until they can successfully complete their respective Officer Basic Course (OBC). Although this study will not address the actions being taken to improve the throughput in the OBC program it is an area of intense focus and coordination between TRADOC, NGB and USARC, because it also affects DMOSQ.

DMOSQ is affected by several areas of training, which are initial entry training (IET), reclassification training, noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES), and OBC. The AC only has to be concerned with MOSQ, but because the RC uses duty specific qualification the required training spans a larger spectrum. This is not to say that the AC does not require the same training, because they do; however, when evaluating readiness they are not measured against duty specific qualifications.

Reclassification training, which is the focus of this research, is required when a soldier is assigned to a position on the UMR but does not possess the correct MOS qualification for that position. The fist requirement for RC soldiers to get their training falls under IMT. Initial Entry Training (IET); which is a part of IMT, is the basic skills training required for all individuals when they enter the service. All individuals attend this training at an AC installation. The individual attends basic training to establish basic soldiering skills and become exposed to Army values. Once this phase is complete the soldier then attends Advance Individual Training (AIT). In this phase the soldier gets the specific training for their particular MOS. In most cases this training is conducted in one location and the AIT phase directly follows the basic training phase. National Guard soldiers are no exception to this but oftentimes soldiers transfer from one unit to another
due to various reasons, most are typically work related job changes requiring the soldier to move. In many instances this requires the soldier get training in another MOS. The National Guard does not send the soldier back to AIT for the new MOS needed; instead they have a school structure that conducts reclassification training. These courses are similar to the training conducted at the AC AIT; however, some modifications are made to account for those skills already learned in basic training and the course structure to account for the different training availability of the RC soldier, like training on multiple weekends and a two week resident style culminating event to complete the course.

An interesting aspect to the RC reclassification training is the necessity to schedule the soldier for multiple phases in ATRRS. In the AC, the soldier is scheduled once for IET and AIT. In the RC reclassification is conducted in multiple phases to align with the soldiers required training times; one weekend a month. The RC must schedule the soldier for each phase of the reclassification training. In some cases, reclassification courses have as many as five phases that span three years if every phase is attained at the earliest possible start time. As discussed earlier the start dates are predetermined through the SMDR process and may not provide an opportunity for enrollment to the soldier in the most expeditious manner.

When this happens the soldier must wait until the next available start date to attend training. During this time the soldier is not considered qualified and unit readiness is negatively impacted. Unlike the AC, the RC has not yet adopted the trainees, transients, holdover and student (TTHS) account. This account is a holding cell for soldiers who are not yet qualified for any number of reasons. The most common is the soldier is currently in training, or injured. When readiness information is reported the
soldiers in TTHS account are not part of the calculations. The RC has not adopted this yet and as a result the readiness levels reported are degraded by that amount.

A review of the RC education system history reveals a significant reorganization in the early 1990s. When DA conducted a review of the mobilization of RC soldiers to support operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm it was determined that the education system needed to be restructured. Total Army School System (TASS) was introduced. A RAND study on the effectiveness of the Army’s efforts to consolidate the schools systems identified the reason for change in the following way.

For some time, the US Army has recognized persistent problems in its extensive system of schools that provide technical and leadership training for the Reserve Components (RC). Critics have suggested, for example, that the existing system of schools lacks efficiency, provides inconsistent quality of training, and is difficult to manage to meet the training needs of RC units. (RAND 1997)

As a result a regional based training concept, known as TASS was established and schools would teach more proponent specific courses instead of being multifunctional. This concept endured and is still present today. RC schools conduct reclassification and NCOES OCS, basic officer leader course (BOLC) and intermediate level education (ILE) training. The AC school has the responsibility for IET. The RAND study also determined some systemic problems that would need to be addressed for the system to be optimized. Some of these same challenges still plague the training system. RAND identified the following problem “A fundamental quality problem, for instance, lies with the availability and adequacy of the courseware and programs of instruction. In addition, some courses lack equipment, ammunition, and training aids, especially in IDT” (RAND, 1997). These specific areas will be looked at in more depth in the following chapters.
The ARNG refers to its training schools as regional training institutions (RTI). There is at least one RTI in each of the 54 states and territories of the US. ARNG soldiers who need training other than IMT typically attend training at the RTI. The RTI has a few dedicated full time staff members, but the primary staff positions are filled by traditional weekend drilling soldiers. The instructor cadre comes from the operational units in the field. They are assigned to the school for a determined amount of time. Instructors must meet the certification requirements established by TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products*, and any specific proponent school requirements. RC instructors must adhere to the same certification requirements as the AC. Those requirements can vary slightly from proponent school to proponent school but generally consist of the following things as directed by regulation.

Note: Certification time cannot exceed the time available to the Reserve Component during one TATS Training Year.
1 Include TAITC, subject matter competence, teaching competence, and other mandated instructor requirements.
2 Specify specific instructor grade levels. (See AR 611-201.)
3 Ensure standardization across components (Active Component, US Army National Guard, US Army Reserve, and DA civilians) for each proponent course.
4 Include technical/tactical recertification requirements. (Proponents should specify the maximum number of years allowed since the instructor last taught the course before the instructor must be re-certified.). (TR 350-70 chapter II-1-3 g 1999)

Some proponent schools add additional requirements, for example, the Military Police school requires an instructor to have desk sergeant and platoon sergeant time.

Equipment continually provides challenges for the RTIs. RTIs are not authorized equipment on their TDA. Coordination must be made with the MTOE units for the use of equipment. This seems logical: the units need their soldiers trained, so they support the RTIs by providing equipment to train them. Unfortunately, there are many factors that
affect this. Operational readiness rates of equipment can influence the willingness of units to part with their equipment. Current operational tempo requires state-side units to provide equipment to units in theater. This problem is compounded when the specific equipment is only fielded in limited numbers and primarily to the AC. There are others as well, but it suffices to say coordination of necessary equipment is very challenging and has caused training to be cancelled when equipment is not available.

The concept of In-unit training is similar to a program used by the Army a few years ago, called on the job training (OJT). In this program, formalized training was done at the unit level. It was conducted by members of the unit and provided the opportunity for commanders to begin the training when it best fit into the established training schedule. This concept seems to be the perfect fit for RC training; however, many were skeptical about the validity of the program. In fact, a study by Ayn Rand institute had the following to say:

Findings from the literature review were reported in Zsambok, Crandall, and Militello (1994); we found no comprehensive cognitive model of OJT that empirically based or that is generally accepted by practitioners or researchers. Nor did any models depict the value added by OJT providers passing on their expertise about how to do the job. This is odd since the OJT format and setting are poised precisely fro taking advantage of this job-related knowledge and skill transfer. (RAND 1997)

For various reasons the program was determined to be no longer acceptable as a form of training in regard to producing MOS qualifications. In addition to the comments above it was also mentioned that the program did not have the appropriate quality controls in place to ensure the training was conducted to standard.

The In-unit training approach is similar to OJT; however, there are more control measures imposed. The persons instructing a course in the In-unit training method must
be certified. The instructor candidates use their local TASS BN or RTI to assist in the certification process. Another difference between In-unit training and OJT is the courseware requirement. In-unit training requires all courses taught must be TATS courseware compliant. When OJT was in use, the requirement for TATS courseware did not exist. This caused wide interpretation of how the course was administered. TATS courseware is approved by the three components AC, ARNG, and USAR, and as such establishes clear guidance regarding the administration of the course, the course conduct and completion are identified in the courseware.

The administration of the course must be closely monitored by the RTI. Soldiers from the RTI serve as the proctor for examinations. This provides the quality control measure that was sorely lacking in the OJT program. The RTI assists the unit in obtaining necessary training courseware. The testing is also closely monitored by the RTI, primarily because of the test control requirements established by Army regulation. Local units do not have the capability to provide a certificate of training completion to the soldier, so the RTI once again has to assume this responsibility in coordination with the unit. This concept can be compared to the typical university concept. The center is the main campus and it supports the satellite campuses. The main campus is the RTI and the satellite campuses are the units conducting In-unit training. Though they have the ability to function independently they rely on the main campus to keep them up to date on all the latest changes to the material and for administrative support. In this way, the main campus or RTI offers greater access to changes and updates to the training satellite or unit conducting the course. The In-unit training concept offers more to the unit commanders in the field. It allows a unit commander the opportunity to schedule a soldier.
in courses at the satellite campus according to need and is not restricted to just the options offered by main campus. RTIs undergo accreditation every three years, and usually receive follow-up evaluations and preaccreditation visits as well. This effectively establishes the credibility of the RTI as an entity capable of quality control. As a result when the RTI provides oversight on the conduct of training at the unit level, it provides the quality control measure that was not present in the former OJT system.

Although In-unit training sounds a lot like OJT and it has several similarities, it is clear that this program is much more governed, especially from the aspect of how training is to be conducted with specific limitations, which was never clearly defined in the OJT program; however, it is not so restrictive that it looses its flexibility or feasibility.

It is also important to look at future requirements to determine what the real value of In-unit training may offer. DMOSQ is not a new challenge and getting soldiers retrained for their particular MOS is an ongoing challenge. The author contends that this problem will only increase in the near future, based on the changes due to modularity. The Army school system directorate (TASSD) at TRADOC has addressed the potential implications of modularity in a slightly different way. TASSD conducted a study to see if the current RC training system was suited to the changing needs of the Army. TASSD began its study by hypothesizing a requirement versus capabilities mismatch existed. The study identified the capabilities of the RC training system that had been in place for approximately ten years. It determined historical training quota usage and forecasted expected training quotas based on the expected changes due to modularity. Ultimately the study determined an excess capacity in some MOSs and a significant shortfall in others. It also identified that potential efficiency problems would most likely occur if the
projections for modularity impacts held course. This area will be reviewed in more detail in the following chapters.

This research will also look at the reclassification requirements over the past few years and the projections for the next few years. The information in table 1 is taken from the Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System (ATRRS), specifically the Quarterly Training Utilization Model (QTUM). It helps to provide a perspective on the reclassification efforts for the past few years when measuring the allocated quotas against the number of students enrolled. It also provides comparison to the other components on the amount of MOS qualifications training performed each year. Quota utilization rates are important because they are factored into funding considerations when DA reviews the POM. It is unfortunate that this factors into funding consideration at DA when schools do not have the ability to control the attendance of students to the course. The result is increased difficulty getting necessary funding based on the poor utilization rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOSQ REQUIRED AC</th>
<th>MOSQ REQUIRED USAR</th>
<th>MOSQ REQUIRED NGB</th>
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<td>Quotas</td>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>% Fill</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>58882</td>
<td>54852</td>
</tr>
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<td>53487</td>
<td>50226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50892</td>
<td>49822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>216517</td>
<td>204790</td>
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</table>

*Source:* ATRRS Quarterly Training Utilization Model.
Quotas are the forecasted requirements obtained through the SMDR process alluded to earlier. Inputs are actual students who have started the course. Percentage of fill is simply an expression of this information. Many factors cause the poor utilization rates; however, this area is being thoroughly looked at by the focus group at TRADOC. As discussed earlier, the system provides opportunity for training. There are external factors that affect it. Historically, students failing to show up for training is the biggest reason that the utilization is not higher. This is a difficult concept to grasp for the AC because soldiers are under control of their leadership constantly. The RC soldiers have civilian employment issues that can affect their commitment to attend. When the soldier does miss a scheduled training opportunity, it requires the soldier and his command to reschedule a new start date; however, there is no guarantee that the soldier can coordinate a new start date in that year. Hence, the soldier potentially has to wait another year until the training becomes available again. This situation also occurs if the unit is in need of the particular soldier and request that he delay his training in order to support the needs of the commander. Most commanders use this option sparingly because it causes a disruption in the career progression of the soldier.

The TASS restructure initiative being led by TASSD identified some interesting projections for the impacts of modularity. The intent of the study was to determine if the current RC school system was capable of supporting requirements given the high OPTEMPO. Mr. Seger, who is the assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (DCSOPS&T) at TRADOC, identified that the AC goes through a rebalance of its capabilities each year to ensure they can support the ever changing needs of the force. It was identified that the RC school system did not undergo such a review. In fact the RC
system has remained relatively static for the ten years it has been in operation. A study was directed and participants from USARC, NGB, TRADOC, and FORSCOM, to determine if the RC structure was adequate. Through the course of the study they also determined some projected forecasts based on the expected modularity changes. Figure 2 depicts those forecasts. The information provided is not meant to firmly establish actual requirements, because that is done through the SMDR process; however, it does provide a reference point from which to plan future changes.

Figure 2. Modularity Impact on RC Training BNs


The DA Tiger Team has also proposed a campaign plan for DMOSQ. DA G3 drafted the campaign plan to establish concrete guidance on some of the specific problem
areas impeding the forward progress of increased DMOSQ. This document is currently being staffed but provides some insight to areas that are beyond the capabilities of the ARNG to resolve. The plan points out that funding has historically been inadequate to support the readiness levels expected, specifically in the areas of reclassification training and Initial Military Training. It also addresses the issue of cross leveling of personnel to support war time requirements as having a negative impact on the ability to maintain a training readiness posture. When the units are required to fill at specific personnel levels it typically draws the qualified personnel, leaving a void in those units. This problem has second and third order effects. When replacement soldiers get moved into these positions they are not qualified and require the appropriate IMT or reclassification training. The funding to support this extra training is not there because it was never planned for during the SMDR and POM process.

The campaign plan also identified problems with mobilizing soldiers for training. Current laws do not allow RC forces to be mobilized for training. This has posed significant challenges for units who have received short notification deployment orders. Many of the units called upon to mobilize in 2004 were units that were not funded to maintain higher readiness levels and as a result they required extensive training in order to meet the mobilization requirements established by FORSCOM. Once the notification order was received the units could then schedule all the necessary training needed to produce qualified soldiers. The required training timelines did correspond to the timelines of deployment. Reclassification training in the RC typically lasts for a calendar year, which would not be feasible in short duration mobilization timelines. One can clearly see the dilemma; reclassification training is based on the yearlong process; however,
notification for mobilization requires a unit to deploy in three to six months. The unit is not at the trained readiness levels it should be because it was never funded at a particular level. Now the system that is designed to train a soldier over the period of a year must produce a trained soldier in three months or less. The campaign plan addressed this issue in two ways, first DA is working through congress to get the law amended which would allow for soldiers to be mobilized for training in order support the global war on terrorism. Secondly, it would improve the notification process, thereby allowing units the opportunity to schedule required training necessary to achieve the required readiness levels to deploy prior to mobilizing.

The plan also addressed the prioritization of training for those soldiers who are mobilizing. This prioritization would cover IMT and reclassification training and would not be limited just to the RC. It would account for both AC and RC units deploying and establish priorities as such. In addition, the specific MOSs would be identified as priority and the same screening criteria would be used.

The campaign plan will provide a road map to improving DMOSQ. It clearly establishes responsibilities and addresses problem areas that must be resolved in order to support necessary readiness requirements for the RC.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research methodology and design. The primary focus will be on qualitative analysis of current systems in place to conduct DMOSQ and reclassification training for Reserve Component soldiers. However, it will be necessary to quantify trend data and future projections, which will require the use of two research methods which Creswell (1994) refers to as a mixed research methodology.

The second section of this chapter will discuss the research design used to support the comparison of systems. Explanation of the current system follows in section three of this chapter, which is vital in establishing a common reference point from which to compare the proposed In-unit training concept.

The qualitative method of data collection will support the comparison of the proposed training method of In-unit training to the current system in an effort to determine its feasibility. Clearly, this thesis will not suggest In-unit training as a replacement for the current system; it will, however, ascertain if In-unit training may improve overall DMOSQ ratings when used in conjunction with the current system as a means to maximize reclassification training opportunities.

In order to provide a solid foundational understanding of the current system and its shortcomings, some statistical data regarding the use of allocated training requirements, courses offered and the trends in overall quota utilization will be utilized. Future training requirements based on transforming to a modular army will also be addressed. To this end empirical data collected will be evaluated by quantitative analysis. In general, Creswell (1994) advises that one should use only one methodology; however,
applying this research to the framework in table one, it becomes clear that a mixed design was necessary. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, triangulation substantiated the hypothesis. This will be further explained in the research design section of this chapter.

The primary question addressed in the course of this research is can In-unit training improve DMOSQ for the Army National Guard? Subordinate questions and areas of research include: (1) What is In unit training? (2) What is DMOSQ? (3) What system is currently in place and what are the constraints, if any? (4) Is the current system capable of supporting the requirements? (5) Why is it important to improve DMOSQ? and (6) Who will benefit from In unit training?

This thesis will define the current structure in place to conduct reclassification training. The structure of the proposed system will be analyzed, with special emphasis on the similarities and differences in the two. The author will further gather information on the rules that apply to the current and proposed systems. The limitation and constraints of each system will be extracted through the analysis of information gathered. Through comparison, the author will attempt to find the strategy or key elements to the operation of each of the systems.

It is important to establish credibility for the comparison of systems as an accepted scholarly method. Hermeneutics “is the study of the methodological principles of interpretation” (Merriam-Webster, 2005). In essence the basic question in hermeneutics is, “What is the meaning of this text?” as Radnitzky states it (Radnitzky 1970). Most of the material referenced in chapter 2 is text based. There is limited data in which to apply a quantitative analysis. The author will provide contextual information for
analysis using interpretation. Taylor clearly establishes that interpretation although subjective in nature is a valid methodology.

Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object must, therefore, be a text, or a text-analogue, which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory - in one way or another, unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense of understanding (Taylor 1976).

In fact, this research will provide clarification and understanding of how the training system works in the AC and the RC. As Michael D. Myers, a researcher and editor of the web site on qualitative research in information systems, points out “In an organization, people (e.g. different stakeholders) can have confused, incomplete, cloudy and contradictory views on many issues. The aim of the hermeneutic analysis becomes one of trying to make sense of the whole, and the relationship between people, the organization, and information technology.” (Myers 2005)

Data collection will consist of DMOSQ rates over the past several years to establish a trend for analysis. Student throughput information will be compared to past requirements and potential increases in reclassification training requirements based on the current restructuring of the army based on transformation. The author will address the rules that apply to both model systems. Those systems are the current SMDR process for training allocation and the proposed In-unit training system.

The guiding questions in the research methodology were ultimately derived by applying the model suggested by D. Ledy and J. E. Ormrod. 

Pratical Research and Design 7th edition, and are represented in the table 2.
Table 2. Determining Research Approach

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<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>What is the purpose of the research?</td>
<td>• To explain and predict($)</td>
<td>• To describe and explain($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To test theory</td>
<td>• To explore and interpret($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the research process?</td>
<td>• Focused</td>
<td>• Holistic($)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Know variable($)</td>
<td>• Unknown variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Established guidelines</td>
<td>• Flexible guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Static design</td>
<td>• Emergent designs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Detached view</td>
<td>• Context bound($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Context free</td>
<td>• Personal view($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the methods of data collection?</td>
<td>• Representative large sample($)</td>
<td>• Informative small sample</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Standardized instruments</td>
<td>• Observations, interviews($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the form of reasoning in the analysis?</td>
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<td>How are the findings communicated?</td>
<td>• Numbers</td>
<td>• Words($)</td>
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<td>• Statistics, aggregated data($)</td>
<td>• Narratives, individual quotes($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Formal voice, scientific style</td>
<td>• Personal style, literary style($)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates areas addressed in this thesis.

*Source: Leedy and Ormrod 2001.*

**Research Design**

This research is based primarily on documentary work or regulatory guidance pertaining to how educational training is conducted for the army. The author will critically review the current process and will show how and where the proposed method would function within that system and what advantages or disadvantages would result.

The primary source of information gathered focuses on understanding the current education system. Because the education system for the RC varies slightly from that of the AC it becomes necessary to identify and explain the differences, especially as it relates to reclassification training. Figure 3 depicts the focus for the assimilation of literature and regulatory information in chapter 2.
The majority of analysis identified in question three (What are the methods of data collection?) from table 1 will be inductive, and the findings will be communicated (question five from table 1) by data collected and analyzed and through narrative explanation.
Current System

Understanding the current education system is essential in providing a basis for suggested improvements. The system depicted in figure 4 shows the typical education requirements for enlisted soldiers and officers over the course of a career. The main focus should be on “area affecting DMOSQ.” This area is the heart of the research and where the author will compare both the AC system and the RC systems, but more specifically where the proposed In-unit training aligns with the current system. It also shows where the AC and RC systems overlap, potentially indicating duplicity of effort. As can seen, the AC and RC both teach BNCOC; however, it is conducted quite differently for the AC and the RC. The AC method requires the student to attend in resident status, meaning that the soldier arrives at the site for training and does not leave until the course is complete. The RC course may be conducted in multiple ways. The soldier may attend training one weekend a month for several months, then attend a two-week phase to complete the training. Another option is the soldier attends the course in multiple two-week periods.

This research will discuss the differences as they relate to DMOSQ training. The most significant aspect of this system is where DMOSQ can be affected. Both the AC and RC systems have an impact in this area as shown in figure 4. This thesis is limited and will only focus on reclassification training for the ARNG. This training occurs just after basic training and prior to PLDC. Basic training is the responsibility of the TRADOC training institutions; however, in recent DA Tiger Team meetings, the concept of using RC training to conduct select BCT has arisen. It also provides perspective on how much the educational life cycle training impacts DMOSQ for the RC.
The primary method for analyzing the data collected will be comparison. The author will also elicit expert opinion of the current system and the proposed system. Looking at trends and forecasting future requirements, which are affected by the transforming nature of the armed forces and more importantly the immediate changes, will provide the basis for the hypothesis to be evaluated. Figure 5 shows how the author
intends to analyze the various types of data collected to ascertain the feasibility of the proposed hypothesis.

**Figure 5. Analysis Model**

In summary chapter 3 describes the research design. It is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, which best illustrate the current and
proposed education training systems. The literature analysis and review of past performance of the current system will offer opportunity to introduce alternative training methods, such as In-unit training, to augment the system, which could potentially increase efficiency of the collective AC and RC training systems. This chapter clearly identifies the thought process in determining the chosen methodology and establishes that the constructed design will support the author’s intent to seek feasibility of the proposed concept in the current education system.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter will use the methods described in chapter 3 to assess the current system, review the proposed system and finally present information regarding future challenges to the training structure in order to evaluate the potential solutions for training shortfalls. The current system is based on a five-year planning and refinement cycle to lock in funding and allow training resources to be coordinated. There are several prominent reasons that the current system has not produced the desired results.

Class start dates are generated through an extended process. The common practice is to schedule the training for inactive duty training (IDT) and active duty training (ADT) mode, meaning the soldier attends weekend training sessions (IDT) for several months instead of performing his normal training with the unit. The length varies depending on the specific MOS, and then in lieu of the typical two week training period the soldiers attends the ADT or resident phase of the training. This system was designed to allow RC soldiers the opportunity to attend training in a manner that closely resembled a typical duty requirement to alleviate any undue interference to civilian job schedules. This system has accommodated that need. However, it falls short in the area of accounting for soldiers who join a unit after the window to enroll in IDT classes has passed. That soldier now has to wait, in some cases up to a year, to get another opportunity to attend the needed training.
Current System Analysis

Start dates are typically limited to the beginning of the fiscal year in order to allow the soldiers to complete the training and allow them the opportunity to enroll in the second part of the training; phase two or ADT. Multiple phase training is specific to the RC. The AC method is resident training from start to finish and does not require the managers of that soldier to juggle multi-phase requirements in that regard. This requirement to schedule multiple courses also factors into the difficulty of getting the soldier slated for the phases necessary to complete MOSQ training. Start date issues affect all phases and are not simply limited to IDT.

The DMOSQ Tiger Team also explored this area and has developed some temporary fixes to fulfill short-term requirements to support the increased call up of RC units when start dates did not coincide with the need. The Tiger Team is a special focus group directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to explore particular areas of interest. The Tiger Team developed a plan to mobilize RC trainers for active duty to conduct courses in an accelerated mode. This was a solid temporary fix; however, it is not a feasible solution to the problem of limited start dates over the course of time. The instructor pool cannot remain on active duty indefinitely and the ability to sustain this is cost prohibitive.

This approach did reveal that another method of delivering the training could be conducting the course in an ADT-ADT mode. That type of training typically consisted of two two-week courses conducted back to back or within close proximity of each other. This met the intent of accelerated training and produced the trained soldier ready to deploy as DMOSQ, as well as accounting for the necessity of start dates outside of the
normal first quarter pattern. Once again this is an option but may not be the panacea for resolution of the issue faced by many RC soldiers, which is ability to get time away from civilian employment for multiple two-week periods. Since 11 September 2001, it appears that employers are more understanding of the importance of training for the RC. This should not be viewed as a truism for all employers. It is important to understand that current law only requires the employer to allow a single two week period for annual training, so the option to use the traditional method is still viable and necessary, especially when it supports college student’s schedules, who are ideal candidates for recruiting to maintain the necessary force.

Start dates have been identified as a problem, but what happens when a student is terminated from a course before its conclusion? The reason could be anything from academic failure, to unforeseen circumstances where the student can not attend all of the scheduled training. The current system does not have the ability to recycle, the student. Although the training institutions do all they can to work the situation, if the student does not meet the academic hour requirement prescribed in the program of instruction, the school is limited in its ability to provide assistance. So now the soldier is faced with the challenge of getting another class start date.

Equipment is not a resource the RC schools have in the current system. The equipment resides in the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) units and not in the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) structured school. Specifically the equipment comes from the units who are sending soldiers to get trained. One would think this symbiotic relationship would yield the ideal situation, and it does most of the time but with the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) at such high levels equipment from all units
is being collected and sent into theater to support current operations. The AC schools have even experienced the reach back of current operations as equipment has been taken and the lack of replacement equipment. This example is best illustrated by looking at the M998 HMMWV. The school system as a whole, both AC and RC, has been constrained by the high demand for these assets. It has required both systems to be very flexible in adapting to less than perfect conditions for training. Since it appears that current operations will maintain the present OPTEMPO, the once small issue of appropriate equipment for training may become a significant problem.

In summary the challenges facing the current system are: (1) limited start dates, (2) early termination, and (3) equipment issues. Although some factors are out of the control of the current system, for example, students not appearing for the course, and early termination, they still have impact on the overall effectiveness of the system, and the larger problem is how to rectify them or minimize their impact.

In-unit training Analysis

In-unit training will be conducted by the command, most likely this will be consolidated at the battalion level; however, this aspect has not been clearly defined. It would seem logical that this is the appropriate command level to manage the scheduling of training so that it could be consolidated and coordinated with the command collective training plan. One of the advantages of this concept is that now the commander can balance his efforts to improve the readiness of his unit by more directly influencing the individual and collective training of his unit. Currently individual training has been the responsibility of institutional training and the units are responsible for conducting the collective training.
OJT was a viable means of reclassification training for individuals at the unit level; however, this program was terminated. Most studies found that there was no oversight to enforce the standards for the trainers which resulted into low quality soldiers coming out of the training. In-unit training accounts for this lack of oversight by requiring that instructors be certified by their respective proponent schools, for example, an instructor for 11B would have to be certified by the Infantry school, since they are the proponent for that particular MOS. The In-unit training program would also receive direct oversight by the associated TASS BN. The TASS BN or RTI as it is often referred to in the Nation Guard has the responsibility to assist in the instructor certification process as well as assisting the unit in obtaining the appropriate training courseware. The OJT program did not have these oversight required to measure skills in place, so the Army relied on a method of testing the soldier’s proficiency through the Skills and Qualification Test. The Army no longer uses specific tests to determine the individual soldier’s knowledge of their respective MOS. Thus the lack of quality controls on OJT led to reclassification training solely being taught at an approved teaching institution like the proponent school or a TASS BN.

Quality assurance is now achieved through accreditation of the teaching institutions. The TASS BN, an accredited institution, would monitor in-unit training. It would also proctor the testing and participate in evaluation of the culminating event in the course to provide credibility to the program. The TASS BN will also have the responsibility to oversee the instructor certification process. The potential instructor will have to meet the qualification requirements laid out in TR 350-70, as well and any requirements particular to that proponent. Most Proponent schools have a similar
instructor certification process requiring the individual to hold the MOS they want to
teach, they must be instructor qualified and they must teach the course before a murder
board, or a panel of qualified instructors to evaluate proficiency. Once that is completed
the TASS BN would forward the appropriate paperwork to the proponent for final
approval. This requires a considerable amount of command and control from the TASS
BN. If this system is implemented this area will require special emphasis and needs to be
closely monitored to ensure there is no break down in the quality assurance function.
Additionally the TASS BN will be able to provide an increased level of experience and
expertise to the units as they develop.

In-unit training provides an alternative to the challenge of limited start dates. The
command could coordinate a consolidated schedule to augment and support the
established institutional start dates. This would compensate for those soldiers who come
to the unit after the traditional start dates or potentially enroll students who have not been
able to complete a course that was previously started, for example a student becomes sick
and can not complete the mandatory course hours and must be returned to their unit.
However, this does not eliminate the challenge to coordinate start dates that allow the
appropriate time for completion of the approved courseware and allow opportunity for
enrollment into secondary follow-on phases.

Soldiers who cannot attend all the scheduled training dates due to unforeseen
circumstances may have an alternative with the In-unit training system. Because the
instructor and the student are both local and the training is conducted at home station or a
location close to home station, it is possible for the instructor to arrange makeup training
for the student. This option is available in the current system as well; however, due to
soldiers traveling long distances to the RTI for training, it is not as feasible. In addition the instructors who teach at the RTI only have a duty requirement once a month, just like the typical soldier. It would potentially require additional funds to pay for the instructor’s time in the event that training was on a weekend other than what is scheduled.

Because In-unit training is conducted at the unit level, the equipment is an asset at the unit’s disposal. This is a significant advantage for this system. The overriding assumption is that all commands will be much more willing to support equipment requirements internally as opposed to giving them to the TASS BNs for an extended period of time. When the assets are used internally they can be allocated and monitored much more closely. It even provides the flexibility to alternate the use with the typical drill weekend. One can see that this is much more difficult to accomplish when the RTI is one location within the state, and the units are spread all over the state. The coordination efforts required could become a logistical task that is too difficult to support equipment use on multiple weekends. Another advantage to using unit equipment is that the soldier gets training on the exact equipment that he will be using. This is a positive in one aspect, but is a drawback from the perspective that the unit will potentially be fielded more modern equipment over time and the soldier will require training on the newer system, which he would have received training on at the institution. Therefore the unit looses a potential trainer for the newer equipment. Although limited, some classes are not conducted due the difficulty in obtaining a particular system, either the primary called for by the approved courseware or an alternative in the substitution annex of the POI.

Pilot courses for In-unit training were conducted at the Texas and Georgia ARNG for 19D and 11B reclassification training, respectively. Discussions with the TASS BN
accreditation team from the Armor school, determined that the course was conducted; however, according to the armor accreditation team, they did not conduct it in accordance with the prescribed guidelines for In-unit training. Instead training was administered as a mobile training team (MTT) concept, where instructors from the TX RTI s were sent to the unit to train the soldiers. Although this is partially what the program intended to do, it failed to utilize the instructors resident within the MTOE unit. The unit’s equipment was utilized and oversight was provided by the TASS BN, because their representative was the instructor. TASS BN accreditation evaluators can be established as subject matter experts because the program has been accrediting institutions since 1992 and each member of the team has to be qualified in order to perform evaluations. The evaluators also raised the question of accreditation of In-unit training, and although this issue has not been resolved, it was discussed. The popular opinion seems to be that In-unit training will not be accredited, but it will be one of the areas of evaluation for TASS BNs during their accreditation. Obviously if this method of instruction is approved this area will need to be developed with more fidelity in order to ensure quality controls are in place.

Although In-unit training can assist in many MOSs, it will not be able to accommodate a select few. This situation currently exists for MOSs that either have specific limited equipment issues or that the particular training requires resident attendance. Aviation MOSs are good examples of such MOSs that would not conform to the In-unit training model. Others may include certain medical or military intelligence MOSs based on the equipment necessary to provide the training. Theses MOSs constitute a relatively small percentage of the reclassification requirement and have not presented significant challenges to the current system.
Accounting for the training will be an issue that needs to be resolved for In-unit training to be successful. Currently, only the AC and RC institutional schools have the authorizations to schedule and document training in ATRRS, which is the system of record for all training in the Army. The element conducting the training needs to be able to access ATRRS to manage the schedule, document the soldier attendance status, for example, if they began the class, or if terminated during the course due to academic failure or other reasons, and finally to post course completion data. Units currently do not have access to ATRRS to enroll students for training, but they do not have authorization to input potential class start dates or adjust the status of the student scheduled for training. There are several options that would alleviate this problem. The RTI will be directly involved with the In-unit training program, which affords them the ability to support this function. However, the draw back to this proposal lies in the additional workload placed on the RTI staff. A second alternative, but one that involves some potential policy changes would be to provide units the proper authorization levels to manage this process. The pilot did not address this consideration, and as a result further study would be required to determine the best method to manage the process.

**DMOSQ**

Why is DMOSQ important? FORSCOM has determined that it is a readiness indicator for the RC. FORSCOM, in coordination with NGB, determines the RC units that will mobilize in support of current operations. This is the purpose statement presented at the DA Tiger Team meeting in 2003, “We will improve RC DMOSQ in order to mobilize integral units, as well as achieve and sustain the required readiness levels in support of Combatant Commander’s requirements” (Dwyer 2003). FORSCOM
further defined DMOSQ as “the three-digit, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) code that qualifies a soldier in the duty position to which assigned IAW AR 220-1 reporting standards. It includes both reclassification training and initial entry training for all soldiers, officers, warrants, and enlisted” (Dwyer 2003). NCOES is also included as one of the areas for training that affects DMOSQ. The Chief of Staff of the Army in 2002 determined that the RC did not have and adequate DMOSQ rating. He established a requirement of 85percent DMOSQ by 2005. The RC established incremental targets over the next three years to achieve the objective. This progress is tracked and reported through FORSCOM to the CSA. Figure 6 shows the incremental goals established by NGB and USARC progress since FY 2002. The information reflects the percentage attained at the close of each FY. It is important to known that this figure is in constant fluctuation based on the rapid turnover rate in the RC.

![DMOSQ Trends](image)

Figure 6. DMOSQ Trends

*The dotted lines represent the projected trend.

TRADOC commander, General Byrnes had higher expectations for the ARNG as he spoke with them at a senior commander’s conference in February 2004:

I think next year we’ll go to 85[percent], but should 85 be the endstate? I don’t think so, not with a nation at war. I think we’re fooling ourselves because that’s the very lower limit of C-1. We can’t operate at the lower limit when we’re sending troops into combat; I think we need to bump that up to perhaps 90 percent. And we’ve got to fight for the resources. IET is top priority.

He commended their present efforts to improve DMOSQ and stipulated that he would do everything possible to address the resource constraint issues at the DA level. As you can see DMOSQ is priority across the Army from the CSA to the TRADOC commander. RC training issues now have visibility and accountability at the highest echelons.

One of the primary inhibitors in the pursuit of the 85percent DMOSQ goal was and continues to be the high rate of turn-over in the RC. It has been conservatively estimated that the average turn-over is 20 percent. This would include all new recruits, transfers, and losses. One can easily see this poses a significant mathematical challenge in attaining 85 percent DMOSQ. The TRADOC focus team determined that there were numerous data entry and data management errors that were impediments to achieving the DMOSQ goal. This thesis did not discuss some of those problem areas; however, they are no less important in identifying and rectifying the problem.

When looking at the DMOSQ challenge on the whole using Figure 7, one might argue that the reclassification training portion is not where the focus should be placed. True, the largest requirement resides in the initial entry training field; however, initial entry training is the responsibility of TRADOC and can only be managed by the RC. Reclassification training on the other hand, is directly controlled by ARNG and USARC, which provides easy opportunity for change. There is a much shorter timeline for policy
approval and implementation throughout the system. The ARNG has 16,257 soldiers in need of reclassification training based on information reported to FORSCOM in figure 7, which is within the capabilities of the current system to train. But, as it has been identified earlier in this chapter capability has not been the problem in the current system. The problems reside in the inability to accommodate more start dates and the assurance that soldiers scheduled for training will in fact arrive for that training.

Figure 7. Current DMOSQ Challenge
Source: FORSCOM G3/5/7, 1 April 2005

One might question the importance of DMOSQ if soldiers can be deployed when they are not DMOSQ. Although this does happen, it is not the accepted practice. This thesis did not delve into quantitative analysis of this particular problem; however, it is an
area of concern that has not been overlooked as one can clearly see by the involvement of multiple focus groups dedicated to improvement of DMOSQ that it is a priority to insure soldiers are qualified..

**Modularity Impacts**

What impacts will modularity have in reclassification training requirements and is the current RC training structure going to change? The Army school system directorate (TASSD), an element of TRADOC Operations and Training, is working closely with ARNG, USARC and FORSCOM to determine if the current structure is supporting the need. In other words do the capabilities of the TASS BNs support the current requirements? Analysis by TRADOC’s TASSD suggests that several areas in the current RC training institutions are underutilized while others, like Military Police are overloaded. Modularity changes will affect personnel management more so than the training base resulting in an increase of unqualified personnel. The structure changes being reviewed will have impact on the ability and timeliness of training that can be provided during the transition. There will be a potential lag time in the establishment of qualified instructors to support the training requirement change because the instructor must possess the MOS for which he teaches. Unless the individuals held the particular MOS as a secondary, they will have to go through reclassification themselves first; then get certified before they can train others. Therefore it is even more important to capitalize on all potential training options to ensure that reclassification training will not be degraded during this time.

Although the specific increase in numbers is not available yet, it is know that several MOSs will increase. Infantry 11B, Military Police 95B and Transportation 88M
are the leading candidates for significant increases. On the other hand, Field Artillery 13B and Air Defense Artillery 14M will be downsizing. These units will have to transition soldiers to new MOSs. Over time this transformation will have the majority of its impact on IET; however, during the early stages the burden will fall heavily on the reclassification effort. The system needs to be as robust as possible to handle the initial surge.

**Unintended Findings**

This section discusses those findings that resulted from the research but were not a primary focus. The findings may be useful for anyone choosing to conduct follow on research in this same subject area. These are only observations from the author’s research and have not been analyzed.

Through the efforts of the TRADOC DMOSQ focus team it was proposed that ARNG and USARC units might begin to conduct IET training in selected MOSs. Changes do to modularity have affected the AC and the RC in a similar fashion, which strained the current system. This effort is still being drafted and staffed at TRADOC, NGB, USARC and FORSCOM. This could place additional requirements on the system that has not yielded satisfactory results to date; however, this is arguably not a function of the training institution’s ability to conduct the training but more a function of the RC unit commanders enforcing soldier attendance once a training allocation has been dedicated to the service member.

It was also identified through the DMOSQ Tiger Team that one of the factors leading to reduced readiness rates is the process by which FORSCOM used to select and mobilize RC units. It became evident that FORSCOM did not take into account that some
RC units are not resourced at the same levels. The units that FORSCOM wanted were not the units who were funded to operate at the higher readiness levels. As a result, those units with a lower force support package (FSP) rating took longer to prepare and deploy. Training money allocated to the lower FSP units was insufficient to get units to the appropriate training level. It is for this reason that accelerated DMOSQ training was established. It required mobilization of instructors and cadre to conduct accelerated back-to-back training. Instead of the course being conducted once a month for several months followed by the culminating two week resident portion, now the course was conducted in two segments. Both were two weeks in duration and typically they were conducted within close proximity. This method did allow the soldiers to get qualified faster in preparation for mobilization. The main problem was that notification of mobilization did not allow enough lead time for units to schedule soldiers for the necessary training. As mentioned the usual start to complete time for most MOSs is one calendar year. Some units had less than three months to mobilize and deploy. FORSCOM has since devised a new training methodology to mitigate this problem. It is seeking earlier notification to units by establishing the following priorities of effort were Train, Alert, Mobilize and Deploy. The previous system advocated alert, mobilize, train, and deploy. The old system worked very well when the mobilized units had significantly more time at the mobilization station to ensure the training level was appropriate. With the high OPTEMPO today, and the greater need for both combat arms and support elements in theater, the combatant commanders could not afford the extended times the units needed at the mobilization station.
Certain MOSs were projected to increase based on modularity changes. Infantry 11B, basic rifleman, was expected to significantly increase, where Air Defense Artillery 14M was expected to be significantly reduced. Based on future training requirements programmed in ATRRS, the system of record for training, one might argue this assertion. The ATRRS information provided in table 3 illustrates the requirements over the past six years. Fiscal years 2003 and 2004 provide a frame of reference to the past trends and fiscal years 2005 through 2008 look at future requirements.

### Table 3. Requirements Trend Data

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The “SMDR” column simply defines the region in which the requirements will be or were trained. The information depicted is only reclassification training conducted by the RC. Based on the general knowledge that the army needs more infantry soldiers, one would expect to see significant increases in a phased progression to account for modularity. This data does not support that notion. Although there are some sporadic
increases, it is not the steady progressive model one might expect, nor is it a front-loaded build where the bulk of the increase would take place in the early years, fiscal years 2005 through 2006. Based on this limited comparison, it appears that there is no systematic plan to increase requirements in this area; however, this process has the capability to continually adjust each year until execution. It is entirely possible that through this refinement process the requirements will be adjusted to fit the need.

In summary, chapter 4 has reviewed the current system and identified the significant areas that are not supporting the goal of increasing DMOSQ. In-unit training was critically analyzed to determine what benefit it would bring to the current education system. The importance of DMOSQ was emphasized and reinforced by revealing the specific interest of FORCOM and the CSA as evidenced by their establishment of a Tiger Team in order to bring the appropriate level of effort into resolving a complex issue for the RC. The chapter closed by discussing some of the unexpected or unintended finding as a result of the research.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Many thousands of members of the National Guard and other Ready Reserve components of the US Armed Forces have been called to active duty for Operation DESERT STORM. The service of the Guard and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines will be crucial to the American victory over Iraqi aggression. (Cheney)

The need for the RC to play in integral part in major theater operations is not something new. As seen by the quote above the armed forces have relied on the RC to supplement AC forces during times of war and have continued to support in current Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In some cases the RC is the main effort for the operations, such as the Balkans. Understanding this, one could infer that there has never been a more important time in RC history to be prepared to support and augment AC forces. It is incumbent on the senior leaders of these great forces to ensure that readiness levels are optimized.

In this thesis, the author has presented a concept to augment and support the current education system in order to improve DMOSQ of RC soldiers to increase readiness levels, which ultimately leads to reduced preparation during mobilization and allows support to the combatant commander to arrive on station in a more timely manner.

The current system has provided for reclassification training needs since DESERT STORM; however, it does not satisfy the current OPTEMPO requirements. Combatant commanders are requiring more and more personnel to maintain the foothold established. When the RC is called upon to mobilize in support of this effort, they need to be able to spend the minimal amount of time in the mobilization station to support this effort. In
order to support this need the current training system must become more flexible in a number of ways.

This thesis identified reclassification training as an area for improvement needed in the RC. It was proposed that In-unit training would provide a viable means to increase DMOSQ. Is this accomplishable with in the limitations of the system? The answer to this question is yes and here is why. By electing to establish a program like In-unit training, the ARNG has the ability to make policy and execution changes that do not require extensive external coordination. This allows the change to occur with much less friction and improves the timeliness of decisions from the headquarters level to the execution at the line units.

The flexibility provided by In-unit training will allow unit commanders more options to get their soldiers qualified by increasing the training opportunities available for reclassification training. This sets the conditions to allow for more collective training opportunities at the unit. The obvious advantage being, the more collective training done at the unit the less time required at the mobilization station. In-unit training is not intended to take the place of the current system, and could not feasibly support such a large mission. However, it could easily integrate into the current system, which would provide additional training opportunities for those soldiers who arrive at a unit during a time period that does not coincide with the historical start dates for training in the current year. If In-unit training is implemented, the soldier and his commander do not have to stand idly by for up to a year until the next training opportunity presents itself.

A challenge for the RTI is getting instructors. The units do not want to give up their qualified sergeants to school to teach because it causes a void in the leadership of
that unit. Under the In-unit training concept the sergeant who teaches does not become temporarily separated from the unit while performing teaching duties. It affords the instructor the opportunity to stay actively engaged with the activities of his subordinates in the unit. It allows the commander the ability to keep that leader included in the progress or needs of the unit instead of being separated and attached to the schoolhouse with no unit interaction. It should be noted that the use of these NCOs could potentially affect the ability to conduct collective training because they would be engaged in reclassification training but if the commander manages this program, it should not have significant impact.

In-unit training is a much-improved concept over OJT. The quality control measures that are proposed will be vital to its success. The extensive involvement of the TASS BN or RTI ensures that training is conducted to the highest standards. The RTI provides the linkage of the unit and the proponent school to ensure that the instruction is in accordance with the POI and has incorporated elements of the common operational environment; to include the latest lessons learned information from current operations. This linkage to the MTOE unit and the training institution would not be as readily available if the unit were conducting In-unit training. This linkage is created because of the newly established relationship of the RTI and the MTOE unit, which provides ready access to information pushed down from the proponent schools through the RTIs and ultimately to the line units.

Regarding the involvement of the RTI one must recognize that supporting In-unit training involves significantly more work for an element that is already engaged in training its requirements as well. The staff for the RTI is not as robust as it should be, due
primarily to funding, and this additional requirement to support an extension campus for training will be very demanding, especially during the developmental stages of the program. The pilots that were conducted should have provided a little more clarity to this potential problem; however, the pilots were not conducted in strict accordance with the proposed guidelines for In-unit training, therefore the information regarding this aspect of support is not documented. The Armor school noted that the pilots seemed to focus on taking the training to the soldier in the form of mobile training teams (MTTs). The instructors came from the RTI instead of being selected internally from the line unit, which was not part of the pilot, but the MTT did provide instruction at the unit instead of at the RTI. The pilot did not reveal any pertinent information on the expected challenges of providing classroom materials, entering student enrollment data into ATRRS, or what the impact of supporting such operations had on the RTI. One might imagine that additional pilots would need to be conducted to ascertain answers to these questions. It would seem likely that given NGB’s close relationship with the vendors who developed ATRRS, adjustments could be made to the system if current policy was changed, thereby allowing units to update enrollment information and status to support In Unit Training.

One of the potential problem areas regarding management of In-unit training is the ability to provide resourcing for the necessary supplies to conduct the course. NGB issues the training funds to the individual state headquarters. The states headquarters in turn manage the distribution of funds to both the MTOE units and the RTIs. The RTIs and the MTOE units fall under separate chains of command. In light of the chain of command differences, there is a potential that coordination could be difficult at times based on the different priorities of each. An example is when a RTI needs to coordinate
for equipment. The RTI does not own any of the equipment necessary for training and thus must get the equipment through the MTOE units. If the units cannot support the borrowing of equipment it could potentially prevent the course from being conducted. Additionally, one point of control minimizes the possibilities of funds being diverted to other areas of need because it has the proper oversight. Additionally, it provides the HQ with the ability to monitor and measure success of the program.

As with all training, it is the commander’s responsibility to ensure that training is free from distractions. In-unit training will typically be conducted and home station, which makes it vulnerable to distractions. It is incumbent on the commander to ensure the instructors and students can focus on reclassification training and not be given separate tasks that distract the training mission.

There are additional elements working on improving DMOSQ simultaneously; the CSA Tiger Team, the TRADOC focus team, FORSCOM, TASSD and NGB. Each element has specific areas of focus. Although attacking DMOSQ through improving reclassification training will assist in the grand scheme, it is imperative that all efforts of these activities be synchronized to ensure unity of effort and ultimately more DMOSQ soldiers are produced.

One of the more significant developments from the ongoing studies has been the proposed restructure of the current RC training base. This could potentially offset the necessity for In-unit training. The study has indicated that the current system has resources, primarily instructors; allocated in such a manner that maximum efficiency is not being obtained. It is proposed that realignment is necessary in order to compensate for the flux in requirements across all MOSs. This is currently under review with NGB,
USARC, TRADOC and FORSCOM. This study, which is spearheaded by TASSD, has identified the MOSs that have excess resources such as instructors or requirements, based on historical throughput or graduating students. If adjustments are made to the structure it could have an effect on the issue of start dates. By increasing the instructors, and staff, the school, in coordination with the customer units, could provide sufficient start date possibilities in order to meet the needs of the line units and thus produce more qualified soldiers. This restructure is managed by NGB so if in fact the structure is changed the feasibility of In-unit training could be assessed internally.

Notification of specific units must start much earlier if DMOSQ is to improve. In this way the units can ensure the maximum numbers of qualified soldiers are available for mobilization. FORSCOM, TRADOC, DA G3, NGB, and USARC participate in the DA Tiger Team meetings and are very well aware of the need to improve this process. They are currently working initiatives in congress to change the laws regarding mobilization for training. FORSCOM has also established close coordination with TRADOC, NGB and USARC to notify units earlier, and prioritize the available training allocations to support and expedite the mobilization process. Prioritized critical MOSs have been established, which allows both AC and RC training institutions to focus efforts to support this demand.

Based on the multiple focus groups dedicated to the DMOSQ problem, it is clear that the Army views this issue as critical. This thesis has offered a new method of improving DMOSQ, which will augment the current system and produce higher readiness to support the necessity of more trained units for mobilization. In this regard, FORSCOM’s endstate in the RC DMOSQ campaign plan is closer to fruition. Efforts
must not stop there, if DMOSQ is to be sustained. As this research has pointed out, there
are systemic problems in the structuring of the training force, the inability of the RC to
fill all the allocations provided for training, the continual under funding of training, and
the RC mobilization process, specifically the notification process.

The reality of American forces being deployed on multiple fronts conducting
various operations will persist for an undeterminable amount of time. It appears that the
force will not grow substantially in the near term as well. As a result the RC must
maintain it vigilance and be prepared to mobilize and serve as required. Therefore it is
imperative that all the elements working to improve DMOSQ continue their efforts in a
unified manner to ensure that the education system can produce the highest quality
soldiers possible to prosecute the actions necessary when called upon. The Army owes it
to it’s most valuable resource, the Soldier, to get it right.
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