

AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

THE FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENT FOR
AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE

Edward H. Houle. Lt Col. USAF
National War College
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the National War College or any other governmental agency.

"At the heart of the problem there lies the basic fact that two separate peoples lay claim to one and the same country"¹

ZALMAN SHOVAL

"Wishful thinking aside, between the rights of the Palestinian people and the claims of Israel there can be no compromise. They are mutually exclusive."²

FAYEZ SAYEGH

PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

-THE DOOR IS CRACKED OPEN - MAYBE-

Over the past several months, the United States has attempted to orchestrate a series of meetings between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Diplomats hope that these talks will eventually lead to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not surprisingly, this latest effort is proving to be a long and arduous task.

However, despite the best intentions of the United States, this attempt to foster a dialogue between the warring parties will not, by itself, produce the desired result - a comprehensive peace between the Arab nations and Israel. A successful effort will require much more from the United States. A report from The Brookings Institute says that "bold new initiatives" are needed, initiatives that involve a "wedding of American power to the purposes of the diplomacy of peace."³ It could be right.

The history of this issue also dictates that the United States rethink its Middle East policy, particularly as it applies to the Palestinian issue and the concept of an independent Palestinian state.

I believe that it's time for the United States to recognize that a lasting peace between the Arabs and Israel will only come when the area's Palestinian Arab population has its own independent homeland. More importantly, I believe that this is in the national interest of the United States.

This paper will explore that argument. After outlining the problem, Part Two (Background and History) will address the major historical events that have played a role in developing the Palestinian issue. History has a major impact on the people of this region, and it is an important ingredient for those attempting to understand the issues. This background will focus on the development of national policies by those entities involved in the current peace process. This specifically means the United States, Israel, "moderate" Arab nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The 1978 Camp David accords provide the overall international framework for addressing the Palestinian issue. However, the primary parties have further defined their positions in additional policy documents. The foundation of United States policy is outlined by the 1982 Reagan Plan. For the moderate Arab states, the 1982 Fez Plan provides a framework for addressing the issue. Israeli policy can be traced to the 1989 Shamir Plan (for Likud) and the earlier Allon Plan (for Labor). The PLO policy has evolved from the 1968 PLO Charter to the November 1988 PLO declarations. Radical Arab states and organizations, on the other hand, have no policy beyond the annihilation of Israel. Part Two will look at each of these plans in more detail because they provide the basis for current policy on this

issue and help explain the positions of these "players" in the current peace talks.

In Part Three (A Lasting Peace), I'll outline my thoughts on why the option of a Palestinian state represents the best choice for long-term peace and stability in the region. The primary issue focuses on balancing the legitimate security requirements of Israel with the legitimate right of self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs in the hopes of establishing an environment conducive to a lasting peace.

In Part Four, I'll describe where I believe United States policy should focus. I'm proposing a very active involvement by the United States, one that attempts to wed American power to a strategy of peace. That proposed policy targets three primary groups - Israel, moderate Arab states and the Palestinians. It's objective is to use an Israeli settlement freeze in the occupied territories as a springboard for reciprocal Arab action to build positive momentum for the peace process. Without a very active and forceful United States involvement, the chance of seeing peace in that region of the world is greatly diminished.

Part Five will complete the paper with a short conclusion on this very demanding topic.

-WHY EVEN GET INVOLVED?-

The Middle East has suffered from five major Arab-Israeli wars and almost constant military tension since 1948. This conflict has produced 240,000 casualties and almost 100,000 dead. Between 1980 and 1990, the two sides spent over \$500 billion on new arms. This accounted for over 35 percent of the world's total arms trade and was almost twice the

combined amount spent by NATO and the WARSAW Pact for the same period.⁴ This chronic instability and growing threat to peace have had a serious impact on United States' regional interests as well as implications for the world as a whole.

An Arab-Israeli peace "while challenging and complex, is necessary if American interests in the region are to be protected."⁵ At least that's the feeling of The Brookings Institute. The United States' interests include (but are not limited to):

- The free flow of oil.
- Long-term regional security.
- The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and the means of delivering them.
- The advancement of human rights throughout the region.⁶

President Reagan, in a September 1, 1982 address outlining his peace proposal for the Arab-Israeli conflict, underscored American interest in this region when he said that "the strategic importance of the region to the U.S. is well known...Our involvement in the search for mid-East peace is not a matter of choice, it is a moral imperative."⁷ In the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush committed the United States to a continued effort to find "a comprehensive peace and true reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians."⁸

If the Arab-Israeli conflict is not resolved, there is little doubt that tensions will eventually escalate resulting in a major military confrontation. Additional contentious issues are already aggravating the problem and may provide the spark for a sixth Arab-Israeli war. For

example, regional disputes over water could easily bring the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) into battle with neighboring Arab armies.

If that happens, it may be very difficult for the United States to avoid being drawn into the conflict. American ties to Israel, although strained in recent months, would not allow the United States to watch Israel suffer a crippling military defeat. Israeli threats to use nuclear weapons could easily prompt the United States to get involved with military forces. American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines could become enmeshed in a very costly military conflict.

The idea of "wedding" American power to diplomatic efforts is fully consistent with the new emerging United States national military strategy. However, if the diplomatic effort is not successful, the Arab-Israeli conflict could provide the first real challenge for the United States' new "regionally oriented" defense strategy.⁹ Therefore, it should be easy to see that the United States has a vested interest in helping to establish a long-term peace in the Middle East.

-THE PALESTINIANS ARE KEY-

Over the years, the Palestinian issue has emerged as the core problem in this lingering Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict that remains very intense even today.

"Time has not lessened the passions of those who fight for or defend their rights in Palestine; but it has changed the equation between them. Throughout the first half of the century, the Jewish community in Palestine struggled for a foothold in the land and for international recognition of the legitimacy of its endeavors. In the second half of the century, Palestinians have found themselves in a similar situation."¹⁰

Labor Party Leader Yitzhak Rabin emphasized the importance of the Palestinian issue during a February 3, 1992 interview when he said, "the most important thing in Israel's interest now is the Palestinian status in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."¹¹ Zalman Shoval, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, seemed to agree with this viewpoint when he wrote that a realistic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must satisfy "the distinctive national and cultural aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs."¹² Ambassador Shoval is right. The question is how to do this?

The United States finds itself in a new position in 1992. American prestige and respect among Middle East countries is higher now than just about any time since World War II. This resulted from the success of the Persian Gulf War, the favorable outcome of the Cold War, and the resulting disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The United States is uniquely positioned to have a great influence for peace in this region of the world. But, time is critical. According to Shimon Peres, a past Israeli Prime Minister and former leader of the Labor Party, "we do not have much time to take advantage of the new influence that the Persian Gulf War bestowed upon...the U.S."¹³

However, before discussing 1992, it's very important to first examine the background and evolution of the Palestinian issue.

"Arab declarations about the need to liberate all the Palestinian land...[do] not exist anymore."¹⁴

SULAYMAN AL-NAJJAB

PART TWO - BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

-ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE AND THE PALESTINIAN DIASPORA-

Israel declared itself an independent state on May 14, 1948. The declaration came as a result of the 1947 United Nations vote to end the British mandate in Palestine and partition the area into two separate states - one Jewish and one Arab. According to the United Nations plan, Jerusalem was to become an international city, open to all but belonging to neither country. The Jews, led by David Ben Gurion, accepted the plan for partition. However, it was rejected by the neighboring Arab governments as well as the Arab Supreme Committee for Palestine, the representative body for Arabs living in the disputed region.¹⁵

The issue was eventually settled on the battlefield. When the 1948 war ended with a cease fire, Israel controlled 77 percent of what had been known before the war as Palestine. With the land came a population of 1.35 million people; 600,000 Jews and 750,000 Arabs. Of the 750,000 Arabs, only 160,000 remained in Israel. The rest abandoned their homes, land and businesses. One-third fled to the West Bank, another one-third moved to the Gaza Strip and the remainder spread throughout Transjordan (East Bank), Lebanon and Syria. The Palestinian diaspora had begun.¹⁶

Egypt exercised administrative control over the Gaza district while Transjordan managed the West Bank, to include East Jerusalem. The new State of Israel claimed the rest of what had been Palestine. In 1950,

Transjordan formally annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem, reconstructing itself as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While Jordan extended citizenship to the Palestinian Arabs within its new borders, the annexation was not supported by the other Arab nations of the region.¹⁷

-THE 1967 WAR AND THE ALLON PLAN-

This territorial arrangement persisted until June 1967 when Israel captured the West Bank (with East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in the third Arab-Israeli war. This brought a majority of Palestinian Arabs under the control of Israeli occupation and created a major refugee problem with the second Palestinian diaspora. The United Nations estimates that over 150,000 Palestinians fled the occupied West Bank in 1967 to become refugees in Jordan.¹⁸

On November 22, 1967, in response to the June 1967 Six-Day War, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 242 which the United States and most Arab nations accepted as a "just foundation for peace". The resolution stated that:

- All states in the Middle East (including Israel) had the right to exist as sovereign, independent nations within "secure and recognized boundaries."
- All nations must work for a "just settlement" to the Palestinian refugee problem.
- Israel must withdraw its "armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."¹⁹

Shortly after the 1967 war, the ruling Labor Party in Israel proposed its own plan for resolving the issue of the occupied territories. The so-called Allon Plan, named for former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, remained the basis for territorial discussions in the ruling Labor Party from 1967 until its election defeat ten years later. Its provisions still influence Labor Party policy regarding the occupied territories today.

The plan included a partial territorial compromise where Israel retained a "forward defensive belt" in the Jordan Valley and along the mountain ridge parallel to and overlooking the Jordan River. This meant that the West Bank would remain a security buffer for Israel. The heavily Palestinian western regions of the West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip, would be transferred to Jordanian control. Under the plan, Jordan would be granted access to its "new" territory through a corridor in the Israeli defensive belt. It would also be offered transit rights through Israel to Gaza and the Mediterranean Sea. This new Jordanian territory would remain demilitarized with Jordan deploying only enough force in the area to maintain law and order.²⁰

The Allon Plan was designed to rid Israel of the Palestinian problem without losing military control over the strategic regions of the West Bank. The territorial compromise left Israel as a Jewish state while "giving the Palestinians a channel for political expression in a Jordanian-Palestinian state."²¹ Not surprisingly, the plan was rejected by the Arab world.

-THE PLO CHARTER-

The Arabs saw Israel as "a covetous, expansionist state seeking to fulfill its manifest destiny by seizing Arab lands."²² It is important to note that prior to the 1967 war, few Palestinians supported the idea of a separate and distinct Palestinian entity. It seemed "to contradict the essence of Arab unity."²³ Further, the Arab states themselves saw a separate Palestinian nation as a direct challenge to their own authority. However, the Israeli occupation changed that. As a result of the 1967 war, the question of Palestinian self-determination became an important issue.

With this new movement supporting Palestinian self-determination, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as a predominant voice in the struggle.²⁴ In July 1968, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the 430-member voting body of the PLO, adopted an amended charter which outlined its ultimate aim as "the total liberation of Palestine from Zionist control." The PLO goal "was tantamount to the destruction of the existing political-social-economic system of the Jewish state."²⁵ The PLO, with its many factions, employed random violence, guerrilla warfare and terrorism in its "armed struggle" to "liberate Palestine".

After the Israeli victory in the October 1973 war, the Arab nations and the PLO saw the chance of an "ultimate total victory" fade away. The PLO was urged by Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet Union to modify its aims. On February 19, 1974, the two largest and most moderate PLO factions (Fatah and Salqa) were joined by the Popular Democratic Front

for the Liberation of Palestine (PDLFP) in approving "a document calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state in any parts of the occupied areas evacuated by Israel." The idea of a Palestinian "mini-state" was born.²⁶

The concept of a Palestinian "mini-state" was officially adopted by the PNC at the Twelfth Palestinian National Council in June-July 1974. However, the move created a split in the PLO. Moderate groups endorsed the proposal, but radical "rejectionists" factions like George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) refused to modify their goal of liberating all of Palestine through armed struggle.²⁷

At the October 1974 Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco, the Arab world designated the PLO as "the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The conference communique supported the concept of a Palestinian "mini-state" when the Arab League resolved:

- "To affirm the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to return to their homeland."
- "To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization... in any Palestinian territory that is liberated."²⁸

International support followed shortly behind the Arab League action. On November 22, 1974, the PLO was "recognized by the General Assembly of the U.N. as the representative of the Palestinian people in its resolution 3210."²⁹ On the next day, November 23, the U.N. granted "observer status" to the PLO.³⁰

By 1976, the PLO had gained the support of a majority of Palestinians living in the occupied territories. During local elections

on the West Bank, Palestinians heavily favored candidates linked to the PLO over candidates who supported King Hussein of Jordan.³¹

After 1967, most Palestinian refugees remained stateless. Those living in the refugee camps existed in squalid conditions and depended heavily on subsidies from charitable organizations and the United Nations. However, those who made homes and integrated into the Arab societies in the West Bank and Gaza enjoyed some prosperity as a byproduct of Labor Party policies.³² That changed with the May 1977 Israeli elections.

-THE LIKUD AND CAMP DAVID-

In 1977, after almost 30 years as the opposition party in Israel, the conservative Likud Party finally wrestled control of the government away from the Labor Party. Menachem Begin's Likud formed a coalition with the largest religious faction, the National Religious Party, and other smaller right wing groups, to create a new Israeli government. Occupation policies under this more conservative government became increasingly repressive. The relative prosperity that Palestinians in the occupied territories had enjoyed under the Labor government began to disappear.

The Likud has controlled the Israeli government almost continuously since 1977, first with Menachem Begin as its Prime Minister and, since 1983, with Yitzhak Shamir as its leader. The only break came during a two year timespan in 1984 and 1985. During this 25-month period, Shimon Peres of the Labor Party was the Prime Minister of Israel leading a Labor/Likud coalition in a National Unity Government.

Despite retrenchment and stricter occupation policies under the Likud, a major breakthrough in the conflict resulted from the bold initiative of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. His historic visit to Israel in November 1977 eventually resulted in the Camp David accords. The accords, signed on September 17, 1978 by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, included two basic documents. The first, "A Framework for the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel", outlined procedures for establishing a formal peace between the two nations.³³

The second document, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East", set forth "the conditions for a broad and comprehensive resolution of the Middle East conflict, and especially, for solving the Palestinian problem that remained at its core". It was accepted "in principle" by both Egypt and Israel.³⁴

The negotiations on bilateral issues under the first framework went well and resulted in a formal peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979. The treaty included a provision for the return of the Sinai to Egypt. In a joint letter to President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin pledged to "proceed with the implementation of those provisions relative to the West Bank and Gaza", referring to the Camp David "Framework for Peace in the Middle East."³⁵ However, despite this assurance, negotiations on the Palestinian issue made little progress.

Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan joined the rest of the Arab world (with the exception of Oman and the Sudan) in condemning Egypt and refusing to support the Egyptian-Israeli talks on the

Palestinian issue. The talks continued anyway. The Camp David "framework", the basis for the negotiations, provided that:

- Inhabitants of the occupied territories would elect a self-governing authority (administrative council). This body would have "full autonomy" during a transition period and would be guided by the "principle of self-government" and the "legitimate security concerns" of all parties.
- There would be a transition period, not exceeding five years, as a period of self government. As soon as possible after initiation of the self-governing authority, but no later than three years after the start of the transition period, negotiations would begin to determine the final status of the occupied territories.
- Upon election of the administrative council, Israel's military government and civilian administration would withdraw from the occupied territories. Israeli military forces would "partially withdraw and partially redeploy into specific security locations."
- Egypt and Israel would invite Jordan and a Palestinian delegation to join the negotiations on the self-governing authority.
- United Nations Resolution 242, which recognizes the legitimate rights and security needs of all, would provide the foundation for the negotiations.³⁶

However, the negotiations did not go well. There were three basic issues at the heart of the disagreement between Egypt and Israel. First, the two sides disagreed on the nature and scope of Palestinian autonomy and the idea of Palestinian self-determination. Second, disagreement arose concerning new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Israel intended to build new settlements in apparent violation of at least the spirit of the Camp David accords. Finally, the two sides differed greatly on who was the legitimate spokesman for the Palestinian people. Despite Egypt's contention that the PLO was the

single legitimate spokesman, Israel refused to acknowledge what it labeled a terrorist organization.

The fundamental problem between Israel and Egypt ultimately focused on the final status of the occupied territories. Egypt favored autonomy for the Palestinians as an interim measure eventually leading to an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. Israel, however, made it clear that the final status of the occupied territories would include local Palestinian autonomy with a continued Israeli occupation. Israel refused "to accept any political boundaries between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River." The United States, represented by American envoy Robert Strauss and later by Ambassador Sol Linowitz, generally agreed with the Egyptian position but stopped short of endorsing an independent Palestinian state.³⁷

Claiming that the Camp David accords called only for a temporary moratorium on new settlements, Israel began new building projects in the occupied territories in mid-summer 1979, just three months after signing a peace treaty with Egypt.³⁸ Israel defended the new construction on both security and ideological grounds claiming that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) belonged to Israel.

The autonomy talks were scheduled to end by May 26, 1980. Between mid-summer 1979 and early May 1980, the two sides made virtually no progress. Israeli construction in the occupied territories continued, and waves of Arab violence spread throughout the area. When the Israeli Knesset entertained a motion to formally annex East Jerusalem, President Sadat, sensing little hope for progress in the negotiations, unilaterally suspended the autonomy talks on May 8, 1980. During the

following month, on June 30, the Knesset voted to annex East Jerusalem as a permanent part of Israel. In 1981, Israel also annexed the Golan Heights, territory captured from Syria in the 1967 war.³⁹

In Egypt's view, Israel's hold on the West Bank and Gaza "appeared to be motivated not only by perceived security needs but also by the kind of expansionist tendency that the Arabs had long associated with Zionism."⁴⁰ This view would continue in the minds of many for years to come.

-THE REAGAN AND FEZ PLANS-

The early 1980's brought great turmoil in the Middle East. The Shah had been deposed in Iran and replaced by a radical Islamic regime. Iraq started a prolonged war with Iran, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. Israel invaded Lebanon, and U.S. Marines were killed at Beirut.

While President Carter had played an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, President Reagan adopted a more passive approach. Viewing the increased Middle East strife in a global perspective that focused on the Soviet Union, the new administration reserved its diplomatic effort until both sides indicated they were ready for serious negotiations. The administration believed that "the more the parties came to depend on Washington...the less likely they would be prepared to deal directly with one another."⁴¹

However, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and evacuation of the PLO from Beirut prompted the United States to take more action. On September 1, 1982, the administration released a United States proposal

for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict - the Reagan Plan. It reinforced the United States commitment to the Camp David agreement and United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. In an effort to "reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians", the plan called for "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan."⁴² The administration did not favor an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories nor did it support annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. The plan also called for an immediate freeze to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

The proposal was immediately rejected by the Israeli government on September 2, during an emergency session of the Knesset. This was followed by a formal Knesset vote on the proposal on September 8. Although the Reagan Plan was supported by the Labor Party, it was rejected by a 50 to 36 vote.⁴³ In Israel's official response to the Reagan Plan, the government seriously questioned provisions of the proposal regarding internal security, a settlement freeze, and the definition of "full autonomy" over land and water. The Likud government maintained that the Reagan Plan seriously deviated from the Camp David accords and "created a serious danger to Israel." Israel refused to relinquish control of internal security to "the terrorist organization called the PLO". It declared that settlements in the occupied territories were a "Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of our national security." Israel also adamantly rejected any concept of an independent Palestinian state.⁴⁴

The Palestinians, while acknowledging that the Reagan Plan contained some positive aspects (i.e. a settlement freeze), rejected the other provisions of the proposal. At the Palestinian National Council at Algiers in February 1983, the Palestinians stated that the plan "failed to conform to international legality and did not provide for the attainment...of their inalienable rights of return and self-determination." According to the PNC, the plan "did not constitute a valid basis for a just and durable settlement."⁴⁵ The Arab League offered the Fez Plan as an alternative.

The Fez Plan, so named because it resulted from the Arab League Summit at Fez, Morocco on September 8, 1982, represented the Arab League proposal for solving the conflict. The plan's five major points called for:

- The dismantling of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
- Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
- Palestinian self-determination under PLO leadership.
- The establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital.
- Compensation for Palestinians who left their homes in what was now Israel as a result of the conflict.⁴⁶

At the Fez Summit, the Arab world (with a few exceptions from radical Arab states) also announced that it would endorse any solution to the West Bank and Gaza issue that a majority of Palestinians found acceptable.⁴⁷ Israel immediately rejected the Arab proposal reiterating "its opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967."⁴⁸

King Hassan II of Morocco attempted to break the stalemate in July 1986. Without consulting with the PLO or other Arab nations, King Hassan invited Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to meet him at his summer residence in Ifrane, Morocco. The meetings, which lasted for two days, focused on finding some agreement based on the Fez Plan. The meetings failed because Prime Minister Peres rejected two principal Arab demands; Arab insistence that Israel negotiate directly with the PLO and that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories. The meetings were condemned by the rest of the Arab world.⁴⁹

-THE INTIFADA AND A NEW PLO-

The "most important new fact in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle" began on December 9, 1987. This "explosion of Arab violence", called the "Intifada", had "serious, far-reaching and growing" consequences for both sides. More than civil disobedience but less than a full armed revolt, the Intifada "tended to galvanize an already existing Palestinian national consciousness across class, clan and geographic lines."⁵⁰

At the same time, the PLO began to move further toward what Graham Fuller, a senior political scientist with the Rand Corporation, calls a new "realism." In 1974, the PLO had begun to modify its earlier goal of reclaiming all of Palestine from the Zionists through an armed struggle. It adopted the idea of a "mini-state." By 1987, it began to view a fully independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza as far more realistic than any ultimate military victory over Israel.⁵¹ The idea

of an independent state received support when King Hussein of Jordan dropped all claims to the West Bank on July 31, 1988 and decided to cooperate with the PLO for an independent Palestinian homeland.⁵²

By the end of 1988, the PLO had also mounted a new diplomatic offensive. In November, the Palestinian National Council "recognized the legitimacy of a two-state political solution, renounced terrorism, and conditionally accepted Israel's existence linked to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state."⁵³ While many called the announcement ambiguous at best, others believed that the PLO had recognized Israel's right to exist. The PLO had apparently accepted United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 while "earnestly and seriously" seeking a peace settlement with the Jewish state.⁵⁴

The Palestinian National Council also declared the establishment of the State of Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza. It named a provisional government headed by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.⁵⁵

As far as the United States was concerned, the PLO initiative was a major step towards peace. The PLO had met the three conditions set down by the administration for direct United States-PLO talks. The PLO had recognized Israel, accepted United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. As a result, on December 14, 1988, Secretary of State Schultz agreed to open a direct dialogue with the PLO. This was a "transforming moment in the history of Arab-Israeli relations", and established the Palestinian question as the primary issue in the longstanding conflict.⁵⁶

However, this new "moderate" PLO position was not universally accepted. Israel rejected it as a ploy to cover true PLO aims. Radical

Arab groups, like George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas, the militant arm of the Moslem Brotherhood, rejected the announcement and called for the total defeat of Israel and the continuation of their armed struggle. Like the "moderate" PLO, these radical groups wanted an independent Palestinian state, but viewed it only as an "interim step to the eventual extinction of Israel."⁵⁷

Seven months after declaring statehood, Arafat's new policies received the blessings of the Arab world at the May 1989 Arab Summit in Casablanca. The summit supported the PLO's "peace initiative", its acceptance of Israel's right to exist, and its renunciation of terrorism. By the end of 1989, more than 100 governments throughout the world had granted recognition to the new State of Palestine.⁵⁸

-THE SHAMIR PLAN-

Under pressure at home to be more accommodating in the face of the intifada, and with some gentle prodding from the new Secretary of State James Baker, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir presented his own proposal for dealing with the Palestinian issue on May 14, 1989. The Shamir Plan joined America's Reagan Plan, the Arabs' Fez Plan, and the recent PLO declarations to provide the final policy statement for the main participants in the conflict. However, the proposal was essentially a "non-starter."⁵⁹ Negotiations with the PLO were completely ruled out and Israel insisted that "there will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the government."⁶⁰

Prime Minister Shamir's plan, which was derived from the Camp David accords, called for "free and democratic elections among the Palestinian inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District". The election would choose representatives for talks leading to a "transitional period of self-rule." Negotiations for a permanent solution would be held later. The proposal was not considered a bold plan by the Arab world. In fact, by calling for elections in the occupied territories, Israel intended to completely exclude the PLO from the process. The Israeli government also hoped to avoid any discussion of a pact that traded land for peace.⁶¹

The Shamir Plan received a hostile reception by the PLO and the Arab League. According to them, the proposal failed to address the vital issues of Palestinian self-determination and desire for an independent state. The legitimacy of the proposed elections was called into question because the Shamir Plan denied participation to Arab residents of East Jerusalem, refused to accept PLO candidates and rejected neutral international observers to monitor the election. The Palestinians rejected the plan because "no honest or productive negotiations could occur when one party was dictating who the participants could be, what the agenda would be, and what outcomes were considered unacceptable."⁶²

While the Arab nations and the PLO immediately rejected the Shamir Plan, Washington still seized it. "Almost any election proposal, creatively handled, could lead to a legitimate Palestinian political body that could...serve as a basis...for future talks."⁶³

On May 22, eight days after Prime Minister Shamir unveiled his plan, Secretary of State Baker responded by calling on the Arab nations to end their economic boycott of Israel and turn the Intifada into a constructive dialogue with the Jewish state. He urged Israel to give up the "unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel", to stop settlement activity in the occupied territories, and to "reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights." Neither side accepted. Israel, linking Secretary Baker's initiative to the Reagan Plan, continued to reject any proposal that hinted at a settlement freeze and territorial concessions. The Arab world refused to discuss any plan unless it included some provision for Palestinian self-determination.⁶⁴

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed his own peace plan later in 1989. This ten-point proposal attempted to bridge the gap between the Israeli position, as outlined by the Shamir Plan, and the Arab position, as defined by the Fez Plan. However, President Mubarak's proposal still fell short of addressing the Palestinians' basic requirements, and still went too far in proposing Israeli concessions. Despite President Mubarak's proposal, and Secretary Baker's additional five-point initiative, both Israel and the Arab world refused to moderate their positions.⁶⁵

-THE STALEMATE-

From December 1988 until the Spring of 1990, the United States tried to start talks between Israel and the Palestinians. The attempts failed. By the Fall of 1990, that emphasis had shifted away from the

Palestinians. United States efforts focused instead on creating a dialogue between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries.

However, the Palestinian problem had grown since 1948, and it was not going away. Israel now had a population of 4.82 million people; 3.95 million Jews and 870,000 non-Jews. It now occupied territory that held 1.527 million Palestinian Arabs; 915,000 in the West Bank and 612,000 in the Gaza Strip. In 1991, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency reported that the total count of Palestinian refugees (in the occupied territories and neighboring Arab countries) exceeded 2.5 million people. A majority lived in the West Bank and Gaza with the remainder scattered across Jordan (960,000), Syria and Lebanon (650,000 combined).⁶⁶

The intifada was also beginning to have an impact. Israel was feeling the economic effects, morale in the military was deteriorating and Israeli public opinion split over government policies to battle the movement.

"As the intifada continues, increasing numbers of Israelis are apparently disturbed at the political, economic, moral, societal, and international implications for Israel in its attempts to crush the intifada and Palestinian aspirations."⁶⁷

In response to the intifada, Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin (a former Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister) acknowledged "that there is no military solution to the Palestinian problem." Israeli military operations "seem less designed to quell the uprising than to hold the line until a political solution is found."⁶⁸ The occupied territories and the Palestinian problem have become major issues in the June 1992 parliamentary elections in Israel.

Assuming that this problem has indeed become the predominant issue, the question becomes - What now? Great disagreement exists between the various "plans" for a lasting solution. The moderate Arab states and the PLO want an independent Palestinian state. Israel is adamantly opposed to that solution and insists on a permanent Israeli presence in the occupied territories. The United States believes that yet another option, linking the occupied territories to Jordan as part of the Hashemite Kingdom, provides the best chance for success. And, a group of radical Arab states and organizations still advocate continuing the armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine from "Zionist Israel."

Part Three will examine each position more closely (except the radical Arab solution, which warrants no examination).

"There is more to Peace than the absence of war."⁶⁹

DAN MERIDOR

PART THREE - A LASTING PEACE

-WHAT IS THE BEST OPTION?-

The true measure of success will be the realization of a final solution to the Palestinian issue that is acceptable to both sides. The question for the United States isn't really what form the final solution should take. A careful evaluation of the proposals leads to just one conclusion -- an independent Palestinian state is the best option. This would be a departure from past United States policy. However, no other option will satisfy those national interests that were outlined in the introduction. The key comes in the attempt to balance this reality with Israel's security interests and then convincing Israeli leaders that it can be done.

But why an independent Palestinian state? It basically comes down to a process of elimination. This section will review the various options outlined earlier to provide the answer.

However, before proceeding to the various options, it's important to address one key issue - the Palestinian desire for an independent state. Israeli hard-liners reject the idea that the Palestinians have a distinct national identity. According to them, Palestinians are just Arabs; there is nothing distinctive about them and they have no legitimate claim as a people to land in Judea and Samaria (or Palestine, if you are an Arab).⁷⁰ However, Israeli Ambassador Shoval was quoted

earlier in this paper as referring to the "distinct national and cultural aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs."⁷¹ Yitzhak Rabin, in a recent interview, stated that the Palestinian Arabs "must be treated as an independent partner" in the ongoing peace negotiations.⁷²

The Israeli hard-liners are wrong. Palestinian nationalism and desire for self-determination have been growing steadily for over twenty-five years. Israeli leaders like Ambassador Shoval and Mr. Rabin understand that Palestinians are a distinct people apart from other Arab national entities. The following discussion on the proposed solutions will help explain why this is true.

-THE JORDAN OPTION-

In the past, the United States has opposed the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the Middle East. This American position was clearly outlined in the 1982 Reagan Plan and remains the foundation of United States policy today. It called for Palestinian self-government "in association with Jordan."⁷³ But, as the head of the Jordanian delegation to the current peace talks put it, "Jordan is not Palestine."⁷⁴

This option would create particularly difficult problems for King Hussein, who is a Hashemite, not a Palestinian. Jordan already has a Palestinian majority and the addition of 1.5 million Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza would seriously threaten the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. King Hussein still considers the Palestinians a security risk 22 years after Jordanian forces expelled the PLO from Jordan in the 1970 civil war. This situation has been exasperated over

the past 18 months by an influx of over 300,000 Palestinian refugees from the gulf states to Jordan as a result of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. If anything, the king would like to tip the demographic balance away from the Palestinians.⁷⁵ This is one reason why King Hussein renounced all Jordanian claims to the West Bank in July 1988. Jordan does not want, nor could it handle, over 1.5 million additional Palestinians.

The Palestinians are equally unwilling to "subordinate their identity within the larger framework of Arabism, or to entrust their fate to existing Arab regimes."⁷⁶ It's not hard to understand why, given their recent experience under Arab control. Arab nations have "socially suppressed, economically exploited, and politically manipulated" the Palestinian people for years.⁷⁷

Arab states actually have a history of harsh repression when dealing with Palestinians and the PLO. Jordan crushed and then expelled the PLO during a civil war in 1970. The Syrians turned on them in 1975-1976 and again in 1983 when they sponsored a split in the PLO and expelled them from Tripoli. Lebanese Christian Arabs sided with Israel in 1982 and massacred hundreds of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Lebanese Shiite militia, the AMAL, conducted a month-long siege of Palestinian refugee camps in 1985 killing hundreds. At one time or another, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt have all attacked or suppressed the PLO.

Further, the more militant Arab leaders, such as Syria's Hafiz al-Assad, cared little for PLO interests. He attempted to control radical Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Abu Musa's Fatah Rebels for his own purposes.

To a large extent, the growth of Palestinian nationalism since 1967 has resulted from the Palestinians' sense of abandonment and persecution at the hands of the Arab world.⁷⁸ Some leaders in Israel recognize this fact. Yitzhak Rabin recently stated that "the Arab world cannot speak on behalf of the Palestinians."⁷⁹

The "Jordan Option" (linking the West Bank and Gaza as part of Jordan) was actually an element of the Labor Party's Allon Plan and was favored by Jordan 25 years ago. Today the plan to make the West Bank and Gaza part of the Hashemite Kingdom is opposed by Israel, Jordan, the Arab nations of the region, the PLO, and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. It is important to note, however, that the most recent Palestinian proposal for self-rule in the occupied territories did raise the possibility of an independent Palestinian state in a "confederal relationship with Jordan."

-THE ISRAELI OPTION-

There are many versions of an Israeli solution to the Palestinian issue - all equally unacceptable as a basis for long-term peace. They range from annexation to continued occupation with some form of local autonomy for the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, there seems to be two basic motivations for Israel's desire to retain control of the occupied territories - security and an ideological vision of a Greater Israel (Eretz Yisra'el). It may be easier to deal with the security issue than with a Jewish ideological feeling that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are a historic part of this nation, ordained by God and forever a part of Eretz Yisra'el (a

position held by the Likud, factions to its political right and most of the religious public).⁸⁰

One option available to Israel is annexation. However, outright annexation would create a demographic problem for Israel. Arab citizens of Israel (which include Arabs involuntarily made citizens when Israel annexed the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem), are "guaranteed" political equality in Israel and are entitled to government assistance in many areas. No one claims that institutional and cultural separation do not exist, and Arab citizens of Israel are clearly discriminated against by the Jewish majority. But, these Arabs are voting citizens of Israel and could become a major political force if over 1.5 million Arabs were suddenly added to Israel's citizenry. Additionally, given the current birth rates of Arabs and Jews in the region, it would be just a matter of time before Israel had an Arab majority, even with very heavy Jewish immigration to offset the Arab growth rate. Therefore, "the Likud has stopped short of calling for annexation, since doing so would force it to deal with the political status of one and one-half million Palestinians living there."⁸¹

Some recommend annexing the occupied territories without granting citizenship to the Arab residents. Israel would find this virtually impossible to do without major modifications to the state itself. It would essentially have to decide between being a democratic state or a Jewish nation -- it could not be both under this option.

A similar alternative calls for annexing the occupied territories followed by some form of action to expell the 1.5 million Arab occupants from this "new" part of Israel. Jewish residents would then populate

the vacated territory. This option is actually supported by certain radical political groups in Israel. However, most Israelis would not support this move because the political and moral costs would be too high, not to mention the international outrage. Additionally, it is hard to imagine how creating 1.5 million more Palestinian refugees would bring peace to the region.⁸²

The final Israeli alternative, as outlined in the 1989 Shamir Plan, calls for Israeli sovereignty over the area with some form of local autonomy for the Palestinian population. One variation modifies the concept of "local autonomy" throughout the occupied territories and calls instead for the establishment of "four regional cantons with dense Arab populations - Janin, Nabulus, Hebron, and Galgilya - which would be under Israeli sovereignty."⁸³

The Camp David accords provide the foundation for the Israeli proposal for local autonomy. Israel restated its commitment to the accords "including the concept of autonomy in the territories."⁸⁴ Ambassador Shoval outlined a plan that would transfer "80 percent of the powers and responsibilities which are currently exercised by the Israeli military and civilian authorities in the territories" to an elected Palestinian body.⁸⁵ Those responsibilities appear to be wide-ranging. However, according to Justice Minister Meridor, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian self-governing authority would not apply to Jewish residents in the West Bank and Gaza, but only to Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, authorities would need some agreement to settle disputes between Arabs and Jews.⁸⁶

However, this autonomy option refuses to recognize Palestinian Arabs as a people and reduces the Palestinian issue to a mere Arab refugee problem. Further, the solution will not lead to a comprehensive peace in the region nor is it really in Israel's long-term national interest to perpetuate a forced occupation.⁸⁷ Although for different reasons, each side has recently proposed a concrete plan for Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories - one Palestinian proposal and the latest Israeli proposal.

On January 14, 1992, the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks presented the Israeli representatives with a detailed proposal advocating "interim" Palestinian autonomy for a "transitional period" in the occupied territories. The proposal seems to follow the Camp David concept of a five year transition period that includes interim self-government for the Palestinians. The Palestinian plan identified a freely elected legislative assembly, an executive council and a judicial body. It called for a "peaceful and orderly transfer of authority...to create the proper conditions for substantive negotiations on the final status of the occupied territory." The parties would conduct negotiations in the future to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. However, the text of the proposal clearly states that "the Palestinian people [is] resolved to establish [its] own independent state."⁸⁸

The Israeli delegation responded on February 25, 1992 with its own "unofficial" proposal while attending the peace talks in Washington. Their plan called for a five-year transitional arrangement to build "mutual confidence." It provided for interim self-government in the

occupied territories whereby "the Palestinian Arabs will be given the opportunity to conduct their affairs in most fields." However, the plan contained provisions that have blocked agreements in the past.

- "It [autonomy] should apply to the people, not to the status of the territories."
- "Israelis will continue living in and settling the territories, as is their right."
- "Israel will have the exclusive responsibility for all aspects of security - external, internal, and public order."
- The plan does not apply to Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem, which is part of Israel.⁸⁹

At first glance the two plans appear somewhat similar but there are actually two fundamental differences. The first problem is reminiscent of the Israeli-Egyptian disagreement that caused the Camp David autonomy talks to fail in May 1980. The Palestinians view this local autonomy as an "interim" measure that will eventually lead to an independent Palestinian state. Israel, however, has clearly stated that it will never relinquish control over the occupied territories and that the autonomy they offer is the final status for the Palestinians. According to the Israeli position, there will never be an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, which many Israelis consider an inseparable part of Eretz Yisra'el. In fact, Israeli Justice Minister Dan Meridor praised the recent autonomy plan as "the most updated, efficient, and clever means of ensuring Israel's continued control over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza." He went on to say that "Israel unequivocally states that at the end of the autonomy period, it will demand sovereignty and that it will continue Jewish settlement" during the transitional period.⁹⁰

The second problem focuses on the scope of self-government. The Palestinian proposal calls for self-governing jurisdiction over the "land, subsoil and residents" and also includes the airspace over the region. Israel views autonomy as "personal" and not "territorial". It will support self-rule for the people but intends to retain control over the land, water and airspace.⁹¹ Ambassador Shoval did suggest the possibility of establishing a joint Israeli/Palestinian body to manage problems concerning land and water resources.⁹²

Both proposals were immediately rejected by the other side. The Israeli delegation rejected the Palestinian proposal because it "actually established a de facto state and not interim accords." Haydar Abel-al-Shafi, the head of the Palestinian delegation, rejected the Israeli plan because it represented a "de facto annexation" and denied political rights to the Palestinians.⁹³

It's important to recall the current situation in the occupied territories when discussing an autonomy plan that includes a continued Israeli occupation. The 25 year Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has become a very heavy burden on Israel and has imposed heavy costs on the Palestinians. It has stressed the Israeli economy, diverted limited resources, discouraged Israel's military and divided the people. More importantly, it is eroding Israel's moral foundation.⁹⁴

Palestinians in the occupied territories live with land confiscation, fines, curfews, travel restrictions, censorship, deportations, prohibitions against public assembly, detention without trial or explanation, collective punishment, house demolitions and

sealings, beatings and intimidation -- all with little or no legal counsel or appeal. Al Haq, a Palestinian human rights group affiliated with the International Commission of Jurists-Geneva, charges that these human rights violations also include "extra-judicial killing" and "torture". These severe measures have caused "damage to the fabric of Palestinian society" and "constitute a pattern of gross violations of Palestinian human rights" by the Israeli military authority.⁹⁵

In addition, Israeli authorities have periodically closed Arab universities and schools. Further, the military authority and civilian administration exercise total control over all civil and political affairs and acts as the final authority for property rights. Israel places severe restrictions on Palestinian water useage for village life and agriculture. As a result, the Gaza Strip has become a "pressure cooker" ready to explode with "overcrowding, poverty, hatred, violence, oppression, poor sanitation, anger, frustration, drugs and crime." In short, Israel's human rights record in the occupied territories is less than shining. Some argue that these repressive measures are required to combat the spreading violence and lawlessness in the occupied territories. However, there is no way that the United States could or should accept this treatment of an entire population as a lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. And, much of this repression will continue if Israel insists on retaining control and the Palestinians insist on owning a homeland. Local autonomy alone will not make these conditions disappear.⁹⁶

The old image of Israel as David, facing the Arab world as Goliath, has been reversed by the "media coverage of Israel's soldiers beating

and shooting protesters."⁹⁷ A continued occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, even with local Palestinian autonomy, will continue to undermine "the moral and political foundation on which the Jewish state has mobilized both its Jewish citizenry and the international community for its defense and support."⁹⁸ This is not in Israel's best long-term interest.

The West Bank and Gaza remain distinctly separate entities from Israel with the people who live there holding to different dreams and aspirations for the future. Those dreams will only be realized in an independent Palestinian state. And that Palestinian state provides the only real potential for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The challenge is to balance that reality with Israel's security needs, then convince Israel that the two are not mutually exclusive.

-A PALESTINIAN STATE-

Those that support the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state understand the problems associated with reaching a final agreement on this issue - they are substantial. A Palestinian state will only emerge after a significant period of Arab self-rule in the occupied territories under Israeli "control." Both sides will carefully negotiate the specific details of any agreement. And, the agreement will involve a certain element of risk for both Israel and the Arabs. Once established, this fledgling Palestinian nation will have severe problems drawing the people together to deal with the economic, social, and political issues it will surely face.

For Palestinian Arabs in the region, an independent Palestinian state will eventually provide an end to Israeli military occupation and the repressive measures Israel has used to control the residents for the past 25 years. This new nation will give the Palestinians something they have never had - a national identity with opportunities for political expression. The Palestinians will finally be sovereign with all the symbols that accompany this status. This new country will also provide asylum for those Palestinian refugees that wish to move to the new state, just as Israel provided a refuge for Jews. The satisfaction of this Palestinian desire for a national identity should reduce any motivations to continue the costly conflict with Israel. Palestinians will suddenly have something to lose in a war with Israel and will now have a strong self-interest in pursuing peace with its militarily superior neighbor to the west.⁹⁹

This is not to say that the Palestinian state will not face major difficulties. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the potential economic, social and political problems that face a future Palestinian state often appear insurmountable. That is one major reason why it is so critical for a new Palestine to establish a true lasting peace and close diplomatic ties with Israel.

The option of a Palestinian state also provides the best long-term hope for Israel. The establishment of Palestine should remove the historic barriers between Israel and the Arab states, while diminishing the probability that an Arab military coalition will rise against Israel. A peace agreement and diplomatic relations between Israel and countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states will make it

extremely difficult for radical states (like Libya, Iraq and possibly Syria) to mobilize Arab support for a war with Israel. Israel will still face a threat from radical "rejectionist" groups and radical Arab states. But, these groups should be isolated from the rest of the Arab world (specifically the moderate oil-producing Arab states and moderate elements of the PLO) that has made peace with Israel. This option would also remove the great resource drain and internal division Israel has experienced by maintaining the occupation. In short, an agreement on the Palestinian issue will significantly diminish the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict and set the stage for a comprehensive peace accord.¹⁰⁰

However, while being the best chance for a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a significant risk from Israel's point of view. To many Israelis, an independent Palestinian state threatens Israel's very existence. Israel sees an Arab population 50 times greater than its own with a total land area 500 times greater than Israel. It sees its neighbor to the north (Syria) rearming and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in this region of the world when the spirit of freedom and democracy spreads in other parts of the globe. It views a Palestinian state as a possible springboard for an attack on Israel by a powerful eastern front Arab army. And, it has learned from history to depend on no other country as far as Israel's security is concerned.¹⁰¹

In light of this threat, Israel looks to a strong army and defensible borders as critical to its security. Thus, the West Bank constitutes a vital area to Israel's security plans. It regards

territory as fundamental to deterrence and, if deterrence fails, to defense. The Israeli military is primarily a reserve force that requires mobilization. Mobilization takes time. From Israel's perspective, the pre-1967 borders do not provide the strategic depth that will allow Israel to defend itself while it mobilizes its military to respond to an attack. If an attack were launched from the West Bank, an enemy force could drive to the sea and cut Israel in half in a matter of hours. That is Israel's nightmare and it almost became reality in the Golan Heights during the 1973 war.¹⁰²

However, despite concerns about the stability of a Palestinian state, this new nation could increase Israel's security by helping to produce and sustain a lasting peace. Major General Mattityahu Peled, a former member of the Israeli General Staff, felt as early as 1967 that the occupied territories were not required for Israel's security. He stated that a Palestinian state would provide Israel with far greater security than the Israeli occupation of that same territory. Some even speculate that a Palestinian state would align itself with Israel and Jordan against a potential threat from a radical Arab country like Syria.¹⁰³

As a minimum, a Palestinian state would be dependent on Israel for economic development and trade; the national interests of the two states will be closely tied.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, it would be in Israel's best long-term interest to help guide the nation-building process in a positive way. Israel should help nurture this entity, build close ties with the new state and then take advantage of the openings with other

Arab nations in the region to build confidence and security for the future.

Israel's long-term security for its people will not ultimately be assured by military might. If the conflict persists, the opposing Arab states will gradually acquire higher technology weapons (to include accurate delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction) and threaten every part of the Jewish nation. The Gulf War clearly showed that Israeli population centers are vulnerable to surface-to-surface missile attacks which are launched from distant Arab countries - but this time they carried conventional warheads. Key members of the IDF freely acknowledge that non-conventional weapons (nuclear, chemical, and biological) pose the greatest threat to Israel. And, the IDF has yet to decide how to deal with this emerging threat.¹⁰⁵ Without a lasting peace, young Israelis will continue to carry guns throughout the country and future generations of Israelis will continue to live an isolated existence among hostile neighbors. And the Israeli society and economy will continue to pay a very heavy price every day.

This is not to say that Israel should relinquish its position as the predominant military power in the region - it clearly should not. Israel, with the help of the United States, should maintain a very strong defensive capability. However, long-term security for Israel and its people will only come with a diplomatic settlement that includes a Palestinian state.

"We have a total, absolute and unwavering commitment to the security of Israel and we're not going to do anything that at least in our good faith judgement would endanger that security."¹⁰⁶

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER

PART FOUR - AN ACTIVE AMERICAN ROLE

-THE STAGE IS SET-

The 1991 Madrid Conference was the first time since 1948 that Israel sat across a table from its Arab neighbors to engage in direct and public talks aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace. United States diplomatic efforts helped make this possible. However, "the belief that a mere procedural formula can accomplish a miracle and produce the elusive substantive solution is infantile and deceptive."¹⁰⁷ Only a fundamental change in the attitudes of the people on both sides of the table will produce the desired peace. This required trust can't be negotiated into existence; it must be built over time with each side accepting the perceived risk that accompanies it.

A report by a study group from the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies states that the United States could play a crucial role in easing the "mutual suspicions on one another's ultimate intentions." The report goes on to say that the United States enjoys a unique status in the region allowing it to have a great influence on events there.¹⁰⁸ But, as Shimon Peres was quoted earlier, "we do not have much time to take advantage of this new ...[U.S.] influence."¹⁰⁹

While meetings are underway between Israel and the Arab world on a wide range of issues, the peace talks continue to revolve around the Palestinian issue. And, despite the rhetoric, signals indicate that

this may be a historic opportunity for peace. Both sides seem to agree to some extent that "the time has come for all of us to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It cannot be solved militarily."¹¹⁰

-THE PRINCIPLE PARTIES-

Israelis are bitterly divided over how to achieve peace but they are united in their desire to find a comprehensive settlement to the conflict. Major General Yossi Ben Hanon stressed that the Palestinian issue must be solved so that "Israelis and Palestinians, and their children, can live a peaceful daily life."¹¹¹ Nor surprisingly, the peace process has clearly taken center stage in the upcoming Israeli national elections.

Jordan would also like to see the conflict end and the Palestinian issue resolved. Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamel Abu Jaber recently characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict as a "family dispute" that has permeated all facets of life in Jordan. More specifically, the Palestinian issue has become a widening problem that places an extremely heavy burden on Jordan's limited resources.¹¹²

Syria, while not as motivated to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, at least espouses a desire for a comprehensive settlement. Further, Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara' recently indicated that a "comprehensive peace" did not mean that all negotiating tracks in the peace process were required to make equal progress. The separate talks could progress independently while eventually leading to a comprehensive settlement.¹¹³ This seemed to imply that Syria would

support progress on the Palestinian issue while experiencing less progress on the issue of the Golan Heights.

The Palestinians, while lacking the political structure and mechanisms to really build a consensus on the major issues, appear to at least desire peace. According to a recent report, the intifada has declined as an effective tool and some Palestinians are even calling for an outright halt to the four-year old movement.¹¹⁴

Further, the PLO may have additional incentives for producing tangible results from the current talks, even though the PLO is formally excluded from participating in the negotiations. Yasir Arafat is attempting to recover from the damage and dissension the PLO suffered after supporting Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Additionally, Hamas, the military wing of the Moslem Brotherhood, is challenging the PLO's claim as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.¹¹⁵

Hamas arose during the intifada as the organization of Palestinian Muslim fundamentalists in the occupied territories. It has refused to align itself with the PLO, has published its own Covenant, and has directed bitter criticism towards the PLO. Hamas recently demonstrated increasing Palestinian support during small-scale elections in the occupied territories. While estimates of support for Hamas range from 15 percent to 40 percent of the Palestinian population, both Israeli officials and informed Palestinians felt that this support is growing daily.¹¹⁶

This could have a major impact on future talks regarding the Palestinian issue. Hamas, which is bitterly opposed to the peace

process, depicts the Arab-Israeli conflict as a religious struggle against the Jews. It portrays the Jews as "endemically evil. According to Hamas, the conflict with Israel "is a fight to the finish" with "no room for compromise, by partition or otherwise."¹¹⁷ If the PLO and moderate Palestinians fail to produce tangible results, Hamas may successfully raise serious questions about the PLO's legitimacy thus undermining the peace process. It could even replace the PLO as the predominant Palestinian force in the occupied territories.

While there may be some evidence that the main participants want to negotiate a final agreement on the Palestinian issue, it is equally clear that the peace talks rest on very tenuous footing. Some, who are less optimistic, question whether the parties will ever be able to agree on their own to peacefully conclude this conflict. This raises the question about the role of the United States.

-A UNITED STATES ROLE-

For decades, the United States Middle East policy has been defined by the Arab-Israeli problem "because of the enduring risks of a major Arab-Israeli conflict and, with it, the risk of United States-Soviet confrontation."¹¹⁸ American options were measured against the threat of enhancing Soviet influence in the region. That has changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key supporter of radical states in the Arab world no longer exists.

United States policy now focuses on finding a comprehensive peace in the region, one based on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.¹¹⁹ But what does that mean in terms of the current peace process? Should

the United States take advantage of the postulated window-of-opportunity to guide the peace process more forcibly? Or, should the United States accept the limited role of bringing the warring parties to the table only to draw back to watch events unfold?

I believe that the final resolution of the Palestinian issue, and thus the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, rests on an active and forceful role for the United States. Just as the Camp David peace accords relied on United States leadership, the current peace process depends on the United States involvement to help create an environment that supports the negotiations.

-THE FIRST STEP-A SETTLEMENT FREEZE-

Short of forcibly imposing a peace agreement on Israel and its Arab neighbors, the United States can't expect to produce a comprehensive Middle East peace overnight. The eventual resolution of the Palestinian issue, which should ultimately include a Palestinian state, will evolve over time.

With this in mind, the United States should support the concept of a phased approach to the Palestinian issue; one that begins with local autonomy for the Palestinians in the occupied territories and grows to eventually include an independent Palestinian state. However, none of this will happen unless the United States can get the peace negotiations moving. The operative word is "moving" and that will require an opening set of moves by both the Israelis and the Arab world to produce momentum for the talks. The United States must use its influence and leverage on

all parties (to include coercion if required) to help generate these opening moves.

Israel must make the first move but has been unwilling to do so in the past. That first step centers around an immediate settlement freeze in the occupied territories. This should not be viewed by the Arab world as an Israeli acceptance of the land-for-peace formula. Instead, the United States should portray it as a bold initiative by Israel to setup substantive talks on interim autonomy in the occupied territories.

This seems to be the objective behind the recent move by the administration to make American loan guarantees for Israel conditional on Israel's agreement to cease settlement activity in the occupied territories. During testimony before the House Appropriations Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Subcommittee, Secretary of State James Baker said that there was "no greater obstacle to peace" in the region than Israel's current settlement policy.¹²⁰

Securing an Israeli settlement freeze will not be easy, as the administration has already seen. The United States is faced with two major roadblocks in this attempt - a Jewish Ideology regarding "Eretz Yisra'el" and the Israeli preoccupation with security. Therefore, it may take more than denied loan guarantees to force Israel to respond favorably.

However, this first step is critical to a successful peace process. Therefore, the United States should "quietly" increase the pressure on Israel to declare a settlement freeze. If required, this leverage should include placing additional conditions on the 3.5 billion dollars

of aid the United States provides Israel each year (despite the domestic outcry that may result).

It is also important that the United States include positive enticements along with the diplomatic and economic pressure on Israel. For starters, the administration should assure Israel that it would quickly approve the requested loan guarantees. Further, while stressing that the freeze is not irreversible, the United States should assure Israel that it fully expects the Arab world to reciprocate in some substantial manner. Finally, while attempting to persuade Israel to take this first step, the United States should reconfirm its unwavering and absolute commitment to the security of the Jewish state.

Admittedly, this initial step will be more difficult to arrange with the current Likud government when compared to a possible Labor coalition, given the public pronouncements of both Mr. Shamir and Mr. Rabin. However, regardless of which party takes power in Israel, a settlement freeze is the essential first step towards resolving the Palestinian issue. The Arab response will determine if the American effort was worth it.

-THE ARAB RESPONSE-

During Secretary Baker's testimony to the House Subcommittee, Representative Lawrence Smith (D-Florida) pointed out that United States influence extends to the Arab side of the issue as well as to the Israelis. In reference to the Arab trade embargo of Israel, he stated that "we are not going to try to broker peace negotiations unless you stop the boycott."¹²¹ The United States must mount an intense

diplomatic effort to convince moderate Arab states to do just that as a response to the Israeli settlement freeze. In fact, key Arab states have already indicated a willingness to lift the trade boycott if Israel suspends its settlement activity.¹²²

But, the United States should not stop there. It is extremely important to draw moderate Arab states together for a successful peace process. In terms of the Palestinian issue, Jordan plays the key role and appears to desire a settlement. However, Jordan is not secure enough to stand alone and engage in a meaningful peace process without support from other moderate Arab states. Syria, and Iraq in the past, have successfully coerced Jordan into maintaining a hard line position against Israel, at least publically. Jordan simply can't make any meaningful decisions for peace under that type of pressure. Therefore, the United States must attempt to draw Arab nations such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states together as a supporting block for Jordan in the negotiations.

This will be a significant challenge given Jordan's support for Iraq in the Gulf War. However, the United States has significant influence with the Arab world. Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States has sold new arms to Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and future arms sales are planned for Kuwait and Bahrain. By using other positive, low-cost incentives (debt relief, for example), and by playing on the pending settlement freeze by Israel, the United States could successfully provide the required support for Jordan. Additionally, it may also set the stage for a collective Arab move

towards diplomatic recognition of Israel, a key indicator to Israel that these moderate Arab states are serious about peace.

There are already indications that the Arab world is attempting to ease Israel's fears (although, admittedly they could do much more). In the opening session of the recent Moscow multi-lateral talks, Dr. Kamil Abu-Jabir, an Arab delegate, stated that it was very important to safeguard "the security of all states in the region, including Israel."¹²³ However, up to this point, Israel has refused to accept any settlement based upon "vague Arab non-aggression pledges."¹²⁴ The United States must take determined steps to turn those "vague pledges" into concrete realities.

Syria is the major roadblock to this effort. Iraq, having still not recovered from the Gulf War, is not really capable of influencing events in surrounding Arab states. Syria, on the other hand, could be very troublesome. The United States has little choice but to be very forceful with Syria in this matter. The moderate Arabs should encourage Syria to join the group in their efforts to seek a true resolution to the conflict. However, if Syria attempts to disrupt the process, the United States should take very serious steps to diplomatically isolate the Syrian regime from the moderate Arab nations. This could even include military assistance and security guarantees from the United States to moderate Arab nations that may feel threatened by Syria or other radical Arab groups.

In an effort to further enhance the negotiating environment and capitalize on an Israeli settlement freeze, the administration must strongly encourage the Palestinians to respond along with the rest of

the Arab world. The United States should direct this diplomatic initiative towards two major groups - the PLO and those moderate Palestinian members of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace talks.

Whether the United States elects direct contact with the PLO or decides to use an intermediary, the administration must convince the PLO leadership that they are at a historic crossroads. It is critical for them to respond positively to an initial Israeli settlement freeze if the PLO hopes to play a constructive role in the future.

The United States should urge the PLO to take three steps in response to the Israeli initiative. First, Yasir Arafat can further clarify his December 1988 declaration by again "formally" accepting United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 and by clearly recognizing Israel's right to exist in accordance with those resolutions. His 1988 declaration was ambiguous enough that many question how far the PLO really went in accepting Israel. Second, the Palestinian National Council should modify the PLO charter to delete any reference to the "total liberation of Palestine from Zionist control". Finally, the PLO should suspend the Intifada pending interim autonomy for the Arab population in the occupied territories. While all three steps seem fairly easy and largely symbolic, they will cause significant dissent within the PLO. Yasir Arafat will most likely retain support from Fatah and other "moderate" groups within the PLO, but the more radical members will fight the move. The move could also easily result in a major split within the PLO.

In addition to internal PLO problems, Hamas will almost certainly increase its attacks on the PLO as it attempts to undermine the peace process. Regardless, Yasir Arafat must understand that the time has come for the PLO to support the peace process or divorce itself from the negotiations completely and resume its earlier strategy of armed struggle. The PLO can no longer straddle the fence with one foot in each camp; it will be forced to show its true colors.

The Palestinian delegation to the peace talks is another problem. According to a recent Washington Times report, the delegation is "badly divided" and "unable to seize opportunities" in the negotiations. Dr. Haldar Abdul-Shafi, a chief Palestinian delegate, publically complained that the "Palestinian national movement is in disarray." Bush administration officials were very upset at the "failure of the Palestinians to advance the negotiations in Round Four." The Palestinians were hindering the talks by ignoring the step-by-step autonomy proposals of the Israelis.¹²⁵

While the Palestinians have problems reaching a consensus on many issues, they are in agreement on their top priority -- get out from under Israeli occupation as soon as possible. The United States should use this rare consensus to emphasize negotiations on interim autonomy while prompting the Palestinians to "table" talk about the final status until later in the peace process. The administration should strongly urge the Palestinians to drop any preconditions to the autonomy talks that guarantee an independent Palestinian state in the future. This position is a non-starter with the Israeli government, given the current

security climate, and blocks progress almost as much as the Israeli settlement policy in the occupied territories.

This does not diminish the administration's commitment to an eventual Palestinian state. The United States' position should continue to support the concept of an independent state but only after a period of autonomy in the territories.¹²⁶

Therefore, the United States should offer technical, financial, educational and political support to the Palestinians as part of an Israeli-Palestinian autonomy agreement, but only if the Palestinians drop preconditions for pursuing the interim arrangement. Additionally, the United States should insist that Palestinian leaders do everything possible to halt the Intifada and police their own population against radical groups that attempt to undermine the process.

-AN ACTIVE STRATEGY-

Assuming that Israel and the Arab world take the first real steps towards peace (and that is a very big assumption), the United States should then redouble its efforts to build on the success. This is not the point where America withdraws to allow the two sides to finish working out their own problems -- because they won't. The administration must continue to push the parties towards a final comprehensive peace agreement.

This will eventually require full diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Arab world with normalized relations between the countries. A formal peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors must include some territorial compromise by Israel. The Arabs must be willing to accept

Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights while also demonstrating patience with the interim autonomy arrangements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Talks on refugees, water, arms control and other vital issues should then follow as negotiations between nations at peace instead of between belligerents who have been at war for 45 years.

This will require a very dedicated and involved commitment by the United States. An active peace process will require active American leadership. An eventual settlement could even include a prolonged United States presence in the region with security guarantees for Israel and other participating Arab nations. In all cases it still spells United States involvement.

"Any country that pays soldiers three-times that of teachers, doesn't really have a future." 127

BRIGADIER GENERAL YONI SHOMSHONI

PART FIVE - CONCLUSION

The stakes are high. As I outlined in the beginning of this paper, the United States' national interests in the region will be best served by a long-term peace and stable environment in that part of the world. This concept is clearly outlined in the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States. The United States must stay actively engaged.

The reason is very clear - the alternative is extremely "ugly." The thought of mass destruction weapons spreading throughout the area brings me chills. An interrupted flow of oil could be devastating to the world economy, particularly to Europe and Northeast Asia. The United States can't accept an attempt by a nation or radical group to threaten the survival and security of Israel. By the same token, America can't accept a situation where a friendly, democratic country continues to deny an entire group of 1.5 million people basic human rights and fundamental self-determination.

A comprehensive peace must also incorporate issues that this paper did not really discuss. Items such as water, land, and weapons proliferation must be addressed as part of a total peace. Additionally, this paper does not even mention the most emotional issue of all - Jerusalem. That will be a very difficult issue to resolve. However, regardless of the problems blocking a final agreement, this comprehensive "true peace" must provide for Israel's security needs

while also providing for the legitimate political rights of Palestinian Arabs.¹²⁸ To me this means an independent Palestinian state. It's in Israel's long-term interest as well as the Arabs' long-term interest.

It is my opinion that any solution that stops short of an independent Palestinian state will not provide long-term peace and will eventually result in more tension, instability and ultimately another major military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And if that happens, the situation may force the United States to take sides and eventually introduce military forces of its own.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Zalman Shoval, "Israel's Approach to Palestinian Self-Government," in Yehuda Mirsky, ed. From War To Peace in the Middle East (1991): 61. Mr. Shoval is the Israeli Ambassador to the United States.
- 2 Fayez A. Sayegh, A Palestinian View (1970): 1. Mr. Sayegh was a Senior Advisor to Kuwait's Foreign Minister and served with the League of Arab States.
- 3 The Brookings Institute, Toward Arab-Israeli Peace (1988): 26.
- 4 Avi Plascov, A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives (1981): 1; David Levi in an address to an open session of the Knesset, as quoted by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report - Near East and South Asia (FBIS/NESA) (28 January 1992): 4. Statistics include 240,000 casualties (40,000 Israeli; 200,000 Arab) and 97,000 dead (17,000 Israeli; 80,000 Arab).
- 5 Brookings: 12.
- 6 Robert E. Hunter, "The United States Role in the Middle East," Current History (February 1990): 5; Brookings: 12.
- 7 The text of President Reagan's address is at Lukacs, Yehuda ed. Documents of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - 1967-1983 (1984): 35-37.
- 8 National Security Strategy of the United States (1991): 10.
- 9 National Military Strategy of the United States (January 1991): 1-4.
- 10 Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank (1987): 305.
- 11 As quoted by FBIS/NESA (7 February 1992): 36.
- 12 Shoval: 62.
- 13 Shimon Peres, "No Alternative But Compromise," World Press Review (September 1991): 13.
- 14 As quoted in a 5 February 1992 interview by FBIS/NESA (7 February 1992): 3. Mr. al-Najjab is a member of the PLO Executive Committee.
- 15 Plascov: 3.

16 Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians (1989): 89-90; Plascov: 3. Out of a total Palestinian population of 1.3 million, 600,000 were displaced, 160,000 remained in Israel and roughly 540,000 remained in their homes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When the major population shift was completed in 1948, 800,000 Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship while over 450,000 remained stateless (270,000 in Gaza; 100,000 in Syria; 80,000 in Lebanon).

17 Lesch and Tessler: 90; Plascov: 3.

18 Plascov: 7; FBIS/NESA (24 January 1992): 11. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) defines a Palestinian refugee as "any person who, on the eve of the 1948 conflict, had lived in Palestine for at least two years and who later lost his home and means of existence." After the 1967 war, this definition was expanded to include displaced Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

19 Tom Travis, A Proposal To Solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1978): 25-26. A copy of the text is contained in The Middle East Seventh Edition, published by the Congressional Quarterly (1991): 301.

20 Yigal Allon (former Israeli Minister) reaffirmed his plan for peace in a 1976 article. A text of that article is contained in Lukacs: 98-105.

21 Aronson: 14-16; Plascov: 18-19.

22 Travis: 11.

23 Plascov: 10.

24 Yasir Arafat created the "Fatah" in 1959. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an expansion of Fatah, was established on 28 May 1964.

25 Bard E. O'Neill, "The Intifada in the Context of Armed Struggle," in Robert O. Freeman, ed. The Intifada (1991): 39-40.

26 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (1985): 374.

27 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics. (1984): 61-62.

28 A text of the communique is contained in Lukacs: 223-224.

29 Lukacs: 117.

30 Cobban: 377.

- 31 Lesch and Tessler: 17.
- 32 Ibid: 90.
- 33 The framework included provisions for negotiations on a formal peace treaty, the return of the Sinai to Egypt, military arrangements to insure security and the normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt. A copy of the text is contained in The Middle East: 303.
- 34 Lesch and Tessler: 3. A copy of the text is contained in The Middle East: 302.
- 35 Ibid: 5. A copy of the letter is contained in The Middle East: 304.
- 36 Ibid: 4. A copy of the text is contained in The Middle East: 302.
- 37 Ibid: 3-4, 12-13.
- 38 The Camp David documents do not actually mention a settlement freeze. During negotiations at Camp David, Prime Minister Begin agreed that Israel would not establish new settlements during negotiations leading to a formal peace treaty. According to Israel, that promise was fully met and Israel was free to restart the settlement program after the formal treaty was signed on March 26, 1979. See Lukacs: 109.
- 39 Jorg Von Uthmann, "When the U.S. Talks, Israel Must Listen," World Press Review (September 1991): 8; Aronson: 21-22; Lesch and Tessler: 8-13.
- 40 Lesch and Tessler: 8.
- 41 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1988): 259; Hunter: 50; Brookings: 24-25.
- 42 As quoted by Lesch and Tessler: 199. The text of President Reagan's address concerning the peace plan is at Lukacs: 108-110. U.N. Resolution 338 was passed on 22 October 1973 in an attempt to stop the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. It called for an immediate halt to the fighting and reaffirmed the provisions of U.N. Resolution 242.
- 43 Khouri: 439.
- 44 Khouri: 436-441; the text of Israel's formal response to the Reagan Plan is at Lukacs: 108-111.
- 45 Henry Cattan, The Palestinian Question (1988): 296-301; Quotes are from the PNC response located on page 299.
- 46 A copy of the text is contained in The Middle East: 306.

47 Alan Elsner, "U.S. Insists Israel Stop New Housing In Territories," The Washington Times (February 13, 1992): A8; Lesch and Tessler: 201;

48 Cattan: 302.

49 Ibid: 303.

50 Kenneth W. Stein, "The Intifada and the Uprising of 1936-1939: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Community," in Robert O. Freedman, ed The Intifada (1991): 20-21; Graham F. Fuller, "The Palestinians: The Decisive Year?" Current History (February 1990): 53; Lesch and Tessler: 272.

51 Fuller: 54.

52 Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Linkage or Disengagement? (1991): 4. A transcript of King Hussein's statement is contained in The Middle East: 309.

53 Stein: 13. A transcript of Yasir Arafat's statement at a December 14, 1988 press conference in Geneva is contained in The Middle East: 311.

54 Hanna Siniora, "The Palestinians and the Peace Process," in Yehudah Mirsky, ed. From War To Peace in the Middle East (1991): 69; Stein: 13. Hanna Siniora is the editor of Al-Fajar, a Palestinian newspaper based in Jerusalem.

55 Fuller: 53. The text of the declaration is contained in The Middle East: 310.

56 Hunter: 51.

57 Travis: 10.

58 Fuller: 89; Lukacs: 115-117; Eventually, over 130 nations would grant official recognition to the State of Palestine with 61 extending PLO representatives full diplomatic status.

59 Hunter: 51; Fuller: 55.

60 Deborah J. Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples (1991): 175.

61 As quoted by Hunter: 51.

62 Gerner: 175-176.

63 Fuller: 55.

64 As quoted by Hunter: 51; Gerner: 177-178.

- 65 Gerner: 177-178.
- 66 U.S. Department of Labor, Foreign Labor Trends-Israel (1991): 2; Fuller: 81; Elsner: 13.
- 67 FBIS/NESA (24 January 1992): 11.
- 68 As quoted by Fuller: 54.
- 69 Dan Meridor, "Israel's Approval of the Peace Process," in Yehuda Mirsky, ed. From War To Peace in the Middle East (1991): 37. Mr. Meridor is Israel's Minister of Justice.
- 70 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Palestinians Problem and United States Policy (1986): 30.
- 71 Shoval: 62. See endnote 8.
- 72 Yitzhak Rabin in a 3 February 1992 interview as quoted by FBIS/NESA (7 February 1992): 35.
- 73 Kuniholm: 5. See endnote 28.
- 74 Dr. 'Abd-al-Salam al-Majali as quoted in a 21 January 1992 speech FBIS/NESA (22 January 1992): 3.
- 75 Plascov: 17-18.
- 76 Brookings: 20.
- 77 Plascov: 30.
- 78 Rubin: 7; Kuniholm: 7-8.
- 79 As quoted by FBIS/NESA (7 February 1992): 35.
- 80 The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The West Bank and Gaza Israel's Options for Peace (1989): 106.
- 81 As quoted by Brookings: 17; Lesch and Tessler: 94; Aronson: 307; Plascov: 13.
- 82 Plascov: 13; Fuller: 53.
- 83 Deputy Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as quoted by FBIS/NESA (11 February 1992): 34. A canton is a small district, presumably under some form of municipal self-government in this case.
- 84 Yitzak Shamir as quoted by FBIS/NESA (21 January 1992): 25.

85 Shoval: 62. According to Ambassador Shoval, the self-governing authority would assume jurisdiction over the following: justice, agriculture, finance (including taxation), civil service, education, culture, health, housing and public works, transportation, communications, labor and social welfare, municipal affairs, religious affairs, industry, commerce, and will include "a strong local police force."

86 Justice Minister Dan Meridor as quoted by FBIS/NESA (13 February 1992): 34.

87 Emile A. Nakhleh, "The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later," Middle East Journal (Spring 1988): 212; Plascov: 13.

88 FBIS/NESA (23 January 1992): 6-7. The full text of the Palestinian plan for self-rule is contained in FBIS/NESA (5 March 1992): 3-6. It is interesting to note that while the proposal calls for the "independent Arab State of Palestine", the plan states that this independent nation, "established alongside the State of Israel, would opt for a confederal relationship with Jordan." While the Palestinians are not unified on this position, King Hussein indicated he would agree to the proposed confederation during his March 1992 meeting with President Bush. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat also indicated that he supported the idea of a "confederation" after an independent Palestinian state is established. See FBIS/NESA (18 March 1992): 4.

89 The text of the "unofficial" Israeli proposal is contained in FBIS/NESA (2 March 1992): 3-4. Areas identified for possible control of the interim Palestinian authority include legal conduct, administration, budget and taxation, industry, trade, tourism, labor and social welfare, local police, transportation and local communications, municipal issues, religious affairs, agriculture, education and culture, and health.

90 Justice Minister Dan Meridor as quoted in a 2 March 1992 speech to settlers at the Mate Binyamin Council, FBIS/NESA (3 March 1992): 45.

91 FBIS/NESA (23 January 1992): 6-7; Plascov: 11.

92 Shoval: 62.

93 FBIS/NESA (5 March 1992): 6; FBIS/NESA (2 March 1992): 3-4.

94 Harold M. Waller, "Israel's Continuing Dilemma," Current History (February 1990): 69; Brookings: 13; Kuniholm: 19.

95 U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991: Israel and the Occupied Territories." in Al Haq, Critique on the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights for 1991: Israel and the Occupied Territories (11 March 1992): 1-12.

- 96 Quote by Nakhleh: 210; Lesch and Tessler: 16; Kuniholm: 17; Aronson: 118-129.
- 97 O'Neill: 61.
- 98 Aronson: 308.
- 99 Jaffee, Options: 92-94.
- 100 Ibid: 99-101.
- 101 Lesch and Tessler: 275; Plascov: 43; Kuniholm: 27-28; Meridor: 35.
- 102 Shoval: 65; Meridor: 35; Briefing by and conversation with Major General Yossi Ben Hanon, Commandant, Israeli National Defense College, in Tel Aviv on 12 and 14 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 103 As quoted by Kuniholm: 14; Plascov: 51-53.
- 104 Jaffee, Options: 101.
- 105 Briefing by and conversation with Major General Hanon and Brigadier General Yoni Shomshoni, Deputy Chief of Planning, IDF General Staff, in Tel Aviv, 15 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 106 Secretary of State Baker during congressional testimony on February 24, 1992. Transcript of testimony contained in "The Reuter's Transcript Report of Secretary Baker's Testimony" (25 February 1992): 15.
- 107 Sayez: no page number.
- 108 The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza - Toward A Solution (1989): 21.
- 109 Peres:13, see note 13.
- 110 Ibid.
- 111 Conversation with Major General Hanon.
- 112 Interview with Kamel Abu Jaber, Jordanian Foreign Minister, in Amman, Jordan, 9 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 113 Interview with Faruq al-Shara', Syrian Foreign Minister, in Damascus, Syria, 7 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 114 Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Advisory Committee to the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, recently called for a halt to the violent aspects of the intifada. Sari Nusaybah, another senior member of the Advisory Committee, called for a "unilateral" halt to the intifada by the Palestinians.

- 115 Clinton Bailey. HAMAS: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the PLO (1992): 3.
- 116 Bailey: 3-9; Briefing and conversation with Colonel Shlomo Harari, Deputy Coordinator for the Territories, IDF General Staff, in Tel Aviv, 15 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 117 Bailey: 33.
- 118 Hunter: 50.
- 119 Richard Haas, "The Impact of Global Developments on U.S. Policy in the Middle East," in Yehudah Mirsky, ed. From War To Peace in the Middle East (191): 4. Mr. Haas is the Senior Director, Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council.
- 120 Secretary Baker's testimony: 23.
- 121 Comments by Representative Lawrence Smith (D-Fla) and Subcommittee Chairman David Obey (D-Wis) during Secretary Baker's testimony: 32.
- 122 Foreign Labor Trends: 12; Secretary Baker's testimony: 17. Examples of "moderate" Arab states include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the GCC states.
- 123 Dr. Kamil Abu-Jabir, as quoted by FBIS/NESA (28 January 1992): 6.
- 124 Travis: 11.
- 125 Washington Times (25 April 1992): no page number. This evaluation was repeated by the U.S. Consul General Molly Williamson at the U.S. consulate, Jerusalem, 13 May 1992 (author's notes).
- 126 Conversation with U.S. Consul General (author's notes).
- 127 Conversation with Brigadier General Shomshoni (author's notes).
- 128 Dr. Sa'ib Uraygat during a 17 January 1992 interview as quoted by FBIS/NESA (21 January 1992): 3. Dr. Uraygat is a member of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace talks.

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