The Role of the Department of State in the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

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This paper discusses a President's needs in making and implementing a foreign-policy strategy for the United States. It begins by listing the major responsibilities which have been transferred out of the Department of State's jurisdiction since World War II. It then reviews the ten most common critiques of the Department of State's performance in fulfilling the President's foreign policy needs. It mentions the common attitudes of members of the Department's mid-level and senior-level workforce to those criticisms. Finally, the paper makes suggestions aimed at helping remedy the ten problem areas and generally improving the Department of State's performance in the task of assisting the President to develop and implement a sound foreign policy strategy for the United States.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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The Department of State has played a changing role in foreign policy formulation since the end of World War II. Some of the changes appear to be cyclical, or caused primarily by the personality of the President or Secretary of State. Other changes, albeit evolutionary, seem more permanent and represent a significant loss of authority for the Department.

The losses of functions since 1945 which appear to be most significant and permanent are:

--The loss of the exclusive function of coordinating foreign policy for the President and being the President's almost exclusive adviser on foreign policy, in 1947, with the National Security Act and the establishment of the National Security Council.

--The loss of the intelligence-gathering, intelligence-coordinating and covert operations functions, in 1947, with the National Security Act and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.

--The loss of the overseas information operations function, with the establishment in 1953 of the United States Information Agency, first viewed as an appendage to the Department, but later a quite independent agency to which the Department was merely to provide policy guidance.
--The loss of responsibility for supervising and coordinating the trade agreements program and for directing U.S. participation in trade negotiations with other countries, to the Special Trade Representative, in 1975, under provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974.

--The loss of the cultural and educational exchange program, to USIA, in 1978.

--The loss of the commercial function, -- assistance to U.S. business overseas and development of more U.S. markets overseas -- in 1979, to the Department of Commerce.

--The loss of policy guidance for U.S. overseas information operations, with the establishment in 1981 of the public diplomacy program under the authority of the National Security Council.

--The loss of the foreign policy crisis management function, in 1981, with the passing of this function to the Vice President after the Secretary of State had specifically requested the role.

There was also the loss of the position of the Secretary of State, the first among cabinet members in seniority, as the successor position to the Vice President in case of the death of both the President and Vice President during a term of office, during the Truman/Acheson regime.¹

It would appear from this list alone, that the rate of losing significant formal functions has not slowed down, and
may even be increasing as administrations change. Officers in
the Department have often agonized among themselves about
these losses in State’s functions, and have bemoaned the
apparent fact that the Department is playing a decreasing role
in foreign policy formulation and implementation. To date,
however, there has been no central policy review in the Depart-
ment to determine whether the losses do in fact seriously
undermine the Department’s principal role as chief foreign
policy adviser to the President, whether the Department can or
should do anything to prevent future losses of
responsibilities, and, if so what it might do, and how.

This paper is a first effort to address the underlying
questions: Can the Department of State play a more effective
role in Presidential foreign policy decision-making, and if
so, how?
CHAPTER I

THE ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING

Under Article 2 of the Constitution the President has prime responsibility for foreign policy. This authority comes from his power as chief executive, his power to appoint and receive ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, to make Treaties provided two thirds of the Senators present concur, and from his oath of office requiring him to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.

In the wake of World War II, with the United States clearly the most powerful nation on earth, it was evident throughout Washington that better coordination between foreign and defense policies and intelligence was required than existed before 1940. One result was the National Security Act, which established a National Security Council in the Office of the President, a formal body bringing together the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense as members, with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as regular advisers.
Under President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, both of whom had matured politically in a pre-existing system and had previously developed views of the role of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State continued to be the paramount voice in foreign policy, even though the other agencies had a policy input in the NSC. The NSC Adviser played a coordinating role.4

The arrival of President Kennedy, however, brought a new set of expectations. This was the first President who had matured with the National Security Council mechanism already in place. Moreover, the President seemed to have absorbed some of his ambassador-father’s considerable skepticism, even antagonism, toward the Department of State and the Foreign Service Officer Corps. Consequently, Kennedy leaned much more heavily upon his National Security Adviser, his long-term friends appointed to White House positions, his brother, and the Secretary of Defense in reaching decisions which in earlier periods might have been considered State’s exclusive prerogative. Dean Rusk was a very important counsel for the President, but he was now just one among several key voices. The NSC met rarely except in crisis management situations under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

President Nixon entered office even more skeptical toward State and the Foreign Service, and from personal rather than indirect experience. He had been quite unfavorably impressed
during his Vice Presidency with embassy advice and support he received on his Latin American tour, during which he was nearly killed by Communist agitators. Mr. Nixon was keenly interested in foreign policy and followed international issues closely during and after his term as Vice President. His overseas experiences in the years between his Vice Presidency and his Presidency only confirmed in him the impression that the Department and Foreign Service were ineffective foreign policy managers.

Consequently, Nixon was determined from the outset to run foreign policy directly from the White House. His selections of National Security Adviser and Secretary of State revealed his intentions. He chose Henry Kissinger, a man who had spent his lifetime in teaching and advising on foreign policy, NSC Adviser and William Rogers, a relatively distant friend with no expertise in foreign policy, Secretary of State. Nixon called the NSC together weekly and attended. He authorized Secretary Rogers to conduct policy for the Middle East, but had NSC Adviser Kissinger conduct policy for all other parts of the globe. In August 1973 he simplified the situation by naming Kissinger Secretary of State, while keeping him as National Security Adviser.

President Ford initially retained Kissinger in both roles, at least in part because of the domestic and international respect which the Secretary had and in part to provide
continuity of policy in the troubled post-Watergate period. The NSC met rarely under either President Ford or Carter.

President Carter assumed office with a strong distrust of Washington in general, and an equally strong wish to emulate President Nixon’s foreign policy successes. He, therefore, tried to replicate the Nixon plan of a very strong National Security Adviser in Zbigniew Brzezinski, along with a Secretary of State whose primary work experience had been that of a lawyer. Carter’s first two decision memos, -- prepared by the control-minded Brzezinski, -- concerned the organization of the NSC staff and the assurance of its integrating and coordinating role in foreign and defense policy decisions as well as its role in setting the agenda for NSC meetings and preparation of the necessary papers for those meetings.7

President Reagan entered the White House without a distinct, clear foreign policy strategy, but with a determination to move foreign policy advice out of the White House and back to the Department of State while at the same time keeping control of foreign policy decision-making by weekly NSC meetings which he chaired. His first Secretary of State, -- Alexander Haig, -- wanted to be the President’s "vicar" in terms of foreign policy, but failed to establish a close working relationship with the President, and was thus unable to take advantage of the relatively weak NSC Adviser Richard
Allen. With Secretary Haig's departure over the issue of crisis management, the President selected a new Secretary with broad experience in Government, although not specifically in foreign policy, and wide trust throughout Washington political circles. He moved the former Deputy Secretary of State, Judge Clark, a close personal friend, to the NSC Adviser's role.

Secretary Shultz tried to sway the President on foreign policy; news reports periodically portrayed some difficulties and successes in that effort. By early summer of 1986 the Secretary was widely seen to be winning many inner policy debates. Yet in 1986 Shultz took public issue with the President on three matters: the disinformation effort with Libya, the President's plan to use screening-type lie detector testing throughout the Executive Branch to control leaks of information, and the arms-to-Iran/profits-to-contras incident, with its side issue of whether the NSC should give directions to ambassadors without passing through the Secretary. The news of IranContra broke in November 1986, and left many different interpretations of the relations between Secretary Shultz and President Reagan. Nevertheless, journalists in close touch with the most conservative Republican circles (where Shultz's greatest opposition lay) gave Shultz credit for being able to remain Secretary of State throughout the Reagan administration because of his eleventh-hour defense of the
President and the President's Iranian policy, both during testimony in Congress and on television, and his strength with Congress, the press, and European leaders.  

STATE'S ROLE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: NATIONAL v. NATIONAL SECURITY v. FOREIGN POLICY

Under each President and NSC Adviser, State has played a key role in staffing many of the principal and subordinate NSC committees. State no longer chairs them all, however, and has not done so since Kennedy's Presidency. Some of the newer committees on trade, economics, science and technology, have typically been chaired by representatives of other agencies.

All NSC Advisers have emphasized that their role concerns national security policy, rather than foreign policy. In 1947 this meant that defense policy and foreign policy needed to be related and coordinated. National security decision-making was merely a code name for coordinating the policies of State and Defense. With the growth of United States interests in almost all problems of all countries and regions, however, national security decision-making has also broadened to the point that it now requires coordination of other U. S. agencies' international policies as well: particularly Agriculture, Treasury, Special Trade Representative, and Information Agency.

Moreover, because the United States is more affected by the world's stability and trade than it has ever before been,
domestic policy and national security policy are also much more closely linked than ever before. One senior ambassador depicted the new age by stressing that the President makes national policy, and is the only one who can do so. That national policy may, however, need to go directly contrary to strictly foreign policy interests. To a certain extent, the White House, the Executive Branch, the Congress and the American people are groping for a means of coordinating all varieties of domestic and international issues flowing into the President for decision-making. It is an awesome task, as evidenced by the rather stormy history of relations between the NSC Adviser and the Department of State.

It has become common for current and former policy-makers to press the view that foreign policy must be bipartisan, because there is no room for fickle partisan changes in the country's international relations. With the growing interdependence of domestic and foreign policy, however, one can speculate whether domestic policy can become less partisan, or whether foreign policy must perforce become, or remain, more partisan than it once was.
CHAPTER II

A PRESIDENT'S NEEDS IN FOREIGN POLICY

When each new President parades up Pennsylvania Avenue for the first time, he inevitably has high hopes for his new administration. Just as Ecclesiastes points to the ages of a man, one can point to the ages of a President in office.

The first age is a partisan age. Those who clustered about the Presidential candidate and worked for his election celebrate their victory. Usually each higher-level participant in the campaign wants a specific reward in terms of a title and position in Washington, preferably in the White House itself. Partisan committees process innumerable job applications. Defining the President’s specific policies from campaign rhetoric becomes a critical but camouflaged activity. No President ever ran on a platform that he would simply continue the policies of his predecessor; each has had to galvanize supporters behind some new "reform" program just to get elected. Each President has had to convince supporters that, together, they have the knowledge, clout and power to implement their program. No President, however, could conceivably please all supporters. Parts or all of some programs must be relegated to lowest-priority, without anyone
(particularly the President) specifically saying so and thereby alienating supporters. Other programs may be high priority, but must be camouflaged because political strategists believe they can be successfully marketed only on a very quiet basis or at a later time.

The second age is the power maintenance age. There are myriad pitfalls in Washington. A mis-statement at a news conference, loyalty to a less-than-perfect friend, physical awkwardness, and shortcomings in graciousness toward other powerful elements in Washington have all chipped away at Presidential stature. Internationally, the pitfalls for a President are even greater, -- the order in which he receives foreign visitors or visits foreign countries, the remarks he makes about or to foreign leaders, the tone of final communiques, the sophistication of his spouse, can all help or hurt a President's image and power, and, consequently, his ability to accomplish his goals.

During this power maintenance age the President begins to realize how vast the coalition is which he needs to implement his policies, -- particularly how much broader this coalition must be than that which elected him. This is the age when the President becomes more "bipartisan," sometimes to the dismay of his original backers. This is the age, too, when the President usually realizes that he must continually hone his skills, -- studying the issues, choosing wisely among the
options, developing a relatively coherent set of policies, communicating them, persuading Congress and the public, working with the domestic and international news media, and choosing and retaining wise and able subordinates. The more effectively he performs all these managerial and communications tasks, the more powerful and successful he remains. Flaws in any part of the process, however, can virtually destroy his ability to be a success abroad or at home.

Finally, there is the reflective age. As Presidents move toward the end of their terms, they take stock more and more of their place in history. American Presidents are extraordinarily powerful in the world’s and nation’s eyes, and they know they will inevitably be more than a footnote in history. As their terms mature they begin to read critiques of their administrations with new eyes. No longer do they seek respect merely from those who put them in office, or even from their countrymen, but rather they look to the world’s citizenry, and to the next generation, for their ultimate stamp of approval.

It is clearly the President’s duty to challenge bureaucrats’ policies and inject new ideas into foreign policy. It is in the interest of the Department of State, -- and arguably in the interest of the entire American public, -- to move the Presidency into a mature stage of the power maintenance age as quickly as possible, and to keep stressing to the President his historic, national and international respon-
sibilities rather than his partisan responsibilities. Inevitably these two sets of duties will produce conflict.

In the foreign policy arena, the President needs the image of success, because there is no over-riding personnage, system, or law to which to appeal. The free world expects and wants the President of the United States to be its leader, too. To perform this international role successfully, the President must convey the notion that he is both wise and good, knowledgeable, thoughtful of free world interests as well as of America's own narrow interests, that he is powerful in his own country and that his country is at least as powerful as any other single nation on earth.

In order to convey these impressions in the sophisticated world arena, the President needs a bureaucracy which gives him an unusual degree of support:

1) It must offer responsible and timely options and recommendations (based on very deep expertise) from which he must make his foreign policy choices.

2) It must take all foreign nations' needs into consideration and make certain that, even if the President does not act in a way any individual foreign country wants him to act, he is at least aware of the interests of other countries and of the impact his decisions will have on other countries (and the consequent impact upon those countries' perceptions of, and confidence in, the United States).
3) Depending upon the President and his interest in and long-range study of international relations, the bureaucracy may have to develop for him the relatively coherent set of foreign policy priorities which are appropriate for the United States. These options must be continually revisited as circumstances change, and the President needs to be clearly informed of those changed circumstances and the new options by which he can address the challenge of the changes.

4) Because the rest of the world does not practice the intense self-criticism prevalent in the United States, and because there is much greater fragility of leadership on the world stage, where every one of the 150 countries has sovereignty, the President needs active support from the foreign policy bureaucracy to establish and maintain his leadership role. He naturally expects the bureaucracy to help portray him as the good and knowledgeable leader, to explain sensitively to foreign countries his personal distress if he cannot do what they would like him to do, explaining the reasons he must act differently, -- in brief to be proactively loyal.

5) This sensitivity must be conveyed promptly through a variety of family-like communications, -- letters, notes of congratulation and sympathy, visits, gifts, toasts, etc. Each country which is already an ally, or potentially a friend or ally, must be recognized as unique, special, and deeply
respected. Antagonistic powers must also be treated with respect if the United States intends one day to negotiate anything with them, as it inevitably does.

6) Because there is inherently great risk in offending another country by some slight, and great embarrassment if one country's special relationship seems to run contrary to the "equally" special relationship of a third country, diplomats have historically been valued not only for their graceful words, but also for their studied silences. Leaks in foreign policy need not be critical national security leaks to be extremely embarrassing to the United States Government, or seriously undermining to the power of the President in some important country or region of the world. Consequently, the standard for what constitutes a serious "leak" is much broader in foreign policy than in defense policy. The President expects his proactively loyal diplomats to exercise extreme discretion with all audiences -- foreign, domestic, press, Congressional and social.
CHAPTER III

CRITIQUES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Recent literature on the Presidency, foreign policy and the Department of State is full of criticisms of the Department. Often the same criticisms are repeated from one President to the next and one National Security Council Adviser to the next. Most of the critiques can be condensed to the following ten points, arrayed in order of the importance, rather than the frequency, of the charge.

It is alleged that:

1) the Department has not, and perhaps institutionally cannot, develop a coordinated global foreign policy strategy for the United States. One subset of this argument concerns the structure and conventions of the Department; another the lack of sufficient in-depth knowledge of geographic and particularly functional areas; a third is poor analytical work.

2) members of the Department's staff frequently leak information which embarrasses the President. It is charged that these leaks are often traceable to the wide distribution of cable traffic through the Department and abroad. The allegation is that the leaks are made by employees, however, not that the cables are intercepted and decoded while in the
electronic stage. This particular allegation is so pervasive that highly secret agencies, it is alleged, are no longer passing their most highly classified cables to the Department's desk officers. 14

3) the Department does not take initiative in policy, but rather it expects initiatives to come from other sources, -- the White House, foreign countries or incidents. Some charge that the Department is simply too absorbed in the day-to-day process of implementing yesterday's decisions and managing the bureaucracy to develop new and important initiatives. 15

4) the Department is slow to respond to the White House, and does not give clear responses to questions. Rather, it allegedly homogenizes and hedges its recommendations because of internal bureaucratic disharmonies among its 30 bureaus. 16

5) the Department does not provide enthusiastic or strong support to the President's initiatives. This is allegedly caused in part by a failure to understand the President's policies, in part by disloyalty to the announced policy (sometimes allegedly partisan disloyalty), by arrogant irritation with White House "interference" in foreign policy or simply by inadequate nuance in explaining the President's policies. 17

6) the Department does not take a President's domestic needs into account when making foreign policy recommendations.
Consequently, its advice may seem quite unrealistic when viewed by the White House. 18

7) the Department is so absorbed in listening to and presenting foreign nations' views that it develops "clientitis," putting foreign interests above those of the United States. 19

8) the Department is never prepared to counsel the use of force or confrontation when necessary to seize an advantage for the United States, no matter how great the provocation. 20

9) the Department is not sufficiently disciplined or skilled to advance State's needs in the domestic bureaucratic setting. Moreover, the Foreign Service is too arrogant, too whiny, too self-serving to be as effective as it should be, either at home or abroad. 21

10) the Department's budget is so small that even if it wanted to exercise more significant power within Washington, it would not be able to do so. 22

DEPARTMENT'S PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THESE CRITIQUES

Employees of the Department have heard these criticisms so often throughout their careers that they have become somewhat blasé about them. On occasions when they are expected to support the Department, however, the Department's senior leaders have said the following:

1) The idea that America must have a total global strategy was strictly Mr. Kissinger's or Mr. Brzezinski's
view. International events, especially conflicts, occur too quickly to permit development of one great global strategy. Inevitably new administrations will reinterpret the same old facts; domestic issues may cause foreign issues to be seen totally differently, even when nothing abroad has changed.

2) The Department of State does not leak information any more than any other Department or the NSC staff itself.23

3) The Department is the policy option developer and the policy decision implementer. Its role is not to put a partisan "spin" on American foreign policy. Inherently, that role belongs to the President and to the President alone.

4) While the Department is often slow, this slowness comes from the need to vet any paper going to the President with extreme care. Lawyers, economists, political experts for different geographic regions and functional bureaus often must approve. The slowness is merely a reflection of how broad, deep and complex the international issues facing the United States are.

5) The Department does support the President in foreign policy. There is, however, an inevitable difficulty of having both the White House and State press spokesman deal with foreign policy, for the press tries to find and highlight differences between the two organizations.

6) The Department cannot effectively take the President's domestic political needs into account. First, those overseas
cannot know Washington politics very well; nor can nonpartisan outsiders understand partisan politics as well as the White House insiders.

7) Clientitis is an inevitable part of foreign policy. No one else in Washington has the responsibility of reminding domestic policy-makers of other countries' interests; this is a unique and critical Department of State role. The State bureaucracy which exists above ambassadors and desk officers, -- Assistant Secretaries, Under Secretaries, a Deputy Secretary, and a Secretary -- assure that unsupportable clientitis is toned down before policy options are prepared or decisions made.

8) Department instructions require its senior officers to persuade, cajole and confront every day, on a wide variety of issues. If the United States wishes to use military force, such a decision must inevitably be made by the White House.

9) The Department may well have a weakness in bureaucratic disputes within Washington, but the Department is trying harder to develop broad managers. The Foreign Service secures the best officers of any Department in the United States Government; most of them have master's degrees and have been carefully selected from among several thousand serious applicants. Only one in one hundred candidates passes both written and oral FSO examinations and enters the Service.
The Department's budget grew apace in the early 1980s. Foreign policy does not need the mammoth budgets of defense agencies. To protect State's budget, State has been recognized by OMB as a national defense agency. Until the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings controls have exhausted themselves, no agency can expect to gain much in appropriations over other agencies.

INFORMAL ASSENT TO SOME CRITIQUES

Yet, when assured that one will not quote them directly, both mid-level and senior-level officers tend more to agree with the criticisms rather than to disagree. Officers in one bureau will protest that another bureau has gained some unfair advantage that would have been impossible had there been overall policy "coordination" on the merits of the issue, rather than purely internal bureaucratic politics. Others complain about the Department's inability to set priorities and to fashion a budget which takes those priorities into consideration. On occasion, Department officers themselves use CIA communications channels to protect their own sensitive information. One Assistant Secretary complained in mid-1986 that he had "never" seen so many serious leaks on important U.S./U.S.S.R. negotiations as he had seen recently. Another senior officer lamented what he regarded as the lack of discipline and increasingly self-serving attitude of the Foreign Service, which he attributed to the unionization of
the Service. Many agreed with one senior officer's statement that the Department had reached a state of "total gridlock." One employee who came to the Department from long experience in private industry indicated that he had never before seen such a wildly inefficient and ineffective budget process as that in the Department. A mid-level official close to the budget process said, "Well, the Department's budget doesn't have much impact on the things we buy, the things we do, or the positions (i.e., jobs) we create, so there's no point in paying much attention to it."

Because many responsible individuals in the Department quietly sympathize with the critiques, because the critiques are widely perceived outside the Department as true, and because the widespread perception that the critiques are true appears to be responsible in part for the Department's losses of responsibilities, it appears more useful to examine actions the Department might take to improve its performance rather than to challenge at any further length the degree of accuracy of the critiques themselves.
CHAPTER IV

POTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT

Private-sector managers and academic analysts tend to develop remedies for all of the kinds of problems which allegedly face the Department. In private industry managers tend to apply their remedies periodically, and develop confidence that certain results will be produced by certain actions. The Department, however, tends to be quite skeptical of any textbook remedies. First, those who have lived in many different countries recognize that no solution is totally portable. Even when countries copy each other's constitutions verbatim, the countries inevitably develop very different governments. Consequently, the Department tends to reject textbook remedies on principle. Second, Department managers point out that private sector actions can be conducted without the heavy political interferences which are bound to occur in the public sector generally, and at the Department in particular. Such political interferences can change normal outcomes quite radically. Third, Department managers note that the private sector often takes a remedy too far. One year "grid" pattern management is stylish, and then some of its practitioners push companies into difficulty, and that style of organization becomes passé; soon another manage-
ment style,-- perhaps Japanese quality circles, -- becomes the new style, until this fad, too, wears itself out and is overtaken by yet another. No Department manager cares to emulate these wide swings of style in America's premier department, which generally upholds the need for policy continuity as a way of establishing credibility with both allies and competitors.

At the risk, then, of suggesting analyses and solutions which will inevitably appear unacceptable, I offer the following thoughts on the Department's problems.

1) Global strategy -- Insofar as any country can have a consistent global strategy, the Department tends to have one, and it appears to be relatively well-coordinated most of the time. The Department seems reluctant to articulate its strategy, (1) for fear of having to defend it both domestically and abroad, from the many diverse political groups out to attack it no matter how correct it may be, (2) because of the continuous changes in the international arena which will make today's policy passé tomorrow, and (3) for fear that the public, once convinced a policy is correct, will then prevent changes in it, blocking all flexibility, despite differing circumstances. This lack of continuous, public communication and justification of the nation's foreign policy, however, allows as many critics to enter the fray as it silences. It tends to leave the American public and the vast bulk of the Department's Foreign and Civil Service employees somewhat
unsure of the Department's goals and plans. Dulles was the last Secretary of State who used regular news conferences to convey his strategic concepts, which may have been an important factor in maintaining a foreign policy consensus.

Moreover, where the policy options available include one option which would require very bold steps and which could produce radical antagonisms among the American public, -- the China policy, for instance, under both Nixon and Carter, -- the Department tends not to take the initiative to push for the radical option, even if it seems inherently best. The principal reason for this hesitation is the lack of assurance among FSOs of their accuracy in interpreting the President's policy, his will for change, and the breadth (or narrowness) of options the American political spectrum permits in foreign policy at particular moments.

The arguments of various authors that the Department lacks expertise and analytical perception should not be neglected by the Department. The growth in the number of foreign policy think-tanks in the United States, offering many extremely well-educated individuals the opportunity to develop international expertise on a full-time basis, constitutes a growing threat to the perception of the Foreign Service as the most knowledgeable base of foreign policy experts in the country. Moreover, the think-tank employees have the luxury of special-
izing in a geographic or international functional area, while remaining in the United States where they can develop deep personal contacts with the press, Congress, foreign embassies and academics.

The relatively small size of the Department constitutes a serious obstacle to the long-range career development of deep foreign policy expertise. Only a few deep experts are needed for most areas of the world or specific functions, and so long as individuals remain highly specialized, they cannot advance to the more senior positions, coveted in any case by FSOs. Yet, it would be highly frustrating for outstanding experts to contemplate a 30-year career with no advancement.

Given the rotational nature of the Foreign Service (with locations of service based mainly upon personal desires rather than short- or long-range institutional needs), the fact that virtually all professional positions in all five regional bureaus are staffed by the Foreign Service, and the declining budget for training, the traditional perception that the Department has sufficient or pre-eminent expertise compared to think-tank personnel is already undergoing a major change. The traditional perception could only be restored by carefully identifying position needs throughout the Department and posts abroad and then developing a coordinated training/assignment/career plan to meet those needs, -- something the Department has been reluctant to undertake. 28
For the sake of continuity and expertise, the Department should also re-think the issue of keeping Civil Service employees out of upper levels of the geographic bureaus. At present, the Foreign Service regards the idea of greater Civil Service input into policy as heretical, and the Management Council specifically rejected the notion in 1985. During the 1970's, when the Department aimed toward a single service (the Foreign Service) for all employees of the Department, the skills necessary to manage a strict Civil Service system were lost. Gradually, the Civil Service experts who had resisted entering the Foreign Service, -- first under the Wriston Program in 1953 and then with the single service plan of the early 1970s, -- retired, taking their continuity expertise with them. Today, Foreign Service managers find many Civil Service employees do not perform their duties well, but the FSOs do not know how to remove them from their positions quickly without suffering personal agonies, lawsuits and other challenges. As one former ambassador said, "There is nothing which so frightens a Foreign Service officer as to have senior Civil Service employees in his or her office."

There are solutions to that problem, however. Civil Service employees can be hired on temporary schedules (e.g., Schedule B), allowing quick and easy termination but permitting the best to remain up to four years. Outside expertise can also be hired on a temporary basis from academic institu-
tions, retired military and think-tank employees. Usually outsiders need two years to develop sufficient bureaucratic skills to assist their offices; during the next two years they begin to produce effectively. Without retreating to the pre-Wriston situation, where the Department was staffed overwhelmingly with Civil Service employees, one can find a balance where Civil Servants (selected and promoted as rigorously as members of the Foreign Service) could make a substantial contribution of expertise and continuity to the Department which the FSOs cannot make by virtue of their constant rotation. Sheer prejudice against a pay plan needs to give way to reason. Good management of the Civil Service could help immeasurably in raising the Department's level of expertise and could help the Foreign Service achieve the breadth it wants by relying more on Civil Service employees for the needed depth.

Developing a tour of duty policy which linked length of tour to the specific requirements of each position rather than simply according to grade level or the proclivities of individuals would also help. Probably it would be determined that ambassadors and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, who typically serve just 30 months, would be kept in their positions somewhat longer.

Building a high-quality computer data base of manipulable country, regional and worldwide information could also
increase the foreign policy knowledge of FSOs and help in indicating trends, such as the rapid growth of adherents to the Moslem religion (compared to other world religions), which play a key role in understanding national problems but which are all too easy to overlook in the course of a two or three year assignment to a single country or country desk. Members of the Foreign Service have been extraordinarily reluctant to move toward the use of computers in analytical work, in part because of their abhorrence of systemic approaches which might curb the flexibility they have always felt essential to their trade and in part because of their tendency toward a specific type of personality. CIA has begun to make serious use of computer-assisted analyses of foreign-policy related data and is quickly outstripping the Department in this arena. While computer techniques cannot stand alone, i.e., without direction and interpretation by experts, they could begin to be of great use to FSOs to supplement the traditional reporting of conversations and observations by individual officers abroad. The more common such analyses become in other agencies, in academia, the private sector and think-tanks, the more outdated the Department's traditional approach will seem.

Since 1968 the Department has vacillated between having "specialists" and "generalists" in the Foreign Service. In the 1960's, provisions were made to hire new FSOs in one of
four "cones" -- administration, consular, economic or political. By the mid-1980's, those originally hired and developed in cones were beginning to reach senior levels. Yet in 1986 the Department's most senior career managers were still uncomfortable with the "cones," and still had not defined any type or quantity of specialized needs relating to geographic or functional expertise other than conal specialties for which FSOs would be trained and developed. Instead, management moved slightly away from cones and adopted a multi-functional system of promotions which allows any FSO to rise within the Service without ever serving in tours of duty in his or her own cone. It would be wiser to define position needs first, and then determine the best means of fulfilling those needs through hiring, training, assignments and promotions. Quite possibly, the current promotion system, which promotes set numbers of FSOs with no relationship whatsoever between the skills of FSOs and geographic or functional expertise of positions (other than the four cones) would ultimately be modified.

Lastly, the Department might once again seek to have one cross-bureau policy planning group which tries to look ahead (and to encourage the bureaus to do so) to tomorrow's problems, much as George Kennan did in the late 1940's. There appears to be ample consensus in the Department that the current Policy Planning Group does not perform this task,
which is often labelled the most difficult of all foreign policy processes. 31

2) Leaks -- While most of the members of the Foreign Service regard the charge of leaks as a "bum rap," neither the White House, nor other agencies, nor the Deputy Secretary of State does. 32 The suggestion that other agencies are already withholding cables from desk officers means there is an urgent requirement for dramatic change if State is not to lose ground in foreign policy formulation once again. The Secretary has already made known that he would not permit screening-type lie detector testing in the Department because he believes it would not be practical.

The Secretary's recent firing of one acknowledged leaker helped dramatize the issue, but was only possible because the person who leaked both admitted the fault and was in a personnel category (Schedule C) which permitted instant firing. For the broader group of tenured Civil and Foreign Service employees, immediate firing is not an alternative. Concrete proof against the perpetrator can almost never be established, because the press is committed to protecting its "sources," the leakers. Consequently, the lie detector test has proven the only method of determining who did, in fact, leak.

Currently, no member of the Civil or Foreign Service is required to submit to lie detector testing. Although members of the Service are encouraged to take the lie detector test
during particular investigations, they do not have to do so, and have refused to do so, particularly in cases where they have felt it might incriminate them. The Foreign Service has been loath to acknowledge that over the past 40 years NSA and CIA have come very far in establishing the lie detector as a valid and accurate means of investigation when in the hands of well-selected and highly-trained practitioners.

The one remedy sufficiently powerful to change the situation would be to require all new Department employees of either Service, and all existing members of either Service being admitted to or exiting from a position requiring special compartmentalized information (SCI), to submit to a lie detector test and to agree to resubmit to one whenever there is a leak of classified information to which they were privy, and to recognize that they would never again be allowed access to any classified or SCI material if it is established by expert lie detector methods that they did leak information. This proposal would, of course have to be negotiated with the union and, given the testiness of the issue, might require several years to negotiate and implement. It appears to be the only solution which could have sufficient impact to change both the behavior of Foreign and Civil Service employees of the Department and the perception of other agencies in Washington about the leaky character of the Department.
could go a long way toward re-establishing White House trust in the Department and Foreign Service.

Periodic reviews of cable traffic distribution, to limit distribution to "need to know" offices, would also help, but only minimally.

3) Initiative -- Any large bureaucracy has difficulty taking bold initiatives. By the time the proposed action is circulated among the relevant bureaus for clearance, nearly any new idea will be batted down by someone. This is particularly true because of the minute divisions of responsibility between the 30 some bureaus, so fine that some senior officers believe no one beneath the Secretary has much authority left, and that total "gridlock" exists throughout the Department. The potential remedy to this is the same as that for the following complaint.

4) Slowness of Response -- The Department does provide slow responses to the NSC. Once again, the Department wants to make sure that "all bases are covered." Doing this requires broad circulation of the questions or proposals among the many separate regional and functional bureaus which are impacted by any given policy.

Managers who have worked in the private sector suggest that the normal solution to this problem is to simplify the Department's organization. (a) Combine those bureaus -- some of which have only 12 to 20 officers -- into other bureaus so
that there can be better coordination, and that Assistant Secretaries responsible for larger bureaus have the knowledge and authority to clear more documents and policy issues than they do at present. (b) Remove extra supervisory layers wherever possible, e.g., multiple Deputy Assistant Secretaries whose responsibilities remove much authority from Office Directors below them. 34 (c) Socialize the workforce around a set of common values to enable it to focus on its external work rather than internal politics. 35 The reason these remedies have never been undertaken is threefold: (a) a number of the bureaus have been created specifically by order of the United States Congress to get attention for one or more areas which Congress felt were neglected by State (e.g., human rights, international telecommunications). They can only be "undone" by the same authority, and Congress is unlikely to act unless there is a Congressional consensus on the dissolution, which there almost never is. (b) The propitious moment for such restructuring comes at the beginning of a new administration, -- before political appointees begin filling the unnecessary but nicely-titled positions; yet at that very moment the new senior political appointees do not have sufficient familiarity with the Department to recognize the cumbersome quality of the Department's structure and are loath to act. (c) Members of the Senior Foreign Service aspire to many of those Deputy Assistant Secretary and redundant staff
positions which would be eliminated. (d) The Department's managers have never developed a consensus on the common values of the Department (or the Foreign Service), -- values which need to be instilled in all personnel.

However, the Secretary could try to develop a design to streamline the Department, could take as many steps as possible within his own jurisdiction to reduce and combine bureaus, and to produce accountability for performance between bureaus, and then attempt to persuade both the White House and Congress that the infinite splitting of responsibilities among different bureaus within State does not serve the public well. There are significant gaps in bureau responsibilities as well as significant overlaps of responsibilities; both situations need attention. Perhaps one of the Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee could be persuaded to do for State what Senator Stennis did for the Department of Defense, -- insist that there be a fixed number of bureaus and refuse to permit any additional number, although titles and responsibilities could be changed. With White House and Secretarial support, the current structural problem need not be either the dead letter or the hot potato that it has been. A better, simpler organization of the Department could go a long way toward making the Department more responsive and speedy.36 Establishing a few common values for the organization could also enable the Department to become more effective.
5) Support of the President -- The Department has recently been commended for its responsiveness by the Deputy Secretary. Effective and continued loyalty, however, exists only when reciprocated. So long as the Department's policy recommendations are listened to, taken into consideration, and accepted or rejected for sound reasons (defense, domestic policies, or other explainable reasons) the Department has supported them. It is only when the Department's collective wisdom is ignored, when the NSC Adviser seems to prevent the Department's knowledge from getting to the President at all, or from getting to him except in distorted form that the Department has gone public with its dissent.

Consequently, the solution to this problem seems to lie more in the realm which the President must address than that which the Department can effectively address on its own. Certainly, the Department can take steps to explain the President's policies more widely to officers in Washington and abroad. One international agency makes it a point to send verbatim texts of the best analyses of the President's policies (both pro and con) and problems to all its officers abroad. Such a step, however, helps only marginally; the biggest assist will come from the President paying heed to his chief foreign policy adviser on a regular basis. This, in turn, can only be achieved when the Secretary and the President see each other almost as frequently and lengthily as
Kissinger (as NSC Adviser or Secretary) saw Presidents Nixon and Ford: for about one to one and a half hours daily. Here the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Weinberger that the Secretaries of State, Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence maintain offices in the old Executive Office Building and meet with the President every morning has great merit and should be investigated further.

6) President's Domestic Needs -- Many of the senior officers in the Department have commented from time to time about the bureaucratic ineffectiveness in Washington of the Department as a whole, -- including of course, its senior officers. Here the problem seems to be one of focus. Members of the Foreign Service are taught to focus on the overseas political environment, and frequently neglect the Washington political environment. This problem seems to be best attacked by training all Foreign Service officers immediately prior to any new Washington assignment, as the Foreign Service Institute has just begun to do. Just as teenage and spouse members of Foreign Service families are "re-introduced" to America through "re-entry" courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute, Foreign Service officers, who may spend 10 to 15 years consecutively in assignments overseas broken only by brief periods of home leave, should be given a few days of seminars about the Washington scene, the concerns of middle America, of Congress and, of course, the President. They

38
could be instructed that interpreting the Washington scene will be as much a part of their responsibility in pushing through their programs as interpreting their host government to Washington was when they were overseas. 40

7) "Clientitis" -- Most members of the Foreign Service appear to believe that "clientitis," or the over-emphasis on the needs of a particular foreign country, is an inevitable result of service abroad and of the fact that no other institution in Washington has responsibility for inserting a knowledge of foreign governments' interests into American policy. Most, however, believe that the very multitude of supervisory layers above each desk officer and ambassador eliminate any danger of "clientitis" infecting the Department's final policy recommendations to the President. In this, they are probably right. Each geographic Assistant Secretary has no fewer than 20 countries on which to report, and inevitably will balance off the recommendations of the over-eager desk officer or ambassador for one country with those of a less-active desk officer or ambassador for another. Focussing more on State's overall goals, objectives and mission would, of course, tend to make clientitis less of a problem, whether actual or merely perceived.

8) Failure to Confront -- Members of the Department are recognized for not being prone to confrontations, either among themselves or with the governments of other countries. Such
hesitation abroad is perfectly natural. One always wishes to save a relationship for the test which may come tomorrow or the day after, and which may be more important than today's test. Moreover, foreign leaders may react very differently to confrontation than we would expect. The Aswan Dam case under John Foster Dulles is an example. There are other cases where foreign governments were confronted and pressured by an American ambassador, acting on instructions, and where the ambassador was moved out of that ambassadorship, at the request of the host country, as a direct result of the pressure and confrontation. Consequently, ambassadors usually do play the need for confrontation quite conservatively unless they are very solidly backed by both Secretary and President.

Mature confrontation in an international setting is a skill which needs development. It is a skill important to teach and re-teach throughout the Foreign Service officer's career.

Once again, the Secretary and President can contribute much to the solution through demonstrating loyalty downwards, by articulating and establishing goals and objectives on a country-by-country basis, and by holding senior policy-makers accountable for making progress toward the articulated goals.

On the inside of the Department, increased ability to confront issues is equally important, for there is a strong sense among FSOs that serious issues are being avoided rather than confronted, and that issues on which there is no consen-
sus will continue to be hidden from the next higher level in order to avoid risk and a loss of face for the "loser." The Secretary and Deputy Secretary would need to take a strong personal interest in ferreting out unanswered problems in order to resolve this typical bureaucratic situation.

9) Discipline, Arrogance, Self-Serving Attitudes -- For some of the more experienced members of the Service, the attitude of the "new" Foreign Service is the key to a serious problem. The Foreign Service has always had a reputation for arrogance. At one time that reputation was based upon family background, wealth, social standing and education. With the Foreign Service Act of 1946, however, the Foreign Service began democratizing itself. By 1984 the family backgrounds and education of those taking the key oral examination were no longer made known to the examiners, and the intake system was as close as possible to a true meritocracy. By the mid-1980's there were no officers left in the Service who had been selected into the Service prior to 1947; the old aristocracy had disappeared.41

The new officers, however, absorbed much of the arrogant aura of their predecessors, even though they often did not have the connections, background or wealth of the old aristocrats. There is one additional difference: the focus of the newer officers has been much more strongly on benefits: special allowances, family benefits, etc. Moreover, the
Department's senior managers, all of whom are now from the "new" system rather than the old, have fully abetted this focus on employee benefits. Over the past six years, the Department has concluded 45 agreements with the American Foreign Service Association, the Foreign Service's union, 22 of which provided management-initiated additional benefits with no *guid pro quo* from the union, at a time when the President was seeking cost-containment management. Nor did the Department calculate what each of the additional benefits would cost the Department before it offered the new benefits to the union. One of the Department's senior managers (an Assistant Secretary) represented the union at a union-management forum in 1985, contrary to the ground rules for labor-management relations and in front of the Under Secretary of State for Management.

The Department has been pressured from time to time by the Office of Personnel Management to agree to legislation removing all members of the Senior Foreign Service from its bargaining unit. The Department has opposed on the grounds that the union is more responsible if it, like management, must face up to the broadest array of senior, mid level, junior level and staff level problems. Congress, too, has supported the inclusiveness of the union.

The Department's management would do well to recognize that AFSA is no longer the historic professional association.
for FSOs, but a full-fledged, benefit-oriented union, which has arisen in part because of management failings. State's intimate management/union relationship is subject to valid criticism, and management needs to distance itself from practices that can be said to be self-serving, e.g., maintaining a wide open door policy with union leaders, traditionally appointing outgoing union chairmen to deputy chief of mission positions, offering benefit packages without quid pro quos or prior budget estimates. Useful quid pro quo arrangements would make it easier to a) move members of the Foreign Service more quickly to positions where there is the greatest need for them (especially to positions for which they already have the language) rather than merely to positions desired by the officers, and b) require non-lifestyle lie detector tests for new employees and those needing SCI access.

On the issue of arrogance the Department faces a difficult situation which can be remedied only by recognizing a problem and changing long-held attitudes. It needs to recognize that the Department has long seemed arrogant toward other agencies, and that arrogance is tolerable only if accompanied by undeniably superior competence. Officers at all levels need to be trained how to avoid (or correct) the impression that they are arrogant, and how to take other agency needs into account when developing "State's" foreign policy recommendations and when providing services to other agencies. Without
this accommodation, State has little hope of obtaining effective coordination between the six foreign affairs agencies (State, AID, USIA, Agriculture, Commerce and Peace Corps) or the other agencies with a strong international role (CIA, Treasury).

10) Budget Process -- The Department's budget process has long been an extraordinarily odd one. The Department's senior managers have held firmly to the belief that the Department's resources were so small (State has long been the second smallest department in Washington), that management measures appropriate to large organizations were undesirable and unnecessary, and that merely average managers could take care of this housekeeping function quite adequately. This attitude did not change when the Department's annual budget passed the billion dollar mark. Even then, senior managers did not pay attention when GS-15 civil servants were permitted so much control over the budget process that they changed the budget priorities of Assistant Secretaries without informing them. After all, it is said, civil service budget experts only secure funds from OMB and Congress, and do a very good job of that; once funds are available, bureaus control spending, and can do what they want with available funds so long as they remain within specific budget categories.

As a result of lack of attention, the Department has never had an effective link between official policy priorities and
the budget process. Its Policy Priorities Group, now abandoned, did not work effectively; its absence has not helped. Management regularly authorizes substantially more positions for the bureaus than the Bureau of Personnel is allowed to fill within employment and full time equivalency (FTE) ceilings, with the result that some of the highest-need positions cannot be filled. It has never required that Office of Personnel Management requirements on measuring full-time equivalency hours (FTEs) be followed. It has never insisted that bureaus receive prompt, accurate reports on various categories of expenditures. It has never examined whether actual expenditures matched any previously agreed-upon set of priorities. The manner in which the new Diplomatic Security budget was recently developed attracted widespread criticism within the Department. Given the close relationship between some employees of the Department and Congress, it will doubtless not be long before Congress begins to share these concerns; in fact the recent sharp reduction in State's budget request may have stemmed from such internal criticism.

Bringing the Department's budget under policy control is possible, however, just as soon as a set of policy priorities is articulated. The Under Secretary for Management's Operations Staff, the logical locus of such priority staff work, currently consists almost exclusively of FSOs drawn from all cones, but most heavily the political and econ-
omic cones. Staff members currently suffer from lack of experience and expertise in their efforts to address the Department's management problems.

The Management Operations staff, however, could be made a much more central resource operation. Under an ex-ambassador who typically heads the staff, there could be two career Civil Service (SES) deputies who were specialists in human and financial resource management. Each deputy would have a small staff with perhaps an equal mixture of Foreign and Civil Service employees who would specialize in drawing up coordinated resource choices for the Under Secretary for Management and the Secretary, and in reporting on the eventual expenditures by those priorities. The current Comptroller's Bureau and Bureau of Personnel would then be responsible for implementing the agreed-upon priorities. Some of the Department's double book-keeping might be avoided.

This organization might substantially help the Department begin to use the budget and personnel resources in a more coordinated manner, with greater responsiveness to the Secretary's long-range plans. Moreover, its very existence might help the Department's senior managers, -- particularly the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Policy Planning staff -- focus more on the future than they do at present, and also begin to coordinate more effectively the policies and adminis-
trations of all three core foreign affairs agencies, -- State, USIA and AID. Finally, once the budget was developed in such a manner, the Congressional Relations staff and posts abroad could be instructed to educate Congressmen about it, much as the Air Force mobilizes its legislative staff behind its budget process. Last-minute efforts by the Secretary to argue for the Department's budget, no matter how valiant, cannot make up for years of staff neglect in marketing the Department's programs and budget.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The Department of State has its weaknesses, although they are not nearly of the depth that NSC Advisers Brzezinski and Kissinger suggest. Wise NSC advisers would concentrate on assisting the Department of State to achieve its maximum strength rather than denigrating it, or going around it to achieve short-term objectives.

The current Secretary of State is probably the strongest organizational leader the Department has had in two decades. He has shown that he deeply cares about the organization of the Department, -- taking time first to meet on a daily basis for several months with those in charge of security problems and then on a weekly basis with the members of the Management Council. He has also made himself available to meet with Assistant Secretaries whenever they have a need to do so, -- something not all of his predecessors have been willing to do.

Such actions are important and helpful. Yet, to date, they have not been sufficient to restore to the Department its long-lost sense of mission and direction. Without a much keener sense of mission and direction, the Department will not be able to forestall further efforts to cut away more of its responsibilities, because it will not be able to mobilize
itself, to make use of the excellent talent it has, to recapture its lost expertise, or to begin to use its budget and personnel system to obtain its objectives.

The weaknesses of the Department should be addressed, and quickly, if the continued tendency to push the Department out of the President's policy councils is to be avoided or reversed. The move to recapture State's historic role cannot be won by a strong and capable Secretary on a political battlefield alone; it will require substantial work with State's infrastructure. Ideally, the senior career officer in the Department, typically the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, would be the catalyst for the necessary planning and consensus-building. He could personally lead a group which would set about articulating what the Department wants for its prime values, what the Department wants to be and do in the 21st century. State may not be able to recapture "primacy," as Brzezinski defines it, but with sufficient thought and planning, it could become once again the primus inter pares department in foreign policy, drawing up the options for the President and securing the authority to implement the President's foreign policy decisions. The grand decline in State responsibilities noted in Chapter I, which persisted right into November 1986, when CIA Director Casey began announcing his proposals for a new U.S. policy toward third world nations, can be reversed. The Department has the brainpower to turn around this long trend and launch itself as
a far stronger agency, but to do so it will need to begin, now, to undertake the necessary internal structural steps. Without such steps, without this intensive re-examination of what the Department and the Foreign Service wish to be, and where they wish to go, the trend toward reduced roles and policy impotence can only continue. Moreover, the re-examination must not conclude, as studies so often do, with an interesting volume on the shelf of the library. There are serious handicaps within State keeping it from being the responsive, trustworthy organization needed by the President. Depending upon the goals the Department wishes to reach, there will need to be some restructuring of the organization, the personnel and the budget system currently in place.

The suggestions in this paper have been culled from personal experience and from the wisdom of many junior, mid-level and senior Foreign Service officers and Civil Service employees of the Department for whom I have the greatest respect. All fault with the suggestions, however, lies exclusively with the writer.
# APPENDIX A

## TABLE OF PRESIDENTS, SECRETARIES OF STATE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISERS, AND APPROXIMATE SIZE OF NSC STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Secretary of State</th>
<th>NSC Adviser</th>
<th>SIZE NSC STAFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>McGeorge Bundy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>63-66: Bundy</td>
<td>28 to 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>68-73: Rogers</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>28 to 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>68-73: Rogers</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>28 to 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>74-75: Kissinger</td>
<td>40+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>74-75: Kissinger</td>
<td>40+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>77-80: Vance</td>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>30+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>77-80: Vance</td>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>30+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX B

**SUMMARY OF CRITIQUES, PUBLIC RESPONSES AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITIQUES</th>
<th>PUBLIC RESPONSES</th>
<th>POTENTIAL REMEDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of coordinated global foreign policy strategy.</td>
<td>Coordinated global strategy not possible in rapidly changing world.</td>
<td>The most difficult task for any Dept. Requires determination by Secretary that this will be a key task in which he will participate actively. Position needs must be documented for type and degree of knowledge required for top performance. Expertise must be developed and maintained, partially thru greater use of short-term Civil Service appointments and longer-term FS assignments. Build high-quality country and regional data base for long-term information and quantitative analyses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaks of information</td>
<td>State does not leak any more than other agencies do. Prosecute if you can.</td>
<td>Use non-lifestyle lie detector tests in same manner that DOD and DIA do, for all new employees, all those entering or leaving SCI areas, and before retirement or resignation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of policy initiatives</td>
<td>State cannot put a domestic spin on foreign policy; inevitably that is the White House task.</td>
<td>Simplification of Department's structure and reduction of supervisory layers. Identify gaps and overlaps in bureau responsibilities. Make bureaus accountable to each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow, homogenized recommendations to White House</td>
<td>Complexity of issues same as above inevitably produces delays in order to provide President wisest counsel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of enthusiastic support of President's policies.</td>
<td>State does support President's initiatives if its advice and counsel have at least been well considered before decisions are made.</td>
<td>Assure that advice from State gets careful consideration in White House; provide good explanations to field of President's policy choices, dilemmas and decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to take President's domestic policy needs into consideration</td>
<td>State cannot take President's domestic needs into account; State must concentrate on its unique foreign policy perspective and leave domestic considerations to White House staff.</td>
<td>Provide better training to State officers returning to Washington on the way to be effective policy and organizational managers in Washington setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientitis</td>
<td>Layers of supervisors above desk officers and ambassadors assure that clientitis at lower levels is worked out of Department's final recommendations.</td>
<td>Increased focus on global and future strategy and on Department's mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lack of will to confront or advise use of force
State's job is the diplomatic job; any recommendation to use force is inherently a military decision; State does confront foreign governments daily.

Inability to be effective in domestic bureaucratic infighting; arrogant and self-serving.
Department is trying harder than before to develop good bureaucratic mgrs; the large number of small posts abroad makes it hard to develop good managers of large bureaucracies.

Lack of budget power.
State doesn't need mammoth size; it needs only few highest quality employees to carry out its mission.

Open loyalty from President and Secretary to ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries; holding officers accountable for specific policy and organizational objectives, especially between bureaus. Develop expertise on military options.

Devote attention and resources to teaching FSOs how to be less arrogant to representatives of other Departments in US Government; take more professional management stance vis-a-vis Foreign Service Union (AFSA); stress policy management as well as bureaucratic management; focus on Dept.'s mission, objectives; de-emphasize benefits; socialize new employees around Department's values.

Integrate global strategic planning with budget process; develop and implement a priority-setting budget process; use budget process managerially and monitor expenditures vs. plans. Mobilize workforce to market budget.
NOTES

1. U. S. Laws, Statutes, etc., U.S. Code, 1976 Edition, Volume One: Organic Laws, Title 3, Par. 19(a) (1); June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat 677. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 249. It was also in 1948 that the Department of State moved out of the old State-War-Navy building to its current site at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., -- about seven blocks distant from the White House. Some writers consider this move a strategic mistake of the greatest significance because, as Clark Clifford used to say about the desirability of remaining physically very close to the President, "Nothing propinques like propinquity."


3. It was generally believed that the British had achieved better coordination during the war than the Americans. The United States aimed to copy the general purpose and structure of Britain's Committee of Imperial Defense.

4. A similar State-NSC relationship existed under President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Secretary Dulles was often thought at the time to be dominating the President in foreign policy, but more recent documents have made clear that Dulles always sought Eisenhower's approval on foreign policy, and supported the President with unswerving loyalty and devotion. The NSC met weekly, with the President in attendance, under Eisenhower.

5. Conversation with John Ehrlichman, National War College, Washington, D.C., 24 November 1986. See also Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979) p. 11, p. 28, alleging that President Nixon distrusted two institutions more than any others: the Foreign Service and the press. Kissinger discusses the issue further at pp. 9-10, 42-45. President Nixon refers to the same problem in The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) p. 607. It was in 1963 when copies of Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency cables began going directly to the National Security Council, making it possible for NSC's staff to develop its own quick analysis of world events without depending upon developed memoranda and decision papers from the Department and CIA.


9. Conversation with Ambassador Steven Low, Director, Foreign Service Institute and Member, Management Council of the Department of State, Washington, D. C., 5 December 1986.


20. Brzezinski, p. 369, p. 535. This argument merges with that mentioned by Kissinger, White House Years, p. 444 and Carter, p. 53, on the narrow range of choices offered by the Department to the President.


22. George Shultz, "Restoring the Foreign Affairs Budget," speech of November 3, 1986 printed in Current Policy, No. 884. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. The Secretary indicated, p. 2., that only two percent of the Federal budget is dedicated to foreign affairs, and that the tentative cut in the Department's operating budget for FY87 had been 18%.

23. Some allege that the NSC staff and Adviser may deliberately paint the Department of State as an institution of "leakers" so as to increase the President's confidence in (and reliance upon) the NSC and decrease the President's confidence in (and reliance upon) the Department of State.

24. The uncertainty about broad foreign policy goals and policies has a strongly adverse affect upon budget and personnel policies, which, because they cannot be anchored on relatively permanent well-articulated and official foreign policy goals, tend to vacillate as senior officers at the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant Secretary levels sway budget and personnel policies first in one direction and then another. The absence of a clear strategic plan is more obvious when a nation faces an adversary with a strong long-range strategic plan than it would be otherwise.

25. Speaking before journalists on television news shows may not be as effective a public format as Secretarial press conferences to which all members of the press are invited, and which may play better in hometown newspapers because of each local reporter’s desire for a front-page, by-line story in the hometown paper.

26. The difference in the management of U.S. trade policy under the Department of State and under the Special Trade Representative (STR) Clayton Yeutter is a clear example of the difference which can be achieved by more global thinking, planning and policy development. When trade negotiations were primarily the Department’s responsibility, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the appropriate country desk typically developed ad hoc trade policies toward individual countries before beginning bilateral trade negotiations. Mr. Yeutter has instead developed a global strategy for trade, has outlined problems and options for the President has held several lengthy meetings with the President and appropriate cabinet council to review these options. Through these efforts the STR has received an approved plan for a new world-
wide round of trade negotiations; the President and appropriate agencies have a common view of the problem and have developed a general consensus of how to approach and overcome the trade problems. The difference in approach and policy result has been dramatic.

27. Congressional and corporate foreign policy expertise has also grown rapidly in the past decade and is yet another source of challenge to the perceived expertise of the Department. During the Kissinger period as Secretary of State, Kissinger was highly disturbed at seeing what he thought was narrowness of concern on the part of U.S. ambassadors in Latin America. He believed this narrowness came from too many assignments to the same region. Consequently he proposed, and the Department soon implemented, a global assignment policy which aims to move officers among the various regions. This policy still exists since each officer bidding to be assigned to a vacant position must request assignment to at least three different bureaus. Over the long run, such a policy works against the achievement by individual officers of expertise in one or two regions of the world.

28. Since there is no specific academic requirement to enter the Foreign Service, merely success on the highly-touted FSO examination which eliminates 99 out of every 100 candidates, it is possible to enter the service with very little academic background in international relations, economics, diplomatic history, etc. The Department immediately enrolls new officers in its traditional A-100 course, but this course does not stress policy goals or diplomatic history. It often leaves idealistic new officers with the impression that they have learned only the "system," -- the benefits, personnel systems, technical steps to move overseas, etc. Given the fact that State deliberately seeks officers from the entire U.S., and given the fact that many new officers do not have good international backgrounds at the moment of their entry into the Foreign Service, a 6-week intensive course in U.S. diplomatic history and the current Department objectives would be highly useful and motivating to the new officers.

29. Interview with Bill Bacchus, Legislative Assistant to the Under Secretary for Management, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 9 January 1987. The Department's Bureau of Public Affairs has developed a few one- to three-year "positions" to be rotated among several outstanding organizations specializing in diplomatic history. This has provided benefits both to the Department and to the organizations concerned.

determined that FSOs are overwhelmingly Introvert-Intuitive-Thinking and Judgmental. This type of personality tends not to be attracted to quantitative analysis.


32. Interview with John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C., 29 December 1986.

33. Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency employees have already begun such practices. The more agencies follow such procedures, the more State's refusal to do so will appear unsupportable. The type of testing given by DOD and DIA is not life-style testing, but rather pure counter-intelligence testing, which is what is suggested for State.

34. Individual bureaus have had up to seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries (or equivalents to Deputy Assistant Secretaries). The span of control over the number of office directors whom they supervise has been as small as one DAS for two office directors, a situation which naturally eliminates breadth and responsibility from those directors.

35. Richard Pascale, "Fitting New Employees into the Company Culture," Fortune, May 28, 1984. pp. 28-43. Pascale argues quite forcefully that a degree of social uniformity enables organizations to work better and has been a feature of America's most long-run successful corporations. Some of the steps he finds necessary to that socialization already exist in the Foreign Service; others do not: 1) a very rigorous selection process; 2) requiring new recruits to perform long hours of intense work that carries them close to their limits (and helps produce a certain amount of humility); 3) carefully-monitored work in the field, teaching the lesson that specific skills must be acquired step-by-step to move up the corporate ladder; 4) comprehensive and consistent rewards systems built on those factors deemed critical to the success of that particular organization (along with mechanisms for disciplining anyone who has violated a corporate norm); 5) instilling the values of the organization in all employees (e.g., serving mankind, providing a first-class product); 6) develop a folklore around watershed events in the organization's history that reaffirm the importance of the firm's culture and legitimize special channels for moving an organization in a hurry; 7) providing role models consistent with the values the company wants instilled in its employees (e.g., analytical, energetic and adept at motivating others). Pascale finds that consistency across these seven steps provides a cohesive, enduring culture which can lead to long-run excellence of an organization.

36. Much can be done to simplify organizational structure within the Department. In 1984 the Office of Management and Budget approached the Department, along with all other agen-
ties, with a request that it begin cutting its "overhead" staff, starting with the personnel function. The Department calculated that it used somewhat more than 1,000 full-time equivalent workyears to service some 13,000 American and 10,000 foreign national employees working for State alone. (If all other agencies' nationals were counted, the figure would rise to approximately 20,000 FSNs.) The Department devoted hundreds of employee hours to the study of the proper ratio for personnel employees to total employees in the foreign affairs agencies and devised at least a half-dozen plans to reduce the Department's personnel overhead. As of February 1987, however, no occupied positions had been cut, no strategic plan accepted to cut the Department's overhead. The reason the task is so difficult is that State has no effective way in which to hold any one bureau responsible for its services and assistance to other bureaus; consequently each bureau tries to service itself as autonomously as possible, minimizing its reliance upon other bureaus' often ineffective support. Most overhead functions, -- contracts, budget, etc., -- are thoroughly fractionalized among the 30 bureaus, with each fraction strongly protected because of this total lack of confidence in other bureaus' support. A good deal of confusion results from this fragmentation, for instance, central salary allotments are held centrally when they involve employees in a full time permanent status; bureaus hold the allotments for all temporary and part-time permanent employees. This creates considerable inflexibility between accounts, and encourages managers to fight to the limit for excessive grade structures on all full-time permanent positions, since bureaus do not have any managerial price to pay for doing so. Among most mid-level managers there appears to be an overall consensus that (1) the Department does indeed have much too large a burden of employees in so-called overhead functions, (2) the Department could better carry out its basic mission if it could secure greater efficiency in its overhead duties and then redirect its resources from these overhead activities to more direct mission (i.e., foreign policy) requirements, and (3) there is no way to make cuts in overhead functions, for instance, through consolidation, without some official means of establishing the Department's overall goals and priorities, and holding employees to pursuing such goals and priorities.

37. Interview with John C. Whitehead.


39. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now meet approximately quarterly with the President to discuss military issues, and set the agenda for these sessions themselves. It would appear particularly useful to have high-level State officials brief the President and his NSC adviser about five times as early in each new administration as possible, -- on the overall situation in each of the five main geographic regions, and then see the President quarterly thereafter on topics set by the Department. These sessions would, of course, be particu-
larly convincing if the background provided the President by State represented a coordinated view between CIA, USIA, AID, and DOD.

40. Bacchus, p. 232.

41. While it is unprovable, the assumption seems fair that the old aristocrats tended to have a much better understanding of foreign cultures and diplomatic history through family and academic connections than those currently selected, even though the current crop of FSOs is selected on the basis of merit. Moreover, the aristocrats probably had more shared (socialized) values than the diverse group the Department currently recruits. Current recruits are given high marks among other agencies for being "the best" new professionals of any agency in the U.S. Government. Equally often heard, however, is the comment that, within 15 years of entry on duty, recruits of other agencies outshine those who have come into the Department of State's Foreign Service, because of the training, counseling and career development offered by some other agencies.

42. Bacchus, p. 232.

43. A DOD colleague who has worked with the Department of State both in Washington and overseas offered the following comment on a Civil Service employee who had risen to unusually high levels in the Department, despite the modest inherent grade level of the position he occupies. "He was successful," said the DOD employee, "because, unlike all the FSOs around him, he learned something about the budget of certain international organizations and hence became indispensable to his bureau." People with the INTJ personality, identified by Ted Strickler as typical in the Foreign Service, tend not to want to get involved in budget details.


45. William J. Casey, luncheon address, Seventeenth Annual Leadership Conference of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Atlanta, Georgia. 8 November, 1986.


**INTERVIEWS**


Whitehead, John C., Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.: Interview. 29 December 1986.