REDESIGNING US ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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This paper was prepared to fulfill the requirements of core courses 4 and 5 of the National War College. Much of the substance of the paper is based on the author's 20 years of experience working with the Peace Corps and AID in Africa. All opinions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author, who reserves all rights and accepts full responsibility for any faults this paper may contain.
Africa's desperate plight is an ugly reminder that the end of the Cold War does not necessarily foretell of a better New World Order to come. The deepening of Africa's multilayered development crisis, and the horrific toll it is taking on millions of lives, is almost ignored as the world's attention is riveted on the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Fears about changes in the global power structure, which reduce Africa's already weak appeal for the favors of industrialized countries, seem to be increasingly justified. Indeed, predictions abound that the end of the East-West conflict will leave Africa worse off.  

The prime reason that a continent almost three times the size of the United States can be so marginalized within the new global construct is its striking lack of strategic value. The dissolution of the Soviet threat eliminates Africa as a battleground for superpowers; therefore, the US no longer has to be concerned about the perceived need to contain Soviet influence on the African continent. This precipitous drop in US security interests in Africa raises doubts about future commitments to helping this continent recover from years of economic decline.

This dramatic geopolitical shift suggests that the time is right for a reassessment of US interests in Africa and a
fresh determination of how US assistance might be designed to serve these interests more effectively. US domestic resource constraints and growing foreign assistance needs also suggest that past proposals to reform the US foreign aid program should be restudied. Redesigning US assistance for Africa to fit the post-Cold War era may be only part of a long-overdue revision of foreign assistance legislation and the charters of the government entities charged with its implementation. Much will depend on the will of the executive branch following the 1992 election and the legislative agenda of the 103rd Congress, which makes its debut in January 1993.

AFRICA: A SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT CASE

By any measure, Africa is the world's poorest region and all projections show this extreme poverty level growing in the years ahead. Of the world's 42 low income countries (less than $500 annual per capita GDP), 27 are in Africa, which has the lowest GDP growth rate, the lowest intake of daily calories per capita, the fewest physicians per capita, and the lowest life expectancy of any other region. It consistently falls further behind all other regions in virtually every economic and social indicator.

Africa has the highest infant mortality rate, yet the annual population growth rate of 3.3 percent is the highest ever recorded. The economies of most African countries have
declined since the 1970s, and in 1990 the average per capita GDP was 15 percent lower than a decade ago. Contributing notably to this pronounced economic decline was a 50 percent drop in Africa’s share of world trade, which fell from its low level of three percent in 1960, to an abysmal 1.3 percent in 1987. This constant downward trend raises doubts about the reversibility of Africa’s grim economic status.4

Although improvements in literacy and health can be cited, Africa continues to defy the best available assistance remedies. The 1960s saw the premature creation of fragile African nations within artificial borders pursuing centralized political and economic policies which led to ruin in the 1970s. The 1980s brought multidonor, World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led structural adjustment programs to correct economic mismanagement and reorient the national economies to free market principles.5

Known as the “lost development decade,” the 1980s tried to restructure African economies and lay the groundwork for long-term growth. The 1990s was heralded as a decade of building on limited successes of the past and restoring of the development process in Africa. Poor economic performance and seismic changes in geopolitical alignments now make the 1990s look so much less promising that it is being referred to as the “fight for survival decade.”

Normally, the peace brought about by the end of the East-West conflict should contribute to a more stable and prosperous Africa. However, a strong case can be made that
the conflict's end leaves a vacuum in many parts of Africa which creates greater instability. Border disputes, ethnic conflicts, unresolved civil wars, drought, the AIDS epidemic, rise of Islamic fundamentalism, potential for increased drug trafficking, rapid urbanization, apartheid, and uncertainties engendered by a rowdy transition to democracy are among other troubling aspects supporting increased instability. No doubt that the future of the more than 300 ethnic groups living in this vast and diverse continent will remain unpredictable. Chances are that things will get worse before they get better.

Neither words nor statistics can adequately describe the misery faced by most Africans on a daily basis. It is even more depressing to imagine what human misery will be like in the year 2015 when the African population will be more than double its present estimated 540 million people. Tackling such widespread and deep-seated poverty will strain the best efforts of donors and host governments.6

Now, with the dissolution of the "East-West" strategic interests, and a global economy that is increasingly marginalizing Africa, donor communities already fatigued with the apparent insolvability of Africa's complex and enduring development problems may find themselves unable to meet the increased demands of the African development challenge in the 21st century. Nevertheless, Africa's desperate situation will become irreversibly hopeless if the special nature of its status as the world's most
disadvantaged region does not evoke a special assistance response on the part of the international community.

US ASSISTANCE ROLE

Given the past and present involvement of the US in Africa, its large repository of African expertise, and its status as the world's preeminent superpower, the United States is well-positioned to be a major player in helping Africa out of its economic morass. It is unlikely, however, that domestic politics and competing demands for limited foreign assistance funds will allow the US to utilize fully its potential capacity for helping Africa.

Although it created a special Development Fund for Africa (DFA) in late 1987, and increased by 37 percent planned annual assistance levels, the US is still not the major donor to the region. This amount, $300 million, represents almost 15 percent of the US total 1992 development and economic security assistance budget, but after it is meted out to all countries in Africa, the US contribution usually makes it a minor bilateral donor. While this lack of bilateral funding leverage is offset to some extent by general US prestige, the strength of its field missions, its contributions to multilateral donor organizations and in some countries by its ability to provide substantial food aid, the amount of US aid to Africa is still much lower than one might expect. In the 1980s, US assistance to Africa averaged seven to 12 percent of the
total donor amount provided Africa. In terms of dollar assistance as a percent of GNP, the US ranks last among 17 major industrialized countries.\textsuperscript{10}

The reasons for such a low portion of the US aid budget going to such a large geographic area may reflect perceived US interests in Africa. In the past, US policy in Africa has mostly revolved around containing Soviet expansionism and related insurgency wars on the continent, bringing an end to apartheid in South Africa and providing humanitarian assistance to friendly African countries, especially those that support US positions in the United Nations and other international fora.\textsuperscript{11}

The breakup of the Soviet Union helped the US play an instrumental role in negotiating the end of long-standing insurgency wars in Namibia, Angola and Ethiopia. It has also been helpful to the courageous efforts of South African President F W de Klerk to end apartheid, and in resolving armed conflict in Mozambique. These impressive foreign policy achievements appear to leave humanitarian assistance as the central focus of future US involvement in Africa.

If this is so, it would seem to support arguments for reconceiving the delivery of US development assistance to Africa. Before jumping to this conclusion, however, an attempt should be made to review US major interests in Africa and the policy objectives that might evolve out of a reevaluation of these interests.
US INTERESTS: PAST AND PRESENT

The Cold War Legacy

US strategic interests in Africa have always been slight, but, in the past, some importance has been attached to unfettered use of the sea lanes around the continent (especially around the Cape of Good Hope and the Horn of Africa) and maintenance of communication facilities in countries like Liberia and Ethiopia. Access to ports in East Africa (Berbera, Mombasa) and to some airstrips (like the secret airbase in Kamina, Zaire) were also considerations during the Cold War years. It was also useful to have a foothold in countries like Chad and Sudan to counter incursions of that international menace, Moammar Gadhafi of Libya.

Of some interest were strategic minerals like cobalt in Zaire and Zambia, platinum in South Africa, chrome in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent manganese in Gabon and bauxite in Guinea. In recent years, oil imports from Nigeria and Angola's Cabinda enclave gained importance.

The departure of the Soviets and their surrogate Cuban fighting forces has removed any real threats to the sea lanes around Africa. Violence and instability in Zaire, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan has greatly reduced US desire to maintain any interests in these countries. The havoc wreaked upon these "US client countries" in recent years does, however, raise some questions about US
involvement in Africa. After all, these five countries were
the largest recipients of US aid over the past 20 years.

The departure of the Soviets, the establishment of an
important US base in Diego Garcia, and the presence of many
friendly countries in the region has eliminated port access
(sea and air) as an issue. Obtaining independence for
Namibia, and the Soviet and Cuban withdrawal from Ethiopia
and Angola--where a US-brokered peace settlement ended 15
years of bloody civil war and laid the basis for democratic
elections later this year--removes any need for the Kamina
base. The end of the Angolan conflict also removes any
further need for the US to put up with the brazenly corrupt
regime of Zaire's President Mobutu, whose one-man
dictatorship has enjoyed US assistance largess for over 30
years. Zaire is thus an example of a top US aid recipient
which is being left in economic ruin and on the verge of
collapse as a nation in the wake of the Cold War.

The political choice--if there is one--in Zaire and
other African countries may not be so much between democracy
and authoritarianism, but between civilized behavior or a
return to barbaric internecine conflicts. This sad turn of
events in Zaire and elsewhere on the continent should cast
doubts on the wisdom of using development funds to achieve
foreign policy objectives not directly related to the
welfare of the population and dependent upon maintaining
corrupt regimes in power. In the future, humanitarian and
development assistance should not be commingled by Congress
with security support funds in the same budget.
Oddly, now that the Cold War is over, and aid dollars can now be more clearly directed toward development needs, the US appears less motivated to provide that aid. It appears that fighting the Soviet menace and apartheid in Africa were major rallying points for US policy, and that the absence of these elements narrows considerably the domestic constituency for US aid to Africa.

Decreased interest in Africa's welfare comes, unfortunately, at a time when most African countries are following the advice of the US and other donor countries in moving ahead with profound political and economic reforms that require more—not less—aid to be successful. The importance of this political-economic transition in Africa argues in favor of conceptualizing new incentives for maintaining US interests in Africa. Following is an outline of possible US post-Cold War interests and reasons why any lessening of US involvement in Africa should be avoided now that African countries are opting for democratic forms of government and market-oriented economic policies.

Post-Cold War Interests and Issues

Although US concerns about Africa may now be primarily humanitarian in nature, the continent is still of some post-Cold War strategic value. Exploitation of Africa's current and potential mineral wealth will continue to be important. US interests would be served by reducing dependency on oil from the Persian Gulf area by increasing
Nigeria and trade with South Africa were excluded, US trade and investment in Africa would be minuscule.\textsuperscript{15}

US business interests in Africa are also of little significance. The high costs and risks of doing business in Africa, combined with low returns and better opportunities elsewhere, have not only discouraged US investors, but have brought about a negative flow of investment from France and Great Britain—countries that have traditionally kept commerce alive in their former colonies.\textsuperscript{16} Along with loss of investment capital, Africa has lost a large portion of its agricultural commodity markets to more competitive and
stable economies in Asia. Notable examples are the manner in which Southeast Asia has successfully entered the palm oil and cocoa markets--formerly two mainstays of the economies of several West African countries.\footnote{17}

Africa's rapidly growing population represents a sizeable market for US products, but the poverty of the region reduces its buying power to a negligible amount. The collective GDP of all countries in Africa is less than that of Belgium, a country with fifty times fewer people than Africa. The average GDP of African countries, excluding Nigeria and South Africa, is less than the gross municipal output of Hartford, Connecticut--a city of 200,000 people.\footnote{18} These statistics amply show Africa's feeble position on the world commercial scene.

**New Threats and Concerns**

Gadhafi's influence in the region remains a concern to the US, although his disastrous defeat by lightly armed Chadian troops in the desert battle of early 1987, and current international pressure have served to curtail his support of terrorists and insurgent factions.\footnote{19} Gadhafi's support of Tuareg rebels in northern Niger (where he covets rich uranium mines) and eastern Mali, and his support of political factions in Sudan, Liberia, and Burkina Faso bears watching. The possibility of his also seeking revenge in Chad should not be overlooked. Africa and US interests will be better off once the Gadhafi menace is eliminated.
Recently, a new foreign menace that threatens US interests has appeared on the African scene. It looks as if Iran's quest to become an international power has led it to send part of its fundamentalist legions to Africa. Already it has been reported that there are 10,000 Iranians in Sudan indoctrinating a large Islamic following. It also rumored that they are setting up outposts in Somalia and the Comoros. These inroads by Iran on the African continent must be viewed with alarm as an initial attempt to spread Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism among Africa's 200 million Muslims. The linking of Libyan and Sudanese troops with dissident factions in Algeria and outcast Ethiopian soldiers should be regarded as real threats.

The propagation of such religious dogma, in the Iranian form or otherwise, could have a serious destabilizing effect in Africa. Islam continues to be the fastest growing religion in Africa and conflicts between Islamic and non-Islamic groups are not uncommon (e.g., Sudan and Chad). The introduction of Islamic fundamentalism would increase the potential for such conflicts and could cause trouble like that observed in Algeria for democratic reforms.

Foreign Islamic influence on the role played by powerful Islamic brotherhoods in "democratic" Senegal should also be monitored. Northern Nigeria, with its large Muslim population, low level of economic development, and history of violence between the government and various Islamic sects particularly bears watching. Islamic fundamentalism could
be one of a number of ideological strains that move into part of the vacuum left by the end of the East-West conflict and the decline in Western interest in African affairs.

It must also be assumed that these unwanted outside influences will contribute to an undesirable proliferation of arms. Worst case scenarios might be some Islamic zealot testing chemical or biological weapons in the Sahara, or a disinherited Afrikaner blowing up his "lost" world with the atomic weapons that South Africa allegedly possesses. And, if Islamic revivalists and associated anti-Zionist elements are to come to Africa, close behind will be the Israelis who have already played a dubious military assistance role in Africa. It would not be in the US interest to see the Israeli-Islamic feud extended to Africa.

Non-traditional interests will undoubtedly become increasingly important in Africa. The poverty of the region makes it very inviting for production and trafficking of drugs. Already, Nigerians have become the principal "mules" for delivery of heroin from South Asia and the Far East to North America via Africa. Climatic and soil conditions permitting, it doesn't take much imagination to visualize parts of Africa becoming drug centers--perhaps to serve the expanding European Economic Community areas and new markets in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics.

Protection of the African environment is another area of growing concern for US interests. This includes
preservation of Africa's unique assortment of wildlife, the
tropical forests and open savanna serving as their habitat.
Both the wildlife and their habitat is disappearing at an
alarming rate, mostly due to need for firewood and more
farmland. The impact of the disappearance of the forests on
the world's climate and loss of medicinal plants they may
contain are incalculable.

Rapid population growth also increases pressures on
fragile soils which erode easily under the "slash and burn"
methods employed by African farmers, who represent the
majority of the African population. The smoke released into
the atmosphere by the annual burning of farm land in Africa
is a major contributor to global warming. The
encroachment of Africa's rapidly expanding population onto
marginal lands is also changing the amount and quality of
soil blown during the dry season across the Atlantic to the
Amazon region of South America by the famed Harmattan winds.
There is evidence that this annual dusting of the Amazon
Basin with African soil is important to the life-cycle of
the tropical forests in that region.

It is obvious that saving African flora and fauna is of
vital environmental interest to the international community.
However, if massive efforts are not made now to assist
Africa with its economic development, it will soon be too
late to make such difference.

As the two areas in the world with the highest number
of reported AIDS cases, the US and Africa have a common
interest to work together in finding ways to treat and cure this deadly disease. As AIDS has already killed several hundred thousand Africans and another two to three million are expected to die by the end of this century, any remedies developed by the US will be immensely helpful to Africa—if they are affordable and African health systems are capable of delivering them.

AIDS has been particularly destructive in Africa since its incidence is often highest among trained African professionals whose skills will be sorely missed. Since AIDS in Africa is almost totally transmitted through heterosexual relations, tens of thousands of babies are being born each year with the disease, while an even greater number are losing their mothers and fathers. Adding this great number of "AIDS" orphans to the millions of African refugees and drought victims will almost be more than most governments and donors can manage. The heavy concentration of AIDS in certain areas of Africa should provide US medical researchers with an unusual research opportunity. In any event, it is certainly not in the US interest to see Africa’s dismal development prospects further stymied by an unchecked AIDS pandemic.

The African-African/American Connection

Perhaps the most important element backing US interests in Africa is the 12 percent of the US population that traces its origins to this continent. Although this large and
vocal group is fully preoccupied with problems facing members of their race in the US, they are not apt to stand by quietly while Africa's share of US assistance funds is reduced. Indeed, it was the Congressional Black Caucus that played a decisive role in obtaining for Africa a larger share of the US assistance budget by backing legislation that created the DFA account and increasing US assistance for Africa from $585 to $800 million in 1991. Plans to raise this amount to $1 billion in 1992 were, however, derailed by overall budget constraints and difficulties encountered in absorbing increased funds at a time when instability in a number of countries precludes normal assistance activities. The retirement and death of key members of the Black Caucus who had strong interests in Africa makes it even less likely that Africa will ever receive its "fair" share of the official US assistance package.

While the foregoing interests should be sufficient to keep the US involved in Africa at near current levels, the lack of vital or even major strategic interests will keep African affairs on the periphery of the US foreign policy framework. Indeed, outside of a handful of African specialists in the State Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), Congress, and the intelligence community, very few government officials can speak knowledgeably on the many facets of Africa's development crisis.
In other US government agencies (i.e., Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, US Trade Representative (USTR), Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC), Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and offices working on international affairs, Africa is almost a nonentity. Africa is usually assigned to junior personnel, lumped with other areas of the world, and approached from a very narrow perspective. There are a good number of private African specialists, but they are under utilized and rarely appointed to important government positions.

US POLICY GOALS AND KEY OBJECTIVES

It is not an easy job to derive from apparent US interests in Africa a coherent set of foreign policy objectives that reflect these interests fairly. A conflicting domestic agenda and pressures from special interest groups often contrive to distort the formulation and ranking of objectives. Overriding concerns about protecting US interests and projecting US values and ideals, usually form a commanding part of the window through which objectives must be viewed.

Also, along with stated objectives may be implicit objectives of equal or higher importance that remain unstated because of peculiar diplomatic sensitivities. One benefit of the end of the East-West conflict may be the advent of a period when foreign policy objectives can be
stated clearly and discussed in an open and frank manner with concerned national leaders. Certainly, there should be no secret about US intentions toward Africa.

With respect to the US interests presented, it is clear that the overall goal for US policy in Africa is to foster a more stable and prosperous socio-economic environment. This means pursuing objectives that help prevent radical elements from taking control of African governments, diffuse the potential for violent confrontations and alleviate conditions causing economic decline.

As the world's only remaining superpower, the US can now play, if it chooses, a predominant role in bringing together other industrialized countries, multilateral institutions, and host governments to pursue collectively these broad objectives. To do so credibly, however, the US will need to increase its assistance to Africa, make its contributions to multilateral institutions in a timely manner and alter some of its own policies on trade access, debt management, agricultural imports, and family planning.

The following briefly proposes six areas for consideration as the key underpinnings of the US policy approach toward Africa in the post-Cold War era.

**Democracy and Good Governance**

Pursuit of this objective does not mean attempting the wholesale transfer of US-style democracy to Africa. It does mean being critical and nonsupportive of regimes that
repress basic freedoms, violate fundamental human rights, and misuse government funds for personal ends. While attentive to the inherent difficulties of instituting democratic values in areas that have little or no experience with their practice, and cognizant of the patience needed to instill these values in cultures accustomed to different forms of government, the US must remain loyal to its own ideals and stand firm in its support of certain undisputed principles of good governance. These include:

--A fair and independent judiciary committed to due process, the rule of law, and the defense of civil, human and private property rights;

--freedom of press, speech, association, and private access to public media monopolies;

--free elections, using a secret vote and carried out without fear of intimidation;

--practice of merit systems in public service and school systems;

--transparency in government accounting and national allocation of resources (e.g., curb corruption and ostentatious spending); and,

--civilian rule of the military and equitable application of justice to both military and civilian personnel.

Market-Oriented Policies

Closely related to efforts to liberalize African politics are efforts to open its statist economies to market forces. During the past decade, at least 28 African countries have embarked on Structural Adjustment Programs designed by the World Bank and IMF and supported by most donors. The hallmarks of these programs are fiscal
austerity, debt management, privatization of state enterprises, currency devaluation, and streamlining of bloated government bureaucracies—all aimed at creating viable market economies. In many ways, these donor-imposed programs are believed to have contributed to the wave of democracy now sweeping across Africa as it became apparent that political authoritarianism placed limits on the full pursuit of economic pluralism.

Although this harsh remedy to the dismal failure of statist economies has begun to show some signs of success in a handful of countries, it is doubtful these programs can overcome the multilayered dimensions of Africa's economic crisis and achieve the vigorous level of growth Africa needs to improve appreciably living conditions. It is estimated that an annual GNP growth of five to six percent (one to two percent higher than the annual population growth rate) would be needed over several years before significant economic and social benefits begin to "trickle down" to the poor. This contrasts with the most optimistic projection of two to four percent per annum.

Certainly, countries following such programs are better off than if they had not taken the structural adjustment course. The US should expand its work with other donors in helping Africa stick to the course over the long term needed to allow these programs to take root. Meanwhile, Africa's experience with converting its economies from a statist to open market system may offer some lessons to countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that are just now beginning their liberalization programs.

**Peace and Prosperity in South Africa**

Ending apartheid and achieving a peaceful transition in South Africa will remain mainstays of US objectives in Africa until a nonracial, democratic political system within a free market framework is established. While pursuing this most challenging objective, South Africa's promising potential for assisting with the development of neighboring countries should be kept in mind. One scenario for the development of the continent in the 21st century centers around the creation of strong "development poles" which would serve as engines of growth for the rest of Africa. South Africa and Nigeria are potential poles where cooperative linkages might be built in a post-apartheid era which would benefit most of the continent. In view of the powerful role Nigeria might play, it is surprising that this country, Africa's most populous, receives so little attention from AID.

**Conflict Resolution**

The US should continue to serve as a willing, honest broker in facilitating settlements between opposing factions as it did in Namibia and Angola, is now doing in Liberia, and to some extent, in South Africa. Mozambique and Somalia are other obvious candidates for a US role in
helping resolve conflicts between rival factions. There is also potential for the US to play a stronger role in resolving numerous conflicts across the continent between pro- and anti-democracy forces. Although the interests of former colonial powers in some of these countries might make a US role more problematical, the US should not refrain from injecting its influential voice to bring about greater peace and stability. The US should also, to the maximum extent feasible, support UN peacekeeping forces and mediators. This should include, if need be, taking the extreme step of placing unviable or war-torn countries under a UN mandate until union with neighboring countries or self-government are achieved, or long-disputed borders are redrawn.

Regional Cooperation

Other US objectives would be to continue to cultivate African support for US positions in the United Nations, particularly with regard to collective security arrangements and use of sea, air, and satellite tracking facilities. Related to this will be the collaboration of African states in reducing radical influences such as Libya, Iran and Iraq, and resolving sub-regional conflicts like those in Liberia and Rwanda. Counternarcotics activities and efforts to preserve environmental resources (wildlife and rain forests) should also be high on the list of US priority objectives in Africa.
Humanitarian Assistance

The bulwark of US objectives and presence in Africa should be more completely under the banner of development and humanitarian assistance than ever before. Although the end of the Cold War may place Africa in last-place as far as geostrategic importance is concerned, the traditional humanitarian spirit and moral sense of the American people, in addition to previously mentioned interests should be sufficient to maintain US assistance levels to Africa.

Increased suffering in Africa may even entice more assistance, or at least a decision to guarantee Africa a fixed proportion of the development assistance budget. Achieving this will require convincing Congress and the American taxpayer that US aid is being delivered efficiently, in a cost-effective manner, and that it is improving measurably the quality of life in Africa.

AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT DETERMINANTS AND US AID

Further complicating the difficult task of shaping a US policy and economic assistance approach to Africa in the post-Cold War era is the need to take into account what might be termed the main determinants of Africa's future development: trade and regionalization; debt reduction; demilitarization and arms control; population control and infrastructure rehabilitation; food and agriculture; and
enhancement of the role and status of women, who do most of Africa's work. To the extent possible, US objectives and assistance programs in Africa should key off these determinants. A brief summary of these determinants and possible US support actions follows.

**Trade and Regionalization**

Increasing Africa's share of world trade will require an extra effort on the part of the US, the world's largest market. The US should consider offering Africa a special unilateral Generalized System of Trade Preferences (GSP) status that allows all nonmineral products from Africa to be imported duty-free and unimpeded by nontariff barriers and policies designed to protect certain US products. Given the low level of African exports to the US, this policy would have a negligible effect on the US trade balance, but offer a number of African countries aid of potentially higher value than regular US foreign assistance. Unless Africa can solve its growing trade deficits and declining terms of trade, it cannot reduce its growing dependency on aid. Providing greater trade access for African products is a better option than providing more aid. Breaking the bonds of years of aid-dependency should be an overriding goal in every African country.

The importance of stabilizing prices of Africa's traditional agricultural export commodities should also be studied. An example might be the price stabilization...
mechanism established in 1975 under the Lome Convention between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Africa.  

Steps should also be taken to ensure that the Uruguay round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks does not diminish the benefits Africa already enjoys under current GSP and Most Favored Nation (MFN) provisions. Concerns about the new GATT free trade rules and the formation of the EEC trading bloc which leaves Africa in an even worse trading position need to be carefully evaluated.

Meanwhile, the US should develop its own trade assistance pact for Africa and urge other members of the Global Coalition to do the same. This may mean modifying GATT rules to permit incentives such as export credits and tax breaks to encourage US businesses to invest in Africa. The US should take all possible steps to maximize trade advantages provided Africa.

Only when African countries begin to export more can they earn the foreign exchange they need to import more, pay their debts, and invest in their development. A way must be found to diversify exports, compete in world markets, and serve larger markets within the region.

Although there are formidable obstacles pitted against Africa as a late-comer in world markets, where goods produced by highly efficient Asian firms dominate, African leaders must pursue long term, pragmatic plans to create a business environment that will attract foreign investment and manufacturing interests. This will require liberal investment codes, a low-paid but well-trained work force,
and a well-educated bureaucracy supportive of open market policies. The successful Export Processing Zones of Mauritius should be an example for other countries in Africa. With OPIC/AID assistance, Togo and Cameroon are among a number of countries trying to establish such zones.

Africa should position itself to tap as much of the large reservoir of surplus Asian capital and business know-how as it can. In the last few years, Japan has become the largest bilateral donor of official assistance, and other Asian countries such as Taiwan and South Korea could be enticed to do more in Africa if an adequate profit could be realized. There may be room for some links between Asian capital wealth and the long development assistance experience the US has had in Africa. For example, US field missions might play a role in managing Japan's bilateral funding contributions to joint projects.

The first step is for Africa to raise its productivity, thereby enhancing its competitiveness. It is, however, hard to see how it will be able to trade effectively on the world market until it can integrate its small national markets, at least on a subregional basis. Most countries in Africa have small populations with low purchasing power, and one-third of the countries are land-locked and so resource poor as to cast strong doubts on their economic viability as independent states. The porous nature of the artificial country borders permits prolific informal trade, but barriers to formal trade have been set up to protect
low-scale country industries that produce textiles, beer, soap, matches, cigarettes, et cetera. Most of these industries work way below their capacities because they cannot legally export their products to neighboring countries which have the same industries. Differences in national currencies further complicate matters.

In reality, one efficient medium-sized industry, working at full capacity, could probably supply several countries; but, which countries should they be, and what happens to the employees of the industries closed in other countries? As these employees often represent the majority of salaried workers in most African countries, it can be seen why regional economic integration has been much talked about, but seldom put into practice.

Nonetheless, efforts to form such common markets as the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the 10-member Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC); and the 19-member Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of east, south, and central Africa need to be vigorously pursued and concluded as soon as possible.36 The formation of such subregional trading blocs is the only acceptable way Africans can redress the arbitrariness with which it was Balkanized by European powers. The various trading blocs forming elsewhere on the globe should provide strong incentives for African leaders to make their common markets work as proposed.
If Africa does not want to drop even further behind the rest of the world, it must do in the next decade what much of the world had generations to do. The turn toward democratic governments in most of Africa this year and next should help with this needed acceleration of regionalization. A judicious use of advanced science and technology should also benefit this effort, and African development in general.

Debt Reduction

Improving Africa's trade and investment positions will be very difficult as long as its debt overhang remains as large as it is. Currently, Africa's external debt amounts, on the average, to almost 110 percent of its collective GNP, and 30 percent of its meager export earnings go to service this debt. Overall, Africa's debt per capita is $363, which is higher than the average GNP per capita of $340. Added to this onerous financial predicament is the flight of private capital brought about by increased instability on the continent, and the loss of markets needed to make investments pay off. This situation has resulted in a large negative outflow ($700 billion in 1985) of private capital from Africa over the past several years.

Although bilateral donors have been generous in forgiving debt balances owed under outstanding official assistance loan agreements and rescheduling individual country debt repayments under the Paris Club mechanism,
Africa remains deeply mired in debt, enfeebling further its weak economic prospects.

The IMF and World Bank are Africa's largest lenders, and their loans are on very generous terms with long grace periods and concessional interest rates. Cash inflows of the IMF are, however, now exceeded by the cash outflow needed to service its loans. The IMF and World Bank cannot forgive their loans; they are obliged to suspend assistance when any country is overly delinquent in making its repayments. The US and other donors now find themselves in the position of being asked to grant funds to host governments so they can service IMF/World Bank loans, thereby keeping active the bilateral programs of these organizations. If this trend continues, future US assistance programs might consist mostly of channelling funds for Africa through multilateral agencies.

Since passage of special legislation in 1989, the US has forgiven over $1.2 billion in African debt for official assistance provided over the past two decades under US AID and PL-480 Title I Food Loans. The main condition for forgiving this debt was host government conformance with IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs. In view of this, and unstable conditions in some countries, there remains over $1.8 billion outstanding in AID and PL-480 loans. Most of this is in such unstable countries as Sudan, Zaire, Somalia, and Liberia. Beyond this, most of the African debt owed the US is under Foreign Military Sales
FMS) and EXIM bank loans amounting, respectively, to about $4.70 million and $2.2 billion. Altogether, as of October 1991, the total outstanding debt owed by African governments to the US Government was $4.64 billion.39

Steps must be taken to keep the flows of public and private aid to Africa from becoming less than the financial flows from Africa to the US. The quasiprivate status of the EXIM Bank makes forgiveness of its loans difficult, but some creativity should be exercised to reduce this level of EXIM debt so US businesses will not be further discouraged from doing business in Africa. It appears that there should be a means for canceling all of the FMS debt and halting further loans except under special circumstances. Cancelation of over $7 billion (greater than a decade of development assistance to Africa) in debt owed the US by Egypt following its support of the US in the Persian Gulf War should serve as an example of what is possible when there is a determined US political will to take action.40

Demilitarization and Arms Control

Another area where the US can play an important role in Africa is by helping to demobilize oversized and costly national military forces. Many African countries have built up armed forces far beyond their security needs. It is not unusual for African governments to spend more on military forces than on education or health. On the average, African
governments expend nearly 15 percent of their annual national budgets on military expenditures. This heavy budgetary burden, and the negative role that heavily-armed soldiers often play in disrupting Africa's political life, needs to be brought under control if Africa is to proceed to a higher stage of development.

The US should be in the forefront of an international effort to reach agreement placing strict controls on arm sales to Africa and declaring the continent a neutral zone as far as the manufacture and sale of arms is concerned. Of special significance, in this regard, might be bringing South Africa's sizeable weapons industry under control.

Population Control and Infrastructure

Too much cannot be said about how African's rapid population growth will outstrip the best development efforts. An historically unprecedented high annual growth rate of 3.3 percent is not only making it hard for key development indicators to show any progress, but is creating a population structure that will make future progress much harder. Currently, over 50 percent of Africa's population is under 15 years of age. This creates a situation where more young people depend on a shrinking proportion of working adults. If fertility levels of near 6.5 children per woman of childbearing age continue, the high population growth rate will really take off (AIDS notwithstanding) when this youthful population enters the age of reproduction.
The main way to avoid this Malthusian nightmare, where each citizen receives an increasingly smaller share of a dwindling resource base, is to increase the use of modern contraceptives. Africa-wide, the use of such contraceptives by women between the ages of 15 and 45 is estimated at three to five percent. To reduce the fertility level from 6.5 to four children requires a contraceptive prevalence rate of 50 percent. To reach this level over the next 10 years will require a profound shift in cultural attitudes, mass educational campaigns, and billions of dollars of investment.

Meanwhile, Africa's population will double by the year 2015, and by the year 2020, there will be as many Nigerians as Americans, and Africa's labor pool will have tripled. Unless strong family planning actions are taken now, Africa's vast empty spaces will be filled in the 21st century with hundreds of millions of under-fed, ill-clothed, and poorly educated people, and millions of refugees who will be throwing themselves upon the mercy of immigration officials across the world. Regretfully, current US policy preventing funding of the UN Population Fund and other international family planning efforts seriously undermines US credibility in this vitally important area.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of this population explosion is the massive movement of Africans to urban centers. The population of Africa's cities grew during the
1979-1985 period at a phenomenal average of 5.2 percent per year (twice the world average). In 1960, only eight percent of Africa's urban population lived in cities of over 500,000; now, over 42 percent of its urban population lives in cities this size. In 1970, almost 23 percent of Africa's population was urban; in the year 2025, this level will rise to nearly 60 percent.45

The rapid urbanization is especially notable in capital cities like Lagos with its over eight million people, and Nairobi with 58 percent, and Dar es Salaam with 51 percent of their total national populations.46 This staggering demographic shift has grossly overburdened an already very weak urban infrastructure, creating unbearable pressures on housing, sanitation, education, food markets, et cetera. The millions of jobless youth now living in the squalor of rapidly growing city slums represent a new and very large destabilizing element in Africa.

It will take tens of billions of dollars to address the minimal urban infrastructure needs of Africans, and billions more for building and maintaining roads, bridges, dams, schools and hospitals that Africa needs to develop. Some priority must be given to rehabilitate existing infrastructures that have been allowed to decay because of a lack of maintenance. It is regretful that much of the infrastructure inherited from colonial powers, and built by donors following independence, has fallen into disuse.47 Evaluation of Africa's existing infrastructure and the cost to repair or replace it is an urgent task.
In the 1980s, Africa basically lost the ability to feed itself. For the past 20 years, the annual increase in food production has been significantly lower than the population growth rate. Growing food imports pose a heavy burden on national budgets and often squeeze off the market locally-produced, uncompetitive food products. Fragile African soils, drought proneness, land tenure disputes, and civil strife have worked to increase the amount of food aid going to Africa. The ongoing famine that affects over 20 million people in the war-torn Horn of Africa, recurrent crop failures in the Sahel region and the worst drought in one hundred years in southern Africa are jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of thousands of Africans. This current situation vividly exemplifies Africa's chronic vulnerability to food shortages.

In areas where farmers can produce more, the infrastructure needed to transport and store food is lacking. Even if it were not, the buying power of nonproducers (mostly the rapidly growing number of urban dwellers) is so low that the markets and profits to be made are too small to justify much effort and investment. As the vast majority of Africans live in rural areas and engage mostly in farming activities, this situation condemns them to low-tech, subsistence farming systems that are becoming even less viable as population pressures require more intensive farming of the same soil. The negative
environmental consequences of this expansion of resource-poor agricultural systems are substantial.

If Africa cannot break out of prevalent subsistence farming modes, begin producing more food for its rapidly growing urban population and create new crops for export, it is difficult to see how it can reverse its economic decline. Any rise in the standard of living can not be expected as long as the fertility of farmland is declining. Reversing Africa's agricultural decline is unquestionably a key factor in reversing its overall economic decline.

Given the strengths of its agricultural technology, the US should have a comparative advantage over all other donors in providing assistance in this area. Regretfully, over the past decade AID has lost much of its capacity to work in this vital area as emphasis has been placed on other parts of the development agenda. The US should play a leading role among donors in pursuing a long-term, strategic approach to developing Africa's agricultural sector, and accordingly, it should build up its capacity to work effectively in this area. Many of the ideas embodied in the Strengthening the African Agricultural Research Program, which was initiated by AID and other western donors in 1981, should be fully revived and vigorously pursued under this new framework. As before, this long-term undertaking should enlist the support of US Title XII Universities and collaborate closely with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture in Ibadan, Nigeria, and other
International Agricultural Research Centers concerned about the failure to extend the "Green Revolution" to Africa.

**Role and Status of Women**

One of Africa's important development handicaps is the low status accorded women. Although women are responsible for most of the agricultural production, much of the commerce, all of the life-giving chores such as child care, water and firewood hauling, and food processing and preparation, they are grossly underrepresented in the running of African affairs. Across the continent, only a handful of women occupy ministerial posts; it is indeed a rarity to find a woman in any important administrative position in government, whether it be at the national or local level. Until Africa fully harnesses the talents and energies of its women, allowing them to ascend to positions of leadership, it will not be able to achieve fully its developmental objectives.

The school enrollment rate for women in Africa is the lowest of any major region in the world and greatly lags behind the rate for male students. As educated women have fewer babies, this is an area of particular concern. Of equal concern is the practice of spending 40 times more on secondary education than on the primary level. This not only creates an unproductive elite that responds poorly to the development needs of Africa, but robs Africa of the critical mass of people with the basic, quality education needed to progress and compete in world markets. A major
overhaul of national education systems should be accorded a very high priority.

OPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND FIELD OPERATIONS

Revisions in the structure of US foreign policy and development assistance budget constraints will entail remodeling the way official US presence in Africa is set up and managed. Indeed, one of the important changes brought about by the end of the Cold War may be in the way the United States government conducts business in Africa.

To a certain degree, Congress opened the door to changing the US approach to Africa with the passage of the DFA legislation. This separate foreign assistance account helped single out Africa as a special case whereby affording it some protection from "earmarks" for more strategic parts of the world, which absorb most of the assistance budget. Besides increasing the funding level, this new legislation delegated more flexibility and responsibility to AID's African Bureau for executing the DFA mandate to alleviate poverty and enhance the productive economic participation of the poor. Congress therefore expects that with this new legislation and increased funding, AID will be able to do a better development job in Africa.

The question now arising is how best this job can be done if AID's 30-year tenure as the US government Agency responsible for administering foreign assistance programs is brought to an end as recommended by a recent White House
The study suggested that AID be incorporated into the Department of State, which has always used "overriding" foreign policy concerns to decide allocation of the lion's share of assistance funds. Also, it would not be surprising if the Hamilton-Gilman legislative proposal of 1989 for overhauling the entire foreign aid apparatus, was again introduced in Congress following US presidential elections. The probability of major reforms in US foreign aid legislation and its management adds to the timeliness of reassessing US interests in Africa and redesigning US assistance to serve these interests.

As the main reason for US involvement in Africa is now primarily to improve the quality of life by providing humanitarian assistance, there should be no conflict between foreign policy and development assistance objectives. Given this, which US government agency should oversee assistance to Africa? If AID is to be absorbed by State, will the latter be able to subdue its traditional diplomatic routine and offer the specialized development expertise and leadership needed?

Or, would it be better to establish a public corporation like the African Development Foundation established by Congress in 1980 to handle small grassroots projects that would not, in theory, be affected by changes in US foreign policy? Such a foundation would be useful, not only to manage US assistance, but also to play a coordinating role with private voluntary organizations working in Africa, other donor agencies, and all US
government agencies impacting on Africa's development. Besides Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, EXIM Bank, OPIC, and USTR, this includes the Trade and Development Program (TDP), United States Information Service (USIS), and the Peace Corps. If greater efficiency and cost effectiveness are important in providing assistance to Africa in the post-Cold War era, the establishment of a formal coordinating mechanism within a single strategic development framework for all relevant US Government actors should have a high priority.

An attempt at creating something akin to such a coordinating agency was made in 1980 with the creation of the International Cooperation and Development Agency (ICDA), but by the time the bureaucratic turf battles were over, legislation produced an agency with no real power that was overlaid on top of AID. Despite the failure of this initiative, the person in charge of managing US assistance to Africa should have a clear mandate from the White House to coordinate the action of other US agencies working in Africa, and sufficient stature to gain the allegiance of private US agencies concerned with Africa.

Some fundamental questions are also being raised about the very existence of direct bilateral aid. In the absence of strong national interests, some observers suggest that the expensive management of bilateral assistance programs could be done away with in favor of channeling US funds through the World Bank. In many ways this multilateral organization has become the leading donor to the continent.
Such an arrangement might see the US agreeing to participate in the design and implementation of World Bank-led programs in specified countries. This could mean providing balance of payment support or specializing in the implementation of sectoral programs in areas such as health and agriculture. In this way, US involvement in selected countries could be maintained with a less costly and smaller foreign assistance bureaucracy.

If all donors followed this arrangement, the host countries would be relieved of the onerous burden of dealing with a plethora of donors. Indeed, many African governments cannot function effectively because their time is taken up with donor-related matters which include meetings with hundreds of consultants and teams that constantly flow through Africa setting up, inter alia, countless workshops and seminars. Ways of obviating this poor use of scarce African skills should be swiftly adopted.

Providing US Assistance in the Field

In view of current US political realities, no profound changes should be expected in the management of US foreign assistance regarding Africa. The only likely short term change would be formalizing the existing, but sometimes tenuous, marriage between AID and State by abolishing the independence of the former and subsuming it under the latter. If this is done, the most important aspects will be how field missions are organized and staffed, and the quality and clout of their Washington leadership.
Also, decisions will have to be made as to whether the US will continue to maintain an official presence in each African country. Reduced US interests and operating budget constraints may bring a return to the themes of the Korry Report commissioned by President Johnson in 1965 to determine the size and rationale for US representation in Africa. This report, covering US policy toward Africa from 1965 to 1975, concluded that AID should concentrate its assistance in a handful of key sectors (agriculture, health/family planning, education/training, infrastructure) and limit its bilateral programs to six countries with "good development prospects" (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) and three others in which the US had a "major special interest" (Ethiopia, Liberia, Zaire).

One of the underlying themes of this report was that the US should generally defer to former colonial powers such as France and Great Britain. The advent of a post-Cold War era appears to present policymakers with the same kind of decisions examined by this report nearly a quarter of a century ago. Perhaps it is time for State, in collaboration with the National Security Council (NSC) and others, to revisit the themes of this report and decide whether a similar approach should be pursued in the years ahead.

Reconstituting US Mission Staff

The core group of employees working in US missions in Africa are composed of Department of State, AID, and USIS foreign service officers whose personnel systems are largely
governed by the same Foreign Service Act of 1980 and uniform employment practices. In most countries this group is joined by Peace Corps staff who are hired on temporary five-year appointments. In the handful of larger missions, there may also be Commercial, Agricultural and/or Military Attaches appointed from the Department of Commerce, US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Defense. The latter department also provides a contingent of at least six US Marines for embassy security.

In most embassies, CIA personnel can be found working under the "soft cover" of State positions. In terms of personnel, a typical US mission in Africa, will have an official staff consisting of 10 to 35 Americans (with 15 to 20 being an average size). In countries where foreign assistance is important, AID personnel represent the largest number of professional employees. This number does not include the dozens of contractors that usually work for AID, nor the 2,300 Peace Corps Volunteers who normally serve from two to three years in 34 countries in Africa. Nor does it take into account the large technical support offices that AID maintains in Abidjan and Nairobi.

Every embassy operates on a "country team" basis which places the Ambassador as the chief of a management group composed of the heads of each US agency assigned to the host country. The ambassador's authority as Chief of the US Mission is derived from the nature of his/her presidential appointment, National Security Directives, and a letter of instruction from the President reaffirming his/her
responsibility for all US activities conducted within the host country. US Ambassadors in Africa tend to be senior foreign service officers in the late stage of their careers serving as ambassadors for the first time.

Although many ambassadors have previously served in Africa, they seldom have had direct experience with managing development assistance programs. Their main concerns are providing consular and commercial services, maintaining "correct" relations with host government officials and other diplomatic missions and cultivating sources that will help them keep Washington informed of host country activities via a constant stream of cables and reports. This central reporting function of embassies contributes greatly to the policymaking process in Washington. Field reports and local situation analyses forwarded by State are often the only good sources of information the US government has to use as a basis for making decisions regarding African countries.

AID directors--ostensibly the only persons delegated with legal authority to implement US foreign assistance programs--report directly to their ambassadors, who serve as their supervisors in preparing the required annual performance evaluation reports which have a heavy bearing on promotions and awards. However, AID directors work for and report to their superiors in Washington who decide onward assignments and employee rewards. By having their performance evaluated by persons working for State, and their paycheck coming from another agency, AID directors are often put in awkward positions. This organizational
anomaly greatly affects their ability to conceive and implement development assistance activities. This incongruent personnel management system must be corrected if the efficiency of delivering assistance in the field is to improve.

There may be better ways of addressing this problem and improving the general administration of field missions, but the most realistic option appears to be that of uniting AID and State. It should not be difficult for the President to issue an executive order abolishing AID, and to name a new Under Secretary of State for Development Assistance (or Economic Cooperation) to take over AID's operations and employees. No matter what scheme is adopted, it is most important that the high reputation of US assistance programs in Africa be maintained by placing competent African development specialists at the head of US missions. Although this makes sense in terms of giving priority to a new foreign policy agenda in which humanitarian assistance is the primary objective, naming a "non-State" person as Chief of Mission would probably meet with some resistance from State careerists thus deprived of a chance to become an ambassador (even in a country as remote as the Central African Republic).

In any event, with this kind of humanitarian agenda, future heads of US field missions in Africa will need solid development and regional experience. There should be a close fit between the ambassador's personal profile and priority US interests in the host country. This will be
particularly true as operating expense constraints, health and security concerns force streamlining the US presence in Africa. This could mean that in countries where the Peace Corps program is the most important US activity, the ambassador (or Charge) and the Peace Corps Director (with an appropriate staff) could be the same person. The US Senate will need to revise the manner with which it confirms US ambassadors to developing countries for these kinds of changes to become effective.

If "politics" prevent qualified personnel from other US overseas agencies from being appointed as ambassadors, the next option would be to assign AID personnel as Deputy Chiefs of Missions. Such assignments could vary according to the importance the US attaches to a country and the size of the bilateral foreign assistance program.

Using this streamlined management model, and considering the makeup of US personnel in a given country, the key criteria in nominating and confirming ambassadors would be to choose the best mix of skills and experience that will enhance achievement of major US objectives in a given country or subregion. The objectives should reflect the consensus of the field mission and all agencies concerned with development assistance, as well as views of other donor agencies and host government officials. The objectives should be public, and serve as a focal point for dialogue; they should also reflect links with an overall "grand US foreign policy strategy" that the US adheres to in its treatment of Africa and its various subregions. The
formulation of such a strategy remains an uncompleted, but high priority task.

**Binational Approach to Management**

An important hallmark of a streamlined model for operating US field missions in Africa concentrating on the quality provision of US development assistance is "binationalism." This means increasing the number of Africans on local mission staffs and assigning them greater responsibilities. Given the thousands of US-trained Africans, many of whom are unable to find suitable employment, the low proportion of professional Africans working on US mission staffs is incredible.

In the past, proximity to classified material, poor accountability of funds and materials, and conflicts with host governments were cited as reasons for not hiring more local professionals and assigning them higher responsibilities. In this post-Cold War era, it should be possible to do away with these restrictions and work toward a mission staff made up primarily of Africans. With a good recruitment and training plan, future US mission staffs in Africa could be composed of no more than a handful of competent American specialists—the rest being highly qualified Africans. The Peace Corps and the World Bank are already well along in this binational approach.

Such a shift in the makeup of personnel should solve budget and security concerns, as well as the increasing assignment difficulties posed by drug-resistant malaria,
AIDS, and general instability. By applying this same binational policy to the hiring of technical contractors who implement projects, the cost of these activities could be greatly reduced. It is scandalous that as much as one-half the cost of many US development projects goes to pay US contract firms. Although it might bankrupt numerous consulting firms (unkindly referred to as Washington’s "Beltway Bandits") who live off of the 50 to 50 percent overhead they charge to provide AID with technical assistants, steps must be taken to contain these costs and to Africanize progressively the personnel funded by US development assistance funds. This would mean, however, that a higher percentage of US assistance funds would remain in Africa.

A New Development Compact

This binational approach will enhance the success of a renewed "development compact" that each mission should establish with its host government. This compact should be an all-encompassing working document that reflects the goals of a national and regional development strategy, the US planned contribution to the achievement of those goals and the conditions which will affect that contribution. This written compact would make host governments move from merely accepting recommendations to requiring timely actions on key development steps. Normally, these actions would be those governments have acknowledged as being something they can do
to improve their development prospects, but have lacked the will and discipline to undertake in the past.

The starting point for such a compact is, therefore, a recognition by the government of things it can do itself and unless these self-help measures are taken, the country cannot expect the US to cooperate. This will require that the host government have a "vision" of how to get from where it is now to where it wants to be in the future. The first order of business should be the preparation of such a plan, followed by taking the steps required to implement it over the near and long term. This "compact" plan may be something the World Bank or another donor has already proposed. The important thing is that the host government and donor community adhere to it over the long run.

The best way to ensure donor coordination is to have a national development strategy acceptable to all donors that allows each donor to select which part of the plan it wants to support. Principal donors for each African country should be designated by consensus, perhaps under the aegis of the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to work with host governments to complete their national and, if appropriate, subregional strategies, and to negotiate donor assistance, if needed, for the various components of this strategy. AID's methodology for preparing strategic objective trees and country program strategic plans paired with World Bank's policy performance frameworks could be a useful approach.
Host Country Obligations

The compact between the US and the host government should not only stipulate adherence to a mutually acceptable development strategy, but should go beyond current structural adjustment and individual project conditionality in covering all behavior judged to be important for a country committed to improving its developmental status. Foremost should be adherence to the elements of good governance already mentioned. Other considerations include the commitment to environmental safeguard measures, counternarcotics activities and, if needed, a reduction of military expenditures and demilitarization of governmental affairs.

In addition, this broad-based compact should cover such important host country obligations as pursuing an active family planning policy, honest customs collection, and collaboration with its neighbors in developing subregional common markets that would improve Africa's development prospects. Cooperation with common market groupings such as ECOWAS, SADCC, and PTA need to be given a high priority. Africa's development crisis needs to be approached more from a subregional than a bilateral viewpoint. Certainly, successful development in Africa requires pursuing regional economic growth strategies rather than bilateral ones.

Given the small populations of most African countries (22 have less than six million inhabitants, and eleven have less than 12 million), regional markets are essential for the expansion of internal trade. This is amply demonstrated
by the gross amount of clandestine trade. However, undoing the current production system and deciding which country can produce which products presents formidable problems.

Another enormous challenge is consideration of a common currency. Strangely, the 14 former French colonies share a common currency, the CFA franc, which is tied to the French franc at a fixed value of 50 to 1, but does not have a common market! In the age of the formation of trading-blocs, Africa will again be left behind if it does not have its own blocs. The day when a truck load of goods can go from Lagos to Abidjan in a matter of hours instead of days—without passing through a half-dozen cargo inspections, dozens of roadblocks, and several custom collection points—should be drawing to a close if Africa is serious about development.

As to ensuring the honest collection of custom fees and taxes, host governments might be encouraged to follow Indonesia's example of hiring a Swiss firm to handle this important task. Payment for the more efficient services of a foreign agent could be recouped from increased funds recovered.

Although it is difficult to apply such Asian examples to Africa's different physical and cultural circumstances, it is interesting to note that at a 1991 conference comparing African and Asian development experience, it was noted that a major factor preventing higher economic growth in Africa was the use of government control over economic assets to sustain political control, or the following of
Fabian socialist ideologies which wasted resources on unprofitable ventures. The conference further pointed out that donors should concentrate a sufficient quantity of resources in countries with able and willing leaders having a potential for becoming development "winners."66

US Military Contribution

In many countries, an important part of the development compact will entail capping military expenditures at a level not to exceed a specified percentage of the national budget. In this regard, the US might consider providing US assistance to help determine the size and composition of internal security forces the country requires. Training and, perhaps, equipping these revamped forces might also be offered as part of a revised military assistance program. The latter might require lifting legislation which put an end to the excellent police training program funded under the foreign assistance budget in the 1960s and early 1970s.

US military forces might also be given greater flexibility to provide humanitarian assistance and intervene in a time of crisis. The 1990 Operations "Sharp Edge," in Liberia, and "Eastern Exit," in Somalia, are examples of such interventions. Consideration should especially be given to utilizing the vast resources of the US military for an expanded role in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations like it is doing with UN forces in the Western Sahara. Additionally, the national military strategy should provide for contingency planning that foresees involvement
in small wars on the continent (e.g., coming to the aid of countries invaded by "Islamized" forces equipped and directed by an Iranian/Libyan/Sudanese alliance, or protecting cobalt mines in a chaotic Zaire). The small wars' doctrine of the US military should cover all possible scenarios for armed conflict in Africa, as well as looking at ways in which it may become more involved in providing humanitarian assistance on the continent.

To accommodate this new US military role in Africa, the US should revise the assistance currently provided under its Military Assistance (MAP) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs. New activities should be devised to help with the depolitization of African military forces, conversion of soldiers to other vocations and administration of internal security. 67

NEW LEADERSHIP WORKING FOR A GLOBAL AFRICAN COALITION

Africa is certainly in need of good governmental and economic role models. The fact that an entire generation has been brought up without observing such models makes future development even more difficult. Donors will also need much better leadership and closer collaboration in dealing with Africa's growing development crisis. As of late, the leadership vacuum at the top levels of AID management has been cited as the main reason for abolishing the agency and combining it with State. 68 Also harmful is
the fact that the leadership of AID's Bureau for Africa has been the object of political patronage appointments for years. These appointees have not always possessed the background needed to lead the African Bureau effectively and gain the respect of the donor community and US organizations interested in Africa. If the US Government is to be taken seriously and do a better job of assisting Africa, it needs to appoint African specialists of stature, with solid credentials, to lead its Africa Bureau.

A new bureau leadership should work more closely with the World Bank, OECD, and the UN within the framework of the recently-created Global Coalition for Africa in coming up with a clear development agenda and grand strategy for Africa which better delineates roles and responsibilities of each donor and host government. One goal here should be to reduce the number of donors and their activities in an individual country. The UN particularly needs to streamline the number of its agencies working in each country. The UN might best concentrate on child survival and conflict resolution issues, and, along with all other donor representatives, stop wasting time with diplomatic functions not relevant to development work.

There should be direct links between the overarching plan for Africa and the individual country development compacts mentioned earlier. The American chapter of the coalition should include not only official government representatives, but also members of the private business community and voluntary organizations, including church
groups responsible for supporting the hundreds of American missionaries in Africa. It should truly be a coalition of all potential forces working for a better Africa.

Playing an important role in this mobilization of "Americans for Africa" coalition would be ADF, African-American Institute (AAI), Historically Black and Colored Universities (HBCU's), and African-American business and political leaders such as those who committed themselves to assisting Africa in an impressive conference in Abidjan last April.

Other important players would be US universities, private voluntary organizations and institutions specializing in Africa, including the many "Friends of Africa" associations organized by the thousands of former Peace Corps Volunteers who served in Africa. This US coalition should reach out to the state and local levels across America and form the basis of a US constituency for aid to Africa. It should actively engage and involve the thousands of African students (many funded by AID) attending US universities, and representatives of African countries and businesses residing in the US. A council of selected members of this coalition should be a major force in the deliberations of the Global Coalition and the formulation of US foreign policy toward Africa.

In terms of planning, a starting point may be the impressive work already accomplished by the World Bank, OECD, the UN's Economic Community for Africa (ECA) and the Organization of African Unity's own 1980 Lagos Plan of
Action that laid out a good, but mostly unheeded, grand strategic framework for Africa. Much of the job will be doing right that which has been known for some time, but which has never been done consistently over the long term with the level of persistence needed.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A STRATEGIC ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

The ideas, interests, objectives and key development determinants presented in this paper should help define a revised US assistance agenda for Africa. Little can be achieved, however, until all US agencies concerned agree upon the main elements of a strategic framework for providing assistance to Africa in the decades ahead. In view of US resource constraints, these elements must be few in number and focused on geographic areas that possess the highest potential for helping the continent develop. These elements should also reflect the strengths of the African foreign aid constituency and any comparative advantages the US may have over other donors. This framework would not only guide all US assistance to Africa, but also inform the US public, other donors, and host countries of the US assistance approach to Africa.

At the outset, an analysis should be made of areas qualifying as "vital poles" for African development. Critical to this determination will be the potential "spread effect" of concentrating assistance in a specific geographic
area and how these poles might be linked over time to create "corridors of growth." This should be followed by calculating the amount of investment and time required to achieve an acceptable level of prosperity. Then the US can review available resources and decide the sequence and concentration of its assistance.

The conclusion of this exercise should result in a commitment to a long term "development marriage" contract between the US and a handful of countries that have agreed to serve as "development poles." This contract would be negotiated not only with "pole countries," but also with "associate member" countries located around and between these poles. In effect, this would not be solely a bilateral approach, but one undertaking to involve progressively a "cluster" of countries and relevant sub-regional economic communities.

As any successful strategic approach to Africa must include its two largest national economies, Nigeria and South Africa, these countries should figure prominently in US assistance plans for Africa. Indeed, the best approach for the US might be to concentrate on Western and Southern Africa, making Nigeria and South Africa the two main development poles, as well as full partners in elaborating an overall strategic assistance plan. These two countries (and others which may be asked to join with the "US Coalition for Africa") will, as the case may indicate, be either beneficiaries or contributors. The starting point
for such an approach would be for Nigerian and South African representatives to sit down at the same table with US officials to discuss proposals for developing Africa.

The progammatic focus of this approach should be on trade, debt management, agriculture, and family planning, with the objective of creating more jobs while stemming the flow of new entrants into the labor force. Eventually, this would entail building a collaborative network stretching from the Cape to Dakar, with US assistance invested according to a carefully determined set of priorities in areas vital to the success of the overall strategic plan.

This plan would leave Eastern Africa (and other parts) for other donors to concentrate on. In the long run, the best option for the eastern part of Africa is to turn toward the wealthy, fast-growing economies of Asia for assistance. If political pressures require US assistance for countries outside the strategic framework, this aid should be channeled, to the extent possible, through the Peace Corps and US private voluntary organizations. If the US continues providing aid all over Africa, its limited resources will be so thinly dispersed as to obviate any possibility of making a significant difference in the course of Africa's development.

CONCLUSION

Resolving Africa's development crisis may be at the periphery of current US interests, but if the US does not
pay sufficient attention now to Africa's problems, it risks contributing to a situation which will place even more difficult obstacles in the path of future world peace and prosperity. This "better world" argument is central to this paper, which attempts to provide a rationale for continuing an active US interest in Africa while suggesting how the new post-Cold War era may permit the US to do this with minimal additional effort or cost. In brief, being strategically disinterested in Africa does not mean the US should be indifferent to Africa and the consequences of its gloomy development prospects.

Beyond maintaining official US assistance levels at an acceptable fraction of the overall US assistance budget, the major new contributions of the US will be in terms of the quality of leadership it provides within the global community to assist Africa, and how it reorganizes itself to make this leadership more effective and befitting of the world's preeminent power. Making policy decisions in the areas of trade, investment, and debt that favor Africa are also important contributions. In this regard, it is hoped this paper will be useful to decisionmakers considering policy and organizational changes needed to raise the US contribution to alleviating Africa's development problems and restarting the economic growth process on the continent.

Africa may no longer be worth much to the US in terms of strategic interests, but it should be worth enough to make many of the changes suggested above. Certainly, this
would be in accordance with the values and ideals the US wants to project, and as such, should be considered a small price for the world's leading nation to pay. After all, it cannot possibly be in the interest of any country, or compatible with any moral vision of a new world order to have on this earth a continent so full of human misery and suffering.
ENDNOTES

1. The use of the word, "Africa," in this paper refers to what is commonly known as Sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises a very diverse group of 47 countries, including six off-shore island nations and the unusual case of the white-ruled Republic of South Africa. Five countries of North Africa are not included: Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. This division, based mostly on cultural and religious affinities, recognizes that the Sahara Desert is no longer the physical barrier it once was.

2. Most important is the 1989 legislative proposal of Congressmen Gilman and Hamilton. This proposal pointed out that the current 500 pages of legislation burdens foreign assistance with 33 objectives and 75 priorities. Also, 1,300 pages of annual budget presentations and 700 Congressional Notifications are required. The report also pointed out that AID was too spread out in managing 2,000 projects in 90 countries, and overburdened by Congress with 288 reporting requirements, second only to the Department of Defense, which has a budget of $300 billion versus AID's $5 billion. This proposal also noted that Israel and Egypt receive 47 percent of the foreign assistance budget; these two countries, and eight others, receive 70 percent of the budget. Moreover, over 70 percent of bilateral assistance funds are "earmarked" by Congress for specific countries and functional areas. These statistics supported recommendations for reducing paperwork, micromanagement by Congress, and the number of activities. See Hamilton Task Force Report, US House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1 Feb 1989, 28-29.


5. The history of Africa's development crisis has been amply documented by the World Bank, UN, and OECD. Most prominent among these documents is the World Bank Series: Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981; Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action, 1984; Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 1989;
Long Term Perspective Studies of Sub-Saharan Africa, four volumes, 1990.


7. Agency for International Development, "The Development Fund for Africa - Report" (Washington: AID, 1991) 2-5. The passage of DFA legislation also protected Africa from pressures coming from other parts of the government to impose "buy America" requirements on aid going to Africa and related mixed-credit schemes. The DFA failed, however, to achieve the multiyear appropriation of funds which would have greatly helped African development planners.

8. Budget of the US Government--Fiscal Year 1993 (Washington: USGPO, 1992) Appendix One, 225. The 1993 DFA amount declines to $775.6 million. This amount is only 4.4 percent of the total international affairs budget of $17.8 billion, which is less than 1.5 percent of the US national budget. (During the Marshall Plan, 17 percent of the US budget was provided for post-war recovery.)

9. In 1992, the US granted $9 million to the African Development Bank (AFDB), and $135 million to its related Development Fund. US Government Budget 222. US food aid to Africa in 1991 was $593 million. Total US economic, food, disaster, and military aid to Africa in 1991 was about $1.5 billion. Department of State, Africa Bureau, unpublished report dated 17 September 1991.


11. UN votes of African countries are still important to the US. This was recently evidenced by the US's high-pressured efforts to guarantee agreeable votes from the three nonpermanent African members (Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Zaire) of the Security Council on the Persian Gulf War and the Israel-Zionist issue. This could become even more of a factor as the UN peacekeeping role is enlarged and the Security Council is expanded to include more permanent members such as Nigeria.

12. Nigeria's high quality, low sulfur oil is especially prized. Although some distance behind Saudi Arabia, Nigeria is the second most important supplier of oil to the US. US
A major obstacle to extracting minerals in many African countries is their isolation in difficult terrain, far from a coastal port, which makes exploitation costs prohibitive.

13. Interview with State Department official, 2 February 1992. US military officials are also concerned about shortages of platinum. Mark Thompson, "$9 Billion Stockpile Has Military Ready to Refight World War I," The Baltimore Sun, 21 February 1992, 1. Stockpiling, alternate sources (e.g., Russia and new Soviet Republics) and mining of the seabeds would diminish, however, this strategic interest in Africa.


16. Investment returns in Africa in the 1980s were near 2.5 percent vs about 30 percent in the 1960s, and operating costs were 50 to 100 times higher than in South Asia where returns are nine times greater than in Africa. "The Bleak Continent." The Economist, 9 December 1989, 79. Jonathan C Randal, "France Seen Reducing African Role," The Washington Post, 31 March 1990, A-21.

17. In 1971, Malaysia overtook Nigeria as the world's leading producer of palm oil, a crop native to West Africa. In 1990, Malaysia exported 1.5 metric tons (MT) of palm oil vs 270 MT for Nigeria, and 594 MT for Africa as a whole. Also, Indonesia exported 350 MT. Africa South of the Sahara, 121.


19. The retaliatory airstrike by the US on Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986, and the shooting down of two Libyan jets over the Mediterranean Sea by US fighter planes on 4 January 1989, also served to curtail Gadhafi's actions. The disposal of the $1 billion worth of Libyan weapons captured by Chadian troops was of great interest to the US.


25. As almost all African-Americans in the US trace their origins to West Africa, some observers propose that this area of Africa be the focus of US assistance.


27. Congressmen Mickey Leland (D-Texas), William Gray (D-Pennsylvania), and Mervyn Dymally (D-California) were key "Black Caucus" players in gaining increased funding for Africa. Regrettfully, Leland died in a plane crash while visiting refugee camps in Ethiopia on 7 August 1989, and Gray and Dymally decided to retire. Gray was the House Majority Whip and senior member of the Appropriation Committee. Dymally led the Subcommittee for Africa under the House's Foreign Affairs Committee. Leland was chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger. Prominent African-American organizations like TransAfrica also played an important role in getting DFA legislation passed.


31. A number of proponents of increased US aid to Africa urge earmarking a fixed percentage of the US foreign assistance budget for Africa as has already been done by Canada, which reserves 40 percent of its assistance budget for Africa. Gary Bombardier, "New Development Directions for Congress and AID," *Foreign Service Journal*, November 1988, 40. This article also provides a good review of the passage of DFA legislation.

32. Most important would be for the US to remove protectionist barriers to importing agricultural products like peanuts, tobacco, sugar, cotton and citrus fruits, and textiles and clothing imports. The latter would call for a revision to the so-called Multi-Fiber Arrangement.


35. Japan's aid to Africa was $792 million in 1990 and was expected to go to near $1 billion in 1992. This makes Japan Africa's largest bilateral donor, but it pales in size when compared to the over $4.2 billion Japan provides Southeast

36. Peter Robson, "Performance and Priorities for Regional Integration with Special Reference to West Africa," Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ed Tore Rose (Paris: OECD, 1985) 267-69. Although ECOWAS, composed of 16 West African countries, was inaugurated in 1975, official trade in 1990 among member countries represented only five percent of their total trade. S K B Asante, "Africa and Regionalism," West Africa, 10-16 September 1990, 2441. Perhaps the most concerted effort of ECOWAS was the provision of peacekeeping forces—called "ECOMOG"—for Liberia. This was done under US pressure and the decision to make Africans more responsible for their own problems. The US recently provided $15 million to support this controversial peace force. Department of State, Africa Bureau, personal interviews and unpublished report dated December 1991.


41. World Bank, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 167-68.

42. World Bank, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 32-5.

43. Unemployment in Africa is already estimated at 40 percent. Agency for International Development, 1989 Congressional Presentations, 44-5. Steve Brent, "Aiding Africa," Foreign Policy, no. 80, Fall 1990, 130-34.


45. Salvatore, 25, 70-1.

46. The 1990 population of Lagos was estimated at 7.6 million, with the world's highest urban density of 129,705 persons per square kilometer. By the year 2000, Lagos is
projected to have over 12 million people, more than most countries in Africa. All of Nigeria will have a projected population of 338 million in the year 2025, compared to 313 million in the US. The World Almanac, 821-22. Salvatore, 73.


48. It is estimated that one person in five in Africa is fed by food imports and $4 billion will be needed annually by the end of the decade to pay for imports. Salvatore, 18-9. By the year 2000, the cost of food imports and debt repayments could exceed the amount of donor assistance. It is estimated that 3.7 million tons of food in emergency food aid was needed in 1991 alone to feed 24 million people in the Horn and Sahelian areas of Africa. This same quantity, plus an additional 9 to 12 million tons for drought victims in Southern Africa in 1992 may be needed. Paul Mitchell, "Food Aid for Africa," CERES, Jan-Feb 1991, 10. John Battersby, "Severe Drought Threatens Reform in Southern Africa," The Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1992, 1.


51. Israel alone has received over $3 billion in economic and military aid each year since the Camp David Accords in 1979. This amounts to $665 per Israeli, whereas all US aid to Africa is worth about $3 per capita. Also, economic aid to Israel is given in the form of an annual check every October. This contrasts with the numerous projects and conditions that affect aid given to African countries.

52. AID, DFA Report 1.


55. African Development Foundation, "Annual Report-1990" (Washington: ADF September 1991) 1. Although Congress passed legislation in 1980 creating ADF, it did not begin operations until 1984. ADF has about 40 staff members and receives around $8 million from Congress each year. As of 30 September 1990, ADF had funded 259 grants in 29 countries in Africa for a total of about $22.5 million.

56. In theory, IDCA still exists, but is seldom referred to anymore. One of the last references to ICDA appears in Blueprint for Development, Agency for International Development, The Strategic Plan for AID (Washington: AID June 1985), one of AID's major efforts to rationalize its activities. The more recent and comprehensive AID document, Development and the National Interest - US Economic Assistance into the 21st Century, February 1989, does not mention ICDA. Strangely, this 120-page document has not been given serious consideration. Princeton Lyman argues that such a "Super Third World Agency" as ICDA is not feasible in "Beyond Aid: Alternative Modes of Cooperation," The United States and the Third World in the 1990s, eds Robert J Berg and David F Gordon (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989) 313.


58. Although the NSC should take the lead in conducting such a study, it is not believed that it possesses the African expertise to do so.

59. The end of the East-West confrontation in Africa will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in CIA personnel working in US embassies. This will have repercussions for the State Department, as it will be hard pressed to fund replacements for these people. In any event, it is hoped that in the future, the CIA can apply more of its formidable resources to solving Africa's development problems.

60. The Peace Corps spends about $58 million of its about $200 million annual budget to maintain this number of volunteers in Africa. This makes an annual per volunteer cost of over $20,000. Some observers claim that this money could be better used to send Africans to US universities. Others believe that dollar for dollar, the Peace Corps is the best US investment overseas, particularly as many former volunteers now occupy the majority of positions in AID and other US international agencies.

61. AID currently has about 4,300 employees, down from 9,000 in 1980, and 17,500 in 1968 when AID was very active in Southeast Asia. About one-half of these employees are stationed overseas, of which about half are foreign
nationals. AID also employs thousands of contractors (about 7,700 in 1989). AID's operating budget in 1991 was $441 million, and State, which has around 25,000 employees, has a budget of $4.5 billion. Hamilton Report 3. US Government Budget, 29, appendix one.

62. Naming AID employees as ambassadors would not be without precedent. For example, the US Ambassador to Burundi was a former AID employee. Also, the current AID representative in Pretoria has been nominated as Ambassador to Madagascar, and another career AID employee, who recently served as Ambassador to Nigeria, has been nominated as Ambassador to South Africa.


64. There continues to be controversy over how much of US assistance funds return to the US via payments to private suppliers of goods and services. For Africa, it is estimated that 80 percent returns to the US. Jerry Seper, "AID Officials Accused of Doctoring Records," *The Washington Times*, 6 March 1992, A-5.


66. Department of State cable no. 216236 dated 21 June 1991, entitled "The Transformation of Africa." This cable summarizes conclusions of a 5-7 June 1991 seminar held in Baltimore, Maryland to determine key lessons from Asia's successful development experience of the 1960-1990 period that can be transferred to Africa. Also see *Challenges of Leadership in African Development*, eds Olusegun Obasanjo and Hans d'Orville (New York: Crane Russak, 1990) 20-34.


47.

69. The establishment of a Global Coalition for Africa was suggested by the World Bank, and supported by a conference held in Maastricht in July 1990 by the Organization for African Unity. Robert McNamara, former World Bank president, President Quett Masire of Botswana, and Jan Pronk, Minister for Cooperation of the Netherlands were selected as leaders of this coalition. Barber B Conable, *Reflections on Africa - The Priority of Sub-Saharan Africa in Economic Development* (Washington: World Bank, 1991) 14.

70. American missionaries have been in Africa since the 1820s and probably continue to be the most highly represented category of Americans in Africa. Although proselytizing is still a required part of missionary work, most are involved with development projects and their generations of association with local populations provides them with a knowledge base of much utility. The largest and most impressive list of Americans who have worked in Africa is composed of missionaries. See David Stravit, *The United States in Africa* (New York: Greenwood, 1989). Also, the financial contributions of US religious and secular private voluntary organizations to African development should not be overlooked.


72. The work of the UN Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development that was launched following a special UN General Assembly session in May 1986 on Africa's development crisis deserves a close review. World Bank, *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* 193. Salvatore, 3-4, 244-45. Also worthy of consultation is the ECA's "Africa Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study," Addis Ababa: April 1983.
Anwar Sadat's War for Peace:
A Masterpiece of Statecraft

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Seminar I
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Anwar Sadat's War for Peace:  
A Masterpiece of Statecraft

In Tel Aviv and Washington, Friday, October 6th, 1973, was just an ordinary day. In Cairo and Damascus, however, Arab military leaders were making final preparations for war. Not unnoticed by Israel or the United States were massive Egyptian military maneuvers near the Suez Canal and an unexplained airlift of Soviet dependents out of Egypt and Syria. Not unheard were President Anwar Sadat's repeated threats to go to war and his rhetoric that he planned to wage a "battle of destiny." Not unseen, nor unheard, these events were misinterpreted by both Israel and the United States. Neither believed that previously defeated Egypt would or could initiate a war.

When 222 Egyptian supersonic jets crossed the Suez Canal at 2 p.m. on October 16th, and Syria simultaneously launched military operations in the north, these beliefs crumbled. Egypt, capitalizing on the advantage of strategic surprise, gained immediate military success upon crossing the Suez Canal. More importantly, by starting the war, President Anwar Sadat gained the psychological advantage and revitalized stature for Egypt that he desperately wanted -- to break the negotiating deadlock with Israel and create a new diplomatic environment in which peace talks with Israel could proceed.

Unlike President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, who joined Egypt in the war for the primary purposes of recapturing territory lost
to Israel during the Six Day War in 1967, diverting attention from his deteriorating domestic position, and inflicting losses on Israel, President Sadat had a larger strategic vision. Sadat ultimately wanted to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel. But, first, he needed to create a world environment in which that could occur. Sadat's strategy was thus to tip the political balance in the Mideast to make peace negotiations possible -- to cure the psychological paralysis that surrounded them.

In Sadat's view, three things had to occur before negotiations could take place. First, he had to burst the bubble of humiliation encapsulating the Egyptian people, free the nation's spirit, and position Egypt as a recognized, respected and independent political force in the Mideast. Second, he had to alter the Israeli view of the world, to make Israel realize that more than territory was needed to give it domestic tranquility. As part of this realization, Sadat had to encourage Israel itself to want peace rather than to continue to assert all-or-nothing terms. Finally, in the absence of a general agreement among the Arab nations in the area, Sadat needed to interest a major "neutral" nation to mediate in the peace process. Despite its close ties to Israel, the United States, a superpower, was the logical choice. But, the United States had to be jolted to be more objective in its view of the Arab parties in any future negotiations.

The strategy devised by Sadat would promote Egypt's vital interests of security, domestic prosperity and national stature,
not just in the immediate future but for years to come. Sadat masterfully matched his strategy, plan of action and choice of methods to further Egypt's national interests.

Paramount among those interests was security. Physical security in Egypt could be obtained if Israel, the menacing neighborhood bully, were removed as a threat. Cordial relations already existed for the most part between Egypt and its other Arab neighbors; none had any territorial or other ambitions adverse to Egypt's territorial integrity or physical survival as a nation. Israel's military strength, on the other hand, was perceived as a constant operable threat to Egypt's survival. Elimination of this threat, militarily or otherwise, was essential for Egypt's long term security.

A significant aspect of any nation's physical security is territorial integrity, and Sadat's strategy encompassed this vital concern as well. By tipping the scale toward peacemaking, Sadat would seek to obtain return of the Sinai as part of Egypt's territory, thereby regaining its historical control over both the Suez Canal and the Sinai buffer region to the east. Obtaining these border changes to be consistent with Egypt's historical boundaries were important objectives in support of the bigger national interest.

A second vital interest was insuring the economic wellbeing, national welfare and prosperity of the nation's people. The cost of maintaining military forces and extensive defensive fortifications in Egypt to offset the Israeli threat was
substantial and was heavily burdening Egypt's economy. The loss of the Sinai and the Suez Canal halted the inflow of Canal revenues to Egypt and also kept Egypt from managing Canal operations. Lack of certainty over the future hindered trade and investment, restricted available foreign aid from Arab nations and threatened continued economic progress. These financial drains on Egypt's economy were serious threats which required positive action.

A third vital interest of Egypt was insuring its stature and prestige among nations -- commanding respect, being treated with honor and dignity, and being recognized as in control of its own affairs. Sadat saw this vital prestige interest intertwined with Egypt's security needs. Continuation of the status quo and Israel's dominance in the region directly threatened this interest. Sadat's strategy boldly incorporated objectives that simultaneously promoted both this interest and Egypt's security.

Soon after Sadat became President of Egypt, he realized that diplomatic efforts by the Arab nations to dislodge Israel from the captured territories were fruitless. Israel, firmly believing that its domestic peace could only be assured by territory, was actively encouraging settlements in the occupied territories -- even paramilitary settlements at Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt's back door.

The Arab nations were psychologically, militarily, and diplomatically paralyzed from their military defeat in 1967. Not only were the armies defeated and Arab unity dissipated, but also

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the highly religious Arab populations believed that they had been dishonored in the humiliation of their defeat. This viewpoint was certainly true of Egypt. Other nations fueled this perspective by their treatment of Egypt -- Israel with its antagonistic propaganda, the Soviet Union with its delayed and second-class foreign aid, and the United States with its refusal to assist in meaningful peace talks so long as Egypt was a loser. Further complicating Egypt's position was the move toward detente by the Soviet Union and the United States. Detente made it even less likely that either country would assist Egypt in its cause.

Sadat, following in the wake of Egypt's popular former President Nasser, was running out of time. In 1972, to rally the domestic population, Sadat coined the phrase "a battle with destiny" to describe a future war with Israel to regain the lost territory. By 1973, however, popular enthusiasm for this phrase and even for Sadat himself had begun to wane.

Sadat, a shrewd statesman, realized his precarious domestic position and Egypt's weak international position. He devised a clever, yet risky, strategy to establish himself as a respected Egyptian leader and gain the loyalty of the Egyptian people, to launch a revitalized Egypt, and to move toward peace in the Mideast. Incorporating virtually every instrument of statecraft, his strategy rested on the accomplishment of the following international and domestic objectives: (1) liberation of Egypt from the shadow of the Soviet Union; (2) cooperation from the Arab community; (3) international support, particularly from the
African, Third World and nonaligned nations; (4) popular support within Egypt for Sadat and his policies; (5) reestablishment of Egyptian prestige; (6) return of lost territory; (7) reorientation of Israeli views towards peace and reduction of Israeli dominance in the region; and (8) a limited victorious war, the "shock" to break the diplomatic impasse. To achieve these objectives, Sadat skillfully employed different instruments of statecraft. How he used them demonstrates his artistry as a statesman.

Sadat began his initial effort to free Egypt from the Soviet penumbra in July 1972, when he ejected all Soviet military advisors and equipment with a diplomatic ultimatum, a form of coercive diplomacy. Although first perceived as a bluff, the Soviets reluctantly complied. For Sadat, the result was the removal of the risk of a US-USSR confrontation in the event of limited war, an assertion of Egyptian autonomy in the world (free of the Soviets), increased credibility and respect for him as the President of Egypt, and perhaps unexpectedly, a misinterpretation of his motivation toward war by Israel, the USSR and the West. All of these results served Sadat's strategy.

To gain cooperation of the Arab community was not difficult, although Sadat realized that any attempt at unity would be potentially short-lived. Sadat had close personal relationships and friendships with the leaders of nearly every Arab nation, relationships that he nurtured with forthright diplomacy, credible bargaining, frequent communications and participation in
a variety of conferences. His policy of treating all Arab nations equally kept him from developing enemies within the Arab world. Even Libya joined in a cooperative way after Sadat’s overtures to Qaddafi. These relationships gave Sadat a latent power that not even Nasser had during his Presidency. Above all, it enabled Sadat to use oil as a weapon and economic instrument of statecraft. When the Arab nations joined to cut oil production, impacts abroad caused both Japan and the EEC (less Holland) to join in condemning Israel’s actions.

In contrast with the Arab community, Sadat actively solicited international support from Africa, nonaligned nations and the international community at large. He actively participated in and used international law and organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity from which he obtained a resolution condemning Israel in May 1973, the United Nations where the Security Council adopted a pro-Egyptian resolution in July 1973 that was vetoed by the United States, and the Non-Aligned Summit Conference in September 1973. In the end Sadat’s efforts gained him the support of more than 100 countries and somewhat bolstered Egypt’s international prestige by supporting its claims that Israel, not Egypt, was the problem.

On the domestic front, Sadat used public diplomacy to gain the support of the Egyptian people. He staked his personal reputation on the outcome with his “battle of destiny” slogan and promises not to concede one inch. He launched mass media campaigns and initiated civil defense measures which served two
purposes: to prepare the civilian population for the prospect of
war and, as covert action, to trick the Israelis into thinking
that war was imminent. In addition, to quiet domestic unrest and
unite the country, Sadat granted a general amnesty to students
and journalists awaiting trial for civil disturbances.

The last four objectives relate to Sadat's choice of a
limited war as an instrument of statecraft. Sadat did not want
to trigger a major confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Rather, he wanted to get a foothold in the
Sinai -- to recapture even 4 inches of Sinai territory. Conflict
seemed to be the only effective tool to regain both Egyptian
prestige and territory since several years of diplomacy had
failed to produce any results. Short of war, Sadat clearly had
the means to use propaganda and public diplomacy in Egypt and
elsewhere, to use international law and organizations, and to
carry out day-to-day diplomacy (positive and coercive).

To choose war as a tool, however, required the existence of
a trained and ready army with available war plans -- something
Egypt did not have. To rectify this, Sadat restructured the Army
leadership, initiated training, directed the revision of a
defensive plan to replace the outmoded Defense Plan 200, and
ordered the preparation of an offensive plan. These actions gave
Sadat the means to use the military for limited strategic ends,
but not, as he well knew, to confront the United States.

To disguise the military preparations that were underway,
Sadat used the extensive covert actions previously mentioned to
allow Western misinterpretations of his actions to linger and to trick the Israelis twice into alerting their forces at great cost. When the war actually began, Sadat's deception gained him the initial strategic advantage when the Israelis refused to be "tricked" again.

Even with a limited war, Sadat stated that he intended to rely on diplomacy before, during, and after the battle. He did not expect the initial military successes achieved by the Egyptian military forces and did not have a detailed offensive plan much beyond the crossing of the Suez Canal and entry into the Sinai. Why not?

As a master diplomat, Sadat recognized the psychological impact of crossing the water barrier of the Suez Canal — the tacit coordination that would occur between Israel and Egypt once Egypt gained ground in any amount on the opposite side of the Canal. In fact, Sadat was quite right from a bargaining perspective when he told Nasser that Egypt only needed to recapture 4 inches of Sinai territory to change the whole situation. Natural and manmade geographic features frequently form the basis for border determinations. This time Sadat had the water within his territory, not on the edge as in 1967, and recapture of the Sinai was highly likely.

Did Sadat achieve his objectives? Did his strategy work? For Egypt, the answer is clearly yes. Although the initial Egyptian military successes may have been turned around by the Israelis, the ceasefire resolution actively sought by Sadat at
the United Nations and put into effect on October 23rd left Egypt in a position of victory. Israel was no longer invincible in its own eyes or the eyes of the world. Egypt was no longer the loser. The tacit coordination needed for return of the Sinai had occurred, and Sadat (as victor and proven leader) could now press forward for peace terms with Israel.

Sadat's decision to use military force to break the deadlock was both courageous and risky. It clearly set the stage for a battle with destiny. Sadat, however, also clearly understood the limits of his resources and how the instruments of statecraft would interact. By blending force with covert action, public diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, use of international law and organizations, and economic statecraft to achieve his objectives and further Egypt's national interests, Sadat demonstrated his remarkable vision and the artistry of his skill as a statesman.