SHOULD THE U.S. TRY TO RETAIN BASE RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINES?

Lt Col Mike Taylor
NWC, Committee 1
25 March 1989
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SUMMARY

The U.S. has been involved with the people and government of the Philippines since the Spanish-American War in 1898. Over time, its status changed from a U.S. colony to a Commonwealth, finally gaining its independence in 1946. Since 1898, except for the years of Japanese occupation during WW II (1942-44), the U.S. has had a military presence there. In the early years following WW II, it was because the Philippine government wanted the U.S. to help guarantee their continued freedom and prosperity. However, after the communist takeover of China in 1949 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet security pact, the U.S. government saw an even greater need to have military bases in the Philippines in order to contain the spread of communism in that region of the world.

For the past 40 years, U.S. presence there has served as a buffer to "contain" the growing Soviet presence in East Asia as well as to signal our "political intent" to remain a regional power. More recently, due to its unique location astride the transoceanic route between the CONUS and the Indian Ocean, the U.S. air base in the Philippines has supported the efficient logistical support of Diego Garcia, enabling U.S. naval forces to maintain a credible posture in the Persian Gulf. Our major installations (the navy ship repair facility at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base) and the small stations supporting radar surveillance and communications together provide immediate naval and tactical air power projection. Additionally, they serve as the "hub" of transportation, supply, and communication (east-west as well as north-south) in that vast and far flung region of the world. The geostrategic
location of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base are the linchpins of the U.S. strategy of forward deployed forces in the southwest Pacific. Current force levels are relatively small; however, the potential of the bases (logistical support, refueling, ship repair, and tactical / strategic force projection) greatly underscores their importance both for deterrence and for expanded wartime operations.

Over the past 29 years, our relationship and presence has been articulated and governed by a succession of trade acts, defense treaties, and executive agreements as well as an evolution of amendments to these documents. The U.S. and Philippine governments recently concluded a pivotal Review of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) in the Fall of 1988 which will remain in effect until Sep 1991. Most critical to the current base rights situation is the upcoming requirement to renegotiate the entire MBA by Oct 1991. This fixed timetable in which to conclude a new agreement was set into motion (and law) by two prior MBA reviews and by the recent changes to the Philippine constitution. In the review of the MBA in 1966, the duration of the MBA was shortened from 99 years (agreed to in 1947) to 25 years. Furthermore, in 1979 an agreement was reached that required that the MBA be reviewed every five years. In 1986, in the wake of the turbulent transition from Marcos to Aquino, the new Philippine government produced a constitution which left no doubt as to the criticality of 1991.

Art. XVIII Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops
or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Therefore, within the next two years, the U.S. and the Philippines must renegotiate the entire MBA in order for the U.S. to remain in the Philippines past that timeframe. With the clock ticking away on this mandated deadline, our future presence within this country and region, the level of our autonomy of operations there, and the price, both political and economic, of staying or leaving will be played out against a background of distracting and often conflicting events and issues by two governments with different perceptions of the national and international scene. The recently concluded Review of the MBA only further refined but did not resolve many of the contentious issues. However, the success of that negotiation along with a continued open dialogue with the Philippine government will hopefully set the stage for a smooth and realistic renegotiation of the MBA prior to 1992. If not, and the resultant political and/or economic cost is judged to be too great, the U.S. may find itself out of the country and possibly out of the region at a time when U.S. presence may be most needed as a stabilizing force in the equilibrium of that region.

ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

Background Issues: The following four broad areas (political framework, economic health, perception of the threat, and the effects of nationalism)
serve more as background issues to the more specific key issues to be addressed in the upcoming MBA negotiations. But, while they appear to be subtle and vague in contrast to the key issues, their influence may prove to be more pervasive and fundamental to the ultimate outcome of the negotiations.

Political - The elections of 1988 in the U.S. did not focus on this basing issue. However, depending upon many factors (threat-vs-cost, status of the U.S. deficit, etc.) the issue may become heavily "politicized" for the U.S. as well as for the people of the Philippines who will also be facing key congressional and presidential elections in 1992. Because the renegotiation of the MBA must be concluded by the Fall of 1991, it is most likely that the MBA issues involved in one will be reflected as political issues in the other.

Economic - The health of the U.S. economy/deficit will weigh heavily in the decision and could have an almost geometric relationship to the cost of acquiring base rights (short- and long-term). Likewise, the economic health of the Philippines could be a factor, and the resulting political cost of a continued U.S. presence may, on balance, heavily skew the quantity and type of funding demanded by the Philippines as an offset for this political cost.

Threat - The Soviet Pacific Fleet has become the largest of the Soviet Navy's four fleets, containing one third of all submarines and naval aircraft and one fourth of all principal surface combatants. It has increased from 200 ships in 1960 to over 500 today. Soviet access to the naval and air base complex at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Vietnam provides Soviet Naval aviation


with the means of intensive attack against maritime shipping in the region. It puts Tu-16 Badger long range aircraft within unrefueled striking range of the important Indonesian straits as well as all of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and the southern coast of China. This capability gives the Soviets unparalleled access to vital SLOCs (mining, reconnaissance, etc) as well as the capability to strike U.S. bases in the Philippines. Clearly, the Soviets now pose the principal military threat to Western interests in the region.

If the Soviet Union scales back its presence in the region, possibly going so far as to leave Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, then the perceived need for "super power" USA in the region will be reduced. Likewise, if the Persian Gulf tensions continue to abate, the requirement for the U.S. to maintain a presence in the region may not be viewed as a necessity by regional nations or the U.S. electorate. Conversely, if the U.S. were to pull out of the region, other nations (China, Japan) might have to increase their capabilities and presence to insure an unimpeded flow of oil/commerce through this region (or just to fill the vacuum). In so doing, this could skew the military balance of power in the region and further raise the spectre of regional instability.

Nationalism - The "Revolution of 1986" in the Philippines ousted a dictator (Marcos), brought in a popular leader (Aquino), and highlighted a resurgent independent democratic "feeling" in the Philippine people. This mood may prove to have a dominant influence on the Philippine Government wanting no foreign power on its soil, regardless of threat or impact on their economy.
These four broad issues are present and will continue to serve as ameliorating forces or "threads" which, woven together, will make up the fabric of background issues covering the negotiating table over the next several years.

Key Issues: The following key issues (sovereignty; nuclear weapons; and levels and types of compensation for base rights) are at the heart of recent debate and will be central to future negotiation efforts. They capture the essence of an emerging desire of the Philippine people to achieve true control and autonomy over their destiny.

Sovereignty - It is entirely possible that the previously mentioned resurgence of nationalism (i.e. the sovereignty issue) may be powerful enough to hold sway over the other key issues, producing one outcome: the U.S. out of the Philippines by 1992 or a withdrawal stretched out over some phaseout period. Sovereignty has been an issue (as well as a catchall under which other issues fall) ever since the U.S. has been in the Philippines. With the rise of Aquino and the feelings her revolution have aroused, it may prove to be the overarching and dominant issue. Sub-issues include:

- Base Land Delimitation: The Philippine Government has always wanted to "hold deed" or own all permanent facilities which we build on its land. Most of our treaties with other nations provide for this. Historically, there has been general agreement on this point beginning as early as 1979 and continuing
- Operational Control: At issue here is how to balance Philippine demands for increased sovereignty over the bases with U.S. insistence for "unhampered military control." The Philippine government has maintained that it wants to assume complete operational control of our bases and our air and naval operations during periods when Philippine national security is at stake.

- Criminal Jurisdiction: This has been a sovereignty issue in the past but, currently, it is not a major issue because a system of "concurrent jurisdiction" has been implemented in recent years. This issue is more of an irritant at the day-to-day working level where, emotionally, each of the two "sides" would prefer total jurisdiction in specific cases.

Nuclear Weapons - This issue has been defined in two ways. In the past, it was felt that the presence of the U.S. and its nuclear weapons made the bases (and the country) a "magnet" for a first strike nuclear attack by other nations. This side of the issue was largely diffused by the explanation that the U.S. could not strike a potential "nuclear power" enemy from the Philippines, therefore the U.S.-occupied bases in the Philippines would not be targeted for preemption. In recent years this issue has evolved into the current argument of "whether surface vessels, aircraft, or submarines should be allowed to transit Philippine airspace or waters while carrying nuclear weapons". The nuclear issue continues to be one of the most contentious problems between the two countries because it diametrically challenges the
longstanding U.S. position to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere, at any time. However, the Philippine Constitution of 1986 specifically addresses this issue as well, thereby making it another critical sovereignty issue in future negotiations.

Art. II Sec 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

This stance takes the issue into the realm of a New Zealand-like posture of "no nukes . . anywhere".

Compensation - Levels and types of compensation continue to be a major issue. Parity of aid with other U.S. allies (Turkey, Egypt, Israel, etc. - see chart below), continuity or multi-year aid guarantees, and predictable lump sum payments with no restrictions are all held up as goals by the Philippine government.

U.S. Military and Economic Assistance ($ Mil) - FYs 85-87

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<tr>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<td>1123</td>
<td>1373.5</td>
<td>2225</td>
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Additionally, the fact that Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan receive the lion's share of U.S. aid without providing any base facilities adds to the sense of unfairness, even though the special situation of those countries and their disproportionate levels of aid is understood (although clearly not accepted)
by Philippine leaders.

However, the level of compensation that is both fair (to the Philippines) and affordable (to the U.S.) will be an issue of debate in both countries with the approach of the 1991 deadline. Total levels of aid as well as the types of funding (Economic Support Funds, Military Assistance Program funds, Development Assistance, Food Aid, and Housing Investment Guarantees) are driven by historical trends and procedures in our congressionally approved budget process. Additionally, the historical levels of corruption within the Philippine government would preclude the U.S. government from ever wanting to agree to the "no strings attached" request of Philippine negotiators. The chart below shows the totals and types of aid which the U.S. has provided to the Philippines within the past decade.

### Annual U.S. Aid to the Philippines ($ Mil)

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<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Invest. Guarantees</td>
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<td>-</td>
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* This historically high level of funding is still well short of the $1.2 Bil per year sought by Philippine Senator Manglepus but is closer to the more reasonable $500 Mil per year proposed by President Aquino.

Ancillary Issues - Other issues raised by Philippine negotiators which do not appear to have major significance on balance with those previously mentioned are as follows:

- Type of Base Agreement: The Philippine government wants future
agreements to be in the form of a treaty vice an executive agreement, thereby achieving more of a guarantee of U.S. government support for the negotiated levels of aid in place of the "best efforts" pledge historically used to obtain the targeted funds through the budget process. In U.S. aid relationships, there is no precedent for this approach and, if proposed as a treaty, would very likely have difficulty getting the requisite two-thirds approval by the U.S. Senate, as required by law. Unfortunately, this "treaty" requirement was also specifically stipulated in the recently revised Philippine constitution. If the U.S. does not comply with this provision (or negotiate around it), Filipinos could view this as yet another situation where the U.S. is unwilling to recognize Philippine sovereignty.

- Base Security: This issue falls under the heading of sovereignty and has been agreed to by the U.S. The Philippine security force has been vested with the sole responsibility of guarding the perimeter of the U.S.-occupied Philippine bases. However, due to ongoing internal Philippine funding shortfalls, perimeter security is currently a joint responsibility. The U.S. has always been responsible for the security of American facilities within the Philippine bases. The perimeter guard issue remains a goal for the Philippine government but is not an issue at this time.

The key issues addressed are significant, especially when their "solutions" polarize the two respective governments. Additionally, the ticking clock of the renegotiation mandate, coupled with the difficulty of keeping the negotiations secret (out of the glare of public scrutiny, hype,
and public opinion), will make their resolution more difficult. This is especially so as they are viewed against the previously addressed background issues of increased political activity, an uncertain economy, and the tide of rising nationalism.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

Resolution of these issues ranges across a broad spectrum of options: maintaining the status quo with only minor adjustments to some of the individual issues; retaining current force levels and bases with major substantive changes to the key issues; executing a partial force relocation from the Philippines; a total force withdrawal but remaining in the region through basing arrangements with other nations; or drawing back entirely from the region through relocation to Japan/Korea or returning the forces to the CONUS. A further variation of all of the above options is a gradual but phased withdrawal of the force(s) from the Philippines. Short of maintaining the status quo, none of these options will be cheap. And even what is perceived as the cheapest (economic) option in the short term could well become the most expensive option (politically) in the long run if all of the issues are not carefully weighed against the emerging realities of rising nationalism, changing economic orders, and shifting alliances.

The best way to explore the alternative basing options is to examine the individual mission areas (i.e., Airlift, Tactical Air, and Ship Repair). Under each mission area we will review the unique benefits of the current
basing option, propose regional alternatives (if any exist) and finally the out-of-region fallback options.

Before looking at the individual mission areas, however, we need to address those non-mission unique facilities, the base support infrastructure which we grow to accept/take for granted with the passage of time. Dormitories, family housing, base exchange/commissary facilities, fuel and munition storage, logistics warehouses, and administrative and morale and recreation facilities - all are very costly and took many years of active funding support. Recent estimates have established a notional current value of between one-half to one billion dollars to build a new base. Assuming that this funding was immediately available, the time required to actually build the facility could easily stretch over several years. With the current budgetary situation and given the recent examples of turbulent base rights negotiations (Spain, Greece, and Philippines), it is most unlikely that the U.S. Congress or electorate would favorably consider a major expenditure of this nature or magnitude of cost. Therefore, option selection must be sensitive to these dynamics. Since we have raised the issue of recent stormy base rights negotiation efforts, it is probably a good time to recall that nationalism and sovereignty issues played major roles in Spain's decision to move the U.S. F-16 Tactical Fighter Wing out of its country.
MISSION AREA ALTERNATIVES

Airlift: Geographically, Clark Air Base is uniquely located to efficiently support logistic support operations in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Distances from other airfields in the region (Yakota, Hickham, Diego Garcia) - all possessing long runways and large, reinforced ramp and logistical through-support facilities - make Clark an optimally-located member of a western Pacific transportation spoke network. The long runways allow for the long takeoff distances required with maximum cargo loads and the fuel required to fly the route lengths. Therefore, when other alternatives are proposed, they either shrink or stretch the transportation links so that inefficient short legs or reduced-load longer legs are mandated.

For instance, the island of Palau, 500 NM east of the Philippines makes the leg from Hawaii 500 miles shorter and correspondingly, the leg into Diego Garcia 500 miles longer. Palau is a "Fully Associated State" under the security protection of the U.S., and assuming basing arrangements could be successfully concluded, the airfield, support facilities, and base infrastructure would have to be built from the ground up.

Singapore and Thailand (Utapao AB) offer other alternatives, but their geographical location would require intermediate stops at Guam or Kadena. Assuming that sufficient ramp space and hanger/storage facilities could be leased for an aerial port at Singapore, its location would be especially useful if the naval ship repair facility at Subic Bay had to be relocated to Singapore. Facilities at Utapao AB adequately supported heavy aircraft operations in the 1970's and assuming a basing agreement could be reached with
the Thai government (the U.S. was invited to leave Thailand in 1975), Utapao could prove to be a useful facility requiring relatively minor upgrade. However, it is unlikely that the Navy would co-locate their ship repair facility in Thailand due to the shallow waters and lack of dock/repair facilities and a trained labor force.

There are obvious collateral advantages to co-locating the logistical airlift and ship repair facilities at the same or nearby locations. However, if only the Navy SRF was relocated to Singapore, it is conceivable that with a relatively minor expansion of facilities and infrastructure at Guam, an airlift hub could be established that would support western Pacific operations as well as a modest South Pacific capability. Expanded storage facilities for logistical items (parts, supplies, fuel, munitions, etc.) would be the obvious immediate requirement. Therefore, the airlift mission relocation has several workable alternatives, but none would fulfill Clark’s current capability to support the region without some decrement. The Singapore option appears to be the most viable option.

Tactical Air: Currently, the Tac Air assets at Clark Air Base consist of two squadrons of F-4G/E aircraft, the Hunter-Killer team optimised to suppress enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability. The F-4E in the Killer half of the Hunter-Killer team is due to be replaced by the F-16. Operationally, the Pacific threat driving this suppression support is located in the North Pacific area. However, Clark Air Base and the Philippines provide several other attractive benefits for the assigned fighters as well as for all of the other Tac Air assets in the Pacific. The Philippine Islands offer relatively
unconstrained low level tactical training and virtually year around fair weather flying. The tactical bombing range at Crow Valley and the nearby over-water air combat training area/missile firing range offer extremely valuable realistic training opportunities for all of the fighter aircraft in the Pacific (all services).

None of these options for any of the mission areas are easy. "as good as" the current setup, or cheap. Infrastructure - ports, hangars, ramp space, runways, fuel and munition storage and handling facilities, schools, etc., are expensive and take time to put into operation but no more so than a trained and reliable civilian work force and an on-going working relationship with another nation's citizens.

Clearly, the threat picture and short-range forecast for East Asia and Southeast Asia have changed from the near halcyon days of post WW-2 and even from a decade ago. The Soviet Union appears to be drawing in its horns (even if its presence has grown more formidable in the region). Like the Soviet Union, China, too, is concentrating on improving its domestic economy. Healthy bilateral talks are on-going between historical enemies, and regional alliances show promise of moderating what little adventurism is taking place. The Iran-Iraq war is on hold for the present, and the need for U.S. escort of reflagged tankers is on the wane. The flow of men and material to that region is likewise abating. The governments of the ASEAN nations have all grown stronger, both politically and economically. South Korea and Japan are stronger economically and militarily and are rapidly moving to that stage
where they can bear an even greater responsibility for their own security. Indeed, why not have the U.S. pull out of Southeast Asia altogether? What are the risks to stability in the region? And what is the cost of these risks? What is perception and what is reality? What is always unclear, however, is the future stability of countries, regions, and the world under the varying forces of change to the economic, political, and security relationships around the globe.

The answers to the above questions are unclear. What we have to do is propose varying scenarios ("what if’s") to the above questions. Against these scenarios we have to answer some basic questions about U.S. interests and goals, both regional and worldwide:

- Is the U.S. interested in regional stability?
- What price is the U.S. willing to pay to maintain stability?
- Is this stability required to further our economic and political goals (and reduce the requirement of having to use active military intervention to maintain stability and achieve these goals)?
- Is our presence in East, Southeast, and Southwest Asia required to guarantee the future stability of the region?

And finally, we must evaluate our responses to this latter set of questions in light of the scenarios presented by the first set of questions. There are costs of doing any of the initiatives previously identified (economic, political, and military). Concurrently, there are costs of not
taking action. Unfortunately, the true cost of any option is not as easy to quantify. Because they can't be quantified cleanly, a simple cost/benefit comparison analysis becomes equally difficult. For instance, the costs associated with any of the options (other than maintaining the status quo) are much more expensive than our current cost of doing business in the Philippines. However, with our current budget situation and the vague nature of the threat, the U.S. is not likely to agree to sharp increases in aid to the Philippines even if it was shown to be less costly than multiple relocation movement within the region. And finally, we must view these questions and their answers from both a short term and long range perspective. The answers most certainly change, and in the final analysis, we must choose what is best in the near term while holding open options for future developments.

Clearly, the forces of change will always be upon us, but they can be for the good. China's peaceful emergence in the region as a stabilizing or offsetting force to the Soviet presence is promising. Japan's robust economic health should allow for a stronger military and a better means to guarantee safe passage of needed raw materials and food for its survival. Japan's projected annual surplus (1988-92) is projected at $60 - 80 billion dollars. With that economic muscle and a visionary approach to the future, Japan could build the confidence and framework for a strong relationship with the ASEAN nations. If it can do this and at the same time diffuse worry within the region about its growing military might, then its strength could be a source of stability. If, however, the nations of Asia view Japan's growing
military capability with alarm, it could be most destabilizing and raise a
host of other regional problems. The answer appears to be as follows: If the
nations of East Asia could grow incrementally, individually and collectively,
maintaining robust economies while establishing stable, offsetting alliances,
then, indeed, it would be possible for the U.S. to draw down force structure
in Asia. The underlying problem centers on the elements of time, stability,
and chance - the uncertainty of the future.

I believe the answers to all of the proposed questions point to the
necessity for the U.S. to move slowly and deliberately to maintain our
presence in the Philippines. This will guarantee our ability to move freely
and quickly in times of crisis to maintain stability in that region of the
world. Only when that stability is assured, could we begin to seriously
entertain the notion of an incremental force drawdown in the country or the
region. The challenge lies in working with the government of the Philippines
to bring this about. Simultaneously, we can encourage the economically
vibrant nations of the region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) to take an
even more active role in shaping mutually beneficial economic relationships
with the Philippines.

The recent successful resolution of the MBA Review (see appendix for
details) will serve as a benchmark toward progress in the renegotiation of the
MBA in 1991. Both governments showed a willingness to resolve the polarizing
issues, at least for the near term. In the next two years, the U.S. must
continue to highlight the contributions that the bases make to common
strategic interests and bilateral relations - to both the governments and
electorates of the U.S. and the Philippines. For instance, it is estimated
that the total annual U.S. economic benefit to the Philippines will be in the range of $1.2 to $1.8 billion dollars in the next two years. President Aquino’s task is to use her leverage to orchestrate reasonable and responsible demands for compensation and modifications to the current treaty which take into account her country’s sensibilities about sovereignty. The challenge for the U.S. is to help President Aquino sustain her political strength while getting the least restrictive treaty for a fair and justifiable price. The real dilemma is that these goals may be mutually exclusive.

However, should these efforts fail, the U.S. needs to be ready to execute alternative options in the hierarchy we have discussed. By that time we will have a better appreciation for force structure decisions associated with our on-going budget deliberations. There may be practical, cost-beneficial moves within the overall Pacific basing plan to accommodate a reduced military budget and still posture ourselves against the threat. We must keep our options open and maintain a broad perspective. To do less would open us up to the folly of an ill-conceived strategy of chasing a declining array of available overseas bases.
Compensation (per year for FYs 90/91)

- Economic Support Funds $160 Mil
- Military Assistance Program (MAP) Funds $200 Mil
- Development Assistance and Food Aid $96 Mil
- Housing Investment Guarantees $25 Mil
Total: $481 Mil per year

Nuclear Weapons

- U.S. agrees that storage or installation in the Philippines of nuclear or non-conventional (chemical or biological) weapons or their components will require Government of the Philippines (GCP) approval
- Transits, ship visits, and overflights will not be affected and will continue in accordance with current NCND policy

Mutual Security

- Reaffirms existing mutual commitment
- Includes a "best efforts pledge" for mutually agreed upon levels of financial assistance. This pledge has been included in agreements since 1979.
Base Land Delimitation (Transfer of Title to Property)

- Title to existing base structures is transferred to the GOP.
- Future structures belong to the GOP from the date of construction (consistent with other U.S. agreements worldwide).
- U.S. retains full use of all improvements.

Procurement of Philippine Products

- U.S. maintains the current waiver of the Balance of Payments Program to permit purchase of Philippine goods for U.S. forces and expands the waiver to include USCINCPAC's foreign Area of Operations.

Base Security

- GOP reaffirms and elaborates its obligations regarding base security and the implementation of a squatter relocation plan.
- Subject to the availability of funds, the U.S. notes that it is prepared to assist the GOP in its security functions.
Postscript

Under the eves of the pantheon devoted to Statecraft, there lies a broad range of finely articulated relationships, bolstered and sustained by a variety of "tools", which collectively structure the relationships bilaterally and multilaterally between states. In the hierarchical scale of "words-to-action", none of these relationships, short of war, lies closer to the ultimate consummate bond between nations than does the basing of one nation's troops upon another nation's soil. And, to shift metaphors, this physical bonding or "grafting" of two nations (politics, economics, military forces) might appear to "look" like a few small branches grafted to a major plant (e.g., 4 small bases in a country); however, they are, in reality, more like two plants (albeit one certainly larger than the other) which have major connections at the root level where the cross-grafting brings about mutually sustaining benefits to the two plants. Thus, how one views such a symbiotic relationship, either literally or figuratively, depends upon both which view one subscribes to (bonding at the branch or root level) as well as from which plant one is viewing the relationship. Or, to return to more solid metaphorical ground, "where you stand depends in great part on where you sit". Two nations rarely have the same view of the world, and likewise, their self interests, real and perceived, are rarely the same. Herein lies the rub and the friction over which negotiation and diplomacy founder or succeed.
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