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This paper is an in-depth case study of the command and control aspects of the operational art as they were demonstrated during the allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. It concentrates on General Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Bernard L. Montgomery and Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley and explains how the command and control aspects of Operation Overlord were complicated by personalities, service loyalties and national interests.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander Anthony S. Montemarano, USN, (B.S., Aerospace Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn) has been interested in factors influencing senior decision makers since he worked as a staff officer in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A designated naval aviator and helicopter pilot, most of his experience has been operational until his assignment to the Armed Forces Staff College in 1983. Subsequently assigned to the Joint Staff, he worked in the National Military Command Center where he was involved in the crisis action system and providing daily operations briefings for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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### APPENDIX

- **A.** GLOSSARY
- **B.** CHRONOLOGY
- **C.** KEY FIGURES OF GOVERNMENT
- **D.** KEY FIGURES OF OPERATION OVERLORD
- **E.** MAPS
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Operation Overlord -- the joint and combined American, Canadian and British invasion of France over the beaches of Normandy -- provides an ideal example of the operational art in action. More specifically, because it was a combined and joint operation, command and control was ultimately influenced by personalities, service loyalties and national influences. These three factors dominated the command and control of Operation Overlord by aggravating lines of authority, allowing public opinion to influence critical command decisions and by affecting the manner in which key commanders interacted with one another.

Regardless of the level of warfare or management, clear lines of authority are essential to a successful endeavor. The effects on the operational art are peculiar because clear lines of authority are extremely hard to establish. In the tactical environment, lines of authority are often the subject of controversy but can generally be resolved with reasonable effort. During operational level campaigns, the problem is with the larger question of how to employ entire air forces, fleets or armies. In the case of Britain, "Montgomery was commanding her last army." How can a nation entrust "the flower of its youth" and the fate of future generations to commanders of
another nation, without insisting on many unilaterally oriented restrictions? Additionally, when the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) was set up in January 1944, the American and British Air Forces were already in the process of establishing themselves as a new force in the art of war. The allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany was the first real opportunity for the air forces to demonstrate what impact they could have on this and future wars. Subjugating portions of their commands to the desires and control of a "ground" commander would disrupt their effort and was therefore totally unacceptable. This paper will discuss how the operational level of warfare was and will be affected by the reluctance of nations and services to relinquish control of forces to facilitate truly effective lines of authority within a joint and combined command structure.

Existing in the somewhat loosely defined "no mans land" between strategic and tactical operations, the operational art is far more vulnerable to the fluctuations of public opinion than the other levels of warfare. Because of the size and clearly defined characteristics of operational level campaigns, public opinion becomes a major consideration. Unlike tactics, where public opinion is normally focused on human interest stories, or strategy, where goals are often vaguely defined or somewhat esoteric, operational successes and failures are easily quantifiable developments that public opinion can readily grasp and
draw conclusions from. Thus, this paper will key on how command decisions were and will be influenced by public opinion.

Using lines of authority and public opinion as vehicles, it will be shown how personalities, service loyalties and national influences dominated command and control before and during Operation Overlord and how they will dominate any future operational level campaigns.
CHAPTER 2

THE OPERATION

Before dealing with the effects personalities, service loyalties and national interests had on Operation Overlord, it is important to understand some of the background and details of the operation itself. (Appendix B contains a chronology of key developments.)

The allied invasion of Europe over the northern shores of France had been a goal of American planners since 1942. Remembering some of the disasters of World War I and some of the recent setbacks at Tarawa and Salerno, Churchill feared a "channel full of corpses" and favored the approach of chipping away at the periphery of the axis empire in the Mideast, Balkans and Mediterranean. Ultimately though, Churchill reluctantly agreed to begin planning for the cross channel invasion that was to be called Roundup. Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark Clark and W. Bedell Smith worked with British planners in London for a late 1942/early 1943 invasion; however, Churchill’s arguments combined with Roosevelt’s fears of committing "unblooded" American soldiers in such a formidable invasion, led to the
shelving of Roundup. Instead, American and British efforts were directed toward the less ominous allied invasion of North Africa (codenamed Torch) and later, of Sicily (codenamed Husky).

In March 1943, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan of the British Army was appointed Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) (COSSAC) and was charged with forming a staff and developing a plan with the objective of securing "...a lodgement on the continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out." Morgan's staff, limited by anticipated landing craft availability, proposed an invasion consisting of three seaborne and two airborne divisions. In August 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in the Quebec Conference, accepted the outline plan and agreed that the newly named Operation Overlord would be the primary effort for 1944. Additionally, since it was then clear that the preponderance of forces involved would no longer be British, Churchill suggested the Supreme Allied Commander should be American.

In December 1943, at the Tehran Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, American and British resolve to conduct the cross channel invasion was questioned. Stalin, eager for the Americans and British to open a second front, was upset by the fact that the Supreme Commander for the operation had not
been selected and further by the British lack of support for the simultaneous invasion in the south of France (codenamed Anvil).

On 7 December 1943, Roosevelt, after having endured some political complications in Washington over the selection, informed Eisenhower that he would command Operation Overlord. British officers were subsequently selected to fill the positions of his deputy and of his ground, naval and air component commanders. See Appendix D.

Montgomery, as the ground forces commander for Overlord and Commander, 21st Army Group, immediately began revising the COSSAC plan upon his arrival in London in early January 1944. Very critical of the existing plan, he quickly worked to widen the front and increase its size to five seaborne and three airborne divisions. Though he too was logistically limited, he insisted that his demands be met. Eisenhower agreed with Montgomery’s version of the COSSAC plan and passed the increased landing craft requirements to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). As a result of the revision and other landing craft demands in the Mediterranean, it became prudent to delay Operation Overlord until early June and Operation Anvil until after Overlord was well underway.

The cross channel invasion was to be performed by the
21st Army Group which included the American First Army and the British Second Army. One Canadian and two British divisions were to land on the three eastern beaches of Normandy and were to join with a British airborne division while two American divisions were to land on the two western beaches and were to join with two American airborne divisions. See Appendix E.

The British Second Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey, was to establish a beachhead and capture Caen and the flat tablelands beyond. The American First Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, was to establish a beachhead, expand west and take the Cherbourg peninsula. With the Second Army attracting the bulk of the German armor and protecting the American left flank, the First Army was to break out to the south and then pivot around Caen in a sweeping action that would send them in the direction of Paris.

To support the ground operation, strategic bomber assets were called upon to conduct the preinvasion "transportation plan" which called for the bombing of German lines of communications in the areas behind Normandy and Pas de Calais. After considerable controversy over the plan and over the control of the bomber assets -- which precipitated Eisenhower's threat to resign -- a
compromise was reached and the transportation plan was executed.

Operation Overlord commenced on D-Day, 6 June 1944. By 25 July, after numerous setbacks including extremely high resistance at Omaha beach, the worst channel storm in 40 years, and the Second Army's delay in capturing Caen, the First Army finally broke out of the beachhead and began its drive across France.
CHAPTER 3

LINES OF AUTHORITY

Unity of command depends as much upon the comprehension and good judgement of officers in high positions as it does upon blind adherence to a principle. An allied command can not possibly be handled as would be a completely homogeneous one.

16
Eisenhower

The lines of authority for Operation Overlord were complicated by two basic problems: British resources were approaching a critically low level and the strategic bomber forces of Great Britain and the United States were in the process of attempting to establish the bomber as an independent war-winning weapon. Both of these situations resulted in some key participants in the war effort operating with unilaterally generated goals that, though not inconsistent with the allied objectives, served to complicate the command structure and undermine the lines of authority.

In the first situation, Montgomery was working for two commanders; Churchill and Eisenhower. While officially designated as 21st Army Group commander and the overall ground forces commander, he worked for Eisenhower, Montgomery clearly and frequently answered directly to Churchill in particular and the
British people in general.

"The British were haunted ... by a fear of heavy infantry casualties." By May 1944, the British army reached its limit of 2.75 million men while the American army, by contrast, was far short of its potential strength at 5.75 million. Thus, it was of far greater importance to the British that their scarce assets be employed in both an effective and judicious manner. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Montgomery to fight more conservatively than his American comrades. This mind set explains his insistence on heavy armor accompanying the first waves of troops assaulting the beaches of Normandy; his obsession with a "tidy administrative tail" before departing the beachhead to exploit his initial successes; and his demands for extensive saturation bombing or artillery shelling before each offensive. Enemy documents, captured in late July 1944, revealed the German perception of British battle discipline by indicating that, "The enemy is extraordinarily nervous of close combat. Whenever the enemy is energetically engaged, they mostly retreat or surrender." Bradley points out that "Monty's incomparable talent for the 'set' battle ...made him invaluable in the Overlord assault..." but "in fluid situations...[his] luster was dimmed...by his apparent reluctance to squeeze the utmost advantage out of every gain or success."
Clearly, Montgomery was unwilling to accept the risk of heavy casualties. He was willing to take the calculated risk, but only when the odds were in his favor. Conservatism is rarely the trait of a victorious general or soldier, but when a nation’s most treasured resource is at stake, its existence can certainly be understood.

Eisenhower was therefore confronted with a situation where --whether he recognized it or not-- the British Army was fighting under different rules of engagement than the American Army. The question is how much latitude did he have, or more importantly, did he think he had, to rectify the situation? As Bradley noted after his 20 July meeting with Eisenhower where they discussed Montgomery’s failure to pursue Operation Goodwood, “if Ike had had a free hand, I am certain that he would have sacked Monty...” The result, as can be seen by the many letters to Montgomery, despite Eisenhower’s obvious dismay at the lack of aggressiveness, his “directives” or “orders” rarely went beyond the level of “suggestive encouragement.”

Throughout the post D-Day period, Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, was frustrated by his inability to obtain from his subordinate the degree of aggressiveness necessary to achieve an expeditious victory. This inability was clearly due to the lack of authority he had, as senior military commander, to
conducted the campaign in the manner he deemed appropriate. This lack of authority stemmed from the fact that Montgomery, as a British commander, worked within two separate and distinct chains of command; one allied and one national -- the latter of which exercised greater influence over him.

The second situation where lines of authority were complicated was in the air war, where differing priorities led to an awkward chain of command. General Carl Spaatz, commanding the American Strategic Air Forces in Europe and General Arthur Harris, commanding the British Bomber Command, believed in Douhet's theory that wars could be won with aerial bombing and that the only utility for ground troops would be in the policing and occupying of the defeated enemy's territory. Harris emphasized the importance of area bombing and its effect on the morale of the people while Spaatz believed in crippling the enemy's war making machine with precision bombing.

In late 1943, the strategic bombing of German cities and factories was proceeding with such success that a plan codenamed Operation Rankin was formulated for the allied occupation of Germany, in the event of a sudden collapse of the German government. In January 1944, the efforts of both the American and British strategic bomber commands were combined and refocused on a plan to destroy the German air force and its
supporting industrial complex (codenamed Operation Pointblank). Even at this point, there existed a problem because Harris was preoccupied with his belief in area bombing and continued his private war while half heartedly supporting Operation Pointblank.

Having been given the mandate to "enter the continent of Europe and ... undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces," Eisenhower felt that this undertaking required full commitment and that he naturally should have command of all the resources that could be reasonably brought to bear against the Germans. Unfortunately, when he attempted to bring the necessary air forces into his command structure, he was confronted by several distinct problems concerning the strategic bomber commands. Because in their quasi-autonomous state, they had been able to wage their own war winning projects with varying degrees of success, Spaatz and Harris were strongly against subordinating their bomber forces to the SHAEF until shortly before the actual operation. Both believed, given a certain number of clear flying days, that they could render Overlord unnecessary. This powerful strategic arm of the military complex had been independent since the end of World War I and, since the beginning of this war, had been quite successful working directly for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subordinating it to Eisenhower for more than the a short period immediately before and during the actual invasion seemed totally unnecessary.
Eisenhower argued aggressively for control of the strategic assets because he recognized early-on that, among other reasons, the assigned tactical assets were not sufficient to support the proposed Overlord airplan. It was finally agreed that Air Marshal Tedder, Eisenhower's British deputy commander, would have authority over all attached air forces (including bomber command assets) and Leigh-Mallory would have control over all assigned air forces

(primarily tactical air assets). The arrangement was to take place upon the approval of the Overlord airplan by the CCS. To complicate the situation, the airplan itself -- the "transportation plan" -- was the subject of great controversy. Its goal was to destroy the German lines of communications behind Normandy by bombing the railway centers and repair facilities. Harris fought against the airplan because it disrupted his area bombing plans; Spaatz opposed it because he had since come up with his own war-winning "oil plan" which was aimed at the German oil reserves and synthetic oil refineries; and the British War Cabinet was uncomfortable with it because of the projected French casualties.

The result was that during the first four months of SHAEF's existence and the final planning stages of Operation Overlord, there was a constant battle over the control and employment of strategic air assets in support of the operation. Finally, on 14 April, Eisenhower was granted, from that point
until shortly after the landing, the right to "direct" the strategic bombers through his deputy, Tedder.

Even after the dispute had been resolved, the air commanders, distracted by numerous priorities, continued to display a lack of dedication to supporting the ground effort. During the amphibious landing exercises at Slapton Sands in late April and early May, intended to simulate the Utah and Omaha beach landings, the Ninth Tactical Air Force could not participate due to other commitments. As a result, U. S. forces entered France "almost totally untrained in air-ground cooperation."

Lack of proper coordination contributed to the needless loss of American life during the First Army's attempt to "break out" from the beachhead (Operation Cobra). Bradley had personally coordinated the pre-offensive bombing plan at a meeting which included numerous commanders of the R.A.F. and U.S. strategic and tactical air commands. During the meeting, Bradley insisted that the bombers be flown parallel to the Periers-St Lô road to preclude the inadvertant bombing of friendly forces. See Appendix E, page E-3. Meeting no resistance, he pointed out that this road was singled out because it could be easily identified from the air. Having concluded what appeared to be an extremely successful meeting, he returned to France and made arrangements to reposition his forces 1500 yards from the road. Without consulting
or advising Bradley, the bombing plan was changed and the bombers attacked perpendicular to the road. Many bombs fell short and numerous Americans were killed. Had the air commanders seen the need to coordinate with or even update Bradley, he could have positioned his forces accordingly and precluded the unnecessary friendly losses.

Throughout the planning stages of Operation Overlord there existed a constant conflict between the strategic bomber commanders, the commanders at SHAEF and the British government. This conflict led to the establishment of a less than optimal chain of command for the air assets and a corresponding air of confusion and inadequate cooperation that prevailed throughout the invasion. Montgomery, who by most accounts brilliantly orchestrated the invasion plan, wrote shortly after the war: From the military point of view, the most difficult single factor during the period of planning was the delay in deciding the higher headquarters organization of the Allied Air Forces. This delay was not purely an Air Force concern, and planning in the Army suffered commensurate delays, because speedy solution of inter-Service problems could not be made until the various Allied Air Force headquarters and responsibilities had been clarified.
There always exists the danger that public reaction to a local tactical defeat will be that of blaming a commander of another nationality.

35 Eisenhower

Public opinion was a major factor influencing the command and control aspects of Operation Overlord. As an operational level campaign, Overlord possessed the following characteristics that made it vulnerable to the massive power of public opinion:

- Its developments were relatively easy for the public to grasp.

- Its leaders (eg., Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley) all had international reputations that made them newsworthy.

- The public sectors of both Britain and the United States had endured considerable hardships and were very sensitive to the relative performance of their respective military forces and leaders.

Beginning with the selection of the Supreme Commander for the invasion, public opinion emerged as a major consideration for the allied decision makers. Having agreed with Churchill at the August 1943 Quebec Conference that the supreme commander should be an American, Roosevelt procrastinated until Stalin pressured him --during the Tehran conference in December 1943-- to make the
selection. The primary reason for the delay stemmed from the fact that the post was to originally be given to his invaluable Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall. Roosevelt, Stimson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Marshall himself were all in agreement until the appointment was leaked to the media and a public uproar ensued. Despite Roosevelt's claim that he wanted to give Marshall the opportunity to become the "Pershing of the Second World War," the public perception was that it was a step down. The entire controversy quickly became a "hot political potato" which prompted Roosevelt to reevaluate the situation and ultimately choose Eisenhower.

The British too were influenced during the initial selection of commanders as evidenced by Churchill's selection of Montgomery as the 21st Army Group commander. Though many factors were involved, in his 18 December 1943 letter to Roosevelt, Churchill demonstrated his awareness of the importance of public opinion when he said "Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel...as Montgomery is a public hero, he will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours."

Eisenhower entered the campaign with a concern for how he was viewed by the press. In early February 1944, during the controversy over the viability of Operation Anvil, he wrote a
memorandum for diary where he stated:

Much discussion has taken place concerning our command set-up, including newspaper evaluations of personalities and abilities...columnists try to show that my contributions in the Mediterranean were administrative accomplishments and 'friendliness in welding an Allied team.' They dislike to believe I had anything to do with campaigns. They don't use the words 'initiative' and 'boldness' in talking of me -- but often do in speaking of Alex and Monty.

Eisenhower's fear of being viewed as over-cautious or unimaginative by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, it appears, kept him from recommending cancellation of Operation Anvil at a much earlier date. It was obvious, with Overlord requiring additional landing craft for the now-agreed-upon five division seaborne assault and with Operation Shingle -- the invasion at Anzio -- stalemated, there was no way possible to simultaneously support Operation Overlord and Operation Anvil.

As preparations for the Normandy landings began and Montgomery presented his revised plan to Bradley, the concern over public opinion focused on the comparative involvement of forces during the assault phase. Montgomery, anticipating greater resistance along the eastern beaches near Caen, intended to land five brigade groups there, with only three to be put ashore in the American sector. Bradley immediately pointed out, "It would be difficult to explain to the American people
the small US part." Political and public-opinion considerations were already rearing their heads and would obscure and complicate Montgomery's command in Normandy all through the summer. Montgomery, accepting Bradley's argument, subsequently requested additional landing craft in order to put an equal number of American's ashore.

Throughout the campaign, the problem of granting the press access to information persisted. Though Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley each had reasonably good rapport with the correspondents accredited to their headquarters, they were all very careful not to reveal certain secrets fundamental to the overall success of the campaign. For this reason, the underlying strategy had to be kept secret and, as a result, Montgomery came under considerably more criticism than he rated.

By mid July, Second Army's attempts to take Caen remained thwarted by the considerable concentration of German armor. Though the attraction of the German armor to the east to facilitate a break out in the west was the strategy throughout, German resistance was greater than had been expected. At this juncture, the Allied effort appeared to be stagnating and comparisons with the failures of World War I immediately began to appear in the news media. It was quickly pointed out that the American troops had gained more ground, captured more enemy
prisoners and had sustained more casualties than the British. Eisenhower was well aware of these facts and he recognized that they were implicit in the basic strategy. As the designated primary ground gainers, the Americans were more likely to sustain greater casualties. Because it would have obviously been very foolish to publicize the fact that the American army was expected to sustain more casualties than the British army, very little could be done to defuse the criticism. Bradley later observed, "too many correspondents...had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay." The fact is that the more Montgomery hammered at Caen, the more German divisions were drawn away from Bradley, thereby making it easier for him to secure the Cherbourg peninsula and to get into position to break out.

Operation Goodwood, Montgomery's 18 July attack on Caen is an ideal example of public opinion playing a major role in the handling of an operational level campaign. Goodwood was planned in conjunction with Bradley's attempt to break out near St Lo (codenamed Operation Cobra). The plan, again consistent with the overall strategy, was for Montgomery to conduct a 17 July attack on Caen, draw the enemy to his front and facilitate Bradley's break out attempt on the 19th. Unfortunately, weather disrupted the execution dates; hence, Goodwood launched on the 19th and Cobra on the 25th.
Montgomery advertised his plans to all his seniors with great enthusiasm and optimism. Once the assault was underway, he further complicated his situation by prematurely making grand announcements of success and figuratively "nailing his coffin shut" by issuing an announcement to the press which included the words "broke through" when referring to the movements of his forces and by concluding that he was well satisfied with the progress made in the first day's fighting. For whatever the reason, his optimistic statements were unfounded and some were blatantly untrue. The following day, his forces endured torrential rains and a fierce counter-attack. By the 20th, the battlefield was turned into a virtual swamp and Goodwood was over. Having not advanced very far and with the press having already displayed in banner headlines the words "break through" and "open country," Montgomery was at their mercy.

The press promptly proclaimed Goodwood a failure. In his Memoirs, Montgomery pointed out that it was his own fault for being too exultant at the press conference held during the battle. The irony was that developments remained consistent with the basic strategy and on the 25th, Bradley launched Cobra and was successful in "breaking out."

The question remains, why was Montgomery so vocal about
the operation and anxious to proclaim victory? The obvious answer was that he was trying to placate his critics. After the war, Bradley speculated that Montgomery’s motivation might have been aimed at public relations or image-building. Montgomery was very sensitive to the fact that Eisenhower was planning to become the overall ground commander when the Third Army joined the First Army to form the 12th U.S. Army Group. To make matters worse he, Montgomery, was being blamed for a lack of progress. To reverse the situation, he needed a "victory." To merely attack Caen as a supporting maneuver for the "break out" in the west was not sufficient. It had to be an operation so spectacular and well publicized that if he broke out he would be a hero, and if he didn’t and Bradley broke out, Montgomery could at least claim a good portion of the credit. As it turned out, Cobra was delayed by five days due to weather and the press failed to recognize the supporting role of Goodwood for Cobra. Goodwood failed, Cobra succeeded, and Montgomery lost.

To summarize, Overlord was continually influenced by public opinion. Throughout the planning and execution, its clearly defined objectives were quickly grasped and evaluated by the public. Consequently, the commanders were very much aware of the power of public opinion and unquestionably considered it when making many of their critical decisions.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The command and control aspects of the operational level of warfare are decidedly influenced by differing service loyalties and national interests. As was the case in 1944 and unquestionably will be the case in any future joint and combined operational level endeavor, the commanders will be confronted with the challenges of integrating stated as well as unstated national and service priorities with the overall objective of the coalition. As pointed out in detail above, these factors will be manifested in their effects on lines of authority and public opinion.

The problem of ineffective lines of authority discussed in this paper is presented with the objective of emphasizing that this factor exists and should be recognized for what it is. To recommend a solution is an easy task. Unfortunately, the solution was known at the time of Operation Overlord and yet it could not be implemented. The primary reason Eisenhower insisted upon command of all available air forces was evidenced when he said we must learn from "the lesson so conclusively demonstrated at Salerno: when a battle needs the last ounce of available force,
the commander must not be in the position of depending upon request and negotiation to get it." Despite this note of wisdom, Eisenhower was forced to threaten to resign unless he obtained adequate control of the air assets. He still failed to achieve the degree of authority he should have had.

The U.S. Air Force continues to maintain an essentially autonomous Strategic Air Command (SAC) that, as a specified command in the Unified Command Plan, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. Today's strategic air assets are in a command structure very similar to the one of early 1944. This is complicated by the fact that all Air Force KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, though indispensible to tactical operations, are assigned to SAC. If confronted with an operational level conflict today, the unified commander would find himself "in a position of depending upon request and negotiation" to get critically needed tanker support as well as strategic bomber support.

In today's environment, one of the most likely coalitions to enter an operational level conflict is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A superficial look at NATO manpower and material resources quickly reveals extraordinary differences, which are in turn manifested in differences in attitudes. In the event of a Soviet cross-Europe invasion, France, which would then probably join NATO militarily, is careful to point out that their
forces would be employed with restrictions. Specifically, General Jeannou Lacaze, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, stated in September 1981 that, "In the case of a commitment at NATO’s side, French forces will remain grouped under national command and in directions or zones covering national territory."

Turning to NATO’s southern flank, the recent difficulties between Greece and Turkey make it clear that unilaterally oriented restrictions would be placed on the employment of either Greek or Turkish troops in an allied effort. Should NATO’s southern flank be attacked, how many fighters will Greece place under NATO’s Sixth Tactical Air Force which happens to have a Turkish commander?

As was seen in World War II and will be present in any future coalition effort at the operational level, nations and services will participate with restrictions that will protect their unilateral interests. It is the task of the operational level commander or unified commander -- as he will more than likely be -- to establish a command structure that will absorb and minimize the effects of the ever-present unilaterally generated incongruities.
The influences of public opinion on the operational art are potentially far greater today than they were in 1944. Reflecting on the war, Montgomery pointed out that "Modern means of communication made it possible for the observers at the front to report events on the battlefield by wireless and in the newspapers of the world, within a few hours of their occurrence." He continued by indicating that war correspondents had profound effects on the morale of the home country as well as on the actual fighting soldier. With the advent of television and instantaneous satellite communications, the impact of public opinion is far more timely and of more consequence today. Modern telecommunications has created a more informed public as well. This will tend to exacerbate the operational level commander's task because, while the public is more informed, it is not necessarily more accurately informed. Classified information will continue to be withheld from the public which will result in situations similar to what confronted Montgomery at Caen. As long as it is in the interest of security, the media will be unable to publish the complete story and the public will continue to evaluate and pass judgment based on insufficient information. Unfortunately, the commanders of the operational level campaigns are going to be the ones that shoulder the brunt of the criticism. The commander must recognize this and guard against it impacting on his judgment.
NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 117.

5. Ibid., p. 119.


9. Ibid.


18. Ibid. p. 23.

19. The Americans used very little armor during the initial invasion.

20. B.H. Liddell Hart points out in his book *History of the Second World War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970, p. 546) that coastal defenses were overcome by 9 AM and there was hardly anything to stop an inland advance. By the time they began to move in the afternoon, they were confronted by a Panzer Division.


22. Ibid.


28. Ibid. p. 265.


35. Ferrell, p. 117.


40. Ibid. p. 498.

41. Sixsmith, p. 151.

42. Weigley, p. 53.


44. Montgomery, p. 231.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

ANVIL: The code name for the attack against the south of France.

BBC: British Bomber Command.

CCS: Combined Chiefs of Staff, which included the American and British Chiefs of Staff.

COBRA: The code name for the First U.S. Army's successful break out attempt from the beachhead.

COSSAC: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and his planning staff.

DRAGOON: The revised code name for ANVIL.

EPSOM: The code name for Montgomery's first major attempt at capturing Caen.

GOODWOOD: The code name for Montgomery's second major attempt at capturing Caen.

HUSKY: The code name for the invasion of Sicily in 1943.

NEPTUNE: The code name for the actual assault on D-Day.

OVERLORD: The code name for the invasion of northwest Europe in the spring of 1944 over the beaches of Normandy, including the entire air, sea and ground operations.

ROUNDUP: The code name for the cross channel attack contemplated for 1943.

SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces

SHINGLE: The code name for the amphibious operations against Anzio, Italy in Jan 44.
APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY

1943

14-24 Aug  Quadrant Conference attended by Churchill and Roosevelt in Quebec, Canada. Overlord set for May 1944.

28 Nov – 1 Dec  Conference attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Tehran, Iran.

7 Dec  Eisenhower was told that he will command Overlord.

1944


21 Jan  First Supreme Commander’s Conference. Eisenhower accepted Montgomery’s version of COSSAC plan.

24 Mar  JCS agreed to the postponement of Anvil.

6 Jun  Allies landed at Normandy.

19 - 22 Jun  Worst storm in 40 years hits the Channel.

25 - 29 Jun  British Second Army conducted Operation Epsom.

27 Jun  U.S. First Army captured Cherbourg.

8 Jul  British Second Army entered Caen but could not capture it.

18 - 20 Jul  British Second Army conducted Operation Goodwood.

25 Jul  U.S. First Army began Operation Cobra and their breakout to the south.
APPENDIX C
KEY FIGURES OF GOVERNMENT

American

President of the United States: Franklin D. Roosevelt
Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King
Commanding General, Army Air Forces General Henry H. Arnold

British

King of England King George
Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill
Secretary of State for War Sir James Grigg
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke
First Sea Lord Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
APPENDIX D

KEY FIGURES OF OPERATION OVERLORD

SNAEF

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces
General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W. Tedder

Chief of Staff, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith

Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied Expeditionary Forces & formerly COSSAC
Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan

Commander In Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces
Air Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory

Commander In Chief, Allied Expeditionary Naval Forces
Admiral Bertram H. Ramsey

21st Army Group

Commander
General Bernard L. Montgomery

Deputy Commander
Major General Sir Francis de Guingand

Commander, U.S. 1st Army
Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley

Commander, British 2nd Army
Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey

Miscellaneous

Commander, British Bomber Command
Air Chief Marshall Arthur T. Harris

Commander, U.S. Strategic Air Forces Europe
Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz

- D - 1 -
AREA OCCUPIED BY ALLIED FORCES ON D-DAY