RECASTING U.S. INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN EUROPE:
TOWARD A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

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This essay represents a synthesis of nearly seven months' study of U.S. and European security issues at the National War College. It results from insights gained through readings, seminars, lectures, and meetings with top U.S. and foreign civilian and military policymakers and national security specialists. I am particularly indebted to Colonel Eckart Fischer, Federal Republic of Germany Army, and adjunct Instructor at the National War College, both for his insights on German views of post-Cold War European security arrangements as provided through his advanced regional studies course on Germany, and for providing meaningful access to senior German and other European diplomatic and military officials. Their candid discussions were invaluable in determining trends and tendencies in U.S.-European security relations.

In keeping with the National War College policy of non-attribution, which encourages frank and open discussion, I have not cited these officials except where their remarks were unequivocally intended for public consumption. In each case, however, I have represented their views as accurately as possible.

The opinions and recommendations expressed in this essay are, in any event, solely my own, and do not reflect official U.S. or foreign government views, nor the views of the faculty at the National War College.
INTRODUCTION


That such language is used to describe conditions and events in many regions of the globe--Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, as well as Europe--only further underscores the point that the political, economic and military transformation of Europe has created a new set of challenges for U.S. policy in the 1990's and beyond. In full recognition that "regional specialists of every stripe tout the importance and critical condition of their particular area of concern, (and) lament the inattention of others to the object of their affection,"1 Europe nonetheless represents a compelling case for rethinking U.S. strategy: the subsiding of East-West confrontation in the arena that served as a focal point for much of the cold war; the collapse of Soviet-backed regimes and sprouting of democracy in Eastern Europe, and; the economic and political transformation represented by both the unification of Germany and EC-92, invites our attention.

This essay will examine U.S. security interests in Europe, European views of its own and U.S. security interests, and potential arrangements for securing those interests.

Competition in responding fully to the challenges of a redefined strategy toward Europe will come not only from other deserving geographic regions, but from the perennial American penchant to reduce foreign entanglements, and increasingly from preoccupation with resolving domestic economic and budgetary problems. If, as this essay suggests, the Atlantic Alliance--NATO--is at risk of being marginalized by other
European-only security frameworks (whose form and substance are only beginning to take shape, and whose definition is by no means assured), the need arises to provide other mechanisms for ensuring full expression of U.S. interests in Europe. Against this backdrop, this examination of U.S.-European security interests will be conducted with a critical eye toward the potential for intensifying U.S.-German relations—a strategic partnership with arguably the new center of gravity in Europe.

The notion of strategic partnership is not novel. One such special relationship exists between the United States and Great Britain—and we intend no disservice to that special relationship in exploring other possibilities for strategic partnership. Where views, values and interests sufficiently coincide, America's principal foreign partners can provide a force multiplier effect—to use the currently fashionable military phrase—in pursuing global or regional security interests. Such partnerships can be especially important under conditions of rapid political, economic and military change, and/or under conditions where resources constrain our ability to fully respond to such change. Both sets of conditions seem reasonably representative of America's position with respect to Europe, and indeed much of the world, today.

Finally, "security" here is used in its explicity European—if not always American—sense: comprehensive political, economic and military (defense) security. It is meaningless to discuss European security outside the political and economic context. EC-92 and the economic transformation of Europe may well have more profound implications for U.S. interests than any refashioning of defense arrangements (NATO, WEU, or any other mechanism). Moreover, military security at the expense of civil liberty is as counterintuitive to Europeans as it is to Americans. The German Basic Law, for example, contains specific injunctions about peace. Yet to Germans, peace can only be obtained in freedom, and Germany policy
explicitly rejects neutrality as self-surrender of freedom.

Shorthand usage of the term security, without modifiers, is always intended to convey the more comprehensive meaning.

**THE GEOSTRATEGIC LANDSCAPE**

The European security landscape today is like wind-swept desert sands. The features continue to shift, and while the pace of the winds of change have slackened since the extraordinary events in 1989, all of the pieces have not resettled. Transition continues, the full magnitude of which will require continuous reassessment.

Nonetheless, some emerging features of the European security setting are discernable. Individually these features justify a reexamination of the role of the Atlantic Alliance and other mechanisms of European security; collectively they force such a reexamination.

--Europe is safer today than in 1945, but not without its risks. What some have termed the "Second Russian Revolution" of the twentieth century has resulted in a Soviet reevaluation of its security requirements. It has relinquished its *cordon sanitaire* in Eastern Europe, decreasing tension and increasing warning time available against conventional attack from the East.

--The concomitant *de facto* demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which became *de jure* with Mikhail Gorbachev's public pronouncement of its termination in February, 1991, represents two interrelated security features: a realignment of the military balance in Central Europe, which together with Soviet retrenchment behind its own borders significantly changes the conventional military equation and lowers the risk of conventional attack from the East, and; the release of nationalist sentiments in formerly occupied East European countries which
are being expressed in both positive and negative ways -- democratic and free-market reform movements, and intra- and inter- nation ethnic strife.

--A third feature of the new European landscape is the existence of a new (or renewed) power center: unified Germany. Its geostrategic position on the continent, economic and technological strength, democratic traditions, traditional role as Mitteleuropa, military potential, and renewed domestic and continental concerns stemming from its military history, all ensure a central role for Germany in any future European security arrangement. To underscore this point, a former Soviet Army Major, now a senior official on the Russian Republic's Committee on Defense and Security, responded unequivocally to what he saw as the object of his vision of eventual U.S.-Russian defense cooperation and even alliance: Germany. Without debating his conclusion, it is clear that unified Germany heightens expectations and concerns, borne on the fear of its past and the promise it holds for a prosperous, peaceful future.

--A fourth and potentially powerful force on the regional and perhaps global landscape is the growing political and economic integration of Europe through the European Community (EC). In the absence of major conflict--including civil war in the Soviet Union--the economic transformation of Europe attendant to EC-92 will have more profound implications for U.S. interests in Europe than any remodeling of other security regimes--NATO, WEU, or CSCE. Although economic issues remain (rules of origin requirements, local content requirements, public sector access, etc.), early U.S. fears that the EC would turn inward and narrowly define its economic interests have proved increasingly unfounded. The "European Debate" over other elements of unification, specifically Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and "harmonization" of foreign and defense policies, however, is less about economics than about political unification
and national sovereignty. Future European security arrangements hang as much in the balance on the outcome of this debate as they do on the nature of the Soviet threat.

Although others may add or subtract from this description of the essential features of the new and evolving European landscape, these seem to be the primary features defining both the scope and direction of future European security: largely as a result of new directions in the Soviet Union, especially a redefinition of its security objectives and requirements, the world and Europe have changed; it is a fundamentally safer place; the Soviet Union cannot be ignored--it is still a nuclear and conventional military power--but other changes in the landscape demand flexibility and adaptability in defining security interests.

Another element which can be added to the landscape, although not limited exclusively to the European context, is that the United States is a smaller superpower. This clearly puts the U.S. spin on the scope and direction of European security arrangements.

Where major differences appear in discussions over future European security is less in defining the landscape than in the relative importance of each of the changes in determining security requirements, and how one views the landscape in terms of risks and opportunities. The next section will examine U.S. and European security interests against the backdrop of their respective views of the risks and opportunities occasioned by these changes.

**U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN A NEW EUROPE**

Fundamental U.S. national security interests and objectives have not changed since being articulated in the President's March, 1990, National Security Strategy White Paper.² Expressed in the context of a new Europe, however, elements of this strategy take on different emphasis:
--The survival of the United States (and European allies) as free and independent nations. Deter aggression, and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack; improve strategic stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements; encourage human rights, market incentives, and free elections in the Soviet Union while fostering restraint in military spending and discouraging Soviet adventurism.

--A healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity. (Promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy.) Ensure access to foreign markets; promote an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes.

--Promote regional stability, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions. Promote the rule of law and diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts; maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

--Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities; support greater economic, political, and defense integration in Western Europe and a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; work with allies in NATO and fully utilize the processes of CSCE to bring about reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free.

Promoting the competitive position of the U.S. economy, emphasized above, may of course come into competition with other stated U.S. objectives.
Unfortunately we do not have as fully articulated a national security strategy from European countries, and certainly not one in a single document as is the U.S. strategy. But from a variety of sources we can deduce that Western European, and to an extent other European, interests and objectives are similar: certainly deterrence and defense; democratic prosperity; regional stability; generally freer trade and open markets; promoting democratic and market reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We can add to this list of objectives from the European perspective: ensuring the continuing long-term commitment of the U.S. in Europe, a goal shared with remarkable consensus from the Atlantic to the Urals, and; more a matter of emphasis than a difference in interests, the economic, and perhaps political and defense integration of Western Europe through the EC.

Individual country differences—on both sides of the Atlantic—stem from the relative ordering of these security priorities, respective views of the risks and opportunities presented by the new Europe, and differences over which mechanisms can most effectively represent those security interests. These can be broadly outlined as follows:

* There is virtual unanimity on both sides of the Atlantic that Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreements between the West and the Soviet Union form the cornerstone of any future security arrangement. There is growing disagreement within the Alliance, however, over what issues may undermine CFE and what issues remain negotiable.

Initially all Western allies agreed that proposed Soviet resubordination of Army forces under the Naval Infantry would sunder the agreement, while other "violations", e.g., early Soviet removal of military equipment to avoid "East of the Urals" requirements, and discrepancies in equipment accounting, represented points of contention but were probably negotiable in order to preserve CFE. Under this reasoning, it was likely
that only additional negative developments such as brutal repression of Baltic independence movements or foot-dragging on Soviet troop withdrawals from former WTO countries would abrogate the agreement.

Lately the U.S. position has firmed that the resubordination of three divisions of Soviet Groups of Forces and approximately 3500 pieces of military equipment (including 1000 tanks) under the Naval Infantry will nullify the agreement (the administration will not submit a treaty for ratification under such conditions), and other discrepancies will color follow-on negotiations. The European position, however, has weakened. Germany in particular has indicated a willingness to negotiate on all issues in order to secure a CFE treaty.

Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that differences between the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance over interpretation of CFE agreements support Western perceptions of reactionary trends within the Soviet Union, and call into question Soviet predictability and reliability in negotiating future arms control and disarmament agreements.

* There is consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that the U.S. has a genuine long-term strategic interest in Europe. Likewise, there is European consensus that a genuine long-term U.S. commitment is in Europe's interest. The fact that this consensus holds for NATO and non-NATO countries, including the Soviet Union, suggests that a continuing U.S. commitment to Europe serves different purposes for different countries.

For the Soviet Union, Poland, and periodically France and others, the U.S. represents reassurance against the potential reemergence of militant German nationalism; for Norway, Turkey, and other smaller European nations, the U.S. represents a measure of protection against their marginalization outside the EC; for many, the U.S. represents an honest
broker, capable of bridging national differences; and for most, the U.S. represents insurance against a still powerful, uncertain and potentially recrudescent Soviet Union.

Disagreements that arise out of the different purposes that continued U.S. involvement in Europe serves are typical of umbrella groups with a common objective but no clearly defined agenda for achieving that objective. Nowhere are these differences over the nature and extent of U.S. commitment to Europe more evident than in the current “European Debate” (really a West European debate).

Nominally the debate is over Economic Monetary Union (EMU), and “harmonization” of foreign and defense policies within the EC. But specifically the debate is about national sovereignty and the willingness of national parliaments to cede foreign and defense policy-making to EC authorities, and about the effect that development of an independent West European military union will have on U.S. commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. The sovereignty issue, on which the debate hinges, is even more problematical for the immediate future of alternative security architectures, especially defense arrangements, than it is for the long-term future of the EC.

Economic integration, including EMU, has retained momentum through Great Britain’s decision to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1990--tacit acknowledgement that its independent position could not be sustained. Decisions on military/defense arrangements, even transitional arrangements within NATO, on the other hand, are held hostage to the larger political debate. Although officially denied, the U.S. reportedly even issued a protest in February, 1991, over the lack of progress on other important European security issues while the debate drags on.4

Before examining the direct implications of the broader political
debate on shaping defense and other security institutions, it is necessary to summarize the European Debate to this point:

** France, and to a lesser extent Spain and Italy view the U.S. as an independent actor likely to withdraw militarily from the continent at any time. France in particular has expressed the need for an independent European defense, and at one point seem willing to sacrifice the Atlantic Alliance in exchange for a West European Union (WEU) defense component linked to the EC. As we shall see, however, new political realities—reactionary trends in the Soviet Union, and more pointedly, the Persian Gulf war—.injected a new sense of pragmatism into even the French position on EC political and defense union. More recently France has repeatedly expressed a desire to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe, and has shown some interest in closer cooperation with NATO’s military structure.

** The U.K. has consistently viewed a separate/autonomous European defense capability as precisely the engine that would undermine U.S. commitment in Europe, and guarantee disengagement.

** Germany has generally taken the middle ground, desiring full European Union but unwilling to achieve defense union at the expense of U.S. engagement on the continent. Sometimes referred to as the “Fusionists”, German efforts have been directed toward a revived and reoriented WEU as a “bridge” linking the Atlantic Alliance to the EC, although reported Franco-German agreement to create a defense component of the EC by 1996 calls their “fusion” role into question.

** The U.S. has consistently supported a stronger Western European defense arrangement along the lines of a strengthened WEU. More recently, however, concerns have been expressed over an “independent actor” institution through which previously negotiated European positions are presented to the U.S. as a “take it or leave it” proposition, with no room
left for compromise. Indeed the previously mentioned report of a U.S. demarche to WEU officials, critical of European efforts to develop a joint foreign and defense policy, appeared in a German weekly under the headline: "Washington does not want the WEU to be in competition with NATO." According to the article, the U.S. letter criticized the European approach as leading to "marginalization" of the alliance and the loss of U.S. influence in Europe. The U.S. nonetheless continues to support a WEU-type defense arrangement more closely associated with NATO.

** Overall, a military component of the EC has lost much of its appeal within the EC, is opposed by non-EC European countries, and would be rejected by at least one EC member (U.K.).

MILITARY SECURITY IN A NEW EUROPE: NATO AND WEU

The events are familiar to us now: INF, the rush of peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989, and CFE in November, 1990; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from WTO countries and Two-Plus-Four agreements that permitted German unification and continued membership in NATO; and Gorbachev's announcement in February, 1991, that the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist as a military alliance. Each event, or series of events--"accelerating history" as Jacques Delors described it-- was further confirmation that NATO was irrelevant and would soon expire. But early euphoria surrounding watershed events like CFE and optimistic predictions about universal acceptance of the rule of law as the stepping stone to European order have dissipated amid other realities in Europe: resurgence of the Communist Party, KGB, and the Army in Soviet political life, and associated reactionary trends in that country; resurgence of ethnic nationalism and growing civil disorder throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and; war in the Persian Gulf.

The Atlantic Alliance is grappling for the appropriate "architecture" for
addressing these realities in the fundamentally altered landscape of East-West relations. The “European Debate” is one manifestation of the groping process. Another is the internal NATO debate over adopting a “broad” or “narrow” approach to European security.

A narrow (“military/strategic concept”) approach is reflected in Paragraph 20 of the London Declaration and forms the basis for NATO force planning, nuclear force posture, and conventional force structure. It would account for current and anticipated changes in corresponding Soviet postures: withdrawal of Soviet forces from former WTO countries, continued progress on CFE agreements, and Soviet conventional and nuclear force structures consistent with the defense doctrine of “reasonable sufficiency”. The ongoing NATO Strategic Review fundamentally represents a narrow approach to European security.

A broad approach is reflected in the additional guidance provided in the London Declaration, and in additional public appeals for a “new architecture” for European security. The broad approach requires a more comprehensive review of Alliance “security policy” along the lines of the Harmel Report and the Comprehensive Concept. It would include a review of future East-West relations, all security institutions, and arms control and disarmament regimes. The broad approach clearly implies acceptance of the European view of “security”, comprising the political, economic and military elements.

In the current East-West environment, neither approach can stand alone for long. Without a comprehensive approach to European security that attempts to mold the future, exploit opportunities and allows for eventual European union, a narrow perspective will collapse under its own weight. Likewise, a long-range comprehensive security approach must rely on narrower military security for insurance.

Initial enthusiasm for the broad approach has been eroded by increased
concern over continuing fluidity in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. To most Europeans, predictions about the future have a half life of a half-year.

Although it was not intended that the military strategic concept would be dependent on a broader review, the anticipated May, 1991, release of the Strategic Review has probably been delayed by the European debate over harmonizing foreign and security policy. Yet in the wake of the Soviet military crackdown in the Baltics in February, continued Soviet intransigence toward CFE issues, and problems experienced in attempting to coordinate EC policies in the Gulf war, the momentum has shifted away from an EC defense arrangement and toward sustaining NATO's military role in Europe. The Strategic Review should not be long in coming.

Much of the general direction of NATO's military/strategic orientation in the new Europe has been made public: a reorientation away from forward defense and toward reduced forward presence, organizing multinational corps, adopting a nuclear strategy of "last resort", etc. Additional considerations still being shaped by the broader political debate suggest the following:

-- NATO will not be given an "out of area" role. While it is accepted as a geopolitical necessity by most Alliance members, reinforced by the Gulf war and increasing concern over potentially militant Islamic countries along the Maghreb, "out of area" is domestically unacceptable, especially in Germany.

The "out of area" dilemma can potentially be solved through the WEU (by one European account, approximately 70 percent of the maritime intercepts related to the Iraq embargo before and during the Gulf war were conducted by WEU countries operating under national instructions but in consultation with WEU and in coordination with non-WEU navies). However, Germany remains a question mark.
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has heretofore supported a change in German policy to permit the use of German forces outside Europe only under U.N. auspices. German military officials, however, express confidence that Germans will develop the "maturity" necessary to permit the use of force under other multinational arrangements such as the WEU. -- Eastern Europe will remain "out of area". Concern is growing over the persistent fragility of the fledgling democracies, and Ralf Dahrendorf's brilliant essay reminding us of the turbulence and risks inherent in contemporary transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes and from centrally controlled to free-market economies, does little to dispel that concern.

Successful transition is of course one potential outcome. The remaining-- and given the turmoil associated with attempting simultaneous political and economic transition, perhaps more likely-- outcomes are all negative: revolution, which creates more problems than it solves, or reaction, either in the form of the old regime, or fascism, "a tyranny based on claims for ethnic or national homogeneity or on ideological purity combining romantic language with the violent repression of dissidence."6

Yet for all of the risks and potential for negative consequences for Western Europe--spillover of civil unrest and ethnic violence, mass refugees spilling into the West, or inter-state war (Hungary has made war expressions toward Romania, for example)--no positive role can be identified for NATO in Eastern Europe that does not threaten the Soviet Union (with the exception of emergency disaster relief). As one senior European military officer expressed it, NATO cannot be the policeman of Europe.

Further adding to the uncertainty of Eastern Europe is the undesirability of issuing NATO security "guarantees" while democratic reforms are still
taking shape. "Assurances", on the other hand, can be provided within the framework of the Helsinki accords.

-- NATO will be projected by Europeans as a "complementary" institution to other non-Alliance security institutions. This is in part to allay U.S. fears that NATO will become marginalized by a WEU caucus, but also represents a genuine political-cultural difference between Europeans and Americans. Europeans have a fondness for multiple—often duplicative—consultative organizations, whereas Americans favor organizational efficiency. Although often difficult for Americans to comprehend, organizational engineering will have to give way to European attachment to "complementary" institutions.

-- The initiative for a European-only defense arrangement will likely remain with the WEU, but one more closely associated with NATO than with the EC.

Adding common foreign and defense policy to an already burdened EC agenda was implausible at the outset. National differences highlighted by the Gulf war simply reinforced that national parliaments are not prepared to surrender that degree of sovereignty to the Community Parliament.

A WEU closely associated with NATO, with more limited objectives than implied by the EC "harmonizing" approach, would also reduce U.S. and non-EC/non-WEU countries' concerns over a competitor organization.

NATO officials have already begun outlining some organizational relationships, including dual-hatted North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Military Committee (MC) Representatives. WEU Command, Control, and Communications (C^{3}), intelligence, and ("out of area") lift requirements can really only be addressed and solved in cooperation with NATO anyway.

Finally, a WEU closely associated with NATO may solve a remaining joint U.S./Western European concern, namely the out of area question, but may not solve the Western European—only desire for greater independence.
from America. At a minimum a NATO/WEU relationship might lessen European pressure to restrict U.S. flexibility as occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (when only Portugal permitted U.S. aircraft refueling), and the April, 1986, bombing of Libya (when only the U.K. provided basing and overflight support), and might provide a mechanism for Western European out of area involvement.

The remaining issue, greater Western European freedom from U.S. influence, however, will only be solved through a mature partnership between the parties, regardless where WEU is associated.

**NATO AND U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE**

The final item in this constellation of issues being shaped by the broader political debate in Europe, yet one which is being equally shaped by issues outside that debate, is the question of U.S. forces remaining in Europe: what interests do they represent, and what should their size and composition be? With due respect to German concerns about the continued presence of “occupation forces” on their soil, for example, the number of U.S. forces remaining in Europe will be subjected to greater U.S. budgetary pressures than German sensitivities.

Much like the changing landscape of Europe, the general contours of the transitional structure of NATO are visible, but the structure remains to be fleshed out. The agreed transitional concept for the Alliance calls for a NATO that is “publicly acceptable and works in practice”, but the details are fuzzy. In the interim, as with any evolving process, contradictions and competing ideas of what is “publicly acceptable” and what “works in practice” abound. From the contours, however, we can discern that what “works in practice” will probably be whatever is publicly acceptable, and serious defense as always will be left to the eye of the beholder.

The European (German) input to continued U.S. troop presence in Europe
is that it should be: (1) a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to Europe; (2) "corps" size ground forces plus supporting Air Force units; (3) capable of conducting independent corps operations, and; (4) credible enough to provide a deterrent effect in conjunction with nuclear weapons.

The likely product, shaped more by the U.S. assessment of its interests, the threat, and not least by budgetary considerations leading to overall military downsizing, rather than European desires, should nonetheless satisfy European parameters: a two division "corps" and three Air Force Wings, comprising approximately 75,000 (to as high as 100,000) personnel.

Additionally, the U.S. will agree to another European desire for some form of multinational corps arrangement, which with the exception of German forces, are "separable" for national use. Here again the details are fuzzy, but it is unlikely that a multinational corps arrangement will go below a national division level because of C³ and "separability" issues. (Even still, this will present C³ nightmares for military leaders.) It is also possible that some "separable" NATO forces can be double hatted as WEU forces.

If the "European Debate" has not thus far succeeded in defining European security outside the limits of NATO, it has at least succeeded in expressing the need for greater European input to NATO policy.

The related issue of what purposes U.S. forces in Europe serve, what (whose) interests they represent, is more complicated, and requires close "analysis". I use the term analysis advisedly here, since the answers to these questions often are points on which reasonable men (and women) disagree, and ultimately may rest as much on (hopefully informed) intuition as on objective intellectual analysis.7

The most frequently cited catalog of interests served by continued U.S. troop stationing in Europe is:
1. Balance the Soviet Union; a hedge against Soviet recidivism; insurance.
2. Provide a nuclear security guarantee to non-nuclear European countries; induc es them not to develop a national nuclear weapons capability.
3. Help Europeans help themselves.
4. Promote democracy and human rights.
5. Provide a staging area for other regions.
6. Because the Europeans want us.
7. The U.S. as a maritime nation needs secure, stable, opposite trading shores.
8. Provides a forum for continued U.S. engagement in Europe.

The first item, that U.S. troops represent a hedge against Soviet military power in Europe, is the most frequently cited, most fully articulated and most strongly held justification for continued U.S. stationing in Europe, and consequently requires the most thorough review. Others can be addressed more succinctly.

U.S. troop presence does not easily translate directly into a nuclear guarantee to non-nuclear European countries, inducing them not to develop their own independent capability. It may be a necessary condition, but is not a sufficient justification. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear guarantee has not always been believable, or believable to all countries. France, who did not accept the infallibility of a U.S. nuclear guarantee developed a national capability; Great Britain, who did not openly question U.S. reliability, also developed a national nuclear capability. The motivation, or lack of motivation to develop national nuclear weapons is largely domestic.

The argument that U.S. troops in Europe represent a means to help Europeans help themselves, and a means to promote democracy and human rights, converges in Eastern Europe. As already stated, there is no role for NATO forces, and in particular U.S. forces, in Eastern Europe. Moreover,
with one possible exception, it is extremely difficult to translate troop presence into promoting democracy and human rights. (The exception may be the model that the U.S. and other Western democracies provide in subordinating the military to civilian control. Presence, in Western Europe, may assist East European fledgling democracies in understanding and adopting the model.) Finally, NATO has already indicated it will not issue security guarantees to Eastern Europe, which rather weakens an argument in favor of troops promoting democracy and human rights.

Europe serving as a staging area for the U.S. involvement in other regions has appeal, but again one must question whether this is a sufficient reason for stationing troops there, and if perhaps there are not alternative locations that do not require a substantial commitment of forces. Does POMCUS (pre-positioned material) require two divisions and three air wings to service and police the material? Mobile Positioning Ships (MPS), though a more expensive means of forward staging, requires relatively little in the way of mutual commitment.

To many, "because the Europeans want us", is a very compelling reason for continued stationing of troops in Europe; for others it is the most explicit case of necessary but not sufficient reasons. Clearly U.S. troops could not be stationed in Europe if they were not wanted. That makes it a necessary condition. Typically the sufficiency question gets framed as: "For what purpose?", or "Whose interests do they serve?", and the discussion gets bogged down in a circular argument. The answer may be that "being wanted" is both necessary and sufficient, but we will defer that analysis until the end.

As a maritime nation, the U.S. does indeed desire stable, secure, and friendly opposite trading shores. But are troops required in Europe in order to provide that? In Spain? Portugal? France? Similarly, the justification that troops in Europe provide a forum for continued
engagement in Europe begs the question. Are they necessary? Are there no better fora for U.S. engagement in Europe?

The case of U.S. troops providing a counterbalance to the Soviet Union is more complex. Combined with Soviet intransigence over CFE differences, domestic developments within the Soviet Union have heightened Western concerns about future Soviet foreign and defense policies.

The so-called "Counterrevolution of the Gang of Four--a parody on the earlier Chinese movement--indicating a reemergence of the power of the Army, Police (KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs security forces), Communist Party, and defense-industrial leaders, signifies a reversal of liberal democratic reform movements and a return to the traditional power centers of Soviet policymaking. In the meantime, Western military analysts evaluating Soviet military doctrine and capabilities are confronted with an enigma: four million Soviet citizens under arms, a professional (volunteer) officer corps, a balanced offensive and defensive capability, and "rough nuclear parity", while internal Soviet debates continue over "reasonable sufficiency for defense", "defensive defense" (meaning forces to repulse attack only, with no capability for attack or offensive operations), and "strategic stability" through "parity" (meaning deep cuts--from approximately 10- to 11,000 nuclear weapons down to approximately 6600 weapons-- toward "minimum deterrence").

Circumscribing this snapshot of Soviet military capabilities and unsettled doctrine is the recognition by both NATO and the Soviet Union that the Soviet theater strategic offensive in Central Europe is no longer supportable. ("The Paradigm Lost", in Soviet black humor). While the West was in the process of negotiating CFE reductions from 600,000 down to 200,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, "democratic forces" initiated the unilateral withdrawal of all 30 Soviet divisions from the region, with
approximately 19 divisions remaining to be removed as of March, 1991. The effect on NATO military planning is stunning. Previous estimates of Soviet force generation rates in the Central Front, for example, are being lowered from 100 divisions in 30 days to 40-60 divisions in 60 days.

Military assessments will continue, and several estimates require substantial refinement. (Estimates of Soviet reconstitution rates, which depend in part on CFE compliance, range from 2-4 months to 2 years). But given the lack of a Soviet theater strategic offensive capability, the central difficulty now confronting NATO political and military leaders is identifying the initiating political scenario which would lead to a Soviet attack across the Oder-Niesse. This difficulty results in an inability to fully articulate and rationalize NATO's defense requirements, and brings into question the counterbalancing role of U.S. troops in Europe.

But imponderables do not erase an enigma. Uncertainty prevails in the West, and Soviet actions externally and domestically continue to feed that uncertainty. Hence the need for insurance. A hedge. Continued planning against capabilities. From the U.S. perspective, conflict in Europe may no longer necessarily lead to global conflict, but from the European perspective, war in Europe is global enough.

Which brings us full circle to the question of how closely U.S. troops in Europe correspond to the interest they represent as a hedge against the Soviet Union. Are U.S. troops absolutely required as a defense against the Soviet Union? Probably not, which is why their size and composition need only be politically acceptable. (This does not make the military leaders' job in NATO any easier--it complicates it!) Are they required as a deterrent? If you pause on this one, you must answer yes, so we'll say possibly, if only as an existential deterrent.

Finally, returning to the question I side-stepped earlier: whether Europeans' desires ("because they want us"), provide sufficient
justification for stationing troops there? Here I would answer yes.

In blunt terms, which Europeans would not use themselves, stationing U.S. troops in Europe is a cost of doing business. In more positive terms, it is our fair contribution to the Atlantic Alliance--fair compensation for continued membership in good-standing.

It would be a mistake to view the contribution negatively. It is not an onerous contribution, nor an extorted settlement, but one which is negotiated and arrived at fairly among partners (and can be renegotiated, upward or downward as the situation warrants). It fills a European need for additional reassurance during a period of transition and uncertainty--a requirement with which the U.S. does not necessarily disagree--and a need for a symbol of long-term U.S. commitment to Europe and solidarity with the Alliance.

In exchange the U.S. receives continued full representation and consideration for its additional security interests both in and out of Europe--cooperation on selected debt relief for East European countries, coordinated policies toward the Baltic States, cooperation on counter narcotics, terrorism, restraint of arms sales, and (hopefully) trade, are just a few issue areas which come to mind.

In short, although a direct ends-means translation between U.S. troops in Europe and a catalog of interests (such as outlined earlier) cannot be made, an indirect correlation can be made as part of a freely-joined Alliance serving mutual needs. "Because Europeans want us" is both necessary and sufficient. (As an added bonus, stationing troops in Europe does assist in serving many of the interests listed earlier.)

RECASTING U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE: FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS

For the next several years, NATO can and should remain the principal
focus of transatlantic military security arrangements. It fulfills several short- and long-term interests and criteria: a measure of insurance against a potentially recidivist, politically turbulent, economically disastrous and militarily powerful Soviet Union, and continued engagement of the United States in Europe.

With the relative decline in Europe of the military component of security, and ascendancy of the economic and ultimately political components, it is far from clear how much longer U.S. military influence can be translated into benefits in other areas, such as U.S.-EC economic bargaining.

Developments in Europe suggest an increasing focus on economic relations—with the EC—and political relations, with institutions like CSCE and European Political Cooperation (EPC). The U.S. is not presently well positioned to exploit this evolution. Even if U.S. economic strength rebounds strongly, traditional ambivalence toward European institution building will complicate dialogue with organizations like CSCE and EPC. Nor, in light of faltering steps toward political “harmonization”, is it clear that increased U.S. confidence in these institutions would be well placed for the near-term.

In the absence of a dramatic reversal of East-West relations, NATO’s military role will continue to diminish and naturally migrate elsewhere. In the interim, parallel structures like the WEU can be used to “bridge” the relationship between NATO and the EC. On a continent characterized by a multitude of overlapping and “complementary” institutions for articulating and reconciling national interests, none is likely in the near-term to provide the United States with the degree and nature of influence it needs to support U.S. regional and global interests. A potentially more potent channel for recasting U.S. security interests with Europe though, might be through nurturing vital bilateral relationships.
Throughout this essay we have highlighted U.S. and German policies and views as a means of examining areas of convergence and divergence on European security issues. It is important to emphasize, however, that U.S.-German bilateral relations cannot be understood outside the context of multilateral relationships. Germany, perhaps more than any other country, is dedicated to multilateralism. To Germans, their tragic past resulted from embracing nationalism and sovereignty; their successful present and future lies in the path of rejecting nationalism and modifying sovereignty. Multilateralism is the means for reassuring themselves and others, and is related in turn to the perception that the U.S. retains a similarly strong commitment to multilateral institutions.

Another caveat in framing U.S.-German relations is the risk of excessive expectations. Germans only grudgingly accept that they are a regional power, and firmly reject that they are a global power. They repeatedly caution not to expect too much too soon. Already we have seen signs of disenchantment from the Soviet Union and East European countries with excessive expectations of the role Germany would play in their transition to market economies.

With these understandings, there is sufficient justification for nurturing already robust U.S.-German bilateral relations. As already discussed, we share the same basic interests in Europe: a continent free from aggression and free from domination by one country, democratic prosperity, and cooperation on a growing range of issues based on shared values. For its part, the U.S. is the only country engaged in Europe without a residual fear of German nationalism, which provides the basis for an unburdened relationship. Beyond that, the defining conditions that have shaped the relationship to this point have fundamentally changed.

The immediate benefits to Germany from an intensified relationship is
recognition of its status as an equal and partner, and sustained engagement of the U.S. in Europe. Although the U.S. will continue to resist efforts to institutionalize CSCE, Germany can probably convince the U.S. to give substance to the platitudes that characterize American ambivalence to that organization.

The immediate benefits to the United States are mainly along the economic dimension. Germany can play a particularly important role in resolving disputes between the EC and the U.S. over agricultural policy, financial markets, and regulation of services, and can assist in opening competitive markets elsewhere. Despite disappointment over Germany's inability to free the deadlock over EC agricultural policy in the GATT Uruguay round, the U.S. can work with Germany to pursue specific agreements in the OECD. Similarly, the U.S. and Germany, working with the OECD and other multilateral economic organizations, can undertake efforts to promote market transformations in Eastern Europe.

Beyond the immediate benefits to U.S. economic interests in Europe, Germany represents a legitimate and effective "bridge" to the economic and political framework which will shape the long-term security environment in Europe.

This is not to suggest that there is full convergence between the U.S. and Germany on economic issues, or more significantly, on the full range of security issues. On the contrary, there is divergence on issues ranging from the Middle East (Iraqi reparations, Arab-Israeli dispute, arms restraint and non-proliferation), to GATT and trade issues, to the fundamental question of deterring aggression. But there is a substantial foundation of shared interests and values to suggest that a strategic partnership with Germany would be in the best long-term interests of U.S. security policy.
NOTES


3. The significance Europeans attach to CFE was underscored during March, 1991, hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, which were attended by the Norwegian Defense Minister, the Defense staff, and the Norwegian Ambassador to the United States.


5. Ibid.


7. For the reader's benefit I should state my own bias in advance, which is that continued U.S. troop stationing in Europe serves legitimate U.S. and European interests. I am indebted to Dr. Lynn Davis for forcing me to confront that this preference is in part based on objective though not unassailable logic, and in part based on (informed) intuition.