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The Standing Joint Force Headquarters Plan—Does It Go Far Enough?

by

William T. Dolan

LTC U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: ______________________________

13 May 2005
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986, the military continues to evolve to meet the requirements and intent of the law, that of becoming an innately joint force. One such initiative, to be implemented by 2007, is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). The intent behind this initiative is to alleviate some of the problems, such as interoperability, flexibility, timeliness and others discussed in detail in Chapter 2, that have been discovered or experienced with Joint Task Forces (JTFs) over the last three decades with respect to command and control, planning, and execution from the headquarters and staff perspective. There have been numerous papers and articles written about the SJFHQ recently, discussing the faults of our current structure and the need for such an organization. The research for this paper is intended to show there is no argument against the need of some form of a standing joint force or joint force headquarters, but there is unsettled discussion about the organization and functions. This paper will discuss not only those topics, but will make recommendations for further research and discussion on expanding the current concept, if the research indicates.

The current objective for the SJFHQ concept is to have a “standing, coherent team of ‘joint generalists,’ led by a flag/general officer.” (JFLL, 1) Each Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) will have a SJFHQ assigned to his headquarters for the purposes of completing the five essential tasks of peacetime daily operations and obviously crisis response. The five essential tasks consist of effects based planning, maintaining situational understanding, fully leveraging the collaborative information environment to enhance C2 capabilities, build and maintain
operational net assessment products and participating in training exercises. “When a crisis occurs, the SJFHQ focuses activities in its five essential task areas on the developing situation.” (SFpam 3, 12-13)

Although this appears to be a step in the right direction to solve many of the problems that have been identified with JTFs in the past, this paper will attempt to show that the concept needs to go further and falls short of the intent of the SJFHQ. This thesis will attempt to show that the SJFHQ concept will not alleviate all of the problems associated with JTF HQs. In short, the military will continue to struggle with the formation of JTFs with regards to command and control and execution of plans or current operations. The SJFHQ should alleviate many of the issues associated with planning operations, leveraging enhanced capabilities, and bring a familiarity of the AOR to the fight, but the JTF and/or the Regional Component Commander (RCC) will still be faced with the problems we have today when forming a JTF. Among those issues, the JTF must still deal with will be overcoming the inertia of bringing a new and unfamiliar team on board, the lack of a habitual relationship with provided forces and other service headquarters, and the lack of redundancy if the RCC finds the need for another JTF HQ in his AOR.

As stated earlier, numerous papers and articles already exist laying out the arguments for the requirement for a SJFHQ concept and other than service parochialism; research for this paper is expected to find little dissension for the requirement of some form of a joint force or a joint headquarters. The intent of this paper is to continue to promote debate and thought on future SJFHQs and will conclude with possible courses of action, derived from the research, for the
future SJFHQs and show where, in this author’s opinion, currently where the concept falls short of the goal. This paper will examine some of the historical lessons learned from past JTFs, the evolutions of the JTF HQ and the concept for the SJFHQ, and finally examine where the latest initiative may fall short of completing the intent for the SJFHQ and the GNA. The analysis will use specific criteria to compare and contrast current doctrine for options for creating JTFs; examine three operations using JTFs; and finally analyze the possible recommendation, and the current position of this paper, that specified three star level headquarters, with assigned joint forces, be manned permanently as a joint headquarters with the resources and capabilities planned for the SJFHQ concept.
Chapter 2

Criteria for a Comparative Analysis of Joint Task Force Headquarters

This chapter will define the criteria for comparison of past, current and proposed JTF formations. It will set the stage for the comparison of the current doctrine for standing up JTFs in chapter 3, analyze three JTFs since 1983 in Chapter 4, and be used to examine the proposed course of action for joint headquarters in chapter 5. Based on the research for this paper, the author chose eight criteria for comparison for comparison of JTF HQs. The criteria, defined below, are: resource requirements, flexibility, interoperability, habitual or organic relationship with forces, command and control, redundancy, familiarity with an area of operations (AOR), and timeliness. Throughout the research, these were consistent topic areas and threads, mostly found in the area of lessons learned, that contributed to the selection of the criteria.

**Resource requirements.** This criterion is a comparative analysis of the amount of resources in personnel and material required to staff a headquarters in a peace time situation. Lower resource requirements will be considered better and advantageous. There is a cost associated with forming any new organization, in both manpower and equipment. It is important that the cost to the force is minimal, but yet retaining the desired effect. The force is stretched thin with the ongoing situations in the world and the fewer additional requirements placed on the services for a SJFHQ is beneficial to both the service and the force.

**Flexibility.** Compares the ability to tailor a headquarters and its forces, not only to the specific mission, but to be able to get the right personnel in the right position for the right job at the right
time. As will be shown in the examination of the three historical examples of JTFs, every operation is different, with different requirements for the force applied to the given crisis. It is considered an advantage if the JTF HQ is more flexible with regards to tailoring the organization for a specific mission.

**Interoperability.** This criterion is further broken down to compare options with regards to equipment; Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)/Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (DTTPs); and staff proficiency. Equipment interoperability focuses on communications and situational awareness tools. SOPs and DTTPs compare familiarity with the interoperations of a headquarters to include time trained together. Staff proficiency compares skill, knowledge and ability in staff operations, deliberate planning, crisis action planning, current operations, understanding of the commander and his intent, and time together as a staff. The importance of this criterion will be seen in chapter 4. From the ability to talk to one another on a radio, to understanding service procedures, the lack of interoperability has had a tremendous impact on the operations of JTFs. More, rather than less, interoperable is an advantage for a headquarters.

**Habitual/organic relationship with forces and services.** This criterion will compare JTFs of past present and future headquarters with respect to assigned forces. Research has shown that a JTF HQ operating with its own organic forces fares better than a headquarters that receives forces from outside the normal chain of command. This criterion will also compare and contrast the training and relationship, if any, among the services within a JTF HQ. It is considered an
advantage if the headquarters has, or has had, prior inter-service staff training or has an organically assigned or attached inter-service staff.

**Redundancy.** Simply put, this criterion is an advantage to a course of action if it allows for two or more JTFs to be organized within one Combatant Commander’s area of operations. One need to only look at CENTCOM today to see the requirement for more than one SJFHQ to provide the redundancy within a RCC’s AOR, as CENTCOM simultaneously conducts operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Familiarity with an Area of Responsibility.** Familiarity compares whether or not a JTF staff has/had an understanding of the geography, culture, history, and military of a specific AOR. It is an advantage if a JTF staff member has/had familiarity with the AOR.

**Timeliness.** “JTF commanders and staffs will not have enough time to receive joint training and establish working relationships with their service counterparts prior to the next operation.” (Hanley, 22) Timeliness compares how fast a JTF HQ is/was able to stand up, and how quickly the JTF HQ became operationally effective. Research has shown that a JTF HQ may be able to stand up quickly, but not become an effective staff for a number of weeks, if at all, primarily due to many of the criteria above. Chapter 4 will examine timeliness in greater detail in the comparison of the historical examples, with the conclusion that a JTF that has about six months to prepare for an operation, its chances of successfully becoming operationally effective are greater than that of the JTF with only days. It is considered an advantage if the JTF is operational upon deployment.
Chapter 3

Current JTF HQs Formations, Employment and Comparison

This chapter will analyze the current doctrine for creating JTFs and compare and contrast them using the defined criteria from Chapter 2. There remain today three primary options in the development of a JTF HQs. The current alternatives consist of “an ad hoc headquarters formed from various sources; a JTF headquarters formed around the nucleus of a Service-only headquarters (augmented with representatives from the unified command headquarters and other Services), and a standing JTF headquarters.” (IDA, ES1) A historical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of headquarters follows in this Chapter, although the arguments tend to be obvious to the experienced military observer.

Ad-hoc JTF Headquarters

As the term ad-hoc connotes, this option brings together a variety of service based capabilities from disparate organizations and rapidly assembles them to meet the needs of an emerging crisis. Generally the JTF HQ is formed and staffed for a crisis then stood down once the crisis is over.

Advantages: Resource Requirements, Flexibility, Redundancy, and Timeliness

Based on the outlined criteria, the ad-hoc approach has some advantages. There are no resource requirements prior to the need for a JTF HQ; the headquarters is flexible and easily tailored to the situation; redundancy is inherent since the headquarters is being manned for the specific task at hand; and although the headquarters can be stood up quickly, history has shown this to be a disadvantage.

With regards to resource requirements, before actually declaring a need for a JTF, there are “no personnel, equipment, money, time, effort, or thought invested in this option [the ad-hoc
The old adage ‘you get what you pay for’ comes to mind as one ponders this option.” (Clay, 10) Another advantage is the ability to tailor the JTF HQ to the mission. “This concept is a joint doctrine imperative and can be accomplished with great precision through specified taskings after careful analysis of the mission requirements.” (Osborne, 23) “The advantage of the ad hoc staff is the temporary savings in personnel, equipment, and money. Tasking for personnel and equipment on an ‘as needed’ basis permits the force structure, to include equipment, to stay at current levels.” (Scott Jr, 16) Since the ad-hoc headquarters are manned for specific missions and there are numerous flag commands to choose from to build a JTF around, a RCC can build as many JTFs as he/she may need within his/her AOR. Other ancillary advantages may be the experience gained by officers and the capability of the taskings to ensure the right officer, NCO, civilian, or commander is chosen for the right job based on their experiences. (Osborne, 23,24)

**Disadvantages: C2, Interoperability, Relationship with Forces, and Familiarity w/AOR**

The disadvantages of this option, however, are numerous and glaring. The headquarters staff will not, in all likelihood, be familiar with the AOR; there will have been no relationship built among the services before the crisis causing command and control issues; since the headquarters is ad-hoc, the interoperability of equipment, SOPs, etc. will be a problem; there will be no habitual relationships among the forces, except for those subordinate units that may come with the core headquarters; and as stated above, although the headquarters may be quick to stand up, it takes time to gain effectiveness.

History has shown that ad-hoc JTF HQs tend to meet with less than successful outcomes at times. One of the most obvious examples in recent history was the failed attempt to rescue the
American hostages in 1980 in Operation Eagle Claw. “Among the findings from the Holloway Investigation was that the ad-hoc command and control system was flawed.” (IDA. 9) Operation Urgent Fury, in Grenada, is another such example according to the official history of the operation:

An adequate JTF organization did not exist in the Caribbean so USCINCLANT (Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command) chose Second Fleet to serve as the JTF headquarters. Second Fleet headquarters was a naval staff with little or no experience in planning and commanding large ground operations. [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General] Vessey sent Major General Schwarzkopf to advise the fleet commander and to ensure coordination of ground operations. Because of the incompatible radios, Navy ships within sight of Rangers and airborne troops could not initially receive or respond to their requests for fire support. On two occasions, when Navy jets did respond, they attacked the wrong targets. (IDA, 10)

Interoperability is an obvious problem with the ad hoc approach, but it is not only in radios and other equipment, but with personnel, doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques and procedures as well. “The personnel assigned to these ad hoc headquarters have not had the opportunity to train and work together before a crisis, thus limiting the ability of the commander and staff to develop the habitual relationships that are important to efficient and effective staff work.” (IDA, 9) Anyone who has joined a new organization understands the time and effort involved to learn the organization, much less trying to do it without an existing organization. Interoperability with doctrine and standard operating procedures is yet another challenge to standing up the JTF HQ. JFCOM has done an excellent job of getting joint doctrine published and to the services. Services have deferred to the joint doctrine versus their doctrine if they differ. So, even as progress continues in this regard, until all services operate the same way, the ad hoc configuration will suffer. If the services are not familiar with each other’s SOPs and
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), then they will be equally unfamiliar with the commander of the JTF. (Osborn, 24)

As a final example of the difficulties associated with the ad hoc relationship, the lessons learned from operations in Somalia give a more recent historical example. “During Operation UNOSOM II, the CJTF met his staff only after he arrived in Somalia. Even then, less than a third of the staff deployed when operations commenced. The lesson learned is grossly understated: ‘Mission execution is more difficult without trained and well organized staffs…”” (Clay, 12) Because of most of these reasons for the major disadvantages to the ad hoc approach, we therefore do not see it used very often today.

**Service Based JTF Headquarters**

Today’s choice for creating a JTF HQ seems to be the option of augmenting a service based headquarters over the ad hoc approach. Though not a standing joint headquarters, as will be discussed later, it is a “JTF headquarters formed around the nucleus of a standing headquarters (Army Corp, Navy Carrier Battle Group, Numbered Air Force, or Marine Expeditionary Force).” (IDA, 10) As of this writing, all JTFs in operation were either standing JTFs or service HQ JTFs.

**Advantages: Flexibility, Redundancy, Resource Requirements**

There are several advantages to this approach none of which immediately jump to the top as the most important. This option does give the RCC an advantage for flexibility in approaching the mission and he can tailor the force to meet the requirements. (Osborne, 28) Chapter 3 will show two examples of the flexibility of this approach in Operations Just Cause and Restore Hope. This approach also solves the problem of redundancy. If a RCC requires more than one JTF in
his AOR, this option allows for the possibility of creating more than one. “Combatant Commanders have trained army corps, navy fleets, numbered air forces, and marine expeditionary forces to serve as a JTF staff for contingency operations and more than one can be employed simultaneously if required.” (Osborne, 28) The example we have today is in the CENTCOM AOR with Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Currently there are two JTFs operating in the CENTCOM AOR, one in Afghanistan, with the 25th Division as CJTF 180, the other in Iraq, with III Corps as CJTF 7. Both of these headquarters are JTFs augmented by other services and specialists.

Although not as inexpensive with regards to resources as the ad hoc headquarters, this option does not call for an exorbitant amount of resourcing at the headquarters level during peacetime. The current configuration of CJTF 7 will be discussed later. Since the core of the JTF is a standing headquarters at the flag or general officer level, the staff functions, equipment, and requirements for a functioning headquarters already exist. The only real expense with regards to resources is what the augmentation staffs bring.

Neutral: Habitual Relationships and C2

Generally the service based option will also have the advantage, though not always, of having a relationship, either assigned or habitual, with many of the fighting forces. However, most likely this relationship would be only with the forces of that service. For example, in Iraq today, 1st Cavalry Division is operating in Baghdad. III Corps is operating as the CJTF HQ as stated. During peacetime operations, 1st Cavalry Division is not only assigned to III Corps, but both units are stationed at Ft. Hood. Obviously this is a tremendous advantage for both units in combat. The drawback, especially for III Corps, is that III Corps had no Air Force or Marine
units assigned during peacetime and has only worked with the sister services during corps level Warfighting exercises. One can not always guarantee that the forces provided to the JTF will come from the assigned higher headquarters, but whenever it can be done, it would prove advantageous, as shown with Operation Just Cause, below.

The command and control of the JTF, much like the discussion in the previous paragraph would seem to be an advantage and is, for the service which the JTF is organized around. However, if the service staff does not integrate the augmenting staffs and forces sufficiently command and control suffers. All three operations discussed in Chapter 4, had varying degrees of success or failure with regards to command and control.

**Disadvantages: Interoperability, Timeliness, and Familiarity w/AOR**

There are obvious disadvantages to this approach, but the first one seems to be more of an advantage upon first glance. However, further analysis shows this option only marginally improves in this area over the ad hoc approach. The apparent advantage is the nucleus of the JTF staff is a core service staff that should be a well trained, cohesive staff functioning under a set of SOPs and inherent understanding of the commander and each other. Most of the JTF staff will be from the original core element and “has already worked together on a daily basis and has trained in many different scenarios.” (Osborne, 27) This is only an advantage as far as it is concerned with the core staff, the challenge of incorporating the augmentees and building the relationships among the services remains an issue. The service language, SOPs and TTPs will be service centric, putting the augmentees at a disadvantage and potentially making the staff
dysfunctional to an extent. AAR comments after an exercise involving the United States Southern European Task Force (USSETAF):

The critical first 48 hours of JTF operations stretched the staff as a predominately army staff transitioned to a joint staff planning for command and control of a sizable joint force. New staff officers issued competing and conflicting guidance due to their unfamiliarity with the joint SOP. Routine and critical interfaces were unclear, as were expectations of various boards and centers. (Osborne, 28)

Even though it appears that it is a disadvantage, the only way you could potentially alleviate this problem completely would be to have the service headquarters already be joint. There will always be a learning curve of some sort and the service based option is a marked improvement over the ad hoc headquarters when it comes to integrating a staff. This also makes timeliness for becoming an effective headquarters a disadvantage. The problem of interoperability of equipment can still remain as well. Although this issue will be alleviated to a great extent because of the fact that the headquarters is already a standing headquarters, the augmentation to the headquarters must have compatible equipment.

US Pacific Command has designed a standing staff that has been designed to act as an augmentation staff for its major subordinate commands. The Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) “is a specially trained joint planning cell drawn from the CINC’s staff that can be activated and deployed within 48 hours of notification.” (IDA 10) The SJFHQ concept looks much like the DJTFAC except for the fact that the DJTFAC is manned by personnel from the PACOM staff, not a stand alone organization. The staff officers perform two functions, that of their “normal” job, and that of the job of being battle rostered with the DJTFAC. The advantages to this concept far outweigh the disadvantages:
This approach is an improvement over the ad hoc headquarters and provides a JTF command and control capability with lesser resource implications that a standing JTF headquarters. However, augmented headquarters remain service entities that acquire only a thin layer of jointness because the commander and the majority of the staff, even after augmentation, come from a single service. Relationships of trust and confidence honed year-round between a commander and staff principles will endure in a crisis, making it hard for an outsider to assume a principle staff role and exert similar influence. (IDA 11)

We will explore later, when looking at the current SJFHQ concept, the advantages and disadvantages of the DJTFAC since the overall concept is very similar. The DJTFAC also alleviates the disadvantage the service centric option has with familiarity of the AOR.

**The Standing JTF**

The Standing JTF has evolved into a permanent JTF in most cases. Stood up for particular missions, they are still standing because their mission has not yet been completed. Examples are JTF-6 at Ft. Bliss running counter drug operations, JTF Full Accounting working in Southeast Asia to account for American remains, and JTF Bravo in Honduras, also conducting counter drug operations. Therefore, when the term Standing JTF HQs is used, one must take care to not confuse the concept of the SJFHQ with a standing or permanent JTF. The next chapter is dedicated to discussions of the SJFHQ and its development.

**Advantages: C2, Interoperability, Familiarity w/AOR, Relationship w/Forces**

From the standpoint of the eight criteria, the Standing JTF has the most advantages of the three options. The most obvious advantage is in the name of the JTF itself, Standing JTF. It is a standing headquarters like any Corps, Fleet, Air Force or Marine Expeditionary Force making the command and control of the JTF seamless. It has its own standing interoperable staff and “a
permanent staff reduces fog and friction in the joint commander’s headquarters … A permanent staff reacts quicker and makes decisions faster because it is a well-practiced team. It can accomplish the mission more efficiently and effectively because it encompasses all the desired characteristics and requirements of a joint headquarters.” (Hanley, 17) The team already exists. The commander does not have to work to bring SOPs together, he knows his intent will be understood and the staff will be familiar with him and with each other, as any staff at any level that has worked together for any amount of time.

The SJTF also overcomes interoperability problems, associated with the interoperability of personnel; equipment; doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP); and SOPs. This goes along inherently with any standing staff. Standardized communication and equipment are the norm. No concerns with connectivity and information flow that you can have with the other two options. “Since communications in a standing JTF are already established upon receipt of the newly assigned mission, systems interoperability is initially good and continually refined.” (Osborne, 19) Neither the ad hoc option nor the service based option could hope to have the interoperability of the standing JTF, since the standing JTF is a fully manned, full time headquarters operating 24 hours a day with the same team and forces.

Another significant advantage this approach has is the staff’s familiarity with its particular AOR. The JTF commander and staff have the luxury of having to focus solely on one particular region. This in turn can be a disadvantage to be discussed later, however “already being knowledgeable of a region’s culture, history, politics, economy, and geography will reduce the time needed to familiarize the staff and commander with a particular area of operations.” (Scott, 14)
Yet another advantage, based on the criteria chosen, is the relationship with its assigned forces and interactions with the services. Again the standing JTF by far has the most advantage here based on everything above. JTF members living, working, and eating together for months and years should serve to form a team, service lines should blur, and the priority will be to the JTF not to the component’s piece of the pie. Osborne sums up this advantage:

The joint staff is already formed and familiar with the command’s standard operating procedures (SOP) and TTPs. Additionally, it is equally knowledgeable of the commander and his or her preferences for information flow and decision making processes. Throughout their continuing employment, the standing JTF staff becomes familiar with the doctrine of the other services and develops an understanding of joint operations that would otherwise not be present. (Osborne, 18)

The unit that works with the higher headquarters on a daily basis should perform better than a unit that does not. The historical example of Operation Just Cause in the following chapter is but one case study that substantiates this. Also, as shown in the example above reference III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq, III Corps had the luxury of operating with some of the same forces assigned to it in peacetime. This can only enhance the capability and effectiveness of the JTF, as “subordinate components understand what is expected of them and what they can expect from the JTF commander and his staff.” (Clay, 9) However, this criterion can be disadvantageous as well, depending on how the JTF is organized or receives its forces. Although the standing JTF headquarters is manned by planners who, as a rule are assigned to that headquarters for 12-36 months depending on the location of the JTF, the provided forces are not necessarily assigned forces. JTF 6 for example gets forces attached for short durations of times to run the drug interdiction missions along the Mexican border. JTF B not only relies on forces
provided for short periods of time, but often has to rely on 90-180 day taskings to fully man the headquarters. The inability to build a relationship with commanders and units doing the actual work of the JTF can only hinder operational effectiveness.

**Neutral: Timeliness**

The criterion of timeliness is neutral for the Standing JTF. Since the Standing JTF has been created for its specific mission, timeliness comes into play only in the infancy of the mission and would meet with the same issues as the ad-hoc headquarters until the Standing JTF has overcome the initial problems associated with a new headquarters. But once the JTF is operational, timeliness is no longer a concern and, if anything, can become a marked advantage for a RCC. An example of this was the use of JTF-B in 1998 for the humanitarian effort required following Hurricane Mitch in Central America. “The key to success was the existence of a forward deployed organization with exportable command and control, familiar with the region, doing forward mission analysis, and prepared to receive, support, onward move, and integrate deploying forces.” (Carpenter, 5) The SOUTHCOM Commander had a standing JTF HQ that was able to rapidly execute a crisis.

**Disadvantages: Flexibility, Redundancy, and Resource Requirements**

There are a few disadvantages with standing JTFs, as we have them today, that is, the headquarters tailored for a specific mission, in a specific AOR. This in and of itself can make the JTF inflexible to any other mission, and often location. Although tailored for the mission it was stood up for, it can not be expected to be able to move on to another mission profile, or even potentially a similar profile, since most likely it is still a JTF because it’s mission is still ongoing. Clay sums up this disadvantage very succinctly in his thesis:

> Our doctrine indicates that JTFs are normally disbanded when their objective is achieved. If the mission of the SJTF is complete,
certainly it could be maintained as a functioning command and control headquarters, applying its attention to the new mission requiring a JTF response. If, however, the original reason for its being is still unsatisfied, the SJTF, if chosen to address the emerging crisis, would have to divide its attention between two missions. (Clay, 9)

The Hurricane Mitch example shows there is some flexibility with the standing JTF, however, as this criterion has been defined, RCCs nor the NCA create standing JTFs for anything other than the prescribed mission. Also, by the nature of the standing JTF being created for the specific mission, it is inherently not designed to allow redundancy for a combatant commander. If, as in the case of Hurricane Mitch, a standing JTF can act as the JTF HQ for an operation, other than it was created for, it is simply an added benefit of the standing JTF and not something planned for when the SJTF was created.

The final disadvantage is in the area of resources. To have a Standing JTF, as we have defined it today, it requires building a headquarters from scratch. This is obviously expensive in time, money, equipment and personnel. (Scott, 16) One can argue that in the long run, a SJTF becomes less resource intensive once the expenses have been paid up front and simply becomes another place the military conducts a permanent change of station to, such as JTF-6. However, these JTFs were meant to be stood up for a short period of time, conduct the mission and disband. Only at the highest levels can the decisions be made, with available resources in mind, to stand up a separate and new SJTF.

This chapter summarizes today’s doctrine for the creation of JTFs to establish the baseline for the further analysis of current and future concepts for JTF creation. The following chapters will analyze historical examples of the execution of operations utilizing the above methods for
creating a JTF, as well as examining the current SJFHQ concept and the proposed road ahead for a JTF headquarters. The examination above will be used to further analyze in greater detail the chosen historical examples.
Chapter 4

Historical Analysis of Joint Task Forces

This chapter will compare and analyze, using the established criteria, three JTFs which used both the ad-hoc approach and the formation around a service headquarters approach. The operation for study of the ad-hoc JTF is Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada. The other two JTFs, which this chapter will explore are Operation Restore Hope, the humanitarian relief in Somalia and Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, both involving the formulation of their JTFs around a service headquarters. The purpose of analyzing these three operations is not to reiterate the need for a SJFHQ, but to analyze three separate ways or levels of forming a JTF and draw the lessons from them in an attempt to apply those lessons to the SJFHQ and other potential options for joint warfighting.

Operation Urgent Fury shows the unmistakable problems associated with the ad-hoc headquarters and confirms much of the analysis done in Chapter 3. The other two operations both involved creating a JTF around an existing service headquarters. The first of the two, Operation Restore Hope, the intervention into Somalia, serves to illustrate and validate the issues and problems associated with this type of JTF analyzed in the previous chapter as well. The last operation, Operation Just Cause, was also a JTF formed around a service headquarters, but with quite a difference. As one examines Operation Just Cause, one can come to the conclusion that the service headquarters, around which the JTF was formed, was already, for all intents and purposes, a Standing Joint Task Force and potentially the way the military should organize for future operations.
**Operation Urgent Fury**

Although Operation Urgent Fury was used in Chapter 3 in the discussion of the ad-hoc headquarters, the operation bears further examination due to the fact that Operation Urgent Fury was a very short notice operation, which most operations over the past decades have been. “In reviewing the operations [operations conducted between 1983 and 1993], it was found that in nearly half the cases (10 of 23 operations), the CJTF and his staff had less than 72 hours notice to plan and prepare for execution.” (Stewart, 14) It is important to analyze the failures at the JTF level of Operation Urgent Fury in examining courses of action for future JTF headquarters development. Operation Urgent Fury was executed in October through December 1983, three years before Goldwater-Nichols, requiring the military to focus on joint warfighting. The purpose of the operation was to “protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace.” (Stewart, pg. 23)

The Center for Naval Analyses study gives a timeline of the significant events leading up to the operation. On 19 October, the JCS issued a warning order to US Commander in Chief Atlantic (USCINCLANT) requesting evacuation plans of the American students within 24 hours. Two days later the National Command Authority modified the mission to add “...neutralization of Grenadian Armed Forces, stabilization and, as requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean states, restoration of democracy in Grenada.” (Stewart, 27) The next day, on the 22nd of October, the JCS issued the execute order for Operation Urgent Fury. On 23 October, USCINCLANT designated the Commander, 2nd Fleet as the commander of the JTF to be called Joint Task Force 120 and on 25 October, JTF forces begin the assault on Grenada. The operation
may be deemed a success, since the mission was accomplished; however, the operation has become the example of how not to put a JTF together. “After-action reports prepared by the services and articles in professional journals revealed serious problems in the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate jointly in 1983.” (Stewart, 30)

**Advantages:**

**Resources**

In examining the operation utilizing the set criteria, it is easy to see the how the disadvantages associated with the ad-hoc approach can become relatively glaring shortcomings; however the advantages to this approach are visible as well. Among the advantages of Operation Urgent Fury is with regards to resources; none were required prior to the alert on 23 October. None of the services had to allocate personnel or material to any headquarters before the onset of the crisis. As discussed in Chapter 3, under the ad-hoc option, very little, to no, resources are required with this option, since there is no headquarters to man, other than the headquarters designated as the JTF headquarters, already manned by its own Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).

**Flexibility**

The other obvious advantage was that the headquarters displayed the flexibility that it could be tailored to the mission at hand; however, “because of the short lead time of the crisis only about 15 of the 88 personnel assigned to the paper organization became involved in the operations.” (Metcalf, 279) Given more time, ADM McDonald and his staff would have been able to tailor the headquarters further. As it was, they realized they needed the expertise from the other services and the JCS ordered MG Schwarzkopf to report to VADM Metcalf to serve as the ground advisor, based on MG Schwarzkopf’s experience with airborne units, Rangers and Marines. (Cole, Operation Urgent Fury, 31) Also sent was Major General George Crist, from
the Marine Corps to assist in coordinating the ground operations for the follow on phases. (Cole, JFQ, 58)

**Redundancy**

Since USCINCLANT did not use its own staff to assist in the manning of the JTF headquarters, the Commander in Chief (CINC) had plenty of other options for another JTF had another crisis arose within his AOR. The potential drawback was the use of MG Schwarzkopf, who at that time was the commander of the 24th Infantry Division. Therefore the CINC, ADM McDonald, had plenty of options and capabilities to stand up another headquarters if needed.

**Timeliness**

Even with all of the problems associated with the reviews of Operation Urgent Fury, for those involved to be able to successfully and decisively accomplish all NCA objectives, with less than three days of preparation and eight days of combat operations was a feat upon itself. The fact that the Second Fleet, acting as the JTF was able to stand up and accomplish this operation shows that with regards to timeliness, it could not have been done much faster. The ad-hoc JTF option can be both cheap and quick, but as shown below, it can be ugly in execution.

**Disadvantages:**

**Command and Control**

In addition to the relationship with the services, the JTF headquarters experienced tremendous command and control problems, somewhat due to the headquarters organization discussed in the previous paragraph, but also due in large part to incompatibility of equipment, which will be discussed below. The problem was not necessarily the fault of CINCLANT or of the Second Fleet, but in large part to service parochialism. “Unity of command was a problem. The problem stemmed from the reluctance of the individual services to allow another service to
command its units. In the case of Grenada, the island was split in half with each half having its own field commander.” (Rivard, 23, 24) The problem of unity of command was solved later when the ground operation was put under the command of one commander; however, the decision to organize this way initially caused problems for the JTF. Had the JTF commander had the time to sort out command relationships and “turf”, perhaps the chain of command would have been cleaner.

ADM McDonald, in his lessons learned report to the CJCS, admits to other command and control issues: “Air assets, provided from a variety of sources, each performing several missions, were not always properly coordinated.” (McDonald, II-1) Also, “the mission and capabilities of the USMC Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Command (ANGLICO) detachments deployed with 82nd Airborne Division, as directed by USCINCLANT, was unclear to USAF elements of the Division’s Fire Support System.” (McDonald, III-4) In addition, “On the ground, three task forces operated (82nd Airborne—TF 121, Special Forces—TF 123, and the 22nd MAU—TF 125). Each reported directly to the CJTF with no other overall ground force commander or coordinator.” (Stewart, 29) These and other command and control issues were a direct result of the last minute ad-hoc relationships among the multiple staffs and services that the JTF commander had to deal with and work through with little time available.

**Interoperability**

One of the more significant problems the JTF HQ experienced was the interoperability problems already alluded to in Chapter 3. “The biggest problem was the inability of the different services to communicate with each other.” (Stewart, 30) The Army/Air Force communication and the Navy/Marine communication tended not to be a major set back, as these services habitually work
together. However, when the Army had to talk to either the Navy or the Marines, the breakdown was significant. “Probably the largest single problem was the inability of some units to communicate. Many Army and Navy units could not communicate with one another. There were also problems between the Army and Marine units on the ground.” (Lockwood, 47) However, “what were never faltered were the communications and interoperability between the Navy/Marine team and the Army/Air Force team.” (Labadie, 13)

The lack of interoperability of the staffs can be considered obvious as well, since the JTF was formed in less than three days around a naval command with very little ground and air expertise as discussed previously. “An adequate JTF organization did not exist in the Caribbean, so USCINCLANT chose Second Fleet to serve as the JTF headquarters. Second Fleet headquarters was a naval staff with little or not experience in planning and commanding large ground operations.” (Cole, 6) The fact that MG Schwarzkopf was only assigned to the headquarters two days prior to execution is a testament to the fact that the staffs had no time to learn SOPs and TTPs, much less plan a joint operation.

**Habitual relationship with forces**

Other than the naval forces involved, the JTF did not have a habitual relationship with the assigned forces. But not only was VADM Metcalf planning on a Naval and Marine operation, at the last minute Army Ranger and airborne units were added to the force mix, causing further planning setbacks, particularly when no one on the JTF staff knew the capabilities and employment considerations of these forces. “Regarding a planning meeting for the operation, ADM Metcalf acknowledged that ‘only the commander of the 82 Airborne Rangers, Major General Trabau, the commander of the Special forces, Major General Shultie, and Major General
Schwarzkopf were present. I was not concerned about the absence of Navy and Marine commanders; I knew how they operated.” (Labadie, 2)

**Familiarity with the AOR**

Another drawback for the JTF was a lack of familiarity with the AOR. Much of this was due to the limited amount of time available to properly perform an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. As discussed later, for Operation Just Cause, the opposite was true, where the JTF for Just Cause had months to properly prepare for the operation. However, the lack of familiarity led to other issues. “Command, control, and communications were all flawed as demonstrated by the CJTF commander and staff’s unfamiliarity with the AOR and with their assigned forces and capabilities.” (Carpenter, 3)

**Operation Restore Hope**

For Operation Restore Hope, the intervention into Somalia for a humanitarian relief effort, took place from 3 December through 4 May 1993, replacing the ineffective United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). This JTF is an example of a JTF being formed around a service headquarters. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis of the Somalia intervention will focus on JTF Somalia, later renamed United Task Force (UNITAF), and not include the follow on organization for UNOSOM II. UNISOM II was formed around the 10th Mountain Division’s headquarters, but was more ad-hoc in nature, which has already been analyzed previously in the discussion of Operation Urgent Fury.

On 3 December the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in Somalia to conduct relief operations. USCINCCENT chose I Marine Expeditionary Force as the nucleus of the JTF
Initially called JTF Somalia, the name was subsequently changed to United Task Force or UNITAF. “I MEF formed the nucleus of a 617-person JTF Headquarters staff with 289 augmentees from other services. Originally, I MEF considered using only a 180-member organization structure to form the JTF staff.” (Hanley, 19) By most accounts, Operation Restore Hope was a successful operation:

Restore Hope was a successful military operation. Support for this statement comes from the accomplishment of the objectives with little difficulty ahead of schedule, the subsequent improvement in relief operations, and the successful transition to a UN-run operation. (Stewart, 173)

A short review of the timeline that lead up to the formation of UNITAF:


- 24 November 1992: USCINCCENT Commander's Estimate provides potential military courses of action to the NCA. JCS recommends military action be taken contingent on UN authorization. I MEF begins detailed planning.

- 3 December 1992: UN Security Council authorizes use of force in Somalia to conduct relief operations. USCINCCENT officially establishes the JTF Headquarters using the I MEF staff as a nucleus.

- 9 December 1992: First Marine forces arrive in Somalia and secure Mogadishu port and airport.

- 10 December 1992: CJTF arrives in country, establishes headquarters at former U.S. Embassy. MV *Lummus* arrives in port to begin offloading supplies for the security forces. (Stewart, 167)

I MEF, therefore, had very little time to plan for the operation, basically the planning effort started on 20 November, with the execution word given on 3 December. Although considered
successful in mission accomplishment, the lessons learned from the UNITAF experience displayed the disadvantages with standing up a JTF headquarters on short notice.

**Advantages:**

**Timeliness**

There is no doubt that UNITAF formed in a very short period of time, as based on the timeline above. However, this advantage is really only a strategic advantage, in that the JTF is organized quickly and met the timeline for a crisis. And although many of the lessons learned from Operation Urgent Fury were applied and not repeated in later operations, the advantage of standing up a JTF so quickly becomes a disadvantage at the operational level. One look at the timeline above clearly indicates a lack of time to properly plan and prepare for a joint operation. “The limited time available between alert and execution, and the lack of a deliberate plan forced the JTF staff to simultaneously plan and execute the operation. There was no time phased force data deployment list (TPFDDL) for this mission because it was an unforeseen contingency operation.” (Hanley, 19) Based on the definition of the criterion for timeliness, Operation Restore Hope meets the requirement as an advantage, but displayed the ongoing problems with short timelines for planning and synchronizing the operation.

**Resources requirements**

Much like Operation Urgent Fury, the overhead for Operation Restore Hope was negligible. There were no resources committed before the operation. As stated above, in Chapter 3 and in the discussion of Operation Urgent Fury, the limited amount of resources required make this criterion an advantage.

**Flexibility**

Operation Restore Hope, like Operation Urgent Fury and the discussions of JTFs in Chapter 3,
allowed for a great amount of flexibility in the force structure and manning of the JTF. Recognizing the operation for what it was to be, a humanitarian mission with possible peace enforcement, the commander of the JTF, Lt. Gen. Johnston, organized his staff and forces accordingly. “Two other important span of control innovations under UNITAF included a Civil-Military Operations Center [established in December] and the division of the country into nine Humanitarian Relief Sectors that allowed both the distribution of food and the assignment of military areas of responsibility.” (Allard, 24) Although time was short, Lt. Gen. Johnston did his best to tailor his staff and forces to the mission.

**Redundancy**

Again, as stated above with regards to Operation Urgent Fury, since I MEF was chosen as the JTF headquarters, CENTCOM had plenty of other headquarters available if other operations had risen. However, the major drawback in this case, as was the case with Operation Urgent Fury, is that another JTF headquarters would have been ad-hoc or service augmented leading to the same problems both of these operations encountered.

**Disadvantages**

**Interoperability**

Based on research, probably the greatest problem the JTF faced was that of interoperability. The JTF had to overcome interoperability issues running the gamut from equipment, to personnel, SOPs and DTTPs. Almost ten years after Operation Urgent Fury, UNITAF faced many of the same interoperability issues. Communications became the primary hurdle to overcome:

“Communications is the critical link in operations. While no Grenada style interoperability fiascoes arose in Somalia, there were some similarities. For example, the same series of Army and Marine tactical radios had compatibility problems because of differing modernization and upgrade cycles. For the few weeks Navy ships were off-shore, the Army hospital in Mogadishu could
not talk to them nor were Army medical evacuation helicopter pilots cleared to land on them.” (Allard, JFQ, 106)

By the early 1990s, the military had begun the move in earnest toward automation, particularly in the area of logistics. The problem was highlighted during Operation Restore Hope, as each service, and even within the services, acquisition of ADP was not unified leading to the problem of passing information.

Another problem was the stove piping of different data systems. At the height of American involvement in a country that lacked even a functioning telephone system, at least ten different data systems were in use. (Allard, JFQ, 106)

Equipment interoperability was not the only issue with regards to this criterion. The differing lexicon of the services, much like Operation Urgent Fury, became a difficulty for the JTF as well.

Forming around a Marine Corps Headquarters led to using Marine Corps acronyms, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). This use of Marine acronyms and TTPs resulted in non-Marine personnel not understanding instructions and delaying actions while waiting for clarification of terms and tasks. (Scott, 4)

The military continues to move toward a more interoperable force, and today we are much better off than we were in 1993, however, as long as services continue with their own acquisition of equipment, without joint oversight, one of the few ways to alleviate this disadvantage would be through joint training or organic joint relationships.

**Habitual relationship with forces**

Since I MEF was the JTF headquarters, and the First Marine Division, among other Marine units, was used for Operation Restore Hope, Lt. Gen. Johnston did have some subordinate units that had answered to him during peacetime. This aided in the initial entry of JTF Somalia into the area of operations. However, the other forces that were later assigned, the 10th Mountain
Division, a Ranger Regiment, naval units, and teams of civil affairs and PSYOPs were obviously not organic to I MEF. (Stewart, 168) This disadvantage did not affect operations other than what has been previously discussed with regards to interoperability issues mostly because of the way Lt. Gen. Johnston organized the area of responsibilities among the forces on the ground, designating Humanitarian Relief Sectors and decentralizing operations. (Allard, 24)

**Familiarity with the AOR**

There was no contingency plan developed for Somalia and very little information available to the planners prior to the conduct of the operation. And as was in the case of Operation Urgent Fury, the staff had no time to do a proper Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, which was even more critical in a peace enforcement or humanitarian relief environment where cultures and customs were as important as the weaponry of the enemy. “The Somalia experience underlines the importance of knowing the country, the culture, the ground, and the language as a pre-condition for military operations…” (Allard, 95) The UNITAF staff had neither the country expertise prior to execution, nor the time available to suitably study the problem in Somalia. This may be a leadership failure in not gaining the needed time for the subordinate staff to properly prepare for the contingency.

**Command and control**

Lt. Gen. Johnston not only had the problem of establishing command and control and unity of command within the U.S. military, but he also had to deal with a multi national coalition of over 20 countries. (Allard, 23) Even though the commander was able to ensure that “a reasonable span of control was worked out, with the major participants contributing brigade size units that could be given mission type orders,” (Allard, 23, 24) he had to overcome several command and control issues inherent with an augmented headquarters and forces from all services. The Center
for Naval Analyses study highlights a few of the challenges for the JTF:

In Restore Hope, there were several cases where responsibilities were passed between different services. For example:

• MARFOR [Marine Forces] often arrived first in a sector and later handed off control of that sector to ARFOR [Army Forces] (or foreign forces).

• Initial logistics responsibilities were handled by the JTFJ4 [Joint Task Force J4] and elements of the 1st FSSG [1st Forward service Support Group]. Later on these responsibilities were given to a primarily Army organization (the JTF Support Command formed around the 13th COSCOM).

• Commander Amphibious Group 3 was Commander, Mogadishu Port Facility until 15 January when these duties were passed to the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Army 7th Transportation Group. There is only a limited amount of doctrine on the transition of operations between services and the new command relationships that often result. Although this has the potential to create a loss in capability when issues "fall between the cracks," the CNA reconstruction of Restore Hope did not uncover any problems due to the transitions. (Stewart, 171)

Operation Restore Hope was marginally successful in the command and control area due to the strength of the command team on the ground and the ability to apportion forces to their capabilities. “A reasonable span of control was worked out, with the major participants contributing brigade size units that could be given mission type orders.” (Allard, 23-24)

The above illustrations, Operations Urgent Fury and Restore Hope, are examples of two different ways to establish a JTF headquarters and the varying degrees of success of each based on the defined criteria. The next operation is an example of a JTF formed around a service headquarters but with a much different degree of success.

**Operation Just Cause**

Operation Just Cause, December 1989 through January 1990, the mission into Panama to topple
the regime of Noriega. “By almost any reasonable measure, the military operations of Just Cause were a success.” (Stewart, 76) There are several reasons for the perceived military success of this operation and a potential model for how the military should function today with regards to JTF headquarters. Doctrinally, the JTF headquarters for Operation Just Cause was a headquarters that was built around a service based headquarters, the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded by LTG Carl Stiner. In reality, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters had in fact been a JTF headquarters, at least for planning purposes, for almost six months prior to the operation. “While still a masterful example of execution, it was not an ad-hoc JTF activated to rapidly react to an emerging crisis. It was an experienced, rehearsed organization that executed a complex mission with forces that habitually worked together, commanded by officers who knew each other personally and often had commanded the units directly subordinate to their present command.” (Carpenter, 4)

Since JTF South, as the JTF to be headed by the XVIII Airborne Corps was called, had the luxury of planning and working together for over six months, many of the problems associated with JTFs in the past were not problems for this JTF. Because of the time available, the JTF headquarters alleviated the disadvantages associated with the service based approach to standing up a JTF and truly should be the model for today’s SJFHQ concept to be discussed later. One could argue that Operation Just Cause is a perfect example of how the current concept for the SJFHQ should work and worked in this case, that being that the SJFHQ from the COCOM augments a standing service headquarters, option two discussed in Chapter 5. But that argument can only be made if the SJFHQ coming from the COCOM and the designated service headquarters has a period of time, about six months in the case of Operation Just Cause, to plan,
prepare, and execute the mission.

A review of the time available to the participants: The Center for Naval Analyses compendium of JTF operations, “JTF Operations Since 1983,” lays out a precise timeline of events significant to the operation. As early as July 1988, the CJCS had approved CINCSOUTH’s choice of the XVIII Airborne Corps as the potential JTF headquarters for any contingency operation in Panama, almost 18 months prior to the execution of the operation. Planning in earnest between XVIII Airborne Corps, JTF South and the other units and services, however, did not begin until 5 August 1989, when CINCSOUTH directed the XVIII Airborne Corps to accelerate its planning. The planners produced OPLAN 90-1 to replace the current plan called Blue Spoon. On October 17th, XVIII Airborne Corps published an updated plan, OPLAN 90-2, allowing CINCSOUTH to task the components with developing their plans as appropriate. D-Day was 20 December 1989. (Stewart, 69) The XVIII Airborne Corps had almost six months to work with JTF South in planning the operation and supporting elements had just over two months to plan and rehearse the operation. “The corps benefited from augmentation by the SOUTHCOM staff and the CINC’s staff participated in the bulk of the deliberate planning before JTF activation. Once the corps was activated as JTF South, personnel who had been instrumental in developing the initial operations plans joined the JTF staff.” (Osborne, 32)

There are further arguments that the XVIII Airborne Corps was essentially operating as the JTF headquarters well before D-Day, giving all participants the needed time to properly plan and execute the operation.

During September [1989], as the staffs of the XVIII Airborne Corps, SOUTHCOM, and SOCOM continued to revise the plan in
that direction [XVIII ABC’s CG’s guidance for a quick, decisive strike], Stiner made another visit to Panama, this time with the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, the Assistant Division Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, the Ranger Regimental Commander, and Gary Luck [JSOTF commander], along with their operations and intelligence officers—including another one of his best planners, to augment the four he’d already left there. (Clancy, 309)

Therefore, direct planning and coordination between SOUTHCOM, whose planning staff was not manned for large scale contingency operations, and the XVIII Airborne Corps had been underway since before September. Better yet, with more than two months before the execution of Operation Just Cause, “General Thurman [CINC South] officially designated Stiner as his war planner and war fighter; and on October 10, Stiner was named commander of Joint Task Force South.” (Clancy, 313)

**Disadvantages:**

**Resource requirements**

One negative from the criteria being used for this analysis deals with the level of resources. For all intents and purposes, the staff of CINCSOUTH became an additional planning team with the XVIII Airborne Corps’ team, initially, then eventually part of the JTF South’s staff. Numerous visits, IPRs, and coordination events took place both in the states and in Panama starting as early as July 1988. This meant that not only was SOUTHCOM’s staff decisively engaged with planning for the operation, but also that XVIII Airborne Corps’ staff is also focused on primarily one major event. The manpower and equipment associated and dedicated to this operation for over a six month period would be a high expense for a three star level headquarters to be manned and function much as XVIII Airborne Corps and SOUTHCOM did.
**Redundancy**

The other negative lesson drawn from Operation Just Cause has to do with the criterion of redundancy, since by all research it appears SOUTHCOM’s sole focus was on planning Operation Just Cause. Also, the CINCSOUTH’s staff became part of the JTF SOUTH staff. Given that, the CINC would have been hard pressed to stand up another JTF within his AOR. Although there were still plenty of flag officer headquarters available if another crisis had risen in CINCSOUTH’s AOR, the JTF headquarters that would have had to stand up for any other contingency would have looked much like the JTF headquarters for Operation Urgent Fury, ad-hoc with little time for preparation.

**Advantages**

The approach in building JTF South, again, made the remaining criterion advantageous resulting in an extremely successful mission. The remaining examination of Operation Just Cause focuses on how the JTF turned the disadvantages, discussed in Chapter 3, associated with forming the JTF around a service headquarters, into advantages. The largest reason for the turn around of these disadvantages is the time available for the staffs and associated units to plan, prepare, and execute the operation. This time available allowed the commands and staffs to overcome the inertia of learning each others ways of operation.

**Flexibility**

Operation Just Cause displayed the advantage of flexibility, in the ability to tailor the JTF headquarters and the forces involved. “The U.S. force structure in Operation Just Cause totaled over 27,000, and included Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine personnel in combat, combat support, and combat service support roles.” (Taw, 13) LTG Stiner focused the operation on a swift campaign designed to take down the Panamanian Defense Force as quickly as possible. He
had chosen 27 targets which he planned to hit near simultaneously in the hours of darkness. This called for a highly tailored force which included special forces, rangers, marines, seals, air force, as well as conventional forces. “The force mix was an unprecedented integration of light and heavy forces along with special operations forces.” (Taw. 13)

**Interoperability**

The problem of interoperability was overcome in large part during Operation Just Cause, due again, mostly to the time available for preparation of the operation. However, the Center for Naval Analyses study gives further explanation for the successful integration of the forces:

In Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, after-action reports named poor communications as the largest single problem faced by the invasion force. By way of contrast, communications worked well in Operation Just Cause. Factors contributing to the improved state of communications included:

- The existence of a large communications infrastructure in-theater due to the U.S. bases in Panama.

- The publishing of a Joint Communications-Electronics Operations Instruction (JCEOI) that specified how everyone would talk to each other. The JCEOI took about two weeks to prepare.

- The establishment of a single set of crypto throughout the theater of operations.

- The overwhelming single-service nature of the ground operations. The Army provided the lion's share of the combat assets, which simplified communications planning since there were only a few, well-defined, cross-service boundaries to communicate across. (Stewart, 74, 75)

Although there were still some communication issues, overall the interoperability of equipment was not a significant problem for the JTF. The JTF was also able to overcome the other aspects of the criteria, as defined, that of staff proficiency and the familiarity with separate SOPs and DTTPs within the operations of the headquarters itself. “When Operation Just Cause commenced in December of 1989, enough time had been available to fine-tune essential aspects
of the operational plan, resolve doctrinal and procedural differences, and assure relatively thorough and effective direction of a highly decentralized operation.” (Osborne, 32)

**Habitual relationship with the forces**

Operation Just Cause was also unique in the fact that the JTF headquarters, the XVIII Airborne Corps, had in some way habitual, coordinated and even organic relationship with the some of the forces involved. As commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, LTG Stiner already had assigned to him the 82nd Airborne Division, one of the key ground units to come from the continental United States. LTG Stiner’s background as a special operations officer also lent credibility to his ability to operate with SOCOM’s special forces. However, most of the forces were not assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps. Operation Just Cause, nevertheless, lends credence to the argument that perhaps certain Corps, MEFs, Fleets and number Air Forces should have some joint forces permanently assigned, since one of the reasons for the success of Operation Just Cause was the available time to prepare and this included all the forces designated to participate in the contingency. LTG Stiner used that time wisely, and though not officially assigned to his command yet, he ensured all units from all services were properly prepared. “Back in the states, Stiner was involved in rehearsals or on the road, making certain that all the major commands from all the services were aware of all the details of the plan and prepared to support their part in the operation.” (Clancy, 328)

**Command and Control**

Command and Control, unity of command and command relationships were established clearly and early on. As the timeline above shows, XVIII Airborne Corps had been the designated headquarters for any operation in Panama as early as July the year previous to the operation and planning among all participants began in earnest during the summer of 1989. “The selection of a
single Warfighter in Panama was significant in establishing unity of effort within the theater of operations.” (Jackson, 21) Command and control and relationships were not in question for Operation Just Cause.

Thanks to effective planning, coordination between all participants in Operation Just Cause was exemplary. A clear chain of command existed from the President to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Moreover, because General Thurman gave Lieutenant General Stiner operational control of the entire fighting force, the chain of command remained clearly delineated down to the tactical level. Even when subordinate units had their headquarters change in the course of the conflict, the passage of operational control was clearly delineated and stated in appropriate fragmentary orders. Stiner himself, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, gave credit to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act for ensuring that “there were no problems with ambiguous relationships or units receiving guidance from multiple sources.” (Taw, 14)

With unity of command established and time available to plan and rehearse the operation, Operation Just Cause stands as an example for future joint operations with regards to command and control.

**Timeliness**

It is difficult to judge the timeliness criteria of standing up the headquarters for Operation Just Cause, since coordination and detailed planning began more than six months prior to the operation. One could argue that without the months of preparation available, the operation would not have been as successful. This would lead to a possible conclusion that given a core of planners, the SOUTHCOM team in Panama, working the contingency plan well before a headquarters is designated, could integrate into a service staff and avoid past issues with organizing a JTF headquarters. However, when using Operation Just Cause as an example to validate the SJFHQ concept of today, one must be careful with the comparison, since the
SOUTHCOM planners and the XVIII Airborne Corps had the time available to properly plan, prepare and execute Operation Just Cause.

**Familiarity with the AOR**

The staffs and some of the units on the ground had unprecedented knowledge and familiarity of the AOR. “For the most part, the planning for Operation Just Cause was admirable. It benefited from a long lead time before the actual operation, as well as U.S. officers’ in depth and close – frequently personal-- knowledge of the PDF.” (Taw, 12) But the knowledge of the enemy and the AOR did not end with the officers assigned to SOUTHCOM in Panama. Due to the time available, leaders sometimes down to the battalion level were able to recon their potential objectives weeks, if not months, in advance. During a commander and key staff session in Panama in October, “toward the end of the first day, each commander made a clandestine reconnaissance of his targets. That night, they made adjustments to their plans, and these were briefed and finalized the next day in open session, with everyone present.” (Clancy, 323) This familiarity with the ground, the targets and the enemy allowed units to conduct detailed and focused rehearsals, a key to success in any mission. “In late November and early December, conventional and special operating forces conducted detailed rehearsals at Fort Bragg and Eglin Air Force Base, and in Panama.” (Clancy, 329) Not all JTFs will have the time or availability to the area to become as familiar with the AOR as JTF South did, however, if a command below the COCOM level, is focused on specific AORs, it can concentrate on knowing it as in depth as possible.

The analysis of these historical examples, although perhaps not critical, is important in applying lessons learned from the past to apply to current and future operations. The following chapters
will continue to explore current and future options using the criteria and these historical operations as the basis for analysis. The purpose of this chapter was, not only to show the need for a SJFHQ, but to ensure the lessons learned from the past are not forgotten or mistakes repeated. It is important have the understanding of current doctrine and of past JTF operations in order to clearly appreciate the reasoning behind the recent initiative for the SJFHQ concept. The next chapter explores and analyzes the current SJFHQ concept; its organization, resources, and capabilities, which are intended to alleviate the problems associated with the formation of past JTFs.
Chapter 5
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters Concept

As stated in Chapter 1, there is little argument for the need of some form of a Standing JTF HQs. The initiative to move forward with the SJFHQ concept shows that the military fully understands the requirement for some form of SJFHQ. The initiative for the SJFHQ is not new. Studies and work on the concept have been ongoing since the GNA and continues through today, even as RCCs are working to establish SJFHQs within their headquarters. This chapter will focus on the concept, some of which are still undergoing revision at JFCOM, analyze the structure, employment options, and compare the concept against the previous mentioned forms of JTFs using the same criteria.

Since there have, to date, been no operational deployments utilizing the SJFHQ, the examination and comparison of the concept will rely on exercises which utilized the concept and historical data based on similar concepts utilized by some of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Millennium Challenge was one such exercise where a SJFHQ was deployed by JFCOM to exercise the SJFHQ concept. The Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) has been use by Pacific Command (PACOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) by European Command (EUCOM). The DJTFAC, in concept, is a SJFHQ within these COCOMs. However the personnel are battle rostered and not manned in the DJTFAC continuously, as discussed previously. The SETAF and the DJTFAC both are close enough in concept to show the advantages and disadvantages of the SJFHQ concept.
Current Structure

The SJFHQ concept gives the RCC three employment options as laid out by The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 3 and figure 1 below:

The SJFHQ-P Concept of Employment envisions three possible options for SJFHQ employment during contingency operations (Figure 1). The Combatant Commander’s (CCDR’s) selection depends on the scope of the contingency, scale of potential contingency response forces, and estimated duration of operations.

- **The SJFHQ can form the core of a JTF HQ.** This option typically would be used for small contingencies and requires significant augmentation with mission specific plugs and appropriate liaison personnel for the SJFHQ to become a fully functional JTF HQ. The CCDR designates the SJFHQ Director or another flag officer as the joint force commander (JFC) for the operation.

- **The SJFHQ can augment a Service component HQ.** During MC 02, the SJFHQ organized and operated as shown in Option 2, providing specific “plugs” and augmentees to III Corps HQ. The SJFHQ facilitated the transition of III Corps HQ from peacetime, Service-oriented operations to a fully functional JTF HQ by providing the continuity in planning and operations required to support a rapid, decisive response to the experiment scenario. MC 02 exercised extensive reach-back capabilities to access fixed-base support as well as other resources. Even if the CCDR employs a JTF, but reserves the SJFHQ for another potential contingency, the SJFHQ uses its peacetime planning efforts and collaborative capabilities to facilitate the JTF HQ formation, deployment, and employment.

- **The SJFHQ supports the GCC HQ.** In Option 3, a CCDR functions as the JFC for the contingency and conducts operations through subordinate Service and functional components and JTFs. Operations are planned and controlled from the Ground Component Command (GCC) HQ. An example would be the recent Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, in which USCENTCOM HQ deployed forward as the joint force headquarters. The SJFHQ could remain as part of the CCDR’s headquarters or could deploy as part of its forward C2 element. The SJFHQ helps the CCDR leverage reach-back capabilities and collaborate with the interagency community and Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). (JWFC JP 3, 24, 25)
This concept for the SJFHQ is not new as we have seen in Chapter 2 with PACOM’s use of the DJTFAC and EUCOM’s JTF HQs models. JWFC Pam 3 admits:

The idea of a “standing” JTF HQ (or elements of such a headquarters) is not new. US Pacific Command’s deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) is an example of a battle-rostered organization comprised principally of GCC staff members and designated Service component staff personnel who are “dual-hatted”—that is, they perform duties associated with a typical headquarters staff position in peacetime and can augment a JTF HQ during a contingency as a member of the DJTFAC. They can assist the JTF HQ in planning and organizing for the contingency, particularly in the early stages of crisis response. This arrangement facilitates planning, increases familiarity with potential operational
requirements, and accelerates the efficient formation of a JTF headquarters during contingency operations. Nonetheless, a DJTFAC does not provide the full set of benefits associated with a full-time, trained and ready team such as the SJFHQ. (JWFC Pam 3, 2)

For comparison with the past approaches to the formations of JTF HQs, the analysis will focus primarily on the employment options. However, to fully understand where the initiative is going, one must understand some of the organizational structure as well. First, the SJFHQ will operate under the directions of a flag officer and will be staffed on a “on a full-time basis with joint-qualified military and civilian personnel who collaboratively plan, prepare, and train with other GCC staff elements and designated component planning cells for specified contingencies within the CCDR’s area of responsibility (AOR).” (JWFC,Pam 3, 7) The HQ is aligned into six administrative groups: Command, Plans, Operations, Information Superiority (IS), Knowledge Management (KM), and Logistics. (Pam 3, 8) See Figure 2.

Command, Plans and Operations operate much like any higher level headquarters staff with respect to these functions and need no further clarification. The other three groups add a different capability than that of a standard service headquarters. SJFHQ Standard Operating Procedure states:

The Information Superiority Group is an administrative organization that provides information superiority expertise to the SJFHQ (CE). That expertise can be categorized in four functional areas:

- Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
- Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JISR)
- Information Operations (IO)
- Effects Assessment (EA)
Each of these areas of expertise is assigned to a specific section of the ISG [Information Superiority Group]. (SOP, 2-1)

The intent of the ISG is to bring these four functions together under one staff section, since these functions would actually be spread across the J-2, J-3, and J-5, in “an attempt to provide a more focused effort in the information superiority arena.” (SOP, 2-1) “The effectiveness of the Information Superiority Team is directly related to its ability to support the Plans and Operations Teams by providing the SJFHQ (CE) the ability to leverage a common IS effort to focus and fully integrate IS activities into plans and operations.” (SOP, 2-3) The current SOP calls for 26 military and civilians to man this section. (SOP, 2-2)

The Knowledge Management (KM) Group is the next “step beyond information management.” (SOP 6-1) Mostly a coordination and process cell, the KM cell is “involved in the creation, receipt, collection, control, dissemination, storage, retrieval, protection, and disposition of information, plus the user requirements for information.” (SOP, 6-1) The organization chart calls for a chief and up to five military or civilians in the organization. (SOP, 6-1)

The Logistics Group, as the name implies, “ensures a chain of administration, responsibility, and accountability for governing day-to-day logistics-related functions while the SJFHQ(CE) is imbedded at the RCC staff.” (SJFHQ (CE) SOP, 14 Jul 04, 4-1) The Logistics Group is further broken down into two sections: the Logistics Operations Section (Log Ops) and the Logistics Plans Section (Log Plans). The Log Ops section “performs the material management, sustainment, and logistics operation functions for the SJFHQ(CE) Operations Team,” while the Log Plans section, led by the Logistics Coordinator “is responsible for the coordination of
activities between current logistics operations and the future planning efforts of the SJFHQ(CE) Logistics Group.” (SJFHQ (CE) SOP, 14 Jul 04, 4-2)

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the SJFHQ has not been utilized in an operational deployment, making it difficult to analyze the concept within the established construct of the chosen criteria. However, PACOM’s DJTFAC and EUCOM’s SETAF are similar enough in construct to explore the advantages and disadvantages of the SJFHQ concept. In addition, the concept has been tested in exercises and some conclusions were drawn in lessons learned and in AARs.

Advantages

Timeliness

An AAR comment from Millennium Challenge states that “the [SJFHQ] can provide up-front contingency planning and the ability to rapidly establish an operational joint task force headquarters that is battle ready as the first soldiers hit the ground.” (Myers, 29) With respect to timeliness all three employment options of the SJFHQ make forming a JTF HQs faster, if for no other reason there is a core deployable anywhere at anytime to respond to a crisis. One could argue whether one option is faster than another. For example, if the SJFHQ is to deploy on option one, where the JTF HQs is built around the SJFHQ, the time for deployment and integration would be potentially less than if the SJFHQ were to integrate or “plug” into an existing service headquarters, where the inertia of integrating a new staff would be greater.

Millennium Challenge 02 seems to have somewhat validated this:

The establishment of SJTF, in theory and under exercise conditions during MC 2002, promises a more timely response with less time required to activate forces. Additional benefits include unit cohesion and ongoing joint staff training, as this cadre of SJTF

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personnel will work together to form the core of an emergent JTF, which promises to be more agile in its responsiveness. (Braun, 5)

During a real world deployment, Operation Sea Angel, the humanitarian relief effort in Bangladesh following Cyclone Marian, the PACOM DJTFAC deployed in support of the III MEF. A successful relief operation and use of the DJTFAC:

The CJTF must be prepared to hit the ground running immediately. That the two elements [the nucleus HQ and the DJTFAC] of the JTF SEA ANGEL staff were able to function magnificently with no prior joint work up should not mask the fact that virtually all personnel interviewed felt that they would have benefited greatly from joint training between the nucleus staff and the augmentees. (Anderson, 29)

Although, as seen with the analysis thus far, the SJFHQ may assist the JTF HQ in standing up quickly, but potentially at the expense of other criteria.

**Flexibility**

The SJFHQ concept has shown it can be flexible and tailored to the mission needs as highlighted above with regards to timeliness. The three doctrinal options available to the RCC, are not limiting in how a commander could employ the SJFHQ to his current needs. Major Walker, in his study of organizing and training JTFs, agrees that, “the JTF formed at the moment of need is certainly flexible but is unlikely to be effective because internal friction will be so high that the staff will not be able to use its available capabilities.” (Walker, 37) The SJFHQ overcomes some of the internal friction Walker eludes to, but as shown below, not all of the inertia of forming a headquarters.

**Familiarity with the AOR**

“Most operations today require the use of multiple pillars of national power, and incorporate international diplomacy and NGO’s. SJTFs in a particular AOR benefit from relationships built
over time, and not thrust upon others when tensions are high and time is short.” (Braun, 5) A marked advantage the SJFHQ will have is that of familiarity within the AOR. Of course it may not have the familiarity for a given crisis, but will have the opportunity before a crisis to examine the AO in great detail and have a greater understanding of the cultures and demographics of the area. “Geographically oriented JTFs have the advantage of being able to familiarize themselves with the languages, cultures, infrastructure, and Allied militaries in a specific region. (Worley, 25) The SJFHQ will have this advantage since it will be focused on one geographical area at a time.

Command and Control

In theory, the SJFHQ will improve C2 for either the RCC or that of a JTF commander. It is obvious that a:

permanent JTF staff reduces the fog and friction in the joint commander’s headquarters during the initial stages of a crisis. A permanent JTF staff reacts quicker and makes decisions faster because it is a well-practiced team. It can accomplish the mission more efficiently and effectively because it encompasses all the desired characteristics and requirements of a joint headquarters. (Hanley, 17)

The SJFHQ is not a permanent JTF headquarters, but a staff designed to augment a staff or be augmented itself with personnel. This does not mean that the SJFHQ does not improve C2 of a JTF, especially when compared to the past operations explored in Chapter 4. Again, from MC02, “JFCOM is convinced that standing joint task force headquarters… has a better awareness of the intent of the combatant commander and the operational situation.” (Myers, 26) The PACOM DJTFAC model also ensures that training and exercises with potential JTF commands is conducted to improve command and control, “they [DJTFAC] train using the same command and control structure they would operate under during an actual contingency.”
The SJFHQ may not make C2 seamless to the CJTF, but will improve it over past JTF formations.

Neutral

Interoperability

The reason interoperability is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage deals mostly with the fact that the SJFHQ staff will have overcome interoperability issues as defined in Chapter 2, however, if option 2 is used for the SJFHQ, where the SJFHQ is used to augment a service component headquarters, many of the issues associated with the ad-hoc approach will still be visible. First, the advantage of the SJFHQ with regards to this criterion internally is obvious. “The advantage of having a SJTF headquarters is to provide a core of operational expertise to afford the combatant commander a continuous planning capability that maybe augmented when the situation dictates.” (Braun, 5) There is no doubt that any organization that works together for any period of time is going to be more efficient in a crisis. If, however, the SJFHQ must augment another headquarters, the initial inertia of working within a new organization must still be overcome. One operational example is Operation Sea Angel, where “despite the high degree of success enjoyed during Operation Sea Angel, most participants agreed that a solid joint training program would help immensely in preparing for future CJTF operations.” (Anderson, 23) Braun gets to the root of the drawback to the SJFHQ, if used as an augmentation team to a service headquarters:

The power of the standing joint task force headquarters is that you get people assigned for three or four years, they develop their staff procedures, they get to know one another, and there is a personal relationship that enables them to do things fairly quickly. But what happens when a crisis emerges? As of now, these JTFs are augmented by personnel, stationed all over, from the different
services in order to manage the growing complexities of the operations before them. (Braun, 6)

Although the SJFHQ will make tremendous strides in overcoming the interoperability issues associated with creating a JTF, it may still have the same issues outlined in Chapter 3, depending on how the SJFHQ is implemented. However, one would have a difficult time arguing that this is not a marked improvement over other options.

Disadvantages

Resource Requirements

One of the drawbacks to the SJFHQ is the cost in personnel, in particular, equipment in general. The current manning document, yet to be approved, calls for 58 officers and NCOs mostly of senior grade. (SJFHQ (Core Element) SOP) This is a heavy burden to place on a force already stretched thin. Currently those billets are being filled from within the COCOM headquarters or officers are being dual slotted, working for both their J directorate and the SJFHQ. The DJTFAC model was organized this way. “A fully manned and organized SJTF is the optimal solution but not very likely to happen. In this age of constrained resources across the services, there is little chance of the resources becoming available, even if the idea could be sold.” (Carpenter, 12)

However, it appears that the manning requirements will get approved following the CJCS guidance that, “the SJFHQ will be composed of a full-time, coherent team that is mission-tailored and led by a senior officer who reports directly to the combatant commander.” (CJCS, Implementation Guidance 05 Mar 03, USJFCOM SJFHQ briefing Mar 04) The final Table of Organization and Equipment is not final yet, but the intent is for the personnel to also deploy with a functional headquarters. The manning and equipping of this force is quite heavy compared to past methods. The question would be, are those personnel and associated
equipment better utilized elsewhere? Chapter 6 will examine this question.

**Habitual/organic relationship with forces**

Some COCOMs do not have assigned forces for their use in a contingency operation. They must rely on other COCOMs to provide forces for them. The SJFHQ within the COCOM also does not have organically assigned forces, nor is it likely to have assigned forces in the future, short of making standing three star headquarters SJFHQs.

Enormous obstacles exist to creating standing joint task forces. Chief among these is the hesitancy each service will probably exhibit in relinquishing significant peacetime control over portions of its forces. However, if the key to America’s future military success lies in new ideas and fresh ways of thinking, our nation’s Armed Forces must never be afraid to explore such ideas and engage in such thinking. (Hildenbrand, 40)

As shown in Operation Just Cause, a headquarters that either has assigned forces or builds a relationship with allocated forces has fewer problems in coordination, reporting procedures, SOPs, etc. Common sense says a fully integrated SJFHQ with forces allocated to it would greatly decrease the inertia inherent with organizations working with or for a headquarters different from its parent unit. Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of this inertia. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), a III Corps unit in the Continental United States (CONUS), was assigned to V Corps for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The unit had to learn new SOPs, reporting procedures, different logistical methods and a new communication system.

**Redundancy**

Another shortfall for the SJFHQ concept is that there is only one for each COCOM. If more than one contingency in an AOR requires a JTF, the COCOM is back to utilizing one of the three
doctrinal methods for creating a JTF. Braun gives a recent example of such a situation in Iraq when discussing CENTCOM creating JTF-4, the JTF to oversee post-conflict Iraq. CENTCOM already had a JTF in Afghanistan, as well as, ongoing operations in Iraq. When discussing the creation of JTF-4, Braun comes to the conclusion that:

This illustrates problem number one; in many AORs there will be multiple contingencies that require the resources of SJTFs. Relying solely on one group to be augmented by outside manpower is fine if there is only one contingency. In this case, multiple and complex operations were required to make a four phase plan, in just one theater in this COCOM’s AOR, successful. (Braun, 9, 10)

Even with the successes EUCOM and PACOM have experienced in the use of the DJTFAC, the lack of more than one SJFHQ can become problematic:

The fact that the DJTFAC is one deep, combined with the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and commitments within the EUCOM AOR, has led to problems in manning the JTF when needed. The result is shortfalls in experience, familiarity, and late integration into the JTF of the fillers when needed because the last person trained has often not been the one to deploy. As highlighted in the AARs, SETAF has faced theses problems in all of the recent contingency deployments. (Carpenter, 11)

The next chapter will discuss a possible option to alleviate some of the problems associated with creating JTFs today. Although the SJFHQ is a definite step in the right direction, the concept falls short of fulfilling the need for headquarters that are ready to deploy as JTF headquarters in a moments notice.
Chapter 6

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters—an Option

This chapter will explore one option for the future of the joint force with respect to establishing joint task force headquarters and compare the proposal with the SJFHQ concept through an analysis using the established criteria. The proposal is simple, as the next step forward: use the resources and capabilities dedicated to the SJFHQ concept and assign them to designated three star headquarters, making several flag headquarters SJFHQs, where three star headquarters can then be designated by the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense as a JFHQ for a given crisis or campaign. In addition, assign forces from other services to that headquarters. For example, an Army Corps could have permanently assigned an Army Division, a Marine Division, an Air Force Wing, and a Navy Strike Group or some mix that makes geographical and strategic sense. Obviously not all three star headquarters would be so designated, however, the number of headquarters available to the nation would increase and be a “ready to go” SJFHQs. This is the option this chapter will explore.

An analysis of interviews with SEA ANGEL participants and members of CINCPAC staff leads to a series of general conclusions regarding the overall environment within which future CJTFs will operate. These are as follows: First, crisis situations can be expected to occur with little or no prior notice. Second, planners must assume, until assured otherwise, that local support infrastructure will be limited or hostile. Finally, deployment will be done very quickly and will necessitate a “come as you are” approach rather than deliberate planning. (Anderson, 24)

It is naïve to think that the military will have the time needed to properly organize the team for future fights. The need for a SJFHQ is real and must be ready to go into action in a matter of days if not hours. The advantages and disadvantages of the proposed concept below are the
opinion of the author and will require some experimentation with the gain or loss of capabilities that the current SJFHQ proposal brings to the fight to determine whether implementation of the above concept is value added to the joint team.

Advantages

Flexibility

This approach is inherently flexible, giving the CJCS and the COCOMs a number of JTF headquarters, and potentially JTFs, that can be easily tailored to any mission. As shown in Operation Just Cause, the flexibility to tailor the forces is easily done since the headquarters will be joint and have in house expertise on its staff for all services. As Fenzel states, “the Department of Defense has stated the importance of expanding the JTF concept. Still the current emphasis remains on establishing JTF headquarters and staffs rather than outfitting JTFs from “head to toe” with troops and equipment.” (Fenzel, 11) Outfitting from “head to toe” will give the COCOMs the needed flexibility and responsiveness with JTFs already on the ready ramp. This paper proposes such a step, that of outfitting head to toe, enhancing the nations capability to operate jointly on a very short notice.

Interoperability

It is obvious that the interoperability issue within the headquarters itself will not be a problem for the command. The staff will train and deploy together and will have formed a team over the months and years they are assigned together. Since as the analysis in previous chapters has shown:

The core [staff] can have the best training available, but when assembled in its entirety the resultant staff will most likely not all be trained in joint task force procedures, unless strict controls are put in place to ensure that qualifications are a requirement. (Braun, 8)
The issue with equipment will also be a moot one, since the headquarters will ensure interoperability in peacetime training. However, when organized with forces other than those already assigned, equipment interoperability issues may still exist unless the command has time before hand to identify and fix those problems. As noted in the analysis of Operation Just Cause, “the success achieved by the XVIII Airborne Corps staff was due, at least in part, to the fact that all of the officers who eventually formed JTF South had worked together as a joint staff for months prior to the operation and they had developed a clear understanding of each other and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization as a whole.” (Osborne, 32, 33)

**Command and Control**

As with the other positive criteria, it is intuitively obvious that command and control can only be enhanced by the proposed method. There will be no initial inertia by commander and staff of “learning” what the boss likes or how he operates. Because, as has been shown, JTFs can train with one group of folks, but may have a wholly different group for the real thing. It seems to be a less than optimal situation to spend time prepping for deployment and hashing out peripheral details at the time when crisis planning requires the most focus. (Braun, 8)

Command and control will be a significantly reduced problem, if perhaps no problem at all.

**Redundancy**

The redundancy issue associated with the past will be all but nonexistent. As outlined above in the number of available three star level commands, it would be difficult to imagine a scenario that would require more JTF headquarters than would potentially available. The COCOMs would not have to worry about where the JTF headquarters would come from for the next crisis if he had already used his SJFHQ. There would be a myriad of other headquarters to choose from. This begs the question of the readiness of the headquarters itself to operate in an AOR
different from what it had trained for initially. This area will be discussed below in analyzing that criterion.

**Timeliness**

As has been shown, time is a critical factor once the crisis emerges or the decision has been made to conduct an operation. The success of Operation Just Cause is due in a large part to the time available. The opposite can be said about Operation Urgent Fury. The proposed option would give the commander a ready to go JTF or a SJFHQ without the need for a “plug” or major augmentation. The headquarters can deploy immediately and be functional faster than any of our current configurations and faster than the SJFHQ, for the reasons outlined in the previous chapter. Bartch argues:

> Future JTF HQs will be established and deployed within days. Accordingly, DOD needs to establish JTF HQs that can take the advantage joint capabilities and resources of the best military in the world. The EUCOM JTF HQs model is a tremendous improvement over the ad hoc JTF HQs of the past. The EUCOM JTF HQs model is half way between the specialization of the past (ad-hoc) and the synergistic goal of the future. By establishing SJTF HQs throughout the unified CINCs, we can take that next step to reach that synergistic goal. (Bartch, 44)

Bartch’s argument lends credence to the SJFHQ concept being implemented today and admits that the EUCOM concept is “half way” between the goal. By earmarking three star headquarters as SJFHQs, the military can get further along the road for implementation of a truly joint headquarters.

**Habitual/Organic Relationship with forces**

With joint forces assigned to the designated headquarters during peacetime operations, the transition to crisis can become almost seamless. However, even though the military may have a Corps or a Fleet designated as a SJFHQ with assigned forces, there is no guarantee that that
headquarters will utilize these assigned forces in the crisis. Those forces may be otherwise engaged already or the crisis may not call for the mix of forces best suited to accomplish the national objective. Obviously it is a better scenario if the assigned forces are used for the given operation, as seen in Just Cause; however, it is possible the headquarters will end up with forces not habitually associated with the headquarters. Historically, this has not been a war stopper when time is available for the command and subordinate units to work our SOPs and TTPs, as seen with Desert Storm, Just Cause and other operations.

Neutral

Familiarity with the AOR

As shown in previous chapters, it is important for the headquarters heading into a contingency to know and understand the AOR for which it is to be assigned. As Braun states:

> It is increasingly important that SJTF manpower reside in or near the AOR in question. Even more critical is that the personnel comprising the SJTF are not recent transplants into the AOR completely. Utilizing personnel who have a comfortable working knowledge of the area and its resources and limitations is far better than those who have just read pass down literature. (Braun, 13)

It is impossible to see into the future and know for certainty where the next crisis may come and how to properly prepare for that contingency. However, the designated headquarters can be given priority areas around the globe to focus on and prepare for accordingly. Using Fenzel’s idea, discussed in the following chapter, for giving each headquarters an AOR to focus on may be the approach and would coincide with Braun’s. It is not new for headquarters to focus on more than one contingency or AOR. For example, as late as 2001, the 1st Cavalry Division, the division focused and planned for both a Korea scenario and an Iraq scenario. The criterion is
neutral however, since there remains a distinct possibility that either the headquarters goes somewhere it had no plan for or was never given a priority area to focus on.

**Disadvantage**

**Resource Requirements**

The only clear disadvantage to this option is the cost in equipment to a small extent and in manpower to a great extent. MNC-I, when manned by III Corps, totaled 848 officers, NCOs and enlisted men. Obviously the joint headquarters Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) would not have the need to be manned to this extent. However, the fact remains that even 58 additional personnel as called for by the SJFHQ concept is an expensive drain on a force already spread very thin. If these 58 personnel, and the capabilities associated with the SJFHQ concept, are spread among differing three star headquarters, the military can get more joint headquarters than the current thought of one per COCOM. The minimum requirements for the joint staff at a Corps, MEF, Fleet or Numbered Air Force is beyond the scope of this thesis, but would be a number smaller than that of 58 in the author’s opinion.

The next chapter concludes with the comparison and recommendation for the way ahead, for as the force continues to become more joint in its organizational structure, particularly at the COCOM level, the military must be cognizant of the past and ensure its collective energies and resources are heading in the right direction.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to explore the concept of the SJFHQ from a current doctrinal perspective, a historical perspective and finally analyze the concept against another proposal, that of utilizing the resources and capabilities of the SJFHQ at the three star or equivalent level headquarters. There is little to no argument for the need of a more innate joint force headquarters, just questions of how that headquarters should be organized and at what level.

This paper has shown, that based on the chosen criteria and through historical analysis, that the SJFHQ concept will indeed improve upon the current doctrine for employment of a SJFHQ for a JTF. However, the paper has also shown that by moving those resources to the next lower level, we, the military, will improve employment of the SJFHQ concept even more. Table 1 in Appendix 1 shows the comparison of the SJFHQ concept against the proposed concept. Based on the chosen criteria and without weighting any of the criteria, the proposed concept proves to be better than the current SJFHQ concept.

The concept proposed in this paper is not new and is not the final step in becoming a truly joint force. Carpenter, in his analysis of EUCOM’s DJTFAC comes to a similar conclusion:

EUCOM has six service core headquarters that can be expanded by the DJTFAC to JTFs when needed. EUCOM could greatly expand its capabilities by selecting those headquarters most likely to deploy on short notice and facilitating their organization as SJTFs to the least common denominator. Identifying the key billets needed to become a functional joint staff and exchanging those positions in EUCOM would do this. Cost to the components can be almost completely eliminated by exchanging the necessary
personnel between the EUCOM core JTF headquarters to provide the joint capabilities to those headquarters most likely to deploy.  
(Carpenter, 14)

The proposal here improves upon Carpenter’s only in that the resources of the entire military should be used to fulfill this concept across all the COCOMs and services and that inter-service forces are assigned to the designated three star headquarters.

**Beyond the SJFHQ and this proposal**

There are further advances required to be a truly joint team. An even further thought for the future joint team, is a recommendation by Fenzel. Fenzel’s recommendation is to permanently assign forces and Areas of Operations in three distinct AOs within each RCC’s AOR. This is currently probably a step too far since resources are so limited and because of the current OPTEMPO and rotation schedule for OIF and OEF, not to mention the Balkans, other standing JTFs and routine operations, such as Korea. The above recommendation falls short of Fenzel’s only with the respect of a designated AO, but, in this author’s opinion, it is the next logical step in the integration of the joint force.

As the military continues to move toward “jointness”, an area for future research, study and debate is what the future joint force will look like. Current talk about Base Reallocation and Closure speculates that the Congress will mandate joint basing among other things bringing the military closer to this paper’s and Fenzel’s recommendation for habitually assigned forces that cross service boundaries. The services themselves are already working exchange programs for officers at the three star level. Billets that are unfortunately not coded joint. The school houses across the services are working toward granting JPME II certification and reallocating the number of students from other services to attend their Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and Senior Level Education (SLE) courses. The first inaugural Joint Advanced Warfighting School
class graduates in June of 2005, graduating the first class of joint campaign planners with the intent of service on COCOM planning staffs, is an example of cross service joint training, giving officers JPME II, as well as, service ILE/SLE credit. The military is moving in the right direction across most of the spectrum of joint operations, the question is, is it enough and is it moving along quickly enough?

Based on the research for this paper and the ongoing events in the world, the short answer is, probably no. Until the services start thinking joint, in everything from career management through the acquisition process, the military will struggle with becoming truly joint. Jointness, like transformation, starts with people. The differences, and at times distrust, of sister services cultures, motivations and capabilities continue to be misunderstood among many in the military. Smith, in his paper on joint officer career development, describes the short sightedness of the services with regards to developing joint competencies. “It is here [early development] that officers will be able to properly address each other [in the joint environment] and begin their understanding of each other’s trade in order to establish a foundation for joint mindedness.” (Smith, 93)

The initiative of the SJFHQ concept, as has been shown, is a step toward moving the force to a more deployable joint team. However, the initial position, and the conclusion, of this paper, remains the same. Specified three star level headquarters, with forces assigned from all services, should be permanently manned as a joint headquarters with the resources and capabilities planned for the SJFHQ concept.
“Far from being unusual or extraordinary events, it should be recognized that the formation of joint task forces has now become “business as usual” for the Armed Forces of the United States.” (Allard, 92, 93) If one agrees with Allard, and his premise that the military will fight as JTFs, then we have a responsibility to the nation to ensure it is done right. The course we choose for the SJFHQ must continue to move our future joint force down the path of maintaining the ability to fight and win our nation’s wars.
Appendix 1

The tables below compare the SJFHQ concept with the proposed concept of this paper. This elementary decision matrix takes the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action (COA) and assigns a value to it. Table 1 shows only the advantages and disadvantages of each COA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>SJFHQ</th>
<th>Three Star HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redundancy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual Relationship</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity w/AOR</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of the SJFHQ vs. the three star headquarters

Table 2 assigns a numeric value comparing the two COAs, either a 1 or a 2. Lower is better. When comparing the COAs, if both have the same result for a given criterion, then each COA receives a 1.5. (1+2=3, 3/2=1.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>SJFHQ</th>
<th>Three Star HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redundancy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual Relationship</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity w/AOR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Numeric Comparison of the SJFHQ vs. the three star headquarters

Without weighting any of the criteria, the proposed concept is better than the current SJFHQ concept.
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