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National War College  
Ft. McNair  
Washington, D. C. 20319

**A Soldier is A Soldier:**  
**Successful Gender Integration in the Armed Forces**

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Class of 1992

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# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>1992</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>A Soldier is a Soldier: Successful Gender Integration in the Armed Forces</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>National Defense University National War College Fort McNair, Washington, DC 20319</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UU</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>47</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## Introduction: Why Successful Gender Integration Matters

*"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." Machiavelli*

The political aftermath of war has often effected significant force structure change in the American armed services. Following World War II, President Truman issued an Executive Order in 1948 to racially integrate the armed forces despite strong objections from civilian and military leaders.<sup>1</sup> The Korean War affirmed the validity of this decision, particularly for combat effectiveness.<sup>2</sup> The end of the Viet Nam war saw the termination of military conscription and the genesis of an all-volunteer force. The tremendous success of the Gulf War attested to both the war fighting capability of this volunteer force and the unequivocal contributions of military women under combat conditions. It also demonstrated the clear contradictions of the combat exclusion policies. Following Operation Desert Storm, the 102nd Congress repealed all statutory restrictions on the assignment of female aviators to combat missions.

Women composed over eleven percent of the active duty armed services at the start of the Gulf War.<sup>3</sup> The fact of an all-volunteer force was critical to the increased integration of military women. In past wars large numbers of American women had donned uniforms to serve in support roles to free men to fight, especially during World War II. Under the all-volunteer force, women entered the services in large numbers, not just to release men for combat duty, but to replace men who chose to stay home as civilians.<sup>4</sup> The employment of women in non-traditional roles, from piloting tactical jet aircraft to operating Patriot missile batteries, steadily increased throughout the last two decades. Furthermore, the

supply of female volunteers exceeded the limits placed on their enlistment by personnel planners.<sup>5</sup> During the military buildup of the 1980s the increased utilization of female recruits was essential to maintain the educational and technical quality of the enlisted force.<sup>6</sup> Over 35,000 uniformed women, including twenty-one percent of the Army Reserve, participated in Operation Desert Storm.<sup>7</sup> Three women were killed in action and two were interned by the Iraqis as prisoners of war. Both POWs were returned at the end of the war.<sup>8</sup>

Prior to the Korean War, the increased utilization of black Americans in the armed forces occurred only as a result of wartime mobilization and external political pressures.<sup>9</sup> According to post-World War I Army mobilization studies, black men were considered "physically unqualified for combat duty" and "mentally inferior."<sup>10</sup> These reports held that extensive racial integration would seriously degrade the combat effectiveness of the military. After World War II, official reports on the performance of Negro airmen in the Army Air Forces were negative and recommended against further integration.<sup>11</sup> Given the social attitudes of the time, it would have been difficult for military leaders of this era to believe that racial integration could ever enhance readiness and inconceivable that the senior officer in the armed forces could be a black man.

Attitudes towards women's proper roles in society have experienced dramatic changes over the last twenty years. Maintaining the historical perspective of racial integration, it is clearly conceivable that women will eventually be assigned direct combat roles. As with racial integration, this will probably be a result of political forces and not peacetime manning requirements in the post-Cold War military. Unlikely as the prospect of a general war might be, mobilization requirements for a highly technical force in a major armed conflict would tend to accelerate the integration process. Plans which include reserve units increase this

probability since women constitute a higher percentage of the Army Reserve and National Guard than active duty forces. The potential need to increase the number of female enlistees in a crisis was also illustrated during Operation Desert Shield when recruitment suffered a dramatic drop (30 percent in the Army) of male volunteers.<sup>12</sup> With the full participation of women in the civilian work force, it would be politically difficult to implement a return to military conscription that impressed marginally qualified male citizens for support or combat duty but excluded better qualified female volunteers.

A common reaction of unit commanders faced with the prospect of integrating women is "I don't need any more problems!" The purpose of this paper is to provide various levels of military leadership a greater perspective on how successful gender integration might be achieved and potential conflicts avoided. To help commanders understand some of the fundamental reasons why females are perceived as problems, the contradictions between the myths of war and reality are examined as the emotional foci of objections to women in combat. A philosophical approach is employed to discuss the nature of the invidious behavior these myths can generate and links the bigotry of racism with sexism. Perspective is also offered on the application of traditional principles of military leadership to prevent the perceptions of favoritism and discrimination that are often the source of morale problems associated with the inclusion of women in previously all-male units.

Racial integration in the armed services serves as a useful model for gender integration. First, it involves the same institution and value system. Secondly, the pervasive belief throughout most of American history that Negroes were inherently inferior to whites is similar in concept to the "deep visceral feelings" that women and war are incompatible. Because the myths of racial and gender superiority share the same intellectual and ethical foundations, those people who

have difficulty in comprehending the nature of sexism often accept the existence of racism and agree that it is morally bankrupt. Unlike homosexuality, which is a class defined by the propensity to engage in certain conduct, the analogy between racism and sexism holds since race and gender address *benign* class characteristics.<sup>13</sup> Individual ability is ignored. Finally, racial integration in the armed forces was mandated change opposed by military and civilian leaders. After numerous problems during implementation, the military is now considered a model of race relations.<sup>14</sup>

Several major assumptions have been made to establish the prerequisite of a "level playing field" so that men and women share equal standards, risks and rewards. First, by virtue of the all-volunteer force, it is assumed that female volunteers will be assigned to combat fields in the same manner as male volunteers. If the nation evokes military conscription, then female citizens will be registered and drafted or deferred on the same basis as males. Once inducted, men and women would be assigned occupational fields according to individual aptitude classification. These postulates are critical because, as the Supreme Court decided in Briggs v. Clarendon County (1954), separate is inherently unequal. It is also inherently wrong.

The second assumption is that policy changes opening combat roles to women will be mandated by Congress or the President, with or without the support of each service hierarchy. History suggests that such social change will be opposed by senior leaders. But history also tells us the Army was forced to integrate during the Korean War because combat readiness demanded it. After relieving General Douglas MacArthur of the Far East Command, General Matthew Ridgway formally requested permission in 1951 to racially integrate the forces within his theater of operations. Not only did Ridgway believe segregation was immoral but

he knew the efficiency of his command suffered from the practice. Badly needed trained replacement soldiers idled away their time in Japan because white units would not accept black infantrymen.<sup>15</sup> Having learned the painful lesson that segregation resulted in poor performance of all-black units, the Department of the Army approved Ridgway's request. It was not until 1954 that the last Army unit was finally integrated.<sup>16</sup>

According to a 1990 Rand Corporation study, men and women join the military and seek warfare qualifications for exactly the same reasons. The same study states there is a more than ample supply of women who would volunteer to enlist if a decision were made to increase their participation in uniform, including combat.<sup>17</sup> This fact increases the size of the available "manpower" pool thus enabling selection of the best qualified individuals to serve. In order to capitalize upon this resource and facilitate combat readiness in the next war, we must avoid the mistakes made in executing racial integration in the military between World War II and the Korean War. By taking a preemptive and positive approach to gender integration in the all-volunteer force during peacetime, we have the opportunity to solve associated problems before a wartime mobilization. The key to implementing gender integration for civilian and military leadership is the ability to perceive and judge women as individuals. The first step is for military men and women to see themselves as professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and officers first. The cornerstone for success can be found in a simple but profound statement of individual recognition: A Soldier is a Soldier.

## Myth versus Reality

"Women give life, not take it!" (General Robert Barrow, USMC,(Ret.) testimony to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee 1991)

"But Jael, Heber's wife, picked up a tent peg and hammer and went quietly to Sisera who lay fast asleep. She drove the peg through his temple into the ground and he died. Judges 5:4:21

The notion that women do not kill would be a hard sell to the homicide officers or social workers in any major city who see women incarcerated for crimes ranging from violent acts of self defense to murdering their own children. In the real world women kill. Yet there are those who object to women in combat based on the false premise that women are incapable of killing. This argument, like so many others opposing women warriors, is intensely emotional because it deals with myth instead of reality.

A myth is a widely held, axiomatic belief (true or untrue) that gives meaning to action.<sup>18</sup> The sure sign of a myth "is the acceptance of the logically and empirically dubious."<sup>19</sup> Dr. Judith Stiehm, a noted political scientist, reduces the myths concerning women to three ideas fundamental to the military enterprise:

- 1."War is manly"
- 2."Warriors protect"
- 3."Soldiers are substitutable."<sup>20</sup>

Women have always suffered, fought and died in war. From biblical times to Kuwait City, women are invariably among war's many victims. In Europe, Japan, Viet Nam and Iraq, American men unintentionally killed women and children as a necessary part of war. Yet, despite the myth that "no society has sent women to fight its wars", women have always elected to be more than the passive spoils of war. History is full of individual and group examples of women taking up arms. Even the United States Military Academy has long honored female warriors in the form of Pallas Athena's helmet in the West Point crest, a painting of Joan of Arc overlooking the mess hall and a statue of Margaret Corbin in the cemetery.<sup>21</sup>

Women have also fought in modern times. The most detailed examples of women warriors are from World War II. Numerous French and Italian women served in partisan units. The Yugoslavian Army had 100,000 women who served as armed combatants. Over 25,000 were killed by the Germans. Drafted the same as men, one million Russian women fought the Nazis in integrated infantry units, tank units, and aboard naval vessels.<sup>22</sup> Most famous were the "Night Witches" who flew bombers in all-female air regiments and as fighter pilots alongside men. Known as the "White Rose of Stalingrad", Lily Litvak shot down ten German aircraft flying a Yak-9 before she herself was killed in aerial combat in 1943.<sup>23</sup>

Today, military women from Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands serve in combat roles, including flying F-16s as fighter pilots and in the infantry.<sup>24</sup> Female officers of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) have completed the rigorous United States Army Ranger training course at Ft. Benning, Georgia.<sup>25</sup> Although very few women finish the demanding Canadian infantry training, those females that do meet exactly the same requirements as males, including physical standards.<sup>26</sup> Contrary to myth, individual men and women share the domain of war.

The second myth, that male warriors are the protectors of women, is equally invalid. The extension of this myth is the "women as children" syndrome. Women are not judged as individual, adult citizens capable of taking care of themselves or their families. Rather, they are judged on the sole basis of biology. Women who buy into this myth seek to exchange personal responsibility for security, even if such safety is a false illusion. They wish to believe that they are unable to protect themselves, or their country, not because they are unwilling, but because they are women. They hold that women are different, and therefore excused from the obligations of citizenship, merely by virtue of being women. Reminiscent of the theories on the innate intellectual inferiority of blacks popularized in the 1960s by the late William Shockley, psychologist Carol Gilligan is one such architect of "difference" theory whose hugely controversial work contends that males and females have different forms of moral reasoning.<sup>27</sup> Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in warning women of the danger presented by proponents of "a different voice" theory, refers to this as the myth of the "true woman."<sup>28</sup>

A common expression of this myth against military women is what one young male naval aviator called "the feminine images of what men fight for--peace, home, family."<sup>29</sup> Men do not want women to fight because sharing the domain of war makes it difficult to retain the illusion of protector. The notion that one is fighting for hearth and home may be a comforting thought to some, enabling them to justify sacrifice in more personal terms, but it is not why wars are won. Perhaps Confederate soldiers drew upon their images of home as a plantation, complete with dutiful slaves, to help them endure the Civil War. However, such fantasies are no more reason to exclude women from war than the fact that the presence of black soldiers before desegregation offended the sensibilities of many a southern white gentleman.

This same aviator goes on to quote George Guilder as arguing that the role of the male is to defend the hub of human existence as represented by the female. Guilder, a free-lance writer who by his own admission avoided enemy fire in Southeast Asia, represents the non-warrior advocate of the myth of male protector.<sup>30</sup> Most military professionals, especially those matured by combat, are acutely aware of their finite ability to protect women or men. People familiar with the use of force and physical danger understand the limitations of violence better than those whose greatest act of personal risk is driving on the freeway. In the real world, wingmen get shotdown by small arms fire, even strong men break and run and sometimes our own soldiers die in friendly fire incidents. Civilians with no or limited military experience may never have observed these sobering realities. Yet, as Stiehm points out, civilian officials can feel the burden of the protector role more than their uniformed advisors.<sup>31</sup>

The third myth, that of substitution, serves an important psychological purpose for those in uniform. In essence, it says that any military member, regardless of occupational specialty, may be called to sacrifice their life in war. Although not explicitly stated, it is always understood. This is the "unlimited liability" clause in the military contract that all uniformed men and women sign.<sup>32</sup>

In a culture that is highly stratified, where those most likely to engage in combat are accorded the greatest respect, the substitution myth has an equalizing effect for the bottom of the professional recognition ladder. Consequently it is evoked against women most often by those who need its assurance most--males uncomfortable with their status in the organization. This leads to the "combat yeoman" syndrome where, even though he performs the same administrative functions as a female counterpart, a young man sees himself higher on the combat

ladder because he *might* be exposed to danger. The civilian counterpart is the fanciful belief that every male, regardless of individual ability, can view himself above every woman on the citizenship ladder because he *might* be drafted. Even though there is no draft and every woman in uniform is higher on that ladder than the vast majority of post-Viet Nam era men who have no military service.

Of all the myths, that of substitution has undergone the most dramatic revision with the expansion of women's roles in the Gulf War. The concept of universal risk was illustrated by the death toll of the Scud missile attack on the Dahahran barracks. Several of the soldiers killed were women and the majority were reservists. The public watched female POWs return home on television while many military men never left home. Combat exclusion policies did not protect military women from death. The American public now applies the concept of universal liability to both sexes.<sup>33</sup>

If part of the function of the universal substitution myth is to promote cohesion by the belief "we are all in this together", then the Gulf War demonstrated vividly that men and women are already "in it together." Myths of manly wars and male protection are hard to validate in the public eye if women serve and die in a televised war. In terms of military women, the reality of substitutability in modern war has destroyed the myth of the warrior protector.

Civilian and military leaders at all levels need to be aware of these myths because they are the intellectual foundation to the "visceral" objections that will be raised when the first women enter combat fields. Women who are unwilling to accept equal risk as the price of equal opportunity may also attempt to hide behind myth. They form the basis of the argument that women should not fight. Believers of the warrior myths will never accept that women can fight--or even be

in the military--if they believe no woman *should* fight. Both sexes should be reassured that the biggest myth of all is that every military member believes in them. As one senior naval aviator stated it "As the captain of a warship, I want good men and women who want to do a good job....So get off this 'can they' kick because I assure you--they can and they do!"<sup>34</sup>

### The Root of the Problem: Bigotry

*"What is a black man with a Phd called? A nigger." Malcolm X*

The underlying problem confronting gender integration in the armed forces is not women or men. It is bigotry. A bigot is a person so obstinately devoted to his or her beliefs or opinions as to be intolerant. Bigotry is the behavior, from verbal to violent, that ensues from this state of mind. In the context of military women, the associated active behavior is sexual harassment.

Myths are functional because people want to believe them. But why do people want to believe untruths? Why do otherwise good people do the bad deeds of bigotry and why do their victims sometimes become advocates of their own inferiority?

Since the nature of bigotry is "bad", an ethical concept, the answers to questions of "why" lend themselves to a philosophical approach. A contemporary treatment of philosophical issues is found in Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and The Last Man*. Fukuyama provides a discussion of Plato's Republic and the abstraction of "thymos" (roughly translated as "spiritedness") which is the chief characteristic of a warrior clan needed to defend the Just City.<sup>35</sup> Fukuyama concludes that the "thymotic" part of the soul is the desire for recognition.

Fukuyama provides two opposite derivatives of *thymos*. One is "isothymia", the desire to be recognized as the equal of others. The other is "megalothymia", the desire to be recognized as superior to others. The victims of racism or sexism feel indignation because they are not recognized at all. In the words of Ralph Ellison, a black is an "invisible man." *Megalothymia* can have positive consequences, such as an Olympic athlete who desires to be superior to all other competitors, or it can lead to the tyrannical ambitions of a Hitler.<sup>36</sup>

Fukuyama provides a revealing example of isothymia in Vaclav Havel's essay "The Power of the Powerless." Havel, the current President of Czechoslovakia, tells the story of a greengrocer who places a sign in his store window proclaiming the communist slogan "Workers of the World Unite!" The grocer was not forced to display such a sign, so why did he do it? In trying to understand the evil nature of the system that imprisoned him for so many years, and the complicity of its citizens, Havel concludes that the grocer is sending a subliminal message of fear and obedience. But because the grocer needs to retain his dignity, and thus would be ashamed to make a public declaration of his fears, he hides them behind the facade of something high, the ideology of socialism. Even if he can not articulate it, the grocer is a moral agent, capable of choice, who must fool himself that he is principled rather than fearful.<sup>37</sup> Black intellectual Shelby Steele refers to this same behavior as "race holding."<sup>38</sup>

If a *megalothymist* is one who desires to be recognized as superior, what is a person who believes that they are superior because of race or gender? Recognition not because of individual achievement, but by sole virtue of genes or chromosomes. Common terminology would be a "racist" or a "sexist", but these words suggest something more than just denying recognition to blacks and women.

These are people who must ensure that the relationship between the source of that superiority (the inferiority of others) and themselves is not altered. In order to feel superior, they need to "look down their nose" at others and keep blacks and women "in their place." A belief in natural superiority can be dubbed "antimegalothymia." It is the desire for unearned recognition.

It is in this fashion that the lowest "white trash" high school dropout is automatically superior to every black Phd or the weakest male is a better warrior than the strongest female. But "natural superiority" has a flip side. Found in the myths of the "true woman" or "true soul", this form of antimegalothymia suggests that women or blacks have some innate moral or spiritual superiority by sole reason of being women or black. Both want recognition, not for what they do but for what they are. Steele refers to this as "compensatory grandiosity."<sup>39</sup>

In the everyday world, *thymos* is more commonly thought of in terms of ego, self-esteem, or dignity. In military parlance it would be called "the right stuff." It is a good thing, natural to human beings, and leads men and women to pursue individual accomplishment and make great sacrifices for higher moral ends. Fukuyama describes the warrior ethos as "the sense of innate superiority based on the willingness to risk death." As both a meritocracy and service, the profession of arms is a highly *megalothymic* institution.

The reason why people choose to believe the myths of racism and sexism is because they fill a need for recognition without having to earn it. A bigot is a lazy *megalothymist*. The Klu Klux Klansman who burns crosses to intimidate black families or misogynist who physically assaults a female soldier are extreme examples. The pettiness of a male officer who must constantly badmouth females or the vocal "combat lawyer" are more common examples. A strong personality, such

as David Duke or Phyllis Schlafly, can successfully employ these themes by playing to the abject, fearful side of human nature. The degree of hostility displayed towards blacks or women is directly proportional to the depth of insecurity in the bigot.

There are examples of distaff bigotry too. The female officer who proclaims women should not be allowed into combat positions because of their "special nature" (but deserve to be promoted along with men) is the uniformed equivalent of Havel's greengrocer. Afraid to compete with men, she hides behind biology but must claim an ideology (true woman) to maintain her sense of dignity. It also affects the civilian political activist who desires to be considered a defense expert and patriotic American but is unwilling or afraid to make the personal sacrifices demanded by military service. Both women seek to use their sex as a justifiable excuse for what is, in essence, cowardly behavior, thus disguising the nature of a moral choice in a convenient myth. The significant difference here is that any male wanting to avoid combat duty or military service would be judged harshly. There would be no pretext of principle.

The military is an ideal institution to control behavior without changing attitudes. Because of the military's emphasis on professionalism, the commanding officer has a ready-made thymotic antidote to weak egos. Professionals derive their self-esteem from objective, superior achievement and do not stoop to denigrating fellow soldiers. If the commander encounters the hard-core bigot he or she also has the perfect military cure--disciplinary proceedings.

#### Racial Integration as a Model

"There will be a general loss of efficiency in the Marine Corps if we have to take Negroes....their desire to enter the naval service is largely, I think, to break into a club that doesn't want them." Major General Thomas Halcomb, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps (testimony to the General Board of the Navy 1942)

"I would take a lesser qualified male pilot over a female....I admit that it doesn't make much sense, but that's the way I feel about it." General Merrill McPeak, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff (testimony to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee 1991)

Being black and being female in the military have several important historical and contemporary similarities. With women slightly over eleven percent of the armed forces and blacks at twenty percent, both are a minority group.<sup>40</sup> Described as the "visual invocation of the problem" by Shelby Steele, there is no way a black or a female can avoid stereotypes evoked by their very presence in an institution that is overwhelmingly composed of "Average White Guys."

These stereotypes carry fundamental assumptions. In the case of black men the most prevalent assumption is that of intellectual inferiority.<sup>41</sup> In the case of black or white women there are basic assumptions of physical weakness and lack of warrior characteristics. This concept of feminine frailty is so strongly embodied in the male culture that weakness is synonymous with being female. This fact is evidenced by the derisive female adjectives often used to insult weak males.<sup>42</sup>

The effect of these assumptions is to change the basic presumption of individual ability. A white male entering some physically or mentally challenging program, such as military flight training, will be presumed qualified and likely to succeed. He must prove himself unworthy by poor performance. But a black man or female

is presumed unqualified by fact of race or gender or, especially in the case of blacks, an additional but untrue assumption of preferential selection based on quotas. They both bear the "burden of proof" for class and individual ability.

It was not until the racial incidents of the Viet Nam war that all the services had to acknowledge institutional racism. Faced with large numbers of poorly educated black draftees and racial violence at home, the military had to confront the fact that problems of racism went beyond individual acts.<sup>43</sup>

Charles Moskos, a professor of sociology at Northwestern University, has identified six major factors for the success of racial integration in the armed forces. These are: 1) A Level Playing Field; 2) No Discrimination; 3) Hierarchy; 4) Goals, Not Quotas; 5) Social Engineering; and 6) Blacks in Leadership Roles.<sup>44</sup>

Moskos describes "The Level Playing Field" of military service as "a radical meritocracy." It includes the equalizing experiences of basic entry training and academic "bootstrap" programs that assist those recruits, mainly black, that require remedial educational skills.<sup>45</sup>

The principle of absolute commitment to equal opportunity, according to Moskos, is no longer debated on the topic of race. An open expression of racism could end a military career. "The concept of no tolerance towards racism from the highest to the lowest levels of leadership has established the full legitimacy of racial integration."<sup>46</sup>

Military hierarchy, with the tradition of dual rank structure, breaks down external social barriers. The authority that goes with rank is visibly displayed on

the uniform and independent of the wearer. A black colonel is always a colonel first.<sup>47</sup>

The military does not promote by racial quota. Promotion board methods vary by service, but the general policy is to establish a goal, review the results and ensure there is no discriminatory reason should fewer blacks than target fail to be promoted. (Boards also set occupational specialty goals.) Recruiting goals are set and aggressively pursued, especially for minority officers with engineering or technical degrees, because of stiff competition for such individuals from the civilian sector.<sup>48</sup>

Moskos refers to social engineering as the ability of the services to train and monitor personnel. Most formal attempts at race relations take the approach of "putting yourself in the other guy's shoes." Moskos points out that, in addition to educating whites, "these courses send a strong signal to blacks that the service is serious about equal opportunity" and ensures that all hands understand the grievance process.<sup>49</sup>

Apart from a black Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the most visible example of black leadership is found in the NCO ranks. Moskos states that the military is the one segment of society where whites are routinely led by blacks. The other leadership factor is that of mentoring. Senior black officers have formed organizations within each service to support junior officers and enlisted personnel and ensure official recognition of minority concerns. Also significant is the fact that senior black officers and NCOs do not see themselves as victims and reject any form of paternalism or the politics of difference and diversity.

Nor does the existence of racial prejudice constitute grounds to discriminate. The success of racial integration in the all-volunteer force in war and peace has refuted the once common assertion that the presence of black men would destroy unit cohesiveness. It also disproved "the tipping point" myth (advanced by, among others, Moskos in 1974) that an Army over thirty percent black might fail to attract white volunteers and thus risk the support of a predominately white society.<sup>50</sup> The opinions of a minority or majority who do not want blacks in the military or in their units are irrelevant. If verbalized or acted upon, they are de facto grounds for removal of the racists and not the black service members. Thus is the legitimacy of racial integration maintained.

Also significant to the success of racial integration is the fact that class characteristics are not used to determine recruiting and assignment policies. If individual ability were ignored, a case based "on average numbers" could be made that blacks should be restricted to non-technical fields. Blacks score lower than whites on aptitude tests and make up sixty percent of the general clerical, supply and food service specialties in the enlisted work force. They are much less likely to be found in the highly technical fields such as electronic warfare and submarine duty.<sup>51</sup>

In the officer ranks black representation is significantly lower than that of the general population. In all the services except the Marine Corps, women officers outnumber black officers by a ratio of more than two to one.<sup>52</sup> In the Navy alone there are more female aviators than black aviators. This is despite the fact that restrictive ceilings are placed on the number of female officer accessions and their assignment opportunities.

Under peace time conditions there are enough "Average White Guys" (especially under conscription) to meet manning requirements if a "lily white male" force were an appropriate national goal. It is not. Blacks enlist in the armed forces, not because the military "needs minorities", but because as qualified Americans they have a right to serve. Their participation in the national defense is predicated on individual ability and not race. Military and civilian leaders do not use statistical portraits to judge or determine the contributions of black Americans in uniform. To do so would be tantamount to evoking the stereotype of a "Stepin Fetchit" to set public policy while ignoring a General Collin Powell.

#### Problems and Perceptions: The Transgressions of Difference

*"How does it feel to be a problem?...It is a strange experience."*

*W.E.B. DuBois*

*"The hardest thing in the military? Getting people to overlook the fact that I was a female." Army E-5*

The perception by military leaders of women as problems is indicative of the basic incongruity that women are not recognized as individuals. Discerning people by class rather than individual attributes leads to differential treatment of that class. Different treatment implies unequal treatment. Unequal suggests a superior and inferior case. For example, if women are treated differently from men in the assignment of combat missions, then the natural conclusion is that women are inferior to men. Disparate treatment also leads to perceptions of preferential treatment of one class over another. And therein lies the genesis for many of the conflicts surrounding gender integration in the armed forces.

When commanders indulge in making decisions based on the stereotypes generated by the warrior or "true woman" myths, they run the risk of ruling by emotion not reason. Emotions can lead to the transgressions of 1) paternalism, 2) fraternization, and 3) segregation that are the source of perceptions of favoritism and discrimination. These foster an environment where the bigot who needs preferential treatment to feel self-important can thrive with the consequential problems of divisiveness and sexual harassment. The traditional principles of military leadership have been used throughout history to ameliorate these problems and forge effective fighting forces composed of different groups.

Paternalism, as an extension of the "protector" myth, is the most common and destructive of these offenses. It is insipid because it is often committed for benevolent reasons, such as "affirmative action" policies. Emotionally, it is easier for some men to view women as they would their daughters, vice their soldiers, and thus engage in protective and over-reactive behavior. This is a manifestation of the "woman as child" syndrome, which ignores the female soldier as a responsible and capable individual who has made an adult choice to serve her country the same as men serve it. Paternalism causes tremendous male resentment that "the skipper is taking care of the girls" which is directed at the women and not the commanding officer. It also denies women the necessary opportunities to make mistakes, acquire operational experience and otherwise develop as military leaders.

Paternalism forms the basis of many "segregationist" policies that justify separate treatment of the sexes as necessary to "protect" women from men. Examples include billeting arrangements that emphasize privacy or security for females over unit integrity, seniority and operational requirements and suggestions

that the services return to the long repudiated separate "female" chain of command.<sup>53</sup> Since Army women routinely sleep in the same tents with males on field deployments, including during the Gulf War, even the basic premise that women must have segregated living quarters should be viewed as a nicety and not a necessity.<sup>54</sup> For the same reasons that racial segregation was detrimental to combat efficiency, gender segregation should be avoided to the maximum extent.

Clearly defined and rigidly enforced fraternization policies are essential to successful gender integration. The traditional mores against "undue familiarity" between military personnel of different rank have been upheld for centuries as conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. The potential for "undue consideration" is even greater when men and women, accustomed to unrestricted sexual and romantic relationships in civilian life, must live and possibly fight together in uniform.

Another reason that personal relationships between junior and seniors have traditionally been restricted is the possibility of emotional attachment overcoming professional detachment. In an organization whose very purpose necessitates personal risk and sacrifice, especially in war, seniors must give orders to juniors which can get them killed. They must be able to do so with full objectivity. Juniors must have confidence in the judgment of seniors that what they are being ordered to do is necessary and fair.

With women in uniform, fraternization has become commonly associated with dating between officers and enlisted. However, the nature of junior to senior relationships extends beyond rank division and chain of command distinctions. The confusion behind some military leaders inability to enforce fraternization standards between men and women is the assumption that, since it is natural for them to

engage in sexual and romantic relations, this fact transcends the divisions of rank which normally define appropriate junior to senior social conduct. They see females. not as soldiers and officers first, but as women. Since men and women have personal relationships, rather than professional military ones, there is a tendency to create an "anything goes after working hours" environment in the command. Not only is this situation an aberration of the concept that a military member is always accountable for their actions regardless of duty status, it is a ticking "anti-unit morale" time bomb.

Healthy men and women are naturally attracted to one another. While such behavior can never be eliminated completely, it can be controlled in the same manner that we mitigate the natural tendency for young people to resolve disputes with their fists through the traditional means of nonjudicial punishment or more severe disciplinary methods. The military's experience with drug abuse has taught us we can successfully control conduct considered normal in civilian life. Fraternization compromises the chain of command, undermines a leader's integrity and creates the appearance, if not the fact, of partiality and favoritism. Because of these facts, the strict enforcement of fraternization standards becomes even more important in gender integrated commands and provides a time-tested means to control divisive behavior.

#### Gender Differences: Pregnancy, Strength and Sexual Harassment

"My daughter had two [parachute] jumps. When I was pregnant I jumped twice....no. the Army didn't know I was pregnant....after I told them they about had a conniption." Army E-6

The two class differences cited between men and women as reason for dissimilar treatment are physical strength and pregnancy. However, just as with racial group characteristics, these general differences are negated by individual abilities which transcend class distinctions. The categorical syllogism of "men fight, men are stronger than women, therefore women are not strong enough to fight" commits the fallacy of the undistributed middle. There are individual women who are stronger than individual men. If the term "strong enough" is based on objective standards, for example infantry skills, then individual women who meet the same physical strength requirements as men can fight.

Physical strength requirements are different in purpose than physical fitness standards. Fitness standards exist to ensure the health of individuals and are appropriately determined by gender. Applying the same percent body fat limits to both sexes could result in overweight men and underweight women. Strength standards exist to ensure the execution of a given task and are independent of gender. For example, flying high performance aircraft requires physical fitness while completing Ranger training demands strength and stamina. The issue then becomes what is strong enough? This is best determined by the objective criteria of "doing it." As in military flight training or Marine Corps basic school, an individual is considered strong and skilled enough by virtue of completing the course.

Pregnancy must also be viewed in terms of the individual. A military woman, pregnant or not, is an adult fully accountable for her actions. The ability to have a child does not make one a child. The current policies that allow pregnancy as an *ipso facto* reason for discharge are overtly paternalistic and establish motherhood as a different class than fatherhood.

Unless a woman is very unlucky or raped, conception is an act of volition. Highly effective birth control methods are available to military women. Even if a woman falls into the small category of accidental pregnancy, her status as a soldier is not erased. As a temporary disability, limitations on her job requirements are an individual matter between her, the physician and the commanding officer. Under no circumstances can a level playing field be maintained if the military obligations of future mothers are treated differently than those of future fathers.

The pregnancy rate among junior enlisted personnel is a visible barometer of command morale. A high rate implies possible fraternization, harassment or leadership problems. Just as exceptionally high numbers of disciplinary infractions are a signal to commanders something is not right, numerous pregnancies suggest young women are exercising the option to escape. Unhappy men can exercise the escape option by engaging in misconduct (e.g. drug use) resulting in early discharge. For example, in the widely reported case of high pregnancy rates aboard a single Navy ship during Operation Desert Storm, the USS Acadia, female sailors returning from the eight month deployment complained of extensive "sexism" and "hostility" in the command.<sup>55</sup>

Unlike pregnancy, parenthood is common to both sexes. The concerns over single parenthood and dual-service marriages are not female issues. The services have long understood the importance of family to morale by establishing a large support structure to provide dependent benefits. Military fathers who find themselves incapable of matching professional and parental responsibilities have been traditionally accommodated through the avenue of a hardship discharge. Military mothers must be held to the same standard.

Military women with children are still individual soldiers first. Motherhood does not override professional integrity nor does wearing a uniform equate with poor parenthood. The application of equal standards to mothers, including combat duty, will force a difficult choice for those women who desire protected status to facilitate the demands of parenthood over military service. A return to the draft need not alter this perspective since family deferments were granted to fathers, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, during past conscription. As with men, those who can not resolve this dilemma should be civilians.

Sexual harassment is another great source of concern to those who lead men and women. A 1988 Department of Defense survey showed that sixty four percent of military women felt they had been sexually harassed.<sup>56</sup> Acts of aggression and intimidation, not words, are the biggest problem. Much of what is classified as sexual harassment would be better described as peer harassment. Foul language can be offensive to, or used by, both men and women. Sexual harassment is better understood if viewed as a form of bigotry, analogous to the invidious deeds of a racist. Its purpose is to drive women out of the institution. It has little to do with sexual attraction.

Behavior ranges from offensive epithets to assault, all of which are covered by the UCMJ, and should be not be treated as a separate category. Commanders must also be sensitive to the potential of false accusations by avoiding paternalistic overreactions. Maintaining the connection to racism, the criminal acts associated with sexually harassment can only be controlled by "top down" enforcement of the UCMJ. Senior officers and enlisted are not immune. Efforts to eliminate racism in the services did not eradicate negative attitudes towards blacks, but they were successful in seriously reducing the number of incidents. Making known the consequences of engaging in such behavior by publishing sanitized descriptions of

actual cases, as done in aircraft mishap investigations, is one way for leadership to convince offenders that their commitment to stop it goes beyond words.

The classic example of institutional discrimination leading to violence against the segregated class was the highly publicized charges of sexual assault at the 1991 Tailhook Convention at the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel. Many of the objectionable activities were attributed to Marine Corps aviators, the only service which has steadfastly refused to accept female aviators in any capacity. The Naval Inspector General's Report of Investigation, which identified 26 cases of assault, noted that during the Flag Officer Panel portion of the Tailhook program, naval aviation leadership failed to strongly counter the openly demonstrated unwillingness of the Tactical Aviation community to accept women.<sup>57</sup> As Washington Post reporter John Lancaster put it "senior officers still don't seem to get it...they have blamed heavy drinking, a 'mob mentality' and Me Generation decadence...that the scandal occurred after the Gulf War, in which women achieved new military equality by sharing desert duty with men, speaks volumes about sexism in the Navy: It's alive and well."<sup>58</sup> The Secretary of the Navy had the statutory authority to complete the integration of naval aviation by assigning qualified female aviators to combat cockpits since December 1991, but failed to act. Despite the fact that many officers, including senior officers, refused to cooperate with the official investigation, the Navy's only formal action was to send "training packages" to fleet units in "an attempt to help Navy people shape important 'core values' that would keep them from wanting to commit harassment."<sup>59</sup>

The reason why a minority of men harass women is because they can get away with it. They get away with it because, no matter how many messages or training packages are sent proclaiming "zero tolerance of sexual harassment" the fact is that civilian and military leadership still holds, by word and deed, that women

aren't good enough to fight. From the constant verbal abuse so many military women put up with to the criminal acts of a Tailhook debacle, sexual harassment will continue because the combat exclusion laws and policies make women institutionally inferior.

### Final Perspective

*"No matter your doubts about the war, when you cross the beach and go feet dry, you must be 100 percent committed to the fight ahead." VADM Jim Stockdale, USN (Ret.)*

The superior model for successful racial integration is the United States Air Force. Unlike the other services, the Air Force openly embraced racial integration following President Truman's order. Under the leadership of General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, on May 11, 1949 the Air Force announced a new policy that directed enlistment, promotion and assignment be based on "individual merit and ability" and stated blacks would be eligible for any assignment for which they were qualified. The process of desegregation began immediately and pressured the Navy and Marine Corps to follow suit. On the eve of the Korean War only the Army maintained racially segregated units.<sup>60</sup>

General Vandenburg was a convert to the cause of racial integration. At the end of World War II he had declared blacks too lacking in intelligence to economically train. Under the influence of General Idwal Edwards, USAF, whose persuasive powers were inspired by his wartime association with Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., General Vandenburg changed his mind and concluded that the Air Force could not arbitrarily exclude blacks. Many of his senior Air Force officers continued to oppose desegregation plans. General George C. Kenney, USAF,

commander of the Strategic Air Command, argued that integration "would be unfair to blacks, by placing them at a disadvantage by forcing them to compete with whites." Brigadier General Dean C. Strother, USAF, director of personnel, was concerned that the service was moving too quickly.<sup>61</sup> Despite these objections, General Vandenburg displayed foresight and courageous leadership in ordering the Air Force to take the lead in racial integration. This decision was later vindicated during the Korean and Viet Nam Wars when the Air Force suffered minimal problems of racial strife and violence compared to the other services.<sup>62</sup>

The effect of General Vandenburg's 100 percent commitment to racial integration was to establish the full legitimacy of black Americans as military professionals. Whatever their individual performance, the permanent and unlimited participation of blacks in the Air Force was no longer debatable. In doing so, under President Truman's leadership, General Vandenburg achieved what would take American society another twenty years to accomplish: racial equality. Although not by their own volition, the military services were on the vanguard of social change.

Unfortunately, the same can not be said in the case of female Americans who serve their country in uniform. Although an impressive start was made at the beginning of the all-volunteer force, the armed forces have steadily lagged behind American society as a whole in the integration of women. Military and administration officials even observed Congress take the lead in opening combat roles to women. After the Gulf War the Senate repealed, by an extraordinary 69-30 roll call vote on the floor, all statutory restrictions on the assignment of female military aviators. The only remaining legal restriction on the utilization of women is 10 USC 6015, which prohibits the permanent assignment of non-aviator Navy women aboard combatant ships. The current combat exclusion policies constitute

perspicuous class discrimination that would be unthinkable and illegal in the civilian workforce.

Today the services practice overt gender segregation. Women are segregated by military occupational specialty, platform, command, service branch, and in the case of enlisted Navy women, different promotion opportunity based on gender. This male versus female promotion method is justified by the Navy as necessary to maintain balanced sea-shore rotation for men because women are not permitted aboard combatant ships.<sup>63</sup> To the women who must live, work and perhaps die under such practices, these policies constitute a "Jane Crow" environment where the determining factor in a military career is gender, not ability.

Segregation is the antithesis of unit cohesion. Cohesion, camaraderie, and bonding are all terms that require shared experiences, dangers and rewards to materialize. Throughout the services, from Air Force tanker pilots flying deep into Iraq to Navy sailors deploying aboard ships for six months in the Persian Gulf, military men and women have already developed close but professional relationships that have stood the test of war.<sup>64</sup> These are extensions of similar associations in civilian life, from sharing athletic playing fields to professional competition, which acknowledge fundamental changes in American society that allow men and women treat one another as equal individuals. While there are some military men who are unwilling to serve in combat with women, just as some racists would not serve with blacks, most are simply concerned with the question of "can they hack it?" As one combat veteran of the Gulf War expressed this changed outlook "I believe in the absolute right of women to serve alongside men in combat--provided they can do the job...if they qualify, I would be proud to serve with them."<sup>65</sup>

These profound changes in the role of men and women have also increased the expectations of each new generation of Americans entering the military. Because the military is a reflection of the society it defends, it is only a question of when, not if, women will serve in all combat roles. Judgment on the success of gender integration will be pronounced, not upon women, but on the military as an institution. The verdict will be determined by the performance of an integrated force in future armed conflicts. Returning to the example of racial integration, Air Force historian Bernard Nalty concludes that "the history of race relations in the military teach one inescapable lesson: progress requires pressure, whether from elected officials, the demands of war, or from black Americans themselves."<sup>66</sup>

There is strong cause for optimism. Women in the all-volunteer force owe much of their success to the support of men. Whatever their doubts on gender integration, the vast majority of military leaders are men of integrity who uphold a culture that prizes individual courage and merit. Because of this professionalism, they are used to implementing well even those policies they disagree with. The precepts of bigotry are contradictory to the value system of an honorable institution and impede its ability to wage war. They are also contrary to that for which every military member swears to uphold and defend, the United States Constitution.

Finally, there is the issue of personal accountability. The military is not a singular entity but an institution composed of many and led by a few senior officers charged with shaping their individual service's future. Such responsibilities are intensely personal because, unlike their political superiors, these men have devoted a lifetime to uniformed service. They are chosen because they have proved themselves considered leaders through years of operational command and demonstrated judgment. Such judgment includes the ability to

recognize when social change has already supplanted service tradition. They are as accountable for their sins of omission, that which they fail to do, as they are sins of commission. The failure to act also has consequences. Our leaders get paid to make tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions whose import is in the longer run. These decisions include ones which trade short term problems for long term solutions. And they too are agents of moral choice.

Not unlike their predecessors in 1948, current civilian and military leaders are faced with a difficult choice. They can choose to stonewall the integration of military women, as did the Army with racial integration prior to the Korean War, or they can choose to follow the example of General Vandenburg and "just do it." One way or another, American women will fight and die in our next major war. The greatest responsibility for deciding whether the problems of gender integration are resolved under peacetime conditions or on future battlefields rests with today's service chiefs. As always, the price of their choice will be paid by young servicemen and women in our next major war.

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September 20, 1991

DE GAULLE: AN ALLY PURSUES AN ALTERNATE COURSE

## Introduction

Charles de Gaulle sought to develop greater independence in French foreign policy as part of his more general effort to establish a stable and prosperous nation able to assume a leading role in post-war Europe. The U.S. nuclear guarantee, the weakness of traditional rival Germany, and the East-West stalemate afforded him opportunities to make controversial policy initiatives intended to build France into a modern European nation. His successors built on these policies in order to preserve a leading role for France in decisionmaking on the European continent. These policies eventually worked to the benefit of U.S. interests in Europe.

## Background

When de Gaulle assumed power in 1958, France was a nation divided by its recent past but at the same time experimenting with policies that could concentrate its energies on building a more stable future in Europe. The nation had suffered heavy losses in population in the First World War and had proved unable to defend itself in the Second World War. A large, unwieldy colonial empire burdened the governments of the Fourth Republic, which proved unwilling to shed the colonies and unable to quell the Algerian rebellion that threatened metropolitan France with civil war. A strong Communist Party posed another threat to the nation's long-term stability.

These characteristics of France in 1958 placed the nation in

a position that forced its people and its leaders to look to the past. Experience in two world wars left many of its citizens embittered towards Germany. The wasting of lives in trench warfare in the First World War produced a rebellious rank-and-file in the army by 1917 and an entire generation with doubts about its political leadership. Failure to develop reliable allies in the 1930s and an effective military strategy to resist Hitler's armies in 1940 had further eroded popular confidence. The colonial empire had produced a French population divided between those who benefited from an often privileged life or investments in the colonies, and those who believed the colonies to be an anachronistic economic and political burden that diverted the nation from developing its own resources and finding its future in Europe. These sins of the Third Republic were visited upon the Fourth Republic, which proved unable to dispel doubts about the ability and integrity of the nation's political elite.

Membership in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Coal and Steel Community, and then the European Community, pointed to a different future. This was a future of muted nationalisms and of institutionalized coordination with neighboring states or the United States in shaping economic, political, and security policies. De Gaulle's policies would set France firmly upon a course that promised greater integration into European life and a diminished risk of political fragmentation and decline.

#### The Domestic front: the effort to establish stability

De Gaulle created the Fifth Republic in 1958 as an instrument

to produce a more stable central governing structure. Its essence was stronger presidential authority and a sharp reduction in the factionalism expressed in the National Assembly -- a factionalism that had hamstrung the Fourth Republic. The structure of the Fifth Republic carried risks: if it muted institutional factionalism, then disputes might be taken into the streets for resolution. A strong presidency meant that some elements of the population with legitimate grievances might lose their role in the process of making policy.<sup>4</sup> What the Fifth Republic surrendered in democratic forms, it gained in cohesiveness in the policymaking process, a cohesiveness heavily reliant on the judgment and restraint of the president.

De Gaulle formulated policies that provided the Fifth Republic with breathing room. The Algerian War had sharply divided the French population and spawned rebellious elements in the armed forces who wished to preserve Algeria as the cornerstone of a colonial empire that they believed both prestigious and critical to the nation's prosperity. They terrorized political opponents of the war who lived in both Algeria and France, and turned sharply against de Gaulle when he proposed a negotiated settlement to the conflict. By 1962 de Gaulle had not only granted Algeria

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<sup>4</sup>See, for example, George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. p. 198. Many workers and intellectuals were driven into the Communist Party because the Fifth Republic did little to enhance the lives of those who worked in French industries. As long as the Communist Party remained a minority with little hope of forming an alliance with other parties, it offered a minimal electoral threat, though the possibility always existed of crippling strikes and violent measures against the government.

independence but promised freedom to any other French colony desiring to break the link with Paris. These were acts that created a viscerally emotional minority of former *colons* who, forced to live in France as the empire dissolved, would provide right-wing opposition to de Gaulle on a wide range of issues for the rest of his presidency. Nonetheless, de Gaulle's shedding of the empire removed from the domestic agenda the nation's most troubling issue and made possible the opportunity to build political and economic stability.

#### The Gaullist foreign policy: controversy but coherence

De Gaulle centered his foreign policy upon an independent nuclear force and efforts to develop a European security alignment able to resist superpower initiatives that he believed detrimental to French, and to European, interests.

De Gaulle built a superstructure for French foreign policy by securing improved relations with Germany. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the two world wars were hard evidence that France and Germany must settle their differences if Europe was to know peace. Jean Monnet had taken the first step: French coal and German industry were the core of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was itself the principal building block of the European Community. De Gaulle had once harbored great enmity towards Germany. In 1946, as head of the French provisional government, he sought the annexation of the Saarland and the break-

up of the German state.<sup>2</sup> By the late 1950s, however, de Gaulle had greater faith in the prospects for an enduring German democracy. He trusted Adenauer's stewardship of Germany, and the two men came to symbolize the Franco-German *rapprochement* that today remains a cornerstone of French and EC policy. In 1963 France and Germany signed a treaty that committed the senior foreign policy and defense officials to seek coordination in developing policies. Though such coordination has been fitful, the treaty was a critical symbolic step that provided a psychological momentum to the process of the two nations' populations setting aside historic grievances.

De Gaulle's emphasis on Franco-German *rapprochement* also served to sustain his interest in the European Community. The EC provided France with ready access to a diverse market. Because Germany had become the economic engine of the European Community by the 1960s, France had an added incentive to continue to coordinate its economic growth within the EC, with Germany as a focal export market. Those who emphasize the "independence" of Gaullist foreign policy often ignore the Fifth Republic's steady commitment to the building of a highly integrated economy within the European Community.

Resolution of problems stemming from the colonial empire and improved relations with Germany provided de Gaulle with the opportunity to build a foreign policy giving France greater independence of action. Though de Gaulle clearly valued the

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<sup>2</sup>Herbert Luthy, "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy" (1965), in Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs, ed. by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. p. 361.

Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. nuclear guarantee, which he saw as worthy of preservation as an "ultimate precaution,"<sup>3</sup> a national nuclear force was critical to the nation's prestige and, he believed, to its survival.

The developing nuclear parity in the 1960s between the United States and the Soviet Union eroded de Gaulle's faith in the U.S. nuclear guarantee. He doubted whether the United States would risk its own destruction to prevent a Soviet victory in a war in Europe. Even some of Kennedy's and Johnson's closest advisors were unsure, if the moment arrived, that the United States would accept such a risk.<sup>4</sup>

The U.S. policy of "flexible response" seemed to give some credence to doubts about the U.S. nuclear guarantee. "Flexible response" pledged a nuclear response to a Soviet attack in Europe only after conventional warfare had failed to halt advancing Soviet forces. In the eyes of some Europeans, such a policy was a sign that Washington was less likely to use the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe's defense because such use was certain to trigger a Soviet nuclear attack on the continental United States.

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Don Cook, Charles de Gaulle: A Biography. 1983. p. 336.

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, George W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern. New York: Norton & Co., 1982. p. 332. The problem continued into the 1980s. SDI raised questions whether the United States was seeking to provide a missile defense for itself, and leaving the Europeans vulnerable. President Reagan's offer at Reykjavik in 1986 to destroy all nuclear weapons left Europeans wondering if nuclear deterrence were dead. And some Europeans believed that the INF Treaty severed the link between U.S. nuclear forces in Europe and the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

The Cuban missile crisis fed French apprehension over the superpowers' nuclear forces. In January 1963 de Gaulle said that the crisis proved that the United States would consider using its nuclear forces without consultation with its allies.<sup>5</sup> The United States had global interests that were not always the interests of its European allies. Should the United States go to war with the Soviet Union over such an interest, Europe's destruction was virtually certain. In this light, the *force de frappe* was an effort to send a political message to the Soviet Union that in some instances French and American interests were different, that France, and eventually Europe, would reach positions of sufficient political strength and independence that the Europeans could separate themselves from selected aspects of superpower rivalry. Ultimately, in this view, the *force de frappe* could serve as a true counterforce deterrent, with France providing the core of European security and the means to diminished dependence on the United States.

#### The Legacy of Gaullist Foreign Policy

The objectives of de Gaulle's foreign policy were greater stability at home and independence in pursuing France's political and security interests in Europe. Decolonization enabled France to concentrate its resources on political and economic problems at home, pared French responsibilities abroad, and opened the door to a more constructive policy towards the developing world.

At the same time, decolonization enabled France to turn its

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<sup>5</sup>Ball, Past has another Pattern. p. 270.

attention to Europe, where, arguably, its true political and economic interests lay. Today, no viable political party in France would dispute the benefits of membership in the European Community and close relations with Germany. The Gaullist foreign policy helped to push France into a modern European state. France has identified its future with the European Community, and has set aside nationalist rivalries that in the past led to war. Economic integration in the EC has meant a large degree of political and psychological integration as well because the future of each EC member is now bound closely to that of all members.

De Gaulle's policies have not, however, always reached his evident objectives. France has the strongest military in Europe, but most EC members have resisted French leadership in the security field. Most European NATO states may believe that the *force de frappe* eventually served a positive purpose by making Paris a second "decision center" in the effort to deter the Soviet Union from war in Europe. None, however, has sought French nuclear protection, and Germany has viewed the *force de frappe* as a potential danger because elements of the force could reach Soviet units only upon their arrival on German soil. The virtual eclipse of the Soviet military threat means that Europeans now have an even greater incentive to fend off French leadership -- and perhaps the leadership of any single nation -- of a European security system.

#### Lessons for the United States

In the late 1940s and the 1950s the United States explicitly supported greater economic and political cooperation and

integration among its European allies. The goal of such cooperation was stability in Western Europe and a stronger hand in facing the Soviet threat. NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Community are products of this policy and of European initiatives and sense of purpose. Gaullism was a phenomenon that both took advantage of greater European integration and served to foster important elements of its progress.

U.S. officials have often chafed at French independence of action, but that independence has been part of the price of economic and political stability in Europe. Other allies, Germany chief among them, are now following a course more independent of U.S. influence as well. The principal U.S. objectives in Europe have been achieved: a strong NATO, the vitality of our principal trading partners, and the growth of democracy on the European continent. Perhaps a lesson of the Gaullist era for U.S. officials is to concentrate upon key objectives in an alliance system, and accept independence of action that does not damage those objectives. This lesson was not evident, for example, in the criticism by officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations of European governments that opposed U.S. policies in Vietnam.

The United States is a global power and has the military strength to send its forces to a range of theaters. None of the United States' allies is a power in this sense, though nations such as Germany clearly have important economic interests around the world. The means of protection or preservation of these interests may cause friction between the United States and its allies, as in

Germany's initial reluctance to support Washington in the Gulf war. U.S. experience with France could usefully serve to make policy-makers more sensitive to domestic factors influencing policy in allied nations, and to the diversity of interests and means to protect those interests that are likely to result.