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# STRATEGIC STUDIES PROJECT



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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
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STRATEGIC STUDY

COMBINED NATO OPERATIONS WITH THE TURKISH  
AIR FORCE: AN ALLIANCE WEAKNESS

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Combined NATO Operations with the Turkish Air Force:  
An Alliance Weakness

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DATE: March 1984

In view of the Soviet Union's growing interest in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area, NATO's Southern Region, neglected for over 30 years, is rapidly becoming a chief area of concern, second only to the Central Region. And yet, its defensive capability is no match for the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat. Turkey, although the most strategically important member in the Southern Flank, is the weakest. The USAF rotational fighter squadron at Incirlik can be utilized immediately and cost effectively, to both strengthen the Turkish Air Force and to develop a combined USAF-Turkish Air Force concept of operations that will enhance the deterrent posture of the entire Southern Region.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Samuel E. Porter, USAF, became interested in United States Air Force-Turkish Air Force combined operations while serving as a tactical fighter squadron commander at Hahn AB, Germany from 1980 to 1982. His squadron, along with other USAF units shared the responsibility, on a rotational basis, for maintaining a USAF presence at Incirlik AB in south central Turkey. It was during these tours of temporary duty that he had the opportunity to train with the Turkish Air Force and become familiar with concept of operations. Colonel Porter has served with the USAF Tactical Air Forces in CONUS, the Pacific, and Europe. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The idea of nations joining forces to fight a common enemy is not a new concept. Few major conflicts in history have been fought and won by autonomous forces. Even Napoleon finally succumbed to allied armies after twenty years of defeating a weak coalition that failed to overcome the inherent problems of varied national political objectives, language, culture, laws, sovereignty and national pride. And the two most important issues, unity of command and a unified strategy, were never resolved. In other words, who's in charge and what's the plan?

When we look at our own country's experience with allies, we find that early on we only entered into very loose arrangements for specific purposes which followed the lead of our first President who warned against entangling alliances. We were finally forced into WW I by a strong national sympathy for the allied cause, but we were totally unaware of the political and military implications of such a venture. Although the allies prevailed, losses were staggering and the war was unquestionably prolonged because of a division of effort. Each nation carried on its own war while ostensibly fighting as a coalition. The situation was further complicated at the operational level by differences in organization, language, doctrine, terminology, strategy, tactics, and personal prejudice. Unfortunately, most of the lessons that were so painfully learned were lost in the immediate post war euphoria as expressed so vividly by General Robert Bullard, "I saw today a line of eight or ten Americans, French, and British soldiers, arms locked, singing and walking together in celebration of the armistice and the hope for peace."<sup>1</sup>

Although the U.S. and its allies did little after WW I to prepare for future contingencies requiring a coalition involvement, some of the lessons of history began to penetrate the minds of the political and military leadership so that by the time WW II rolled around at least the U.S. and Great Britain had agreed upon the framework of a combined military command structure. However, operationally, the allies had failed to develop and exercise combined operations plans, to understand one another's doctrine, organization, weaponry, and equipment, all of which contributed to early allied defeats.

In an attempt to reverse these setbacks, snap decisions were often made that further exacerbated the situation such as the wholesale integration of forces in North Africa that led to allied defeats at Tunis and the Kasserine Pass. Lt Gen Eisenhower probably best summarized this operation in the following statement:

I think the best way to describe our operation to date is that they have violated every recognizable principle of war, are in conflict with all operational and logistical methods laid down in text books, and will be condemned in their entirety by all Leavenworth and War College classes for the next 25 years.<sup>2</sup>

However, as the war progressed, the wheel was reinvented and the allies were once again victorious. Throughout the conflict, while turmoil and disagreement raged among government and military leaders, this friction was overcome, as it always is, at the operational level, and the troops got the job done.

The post WW II national attitudes were characteristic of the WW I withdrawal into isolationism. The small American, British, and French occupation forces watched apprehensively while the Soviet Union strengthened its hold on Eastern Europe. There were halfhearted attempts by the allies to form bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, but there was not unified effort until the communist party seized Czechoslovakia in Feb 1948. A year later, eleven nations plus the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Since then, NATO has grown into a strong multinational alliance that, although it has never been tested on the battle field, has deterred the Soviet threat and preserved the peace. We'll examine more closely NATO's current capability, but let's first look at the Korean War and its multinational implications.

In 1950, the U.S. and 17 other allies responded to South Korea's call for assistance when North Korea invaded. General MacArthur and his veteran commanders, remembering how long it took for the allies to develop an effective force during WW II, immediately set about standardizing procedures and equipment. Still the task was monumental. In addition to the language differences, there were doctrinal disputes, shortage of weapons, complaints about the food, and the Ethiopians even came dressed for warm weather operations. Despite these obstacles, the U.N. Security Forces in Korea developed into an effective multinational organization that was ultimately victorious.

Historically, the problems of interoperability have been solved, when they have been solved at all, primarily through trial and error during the actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. This is a costly process in terms of men, materjal, and time. These may be lacking in future wars.<sup>3</sup>

Today more than ever before, allies are of fundamental importance. Not only those nations allied to us by treaty, but all nations with which we share common interests. This increased importance of allies underscores the U.S. commitment to maintain a strong coalition military strategy such as exists in NATO. The question is, just how well prepared is NATO to fight a coalition war today? There is no doubt that despite the withdrawal of France and the frequent political fueds among the allies, NATO has come a long way in developing peacetime cooperation over the past 35 years, but it is only in the pivotal Central Region that a strong multinational force has been established. The U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands have forged both a conventional and nuclear deterrent that has remained unchallenged.

However, when we turn our attention to the Southern Region, the picture looks entirely different. For a number of primarily political reasons, this vital area has never received the attention accorded the Central Region, although it suffers from insufficient resources and isolation. Consequently, we are ill-prepared to fight a major conflict in this area.

If we were to choose the most strategically important NATO partner in the region, it would have to be Turkey. Geographically, it is the pivotal country in the region, it guards access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and it shares the longest common border (600km) with the Soviet Union of any NATO nation. Dr Lawrence L. Whelton puts it another way:

Particularly against the backdrop of developments in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area and their broader regional reverberations, NATO's Southern Flank is turning into a second front on its own right -- a front characterized by unique strategic linkage, but also by political contradiction and widening defense gaps. In the new and fluid scenario, Turkey takes on starker strategic significance as the only real local barrier to a full southward flow of Soviet military power.<sup>4</sup>

Yet Turkey is by far one of the weakest, militarily, of the NATO countries, primarily because of the 1975-79 U.S. arms embargo and an economy weakened by political instability. Since the embargo was lifted, Turkey has begun an aggressive rebuilding program with security assistance from the U.S. and West Germany but, at the current pace it will be a long term process. In the meantime, the Soviets are focusing more and more attention on Turkey, a historical adversary that represents a barrier to their Middle East expansionism. Their current strategy is to maintain a cooperative but competitive relationship with Turkey while continuing to secure their ties with radical Arab and African states. But, as long as Turkey controls the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, they will remain one of the Soviet Union's chief objectives.

So, we've established Turkey's strategic importance to NATO's Southern Region and the urgent necessity to accelerate the military modernization program, specifically the Turkish Air Force (TAAF). However, before we explore ways of improving the TAAF's capability, let us first review the readiness initiatives that have been so effectively utilized to improve the Central Region air forces.

## CHAPTER II

### CENTRAL REGION

Among the most recent initiatives that have been taken to strengthen the Central Front include aircraft modernization, the development of a Collocated Operating Base (COB) program, facility hardening, cross servicing, sortie surge and combat quick turn procedures, and more realistic large scale combined exercises.

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION. Since 1977, thirteen tactical fighter squadrons have received new aircraft and three additional squadrons have been added. The F-4s at Bitburg AB, Germany and Soesterberg AB, the Netherlands were replaced by the F-15, giving the Central Region an enhanced air defense capability. The F-4s at RAF Bentwaters-Woodbridge U.K. were replaced with six squadrons of the new A-10 close air support aircraft. Detachments from these units are continuously deployed to forward operating locations in Germany where they fly training missions in support of NATO ground forces. In addition to the USAF converting three of its F-4 wings to the multiple role F-16, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands also upgraded their aging fighter fleets with this aircraft through the first ever NATO tactical fighter consortium. Although not a new aircraft, a squadron of F-5s are now based at RAF Alconbury in the U.K., providing realistic air combat tactics training for the NATO air defense units by simulating Warsaw Pact (WP) and Soviet tactics.

COLLOCATED OPERATING BASE CONCEPT. One of the major problems facing NATO planners is the vulnerability of the Main Operating Bases (MOB). These already crowded installations are among the Warsaw Pact's (WP) top priority targets. They become even more lucrative with the addition of follow-on forces. To allow for dispersal of these forces, the COB program was developed. Under a multinational agreement, all inactive airdromes capable of supporting tactical operations are being refurbished for this purpose. The concept is exercised to the maximum extent possible with each CONUS unit deploying to its assigned COB as often as funds permit.

FACILITY HARDENING AND TONE DOWN. Facility hardening is also a priority project in the Central Region, but with the exception of aircraft shelters, command centers and operations buildings, few hardened facilities have been constructed at NATO MOBs, and thus they are extremely vulnerable. The plan is to eventually provide the COBs with hardened facilities as well. When funds are available, these hardened structures will also be modified to provide a nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination and filtering capability.

One of the passive methods of air base defense is called "tone down", which means to make less visible from the air. One of the most common methods is to paint everything including streets, taxiways and runways, as well buildings, various shades of greens and browns. This is extremely effective. Oftentimes even home-based aircrews find it difficult to locate their own airfield without electronic navigational aids. Some bases also plant sod on top of buildings, aircraft shelters, etc. Blackout exercises are also practiced routinely.

CROSS SERVICING. Perhaps the most productive and cost effective readiness initiative is cross servicing, a program in which almost all NATO countries participate. Cross servicing is the capability to simultaneously refuel, rearm, and retask any NATO fighter or reconnaissance aircraft at any NATO base. This is a critically important capability, considering the high probability that a preemptive Warsaw Pact attack would interrupt operations at most NATO bases if not close them indefinitely. Initially it was only a refueling capability, but it has been expanded to include rearming and retasking, all conducted simultaneously. If aircraft returning from a combat mission cannot reach an open base, they still have another option. Designated autobahn landing strips can be used in an emergency; however, only a refueling capability is currently available. So important is this program that the USAF Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) criteria requires all units to satisfactorily demonstrate cross servicing capability. This procedure is performed by ground crews wearing the complete chemical protective ensemble.

SORTIE SURGE AND COMBAT QUICK TURN EXERCISES. Realizing that we may never be able to match the Warsaw Pact in numbers of combat aircraft, NATO has developed the capability to generate maximum sorties in minimum time by accelerating the recovery and launch schedule. In 1978, Hahn AB, Germany conducted the first sortie surge exercise, flying over 2700 sorties in 13 days with three squadrons of F-4s. The combat quick turn, or the procedure of refueling and rearming an aircraft in minimum time, is an integral part of the surge process. Three to five day sortie surge exercises are now conducted routinely by most NATO bases.

COMBINED EXERCISES. Most Central Region bases conduct frequent combat readiness exercises, but the true test of how well prepared NATO is to fight a coalition war is the large scale exercises. The annual Autumn Forge series of exercises includes both joint and combined operations and has proved to be extremely productive. Usually all countries participate, but the most activity occurs in the central Region where the standard NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario is acted out over a three-week period which includes deployment and beddown time. A number of COBs are activated to receive the CONUS based tactical forces, and the airspace over the simulated battlefield is divided into sectors that are assigned to the various national forces as their specific areas of responsibility. Although standardization and interoperability are stressed during these peace time exercises, the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) war plans are based on autonomous operations under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces Central Europe (CINCAAFCE). Therefore, even during major exercises, most NATO Air Forces operate from their home bases with little, if any, integration of forces at the operational level. However, the staffs throughout the command structure are completely integrated. Thus, theoretically, we can expect a reasonably smooth transition from peace to war. So as you can see, NATO in the Central Region is well prepared to conduct combined wartime operations. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Southern Region and Turkey in particular. Let us now look at Turkey's current tactical air force readiness posture.

## CHAPTER III

### THE TURKISH AIR FORCE

It is extremely difficult to assess the combat capability of the Turkish military. Little is written about it, and they seem reluctant to discuss their strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that most western analysts underestimate their capability. For example, in his testimony to a House Foreign Affairs Committee on 7 May 1980, only one year after the arms embargo was lifted, the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and Technology stated that, "the Turkish Armed Forces have not appreciably improved since the arms embargo was lifted."<sup>5</sup>

I can't speak for the Army or Navy, but the Turkish Air Force has made steady progress, and with our assistance, they can become the best in the Southern Region. They currently have 15 combat ready fighter squadrons and two reconnaissance squadrons. Although badly in need of new aircraft to replace their aging F-100s and F-104s and a better training program, the TUAF is capable of conducting effective conventional air to ground operations, including close air support and interdiction missions in a low to medium threat environment. Their five squadrons of F-4Es are particularly effective in this role. They have also developed a basic air defense capability using the U.S. built F-5. This is primarily a day only capability against non-maneuvering targets; however, they are converting one of their F-4 squadrons to the air defense role which will give them a night and all weather capability. The TUAF is programmed to receive the first of their 160 F-16s in 1986. This aircraft will give them a significant technological advantage over any potential adversary.

My first opportunity to observe TUAF flying operations was in July 1980. At that time, I commanded a Germany based F-4 squadron that shared with other United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) F-4 units the commitment to maintain at all times a squadron of tactical fighter aircraft at Incirlik AB near Adana in south central Turkey. These aircraft represent the most forward deployed land based American fighter aircraft capable of tactical conventional or nuclear operations in the region. Incirlik is an excellent location for conducting combat aircrew training; however, to date, very little training with the TUAF has been performed. Although no TUAF aircraft are permanently based at Incirlik, the base is capable of supporting up to two additional squadrons on a temporary basis and, in fact, there is almost always one TUAF squadron deployed to Incirlik while their home base runway is being repaired. For example, two F-4 squadrons from Eskisehir AB in northwest Turkey were deployed to Incirlik at the same time my squadron was there in July 1980. I frequently discussed the merits of combined training with my TUAF counterpart who was equally enthusiastic about the idea. The aircraft, missions, and training objectives are almost identical, so it would have been extremely easy to develop a combined training program at no additional expense or alteration of our respective training goals. A proposal was presented to both the USAF and TUAF authorities, but no agreement has been concluded.

In Sep 1980, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work with the TUAF as the Site Commander for all NATO forces deployed to Eskisehir AB to participate in the annual Display Determination exercise. Forces included ten USAF F-4s, eight USAF F-15s, and six Italian F-104s along with over 500

maintenance and combat support personnel from 12 NATO bases. The three F-4 squadrons from the host base also participated. It is with these units that we conducted all of the combined training. The Italians elected to operate autonomously. The exercise lasted six weeks and marked the first time since before the arms embargo that large scale USAF-TUAF operations had been conducted.

In an attempt to simulate actual wartime conditions, operations were scheduled to commence 48 hours after all deployed forces were in place; however, we encountered major logistical problems that had been overlooked by the planners. These difficulties had to be corrected before the exercise could begin. For example, there was a critical shortage of fuel trucks which would have reduced our sortie generation capability to an unacceptable level. The food for the field kitchen had not arrived from Ankara, and there were less than half the cooks required to man the kitchen. So we ate K-rations for two days and when the food arrived, we converted a number of security police personnel into cooks.

It also became readily apparent that the language barrier was going to pose a bigger problem than had been anticipated. Fortunately, our hosts had selected one of their top officers as liaison officer. He worked tirelessly during the preparation, reception, beddown, employment and redeployment phases to ensure that our every need was accommodated. He was, without a doubt, the most important factor in the successful outcome of this important exercise. Actually, the problems we encountered at the outset, as well as the unexpected

difficulties that cropped up throughout the exercise, created a very realistic environment that required USAF and TAAF commanders and supervisors at every level to develop a spirit of cooperation that far surpassed anyone's expectations.

Because of the language problem, we modified the first week of the scenario, giving more detailed briefings and initially allowing only one USAF and one TAAF aircraft to fly together on missions to the nearby gunnery range. The crews adjusted quickly, however, and we were able to resume the original schedule after the first week. We began scheduling mixed flights on the more complex close air support missions in the Bulgarian Buffer Zone, over 150 miles northwest of Eskisehir. Initially, these sorties were flown by the more experienced aircrews, but as we became more familiar with one another's procedures, everyone got an opportunity to plan and fly these more demanding missions. From the two aircraft element, flights were expanded to four, eight, and eventually 12 aircraft that used advanced tactics to conduct simulated strikes on targets ranging from troop and vehicle concentrations to airfields. The USAF F-15s simulated enemy interceptors which added a dimension of realism that most of the TAAF aircrews had not previously experienced. We found the TAAF pilots to be well trained in the fundamentals of basic airmanship. Their low level navigation is excellent and they are expert at conventional weapons employment, particularly when they use the F-4s computer bombing system. However, they do not take into account the survivability factor when developing tactical profiles. They use the same

basic tactic on all missions which makes them predictable and therefore vulnerable. They acknowledge this deficiency, but are reluctant to change because they are concerned that it would affect their bombing accuracy. This is an important area that they really need to work on or their attrition levels in a medium to high threat environment will be unacceptable. They are also deficient in both knowledge and proficiency of employing live munitions.

The TUAF's limited budget does not allow for even the occasional use of live munitions for training purposes. And, although their inventory includes guided munitions, few of the aircrews have been schooled in their use.

Another area of concern is the fact that they have made little use of the multiple role capability of the F-4. Although they have mastered the basic conventional air to ground mission, they have just begun to develop the air-to-air potential of the system. In 1980, they were beginning to realign their mission priorities and designate some of their air to ground squadrons as primary air superiority units including one of our host squadrons at Eskisehir. Few of the pilots had any knowledge of air-to-air weaponry, tactical intercept geometry, or basic air combat tactical maneuvering. Both the USAF F-15s and F-4s worked with the TUAF F-4s, but little progress could be made in the limited time available. Since then, they have developed their own training program, but they desperately need our assistance in this important area. One of the most productive air defense missions of the exercise involved a combined flight of four USAF F-4s and four TUAF F-4s escorting three B-52s that were simulating conventional attacks on numerous targets across Turkey. It was the first time the TUAF pilots had ever seen a

B-52 up close in flight, so it was an excellent learning experience for them, and they were very effective in protecting them against the F-15s that were simulating the aggressor role. The exercise culminated with a twelve aircraft combined raid on simulated enemy naval forces operating in the Aegean Sea. The mission was expertly planned and flown, although as we expected, the Greek air defense system responded, and we were intercepted by their fighters.

Display Determination 1980 was rated by both U.S. and Turkish officials as an unqualified success with the combined air operations at Eskisehir being one of the highlights. The TUAF immediately submitted a request for an on-going combined training program with the USAF. However, it was not until a year later that the next exercise was scheduled. Coincidentally it involved a small four aircraft detachment from Eskisehir that just happened to deploy to Incirlik at the time my squadron was there. It was a small scale effort compared to Display Determination and only lasted a week, but once again it proved to be very beneficial for both units. We developed a realistic wartime scenario that increased in intensity throughout the week and culminated with a simulated airfield attack on Incirlik using two USAF F-4s as air defenders against the combined USAF-TUAF attack force. This was the standard USAF exercise profile, but the TUAF aircrews had never been exposed to such advanced tactics.

One point that should be made before we continue is that the Turkish fighter pilot is no different than any other fighter pilot in terms of his "can do" attitude and the determination to be the best in his profession. They are dedicated, loyal, and hard working. They also talk freely about the

Soviet threat. They respect, but do not fear, the "Bear" as they call him, but they clearly understand that they will need our help if it comes down to a direct confrontation with the Soviets. It is for this reason that they are eager to continue the combined training program with the USAF. They need extensive training in high threat tactics, battlefield air interdiction, defense suppression and electronic countermeasures. They will also require training in nuclear weapons employment if they once again assume responsibility for that mission. Although they are making progress, the TUA is a long way from being combat ready in the important air superiority mission area. It's by far the most difficult concept to master, but one of the most important. For without adequate air defense and the ability to achieve and maintain air superiority over the battlefield, it will be impossible to survive and respond to a preemptive attack. If at least some of the 160 F-16s they are going to buy are assigned to the air defense role, the TUA will have a clear advantage over most of their potential adversaries. The introduction of the F-16 into the TUA inventory represents an excellent opportunity for both TUA and USAF to develop a combined training program that fully exploits the flexible capability of this aircraft.

Finally, we come to the main point of this paper, that is, my proposal, in terms of specific recommendations, for enhancing the TUAs capability to fight alone if necessary while developing a combined operational capability with the USAF.

## CHAPTER IV

### RECOMMENDATIONS

EXPAND THE ROLE OF THE USAF ROTATIONAL SQUADRON AT INCIRLIK. As I mentioned earlier, the USAF is required to maintain a squadron of tactical fighter aircraft at Incirlik AB on a rotational basis. The F-4 squadrons from Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases, Germany share this responsibility with the F-16 units from Hahn AB, Germany and Torrejon AB, Spain. In my view, it would be a relatively simple and inexpensive matter to expand the role of this squadron to include combined training with the TUAf. Initially, a squadron exchange agreement could be worked out between the USAF F-4 squadrons and the TUAf F-4 units at Eskisehir and Erhac Air Bases, with detachments of no more than four aircraft deploying simultaneously to offset the support costs.

Once the program is functioning smoothly, it can be expanded, both in numbers of aircraft and scenario complexity. The TUAf F-5 air defense units should also eventually be included in the program, training with both the F-4 and F-16 squadrons. The program should become self perpetuating, i.e. as more of the TUAf pilots gain experience in working with their USAF counterparts, they in turn will pass along this tactical knowledge to other TUAf aircrews.

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION. The TUAf is currently equipped with the old F-100 and F-104 which will gradually be phased out. They also fly the more modern F-5 in the air defense role and their newest acquisition is the F-4 equipped with

smokeless engines and a computer bombing system. They are negotiating with the U.S. for additional F-4s as well as 160 F-16s. In the meantime, the USAF F-16s that deploy to Incirlik can play a key role in the TUAf's conversion program, using the lessons learned by the U.S., Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark during their transition to the F-16. Focusing on the three TUAf bases scheduled to receive the F-16, the USAF rotational squadrons can begin with a basic orientation program, using one aircraft as a maintenance training device as well as for operational demonstrations. In addition to deploying single aircraft to each of the TUAf bases scheduled to receive the F-16, the USAF should conduct ground training at Incirlik for as many TUAf personnel as can be made available. Such a program would not only greatly facilitate the TUAf's conversion program, but enhance the development of a combined operational capability

COLLOCATED OPERATING BASE CONCEPT. Turkey has actively participated in the NATO COB program by hosting CONUS based USAF fighter units each year during Display Determination exercises. These have been successful deployments including some limited combined training activities. As funds become available, more designated COBs will be made serviceable, but it's a slow process throughout NATO. Perhaps the most important military construction project in all of NATO at the present time is the refurbishment of two bases and the building of a third in eastern Turkey. These three bases will allow NATO to project tactical air power further into areas of potential hostility than ever before. Hopefully, the USAF will be permitted to use these facilities for peacetime exercise training and COB deployments.

FACILITY HARDENING AND TONE DOWN. Although most of their aircraft are protected by the standard NATO shelters, few of the TUAFF'S other key facilities have been hardened. They use WW II bunkers that are not survivable in today's environment as alternate command and control facilities. The lack of adequate communications and the absence of a nuclear, biological, or chemical filtering capability further degrades their effectiveness or survivability. Some tone down procedures have been implemented, but like all air base survivability initiatives, it's a low priority item due to critical funding constraints.

CROSS SERVICING. Unlike the Central Region Air Forces, who have perfected cross servicing procedures, the TUAFF has made little effort to develop this capability even though it's a low cost, high pay off program. Once again, the USAF rotational squadron could be helpful by offering instructional guidance and demonstrations.

SORTIE SURGE AND COMBAT QUICK TURN EXERCISES. Since the Soviet air threat facing the TUAFF is just as formidable as the Warsaw Pact numerical superiority over the Central Region forces, it is imperative that the TUAFF develop the capability to generate maximum sorties in minimum time by using the combat quick turn procedures during sortie surge exercises which should be practiced by every TUAFF unit at least quarterly. TUAFF maintenance personnel are superbly trained and highly motivated, so it would not be difficult for them to master this technique. Th USAF rotational units could easily facilitate this learning process during the squadron exchange operations.

EXCHANGE PILOT PROGRAM. For over 20 years the USAF has participated in a pilot exchange program with most of the NATO air forces. Highly qualified officers are selected through a very competitive process to serve 2-3 year tours with an allied air force fighter squadron, performing basically the same duties as their counterparts. It gives them the opportunity to become familiar with another nation's concept of operations within the NATO framework, exchange tactical ideas, and better prepares them to effectively conduct combined arms warfare. Although Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952, the USAF and TUAF have never participated in the exchange program. The German Air Force has two F-4 pilots on duty with the TUAF at all times; however, the TUAF cannot afford to reciprocate at the present time.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

At this point, there should be no doubt in the readers mind that:

1. The Southern Flank of NATO is weak and vulnerable compared to the Central Region.

2. Turkey is the pivotal nation in the region and represents a major barrier to Soviet expansionism into the Middle East-Persian Gulf area.

3. The Turkish Armed Forces, weakened by the 1974-79 U.S. arms embargo, need increased military assistance to accelerate its development.

4 The USAF rotational squadron at Incirlik AB can be used effectively, economically, and immediately to develop a combined training program with the Turkish Air Force (TUAF) which will:

- a. Enhance the TUAF's combat capability
- b. Prepare the two air forces for coalition warfare
- c. Strengthen the ties between the two countries

5. Many of the initiatives that have become standard operating procedures in the Central Region can and should be implemented by the TUAF with the assistance of the United States Air Force.

As Turkey goes, so goes the Southern Region. The entire region, specifically Turkey, has been neglected for too long. I recommend that we act immediately to not only improve the TUAF, but look for cost effective ways of developing, as rapidly as possible, the entire Turkish Armed Forces into a legitimate military power in the Southern Region. A bona fide deterrent that the Soviet Union will never challenge.

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