THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY: CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED FREQUENCY OF DEPLOYMENT ON THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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by

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The National Guard in the Expeditionary Army: Cultural Implications of Increased Frequency of Deployments On the Army National Guard

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Since 1916, the Army National Guard has been organized, funded, and missioned as the nation’s primary strategic reserve to the Army. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Guard began an extended period of combat deployments, mobilizing almost 210,000 soldiers by April, 2005. The primary question this paper seeks to answer is: What are the cultural implications of sustained federal mobilizations and deployments on the Guard? The size and duration of the federal mobilization requirement put tremendous strain on the Guard organization, sparking concern about its continued health and ability to respond to the nation’s needs. Many organizational and structural challenges reveal themselves as a result of the Guard’s abrupt transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational part of an expeditionary Army. The cultural implications of this transformation, however, appear to be primarily positive. Changes in demographic, mindset, and motivation for service combine to produce a sweeping cultural evolution that can only increase the readiness and effectiveness of the Guard as an operational fighting force.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY: CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED FREQUENCY OF DEPLOYMENT ON THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, by MAJ Anthony H. Adrian, 64 pages.

Since 1916, the Army National Guard has been organized, funded, and missioned as the nation’s primary strategic reserve to the Army. However, after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Guard began an extended period of combat deployments, federally mobilizing almost 210,000 soldiers by April 2005. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the cultural implications of sustained federal mobilizations and deployments on the Guard? The size and duration of the federal mobilization requirement put tremendous strain on the Guard organization, sparking concern about its continued health and ability to respond to the nation’s needs. The Guard is experiencing a period of intense stress as it struggles with the continuing demands of the Global War on Terrorism. Many organizational and structural challenges reveal themselves as a result of the Guard’s abrupt transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational part of an expeditionary Army. The cultural implications of this transformation, however, appear to be primarily positive. Changes in demographic, mindset, and motivation for service combine to produce a sweeping cultural evolution that can only increase the readiness and effectiveness of the Guard as an operational fighting force.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It cannot be stressed enough that the Army National Guard has an increased and more vital role in the U.S. Army than ever before. The U.S. Army is at the forefront of the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Reserve Components of the Army continue to deploy at increasing rates, the Army National Guard joins the Army in its objectives to remain ready and relevant in the midst of a war where our enemy is elusive. We are transforming ourselves into a more flexible, responsive, and capabilities-based force that is able to seamlessly integrate into the larger Army. As the Army transforms itself from the Current Force to the Future Force, so will the Army National Guard. (NGB 2005, 1)

The Army Transformation effort that is taking the Army National Guard from its traditional status as a rarely deploying strategic reserve, to a regularly deploying part of the expeditionary force represents a fundamental cultural change that will have many implications, both positive and negative. The Army National Guard is a constitutionally based military force comprised of citizen soldiers in the militia tradition, with both federal and state missions. Originally formed to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” (US Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8), the Guard’s federal mission has evolved throughout its history to become for most of the twentieth century a strategic reserve to be called out in the event of a major war or national emergency. Although these forces are frequently called upon by their governors to respond to local and regional crises as part of their state mission, they have not been historically expected to routinely deploy for long durations overseas in response to expeditionary needs. The National Guard is not currently culturally disposed nor organizationally designed, nor adequately resourced or equipped to quickly respond to the expeditionary requirements that it is now expected to perform (ARNG, 2005c, 17).
Background

The concept of citizens organizing and training themselves to provide security and civil order for their community or region dates back over three thousand years to the Hoplites of Greece and beyond. Today’s National Guard has evolved to its current form through a series of four major iterations over the course of the country’s history. On 14 May 1607 the first English colony of Jamestown was established in the new world. When Native Americans became a serious threat to their survival, Captain John Smith organized and trained the citizens of Jamestown into what was, in effect, America’s first militia. Eventually, all males between the ages of 16 to 60 were required to perform militia duty, and became known as the Enrolled Militia (Doubler and Listman 2003, 3). By the mid-1700s, every colony in the new world had established its own militia to provide for their common defense. These small local militias were sometimes combined to form an ad hoc organization called provincial troops to meet larger threats or conflicts, including most notably the French and Indian War. The separate militias went on to fight the first battles of the war for independence, including Lexington and Concord, Breed’s Hill and Bunker Hill. They continued to fight, mostly as irregulars, in support of Washington’s Continental Army throughout the American Revolution and played a key role in winning our independence. After the Peace of Paris agreement, the establishment of organized militia was mandated in the Constitution and intended as the nation’s first line of defense to fend off invasions or insurrections until a standing Army could be mobilized to relieve them (Doubler and Listman 2003, 18). The Enrolled Militia continued in existence through 1794, when the state governors began appointing
Adjutants General and officers when, following the War of 1812, it began to evolve from mandatory service to what has become known as the Volunteer Militia.

The militia flourished under the volunteer system, experiencing a drastic rise in enthusiasm for drills and musters, increased camaraderie, and organization into specialized units, which in turn led to the acquisition of adequate facilities in which to muster and train (Doubler and Listman 2003, 23). The Volunteer Militia continued to improve and refine itself and performed well in limited action in the Mexican War, until finally coming into its own by displaying admirable performance in many well-known battles during the Civil War. During the Spanish-American War, future president Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” included National Guard cavalry squadrons from New Mexico and Arizona (Doubler and Listman 2003, 48). Subsequently, the National Guard had significant participation during the Philippine Insurrection, including the 2nd Oregon and the 1st North Dakota Infantry (Doubler and Listman 2003, 51).

In 1903, the Volunteer Militia became officially known as the National Guard with the passage of the Dick Act. This act organized the militia into units of the National Guard and for the first time assigned them a formal federal mission in addition to their state mission. National Guard units would henceforth be expected to conform to federal training standards and organization but in return would receive increased funding and equipment, and also for the first time its members would be paid for their service (Doubler and Listman 2003, 53). Just prior to the U.S. entrance into World War I, the National Defense Act of 1916 established the National Guard as the Army’s primary reserve, while expanding the regular army and simultaneously creating a separate Army Reserve. With WWI looming on the horizon, the National Guard was mobilized and
reorganized into seventeen divisions numbered 26 through 42. These National Guard divisions served with distinction during World War I, in fact, of eight American divisions the German High Command considered especially effective, six were National Guard divisions (Doubler and Listman 2003, 67). The Guard returned home from the war, and began the long process of reconstitution and reorganization. A key development occurred during this time that would eventually change the face of the Army and the Guard: The 1920s brought the emergence of the first National Guard aviation units. Captain Charles A. Lindbergh of the Missouri National Guard’s 110th observation squadron was awarded the Medal of Honor for achieving the first solo flight across the North Atlantic on 20 May 1927 (Doubler and Listman 2003, 70).

During the Great Depression, the National Guard both served as a steady source of badly needed income for its members, and provided through it’s armories a venue for social gathering and free entertainment also badly needed during this time of depression. In addition, the Guard proved its reliability in enforcing domestic laws by restoring order following such events as labor strikes and riots.

World War II again saw the mass mobilization of the National Guard, with more than 300,000 guardsmen sent to both the European and Pacific theaters of that war (Doubler and Listman 2003, 89). The National Guard’s divisions were a ready, standing force capable of deploying immediately, shortening America’s entrance into the ground war from what might have been years to a matter of months. National Guard units in WWII fought bravely and well, carrying their share of the load alongside their regular army and reserve counterparts. In all, the eighteen National Guard divisions employed in
both theaters suffered over 173,000 casualties during the war (Doubler and Listman 2003, 89,96).

In the aftermath of World War II, the National Guard again endured a period of reconsolidation and reorganization. The War Department authorized the Guard to reorganize into twenty-seven division, twenty-one regimental combat teams, and hundreds of separate battalions and companies (Doubler and Listman 2003, 101). In October 1948, the National Guard divided itself into the separate Army and Air National Guard components, representing the fourth and (until recently) final major change in their structure. This created the position of the Chief, NGB as the joint representative for both the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard. This change heralded the beginning of the modern National Guard, which remained fundamentally unchanged until 2002. In 2002, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, current Chief, NGB, directed that all states and territories as well as the NGB itself would reorganize to form Standing Joint Headquarters, combining and flattening the staffs of the separate army and air components. This effort to streamline command and control and to create a culture of jointness within the National Guard was completed in 2003 and represents a fifth major change in National Guard organization.

Through all of these changes, growth, development, and gradual integration with the active component, the foundation of the organization, the individual guardsman, has remained fundamentally the same.

The events of 11 September 2001, however, changed this country and the entire world in many profound ways. The terrorist attack in New York and Washington, D.C., revealed an elusive and dangerous enemy that this country is forced to confront and
destroy in order to ensure its continued security. The elusive nature of this new enemy however, has led to what appears to be a sustained condition of war, which could easily continue through the end of this decade. While the imperative to destroy this enemy completely is in little doubt, the requisite period of sustained deployment for the Army National Guard represents a major departure from what has been historically expected of the Guard and could potentially change the entire paradigm under which it and its soldiers operate.

Throughout the history of the United States, the National Guard has served the nation as the steadfast protector of the home front, responding faithfully and effectively to domestic crises and natural disasters, and more recently providing temporary infrastructure security to defend against hostile external aggressors. As we have described, its traditional federal role has been to provide a trained reserve of combat and combat support units that can be quickly mobilized and validated to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of a major conflict or emergency that the standing army is not able to handle alone.

In recent years, however, the Army has become more dependant on the National Guard, demanding more frequent deployments to augment their shrinking structure and growing workload. Much of the public does not know, for example, that since 2002, National Guard units have been in command of the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions, as well as the Multinational Force of Observers--Sinai. Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) though, National Guard units have been deployed both in security roles within the Continental United States (CONUS), and alongside their active duty counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Currently, there are over 85,000
National Guardsmen deployed in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. This recent trend toward frequent deployments, potentially continuing indefinitely, represents a major shift in emphasis for the Guard and brings with it a host of potential problems, as well as benefits that are the subject of analysis for this paper.

**Research Objective**

The objective of this research and analysis is to identify the most critical effects of regular deployment of the Army National Guard, both short and long term, and to analyze the cultural implications of those effects on the Army Guard as an institution. The research questions form the basis for this analysis and attempt to reach the roots of Guard culture and sources of organizational effectiveness. The Army National Guard has fully embraced its role in the GWOT, and the increased rate of federal mobilization required. There is no doubt about the legitimacy of the Guard’s significant role in this war. As illustrated in this chapter, the Army National Guard has a long history of mobilizing and fighting when its country needed it. The primary question is: What cultural impacts, both short and long-term, will this increased frequency of federal mobilization have on today’s Army National Guard? In order to answer this question, the research must first examine the Guard’s contextual environment, past and current. What was the Army National Guard operational context prior to 11 September 2001? What is the current operational context? A comparison of the answers to these two questions will then be conducted to determine the extent of environmental change. What are the key differences between the two contexts? How do these changes affect Army National Guard soldiers and the organization as a whole? The answers to these questions should provide the information needed to make informed judgments in answering the primary question.
Significance

This topic is important because the future of the Guard as an effective reserve component may be at stake. National Guard soldiers throughout America’s history have voluntarily served under the presumption that they are part of a strategic reserve, which would deploy rarely, under conditions of national emergency or major war for which the entire national will is also mobilized. Although Guardsmen are constantly aware that these deployments are possible (after all, that is the reason they exist and train), their lives are nevertheless built around the assumption that these deployments will be a very rare occurrence, and may happen only once or twice in their entire career (Grass Interview, 2005). Their employers as well operate under this assumption, accepting this minimal risk as a trade-off for the normally high work ethic, discipline, and leadership skills that Guardsmen contribute to their organizations.

Under the current circumstances of frequent deployments of up to eighteen months, with additional deployments of similar length expected within five years (U.S. Department of Defense, Roadmap, 2005), the entire paradigm under which Guard soldiers volunteer to serve has shifted. Employers must now reevaluate the risk to payoff ratio of hiring or retaining Guard members in key positions within their organizations. Families must now consider the higher personal costs and increased potential for catastrophic loss involved with service in the Guard. These new personal considerations affecting Guardsmen have the potential to severely reduce the ability of the National Guard to fill its units.

Similarly, governors and state emergency management officials must reevaluate their ability to respond to domestic crises when up to one-half of their state forces are
deployed. Finally, the nation itself must recognize the implications of this shift and reevaluate its ability to respond to a major conventional threat having already committed its strategic reserve.

**Delimitations**

This analysis will be limited to the examination of cultural implications of increased and sustained deployments on National Guard soldiers and units. Secondary consideration will be given to the organization, training, materiel, and personnel portions of the Army’s Force Management spectrum: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DTLOMPF) as it relates to the problem and impacts cultural implications. The research and analysis will also be limited to the Army component of the National Guard, with only occasional references to the Air National Guard. Additional delimitations will be added as required to keep the scope of this thesis realistic and feasible.

**Key Terms**

Definitions: The definitions of some key terms for the purposes of this thesis are: “Expeditionary Army” refers to the highly mobile, deployable, and modular force structure centered on the newly designed Brigade Combat Team. “Deployments” for the purpose of this thesis refers only to operational missions conducted outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Federal mobilization refers to the mobilization of Army National Guard units for other than Title 32 state active duty and includes primarily the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) and Partial Mobilization.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis began by tracing the origins and missions of the Army National Guard, both statutorily and organizationally, and assessing how it has changed through the years. It will continue by examining the nature and relative frequency of significant federal mobilizations and actions between World War II and the turn of the century. The contemporary stage will be set with an assessment of the Guard’s legal, perceived, and practical roles and relationships in the mid-1990s. From there the thesis will begin to trace the transformation of the National Guard from a strategic reserve focus to the current quickly reacting, frequently deploying expeditionary force seen today. It will examine the effects on readiness, strength, and equipping upon National Guard units involved in small-scale contingency (SSC) operations, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, as well as major actions, such as Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Finally, this thesis will attempt to analyze overall cultural effects of this increased activity in context with the Guard’s continuous state missions and attempt to draw conclusions as to their ability to sustain this increased level of activity.

The research will be divided into four areas, corresponding to each of the supporting questions for this thesis. The first supporting question, What was the Army National Guard’s operational context prior to the start of the GWOT? guides the research into an in-depth look at the historical context, beginning with the Guard’s involvement in the Korean conflict. The most valuable sources for information pertaining to this conflict are documents, records, and reports maintained by the Army National Guard’s official
historian. Original documents and records from the Korean and Vietnam conflicts will provide accurate data for the quantitative analysis, while mainstream publications, such as William Berebitsky’s *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953*, will provide a more qualitative feel for how the Guard reacted to this mobilization. This reference contains the personal accounts of over 130 Army National Guard Korean War veterans providing insight into topics from battlefield vignettes to the strength, training, and readiness of their units at the time of mobilization.

The next supporting question that the research must answer is, What is the current operational context? Although few would argue that the Army National Guard operational environment and pace has changed since 11 September 2001, it is incumbent on this research to establish this assertion as a fact through quantitative and qualitative analysis. Hard data on Guard mobilizations is made available to the director and primary staff of the Army National Guard continuously in the form of a secure website called the Reserve Component Mobilization and Strength database. This information is compiled directly from mobilization orders and recruiting and retention reports from the states and territories for official use and will therefore be treated as a very reliable primary source.

A large amount of open-source research currently exists on the topic of increased deployment rates for the National Guard. Although the most current information relating directly to this topic resides primarily in periodicals, congressional records, and Army records, there are many direct quotes from key Army National Guard leaders speaking on the topic of increased Guard mobilizations. As the percentage of National Guard units federally mobilized for action in the GWOT approaches 100 percent, interest in and key
leader comment on this topic increases, continuously introducing new input for this stage of the research.

Additional base-line primary references include the U.S. Constitution, subsequent amendments and laws affecting the Army National Guard, and U.S. Department of Defense and Government Accountability Office (GAO) documents as they relate to the Guard. The obvious importance of these documents is that they shape the context under which the National Guard is supposed to operate and define any expectations or constraints involved in the employment of Guard forces. These sources will be cited frequently to display this operational context, as well as compared to uncover any recent changes, conflicts, or vagueness. In some cases the sources of these documents, such as congressional records and notes (where available), may be analyzed in an attempt to determine their original intent.

Other important references include after action reports from units recently deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; personal interviews with commanders, staff members, and soldiers from units recently deployed; and recent congressional testimony by senior Army National Guard leaders. There are also several older studies published by organizations, such as Rand, the Strategic Studies Institute, and other think tanks that provide secondary sources that may be useful. Most of the available literature on the subject focuses on the near-term effects of multiple deployments and increased operational tempo of the National Guard.

Interviews with leaders and soldiers at all levels of the National Guard will also be used. Intended subjects for interview include: the Deputy Director, Army National Guard (DDARNG) would provide the National-level view of the Guard’s operational
environment and the organizational position on the Guard’s ability to maintain the current level and pace of deployments. As principal assistant to the director on all plans, programs, and operations, the DDARNG would also know what plans or programs the Army National Guard already has in place or under development which are designed to mitigate the negative effects of increased deployment rates. The Army National Guard Chief Personnel Officer (G-1) would provide a macro level view of the Guard’s ability to maintain strength and replenish losses in this environment and an authoritative viewpoint on any recent trends in recruiting and retention. With direct reporting from every unit in every state, the G-1 has access to current strength data across the Guard. The commander, key staff, and soldiers of the 203rd Engineer Battalion, Missouri Army National Guard recently returned from Iraq would provide a closer, micro level view of an individual unit’s reaction to a lengthy wartime deployment and of the immediate effects of that deployment on its readiness, strength, and equipment. At the time the interviews will be conducted, the unit will have been back from mobilization for approximately six months. This will have been enough time for any initial turbulence to settle, yet the experience will still be fresh in their minds. The Missouri State Training Officer would provide a midlevel view of the current environment, from a state that has seen about one-half of its forces activated for both overseas and domestic duty since the beginning of the GWOT. It is hoped that this source will provide an important balance between the possibly insulated viewpoint of the national headquarters and the emotional, close-to-home viewpoint of the individual unit. Throughout all of these proposed personal interviews, the author will attempt keep sight of the strategic view, in terms of long-term effects on overall U.S. national security, as well as short term effects on the Guard force.
Research into the third supporting question, What are the key differences in operational context? will use the research completed in the historical and current contexts in comparison with one another and draw qualitative conclusions based on the contrasts revealed. The published opinions of notable strategists and think-tanks will be cited to assist in validating the importance or relevance of contrasts or changes highlighted during this comparative analysis. The results of key leader interviews may also be used to verify the importance of those changes in context deemed critical by the author.

The final supporting question, How do these changes affect the Army National Guard? will largely be answered through analysis and patterns found during soldier and leader interviews, as well as participant observation and personal experience on the part of the author.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research for this thesis will focus on a qualitative assessment of how the Army National Guard is responding to the current stresses induced by the increased frequency of deployments since the beginning of the GWOT. Quantitative methods will be used in moderation to establish baseline fact where assumptions would not be appropriate. The ultimate goal is to obtain a glimpse of the organizational mind-set of the Guard, what ideals or paradigms shape its nature, and ultimately how it will respond to its current stressors. The primarily qualitative method of research was chosen due to the nature of these goals. Quantitative measures, although generally thought to be more accurate and measurable, are not well suited to divining such esoteric concepts as “organizational mind-set”, and “ideals or paradigms,” as these concepts do not lend themselves well to mathematical measurement. The qualitative research process, on the other hand, allows the author to develop an argument based on close association with the subject, direct participation, and direct observation, and provides the reader with an opportunity to exercise their own judgment with respect to the validity of the argument.

The strengths of the qualitative method include the ability to provide a view of the subject through participant perspective rather than cold, impersonal statistics; the freedom to express ideas through the filter of, or in terms of, common sense; and provides a vehicle for the subjective measurement of esoteric concepts such as mind-set or paradigms. Qualitative research is limited, however, in its ability to generalize across a population due to its typically small sample size. It is also, by its very nature, little more
than the informed opinion of its author, the value of which is linked directly with the depth and breadth of his or her research into the subject. This thesis seeks to maximize the strengths of qualitative research through liberal use of participant interviews and direct observation, filtered through the lens of over sixteen years of direct participation inside the organization at multiple levels; while attempting to mitigate its weaknesses through the use of quantitative measures where appropriate to show correlation, and through the strength, relevance, and credibility of information sources and subjects chosen for interview.

The resultant thesis will follow a case study design, and will be broken out largely chronologically. Case studies are particularly useful when attempting to explain complex social phenomena, as they lend themselves well to questions that ask how or why, such as How will the Army National Guard respond to the current stressors of the GWOT.

Another significant strength of the case study is its ability to use triangulation, or the use of multiple perceptions gathered from multiple sources, to clarify the meaning behind and assertion, action, or behavior (Flick 1992).

The most significant weakness of a case study design is the tendency to generalize the outcome. The researcher must be careful not to generalize specific behaviors from his small, localized sample to the entire population. At the same time, however, case studies provide an opportunity to expand and generalize theories related to the case study in support of a thesis (Yin 2003). That being said, the subject of this thesis, the Army National Guard in the GWOT, is a case that the author intends to examine to predict its implications on the organization; therefore, the most effective and obvious choice for research design is the case study model.
Bias

One of the inherent dangers in research analysis and in the use of qualitative methodology in particular, is personal bias. The ultimate quality and utility of the results of a research analysis is hinged upon the objectivity of the researcher. The tendency toward bias increases with the researcher’s proximity to the problem, as is certainly the case with a qualitative case study design. Fortunately, the specific methodology of this thesis has been designed in such a way as to minimize and counteract the natural potential toward bias. This methodology mitigates bias in two ways: First, through the use of triangulation, as described above, data will be collected from factual historical and current operational documents, interviews with relevant key leaders across the Army National Guard chain of command, as well as public law, policy, and published strategy. These sources of hard fact and viewpoints from credible figures will serve to counterbalance any unintended bias from the author’s own participant observation and participation. Secondly, the use of quantitative analysis methods in the comparison and contrast of historical and current mobilization and deployment data will again serve to limit the manifestation of personal bias on the part of the author. As a sixteen-year member and interested participant in the organization being studied, the author’s development of personal bias of some sort is inevitable. That being said, it is hoped that the methodology used in the production of this thesis will both severely limit the emergence of said bias and throw into stark relief any instances where it may inadvertently slip through.
Collection of Data

In the introduction, the research traced the history and evolution of the National Guard from colonial security requirements through its current organizational structure and provided a good historical context for understanding the Guard’s contribution to U.S. national security. The analysis in chapter 4 will be organized into four sections: historical context, current context, contrast, and identification of key implications. The research will focus on the cultural effects and implications of regular deployment of the Army National Guard for OCONUS operations and address the problem of identifying potential major negative impacts and possible catastrophic effects on this time-honored institution.

Historical Context

Research into the historical context will continue in chapter 4, with a closer look at Army National Guard participation in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as other smaller scale operational deployments through 2001. Through a more in-depth look at the numbers mobilized, type of mobilization, duration of mobilization, and post deployment effects of Army National Guard mobilizations in these cases, the research will begin to form a more precise picture of common effects on Guard forces deployed in the recent past. In addition, the research will collect data establishing the general frequency with which Guard units were federally mobilized, in order to shape a generalization as to the expectations of Army National Guard soldiers regarding frequency of deployment.

Army National Guard recruiting and retention data will also be collected for the years 1999 to 2001 to set a baseline for pre-11 September 2001 strength maintenance, which will later be compared and contrasted with post-11 September 2001 data. A key
component of this data should include numbers of accessions of active component soldiers migrating to the Guard, the decline of which has recently been identified as a potentially significant loss by key leaders in the organization (Las Angeles Times, 26 January 2005). The research for this historical context will also attempt to gain insight into relative levels of employer support to guardsmen through data collected by the Army National Guard’s Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve directorate. Employer support information will be useful in shaping the historical context or paradigm under which Guard soldiers operated prior to 11 September 2001, as well as provide another area for comparison and contrast with the current setting.

All of this information will be vital in setting the stage for future comparison and contrast with the current context, by providing a factual historical benchmark from which to depart. When possible, the research will compare and contrast these data points against the same units mobilizing in both the recent historical context and the current context.

This more focused historical context will illustrate the paradigm, or condition set under which Guard soldiers and the organization itself perceived they were operating prior to the current context, defined as post–11 September 2001. Although the research does not attempt to directly analyze or categorize the organizational mind-set, it will use the historical actions, policies, and statements of key leaders of the Army National Guard to frame that paradigm.

**Current Context**

The research will progress by collecting the same data points that were examined in the historical context, this time for federal mobilizations occurring after 11 September 2001. Again, the underlying assumption predating this study is that a significant and
sudden change in the operational context of the Army National Guard has occurred and that it began with the initiation of the GWOT, which in turn was the result of the attacks of 11 September 2001. The raw data, including recruiting, retention, and mobilization data will be collected and prepared in the same format as the historical data for comparison and contrast in the analysis of data section of this thesis.

The current context will further collect the viewpoints of soldiers and leaders from one or more battalions recently federally mobilized, through direct interviews. Questions asked of the soldiers and leaders will be open ended to allow maximum freedom of expression and will be geared to determine their original reasons for service, reasons for continued service, overall satisfaction with current conditions, plans for future service, viewpoints on the role of the Guard in the GWOT, and similar issues relevant to identifying the context in which they view the Guard and their service. Utmost care will be taken in the construction of the questions to avoid bias and to avoid leading their response in any way. For example, one of the objectives of the questioning will be to determine their willingness to continue service in the face of almost certain additional federal mobilizations. It would be very difficult to form a single question that is completely neutral in this instance; therefore, in this case the same question will be asked in two or more ways in an attempt to counteract the inherent bias in any one of them. The answers to these related questions will then be evaluated to derive the unbiased answer. A list of the specific questions asked of the unit soldiers and leaders will be included as an annex to chapter 4. The interviews will be conducted individually via telephone or electronic mail.
Key senior leaders in the Army National Guard chain of command will be interviewed to determine their viewpoints and to identify the context with which they see the Guard from their respective positions. Specific leaders to be interviewed include (from bottom up): Deputy Commander, 35th Engineer Brigade, Missouri Army National Guard. This separate engineer brigade has seen each of its four battalions federally mobilized since 2001; The Plans, Operations, and Training Officer of the Missouri Army National Guard. Lieutenant Colonel Allen Garrison is the primary training officer for the G-3 of the State of Missouri; The Chief, Operations Division of the Army National Guard. Colonel Martin Leppert is the Chief of Operations for the Army National Guard, overseeing the mobilizations and deployments, information operations, exercises, combat training centers, and crisis response center at the national headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the DDARNG. As the DDARNG, Brigadier General Frank Grass is responsible for assisting the director in formulating, developing, and coordinating all programs, policies, and plans affecting the Army National Guard. Question sets asked of these key leaders will vary depending on their position and responsibilities within the organization. Specific questions asked will be listed as an annex to chapter 4.

Analysis of Data

This section will take the data collected in the historical and current context sections and analyze the two sets of data in comparison to one another. The comparisons will be broken out into subheadings of: frequency of mobilization, mobilization details, post mobilization effects, strength maintenance, and policy and legislative changes. The objective of this comparative analysis is to identify patterns within the changes from historical to current context, as well as common themes among the interview responses.
The analysis will then move on to identification of key implications brought to light by those contrasts, patterns and themes previously highlighted.

**Contrast**

The contrast section of this thesis will be structured primarily as a comparative analysis of the data collected in the historical and current context sections. The frequency of mobilization subheading will compare the aggregate number of federal mobilizations between the time periods 1999 through 2001 and 2002 through 2004 in order to gauge the magnitude of actual increase in frequency of mobilizations after 11 September 2001. In addition, it will show the number of units mobilized more than once during each time period.

The mobilization details subheading will compare the historical and current data in terms of numbers of soldiers mobilized, type of duty (combat and non combat), and duration of mobilization. The quantitative analysis of this comparative data will provide a closer look at the details of federal mobilizations during the two time periods.

Similar quantitative comparisons will be used to contrast data compiled on recruiting, re-enlistment, and numbers of soldiers joining the Army National Guard after discharge from the active component. These numbers will be a key indicator of overall satisfaction with service in the Guard, and will also be useful in conjunction with other data points such as soldier and key leader interviews.

Analysis of any changes in legislative, policy, or regulatory guidance pertaining to the Guard will be qualitative in nature and serve as an indicator of senior leadership reaction to perceived problems or the direction in which they would like to take the
organization. The research is also open to the possibility that a lack of change in these documents may also be significant.

The soldier and leader interviews will provide an opportunity to qualitatively analyze the attitudes and viewpoints of these individuals in a small sample case study format. Although the size of the sample will not be statistically significant enough for true quantitative analysis, these viewpoints will be an important part of the triangulation of data in support of the other methods.

**Identification of Key Implications**

The thesis will move forward in the identification of key implications sub-heading to further analyze the results of comparisons just made, in an effort to distill meaning from this collection of new information. The analysis will use the patterns and information developed during this original research, other published analysis and opinion, statements from key leaders obtained both through research interviews and media publications, and the author’s personal experience to identify and illustrate the possible future implications of this sudden change in Guard operational context.

**Conclusions**

The research will conclude in chapter 5, with an assessment and review of what this study has accomplished, its relevance, and recommendations for future research and actions. Regardless of the outcome of this research, one thing is certain: The United States of America is at war and requires the services of a strong, effective Army National Guard force to deploy worldwide and assist in the prosecution of the nation’s national security requirements. With this understanding, the recommendations presented in
chapter 5 will focus on the mitigation of negative implications without ignoring the Guard’s requirement to remain fully engaged in the GWOT.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Analysis of the research conducted for this thesis produced results that were surprising to the author. The expectation that the stress and strain of sustained deployment of the Army National Guard would cause catastrophic implications across the organization was not validated. In fact, although the Guard is experiencing some significant organizational and structural challenges as a result of increased deployments, this research concludes that culturally the Army Guard is actually stronger than it was before.

The analysis will be presented in four sections: historical context, current context, contrast, and identification of key implications. The historical context will include examinations of Army National Guard operations and the effects of those operations in the Korean War, Vietnam, small-scale contingencies, and overall recruiting and retention prior to 11 September 2001. Significant time and effort are devoted to the historical context due to its importance in explaining the evolution of Guard culture from the beginning of the Cold War and how it has continued to evolve since. Many of the implications occurring now as a result of the GWOT can be traced directly back to actions taken during and after the Korean War. The current context will examine Guard operations post-11 September 2001, including trends in strength and retention, and will utilize a case study to gauge the effects of mobilization on a battalion just returned from OIF. The contrast section will compare the historical and current contexts and attempt to
draw conclusions. The final section will identify key implications of those conclusions on the Guard as a whole.

More than 201,500 Army National Guard soldiers from a total strength of 350,000 have been federally mobilized since 11 September 2001. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in the first of a series of three reports focusing on the Army National Guard, stated: “The Army Guard has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas deployments.” (GAO, 2004a, i)

The evolution from strategic reserve to operational force and the Guard’s difficulty responding to this change in context represent the central problem that this chapter will analyze. This chapter will go on to identify several key implications, both short and long term, that may result from this fundamental change and offer recommendations for avoidance or mitigation of undesirable outcomes.

**Historical Context**

The analysis will begin with a detailed look at the near-term history of Army National Guard federal mobilizations, starting with the Korean War. In order to fully explain the change that has taken place in the Guard since 11 September 2001, the reader must first understand what it was previously. By looking back at two major federal mobilizations in the recent past and their effects on Guard culture the thesis will reveal a context in which the current situation can be evaluated.
The Korean War

The United States entered the ground war in Korea on 30 June 1950, as President Harry Truman ordered the movement of one US regimental combat team to join the fray (Berebitsky 1996, 3). As the situation on the ground continued to worsen, 19 July the President ordered the call-up of the National Guard: “I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required.” (Berebitsky 1996, 3)

A total of 138,600 Army National Guardsmen were called to active service for the Korean War. This number represented 37 percent of all Army Guardsmen. Although all of these mobilizations were in response to the Korean War, not all units saw combat. Of the first four divisions called, two were sent to the Pacific (the 40th Infantry Division of California and the 45th Infantry Division of Oklahoma), and two were sent to Germany (the 43rd Infantry Division of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont and the 28th Infantry Division of Pennsylvania). These units were sent to Germany to discourage the Soviets from attacking into Europe while the US was distracted in Korea. In all, over 700 units were mobilized for Korea, as well as thousands of individual Guardsmen sent as replacements (NGB 2000). Forty-three of those units were credited with combat (20 companies, 21 battalions, and 2 divisions), while the rest remained in supporting roles in Germany and elsewhere (Berebitsky 1996, 268). The duration of their mobilizations ranged from 21 to 24 months.

Mobilization for the Korean War brought with it some new paradigms for the Guard: Partial mobilization and combat rotations. When the President authorized the
mobilization of “as many National Guard units . . . as may be required” (Berebitsky 1996, 3), the National Guard Bureau was taken by surprise, expecting the full mobilization of all Guard units as had been the case in the two World Wars. This new policy had its good points and its bad. It left soldiers and units in suspense for the duration of the war, wondering if they would be activated. Many put their lives on hold, hesitating to take a new job, buy a house, or start a family. Morale across the Guard suffered, and although the Guard headquarters repeatedly requested full mobilization, the Army continued the partial mobilization policy throughout the war (Berebitsky 1996, 3). In retrospect, partial mobilization seems to have been a good decision by Army leaders. On the positive side over 60 percent of the Guard did not have to be mobilized, separated from their families, removed from their jobs, or put in harm’s way. In addition, during this period in the Guard’s history, it possessed only 46 percent of its authorized equipment, meaning that even had they been fully mobilized, they would not have been fully capable (Doubler 2001, 232). The new partial mobilization paradigm initiated during the Korean War remains in effect today. The combat rotation policy employed during the Korean War was centered on the idea of maintaining a constant core of units in Korea, through which would rotate a constant stream of fresh combatants and supporters. Although the policy was controversial, its main purpose was to avoid the widespread combat exhaustion that plagued soldiers and units during World War II by limiting the duration of direct combat (Doubler 2001, 233). This policy too remains in effect today and has become a part of the Army’s operational paradigm.

Another policy, which fortunately was discontinued, was the practice of stripping Guard units of their most-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers for early
mobilization and fill of units already in combat. This policy violated the expectation that Guard units would be kept intact and mobilized as cohesive units. In addition, the removal of these key individuals severely reduced the overall readiness of the unit by removing the leaders they knew and trusted.

Although the Guard’s Korea mobilization experience was often turbulent and stressful for both soldiers and leaders, the long term, postwar effects turned out to be much more positive in nature. First, the Army National Guard benefited from the Army’s overall increase in end strength after the Korean War, growing from its prewar strength of 325,000 to nearly 405,000 soldiers by 1956 (Doubler 2001, 238). This Army-wide increase in strength resulted from the realization that conventional wars were still possible in the nuclear age and that the US needed to maintain a military that could fight and win these conflicts while maintaining a strategic reserve to deter the Soviets. The increase in Guard authorized strength included the addition of nine armored cavalry regiments and the conversion of four infantry divisions to armored divisions, giving the Army Guard a total of twenty one infantry and six armored divisions.

The five years following the Korean War also brought about several significant improvements specific to the Guard, including changes in legislation, policy, and training. In 1952 Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act, creating the US Army Reserve, consolidating existing laws pertaining to the reserve components, and further defining their roles, responsibilities, composition and regulations. Four years later, in August 1956, Congress created Title 10, U.S. Code to consolidate all laws governing federal military forces, including Guardsmen serving in full-time federal status and those federally mobilized. Congress also created Title 32, U.S. Code in 1956, which contained
all laws and regulations pertaining to the National Guard in State service. Title 32
standardized across all states the basic organization, training, administration, personnel,
and logistics for the National Guard and spelled out the State responsibilities in ensuring
availability of trained, manned, and equipped forces for the national defense (Doubler

The National Guard’s training environment for individual soldiers and units
improved appreciably during the period immediately following the Korean War. Perhaps
the most significant change followed the legislation passed by Congress in 1955 requiring
all National Guard and Reserve soldiers to attend the eight-week active component basic
training on an Army installation. The Guard was fundamentally improved by this
legislation in several ways. First, Guard soldiers were provided with standardized basic
combat training equivalent to that of the active soldiers. Second, Guardsmen were
submerged completely and exposed early to the active Army culture, with its strict
discipline and standards of appearance and bearing. Third, Guard units were freed of the
responsibility of training new recruits in basic skills during limited monthly drill time.
Army National Guard unit commanders recognizing the need for continual, intensive
training saw this as an opportunity to focus on more complex and advanced collective
training rather than basic skills. However, more complex training requires increased
training time. In response to feedback from the unit commanders, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau made the decision to amend Guard policy to allow longer training
assemblies, increasing to two consecutive four-hour periods instead of the previous
separate two-hour periods. Under the former policy, drill was often held for a two-hour
period on a weeknight. In order to maximize the amount of useable training time,
commanders began holding drills on weekends. The additional training time combined with the freedom from training basic skills allowed Guard units for the first time to focus on truly collective training at the squad and platoon levels.

The Korean War brought about three significant changes in paradigm for the Army National Guard. The first was a new precedence negating the requirement for full mobilization when employing the Guard and allowing the possibility of federal mobilization of individual units for combat. The second was a closer identification with the active component by virtue of a shared Initial Entry Training experience. And the third was a new focus on unit collective training during longer, weekend drill periods.

These changes, along with the legislative actions of the post war period combined to signal a new, more professional, better organized, and relevant Army National Guard force.

Over the following decade, the Guard continued to grow and adapt to its new paradigms. The first real test of the effectiveness of the policy and legislative changes of the mid 1950’s came in the summer of 1961 during the Berlin crisis. On 31 July President Kennedy authorized the federal mobilization of 250,000 National Guardsmen in reaction to threatening actions by Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev, including the construction of the Berlin Wall bisecting the city. By October of 1961, almost 45,000 Army National Guardsmen were activated from 39 states and the District of Columbia. Those mobilized included two divisions (the 32nd Infantry of Wisconsin and the 49th Armored of Texas) and 264 nondivisional units (Doubler 2001, 251). Although none of these Guard soldiers were deployed outside of the CONUS, the effectiveness of those policy and legislative changes was demonstrated in the speed with which Guard units were declared combat
ready for this crisis. The two divisions moved quickly to their mobilization stations, began an aggressive post mobilization training program, and were declared combat ready only four months after mobilization; two months earlier than expected (Doubler 2001, 251).

Over the following seven years the Guard would undergo a sweeping transformation to further improve its efficiency and utility to the nation. During the mid-1960’s the Guard would reduce its structure by 1000 units and over 18,000 personnel in order to close the gap between peacetime personnel authorizations and war time personnel requirements, and significantly reduce the need for cross leveling of personnel and equipment during a mobilization. At the end of this reorganization the Army National Guard consisted of just eight divisions, 18 separate brigades, four ACRs, and two Special Forces groups (Doubler 2001, 256).

Vietnam

While the conflict in Vietnam continued to escalate as the 1960’s drew on, President Johnson hesitated to mobilize the National Guard. Though American commitment to the conflict continued to increase, the President argued that large-scale mobilization of the Guard might provoke Communist Soviets and Chinese to enter the war, thereby sparking a major war in southwest Asia. This reluctance persisted until 1968, turning the Guard into a haven for young men seeking to avoid the draft. Finally, in April 1968 following the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the shock of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, President Johnson authorized the activation of 24,500 Guardsmen and reservists. The National Guard mobilized 13,633 soldiers from seventeen states and 34 units for combat service in Vietnam and to serve as a CONUS reserve. The
speed and efficiency of the Guard’s mobilization process continued to improve. This time, from mobilization in May to first unit in theater in August, took just over three months. In the end only 2,729 soldiers deployed with eight units for combat in Vietnam. Another 4,000 soldiers served as individual replacements. The average mobilization period for these eight units that saw combat was about 18 months (NGB 1972, 77).

Though only a small number of Guard units actually deployed for combat, the speed and efficiency of their mobilization and deployment further validated the legislative, policy, and organizational changes made during the previous two decades and provides a benchmark in the development of organizational efficiency for the National Guard as a whole. The units themselves were also better trained, manned, and equipped. Brigadier General James Gunn, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, remarked:

These units proved to be outstanding in every respect. They were composed of mature officers and men who arrived in country with 100 percent of their TOE strength and equipment. They were for the most part well-educated and highly motivated and skilled. (NGB 1972, 77)

Although the Guard’s mobilization for Vietnam was accomplished more smoothly and quickly than past mobilizations, the process was far from perfect, and in fact repeated many of the same mistakes made during previous conflicts. Lessons learned collected after the Vietnam War identified problems such as unreliable readiness reporting, improper notification procedures, and poor availability of personnel status data as recurring errors occurring in both the Berlin crisis mobilization and the Vietnam mobilization (NGB 1972, Encl. 8). However, perhaps the most important lesson relevant to this thesis was not captured in NGB or Army after action reports.
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine what effects and implications will result from increased and consistent use of the Army National Guard in overseas operations. The National Guard’s experience during the Vietnam conflict, however, may provide a glimpse of the antithesis: What effects and implications result from a lack of use of the Army National Guard during extended conflict?

The most significant effect of not mobilizing the Guard during the early years of the Vietnam conflict, as espoused by proponents of the Abrams Doctrine (GAO 2004b, 6), was a lack of commitment of the national will toward prosecuting that war. Then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams was so convinced that mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves would also mobilize the national will that he restructured the Army to ensure that it would not be possible go to war in the future without the reserve components.

Although many of the leading indicators of the Guard’s health, including strength, recruiting, and retention were at an all time high during this period making the Guard appear to be strong, in reality it was at one of its lowest points in terms of morale and combat readiness. Not mobilizing the National Guard for conflict led to the eventual common practice of unscrupulous individuals joining the Guard for the sole reason of avoiding the draft. This practice filled the ranks of the Guard with young men who were not necessarily committed to the service, and damaged morale among longtime Guard members. The resulting lack of commitment and decline in morale across the Guard during this period threatened to undo the improvements in training and readiness gained over the previous twenty years (Doubler 2001, 259).
Small Scale Contingencies

As the Guard moved into the last third of the twentieth century, it also moved into a new era of Total Force policy and the implementation of the Abrams doctrine. The following quote from the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams, Jr. illustrates the emphasis applied to the Total Force policy:

We have to make our reliance on the Guard and Reserves real. No longer will the lyrics be any good. If we make it real in the eyes of the reserve components, then it will be real for the country. (Doubler 2001, 269)

The 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were marked by an insurgence of OCONUS training opportunities, which became known as overseas duty for training (ODT), and increasing Guard participation in small scale contingencies (SSC) and crises across the globe. This era also began a slow and often times bumpy growth in inter-component relations due to the constant requirement for active component and reserve component cooperation.

Although large-scale mobilizations during this period were virtually nonexistent with the exception of 1991’s Desert Storm, small portions of the Guard were mobilized with relative frequency for small crises and uprisings, such as Haiti, Grenada, and Somalia. In addition, Guard units were mobilized for rotating long term stability and support operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sinai. Individually, these mobilizations were not large enough to impact the Guard as a whole since they were generally of short duration, limited loss of life or injury, and spread widely across the force. However, when taken in the aggregate they achieved what GEN Abrams intended in the quote above; they made the Army’s reliance on the Guard real in the eyes of Guardsmen and began a new paradigm of global involvement for the National Guard.
The cumulative result of these SSC mobilizations was to bring the Guard into a much closer (although still sometimes rocky) relationship with the active component, and instill the beginnings of an expeditionary mind-set into a National Guard that was otherwise still bound by the culture, policies, resources, and force structure of a strategic reserve. The National Guard of the post-Cold War era became more professional, better trained, and achieved a higher state of combat readiness than at any previous time in its history as a result of this closer relationship with the active component and its increased likelihood of worldwide deployment.

The 1990s could be described as the “golden age” of the Army National Guard. The Guard during this period became healthier in terms of strength, readiness, morale, and effective force structure; wealthier in terms of modern equipment and increased credibility among AC brethren; and wiser in terms of increased training opportunities and access to combat training centers. The Army National Guard at the end of the Twentieth Century was clearly the best it had ever been as an organization.

“By the end of the Cold War, Guard soldiers routinely operated the Army’s most sophisticated weapons systems including the M-1 Tank, the Apache helicopter, and the MLRS artillery system. In 2000, a new generation of ARNG men and women is embracing rapid changes in information technologies that are revolutionizing training and administration.” (Doubler 2001, 396)

Recruiting and Retention Pre-11 September 2001

During the years 1998 through 2001, the Army National Guard was at the peak of its post-Cold War growth and development. Throughout the fifty years of Army National Guard activities described above runs a thread of continual organizational maturation and improvement. Morale across the Guard was generally high, participation in both CONUS and OCONUS exercises was higher than ever, and recruiting and retention goals were
consistently met or exceeded. For example, in fiscal year 2000, the Army National Guard achieved 100.8 percent of its end strength goal, and in fiscal year 2001 achieved 100.4 percent of that year’s goal. Figure 1 shows the Army National Guard’s consistency in meeting and exceeding end strength goals during the entire period from 1998 through 2001. Although visually the chart depicts an overall downward turn in strength, this is due to a gradual reduction in authorized end strength from 367,000 in 1997 down to 350,526 in 2001.

Figure 1. ARNG Strength 1998-2001  
Figure 2 shows the Army National Guard loss rate during the period from October 2000 through December 2001 (earlier loss rate data was not available). During this period, losses are shown to be fluctuating slightly at between 18.25 and 19.5 percent. Retention fell short of the 2001 goal of 18 percent by just one percent, ending the fiscal year with a loss rate of 19 percent (US Senate 2002, 3). Although the Guard did not achieve its goal, this chart depicts a steady maintenance of losses within 1 percent of its goal, indicative of a generally healthy organization.

![Figure 2. ARNG Loss Rate, October 2000–December 2001](image)

*Source: ARNG, 2005a.*

The Army National Guard during this period, 1998 through 2001 was healthy and strong; a force slowly coalescing with its active component counterpart, with ever
increasing professionalism, training, equipment, and expeditionary mind-set. On 10 September 2001 the Guard was comfortable with its slow but steady growth and improvement, and eager to increase its role as part of a global military force.

**Current Context**

Everything changed on 11 September 2001. Over the next four years, the Army National Guard would indeed increase its role as part of a global military force, some would say to the breaking point. By February 2002, only five months after the attacks, the National Guard had committed approximately 31,770 soldiers to operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, an increase of 23,829 over the previous year (US Senate 2002, 5). By the end of the following year that number would more than triple to 104,798 (ARNG, 2005b). As of 10 January 2005 more than 209,500 Guard soldiers, almost two thirds of the entire force, had been federally mobilized for operations in support of the GWOT (Grass Brief, 2005, 3). Figure 3 below depicts the number of soldiers mobilized at the end of each month through February 2005.

Most of the units mobilized for operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) spent a total of about 18 months on active duty, including one year “boots on the ground” in theater (DoD PPG, 2005, 1-5(a)). This policy, however, was not developed immediately. The first round of mobilizations for OIF were originally told they would be mobilized for a total period of one year, regardless how much time was actually spent “boots on the ground”. These units were notified during their deployment that a change had been made and that they would now be spending one year in Iraq, increasing their overall amount of time activated by about six months. Some of these units were again surprised when, less than one month before they were to go home after a
year in Iraq, they were told they would have to stay for another three months due to an ongoing insurgent crisis. The subsequent rotations of OIF-2 and OIF-3, however, maintained a consistent policy of one year in theater plus required mobilization and demobilization time, for an average of about 18 months activation.

![Mobilized as of End of Month](image)

Figure 3. Guard Soldiers Mobilized by Month
*Source: ARNG 2005a.*

This “one year boots on the ground” policy was a sensible and manageable approach--for a war of short duration. The Army first began to realize it had a problem when it started running out of military police to fill the requirements for future mobilizations. Current law provides the president three methods for call-up of the reserve
component. Table 1 is taken from GAO-05-285T, *A Strategic Approach is Needed To Address Long Term Guard and Reserve Availability.*

Table 1. Authorities Used to Mobilize Reservists after 11 September 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title 10 U.S.C.</th>
<th>Type of mobilization</th>
<th>Number of Ready Reservists that can be mobilized at any one time</th>
<th>Length of mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§ 12304 (Presidential reserve call-up authority)</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Not more than 270 days for any operational mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 12302 (Partial mobilization authority)</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>Not more than 24 consecutive months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 12301 (d)</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: GAO, 2004d.*

Most Guard units called for OIF and OEF were mobilized under Partial Mobilization authority, limiting their length of service for that contingency to 24 consecutive months, which does not provide a problem itself as most units could mobilize, complete a one-year tour, and demobilize in about 18 months. However, DoD policy has further limited their length of service to 24 cumulative months.

As a matter of policy, the period of active duty specified for RC Soldiers in initial orders to active duty UP 10 USC 12302 should not exceed 18-months under the new 12-months boots on the ground (BOG) policy effective 1 NOV 03. This period may be extended at the discretion of the ASA (M&RA). A member who has been released from active duty (REFRAD) prior to completing 24-months, may again be involuntarily called to active duty as long as the total of the combined periods of service under 10 USC 12302 in support of the same declaration of national emergency does not exceed 24-months. Soldiers ordered to active duty up 10 USC 12302 are subject to multiple mobilizations and demobilizations, which may extend beyond 24 calendar months from the date of his or her initial activation, as long as the total, cumulative, mobilized time does not exceed 24–months, consistent with applicable laws and regulations. (Reference DODD 1235.10 and USD (P&R) memo dated 20 SEP 01) (DoD PPG, 2005, 1-5(a))
This policy does create a problem in that as each unit is mobilized and serves its 18 month mobilization, it can not be used again without breaching the 24 month cumulative “clock.” Since military police were in particularly high demand during OIF and the numbers of units available were relatively limited, the National Guard by May 2004 had mobilized every single military police unit available (US House 2005, 5). This shortage of required forces soon lead to the need to remobilize units that had been previously activated under another authority (such as Presidential Reserve Call-up) for an additional tour in OIF or OEF. In fact, by April 2004, 18 percent of the Army National Guard’s military police units had been mobilized more than once (GAO, 2004a, 2).

This shortage of available forces was first seen with the military police, but soon spread to include engineers, transportation, and other specialized but low-density units in the force structure. This condition prompted the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) to begin a series of reports focusing on reserve component utilization and its attendant ability to conduct sustained operational deployments under current policies and force structure. The first of these reports, entitled Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges was released on 29 April 2004, and focused specifically on the National Guard. The GAO’s findings in this and subsequent reports concerning the reserve components serve as an excellent summary of the majority of the widely held concerns and issues voiced in other forums by Guard associations and leadership, as well as civilian journalists and pundits.

The GAO’s initial report on this topic found that the Army National Guard had experienced difficulty responding to the scale of mobilizations since 11 September 2001 because “. . . it was largely structured and funded as a later deploying follow-on force
rather than a ready force for rapid deployment.” (GAO, 2004a, 2) Additionally, it found that the readiness of Army Guard units for wartime missions has declined because Guard units are only funded to meet a portion of their personnel, equipment, and training requirements. The partial manning, equipping, and funding of Guard units leads to the practice of “cross-leveling” personnel and equipment from non-deploying units to those being mobilized in order to bring their strength and readiness up to wartime levels. The second order effect of this practice is that those non-deploying units are left with even lower levels of personnel and equipment, making it even more difficult to bring them up to wartime standards when they are eventually mobilized. According to GAO report 05-21, between 11 September 2001 and July 2004, the Army Guard initiated over 74,000 personnel transfers and at least 35,000 equipment transfers to deploying units. Consequently, the remaining non-deployed Guard units lacked over one-third of the equipment needed to execute their wartime mission if (when) called.

In the long term, the Army has a plan to restructure its forces to be better prepared for future operational missions. The 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap lays out operational readiness cycles that keep future Army National Guard units in a six year training, readiness, and deployment availability cycle. This plan is developed to stabilize the expectations of unit members and provide a predictable, reliable force pool available to respond to the nation’s operational needs. The plan provides a four-phase cycle for Guard units beginning with a reset phase designed to allow units to recruit to fill personnel shortages, conduct needed repairs to equipment, and conduct individual training for unit soldiers and leaders. The reset phase is depicted as lasting about one year. The second phase of the readiness cycle is modular conversion, and overlaps
slightly the first and third phases of the cycle. This phase is designed to allow units time to receive and train on new equipment and specialties required by force structure changes, and is depicted as lasting around two years. The third phase, training and Title 32 availability, is the longest of the four and is depicted as lasting about three years. In this phase the unit will begin conducting unit collective training at increasingly higher levels and will simultaneously be available for state mobilization in response to natural disasters or domestic incidents. The final phase of the Army Transformation Roadmap operational readiness cycle is the ready phase. During the ready phase, which is depicted as lasting about two years, the unit conducts combined arms collective training and certification for operational deployment. During this period the unit is available for operational deployment in response to national security needs. Upon redeployment from operational mobilization the unit would reset to phase one of the operational cycle (DoD Roadmap, 2005, 3-15).

The transformation roadmap will address many of the challenges for the long term outlined by the GAO above in theory, however, the Army has not yet identified how to address the Guard’s current personnel and equipment structure in order to bring units to full wartime manning and resource requirements. Under current Cold War manning and equipping policies, the National Guard, even within this operational readiness cycle would still need to cross-level personnel and equipment from other units in order to achieve readiness levels required during the ready phase of the cycle.

In the near term, however, the Army continues to require between 20 and 29 percent of the selected reserve force mobilized at any given time (GAO, 2004d, 16), and it is still mobilizing units on an as needed, as available basis without the benefit of a
coherent utilization strategy (GAO, 2004d, 16). This condition brings the stress down from the strategic level to the soldier level. Soldiers currently face extreme uncertainty in their expectations of military obligation in the future and are therefore experiencing great difficulty in balancing their military careers with family and civilian career obligations. Many now fear that this uncertainty will force large numbers of experienced Guard soldiers to leave the service. Although conclusive validation of this fear has yet to be seen, Army National Guard strength trends since 2001 seem to paint a bleak picture. For example, the Army National Guard reached only 87 percent of its recruiting goals in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, and for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 it only achieved 80 percent of its goal. Figure 4 depicts overall Army National Guard strength trends between the years 1999 and 2005, clearly showing a sharp drop off from its authorized strength of 350,000 after 2003.

This drop in strength and recruiting is much more complicated than it seems, however. Conditions affecting this situation include implementation of the “stop-loss” program, decline in accessions from the active component, and restrictions from recruiting against currently filled positions, to name just a few. These conditions alone provide a difficult job for Army National Guard recruiters. As units are alerted for mobilization the stop-loss program goes into effect, preventing soldiers in those units from leaving the service due to retirement or the end of their term of enlistment until the unit is demobilized. Since the period of time from the unit’s initial alert to the end of its demobilization process can stretch to almost two years, the cumulative normal attrition rates alone, seen all at once, seem huge. Guard recruiters are having difficulty replacing
these large losses happening in such short time periods. This phenomenon alone could explain a large portion of the downward spike in Guard end strength.

![Total Strength (Values)](chart)

Figure 4. Total ARNG Strength, 1999-2005
*Source: ARNG, DSRO, 2005.*

Although the long term effects of this mobilization can not yet be seen, early indicators including lower overall end strength, increasing re-mobilization of low density units, and the exponentially expanding problem of cross-leveling personnel and equipment to satisfy requirements is cause for concern. A closer look at the prevailing mood and culture inside individual Guard units just returned from mobilization, however, may show that the Army National Guard is a stronger organization than pure numbers make it seem.
Case Study

The author conducted a case study in support of this thesis involving the Missouri Army National Guard’s 203rd Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy). The 203rd “Houn Dawgs” were mobilized for OIF in March 2003, arrived in Iraq in May 2003, and demobilized August 2004. Several methods were used to accomplish this case study, including written and verbal surveys, participant interviews, and participant observation. The surveys consisted of twelve questions pertaining to the member’s experiences and opinions about their recent deployment and were distributed to the soldiers through command channels. The list of questions is located at appendix A. In addition the author conducted a unit visit during a monthly drill weekend, 12 and 13 February 2005. This visit included the opportunity to attend the unit’s first dining-in since returning from mobilization. Not surprisingly the most enlightening information was gleaned from the participant observation, including the informal, undocumented conversations that occurred during the visit.

The written surveys were distributed to two companies within the battalion: A Company and the Headquarters Support Company. Out of approximately 200 surveys distributed, 64 were returned in usable format. Although twelve questions were asked, this analysis will focus on just five of them. It should additionally be noted that not all respondents answered every question. Question number six, “Do you think your unit is better or worse as a result of this deployment?” provides an overall idea of the soldier’s morale and level of pride in the unit, as well as his or her opinion on the unit’s health. Questions 9 through 12 were data point questions which will be useful in making quantitative judgments. Questions 9 through 12 read:
9. On a scale of one to five, how do you rate the overall effect of this deployment on you personally?
(1=very negative / 2=negative / 3=neutral / 4=positive / 5=very positive)

10. Using the same scale, how would you rate the overall effect of this deployment on the unit as a whole?
(1=very negative / 2=negative / 3=neutral / 4=positive / 5=very positive)

11. If you knew you would be deployed every 3 to 5 years, what is the likelihood you would remain in the Guard?
(1=very unlikely / 2=unlikely / 3=neutral / 4=likely / 5=very likely)

12. If you knew you would be deployed every 5 to 6 years, what is the likelihood you would remain in the Guard?
(1=very unlikely / 2=unlikely / 3=neutral / 4=likely / 5=very likely)

The unit member answers to these questions were divided into those answered by officers and noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers. Since there were only three responses from officers they were grouped in with the noncommissioned officers. There were 28 responses from officer-noncommissioned officers, and 36 responses from enlisted soldiers.

Question number 6, asking whether the soldier thinks the unit is better or worse following the deployment, is perhaps the most telling overall. The responses to this question, in addition to “better” and “worse,” included “both” and “the same” as well, muddying the waters a bit but still providing some good insight. For example, only 13.9 percent of the enlisted respondents and 14.3 percent of the officer-NCO respondents thought that the unit was worse following the deployment. Also, a greater percentage of both groups felt that the unit was better following the deployment; 38 percent enlisted, and 64.3 percent officer-NCO. If the responses to these questions can be considered an
indicator of overall satisfaction with the unit, it would appear that a greater percentage of
the respondents are more satisfied with the unit following the deployment.

The responses to question 9 will be used as either reinforcement or counterpoint
to questions 10 through 12 to see how the individual’s personal experiences during the
deployment affect their view of the unit as a whole and their likelihood of continued
service. Not surprisingly, the officers and noncommissioned officers, being generally
more mature and established in their personal life, rated the deployment’s effects on their
personal life generally more positively than did the enlisted soldiers. Of the enlisted
soldiers 28.6 percent rated their personal experience as either positive or very positive,
25.7 percent negative or very negative, and 45.7 percent neutral. Of the officers and
noncommissioned officers, 55.5 percent rated their personal experience either positive or
very positive, 25.9 percent negative or very negative, and 18.5 percent neutral. In the
aggregate, 39.7 percent of all the soldiers rated the deployment’s effect on their personal
life as positive or very positive, 33.3 percent neutral, and 26.9 percent negative or very
negative. At the extremes, only four of all respondents rated the experience very positive,
and only 6 rated it very negative. The mean response for enlisted soldiers lies somewhere
between neutral and positive, while that of officers and NCOs is positive.

Question 10 was designed as a duplication of question number 6, asked in a
different manner. The results provide an interesting contrast to those of question six.
Asked in this manner only 35 percent of all respondents thought the deployment had a
positive effect on the unit, as opposed to 59 percent in question 6; while 28.5 percent
thought that the deployment had a negative effect on the unit as opposed to only 14
percent in question number 6. The answer to this anomaly can undoubtedly in part be
found in the forced quantification of the numerous question 6 answers of “both” and “the same,” however, at least some can be attributed to the psychological effect of attaching the terms “better” or “worse” to a unit with which the soldier identifies. It is the author’s belief, therefore, that this contrast is very significant in that it delineates the logical from the emotional and shows that while 28.5 percent of the respondents believe that the deployment had a negative effect on the unit, almost half of those identified enough with the unit that they did not want to associate a negative term such as “worse” with it; hence, the association of morale or esprit de corps with the results of question 6.

Questions 11 and 12 were designed to gauge the soldiers’ reception to the Army’s planned operational readiness cycle, in which they would be available for deployment at five to six year intervals. As expected, question 11, with its 3 to 5 year deployment cycle, generated a significantly lower likelihood that soldiers would remain in the Guard. Question 12 as well returned somewhat expected results. Of the enlisted respondents, 34.3 percent indicated it would be unlikely or very unlikely that they would remain in the Guard, 28.6 percent were neutral, and slightly more--37.4 percent indicated likelihood that they would remain in the Guard. Of the more heavily invested officers and NCOs, 25 percent said that they would be unlikely or very unlikely to remain in the Guard, 17.8 percent were neutral, and 57.1 percent indicated they would be likely or very likely to remain. These numbers are not surprising given that they had returned from deployment only six months before.

The results of this survey, while generally positive, do not fully convey the perception gained during the author’s participant observation visit to the unit. In speaking with soldiers of all ranks and position, from the battalion commander to the supply clerk,
there exists in this unit an overwhelming sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps unlike any previously experienced. The sense of pride, accomplishment, and commitment to the unit was palpable and came through in almost every conversation with unit members. When a group of soldiers was asked what they would do if the unit were mobilized for a second tour in Iraq the following year, one young NCO replied for the group, “Well, we wouldn’t like it much, but if there’s a job to do, we’ll go over there and get it done.” This attitude was clearly shared by the rest of the soldiers in the group and similarly echoed in subsequent conversations during the entire visit.

In speaking with company commanders and platoon leaders, their greatest concerns were how to design a training plan that is realistic enough to challenge their combat veterans, and how to ensure that new recruits coming into the unit were integrated with that sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps. Conversations with the battalion commander and staff revealed concerns over expediting the reconstitution of unit equipment, increasing overall unit readiness indicators such as unit status report line items, and overall reorganization and reconstitution of the unit. Conspicuously absent here are extreme concerns over unit strength, morale, and retention. This is because unit leaders are confident that the high level of morale and esprit within the unit will generate enough recruiting leads to bring the unit back to authorized strength within the allotted reset period wherein they are not held to normal readiness standards. Nothing about this unit’s actions, words, deeds, or climate suggests that it is doomed to extinction, as is expected by many popular pundits, journalists, and even GAO analysts.
Contrast

The true analysis of this theses primary question may be best understood in the context of its antithesis, as brought out earlier in this chapter. The Army National Guard is by no means free of important issues, challenges, and problems that need to be addressed at the strategic and operational level in terms of force structure, policy, funding, and equipping. The heart of the organization, however, its tactical units in hometowns and communities across America, is alive and well and in many cases better off as a result of this deployment in spite of the decline in end strength demonstrated by the statistics.

The Vietnam experience may provide a useful contrast to the current situation by illustrating opposite extremes in the utilization of the National Guard under similar circumstances. With the Vietnam conflict the nation became involved in a protracted asymmetric war in Southeast Asia, the justifications about which the American people were doubtful. With the Iraqi conflict the nation has become involved in a protracted asymmetric war in Southwest Asia, the justifications about which the American people are slightly less, but similarly doubtful. Thus ended the similarities between these two conflicts; however, they provide the basis to draw broad parallels. The polar differences in usage of the National Guard, the level of commitment of the American public, and the resultant effects on Guard culture between these two conflicts bear examination. Although it is outside the scope of this thesis to debate the validity of the Abrams doctrine, the contrast between National Guard usage levels and resultant cultural effects during these two wars provides a useful comparison.
During the later half of the Vietnam War Guard strength skyrocketed, growing from previous levels of around 350,000 to 466,000 in a short time just prior to 1968. This uncontrolled growth prompted the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to mandate a strength ceiling of 400,000 and suspend all new enlistment of non-prior service individuals (Doubler 2001, 259). Looking at the Guard through a purely numerical or statistical lens during this period would undoubtedly depict a strong, healthy organization manned at 100 percent or more of authorized levels and enjoying the luxury of picking and choosing its prospective members. The reality of Guard culture during this period, however, tells an entirely different story. Since the motivation of the majority of these new members was to avoid the draft by joining the Guard to take advantage of the reserve component draft exclusion, morale among the professional Guardsmen plummeted as they saw their units fill with individuals who were not only not committed to service, but were in many cases openly opposed to the war. Although the numbers told a good news story, the negative culture and discord within the units revealed the sad reality of poor morale, lack of esprit, and conflict between unit members.

That same statistical lens applied to today’s National Guard would, in contrast, depict a weak Guard experiencing a negative strength trend, unable to meet recruiting goals, and struggling to repair or replace worn out equipment. However, as with the Vietnam example, reality in the units is 180 degrees from initial perception. Culturally, the Guard is stronger than it was before the war. Through necessity, the National Guard has completed the cultural shift toward an expeditionary mind-set that has been underway since the mid-1980s.
Identification of Key Implications

Brigadier General Frank Grass, Deputy Director of the Army National Guard (DDARNG), while commenting on the loss of many of the older, non-deployable Guard soldiers remarked that, “Now, that’s a good news story for the Guard, because it means the quality of the force, the deployability of the force--the deployability of that 331,000, since most of them at one point or another have been tested . . . is higher than it has been in the past” (Grass Interview, 2005). BG Grass also remarked during the same interview that drill attendance has risen significantly recently, indicating increased reliability and commitment among that remaining 331,000 members.

The above quote illustrates the idea that the most important fact to keep in mind when considering the key implications of increased mobilization of the National Guard is that things are not always as they first appear. Although the Guard is currently undergoing tremendous stress and strain in responding to the nation’s requirements in the GWOT and will have some continuing challenges with which to contend, it is showing signs of emerging from this crucible stronger and sharper than before in many ways.

Proper consideration of the implications of increased mobilization of the National Guard must be taken separately in terms of culture and organization. As this thesis is focused on the cultural implications, identification of organizational challenges is deferred to the findings of the GAO as summarized below (GAO, 2004c, 28,29):

The Army National Guard’s structure as a follow-on force to the active Army is not consistent with its current use as an operational force.
Current demands for large numbers of fully manned and equipped forces have forced the Guard to transfer personnel and equipment from non-deploying units, degrading their readiness.

If the Guard’s readiness continues to decline, it will hinder its ability to provide ready forces required over the next three to five years.

DoD’s current budget continues to fund the Guard at peacetime levels, and it is not clear whether future budgets will include funds to improve readiness.

Continuing to structure and fund the Guard under current policy will result in continued personnel transfers and readiness declines that may hamper the Guard’s ability to provide forces in support of the GWOT.

The implications identified by the GAO analysis above are far-reaching and vitally important for national, Army, and Guard leaders to resolve. The long-term welfare, relevance, and operational utility of the Army National Guard will not be insured until the organizational and structural problems identified above are solved. This thesis is, however, focused on cultural implications, the nature of which offer a surprising contrast to the organizational gloom depicted by the GAO reports.

Culturally, the Army National Guard is experiencing a period of rapid, forced transformation from a Cold War mentality to an operational, expeditionary mind-set that has been slowly developing since the mid-1980s. After the advent of the Total Force concept the Army National Guard slowly emerged from its CONUS shelter and began participating in training exercises and operational missions across the globe. Along with this gradual shift in mission, the Guard, as a matter of necessity also began working closer alongside its active component brethren. The planning required to conduct these
global missions, along with the cross-leveling of knowledge and culture from the active component brought about in increase in technical and tactical skill sets and professionalism which developed and spread throughout the final twenty or so years of the twentieth century. This, in turn, led to the growth of an operational mind-set that began to flourish around the turn of the century. However, typical of large organizations, the existing pervasive Cold War mentality stifled true transformation of the Guard, and held back the full onset of expeditionary culture within the organization.

The onset of the GWOT and the Guard’s massive involvement in it has created an environment, though, which is incompatible with the Cold War mentality, and has caused the exodus of those who subscribed to it. In the words of BG Grass, “That is a good news story for the Guard!”

The cultural implications of this transformation from rarely deploying strategic reserve to regularly deploying expeditionary force are primarily positive for the Army National Guard, the Army, and the nation. The very real prospect of deploying into an austere, physically demanding, and threatening environment on a regular basis, even every five to six years, has sparked a dramatic shift in the demographics, motivation, and level of commitment of those that are joining and choosing to remain in the Guard. The shift in demographics mentioned by the DDARNG referenced the reality that the Guard has become, like the Army, a young man’s game. Until recently, many units contained a significant number of Vietnam era soldiers still serving in such line positions as first sergeant, platoon sergeant, and even squad leader. Many of these old soldiers, though their years of experience remained relevant and valuable, found that they could no longer cope with the physical demands of combat deployment, or were deemed non-deployable.
during pre-deployment medical screenings and were forced to retire. Similarly, many other Guard soldiers who had been getting by during drill weekends with chronic medical problems or who failed to meet height and weight standards were medically or otherwise discharged when their unit was mobilized for combat (Grass Interview, 2004). This has created a host of units--those recently mobilized--whose personnel are nearly 100 percent deployable.

Another cultural shift also mentioned during the DDARNG interview is the increased commitment among Guard soldiers. It is unfortunate that there are many younger soldiers electing to leave the Guard at the end of their enlistment for a variety of reasons, personal, professional and otherwise. The positive side of this loss in deployable strength, however, is that those that choose to remain by definition possess a higher level of commitment to the service. These are soldiers who fully understand the risks, demands, and sacrifices that their continued service may require, but who, for their own set of reasons, choose to continue in service to their country. The increased percentage of drill participation mentioned by BG Grass provides a direct illustration of this increased level of commitment among the emerging Guard culture.

The cultural changes described throughout this chapter combine to create a more committed, reliable, accessible, and effective force. This is truly good news for the Army National Guard and the nation. The sharp increase in operational combat deployments since Vietnam, and the probability that they will continue has forced acceleration in the Guard’s mentality from Cold War reserve to expeditionary force. Unfortunately, easily garnered statistics do not demonstrate cultural shifts and improvements in overall quality. It is easier for the media, political pundits, and others to analyze strictly quantitative data
that clearly demonstrates a decrease in the end strength of the National Guard over the
last few years. Looking at the sheer decline in numbers makes it easy to pronounce the
Guard as a weakened, declining force. Qualitative analysis of the nature performed by
this author, as well as analysis of other intangibles such as commitment, would
demonstrate a fortified Army National Guard poised and ready to take on new challenges.
The cultural shift that has taken place in the Guard, from senior leadership to newly
enlisted soldier, is a catalyst for overall organizational change. The conditions are right
for an unprecedented increase in the overall readiness, effectiveness, and professionalism
in the twenty-first century National Guard.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Limitations

The primary limiting factor in this subject has been its currency. Many of the benchmark effects of the transition to a regularly deploying Guard have not yet been fully felt, let alone identified, cataloged, analyzed, or attributed. Therefore, some conclusions as to what effects will ultimately take shape will be largely inferred, based on a combination of original analysis of primary research and expert opinions gained during interviews and in secondary sources. This thesis is also limited by the time allotted for completion, which is nine months. The limited time available severely impacted the author’s ability to obtain the full range of expert interviews intended, and curtailed both the breadth and depth of the case study effort. Had there been more time, at least one additional unit case study would have been desirable to validate the results of the first.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that the Army National Guard is currently experiencing a period of intense stress as it struggles to cope with the continuing demands of the GWOT. Many organizational and structural challenges are revealing themselves as a result of the increased level of federal mobilizations and deployments and the Guard’s abrupt transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational part of an expeditionary Army. The cultural implications of this transformation, however, appear to be primarily positive. Changes in demographic, mind-set, and motivation for service combine to produce a
sweeping cultural evolution that can only increase the readiness and effectiveness of the Guard as an operational fighting force.

As the Guard gets younger and stronger through the forced attrition of older and physically unfit soldiers during pre-deployment medical screenings, the personnel deployability of those units should continue to remain very high for years, creating a force that is truly more rapidly responsive and accessible for future mobilizations. Additionally, once these units recruit back to strength, they will have less need for cross leveling of personnel for future deployments, reducing the turbulence and stripping of units that has occurred recently.

An additional impact of many of the older soldiers leaving the Guard is that they will tend to vacate key leadership positions, allowing younger soldiers to be promoted into those slots. A younger cadre should go far toward leading and facilitating the cultural transition from Cold War mentality to expeditionary mind-set. The author’s personal experience has shown that younger leaders tend to be less entrenched in the Cold War mentality or “good ‘ole boy” culture, more likely to embrace change, and more likely to challenge their soldiers with realistic tactical training. These younger leaders should provide a powerful catalyst for cultural change to the expeditionary mind-set.

The soldier’s primary motivation for service in the Guard is also changing. During his interview, Brigadier General Grass highlighted the fact that the Army National Guard has changed its recruiting theme from “Join the Guard and Go to College”, to “Join the Guard and Defend America” (Grass Interview, 2005). Seeking a new type of recruit motivated more by ideals such as patriotism and service to nation instead of the personal gain offered by money or a free college education, the Guard has
shifted its recruiting strategy to reflect the realities of the current operational environment. If recruiters are successful with this message they will eventually fill the ranks with new soldiers who expect to be an active part of the operational force, and move toward the complete transformation to an expeditionary culture within the National Guard.

The increased frequency of federal mobilizations in response to the GWOT has unexpectedly produced overwhelmingly positive cultural effects within the Army National Guard at the unit level. Unfortunately, many of the organizational challenges brought to light by the Guard’s participation in this war have overshadowed and obscured the positive cultural effects and their resultant increased deployability, accessibility, effectiveness, and combat readiness.

Recommendations

The organizational challenges the Guard faces will be very costly to address and will not happen overnight; meanwhile, Army National Guard forces are continuously needed to deploy in support of the GWOT. Although the National Guard Bureau has been proactive in moving to mitigate these challenges through restructuring and rebalancing of the force, shifting of resources, and hiring additional recruiters, policy and legislative changes are needed at the national level in order to properly address the structural and organizational problems brought to light over the last several years.

The GAO found that the primary problems that need to be addressed are the fact that the Guard currently remains structured and organized as a follow-on force but is being utilized as an operational force, and that the DoD’s current budget continues to fund the Guard at peacetime levels even as it requires the Guard to provide almost half of
the combat forces to operational missions. There are currently eight National Guard maneuver brigades and one division headquarters operationally deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo as of 1 April 2005 (Pike, 2005). The Guard cannot sustain this level of deployments under the current structure and funding. Although the Guard has received a portion of the wartime supplemental funding provided by congress, these funds were not intended nor are they enough to address the structural problems that plague the Army National Guard in its current struggle to provide forces for the current conflict.

If the Guard will be required to provide forces for operational missions on a regular basis in the long term future, its underlying doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, logistical, personnel, and facility problems must be addressed. An operationally deploying Guard must be funded to man, equip, and train its units to deployable levels at all times in order to be responsive for worldwide requirements without the need to cross-level from other units to meet the mission. In addition, operationally deploying Guard units must be organizationally compatible with the active component units with which they will be operating. The outdated or “legacy” tables of organization and equipment that still exist in the Guard today often include equipment, major end items, and personnel positions that may be incompatible with the gaining unit’s support or maintenance capability.

Finally, a National Guard that will be expected to deploy regularly in the long term must have available a mobilization funding and full time manning package that will adequately address the increased man-hour effort, parts and equipment requirements, and training support requirements needed to prepare the unit prior to mobilization and assist
in the unit’s reset after a deployment. Unlike the active component, the National Guard does not have a robust full-time force to properly conduct the maintenance, training, administrative, and logistical preparations necessary to ready a unit for operational deployment in a timely and efficient manner. Consequently, many of these required preparatory tasks have to be accomplished after mobilization, adding to the time required at the mobilization station and reducing the time that the unit is available for actual operations during the mobilization period. According to GAO report 04-670T, during fiscal year 2003 the Guard was funded at only 59 percent of its required full-time manning. This truncated full time manning level also lengthens the time and increases the effort required to reset a unit following a deployment. If it is not cost effective to maintain all Guard units at or near 100 percent full time manning levels all the time, they should at least be capable of surging prior to and after mobilization. Guard units should receive additional full time manning and funding authorizations from the time of alert through about nine months after demobilization in order to adequately prepare and reset their units.

Specific recommendations for ensuring the Guard succeeds in its transition from strategic reserve to an effective part of the operational force are best highlighted across the Army’s Force Management spectrum of DOTMLPF.

**Doctrine**

1. Improve the speed and efficiency of the mobilization process by moving from the “Alert, Mobilize, Train, Deploy” model to the more effective “Train, Mobilize, Deploy” model. Currently, most units only strive to maintain a baseline level of training during peacetime, counting on the Cold War strategic reserve paradigm which would
allow them time to bring their readiness levels up to wartime standards after mobilization. The new “Train, Mobilize, Deploy” model utilizes the operational readiness cycle to bring units to wartime readiness levels before they are mobilized, virtually eliminating the need for additional training after mobilization and allowing them to deploy immediately.

2. Remove the self-imposed limitations on available forces by changing DoD policy to reflect the full statutory mobilization authority under Title 10, *U.S. Code*. Changing current policy to reflect the statutory limitation of 24 consecutive months, vice 24 cumulative months would mitigate the current impending force availability crisis for long term contingencies allowing units to be demobilized and then remobilized a second time years later if necessary to maintain forces in theater.

3. Clearly define and allocate Homeland Security mission sets to ensure that unnecessary risk is not taken with respect to the military’s primary mission when deploying the Army National Guard.

**Organization**

1. Ensure ease of supportability of deploying Guard units by continuing parallel transformation of the Guard to modular force organizations and equipment.

2. Provide Army National Guard units with sufficient reach-back capability by increasing authorizations for Guard rear detachments. Until many personnel challenges are addressed, Guard units require robust rear detachment presence to assist with pay and personnel issues not easily resolved from deployed locations.
Training

1. Implement the proposed operational readiness cycle (ORC) to bring units to full wartime readiness standards prior to deployment. Guard units do not currently have the required time or resources to attain or maintain full wartime readiness standards. Additional unit training assemblies and annual training man-days should be authorized during years 4 through 6 of the ORC.

2. Provide and effectively manage professional military education school seats to allow all qualified Guard soldiers to attend. Guard soldiers currently experience difficulty in obtaining required school seats due to mismanagement and obsolete training resource scheduling systems. Training institutions should improve plans for summer surge of reserve component soldiers and allocate them higher priority seats to ensure that a maximum number of reserve component soldiers are trained during their limited summertime training window.

Materiel

1. Accelerate fielding of modern equipment to all Guard units to ensure full and efficient supportability during deployment. In the near term, cross-level modern equipment from units in ORC year 1-3 to units in ORC years 5-6 to bring earlier deploying units to 100 percent of their table of organization and equipment and fully supportable.

Logistics

1. Ensure that active component and reserve component maintenance automation and resource systems are compatible.
Personnel

1. Increase the overall end strength of the Army National Guard to allow authorization of trainee, transient, holdee, and student (TTHS) accounts down to the battalion level. Lack of a holding account for non-duty military occupational specialty qualified (DMOSQ) new enlistees, unit members at professional military education schools, and other non-deployable personnel prevents Guard units from ever reaching 100 percent deployable strength.

2. Gradually increase unit full time manning levels along the ORC, eventually achieving 100 percent during years 5 and 6 of the cycle. Reduce back to original levels after reset and begin the gradual increase again. Mitigate full time personnel turbulence by shifting between units at appropriate times during overlapping unit ORCs. Current full time manning levels are not sufficient to provide administrative and training support required to achieve full wartime readiness levels.

3. Consolidate active component and National Guard personnel and pay systems immediately. Active component and reserve component personnel and pay systems are not currently compatible, creating supportability problems when deployed and directly impacting morale and retention.

4. Authorize battalion level promotions to E-6 while deployed and establish nation-wide policies for allowing conditional promotion to E-7 and E-8 in order to facilitate battlefield promotions. Promotion authority currently remains at the state during partial mobilization, hindering the commander’s ability to promote soldiers into vacated leadership positions and adversely impacts morale and retention.
5. Encourage supporting professional associations to recommend tax incentives for supportive civilian employers and to provide endorsement for those employers through nationwide, regional, and local advertising. Employer support is vital to retention and should be aggressively developed.

6. Increase affiliation bonuses to encourage active component-to-reserve component accessions.

Facilities

1. Increase capacity at Army training centers to accommodate mobilizing Guard units. Authorize completion of certain mobilization tasks at the unit’s home station, reducing the time and resources required at the mobilization site.

2. Begin upgrade of Guard facilities to support storage and security of 100 percent of the unit’s required equipment.

The National Guard culture has achieved great strides in the transformation from the Cold War or strategic reserve mentality to an expeditionary mind-set and has become more responsive and ready as a result of recent deployments in support of the GWOT. The Guard’s organizational and structural challenges, however, must be addressed in order to maximize these increases in responsiveness and effectiveness and exploit the strategic advantages that an operationally capable Army National Guard brings to the nation.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further research is needed in several areas of this topic. First, a thorough analysis of lessons learned during each mobilization from Vietnam to the present would quite
possibly reveal multiple areas where challenges were identified and solutions offered which may be relevant to the current environment. A cursory review of just one lessons learned document from one mobilization (NGB, 1972) sparked a sense of familiarity in the author on several occasions. Comprehensive analysis, comparison, and contrast of previous lessons learned could well provide valuable information for the current context.

The strategic implications of including the reserve component in the operational force over the long term also bear closer scrutiny. If the Army National Guard was designated as the nation’s strategic reserve during the Cold War but is now a part of the operational force, has the nation committed its reserve? What force, if not the Guard, will act as the strategic reserve? The answers to these questions are vital to the strength of our nation’s long-term security.
APPENDIX A

SURVEY

CGSC Research Project

“What are the impacts of an increased frequency of federal mobilizations on the Army National Guard?”
MAJ Tony Adrian

SURVEY FOR SOLDIERS OF THE 203RD ENGINEER BATTALION “HOUN DAWGS”

SOLDIER’S NAME / RANK / UNIT: ____________________.

1. What were your original reasons for joining the Guard?

2. What have been your reasons for staying?

3. Do you think the Guard has changed fundamentally since you’ve been in? How?

4. What are your future plans concerning the Guard?

5. How would you characterize your experience in Iraq?
6. Do you think your unit is better or worse as a result of this deployment?

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7. What do you think of the mobilization process?

8. What were the positive and negative effects on you personally as a result of this deployment?

9. On a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the overall effect of this deployment on you personally?
   (1=very negative / 2=negative / 3=neutral / 4=positive / 5=very positive)

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10. On the same scale, how would you rate the overall effect of this deployment on the unit as a whole?
   (1=very negative / 2=negative / 3=neutral / 4=positive / 5=very positive)

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11. If you knew you would be deployed every 3 to 5 years, what is the likelihood you would remain in the Guard?
(1=very unlikely / 2=unlikely / 3=neutral / 4=likely / 5=very likely)

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12. If you knew you would be deployed every 5 to 6 years, what is the likelihood you would remain in the Guard?
(1=very unlikely / 2=unlikely / 3=neutral / 4=likely / 5=very likely)

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All participants provided informed consent to taking this survey.
REFERENCE LIST


Grass, Frank, Brigadier General, Deputy Director, Army National Guard. 2005. Interview by author, 4 April, Fort Leavenworth. Tape Recording. US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.


*Statement by Lieutenant General Roger G. Schultz, Director, Army National Guard,* 13 February.


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