Filling the Information Void: Adapting the Information Operation (IO) Message in Post-hostility Iraq

A Monograph
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In meeting the challenges of post-hostility Iraq, the area of information operations (IO) has received a great deal of attention. Unlike combat operations, the center of gravity in post-conflict Iraq has been restoration of basic services and influencing public support and perception. Thus, in post-war conflict, IO, with the objective and means to promote legitimacy, reduce confusion, and influence a population, can reasonably be seen as the decisive operation. Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence that planners faced serious challenges during the transition to post-hostility operations in Iraq.

This monograph seeks to add to the Army’s understanding of IO by providing an in depth examination of five challenges faced by IO officers at the start of the post-hostility phase of operations in Iraq. This monograph will discuss the major principles contained in FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics Techniques and Procedure*, and examine whether doctrinal adjustments are needed to provide more effective guidance for IO officers facing the issues identified in the five problem areas.
Title of Monograph: Filling the Information Void: Adapting the IO Message in Post-hostility Iraq

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ABSTRACT

Filling the Information Void: Adapting the IO Message in Post-hostility Iraq by Major Peter A. Sicoli, 67 pages.

In meeting the challenges of post-hostility Iraq, the area of information operations (IO) has received a great deal of attention. Unlike combat operations, the center of gravity in post-conflict Iraq has been restoration of basic services and influencing public support and perception. Thus, in post-war conflict, IO, with the objective and means to promote legitimacy, reduce confusion, and influence a population, can reasonably be seen as the decisive operation. Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence that planners faced serious challenges during the transition to post-hostility operations in Iraq.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

Since the end of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the public’s scrutiny has focused on the US preparation for the aftermath of war in Iraq. Of course, post-war Iraq is not the first time the US military has played the principal role in post-conflict operations. However, experts acknowledge that “winning hearts and minds” in post-war Iraq presents a unique and most complex challenge.

In meeting that challenge, the area of information operations (IO) has received a great deal of attention, and for good reason. Unlike combat operations, the center of gravity in post-conflict Iraq has been restoration of basic services and influencing public support and perception. Thus, in post-war conflict, IO, with the objective and means to promote legitimacy, reduce confusion, and influence a population, can reasonably be seen as the decisive operation.

Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence that both commanders and planners faced serious challenges during the transition to post-hostility operations in Iraq. According to a status report conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in April 2004, the Coalition’s “battle for hearts, minds, and perceptions” was failing. According to CSIS, the US made progress in three (political, economic and security) of the four essential pillars of nation building during the first year after Saddam Hussein’s fall in April 2003. However, CSIS


2 Pamela M. Stahl and Toby Harryman, “Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) Report: The Judge Advocate’s Role in Information Operations,” The Army Lawyer, DA PAM 27-50-370 (March 2004), 31 (arguing that in stability operations, unlike combat operations, “the center of gravity is likely not a particular military unit or terrain feature, [but]rather it is restoring basic services and influencing public support”).

3 Ibid.

concluded that the US had left the fourth pillar, “ideological and psychological” to the Iraqis by default.\(^5\)

The struggle to “win the peace” in Iraq continues today. When one considers that ineffective use of information operations was opined to have significantly impacted the stabilization efforts in the region,\(^6\) the importance of properly formulating and shaping the IO environment is apparent. According to the CAAT II report issued in May 2004 by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) regarding “Phase IV” operations in Iraq, “the doctrinal concept of information operations (IO) as a combat multiplier seems to be universally misunderstood at nearly every level of the Army.”\(^7\) Currently, the Army’s doctrinal understanding is based on FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics Techniques and Procedure*. However, the CAAT II report concluded that FM 3-13 did not provide IO officers the necessary guidance to face the challenges of post-conflict Iraq. In short, the report stated, “[FM 3-13] does not provide sufficient guidance for operations in the Iraqi operational environment (IOE). . .it lacks. . .much information on how IO officers should do their jobs.”\(^8\)

This monograph seeks to add to the Army’s understanding of IO and provides an in depth examination of five challenges faced by IO officers at the start of the post-hostility phase of operations in Iraq. These five factors serve as this monograph’s evaluative criteria. After evaluating each of the factors, this monograph will discuss the major principles contained in FM 3-13, and examine whether doctrinal adjustments are needed to provide more effective guidance for IO officers facing the issues identified in the five challenges. Finally, this monograph ultimately seeks to draw broader observations, both doctrinal and institutional, about what

\(^5\) Ibid., 2.
\(^8\) Ibid.
modifications in the area of information operations could aid in the battle to “win hearts and minds.”

**Organization and Roadmap**

This monograph begins with a brief examination of IO theory, in order to understand what theoretical concepts helped to formulate existing Army IO doctrine. The case study is then introduced, including a brief discussion of the “post-hostility” environment. The goal of the case study is to examine the following five significant challenges that negatively affected the Army’s IO plan in post-hostility Iraq:

1. Lack of planning
2. Proliferation of news sources
3. Rumor and misinformation control
4. Use of the media
5. Cultural/historical context and perspective

The monograph next turns to existing Army IO doctrine. Specifically, this monograph focuses on Field Manual (FM) 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics Techniques and Procedure*.  

After examining the manual’s basic principles, this monograph assesses the doctrine in order to draw observations about its guidance in relation to the realities faced by IO executors on the ground that are indicated in the case study.

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9 I have identified these five challenges based upon my analysis of the research that I conducted. These concepts, areas of concern, or as I have termed them, “challenges,” were repeatedly cited and examined in the documents that I read. As each challenge is discussed in the monograph, corresponding footnotes will identify their major sources.

10 U.S. Department of Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, (DRAG), (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, February 2002) will also be briefly discussed.
Drawing from this analysis, this monograph formulates recommendations, doctrinal and institutional, aimed to improve the ability of commanders and IO officers to face the significant IO challenges that accompany the “battle for hearts and minds” in Iraq.

**IO THEORY REVIEW**

**The Purpose of Theory**

According to Carl Von Clausewitz a theory exists, “so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order.”\(^{11}\) Clausewitz continues, “A theory is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately to guide him in his self education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life…it is the task of theory, then, to study the nature of ends and means.”\(^{12}\)

A sound theory is one that has been formulated through critical scientific analysis, logical rigor, and empirical relevance.\(^{13}\) A theory, if properly articulated, can bring a sense of understanding to a concept or phenomena.\(^{14}\) In turn, this can lead to a sense of prediction and explanation,\(^{15}\) which is vital to the construction of doctrine. Without the ability to show the relationship between the cause and the effect (the goal of any theory), it is difficult to properly formulate a doctrine that will guide the IO community. This monograph will begin with a brief investigation of existing IO theory, in order to determine if the IO community has established the scientific criteria that are necessary for a comprehensive and vibrant doctrine. As Clausewitz stated, “[A] critic should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only as an aid to judgment.”\(^{16}\)

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\(^{12}\) Ibid, 163,164.


\(^{14}\) Ibid, 10.

\(^{15}\) Ibid, 81-82.

\(^{16}\) Clausewitz, 161.
IO Theory Defined

The American Heritage Dictionary defines “information theory” as: “[t]he theory of the probability of transmission of messages with specified accuracy when the bits of information constituting the messages are subject, with certain probabilities, to transmission failure, distortion, and accidental additions.”17

Information and the Department of Defense (DoD) Dilemma

Despite rapid advances in information technology, there remains no clear understanding of information theory. In fact, information operation and its applicability to military operations continue to lag.18 According to a recent DoD sponsored survey, “[f]or many, Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) remain abstract concepts…[O]thers have seen the benefits but are unable to adequately ‘connect the dots’ between improved information (and/or its distribution) and outcomes.”19

As stated in Joint Vision 2020, “Information Superiority” is a state of imbalance in one’s favor in the information domain20 that is achieved by being able to get the right information, to the right people, at the right time, and in the right form, while denying the adversary the ability to do the same.21 Thus, the goal for DoD is to create the conditions that will support overall information dominance and give US forces a decisive edge in future missions. The DoD plan to gain this dominance is through Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The DoD defines NCW as the networking of three (3) domains (Physical, Information and Cognitive) in order to generate

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19 Ibid.
increased combat power by better synchronization of “effects” in the battle space, achieving greater “speed of command” and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness.\(^{22}\)

Despite the rapid acceptance and adoption of NCW by the Joint community, a general theory of information that would provide the Joint community the continuity and guidance to develop and implement standard procedures in the separate services appears to be lacking credibility or is not widely accepted.\(^{23}\) Despite efforts by the DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) to develop and foster a common and accepted information theory to improve functionality and vision, most services are operating on separate paths in IO. The remainder of this section will examine existing information theory in order to formulate and synthesize the Army’s fundamental IO concepts.

**The Search for an IO Theory**

In 1996, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, both RAND analysts, completed a study for the Center for Strategic Studies (CSIS) that examined existing “information” theories. Their study examined three theories or concepts of information. First, they believed that information serves as a “message.” Second, that information is a “medium,” and lastly, they articulated a unique theory that asserts, “information and physical matter are combined” and that matter itself “embodies” information.\(^{24}\)

**Information As Message**

“Information as message” is the more traditional view of information. Specifically, it is information “reduced to bare essentials,” it regards information as an immaterial message, or signal, that contains meaningful (or at least recognizable) content and that can be transmitted

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\(^{22}\) Alberts and Garstka, “Understanding Information Age Warfare,” 57-60.

\(^{23}\) Bryan N. Sparling, “Information Theory as a Foundation for Military Operations in the 21st Century,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 01-02), 12.

from a sender to a receiver. This theory is supported by many other authors studying the subject and “Information As Message” is best illustrated through the development of the information pyramid. The pyramid establishes raw “data” and facts at the base and most fundamental building block that supports the development of other domains. The next level is “information” followed by “knowledge” and then “wisdom.” Figure 2.1 below depicts the “information pyramid” as articulated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt.

Figure 1-Information Pyramid

Information As Medium

This view observes that information relates not just to the message, but more broadly to the system whereby a sender transmits a message to the receiver. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the key concern with this theory is the ability of a communications system to move signals clearly and precisely i.e., with low noise, low “entropy,” and often with high redundancy. They also believe that actual content is irrelevant; what matters is the encodability

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25 Ibid., 145.
26 The other notable authors that agreed with Arquilla and Ronfeldt are: Harlan Cleveland, The Knowledge Executive: Leadership in an Information Society (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1985); and Robert Lucky, Silicon Dreams: Information, Man, and Machine (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989).
28 Ibid., 147.
and transmittability of the message.\textsuperscript{29} They sum up these concepts by stating, “[I]nformation as medium is more about communication than knowledge.”\textsuperscript{30}

**Information and Physical Matter**

This view is probably considered the most radical and potentially encompassing theory that has been articulated to date. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define “Information and Physical Matter” as about much more than message and medium (or content and conduit). They believe that under this paradigm, information is as basic to physical reality as are matter and energy. Thus, all material objects are said to embody not only matter and energy, but also information.\textsuperscript{31} While this third view remains extremely ambiguous, it does offer some interesting concepts for the future of information and its capabilities on the future of warfare. If objects can be tapped into, in order to move and control messages and thoughts, then the ability to communicate rapidly in all types of conditions will be limitless. Currently, this field of study is being led by many physicists, as well as social theorists. While these theories do offer some insightful perspectives on the theory of information, they offer little for the pragmatist who is trying to develop and communicate a coherent IO theory. Instead, the DoD has turned to a concept of “information primitives” to serve as the foundation for Joint IO theory and doctrine.

**The formulation of DoD “Primitives”**

While the DoD continues to study information theory, they have developed their own unique and encompassing theory of information. While this theory is still considered in its “early stages,”\textsuperscript{32} it does establish some basic fundamentals. The DoD has identified eleven (11) “primitives” that are required in order to develop a coherent theory of how information affects the

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{32} Alberts and Garstka[et al.], “Understanding Information Age Warfare,” 3.
performance of individuals and organizations. These 11 primitives are: Sensing, Awareness, Decisions, Observations, Understanding, Actions, Information, Sharing, Synchronization, Knowledge, and Collaboration. The DoD theory is formulated on the belief that these primitives all impact the three networking domains of “Physical,” “Information,” and “Cognition,” which act as the catalyst to develop the network that will allow DoD forces to establish Information Superiority (IS) and information dominance on the battlefield. It is not clear from reading Army IO doctrine how these primitives have affected its development. However, it is clear that if the Army and the Joint community are going to achieve a synergistic information environment, then the Army must incorporate DoD theory and doctrine into its IO functions.

Theoretical Implications

The United States military does not possess a clear definition or construct of information theory. Without an accepted theory, any attempt to publish a relevant and useful doctrinal publication will continue to have gaps or fail to adequately address IO capabilities. As this section has demonstrated, current information theory fails to pass the validity test that Carl Von Clausewitz espoused over 150 years ago, “to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately to guide him in his self education.” The impact of this lack of a clear information theory is the continuing misunderstanding of what IO can contribute as an essential element of combat power and what role information plays in the overall campaign. The next section will focus on the case study of OIF PHO phase, examining the challenges that commanders and planners faced during the transition to the post-hostility phase of OIF.

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33 Ibid., 14.
34 Ibid., 14-29.
35 Sparling, “Information Theory as a Foundation.”, 12.
36 Clausewitz, 163.
THE CHALLENGES OF POST CONFLICT IRAQ

Defining the Post-hostility Environment

Before beginning the theoretical and doctrinal review, it is important to define the post-hostility environment. Currently there is no agreed upon Army, DoD, or Joint definition for this type of operation. For instance, FM 3-0 defines this period as “full spectrum operations” and states, “[f]ull spectrum operations include Offensive, Defensive, Stability operations and Support operations.” Joint Publication 1-02 defines this period as “post conflict actions” that are predominantly diplomatic and economic and that strengthens and rebuilds governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Additionally, DoD defines the “post-hostility period” as “[t]hat period subsequent to the date of ratification by political authorities of agreements to terminate hostilities.” As current operations in Iraq demonstrate, the post-hostility environment contains aspects of all three doctrinal definitions. However, these definitions do not go far enough in articulating the complexities of the post-hostility environment.

As an Army transitions from major combat operations (MCO) to post-hostility operations (PHO), it is faced with an array of both conventional and unconventional threats. These threats will attempt to leverage an assortment of asymmetrical attacks to create an environment of chaos and instability. These same forces will avoid conventional large-scale combat and instead choose to attack when U.S. forces are vulnerable and conditions favor terrorist style attacks. Recent U.S. operations in Somalia and Haiti have presented U.S. adversaries with a blueprint for how to successfully implement these conditions to exploit the vulnerabilities of U.S. forces as they

attempt to provide security and order. It is in this context that this monograph addresses the post conflict/post-hostility environment. This environment combines elements of stability operations and support operations, offensive and defensive combat operations, reconstruction and governmental responsibilities.

**Case Study: Operation Iraqi Freedom Post Hostility Phase**

With elections in Iraq approaching in January 2005, the history of Iraq and its evolution since the fall of Saddam Hussein is far from over. Thus, there is certainly much more analysis that will be done over the next few years about the US military’s role in rebuilding the country. This section provides analysis of five significant challenges that have affected the success of the IO plan and continue to be relevant to the ongoing struggle for Iraqi “hearts and minds.”

These five factors serve as this monograph’s evaluative criteria. After evaluating each factor, this monograph will review the major principles of existing IO doctrine and determine whether future doctrinal and institutional changes could help to address the five challenges identified in this case study.

Due to the interrelatedness of many aspects (economic, political, and cultural) of an IO plan, these factors also share commonalities. For example, while describing the role of media use by US forces, the role of Iraqi culture and history may also be relevant. However, because each of the factors has its own distinct effect, each will be independently examined.

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Lack of Planning to Fill the Vacuum

The necessity of early planning for the post-hostility phase of operations was the focus of studies done before the launch of OIF. The studies highlighted the need for a secure environment in order to achieve and promote US goals during stabilization.41 A February 2003 report concluded that an “overwhelming effort to prepare for occupation” was necessary to ensure success. Further, the authors opined that because preparing for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi political system would likely be more complex than planning for combat, “massive resources need to be focused on this effort well before the first shot was fired.42

There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that US forces were not prepared with a detailed plan to successfully transition Iraq after the fall of the Baath regime. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), anticipated to head postwar operations in Iraq, was first created on January 20, 2003. LTG (Ret) Jay Garner, chosen to head the OHRA, arrived at the Pentagon to start his new job on January 17, 2003, approximately 60 days before the launch of OIF. 43

While various US agencies had conducted extensive planning prior to LTG (Ret) Garner’s arrival, he reported that he inherited a “vertical stovepipe.” In short, there had been no coordination between the agencies in order to create a comprehensive plan. The effect of this lack of coordination would have real implications for the campaign. For example, it was reported that Central Command had drawn up detailed lists of targets that the military should avoid in order to

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facilitate reconstruction. However, it did so without input from other agencies that had better understanding of Iraq’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{44}

The first interagency meeting of ORHA was in late February 2003. Primarily, the group focused on unrealized problems such as burning of Iraqi oil fields, starvation, and chemical and biological warfare.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, LTG (Ret) Garner reported that he was surprised by the rampant looting that occurred unchecked by US forces in the days following the siege on Baghdad.\textsuperscript{46} In addition to the lack of security, basic civilian necessities such as sanitation, electricity, and potable water began to evaporate after US forces entered Baghdad.\textsuperscript{47} Further, in April 2003, extensive looting of precious cultural artifacts at Iraq’s National Museum of Antiquities raised both Iraqi and international outcry, especially considering the protection US forces were providing Iraqi oil fields.\textsuperscript{48}

In January 2003, the Marine Warfighting Laboratory conducted analysis on the effect that the Iraqi people would have on the conflict. Their analysis showed that the first thirty to sixty days would be the most critical to influence the Iraqi’s (and the international community’s) perception. The report identified three activities that would be critical to achieving success: (1) maintaining a secure environment and law and order; (2) maintaining basic necessities such as water, electricity, fuel, schools, and hospital services and (3) rapid return of infrastructure responsibility, including governance, back to Iraqis.\textsuperscript{49} However, when the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted its “one year later” report on the status of Iraq’s reconstruction, it wrote, “[i]t seems fair to say that a divided and poorly coordinated US

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Fineman, “Washington Battle Plan.”}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.; see also Dicker, “Effectiveness of Stability,” 3.}
\footnote{Dicker, “Effectiveness of Stability,” 3.}
\end{footnotes}
government was unready for virtually every aspect of post-conflict operations when Saddam Hussein fell on April 19, 2003.”

Logically, chaotic conditions in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime hurt efforts to shape Iraqi perception that the occupation would lead to improved lives. As noted by a National Defense University study, without early success in establishing security, maintaining water and energy services, and providing employment, disaffected inhabitants become fertile recruiting ground for insurgency in any post-conflict setting.

Ironically, the history of the Hezbollah organization provides an example of the potential to mobilize insurgents by appealing to their basic needs. In the 1990s, Hezbollah’s popularity grew as it provided extensive social, educational, health and welfare services which were not being provided by the Lebanese Government. By providing free health care, rebuilding structures damaged by attacks, constructing water systems and schools, “Hezbollah has shown its effectiveness at winning hearts and minds of its target audience.”

In contrast, according to the Post Conflict Reconstruction Project, as of September 2004, Iraqi unhappiness with a perceived lack of adequate basic services including electricity and sanitation continues to undermine public confidence.

The poorly planned post-hostility phase was accentuated by the rapidity of the Baath regime collapse. In approximately two weeks time, the population of a strictly totalitarian state was emancipated from all regime leaders. Without a coherent US plan to “plug” the vacuum, other entities rushed in to fill the void in power. COL Patrick Simon, Chief of Information

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53 Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker [et al], “Progress or Peril: Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic Studies Institute (CSIS), (September 2004), viii, 56-64, Internet: http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf.
Operations, CFLCC C-3, reported that “looters, opportunists, and regime diehards all threatened to gain control of the cities in the power vacuum left in the aftermath of the Baath regime’s collapse.” 54  LTG (Ret) Garner expressed similar concerns when he and his group remained stuck in Kuwait, due to the security situation, for almost two weeks after Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003: “If you are absent too long, while expectations are created for our government . . a vacuum occurs. . .[a]nd if you are not there, the vacuum gets filled in ways you don’t want.”55

Though “filling the information void” was cited as a key IO event for V Corps,56 it appears that US efforts were too slow. Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, Iranian agents began filling radio airwaves57 with anti-American messages from the “Voice of Moujahadeen,” an arm of a Tehran-backed group of Iraqi Shiite exiles.58 Further, Al-Alam, an-all day Arabic language television news channel, run by the Iranian government, began broadcasting into Iraq in March, and could be picked up with a regular television antenna versus satellite. In May 2003, due to damage of the local broadcasting machinery,59 none of Iraq’s official broadcast media had resumed operations, and Al-Alam was the only television station available to Iraqis in country.60

54 Colonel Patrick Simon, C/JLCC C3 IO Officer, “Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom” (FOUO Report), Section VI.
56 See “Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” FOUO Report, Section VI.
58 A. William Samii, “Iran Rules The Airwaves.”
59 One example of the difficulty can be gleaned from COL Simon’s (Chief of IO, CFLCC C-3) report: “3rd Infantry Division seizes the radio station at Abu Ghurayb. The radio station was to be used to disseminate PSYOP messages to the people of Baghdad, unfortunately, the station was too damaged by the air force to broadcast.”
60 A. William Samii, “Iran Rules The Airwaves.”
Immediately following the fall of Iraq, recognizing that the “vacuum” was indeed being filled, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)\(^61\) was asked by the White House to produce a programming package for Iraq, which it did in two days time.\(^62\) Specifically, the package included US nightly news broadcasts from the major networks dubbed in Arabic. However, by the time the news was beamed from “Commando Solo,” it was one day old and often included news that was irrelevant to the Iraqis.\(^63\)

The major US effort would come in the form of the “Iraqi Media Network,” run by a contractor, with the goal of developing television and radio in Iraq. However, IMN was not immediately ready to go on the air following the fall of the regime and faced delays over US concerns with editorial content. In April, IMN went on the air with radio and then television on May 13, 2003.\(^64\) By August 2003, the head of the station, Ahmad Rikabi, quit his post and stated, “Saddam Hussein is doing better at marketing himself, through Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya channels.”\(^65\) That same month, another senior advisor to the station also quit, concluding that IMN had lost credibility because of the close oversight of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).\(^66\)

If pre-war analysis was accurate, the first 30-60 days following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime were crucial in setting the right conditions for post-conflict success. However, it appears there was a failure to predict and plan for the power vacuum that developed after the

\(^{61}\) The BBG is an autonomous federal entity responsible for all U.S. government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting. Their broadcasters include the Voice of America (VOA), Alhurra, and Radio Sawa.

\(^{62}\) Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to Take Its Message to Iraqi Airwaves.”

\(^{63}\) Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to Take Its Message to Iraqi Airwaves”; LTC Steven Collins, “Mind Games.”

\(^{64}\) Ibid.


enemy regime’s swift collapse. Further, there was a failure to adequately prepare Iraqi perception during a critical and chaotic period.

**Proliferation of News Sources/Internet**

During the Baath regime’s rule, Iraqis had to find one of the fifty seven (57) “Internet centers” around the country to access the internet. That access was limited and controlled by Iraq’s Culture and Information ministry. Iraqis were banned from setting up private internet connections from their homes. ^67

As of January 2004, 150 internet cafes were opened in Baghdad alone. ^68 By August 2004, internet access was considered widespread and commonplace. ^69 Further, private, at-home connections are now available in Baghdad, for a price. Most importantly, there is no censorship or restriction of the sites that Iraqis visit. Beyond internet access, the end of the Baath regime also resulted in a proliferation of independent radio and newspapers. By May 23, 2003, there were over two dozen new “post war” publications produced. By the fall 2003, it was reported that approximately 100 newspapers had set up in Baghdad. ^70 While some likely folded quickly, others had significant circulation, such as *Al Hawza*, with a circulation of 50,000 weekly. ^71

Based on American principles of freedom of speech and the value of debate, one may conclude that the proliferation of news sources is a positive development in the reconstruction of Iraq. However, from another perspective, the proliferation of news sources, in a theater of

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operation, may undermine efforts to affect a population’s opinion. An explosion in the number of news providers may allow viewers to seek news that reinforces their existing biases and opinions. Thus, without government control of unfriendly media, a population is susceptible to messages from radical and even terrorist organizations.

An explosion in uncensored internet access amplifies this risk. The internet can be used by anti-US elements to spread disinformation and horrific images. Messages are typically one-sided, and politically motivated. Further, before a message is spread through cyberspace, there is little chance to check facts and rebut misleading information. Finally, the internet allows terrorist organizations with few technical resources to challenge even an advanced nation’s propaganda tools, while also serving as a recruiting tool. Al Qaeda’s penchant for the internet is well documented, as it has become a key tool in the organization’s ability to communicate and direct.

Within Iraq, the *Al Jazeera* (website and television station) and *al-Arabiya* were cited as the most popular sources of information after the fall of the Baath regime. A State Department poll in fall 2003 concluded that roughly 63% of Iraqi viewers tuned into one of these stations, as compared to 12% that watched US produced programming. Both stations have been accused of

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72 LTC Steven Collins, “Mind Games.” LTC Collins explains that in a world of increasing satellite and internet connections, it is becoming increasingly difficult to influence public opinion. For example: “[a]n Arab viewer who finds the reporting on CNN to be contrary to his own news bias can switch to *Al Jazeera*... and see a perspective of the world perhaps more consistent with his own.”


having an anti-American slant because of their willingness to air horrific images and their calls for uprising against the US military.

The fine balance between allowing a free media in order to demonstrate democratic principles, and maintaining information dominance, logically presents a challenge for US commanders. As attacks against US forces continued into the summer of 2003, the CPA tried to gain control over a very active Iraqi press. In June 2003, L. Paul Bremer issued Order Number 14, “Prohibited Media Activity.” 76 Noting that the CPA was “committed to creating an environment in which freedom of speech is cherished and information can be exchanged freely and openly,” the Order prohibited any media organization from releasing material meant to incite violence, civil disorder, or that “advocates alterations to Iraq’s borders by violent means.” The order allowed no-notice inspections of any Iraqi media organization, and immediate closure of any organization found to be in breach. The order also permitted an organization to file a written appeal with the Administrator, Mr. Bremer. 77 Noting the tension between the Order and what may be perceived as American censorship, Mr. Bremer stated the Order was meant to “stop the people who are trying to incite political violence.” 78

One of the first uses of the Order came in July 2003, when al Mustaqila newspaper was raided, its doors closed, and its manager detained. Allegations against al Mustaqila included its calls for violence against Iraqis who cooperated with American forces as a matter of religious


duty. In late 2003, the interim Iraqi Governing Council banned Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya from covering its news conferences based on allegations that the stations incited violence.

In late March 2004, American soldiers shut down popular Al Hawza, a radical Shiite weekly aligned with Moqtada Al-Sadr. The justification for the closure was Al Hawza’s false reporting that US forces were responsible for an explosion that killed Iraqi police recruits in February 2004. The closure caused protest by Iraqis in the thousands and a negative news cycle that accused the US of setting a “dubious example for the new Iraqi authorities on dealing with independent press outlets.”

Criticism of reactions by US forces and the Iraqi interim government focused in two areas that hurt efforts to manage Iraqi perception. First, well publicized and visible demonstrations like those after the Al Hawza closure only corroborated views of Iraqis who were skeptical about American intentions. Further, fears arose that closing Al Hawza would only increase support of insurgents like Al Sadr. Critics also pointed out that while Al Hawza spouted anti-American and even inaccurate information, it had not directly incited violence. While such distinctions may appear to be hair-splitting, in a country once ruled by a totalitarian regime, and caught up in a post-Saddam explosion of intellectual freedom, such sensitivity is an understandable consequence.

Second, the “dubious example” set by US forces may have also negatively affected US efforts to convince Iraqis to turn off these undesirable sources of information. Eliminating a known, and therefore, easy to monitor source of information only encourages equally effective

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82 Jeffrey Gettleman, “G.I.’s Padlock Baghdad.”
forms of communication (CDs, cassettes, pamphlets, books, etc.) that are more difficult to track and monitor. As later examined in this section, resorting to “underground” exchanges of information is consistent with Iraq’s history of coping with oppression.

The security situation in Iraq created a complex dilemma for US forces trying to enforce stability and create democratic values. According to the World Press Freedom Committee, “as always, the proper answer to bad speech is more speech, not the silencing of inconvenient voices. CPA leaders should not impose restrictions in Iraq that they know would not be tolerated in the established democracies in their own home countries.” However, in reality, the voices that called for hatred and the duty to oppose US forces, were being heard in a country in crisis. In other words, where particular voices are not merely inconvenient, but put lives at stake, perhaps an alternative set of rules is inevitable.

Despite these dangers, when American soldiers are sent to summarily close Al Hawza’s office, our nation’s commitment to “welcoming the emergence of a free and independent media in Iraq” is certainly called into question. Further, and quite significantly, the confusing messages were not effectively clarified due to a slow response to the “information void” that American forces suffered in the days immediately following the fall of Baghdad. In other words, already behind the “information power curve,” US forces were on the defensive end of the media battle. An Army study, conducted after Saddam Hussein’s capture, reported that efforts to communicate with young Iraqis was failing. The study concluded that the US should have been

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83 Christopher H. Varhola, “American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq.”
84 Report, World Press Freedom Committee, “Press freedom groups express concern over restrictions imposed on media outlets.”
85 CPA Order Number 14.
86 Rohan Jayasejera, “100 Iraqi Newspapers In Search Of A Quote.”
more aggressive in building its own broadcasting network immediately after the occupation began, rather than “complaining” about the anti-US bias of established Arab broadcasters. 87

Rumor/Misinformation Control

Among parties engaged in intense conflict, there is typically little direct formal communication or sharing of information. Informally, however, there are likely to be numerous parties who are constantly talking with one another about the conflict. Any gap in knowledge or communication may be filled by rumor or misrepresentation. A history of secrecy and deception makes it more difficult for parties to understand one another’s [situation] and may contribute to inaccurate perceptions and destructive rumors. This may make it difficult for parties to understand who else is involved in the conflict, what they’re doing, and why. In addition, rumors may erode parties’ mutual trust and make it more difficult for them to move towards peace. A proliferation of negative rumors increases the chances that parties will develop worst-case images of one another, which in turn may result in polarization, dehumanization, and violence. 88

This description of the evolution and effect of rumors is particularly relevant to post-conflict Iraq. In a closed society such that existed under the Baath regime, dependence on the “rumor mill” as a source of information can develop. In an environment that prohibits dissension, citizens resorted to passing messages to one another through an underground system of “graffiti-and-gossip network.” 89 Without any independent news media to provide reliable information, “news” came from neighbors or friends on the street. Further, Saddam Hussein appeared to have institutionalized the use of rumors in his government. His security forces monitored and collected the rumors circulated on the streets. Hussein then received a daily briefing on the most popular rumors, as a way to ensure that he knew what Iraqis were thinking. In response, Hussein

used his intelligence service to spread their own rumors in order to achieve specific psychological effects and pacify any restlessness.  

Thus, it seems foreseeable that the spread of rumors regarding the American invasion, as well as their continuing presence was rampant. A few examples of often-cited rumors include:

Night-vision goggles allow US soldiers to see through women’s clothes.  
US soldiers are able to keep cool because their uniforms are air-conditioned.  
US soldiers are passing pornographic material to children.  
Electricity is being denied to the populace as punishment for attacks on US soldiers.

As bizarre as some of the allegations may seem, they are not harmless. The rumors were circulated and believed by Iraqis and served to widen the culture gap between the Iraqis and US forces. Rumors are also used to ignite groups, and have been connected to protests that sometimes turned violent.  

Beyond inciting Iraqis to act, the spread of negative rumors and misinformation can be an effective tool to discourage Iraqis from helping Americans. Rather than building trust needed for a cooperative relationship, rumors can silence a population. Without even actively helping insurgents, silent Iraqis provide the insurgents with the information advantage by default. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Baath regime, the lack of information dissemination by US forces helped to provide credibility to the rumors being circulated.

US forces were certainly aware of the rumor mill that was going on around them. Chief of Information Operations, CFLCC C-3, noted that “countering misinformation and propaganda” was a key IO concern during the initial transition period of April-May 2003. As early as August 2003, tactical psychological operations teams reported spending more time in Baghdad’s

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91 Ibid.
94 “Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom” (FOUO Report), Section VI.
streets, distributing their own newspaper, posters, and handbills that clarified the positive changes in Iraq. In the fall of 2003, US military leaders, realizing that the rumors were contributing to a precarious security situation, established *The Baghdad Mosquito*. A staff of Iraqis and Americans (i.e., the “rumor control team”) were put in charge of compiling and analyzing local and satellite reports to create a weekly collection of “rumor, gossip and chatter.” The intelligence document was distributed via email to a select group of military officers, and posted on SIPRnet (classified Web Server.)

As for a concrete mechanism to counter misinformation, there appears to have been some targeted efforts made by US forces. For example, *Al Sabah*, a daily paper run by Iraqis with financial backing from CPA, printed a supplement debunking rumors after they became overwhelming. Army commanders also reported that the feedback from *Mosquito* “buzz” was helping to successfully refine the information plan. Mostly, units reported that personal communication directly with the Iraqi population helped to render some rumors moot.

However, rumor control is a slow business and it can take months to dispel some rumors. In addition, rumors are the natural outgrowth of long and widely-held suspicions regarding American intentions. In 2003, the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issued its report, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace” which concluded that “the bottom has indeed fallen out” for

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US support by Arabs and Muslims worldwide. Amidst that sentiment, it is logical that Iraqis are apt to believe the worst about American intentions.

Further, the delay in returning daily Iraqi life to normalcy, and Iraqi frustration over their lack of basic services, such as electricity, fueled negative rumors. For example, during the intermittent power cuts that Iraqis experienced in the summer of 2003, various negative rumors evolved to explain why US forces were unable to sustain electricity to Iraqi homes. According to the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project report, as of September 2004, Iraqis continued to be unsatisfied with the provision of basic services (electricity, sewage, etc.). Specifically, the report noted that “the lack of sufficient electricity in major cities continues to undermine public confidence, fueling worrisome discontent in cities like Falluja and Mosul. . .” Most interestingly, the report also described a wide and “striking” gap between the level of services actually being provided (according to US government sources) and Iraqis’ perception that the services are inadequate. Assuming that some improvement has actually been made, perhaps that gap in perception is a reflection of the power that sustained rumors can have over time.

Use of the Media

Earlier in this monograph, poor anticipation of the conditions to follow rapid regime collapse was described as a factor in the “information void” that allowed Iranian control of media in the immediate aftermath of that collapse. However, even once reconstruction efforts began in Iraq, it appears that US efforts to communicate their message to Iraqis continued to fail.

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100 Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker [et al], “Progress or Peril: Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” 64.
In the aftermath of major combat operations, the buildings that housed Iraq’s three state-run radio stations and two TV channels were destroyed.\footnote{Dana Harman, “Winning Iraqi hearts, one song at a time?” \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, 7 May 2003, Internet: \url{http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0507/p01s03-woiq.html}.} The first television station launched by the US was \textit{Al-Iraqiya}, as part of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), and went on the air in May 2003. IMN also funded two radio stations and one newspaper, \textit{Al Sabah}.\footnote{DeYoung and Pincus, “U.S. to Take Its Message to Iraqi Airwaves.”} IMN was funded by the Pentagon and headquartered in the Baghdad convention center. Thus, IMN’s programming was prepared and recorded in the same building that the CPA held its military press conferences. The apparently close association between IMN and the CPA contributed to criticism that IMN was not functioning independently.\footnote{Pratap Chatterjee, “Information Warfare or Yesterday’s News?” \textit{Corpwatch.org}, 6 January 2004,. Internet: \url{http://www.warprofi teers.com/article.php?id=9508}. (According to the article, after one senior staffer at IMN quit, he commented that “IMN has become an irrelevant mouthpiece for CPA propaganda, managed news and mediocre programs. . .CPA has destroyed the fragile credibility of IMN.” )}

Unfortunately, IMN’s failures have been well publicized, based both on its mismanagement troubles, as well as its poor ratings among Iraqis, who are dismissive of its news value.\footnote{Dauenhauer & Lobe, “Massive military contractor’s media mess”; Roahn Jayasekera, “100 Iraqi Newspapers in Search of a Quote”; “Iraqi media test new environment,” \textit{BBC News}, 29 June 2004, Internet: \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3847537.stm}; Anne Alexander, “Iraq: the battle for the media,” \textit{MEIonline.com}, 6 February 2004). Internet: \url{http://www.meionline.com/features/189.shtml}.} In July 2003, CSIS conducted a field review, at the request of Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer, in order to assess the ongoing reconstruction efforts. The report concluded that “changing the Iraqi national mindset” was one of seven crucial tasks. According to their assessment, the current communications campaign was insufficient. Specifically, the report stated that IMN needed to be “revamped and upgraded.” Finally, the review concluded that the lack of effective radio and television programming allowed disinformation to “prevail over truth on key policy issues.”\footnote{Dr. John Hamre, Frederick Barton[et al] “Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction, A Field Review And Recommendations,” Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission, Center Strategic International Studies Institute (CSIS), (July 17, 2003). Internet: \url{http://www.csis.org/isp/per/IraqTrip.pdf#search='Iraq's%20PostConflict%20Reconstruction%20A%20Field%20Review%20And%20Recommendations%20Iraq%20Reconstruction%20Assessment%20Mission'.}} A new contractor was put in charge of IMN by early 2004. However,
the broadcaster continues to suffer from criticism that it is not an independent source of news. In May 2004, the head of *Al Sabah*, along with many on its staff, quit their posts and cited excessive American interference with the publication as the cause of their departure.\footnote{Freedom at Issue: A Freedom House Special Report, “Liberated and Occupied Iraq, New Beginnings and Challenges for Press Freedom,” August 2004, 5; Lee Keath, “Head of US-funded newspaper quits,” *Boston Globe online* (boston.com), 4 May 2004, Reprinted on Internet at: http://www.w3ar.com/a.php?k=120.}

*Al-Hurra*, a 24-hour satellite news and entertainment channel, was proposed as a countermeasure to the popularity of *Al Jazeera*. The station (funded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors) is located in Virginia, and began broadcasting in February 2004. However, the project was met with skepticism that despite its modern and “hip” look, it would be difficult for *Al Hurra* to overcome perceptions that an American funded media outlet could credibly report on Middle East events.\footnote{Jim Rutenberg, “Coming soon to Arab TV’s: US Answers to Al Jazeera, Production Values and All,” *New York Times*, 17 December 2003). Internet: http://discuss.agonist.org/yabbse/index.php?board=1%3Baction=display%3Bthreadid=15363.} It appears that *Al Hurra* is focused on gaining pan-Arabic influence and is not specifically focused on an Iraqi audience. In fact, a survey conducted in April 2004 regarding viewership included seven Middle Eastern countries, but not Iraq. There is limited data regarding *Al Hurra*’s penetration into Iraqi television. However, it does seem clear that its recent arrival in Iraq means it faces an uphill battle. Further, the substantive impact of *Al Hurra* programming for Iraqis, who consistently cite security and electricity as their top concerns, appears questionable.

In its “One year On” report, CSIS determined that, despite US unpreparedness to deal with the immediate collapse of the Baath regime, military forces had been able to improvise and achieve progress in three of four nation building “pillars”: political, economic, and security. The one area of failure was the Coalition’s inability to develop effective media outlets. Thus, the report concluded that the “ideological and psychological” pillar of nationbuilding had been “effectively left [to Iraqis] by default.”\footnote{Cordesman, “One Year On: Nation Building in Iraq,” 2.}
One possible rationale for the CPA’s failure to effectively communicate was an apparent lack of clarity regarding their longer term objectives. In his book, *Plan of Attack*, Bob Woodward highlights that “Phase Four” had the potential to mean different things to different people: “[General] Franks and the military had called this stage [once major combat operations were over] the Phase Four ‘stability operations.’ Hadley [Deputy National Security Advisor] saw it more broadly. It wasn’t just achieving stability –political or otherwise. The president wanted to achieve democracy. So Hadley realized they needed a comprehensive postwar plan. It was a long distance between stability and democracy.”

Anthony Cordesman similarly noted that “the Coalition never had a clear idea of its objectives and never announced meaningful popular goals and objectives before and during the war.”

There is also evidence that US forces are not always effectively using their own resources, including the embedded media and PAO officers, as part of its post-conflict information plan. In the lead up to OIF, Secretary Rumsfeld faced a decision regarding what degree of access reporters would have to military operations. Considering the popularity of non-American sources of information (for example, *Al Jazeera*), it was essential to give a voice to the media reporting simultaneously from the site of military operations. In February 2003, DoD issued its “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedded Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the CENTCOM AOR” which stated in part:

> Media will have long-term minimally restrictive access to US air, ground, and naval forces through embedding. Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. . .Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our long term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals. We

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need to tell the factual story – good or bad- before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do.\textsuperscript{112}

During major combat operations, there were over 700 journalists embedded with military forces, with the vast majority actually positioned with forces on the ground.\textsuperscript{113} Other than dissemination of material that could jeopardize operations or safety, reporters had essentially unlimited access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing.\textsuperscript{114} The access provided was considered an improvement over the structured news coverage within the “press pools” of Gulf War I.\textsuperscript{115}

Overall, the military did succeed in leveraging media coverage to its advantage during execution of OIF. Real time images and reporting while soldiers crossed bridges, and took key points in Baghdad countered claims of the Iraqi government that coalition forces were failing. Attempts by the enemy to sway public support by showing images of POW or civilian casualties were countered by the reports of reporters who lived and worked at the side of military commanders.\textsuperscript{116} In October 2003, military leaders and embedded reporters gathered for a Reporters on the Ground AAR of media reporting during OIF. Despite some criticism of the embed program, the general consensus was that the embedded reporter would be the model for future conflicts.\textsuperscript{117}

Notwithstanding the successful penetration of reporters into major combat operations, the fall of Baghdad appeared to signal the end of the embed program. By the end of April 2003, less

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{113} Starnes, “Leveraging the Media,” 5.
\textsuperscript{114} SECDEF MSG, dated 10 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{116} Starnes, “Leveraging the Media,” 4.
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than 40 embedded reporters remained to provide their reports from Iraq. Once the embeds were
gone, reporters were on their own in Baghdad hotels, away from the units, and therefore, further
away from the “good” news stories they once covered.118 Similarly, those present at the
Reporters on the Ground conference opined that the absence of embed reporters in Iraq once the
Baath regime fell could account for the dearth of “positive reporting” from Iraq after the end of
MCO.119

Without the close relationship and trust often established as part of the embed program,
the military was less likely to influence the tone of reporting.120 As one reporter explained, the
tactic behind the embedded media program evolved from a basic tenet of public relations:
relationships are key. The better the relationship with a journalist, the better the chance that a
reporter will pick up and report the message DOD wants to get out.121 One rationale for the
decreased presence of embeds was the financial cost of keeping them in Iraq. With news
organizations paying the bill, as soon as the long process of Phase 4-stabilization began, they
were called home.122

An important link to the media is the public affairs officer (PAO). According to FM 3-
07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, the PAO “communicate[s] information to
critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of military operations…Public
affairs and CMO - prime sources of information - link the force, the local populace, and the news
media.”123 In the CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IRR), the CAAT emphasized that

118 COL Starnes, “Leveraging the Media,” 8.
120 See Caroline Overington, “Embed With the Pentagon? Not necessarily,” Sydney Morning
Herald (online), 5 April 2003 (where it is argued that a natural result of the “bonding” between reporters
and soldiers is “self censorship” on the part of journalists who end up being tools of “propaganda.”),
Internet: http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-
bin/common/popupPrintArticle.pl?path=/articles/2003/04/04/1048962935267.html.
121 Jeffrey C. Bliss, “The Press Goes to War.”
122 Information from this footnote was taken from the “Media Panel” that was conducted for the
School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas class on 4 November 2004.
123 FM 3-07, 2-75.
“embracing” the media reaped great rewards for various units operations. In particular, those units that “went beyond simply accommodating the media to actually integrating/embracing them into the unit” were most successful in getting their messages out. Although soldiers designated as the PAO may have not had previous training in PA or media analysis, innovative sources of outreach were explored in various units.

However, there have also been reports from journalists about the negative impact that untrained PAOs had. Other than reports about how PAO mismanaged journalists, there were also complaints that the military had some role in why the “good” news stories were not getting out. One embedded reporter critiqued the “passive” mindset of the PAO community whose role seemed limited to acting as a filter for information. Rather than waiting for reporter inquiries, the PAO mission should be to execute an “aggressive media plan” to get the military story “out the door.” Further, PAOs hurt their credibility if they only use specific “talking points” or “themes.” Without in-depth knowledge of what their unit is doing and why, media officials will not view the PAO as a valuable source of information.

Cultural/Historical Context and Perspective

In 1999, a US Institute of Peace report, based on interviews with senior military leaders who served in Bosnia, developed a list of a dozen skills necessary to effectively manage a reconstruction and stabilization operation. In its study in 2003, the National Defense

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125 Lacey, “Who’s Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?”

University cited two of these skills: “understanding historical and cultural contexts” and the “interpersonal skills to exploit that understanding” as the most critical in that list.127

The incredibly complex religious, ethnic, and tribal differences within Iraqi society made it even more crucial to be prepared for “culture –centric warfare.”128 In February 2003, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) warned that American forces would face serious challenges as they tried to navigate through Iraqi society. First, they would face the triangle of conflicting interests between Sunni Arabs, Shi’ite Muslims and Iraqi Kurds. Second, even these distinct sectors of Iraqi society are fractured. For example, some Sunnis were supporters of the Baath regime, while others were not. Further, within the Kurdish community, there are tribal and religious divides, as well as two distinct languages. Third, “tribalism” was revitalized under Saddam Hussein as a way to splinter potential opposition. Thus, the Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish populations include hundreds of tribes scattered throughout a large country. In contrast to Americans who identify themselves with a national creed, Iraqis define themselves through their tribal, ethnic, and religious affiliations.129

Historical lessons also should have indicated that Iraqi society would be challenging to penetrate. The Foreign Policy Research Institute reported that American planners were reading John Dower’s analysis of America’s postwar occupation of Japan as a model for post-hostility Iraq.130 However, in early 2003, Dower himself made a convincing argument that the history of Japan had little application to the future of Iraq. For example, the postwar occupation of Japan was accompanied with “unquestioned legitimacy –moral as well as legal.” Because Japan had declared war, because it had accepted surrender, and because it had been decimated by the war,
their occupation was a natural step in the process to peace. Further, once defeated, Japanese society appeared to welcome the end of war and the opportunity for reform. Finally, Japanese society is a generally homogenous one, and not splintered between tribal, religious, and political strains.\textsuperscript{131}

The circumstances under which post-hostility operations began in Iraq were dramatically different from those in postwar Japan. From the start of the campaign, planners faced an international and Arab media that opposed the war and then opposed the occupation.\textsuperscript{132} In some Iraqi eyes, the controversial “preemptive” action verified the suspicion that the US was motivated by the rich resources of Iraq. Further, religious factors would make concession difficult for Iraqis. Muslims have a formal duty not to submit to the authority of non-Muslim rulers, and have demonstrated that unwillingness.\textsuperscript{133} While the duty to oppose may be temporarily suspended, the combination of religious and Arab nationalism may be one reason that US forces rapidly wore out their welcome.\textsuperscript{134}

Further, the opposition or “insurgent” population currently battling American forces have their own significant history. Radical Iraqi nationalists and those with ties to Islamic extremism have decades of examples in waging political and psychological warfare to model. Car bombings, threats and execution of political leaders have all been well-tested methods of intimidation, especially in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{135} The primary mission of the insurgent is to create a sense of insecurity. Underlying that mission is a psychological and political objective: to undermine public support that peace can be won. Thus, ultimately,

\textsuperscript{131} John W. Dower, “A Warning From History,” \textit{Boston Review} (February/March 2003), Internet: \url{http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/dower.html}.
\textsuperscript{134} Crane, 19-20.
\textsuperscript{135} See Cordesman, “Hostages, Murders and Desecrated Corpses,” 2.
counterinsurgency is not a purely military operation, but rather a much more complex battle, as Steven Metz explains:

The movement [in Iraq] more clearly reflects the Palestinian strategy for insurgency, which targets an external occupier whose primary weaknesses are a potential lack of will for sustained casualties and sensitivity to public opinion or pressure. . .the war becomes a contest of wills, with battles fought in the psychological, perceptual and political realms. . .[T]he insurgents do not seek to control territory. . .but rely instead on internal and international psychological operations fueled by terrorism, riots, guerilla raids, sabotage, civilian casualties and uprisings.136

Metz goes on to conclude that counterinsurgents need to focus on two key battlespaces: intelligence and Iraqi perception. By being able to acquire and act on information about insurgent attacks, US forces can attempt to control the psychological element of the conflict. However, Metz cautions that winning the perception battlespace is difficult, and made even more difficult in a society fueled by surreal rumors and Arabic news media such as Al Jazeera.137

The connection between actionable intelligence to counter insurgents and cultural acumen is crucial. Without deep cultural knowledge, it is impossible to both understand the enemy, and to establish rapport with Iraqis who can provide the necessary intelligence. As (Ret.) General Anthony Zinni noted, “What I need to understand is how these societies functions. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?”138

The experience of US forces in Iraq indicates that there were not enough answers available to these essential questions. In their “lessons learned” report, the 82d Airborne Division noted that “specific information on a specific area (i.e., detailed information on population demographics and city assessments) were not available” and that this void hindered their civil affairs operation. In contrast, another lesson learned noted that “what was helpful was specific information that related to specific religious issues, such as the information on Ashura and the

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137 Ibid., 34.
Pilgrimage to Karbala.” The report also noted that as 2d BCT transitioned from hostilities into SASO, “it was very clear [that] knowledge of the culture, emerging leaders, and civic demands exceeded the tools inherit [SIC] to this unit” and that they relied on the additional elements of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Tactical Psychological Teams (TPT). Finally, once the mission had evolved into SASO, the report noted that “the linguist requirement exponentially increased.” The lack of capability to communicate hampered effectiveness in meetings with emerging local leaders and with the local populations at check points.\textsuperscript{139}

In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in July 2004, MG (Ret.) Robert Scales, Jr. reported that while returning commanders praised their situational awareness, they expressed that what they lacked was “cultural awareness.” Further, the failure to understand the implications of the “cultural phase” of the war lead to failures in gaining the information and intelligence advantage:

The human element seems to underlie virtually all the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories: information operations, civil affairs, cultural awareness, soldier conduct, and most glaringly, intelligence, from national to tactical . . . Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded that great advantage can be achieved by outthinking rather than out equipping the enemy. They are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions- all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.\textsuperscript{140}

In May 2004, the CATT II team issued its Initial Impressions Report (IRR) on “Phase Four” operations in Iraq. The Report concluded that institutional preparation in language, political, ideological, and cultural awareness was needed for effective operations in Iraq. Further, US forces were hindered by their lack of mechanisms to conduct “human factor analysis.” The IRR noted that:

\textsuperscript{139} 82d Airborne Division Final Report OIF After Action Review (FOUO), 6, 9, 16, 18. (21 July 2003).
U.S. forces understood who Saddam Hussein and his commanders were and how they operated, but did not understand all the other parties at play once the war came to a conclusions, such as tribal leaders, local leaders, and Imams. They had very little information about them.  

**Summary**

The case study demonstrates that successful execution of an IO plan was hampered by several significant challenges in post-conflict Iraq. First, poor preparation for operations following the fall of the Baath regime permitted chaotic conditions to develop in the wake of a power vacuum. Such conditions during a crucial period of time hurt US efforts to positively shape Iraqi perception. Further, the apparent lack of planning and preparation regarding the means that US forces would use to communicate with the Iraqi populace led to an “information void” that was readily filled by Iranian agents shortly after the fall of Baghdad.

Second, US forces faced an internet and news source explosion following the liberation of Iraq. Unfortunately, in the weeks and months following major combat operations, many Iraqis were tuning to stations such as *Al Jazeera* to get their news. Simultaneously, to detractors, CPA Order 14 demonstrated that the US appeared most concerned with imposing restrictions on critical sources of information. As the case study discussed, experts agreed that rather than complaining about an anti-US bias from established Arab broadcasters, the US should have been more aggressive in building its own broadcasting network.

Third, consistent with their history, Iraqis turned to the “rumor mill” as a source for information about the US presence. Thus, US forces faced an uphill battle trying to correct misinformed notions about what the US motives were in Iraq. Further, the delay in returning daily Iraqi life to normalcy (i.e., sanitation, restoration of electricity, etc.) only fueled negative rumors and discontent among the local populace. However, as the case study described, certain

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units were responding to the rumor mill by spending more time in Baghdad’s streets, distributing “good” news in posters, handbills and newspapers.

Fourth, US efforts to develop a media campaign to communicate with Iraqis about reconstruction efforts in the months following the end of major combat operations appeared to fail. Negative publicity about the first US effort to produce television programming in Iraq plagued the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). Criticism of IMN focused mainly on its lack of independence from CPA administrators. In July 2003, CSIS concluded that the lack of effective radio and television programming was creating an environment that permitted disinformation to prevail over truth. Further, it appeared that the US military was not always effective in using their own media resources. While over 700 journalists were embedded with US forces during major combat operations, little support was provided to keep journalists embedded with units after the fall of Baghdad. Thus, a major source for “good” news about US actions was lost. Those PAO officers that embraced the media, rather than adopting a “passive” mindset were more successful in getting those good stories out to the public.

Finally, US forces were ill-prepared for “culture-centric warfare.” Experience proved that US forces did not have specific information in areas such as population demographics, tribal leaders, and linguistics. Without deep cultural knowledge, the effort to collect intelligence against insurgents is hurt. Further, without the cultural awareness to accompany our situational awareness, US forces struggled to communicate and forge alliances with the numerous local tribes.

This section outlined five significant challenges that affected execution of the IO plan in post-conflict Iraq and serve as this monograph’s evaluative criteria. The next two sections will evaluate existing IO doctrine and determine whether future doctrinal and institutional changes could help to address the five problem areas identified in this case study.
**IO Doctrine**

**Army IO doctrine**

Information Operations (IO) is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.\(^{142}\) IO related activities include, but are not limited to public affairs (PA) and civil military operations (CMO).\(^{143}\) According to Army doctrine, IO is just one of three pillars needed to attain Information Superiority (IS). The other pillars include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Information Management (IM).\(^{144}\) The doctrine states that commanders will achieve an “operational advantage” through IS by synchronizing the three “independent contributors.”\(^{145}\)

There are two types of IO—offensive and defensive. During operations, commanders synchronize offensive and defensive IO to produce the desired effects that are needed to achieve their objectives. According to FM 3-13 *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, “[o]ffensive IO supports the decisive operations, while defensive IO protects friendly force critical assets and centers of gravity.”\(^{146}\) FM 3-13 continues, “[c]ommanders conduct offensive IO across the range of military operations and throughout the spectrum of conflict…[T]he rules of engagement affect the means used and the effects sought in any given situation.”\(^{147}\) The intent for offensive IO is to facilitate seizing and retaining the initiative by creating a disparity between the quality of information available to friendly forces and that

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\(^{143}\) Ibid.

\(^{144}\) FM 3-0, 4-3, 11-1, 11-11.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 11-5.

\(^{146}\) FM 3-13, 1-70.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., 1-62.
available to adversaries.\textsuperscript{148} The following offensive IO effects create this information advantage:\textsuperscript{149}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destroy</td>
<td>To damage a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt</td>
<td>Breaking or interrupting the flow of information between selected command and control nodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrade</td>
<td>Using non-lethal means or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of \textit{adversary} command and control systems, and information collection efforts or means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>Withholding information about Army force capabilities and intentions that \textit{adversaries} need for effective and timely decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceive</td>
<td>Is to cause a person to believe what is not true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploit</td>
<td>To gain access to \textit{adversary} command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>To cause \textit{adversaries} or others to behave in a manner favorable to Army forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Figure 2 -IO Element}

The Army defines defensive information operations as “\textit{t}he integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems...defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.”\textsuperscript{150} Defensive IO effects include:\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 1-63
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 1-65-1-68.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>All actions taken to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detection</td>
<td>To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration</td>
<td>To bring information systems back to their original state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>To react quickly to an <strong>adversaries</strong> information operations attack or intrusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-10 Effects**

**IO Doctrine in support of Post-hostility Operations (PHO)**

FM 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations (SASO)* further defines IO during SASO. FM 3-07 states that information is at the very heart of many Stability and Support operations and that it may even be designated the main effort during certain phases of an operation. FM 3-07 continues by describing SASO operations as sensitive and politically charged. Further, they may affect perceptions and could become a center of gravity (COG) for Army forces.\(^{152}\)

**Offensive and Defensive IO in SASO**

Offensive IO involves the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers, to influence others, or to achieve or promote specific objectives.\(^{153}\) According to FM 3-07, offensive IO, if incorporated properly and effectively, may give legitimacy to the mission or operation and may reduce bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or influencing.\(^{154}\)

\(^{152}\) FM 3-07, 2-72. Additionally, Major Mackin in his article, “Information Operations and the Global War on Terror: The Joint Force Commander’s Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” JMO Operations Research Paper, Naval War College (9 February 2003), 2-3, states that the center of gravity of the war on terror has been identified as the relationship between the terrorist organization and the Muslim population. It is apparent that from reading both the FM and the article, that IO appears to offer an effective solution to attacking that center of gravity.

\(^{153}\) FM 3-07, 2-72.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 2-73.
FM 3-07 goes on to describe that a command should establish mechanisms such as a joint information bureau and media working groups to educate and inform local and international media.\textsuperscript{155}

Defensive IO protects information and information systems from compromise, damage, exploitation, and sabotage.\textsuperscript{156} A critical aspect of defensive IO is the discovery of capabilities and intentions of proven and potential threats. Potential adversaries in Stability and Support operations will use IO to integrate the elements of their power and capabilities to target friendly forces.\textsuperscript{157} FM 3-07 emphasizes that friendly forces should expect that adversary IO will include all venues and media that adversary leadership can manipulate, to include: propaganda directed at friendly forces, statecraft and public diplomacy used to generate media events that serve IO objectives, as well as misuse of all media to transmit propaganda and adversary PSYOP to all audiences.\textsuperscript{158}

**IO Core and Supporting Elements**

The elements of IO are not organizations. They are independent activities that, when taken together and synchronized, constitute IO.\textsuperscript{159} From a laymen’s perspective, one can think of these elements as a menu of options that can be leveraged to a particular course of action or operation to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Commanders decide which IO elements are appropriate to accomplish the mission. All elements may not be required for each operation.\textsuperscript{160} Figure 2.2 below is a listing of Army IO core and supporting elements as well as related activities.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 2-74.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 2-75.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid., FM 3-13, 1-56.
\item \textsuperscript{160} FM 3-13, 1-54.
\end{itemize}
The Development of IO Themes, Objectives and Tasks

During PHO, each IO element has a corresponding level of command that can approve the themes, messages, or tasks that a unit may desire to disseminate. According to the doctrine, this process can be complicated, time consuming, and requires approval from multiple agencies in the chain of command. The matrix below displays the IO approval process. Note that the doctrine requires the Joint Force Commander to develop the IO objectives, and the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) to approve all PSYOP and counter propaganda messages.

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**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Elements</th>
<th>Supporting Elements</th>
<th>Related Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>Physical Destruction</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Network Operations</td>
<td>Information Assurance</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Network Defense</td>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Network Exploitation</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>Counter-deception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Security</td>
<td>Counterpropaganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Deception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 4-Core Elements**

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161 Ibid., 1-83.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IO Element</th>
<th>IO Concept of Support</th>
<th>IO Objectives</th>
<th>IO Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
<td>RCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Deception</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Next Higher HQ</td>
<td>Next Higher HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>INSCOM &amp; RCC w/ SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Def Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>INSCOM &amp; RCC w/ SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Def Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>NETCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>INSCOM &amp; RCC w/ SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Def Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Destruction</td>
<td>Executing HQ</td>
<td>Executing HQ</td>
<td>Executing HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Executing HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Echelon Dependent</td>
<td>Task dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterdeception</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Next Higher HQ</td>
<td>Next Higher HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Propaganda</td>
<td>Planning HQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
<td>RCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5-IO Matrix**

**IO Training**

FM 3-13 identifies the requirement for IO to be integrated into Army training. The manual states, “[w]hen commanders and units exercise IO elements realistically in training, the readiness and confidence of the force increases.”\(^{162}\) However, the doctrine admits that creating meaningful IO training is often difficult and may require the use of “computer support products” and simulations to enhance IO play. The doctrine states that with creative and inventive methods, Army units can achieve meaningful IO play that will prove useful during actual mission execution.\(^{163}\) However, the doctrine does not provide specific examples or suggestions on how to properly support IO training execution.

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\(^{162}\) Ibid., 1-88.

\(^{163}\) Ibid.
General Doctrinal Conclusions.

The purpose of the next section is to articulate observations about IO doctrine in relation to the issues underlying the five challenges that were described during the case study. While one case study should not be the standard for recommending immediate changes to doctrine, the intent is that these observations assist in the overall and ongoing development of IO theory and doctrine.

Observation #1: The Definition of IO Should be Reevaluated.

The definition of IO fails to adequately address the complexities and the scope of the environment that it serves. The definition emphasizes the technical aspects of IO and how the employment of those assets can assist the “decision maker.” However, the decision maker is not clearly explained and the definition limits the intended audience. For instance, is the decision maker the friendly commander, the adversary, or the indigenous population?

The case study makes clear that in post-hostility Iraq, US forces faced more than one “decision maker” in their operating environment. For example, the Iraqi population was a major decision maker and target for IO efforts. Gaining understanding of the Iraqi society, including their mechanisms for communication, the potential effects of their history, and their religion and culture, should have been a major focus of pre-conflict IO planning. However, US forces also clearly faced adversarial decision makers, including counterinsurgents, and the anti-American press, including Al Jazeera.

A more comprehensive definition of IO is required to better capture the dynamic of the human dimension. The definition should not only address the adversary, but non-adversaries as well, and one that articulates the overall effects that IO can bring to the battlefield. However, until a coherent and comprehensive theory for IO is established, the IO community will continue to struggle over determining a comprehensive doctrinal definition.
Observation #2: IO Construct Requires Modification

Currently, IO doctrine frames IO into an “offensive” and “defensive” construct. As FM 3-13 indicates, offensive IO effects are heavily focused on destroying, disrupting, degrading, and denying access to adversaries. Even the IO effect of “influence” is described as causing “adversaries or others” to behave in a manner favorable to Army forces.\textsuperscript{164} Defensive IO is focused on protecting friendly vulnerabilities. FM 3-13 indicates that the emphasis of defensive IO effects is on actions taken to guard against attack to computer and information systems.\textsuperscript{165}

Unfortunately, this conceptual construct fails to address an essential component of the environment: the populace. The case study provides numerous instances where US forces appeared, at least initially, to undermine their legitimacy by failing to plan for and prioritize the concerns of the indigenous population. For example, by failing to salvage Iraqi media outlets, US forces lacked sufficient means of communicating with a local population in desperate need of information. By failing to anticipate and control the rampant looting of ministries, including Iraqi cultural artifacts, US forces appeared unable to provide basic security in the wake of a power vacuum. Due to a failure to prioritize “cultural awareness,” it was difficult for US forces to establish the relationships necessary to gain the information initiative.

The myriad of issues presented in the case study make clear that the post-hostility phase may often be more complex than an offensive and defensive mindset. The IO community should investigate whether or not an offensive/defensive construct is appropriate in the contemporary operating environment.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 1-62.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 1-63 - 1-68.
Observation #3: IO Much More than a Technical Approach during PHO

In contrast to IO execution during the post-hostility phase in Iraq, the IO plan during major combat operations of OIF was considered a success.\textsuperscript{166} Methods employed by US forces included: massive leaflet drops, broadcast of messages from Air Force planes and Navy ships positioned in the Persian Gulf, and a barrage of email and cell phone calls to Iraqi leaders encouraging them to abandon Saddam Hussein. US forces were also successful in preventing penetration of DoD systems, as well as destroying the “jamming” stations employed by Iraqi forces.\textsuperscript{167}

Interestingly, the IO plan during Phase III of OIF could be viewed as more compatible with the technologically focused approach of FM 3-13 than the IO plan during “Phase IV” operations. For example, chapter 1, “Design of Army Information Operations,” relies heavily on a technical and somewhat distant view of the environment in which IO takes place. Thus, it describes the “information environment” to include: “the worldwide interconnection of communication networks; command and control systems of friendly and adversary forces; and friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle information.”\textsuperscript{168} Further, “threat sources” in the environment are listed as: hackers, insiders, activist non-state actors, terrorists, etc.\textsuperscript{169} Similarly, “methods of attack” include: unauthorized access, malicious software, electromagnetic deception, electronic attack, etc.\textsuperscript{170}

However, little information is provided on the role that human relationships play in the execution of information operations. For example, though FM 3-13 acknowledges that various significant actors exist in the information environment, they simply list “social and cultural

\textsuperscript{168} FM 3-13, 1-1.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 1-10.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 1-20.
elements and their leaders” without further exploration. While FM 3-13 addresses the effect of “policy and public opinion” in the information environment, the emphasis is on US and global perception of military operations rather than the perception of the local population. FM 3-13 briefly discusses IO’s contribution to IPB, and notes that relevant information includes religion, language, culture, and population demographics of key groups. However, the focus again appears to be on gathering information about adversaries in order to determine their potential threat levels.

The case study identified that US forces felt seriously unprepared during the transition from major combat to post-hostilities. As MG (Ret.) Scales reported, “the human element” appeared to underlie many of the deficiencies in information operations and in intelligence gathering during post-hostility operations. While there seems to be a greater acceptance that IO is about more than information system security and computer networks, the doctrine must also transition from the more technical based application to acknowledging the importance of the human dimension. This human dimension must focus on how to influence or control a potentially disaffected population. While beaming radio broadcasts and dropping leaflets from a remote location can certainly be part of IO, the case study demonstrates that personal contact to dispel rumors, manage misperceptions, spread positive news, and forge relationships appeared to be most effective. A detailed study should be conducted by the IO community that will allow them to better understand the “ideological and psychological pillar of nation building.”

Part of the doctrinal solution may be a better incorporation of guidance regarding support and stability operations, found in FM 3-07 and FMI 3-07.22 Counter Insurgency Operations.

171 Ibid., 1-4.
172 Ibid., 1-32.
173 Ibid., 5-35.
174 Ibid., 5-35, 5-36.
176 Cordesman, “One Year on,” 1
Currently, FM 3-13 provides little insight into the specific role that IO plays in such operations. Thus, the IO planner is forced to attempt to interpret guidance found in FM 3-07 and FMI 3-07.22 in relation to that found in FM 3-13.\footnote{FM 3-13 briefly addresses the “commander’s critical information requirements” for a stability operation “in which an information operation is the decisive operation.” See 5-63. While a list of pertinent issues is included, there is little specific guidance for IO officers executing IO tasks on the ground.}

**Observation #4: Centralized IO Planning and Execution Requires Reevaluation**

Throughout chapter 1 of FM 3-13, IO doctrine encourages centralized planning and an approval process in which authority resides at high levels of command. For example, according to the guidance provided, PSYOP and counterpropaganda tasks require approval from the regional combatant commander before execution.\footnote{FM 3-13, Figure 1-3.} In paragraph 1-83, the doctrine appears to acknowledge its own constraints. While discussing the execution of IO during “crisis,” FM 3-13 warns, “many IO activities may require a long time to approve.”\footnote{Ibid., 1-83.}

The case study identified that during the post-hostility phase, the commander may face situations where flexibility is needed to react to local issues in a timely fashion. For instance, if a commander is attempting to counter the proliferation of negative news, rumor, or misinformation, he should have the necessary support to facilitate this requirement. By noting that “commanders from brigade through echelons above corps conduct IO,”\footnote{Ibid., 1-54.} FM 3-13 appears to ignore the reality that in today’s operational environment, soldiers far below the rank of brigade commanders are engaged in information operations. Further, although FM 3-13 emphasizes the changing nature of the information environment, the need for flexibility, and the demand for “imagination and creativity,”\footnote{Ibid. 1-53.} its centralized planning and approval process is at odds with these principles.

The case study demands that the IO community reevaluate how it authorizes psychological message approval during PHO. The current system is cumbersome, hierarchical,
and bureaucratic. While doctrine alone does not establish how the approval process functions, the IO community should make all efforts to ensure that during PHO, lower echelon commanders are empowered to get the mission accomplished.

**Summary**

FM 3-13 should continue to evolve into a more comprehensive field manual for the U.S. Army. As the analysis demonstrates, there remain substantial modifications that need examination. For instance, a deeper understanding of the requirements of SASO, culture, and the “human dimension” should be included in the next manual. Further, the manual should reexamine how it can better empower commanders at all levels. Another area of change must be in the overall definition and construct of IO. The current definition fails to express the breadth and depth necessary for IO to be an essential and integrated element of combat power.

The final section of this monograph builds upon the doctrinal observations to offer additional recommendations for the Army and IO community. The intent is to further contribute to the evolution of IO and help “convert the IO concept into reality.”

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Decentralizing IO Execution**

This monograph has demonstrated that the PHO environment is dominated by the interaction and interface of soldiers with the population. Military commanders often have the responsibility to function as the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of local government. This is a massive responsibility, which requires the constant interaction of information between the command, the populace, and the local media. In order for commanders to properly function in this complex environment, the DoD must re-evaluate how it develops and approves IO themes and messages.

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Currently, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1 and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05C place considerable constraints on commanders to effectively communicate with the population. For instance, the release of leaflets, pamphlets, radio programs, TV programs, and advertisements must receive approval by the United States Secretary Defense for Policy USD(P) before they can be broadcast or distributed. CJCSI 3110.05C states:

The Secretary of Defense normally delegates execution and approval authority for operational and tactical-level PSYOP products and actions to the supported combatant commander in the execute order. The combatant commander is authorized to sub-delegate that authority to a subordinate component or Joint Force Commander (JFC). Approval authority may not be sub-delegated below the component or JFC-level without Secretary of Defense approval.\textsuperscript{183}

During OIF, these instructions encumbered commanders in the field. The Army’s Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, noted that during the MCO and the PHO phases of OIF, the approval process for IO messages was estimated to take between seventy-two (72) hours to six (6) weeks. This process is obviously too slow and does not allow the commander on the ground to efficiently communicate with the population. In an interview conducted with Lieutenant General William A. Wallace, V Corps Commander during OIF, and the current Army IO proponent, he stated:

IO is like politics: everything is local. The means for communicating with the populace is through human interaction and every local area is different… IO messages are frequently too complex or not feasible, and the person receiving the message may not understand what it is that you are asking him to do.\textsuperscript{184}

LTG Wallace attributed these failures to what he termed the “centralized planning and centralized execution mentality” that dominates contemporary IO thinkers and planners. He believes that in order for IO to work properly and efficiently during PHO, the authority to tailor messages, themes and broadcasts must be delegated down to the lowest level possible. While LTG Wallace did not state specifically what level is appropriate, the case study of OIF suggests

\textsuperscript{183} CJCSI 3110.05c, \textit{Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002 (CJCSI 3110.01 series)}, Enclosure B, paragraph 2b.
\textsuperscript{184} Interview conducted with LTG Wallace at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 15 November 2004.
that the approval process for IO during PHO should be delegated to division commanders or in
the case of multi-national brigades, the first general officer in the chain of command. This
delegation authority will provide commanders the flexibility to rapidly and decisively react to the
concerns of the local population. Additionally, and maybe more importantly, it will enable
commanders on the ground to more quickly counter local propaganda, and misinformation that
appears to dominate the PHO environment. As LTG Wallace stated in his interview, “centralized
planning and decentralized execution,” has been a cornerstone for Army operations in the past
and should be applied to the execution of IO today.\textsuperscript{185}

\section*{Intelligence and IO (Human Factor Analysis / Database Collection Issues)}

The lack of actionable “cultural intelligence” underlies a significant portion of the
challenges outlined in the case study. As discussed in the case study, the consensus seems to be
that units in Iraq were not equipped with the level and depth of cultural intelligence required. The
CATT II team reported that “as a general rule, IPB process lacks with regards to IO.”\textsuperscript{186}

Currently, U.S. Army divisions do not maintain any central database or conduct human
factors analysis\textsuperscript{187} with regard to the key players in their AOR (i.e., civic leaders, religious
Imams, terrorists, and insurgents). In one division, intelligence gathering tasks were divided
between G-2, G-5, and PSYOP. However, their different databases were not shared.\textsuperscript{188} Making a
similar observation in November 2003, Anthony Cordesman reported that 1\textsuperscript{st} AD was not
equipped for a mission that relied so heavily on HUMINT. Thus, it was a slow process to “fully

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{186} CALL Newsletter 04-13, OIF CAAT II Report, Chapter 1, Topic B: Information Operations
and Intelligence.
\item \textsuperscript{187} DOD Directive 3600.1, \textit{Information Operations}, still in revision, provides a draft definition of
“human factors”: the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence the
decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at
any level in a state or organization.
\item \textsuperscript{188} CALL Newsletter 04-13, Topic B.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
organize and create suitable data bases, learn how to run sources, find out what sources were reliable and what sources work.”"189

The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for conducting human factors analysis on strategic or national-level personalities.190 In addition, 1st IO Command provides data through a systems study approach using political, military, economic, social information and institutional systems analysis (PMESII). The PMESII study is being forwarded to the field through FSTs (field service teams) and web-based applications.191 However, there appears to be no agency, or organization, at the operational or tactical level, to bridge the gap from strategic or national knowledge to US forces on the ground. As a result, battalion and brigade commanders are learning the AOR by trial and error.192 Further, without a structure to institutionalize such learning, when individual commanders leave the AOR, much of their knowledge leaves with them. In a situation that demands troop rotation, it appears imperative to have a mechanism for incoming troops to learn about the key players in their AOR more effectively.193

Thus, human factors analysis results must be available to division, brigade, and battalion commanders and their staffs.194 The current increase in insurgent attacks makes shaping Iraqi perception even more difficult and illustrates the importance of actionable intelligence. As Dr. Steven Metz explained, controlling insurgent attacks in Iraq enables US forces to control the psychological dimension of the conflict. To successfully control the dissatisfaction that results

190 CALL Newsletter 04-13, Topic B; see also DOD Directive 3600.1 (Revision One), E(1)(k).
191 Information was taken from the IO panel that was conducted for SAMS students on 22 November 2004. The IO panel consisted of representatives from the IO proponency at Fort Leavenworth as well as members of the 1st IO command.
192 CALL Newsletter 04-13, Topic B.
194 CALL Newsletter 04-13, Topic B. (Lessons Learned).
after such attacks, “human and technical sources of information as well as effective methods to analyze and share information across agencies and among coalition partners” is required.\footnote{Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 34.}

The Army’s shortage of qualified linguists and interpreters is repeatedly cited as a factor that reduces US effectiveness. In the 82d Airborne Division After Action Review (21 July 2003), it was reported that the shortage of reliable interpreters made it difficult to coordinate meetings with the emerging civilian leadership as they entered Iraqi cities.\footnote{82d Airborne Division Final Report Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review 21 July 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, 6.} Similarly, the CATT II team noted the lack of trained military Arabic-speaking linguists. When the military was forced to rely on locally hired translators, they found that the tribal affiliations of the translators tended to interfere with US objectives.\footnote{CAAT II-Chapter 2, Civil Military Operations-Civil Affairs, Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq.} The lack of language skills has even led to DOD funding for the “Phraselator,” a palm-held electronic device that can translate English into other languages. However, the device is unable to translate responses.\footnote{“Elevate your hands or I ignite,” \textit{Economist}, 26 August 2004.} The evidence from this case study suggests that DOD funding should focus on producing more soldiers capable of actually communicating in Arabic.

\textbf{Training and Education}

Effective IO in during PHO includes informing indigenous populations about the nature of our mission, our military’s intentions, and how we plan to achieve the articulated objectives. As explained earlier in the case study, during the first few months of the PHO phase (April – November 03), the Army did a poor job of communicating between the CPA and the Iraqi people, and within the CPA itself.\footnote{See Hamre \textit{et al}, Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations (17 July 2003) p. ii.}
Despite the military's ability to react and adapt to their environment as the US presence in Iraq continued, it is clear that soldiers present for the rapid transition to PHO, or Phase IV operations, were ill-equipped to deal with many challenges of the PHO environment. The lack of training and qualified personnel involved in information operations and civil military operations is a theme repeatedly cited in the CATT II report. Further, as already noted, the 82d Airborne Division’s Final Report repeatedly discussed the effect that their lack of cultural and demographic understanding had on their ability to coherently transition their operation.\textsuperscript{200}

In order for the U.S. Army to evolve into an organization that understands the complexity of PHO, it will require particular emphasis from the Army’s military education system to adapt and educate its professionals in order to prepare for the types of operations required in a PHO environment. Specifically, it must improve training and more importantly, integration of the following three IO core competencies: military deception, psychological operations, and public affairs. Further, it must develop a learning environment which encourages its members to study foreign languages. In addition to encouraging leaders to foster a learning organization mentality, the Army should provide incentives for those soldiers who meet certain gates of self study.

In his article, MG (RET) Robert H. Scales Jr., argues that the Army should reward “soldiers who spend time overseas immersed in foreign cultures - particularly those most likely to become engaged in conflicts of strategic importance to the United States.”\textsuperscript{201} General Scales continues, “at the heart of a culture-centric approach to future war should be a cadre of global scouts, well educated, with a penchant for languages and a comfort with strange and different places.”\textsuperscript{202} The military currently has a program similar in design to the recommendation that MG Scales articulated. The Olmsted Scholar Program was designed to identify promising young

\textsuperscript{200} See 82d Airborne Division Final Report OIF After Action Review (FOUO), (21 July 2003), 6, 9, 16, 18.
\textsuperscript{201} Scales Jr., “Culture-Centric Warfare.”
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
officers, teach them a foreign language, and immerse them abroad for two years of study in their chosen language at a foreign university. In 2005, 17 service members were selected to participate in this program. The Army received 2 scholarships, the Navy and Air Force received 6 each, and the Marines received 3. These numbers, while promising, are likely too small to produce significant benefits, and will not provide the culturally knowledgeable force that MG Scales advocates.

In order to advance our efforts, the Army should evaluate the feasibility of the commissioning programs (both Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC) and the United States Military Academy) mandating that cadets complete a minimum of 2 years of language training prior to commissioning. By forcing cadets to participate in language training, their aptitude to gain a foreign language in the future may be improved. Further, such training will increase the spectrum of cultural appreciation in the US Army’s Officer Corps.

Second, the Army must encourage a learning environment in the ranks. One way to initiate this effort is to encourage soldiers to study language on their own time, through a web-based application sponsored by a university. Currently, soldiers can take a language assessment examination, and if they score at a certain level, will receive pay incentives. While this current system encourages service members who already possess certain language skills, it does not create any incentives for soldiers to initiate enrollment in a learning program. A more comprehensive and incentive based system would not only provide financial rewards, but would also eventually lead to increased capabilities and aptitudes Army wide.

The military’s experience in Iraq also demonstrates that the information operation in a PHO is both effected and affected by individual soldiers on the ground. The notion of the

\[203\] A similar comment was made by LTG Wallace in a briefing he did for the SAMS Class on 16 November 2004. LTG Wallace advocated that all cadets be required to participate in 4 years of language training in college as part of their pre-commissioning program. He stated that he believed that the language training required at an early age would facilitate increased language aptitude later on in life.
“strategic corporal” is gaining acceptance as commanders realize that individual soldiers must take actions in stressful situations that can send messages to the indigenous population, as well as the international community. Thus, in addition to specific cultural training and language training, soldiers should also be trained in more practical “civilian” skills including negotiation and effectively dealing with the media. 204 By exposing officers, at a minimum, to this education early in their careers, the Army would emphasize its commitment to preparing soldiers for the full spectrum of operations, including PHO/SASO. In their article, Binnedndijk and Johnson, summarize their model of professional military education for stabilization and reconstruction operations in this way:

[A]n ‘applied liberal arts education’ would supplement instruction in doctrine and core competencies with culture, sociology, psychology, history, language, international and domestic law, ethics, and media and negotiation skills—all important subjects for developing the intellectual skills and capability to deal with complex and changing strategic environment. 205

Incorporating IO training into practical exercises may present challenges. First, the very technical and classified side of some IO elements (i.e., computer network operations, computer network attack, etc.) cannot be easily incorporated into regular training events. The assets needed from STRATCOM and 1st IO Command are currently being used to support the GWOT and other contingency operations, and it is doubtful they could be incorporated into regular training events. Further, in its current form, FM 3-13 is extremely limited on how to incorporate IO training into regular training events. As the CAAT II team reported, FM 3-13 does not instruct “how to actually do the job once in theater.” 206

However, the Army’s experience in Iraq demonstrates that the Army must incorporate Psychological Operations training, Public Affairs and Military deception into all training events. Additionally, all training in the future must incorporate an understanding of culture, language,

204 The need for such training is discussed by Hans Binnedndijk and Stuart Johnson in their article, “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” 94.
205 Ibid.
206 CAAT II-Chapter 1, Information Operations, Topic E: IO at the Division.
historical understanding, law enforcement tasks, and the inclusion of civics. These tasks are fundamental in a PHO environment and have proven to be decisive. Discussing the lack of training for officers assigned IO tasks at the division level, the CAAT II team similarly concluded that IO personnel in theatre need additional PSYOP, CA, and PA training before deployment. According to their findings, “the officers assigned have only limited knowledge about the core, supporting, and related IO activities.”

Looking Inward (Military Culture)

Sun Tzu claimed, “When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” It is clear that the Army must look inward and examine what changes the challenges of today and the future require.

First, the Army must address its own inclination to place priority on those assets directly involved in combat. The lack of planning for “Phase IV” operations demonstrates that the Army feels most comfortable planning for what it knows best: winning the combat mission. During what was delineated “major combat operations,” it appears the IO plan was more successful with its focus on technological tools and dissemination of IO “product.” For example, electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) were successful in suppressing enemy air defense, and defending our computer networks. Further, PSYOP produced thousands of hours of radio programs and disseminated thousands of leaflets meant to encourage surrender. However, once the mission turned to “winning hearts and minds,” other factors, such as use of the

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207 See Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Donahoe, “Preparing Leaders for Nation Building,” Military Review (May-June 2004). While national building and PHO are not exactly the same, it is reasonable to assume that certain tasks overlap in both types of operations.
208 CAAT II-Chapter 1, Information Operations, Topic E: IO at the Division.
210 Batschelet, “Information Operations for the Joint Warfighter,”
media, developing relationships, and cultural understanding came to the forefront. In the Phase IV operation, where efforts focused on those elements of information operations that rely more heavily on human elements (i.e., reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions), the resources were scarce.

Despite the emphasis in doctrine that information operations must be “synchronized” into the Army planning process, it seems that such coordination is not happening. In part, it appears that, at least at the division and brigade level, the lack of personnel and training affected the S-7/G-7’s ability to effectively contribute. For example, the CAAT team reported that one division’s IO working group (IOWG), formed to coordinate and synchronize their IO efforts, ultimately disbanded because the appropriate staff elements were not present at their meetings. As the CAAT team concluded, the involvement of senior leadership is central to giving IO resources a voice. In cases where senior leadership interfaced with the various IOWG’s or chaired their meetings, the rest of the staff was involved.

The challenges in post-conflict Iraq illustrate that improved IO integration could have mitigated the potential for subsequent mission failures. For example, the demolition of Iraqi government-owned media outlets and Information Ministry helped create what is termed the “information void.” Without intelligence input to locate these resources, as well as IO planners to provide input on the possible effects of the demolition, commanders were unprepared to deal with Iraqis “starved” for news. Thus, as FM3-13 acknowledges, the integration of IO must start with its acceptance by senior leadership: “the commander’s personal interest and involvement [in IO planning] is essential to ensure that IO effectively supports this mission. To achieve this, commanders and staff planners consider IO throughout the MDMP.”

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211 MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Culture Centric Warfare”.
212 CALL Newsletter 04-13, OIF CAAT II Report, Chapter 1, Topic E: IO at the Division.
213 CAC G7 briefing slides, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
214 FM 3-13, 5-1.
Second, a study of Iraq demonstrates that the Army needs soldiers and leaders willing to conduct their business in a new way. In January 2004, Newsweek magazine reported:

[T]he Army pulled back into an armored shell. At bases like Camp Warhouse at Baqubah...soldiers wear their body armor and helmets from dusk to dawn. American bases are growing ever more elaborate, with Pizza Huts and Burger Kings, and so large that one, called Anaconda, has nine bus routes to move the troops around inside the wire. It might be called the Da Nanging of Iraq, though the military prefers to speak of the ‘maturing of the battlefield.’

The Army’s “armored shell” has its own IO implications. When troops live indistinct and distant housing, they develop a “cognitive distance” from the population and the image of Americans as the occupying “outsider” is cemented. It has also been reported that soldiers, due primarily to language and security barriers, do not have enough interaction with the average Iraqi. For example, according to the CAAT II Report, American forces are operating in a “relative vacuum of Iraqi sentiments” because their perceptions are formed by those translators or Iraqis who visit the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Finally, the CAAT II Report also noted that civil affairs operations are not always emphasized by commanders. For example, the lack of priority in units was communicated when direct support teams (DST) were not provided security/escort vehicles in order to perform their functions given the force protection requirements.

Clearly, such isolation does not help in the battle for hearts and minds. Further, isolation from the population makes it more difficult to monitor rumors and counter the misinformation on the streets and in the media, as discussed in the case study. Thus, commanders must acknowledge that a battle for the hearts and minds of a population may require a shift in conventional tactics. Though some commanders believe they are “not in Iraq to ‘win hearts and

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216 CALL Newsletter 04-13, OIF CAAT II Report, Chapter 2, Topic B: Transitioning to Civil Administration.
minds,” it appears that there are other leaders who recognize that they must be sensitive to this new type of conflict. For example, LTG Thomas Metz summarized his new perception of the battlefield:

[T]o win an insurgency isn’t necessarily a function of the most can-do attitude. I have been brought up to go do the mission. What I’ve got to do is change my thinking a little bit. I’ve got to...say how do I support the Iraqis get the job done? And I have got to sometimes tailor back. That’s not being fearful, that’s not running from the enemy.  

Further, MG David H. Petraeus, Commander, 101st Airborne Division, was described as more like a “big city mayor than a Light Infantry commander” in that he rallied the cooperation (through money) of local tribe and religious leaders in the unit’s efforts. It was also reported that on each barracks, he had ordered large signs with the words: “WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO WIN IRAQI HEARTS AND MINDS TODAY?” There is evidence that soldiers at lower levels are also realizing the benefits of a change in tactics. For example, tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) at the brigade-level reported that actually engaging populations “face to face,” as well as without body armor and LBE, provided the best results.

However, the security situation in Iraq makes clear that there are no easy answers regarding how soldiers can more effectively communicate with the Iraqi population. On the one hand, units using unconventional tactics are exposing themselves to increased risk. On the other, soldiers secured behind their own perimeter have little chance of narrowing the gap between the way they are perceived and the way they wish to be perceived. Perhaps the best recommendation is that commanders must at least begin to reevaluate their role and their commitment to prioritizing the human side of IO and its related activities.

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217 CALL Newsletter 04-13, OIF CAAT II Report, Chapter 2, Topic B: Transitioning to Civil Administration; see also Christopher H. Varhola, “American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq.”


219 Caryl, Nordland and Thomas, “Operation Hearts and Minds.”

220 CALL Newsletter 04-13, OIF CAAT II Report, Chapter 1, Topic B: Information Operations and Intelligence.
CONCLUSION

In a situation as complex as Iraq, an effective information operation plan is obviously only part of the solution. Yet, as this monograph describes, many of the deficiencies plaguing the reconstruction of Iraq are tied to the information operation: lack of planning and the information void; proliferation of anti-US propaganda; rumor control; ineffective use of media sources; and lack of cultural knowledge.

While the U.S. Army has taken huge strides in the last few years in the area of IO, there is much work to be done. Clearly, reevaluating and further developing IO theory and doctrine, in light of the lessons in Iraq, would be a step in the right direction. Additionally, as this monograph concluded, there are other institutional changes that should be examined that could prove vital in broadening the understanding of the role of IO in the post-hostility environment. The Army must continue to educate its officer corps on how to properly integrate IO into every phase of planning and execution. The days of developing the plan, and then “adding some IO to it,” are over. IO is clearly a component of full spectrum operations, which must be integrated in the overall operational scheme of maneuver through the planning process, if it is going to work and function as the enabler that it is designed to be.
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