The interagency process is a series of hierarchical committees that set the conditions for the President to achieve national objectives by synchronizing the instruments of national power. After the fall of the Soviet Union, increased integration and coordination within the interagency was required in order to contend with increasingly complex global contingencies. This caused a colossal struggle between the President and Congress that redefined the role of the President in dealing with these contingencies. To address interagency coordination in this complex environment, President Clinton established PDD 56, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. However, due to continued congressional pressure, organizational friction at the department level, and insular Presidential level decision-making, the changes in PDD 56 were never fully implemented. What is needed is strong, supra-departmental control of the interagency process at the operational level. Such control will enable effective oversight of interagency planning and reduce departmental friction in order to provide the President with an integrated approach to problem solving in the post-Cold War environment.
Title of Monograph: Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level

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ABSTRACT

Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level by MAJ Thomas M. Lafleur, USA, 42 pages.

The interagency process is a series of hierarchical committees that set the conditions for the President to achieve national objectives by synchronizing the instruments of national power. After the fall of the Soviet Union, increased integration and coordination within the interagency was required in order to contend with increasingly complex global contingencies. This caused a colossal struggle between the President and Congress that redefined the role of the President in dealing with these contingencies. To address interagency coordination in this complex environment, President Clinton established PDD 56, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. However, due to continued congressional pressure, organizational friction at the department level, and insular Presidential level decision-making, the changes in PDD 56 were never fully implemented. What is needed is strong, supra-departmental control of the interagency process at the operational level. Such control will enable effective oversight of interagency planning and reduce departmental friction in order to provide the President with an integrated approach to problem solving in the post-Cold War environment.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Post-Cold War Environment and the Emerging Importance of the IAP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressures Regarding the Use of Force in CCO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structure of the IAP before and after PDD 56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friction between DoD and DoS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts to Improve Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The interagency is the chief forum for executive branch policy development in the United States. The interagency is not a place, but a process involving complex organizations with different cultures and different ideas about forming policy and the policy to pursue. This Interagency Process (IAP) consists of a hierarchical series of committees, comprised of representatives from a community of agencies and departments that depend on effective planning and coordination to facilitate executive branch decision-making. The goal of interagency planning is to coordinate policy employing all instruments of national power to accomplish the President’s objectives. The IAP identifies policy issues, formulates options, and oversees the implementation of policy decisions, thereby transforming the U.S. national engagement strategy into workable policy objectives. Ideally, the IAP sets the conditions for a shared vision within the interagency and a smooth transition to decentralized execution.

The U.S. government employs the elements of national power through its departments and agencies. Each organization has different responsibilities, legislative authorities, funding programs, levels of expertise, assets and interests, and capabilities. Many of these departments and agencies have overlapping responsibilities. The Department of Defense (DoD) is primarily responsible for the military instrument of power and the Department of State (DoS) is principally responsible for the diplomatic instrument of power, based on its primary mission to recommend foreign policy. Nevertheless, no one agency or department controls the informational instrument of power. Similarly, because the Treasury Department, Agriculture Department, Commerce Department, Justice Department and others have some ability to affect aspects of economic

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1 JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I, Revision Final Coordination, Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2004, I-1. The four instruments of national power are the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

2 James R. Bartran, PDD 56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the Pol-Mil Plan, Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, April 2000, 6.
policy, economic power is diffused. Because military and diplomatic responsibilities are consolidated within DoD and DoS respectively, they are the most powerful departments within the U.S. government dealing with national security.

The advantages of an effective IAP are many. First, an effective IAP informs senior U.S. officials about situations that threaten to produce crises that would affect U.S. interests. Second, an effective IAP bridges the civilian-military gap by making information and capabilities transparent amongst departments and agencies. Finally, the IAP provides well-considered advice and policy recommendations to the President. Because each agency brings its own culture, expertise, philosophy, and bureaucratic interests to the IAP, an effective IAP presents planners diverse options and reduces opportunities to circumvent critical issues. The main benefit of the IAP is its thoroughness. The main drawback of the IAP is its slowness and complexity. Despite the strengths of the IAP at the strategic level, from the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 to recent events in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the IAP has been operationally ineffective.

This research examined interagency interaction from the end of the Cold War through Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security structures of the Cold War period were inadequate to contend with the rise of small-scale conflicts termed complex contingency operations (CCO). As these operations became more prevalent, the need for better coordination among U.S. governmental departments grew. However, the primary focus of the early 1990’s was determining the balance between the role of the President as director of U.S. foreign policy, and the power of Congress in declaring war: CCO falls somewhere in the middle. The focus then shifted to improving interagency coordination between departments, most notably DoD and DoS. In April 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive

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56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex contingency operations* (PDD 56), whose purpose was to codify the way that the departments within the U.S. government would deal with CCO. However, PDD 56 was not used during the Kosovo crisis, which means that the Presidential directive was not self-enforcing.

The question, therefore, is why have attempts to improve the efficacy of the IAP failed, and what current efforts to improve interagency efficacy at the operational level are likely to succeed. It is likely that a combination of political pressures and departmental friction have inhibited effective interagency planning. Political pressures include congressional influence on the Executive branch and the changing nature of foreign affairs in the post-Cold War environment. Departmental friction arose from a clash in roles, responsibilities, and culture between the two biggest participants in the IAP: DoD and DoS.

This monograph is organized into five sections. Section one describes the post-Cold War environment and the emerging importance of effective interagency operations. Section two describes the focus of the Clinton Administration throughout the early post-Cold War period regarding the use of U.S. forces in CCO. Section three describes the structure of the IAP established in the National Security Act of 1947 and the proposed changes to the structure of the IAP occasioned by PDD 56. Section four examines the friction between DoD and DoS regarding differences in roles, responsibilities, and culture and provides examples of interagency friction from OIF. The last section examines several efforts at improving interagency coordination at the operational level in the form of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), the country team, and the contingency planning policy coordinating committee. Finally, the conclusion provides potential solutions to improve the interagency process at the operational level.

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The Post-Cold War Environment and the Emerging Importance of the IAP

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the National Security Council shifted its focus from considering the possibility of combat operations to the probability of peace operations, termed complex contingency operations. Complex contingency operations are defined as “large-scale peace operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that include one or more elements of other types of operations, such as humanitarian assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency.” Once relegated to the strategic sidelines of the Cold War, preventing and responding to CCO quickly became the most important component of U.S. strategy for protecting and advancing U.S. national interests in the 1990’s. After the end of the Cold War, collective police actions by the members of the global community or regional security organizations became the alternative to traditional wars of self-defense.

Threats in the post-Cold War world include increasing weapons proliferation, the rise of super-empowered individuals, increased transnational threats, and increased unconventional threats to U.S. citizens and interests such as regional drug cartels and international terrorists, and the probability of which increases as regional instability continues to rise. Consequently, the nature and location of conflicts are more unpredictable. There is a broad spectrum of new threats. The major CCO since the end of the Cold War include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The large number of CCO in the post-Cold War world underscores the complexity of this new national security environment. Actions in CCO crossed traditional lines of authority

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5 JP 3-08, GL-6.
between military and civilian organizations, forcing the U.S. government to integrate and synchronize the elements of national power more effectively. As French military analysts Brigadier General Francart and Jean-Jaques Patry observed, “Military operations are now completely integrated with political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities.”

Secretary of Defense William Perry described the complexity of the post-Cold War environment when he stated “since the end of the Cold War, the political and military issues have become so complicated and inextricably linked it is absolutely imperative that the State Department and Department of Defense have a close working relationship.” In September 1999, the Hart-Rudman commission stated that “…the (future) international system will be so fluid and complex that to think intelligently about military issues will mean taking an integrated view of political, social, technological, and economic developments…the very facts of military reality are changing.”

The increasing relevance of the contemporary IAP is more clearly understood after examining the post-Cold War environment. Michael Evans describes the major transition in international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union as characterized by a greater interdependence and interconnectedness among national, trans-national, regional, and non-state actors. As such, in an increasingly interdependent world with greater competition for resources, CCO will become even more commonplace. This new world order is part of the phenomenon called globalization, which is as “a process in which space and time have been so compressed by

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technology as to permit distant actions to have local effects.”

Due to globalization, the roles of U.S. government agencies are changing. Agency roles are converging because effective action requires an integrated effort. However, departmental goals are diverging to maintain organizational relevance. In many cases, each U.S. government agency develops a separate plan for an operation, most often without a shared vision of the central issues or objectives. Separate planning efforts have accentuated the differences in each department’s approach to planning, and have caused serious problems in planning for and responding to CCO. Uncoordinated planning produces serious differences in assumptions, concepts, policy recommendations, and plans, and when CCO throughout the post-Cold War period are examined, those differences become obvious.

**Pressures Regarding the Use of Force in CCO**

“Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.”

James Madison

The first post-Cold War operation that would later be termed a complex contingency operation was Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. In December 1992, after the UN Security Council passed resolution number 794, President Bush sent U.S. troops to Somalia to assist the UN in distributing humanitarian aid. Resolution 794 authorized the use of peacekeeping forces to address the Somali civil war and the ensuing famine. In June 1993, the fighters of clan leader General Mohammad Aideed killed 24 Pakistani UN peacekeepers. The Pakistani slaughter caused UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali and his UN representative in Somalia U.S.

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10 Evans.
12 Ibid., 177.
Admiral (ret) Jonathan Howe to request greater U.S. military assistance. Because Aideed had killed UN peacekeepers, President Clinton agreed to escalate the U.S. role in Somalia.

On October 2, 1993, a daylight raid to capture General Aideed at the Olympic Hotel failed, ending in the death of 18 U.S. servicemen. After the failed raid, congressional support for Somalia dwindled. In that atmosphere, a compromise was reached between President Clinton and Congress that set March 31, 1994 as the departure date of all U.S. forces in Somalia. After Somalia, Senator Dole announced his intention to introduce a bill stating that no additional U.S. forces could be introduced into peacekeeping operations without prior congressional approval. President Clinton announced that he would fight or ignore any attempts to interfere with his foreign policy prerogatives. He was determined to be more personally involved in the next CCO.13

In the aftermath of Somalia, in May 1994, President Clinton signed PDD 25 Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. PDD 25 described the conditions that would need to be present before U.S. forces deployed overseas. PDD 25 states that peacekeeping can be a “useful tool” to help prevent and resolve conflicts before they pose direct threats to U.S. national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.” PDD 25 had six major reform provisions, the most critical of which was making disciplined and coherent choices about which peacekeeping operations to support. In addition, PDD 25 attempted to bridge the growing gap between the President and Congress. The directive stated, “Traditionally, the Executive branch had not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous,

complex, and expansive.”

PDD 25 was the best of both worlds for President Clinton. With one stroke, he increased his freedom to determine which operations he would support, while at the same time he appeased Congress by agreeing to ask their counsel. The point that PDD 25 did not require congressional approval, but only suggested congressional involvement, was not lost on some members of Congress.

Nevertheless, PDD 25 was contentious because it accepted the possibility that U.S. forces would be placed under UN control. Though there was historical precedent for U.S. forces serving under the command of other countries, in the aftermath of Somalia the issue was political dynamite. According to Phyllis Schlafly, “the fourth finger of Clinton’s global goals is the attempt to put our national security, including our armed services, under global control so that the U.S. will be locked into a perpetual interventionist policy under which American servicemen and women will be sent to faraway places to fight never-ending foreign wars disguised as “peacekeeping” operations. Schlafly parroted what many anti-globalization activists and House republicans were saying at the time, to wit “global treaties and conferences are a direct threat to every American citizen.”

However, the issue was not new. In 1945, the U.S. Senate had sought assurance that the UN Security Council would have no power to send U.S. troops into combat without a declaration of war by Congress. However, the UN Charter also empowered the President to send U.S. forces into a police action when the UN Security Council so resolved. Senator Vandenberg, a delegate to the San Francisco Conference (which developed the UN Charter) and the ranking Republican in Congress commented that “I think that if we were to require the consent of Congress to every use of our armed forces, it would not only violate the spirit of the charter, but it

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16 Franck and Patel, 67.
would violate the spirit of the Constitution of the U.S., because under the Constitution the President has certain rights to use our armed forces in the national defense without consulting Congress.”

The Senate voted to ratify the UN Charter that allowed the President to respond to a UN Security Council call for police enforcement without having to secure a traditional declaration of war from Congress.18

Following Somalia, the next CCO was Haiti. The crisis in Haiti came to a head in September 1994. By that time, President Clinton had been working on a peaceful solution to Haiti’s problem for almost two years. More than a year earlier, Haitian General Raoul Cedras had signed an agreement to give up power and let the rightfully elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide return as President, but when the time came for Cedras to leave, he simply did not go. In July 1993, the UN Security Council approved a resolution that stated that UN member nations were authorized to “use all necessary means” to remove the military leadership on Haiti. In the aftermath of that resolution, the Senate announced that a UN Security Council Resolution does not constitute authorization for the deployment of U.S. armed forces, but President Clinton replied that both adversaries and allies must know with certainty that the U.S. can respond decisively.19

The invasion of Haiti, in the minds of some Congressmen, violated the conditions established by PDD 25 because President Clinton did not consult Congress. Though public opinion and congressional sentiment were against any operation in Haiti, President Clinton ordered U.S. troop deployments. The plan that President Clinton approved was based on returning Aristide to power. The legal basis of the plan was a series of UN resolutions declaring Aristide the legally elected president of Haiti. The situation was delicate because Aristide did not want to go back to Haiti on the shoulders of American “imperialists.” In the end, the U.S

17 Ibid., 68.
18 Ibid., 69.
19 Fisher, 182.
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright garnered support for U.S. action in Haiti in the UN Security Council by obtaining a letter from Aristide that approved of U.S. assistance.20

In the aftermath of Haiti, Congress was displeased that President Clinton deployed U.S. forces without congressional approval at a time when the United States was not under attack. Representative Gene Taylor (D-Michigan), told Undersecretary of State Slocombe that “I hope we will not see this repeated on a regular basis in places like Bosnia, where I don’t think the President, once again, could get the votes to do it (through Congress). But he knows if he sends the troops in, then the American people will say ‘well, you can’t cut them off now.’ Let’s don’t make a habit of this, huh?” referring to President Clinton’s insistence that he could act militarily against Haiti without the approval of Congress.21

The tension between the President and Congress was further heightened by the results of the 1994 Congressional elections. The election created a Republican majority in both houses of Congress and enabled the opposition party to challenge the Clinton administration’s initiatives involving the use of U.S. military force in “peace operations” overseas.22 The 104th Congress, which took office in January 1995, was dominated by the Republican Party and was committed to changing the foreign policy power of the President. Republican discourse at that time was quite critical of President Clinton’s support of UN peacekeeping operations. This struggle centered on the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the extension of Presidential war-making power. According to the War Powers Resolution, the President is required to submit a written report to the Speaker of the House within 48 hours, detailing the circumstances necessitating introduction of U.S. armed forces, the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place, and the estimated scope and duration of hostilities. However, though these CCO

required troop deployment and lengthy commitment, they were not wars but limited interventions.\textsuperscript{23} Limited intervention is a choice for the President alone to make.\textsuperscript{24}

On 4 January 1995, Congress passed the National Security Revitalization Act, requiring Congressional approval of Presidential agreements with the UN Security Council. House Republicans wanted to “rein in” the President’s freedom to support UN peacekeeping operations. President Clinton vetoed the legislation, but felt the political need to appease the opposition by promising to consult with Congress. In response to pending congressional amendments to restrict presidential actions in Bosnia and Haiti, President Clinton again objected that they would infringe on his constitutional authority to make foreign policy and deploy troops without being constrained by Congress.\textsuperscript{25} President Clinton also claimed that fast-breaking crises did not permit the luxury of congressional deliberation and cited the UN and other treaty-based obligations as authorization for U.S. military action.\textsuperscript{26} The Republicans claimed that President Clinton was supporting UN and NATO policy through the UN Security Council resolutions, not through U.S. policy supported by Congress. It came down to a basic difference in approach: to the Clinton Administration, peacekeeping was a foreign policy tool that could be used as a preventative measure to quell smaller crises before they erupted into full-blown conflicts. Clinton’s opposition argued that Somalia, and later operations in the Balkans, were not U.S. problems and should be resolved by Europeans or Africans.

The next CCO was Bosnia. Fighting in Bosnia had been going on since the fall of the Soviet Union, as the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians vied for power in the former Yugoslavia. Each of the warring factions conducted grisly reprisals on the supporters of the opposing ethnic groups,

\textsuperscript{23} Fisher, 291.
\textsuperscript{25} Fisher, 183.
\textsuperscript{26} Banks and Straussman, 198.
but none was as horrifying as the massacre of some 5,000 Muslim males in Srebernica in the summer of 1995. After the massacre at Srebernica, President Clinton was determined to take a more aggressive stand to stop the violence. His advisors presented him with four plans for U.S. intervention in Bosnia. The first one, Tony Lake’s “endgame strategy,” argued for continued U.S. support to the Bosnians excluding military means. The second plan, presented by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, argued for continued negotiation. The third plan, presented by Secretary of Defense William Perry, argued for a 70-30 partition of Bosnia, with the lion’s share going to the Serbs. Finally, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, argued for the use of military threats.27

In President Clinton’s mind the situation in Bosnia was similar to Somalia in 1993 when General Aideed killed UN peacekeeping forces. President Clinton thought that Serbian actions at Srebernica had made a mockery of the UN, NATO, and the U.S.28 President Clinton merged Lake’s and Albright’s plans together, and in July 1995, increased his pressure on the UN to authorize a rapid reaction force. He also authorized a private company using retired U.S. military personnel to train the Croatian Army. It was clear to President Clinton that the Serbs had to suffer losses before effective negotiations could ensue.29

In late July, the U.S. relaxed the arms embargo to the Balkans, allowing Croat and Muslim forces to rearm. This allowed the Croats to resume offensive operations in August. After the shelling of a crowded marketplace in the heart of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces in late August, NATO began intense air strikes on Serb positions, authorized by the UN, which quickly led to the initiation of peace talks in September.

On 21 November 1995, Ambassador Holbrooke and his team reached an agreement on the Bosnia conflict, but NATO would have to send forces there to enforce it. In addition, Russian

27 Poole, 15.
28 Clinton, 665.
29 Fisher, 186.
forces would deploy to the Balkans, ostensibly to prevent reparations against the Serbs. President Clinton addressed the American people on 27 November 1995 and said that the U.S. had helped to produce the peace agreement and should honor it by sending peacekeepers to enforce it. Clinton said that U.S. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia would serve U.S. strategic interests and pledged clear, limited, achievable objectives. Poll data indicated that the American people were proud of the accords but were overwhelmingly opposed to sending U.S. forces to Bosnia. On December 14, 1995, by a vote of 210-218, the House failed to pass a bill prohibiting funds from being used to deploy troops to Bosnia. Thus, the President had the ability to deploy 20,000 American ground troops to Bosnia to support the signed Dayton peace accords.

Immediately thereafter, Congress again attempted to place limits on the President’s ability to deploy ground forces in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act. President Clinton vetoed that act, and only approved it after Congress dropped the offending provisions. However, when it was clear that the Bosnia mission was going to last longer than the projected twelve months, money had to be found to pay for the operation. In a bizarre twist of events, rather than appropriate additional funds to pay for operations in the Balkans, or deny the President funds to continue the operation, Congress authorized the President to reprogram funds initially authorized for defense spending research and development projects into operational funds to support the deployment to Bosnia. President Clinton directed the Secretary of Defense to find the money to cover the operation within the fiscal 1997 DoD accounts and to spend reprogrammed, transferred, emergency, and contingency funds. This precedent would later be used to justify Presidential reallocation of appropriated funds to support operations in Kosovo without approval from Congress, greatly increasing the scope of Presidential control over troop deployments.  

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30 Fisher, 191.
31 Banks and Straussman, 200, 202.
Having consolidated his authority to conduct foreign policy free from congressional interference, President Clinton turned to the problem of increasing the efficacy within the interagency. The first Clinton administration had learned from their experience in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia that each CCO had its own unique set of conditions, circumstances, and challenges, and could not be resolved with cookie-cutter solutions. The structure in place for coordinating security policy in the U.S. was created almost 50 years earlier, and needed modification in order to adapt to the new security environment. But before President Clinton’s measures to adapt the National Security Council System to the exigencies of the 21st Century are discussed, a contextual review of the National Security Council Structure is required.

**The Structure of the IAP before and after PDD 56**

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council, and assigned it responsibility for coordinating security policy. The National Security Council has four statutory members, two statutory advisors, three additional members directed by the President, and a permanent staff. The statutory members are the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The two statutory advisors are the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The National Security Council staff is comprised of about 140 personnel, half of whom are policy professionals, covering regional and functional responsibilities, and the other half, administrative and support personnel. The National Security Council system coordinates departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of national security policies, and advises and assists the President in integrating all elements of national power: domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic.\(^{32}\) The

\(^{32}\) The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 1: *Organization of the*
National Security Council is the principle forum for consideration of national security issues requiring Presidential decision, and provides the foundation for interagency coordination.  

The President holds the National Security Council staff responsible for policymaking, policy coordination, and oversight of policy implementation. There is a natural tension between these functions, since the National Security Council controls the creation of policy and the departments control policy implementation. DoS officials tend to be anxious about the National Security Council usurping control of policy implementation. In contrast, the National Security Council is concerned that DoS will either implement the President’s policies incorrectly or might do so in a way that would make the President’s policy decisions appear ineffective and incorrect. Officials in the DoS tend to oppose a strong National Security Council, because they view it as a rival. Officials in the DoD, however, especially military officers, tend to favor a strong National Security Council. They expect the National Security Council to integrate policy implementation efforts, much like military staffs, and are frustrated when actions are not integrated. But in the end, both departments may actually prefer a weak National Security Council as long as their organizational goals are met.

The Principals committee is the second level within the National Security Council structure. The Principals committee is the senior cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, and provides direct advice to the President. The Principals committee has the same membership as the National Security Council, minus the President and the Vice President. The national security advisor is the chair, and must ensure that all recommended policies are consistent with the policies of the President.

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36 Timothy D. Lynch, A Suggested Decision-making Guide for Use by Interagency Working Groups in Developing Policy Recommendations for Complex Contingency Crisis Operations, Carlisle...
before they are implemented. Within the IAP, the Principals committee functions as the President’s personal staff and ultimately integrates departmental positions in a three step process. First, it reviews new policy initiatives to insure that policy is consistent with the President’s overall policy. Second, it ensures that all appropriate departments and agencies have coordinated in the policy formulation process. Finally, it ensures that the political risks associated with the new policy initiative have been identified and assessed. The policy approval process within the National Security Council attempts to make all the relevant departments stakeholders in the final policy statement.36

The Principals committee can be viewed from two perspectives. It is a policy body composed of statutory members and various staff members who represent their departments and it is a committee at the top of a hierarchy of subcommittees. The subcommittees are all subordinated to the President’s will and directed by the national security advisor, who, assisted by a permanent staff, attempts to unite the departments within the executive branch of the U.S. government. The members of the Principals committee are at the top of the policy process, fully empowered to make any decision within their organization. But to support collective decision-making, the National Security Council staff must study options in detail to identify key issues and resolve conflicts. According to Bruce Pernic, the National Security Council staff must maintain a careful balance between oversight, coordination, and direction in order to be effective.37

Subordinate to the Principals committee is the Deputies committee. The Deputies committee is the senior sub-cabinet level interagency forum that considers policy issues affecting national security. The deputy national security advisor chairs the committee. The Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Undersecretary of the Treasury serve as members and the Vice Chairman of the JCS and Deputy Director of the CIA have advisory

Barracks: USAWC, April 1997, 7. See also JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I, Revision Final Coordination, Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2004, II-3.

36 Marcella, 244.
roles. The Deputies committee ensures that Principals committee issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for discussion.

Below the Deputies committee are policy coordinating committees. These committees identify and develop national security policy and issues. Policy coordinating committees manage the development and implementation of national security policies, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the National Security Council, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The oversight of ongoing operations assigned by the Deputies committee is performed, not by the national security advisor or the National Security Council staff, but by the appropriate policy coordinating committees.38

According to Gabriel Marcella, policy coordinating committees are the heart and soul of the interagency process. Currently there are six regional and eleven functional standing policy coordinating committees. They meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy responses to these issues, and build consensus across the government for unified action. Policy coordinating committees provide day-to-day control over national security policy coordination and policy analysis to the Deputies committee. As such, policy coordinating committees are responsible for developing unified policy guidance for operations, and subsequent policy development and planning oversight.39

In the aftermath of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, President Clinton recognized the need for a more systematic method for managing the interagency response to CCO. In May 1997, the President signed PDD 56 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operation, fresh on the heels of Clinton’s re-election. The purpose statement of PDD 56 called for all U.S. government agencies and departments to “improve political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other

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37 Pernic, 15.
38 JP 3-08, II-4.
dimensions of planning for interventions identified as complex emergencies.” PDD 56 sought to reduce clashes between the civilian and military planners by incorporating planning processes into the IAP and addressing the lack of training and expertise in interagency work across the government. The intent of PDD 56 was to maximize synergy by integrating the civilian components of an operation as closely as possible with the military components. According to PDD 56, integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early in an operation would help to avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.  

PDD 56 established six focus areas that, when used in concert, were designed to achieve U.S. government unity of effort. These focus areas were the establishment of the ExCom, the Political-Military (Pol-Mil) implementation plan, the interagency Pol-Mil plan rehearsal, the interagency after action review, interagency training, and the interagency review and implementation of lessons learned. The ExCom and the Pol-Mil plan would have been key elements in providing a transition from the strategic IAP to the operational IAP, as it is unity of command and non-integrated planning that reduces the efficacy of the operational IAP.

Within the National Security Council system, the Deputies committee is responsible for crisis management. Under the provisions of PDD 56, once a crisis is declared, the Deputies committee tasks the appropriate regional or functional policy coordinating committees to lead the interagency management of the CCO. The selected PCC then becomes the “Executive Committee”, or ExCom, and is charged to begin developing the overarching U.S. government plan for the operation (called the Pol-Mil plan). From that point on, the Chairman of the ExCom,

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an official at the level of deputy assistant secretary, would be responsible for policy development, planning oversight, and implementation of the Pol-Mil plan for the entire U.S. government.

Perhaps the most critical node in the post PDD 56 interagency structure, the ExCom was intended to supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a complex contingency operation. The National Security Council held ExCom members personally responsible for mission areas within the U.S. response.41 The ExCom was required to turn Deputies committee and Principals committee policy decisions into unified policy guidance to DoD and DoS planners. Prior to execution, the ExCom integrated subordinate plans (known as mission area plans) into the overall Pol-Mil plan, and presented the Pol-Mil plan and all supporting mission area plans to the Deputies committee during the interagency rehearsal. During execution, the ExCom is required to monitor the operation, revise policy guidance and update the Pol-Mil plan as necessary. Finally, the ExCom oversees the after action review (AAR) at the conclusion of the operation, and disseminates lessons learned throughout the interagency.42

At the strategic level, the ExCom approach used for CCO might have proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, increasing accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by senior policy makers. The strategic IAP, as established for CCO, provided a sound mechanism to ensure unity of U.S. government effort through the development of synchronized plans.

Complex contingency operations require formal planning to ensure that objectives are clearly understood, that actions are properly sequenced and coordinated, and that appropriate officials are held responsible for attaining objectives. PDD 56 established a requirement for planning, but did not stipulate the authority for plans, other than the interagency process itself.43

42 Pernic, 42. The basis for this requirement initially came from Presidential Decision Directive-56, (PDD 56), later from National Strategic Presidential Decision-1 (NSPD-1).
43 Ibid., 84.
PDD 56 was the first attempt to direct interagency planning for CCO, and it provided instructions for establishing institutional interagency planning at the operational level. Although in some cases individual agencies undertook planning before a complex crisis was identified, official interagency planning was not to begin until the Deputies committee authorized it.

The Deputies committee was charged to ensure that the Pol-Mil plan was effective, integrated, and executable. A Pol-Mil plan is effective if all mission plans support the overall U.S. government mission and achieve all the Pol-Mil objectives, according to planned milestones and timelines. A Pol-Mil plan is integrated when all agency efforts are synchronized during each phase of the operation, according to an overall concept of operations. A Pol-Mil plan is executable when all agencies meet the legal, resource, and financial requirements prior to the authorization for an operation. The chair of the ExCom was expected to designate an agency to lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group, whose role was to consult with the ExCom to ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom could be performed by the assigned agencies consistent with legal and fiscal authorities.

Under PDD 56, when the Deputies committee had authorized the interagency to begin planning for U.S. participation in a complex crisis, the ExCom assembled the relevant participants and began developing the sections of the Pol-Mil plan. The Pol-Mil plan required the interagency to discuss and agree on the critical elements of the operation, including mission, objectives, and desired end state. A Pol-Mil plan included the following sections: purpose, geo-strategic situation, crisis scenario, key actors, policy planning guidance, U.S. strategic purpose, mission statement, desired Pol-Mil end state, U.S. Pol-Mil strategy, task organization, concept of implementation, major mission areas, and interagency management. A Pol-Mil plan was also to include demonstrable milestones and measures of success including detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities that might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the
host government. Pol-Mil planning was not a substitute for the efforts of individual agencies; rather, it was a mechanism for harmonizing agency plans and actions.45

Interestingly, despite the many foreign policy situations that arose during the second Clinton administration, PDD 56 was never used. The first CCO post-PDD 56 was Kosovo. On 30 September 1998, a meeting of the Principals committee took place about Kosovo. The committee decided to send Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to explore every reasonable alternative to force. From 19-23 January 1999, the Principals committee met and discussed sending a peacekeeping force to Kosovo. DoD was against sending a peacekeeping force, and DoS was for it. After being excluded from Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, Congress wanted to be involved in developing a policy to solve the Kosovo problem. The majority of Congressmen generally agreed with the ends, but the ways and means to get there were diverse. On 24 March 1999, the Senate voted to support air strikes, and President Clinton gave the approval for U.S. aircraft to bomb the Serbian positions in Kosovo.46

In an effort to regain fiscal control of troop deployments, on April 28, 1999, the House voted 249-180 to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the deployment of U.S. ground forces unless first authorized by Congress, rescinding their decision three years earlier.47 However, President Clinton again did not consult with Congress. As Clinton explained, Kosovo was not a U.S. unilateral or bilateral problem but a NATO problem. The heads of state within NATO, of which President Clinton was one of nineteen, determined the policy in Kosovo, not the U.S. Congress. In many cases, the heads of state belonging to NATO were hesitant to use force, and could not be easily coerced by President Clinton.48

46 Ibid., 407.
47 Fisher, 191.
In addition to Kosovo, there were several instances when an ExCom-like organization might have been formed to solve smaller problems. In March 1998, Deputy National Security Council Director for Global Affairs Dick Clarke gathered about 40 members of the administration at Blair House for a “table top exercise” on handling terrorist attacks using smallpox, a chemical agent, and a nuclear weapon. In October 1998, during the Palestine-Israeli peace talks, President Clinton formed a policy group consisting of the President, the Vice President, the national security advisor, and DoS to discuss policy options. On November 18, 1998 President Clinton asked Secretary of Defense Perry to head a small group to review U.S. policy with Korea and to recommend a road map to the future. In December 1998 President Clinton’s “national security team” was unanimous in the belief that the U.S. should strike at Saddam as soon as the Butler report was issued. In December 1999, in preparation for New Year’s at the turn of the millennium, President Clinton asked Sandy Berger to convene all of the top national security staff in the White House virtually every day for a month. And in October 2000, after the bombing of the USS Cole incident, President Clinton considered responses that included missile strikes, bombing, and Special Forces into Afghanistan.49

Amazingly, in each of the cases above, rather than follow PDD 56 and form an ExCom and create a Pol-Mil Plan, President Clinton listened to a close circle of advisors and then decided what to do. Time and again, President Clinton made decisions without using the structure he created in PDD 56. While it was clear that President Clinton retained sole control over the deployment of U.S. forces in CCO, it was not clear why he did not implement the policy he constructed for this purpose. One possible answer was that President Clinton preferred to formulate policy himself after listening to a small, select group of close advisors, rather than allow others to formulate policy and then tell him what it should be. While President Clinton encouraged a collegial atmosphere and liked listening to many different views, internal consensus

49 Clinton, 789, 817, 833, 881, and 925.
was not important to him. He thought that a “free and open debate…given the complexity and novelty of many of our challenges, led to a better decision,” but a decision that he would make alone, despite the rhetoric of PDD 56. It is ironic that the President who established the policy designed to best improve interagency efficacy ultimately strangled that process in the grave.

Perhaps there is another factor that contributes to the failure of PDD 56. It is possible that the departments within the executive branch resisted PDD 56, due to a conflict between organizational roles, responsibilities, and culture. To better understand why President Clinton utilized key advisors rather than implementing PDD 56, it is necessary to carefully examine the friction between DoD and DoS regarding roles, responsibilities, and culture.

**Friction between DoD and DoS**

It is likely that the friction between the organizational roles, responsibilities and culture of DoD and DoS resists implementation of PDD 56 and therefore prohibits an effective IAP. An examination of the roles and responsibilities of DoD and DoS will highlight differences that have led to departmental conflict in each CCO since the end of the Cold War. The contradictory yet recently converging roles and responsibilities of DoD and DoS hinder these key agencies from reconciling their differences. According to one participant in the IAP, the roles and missions of DoD and DoS overlap, which creates confusion and generates tension between the departments. Overlapping roles and responsibilities becomes an issue when there is no clear line of responsibility. An overlapping of roles often leads to a struggle to determine who the lead agency for a particular activity is. Roles are argued over because they directly correlate to department relevance, and allow an agency to protect its respective organizational goals. Argument over roles and responsibilities is one reason why interagency integration is incredibly difficult.

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50 Ibid., 827, 804.
The Department of State provides the President foreign policy advice and is the element of the U.S. government responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the U.S. The DoS mission is to create a more secure, democratic and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community. To accomplish that, DoS strives to build and maintain strong relationships with other countries to protect the U.S. and its allies against transnational dangers and enduring threats. According to the DoS mission statement, in confronting those challenges, “DoS combines diplomatic skills and developmental assistance to foster a more democratic and prosperous world integrated into the global economy.” DoS promotes both the long-range security and long-term interests of the U.S. To accomplish this, the State Department analyzes U.S. overseas interests, makes recommendations on policy and future action, and takes steps to carry out established policy.\(^{51}\)

Although an independent U.S. agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is reliant on the DoS for both operational guidance and administrative support. The mission of USAID is to manage U.S. involvement in developmental, humanitarian, and civic assistance activities. Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the USAID supervises and gives general direction regarding all non-military foreign assistance programs. U.S. foreign assistance has two purposes: to further U.S. foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets and to improve the lives of the citizens of the developing world. Foreign assistance is integral to foreign policy. As such, foreign assistance falls under the purview of DoS, but is managed by USAID. The USAID plans and implements overseas programs to improve economic and social conditions, and administers civic assistance programs in conjunction with the

Department of Agriculture. Although USAID is concerned primarily with developmental assistance and civic assistance, some of its programs are security related.

The Department of Defense is responsible for fighting, and winning our nation’s wars. According to the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, the DoD serves three functions. The first function is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The second function is to ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests. The third function is to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.\(^{52}\) As a result of these functions, the DoD has a major role in formulating national security and defense policy, and integrating policies and plans to achieve security objectives.\(^{53}\)

Since the onset of CCO, the DoD has struggled to redefine its role. The usual reluctance of the DoD leadership to take on a CCO is understandable, because during CCO military forces assume responsibilities normally thought reserved to other departments of the government. DoD sees these roles as ancillary to its primary function, national defense. One reason that the DoD is tasked with meeting peacetime challenges is that the military has unique capabilities not found in other government agencies and organizations. These capabilities include a versatile command structure, rapid, high-volume global mobility, organic worldwide communications, regional expertise, and the ability to provide security for its organization and those organizations and individuals with whom it works. Lastly, DoD possesses a vast amount of operational resources.\(^{54}\)

There is a gross disparity between the resources controlled by civilian agencies and those controlled by the military. DoD has an enormous budget, whereas DoS is barely able to pay for...

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day-to-day activities, much less to conduct long-range planning to address possible crises. The DoD budget of $400 billion dwarfs the $10 billion State Department budget. This disparity in budget enables DoD to fund extensive research on policy options, or assign dozens of senior officers to solve just one problem. DoD can also make enormous contributions to CCO, and can do so very quickly. For example, while the USAID could allocate funds and design a program to repair a road in Bosnia next year, from its own resources the DoD could repair that road next month, sooner if need be. The reality of the current situation is that the DoD directs the execution of national policy because there is no other U.S. government element available with the capability and resources to get things done at the operational level. However, roles, responsibilities, and resources are not the only areas of difference, only the most obvious. A much deeper cultural difference between DoD and DoS exists, and may impede the IAP much more vigorously than the more tangible ones.

Differences in organizational culture are another source of conflict within the interagency. In many ways, the culture of any organization is borrowed from and bound up with larger cultural processes associated with the organization’s environment, but the differences within the culture between DoD and DoS stem from different approaches to accomplish their missions, exacerbated by their overlapping roles and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{55} Despite sharing core values of professionalism, dedication, competence, a sense of achievement, and integrity, DoD and DoS personnel often have an antagonistic relationship; a relationship that the realities of the post-Cold War world have forced into an “uncomfortable marriage of necessity and

convenience.”56 This conflict is mainly due to a difference in world-view that affects how each department approaches problem solving.

The differences in world-view between DoD and DoS are stark. First of all, DoS personnel are interested in the big picture, whereas DoD personnel must solve short-term problems. DoS analysts are much less interested in the facts than in how those facts relate to a larger whole. DoS takes a long-term approach. They are frequently in the area well before the military and remain much longer.57 They are goal oriented, but the goals they strive to achieve are often broadly defined, rather than the specific, short-term goals of DoD.

Secondly, DoS personnel have a high tolerance for ambiguity, while military officers strive to reduce ambiguity to a minimum. DoS personnel assume every issue can be seen from different perspectives: alignments with countries shift constantly, nothing is ever quite what it seems, and tomorrow will hold surprises. Their world is painted gray, while the DoD world is black and white. DoD personnel are generally conservative, goal-oriented, time conscious, and detail driven. Reducing ambiguity is necessary for clarity of orders, a benchmark of successful military operations. Military officers assume what they cannot determine and proceed to make precise plans despite uncertainty. Though they recognize that no plan is ever executed as written, they still regard the planning process as indispensable because it leads to a unity of purpose, a shared understanding of the objectives, and a framework for improvisation.

An examination of recent literature regarding the organizational planning culture of DoD and DoS indicates that the departments have different views concerning the detailed purpose of planning. Defense considers detailed, sophisticated planning essential. State displays much less enthusiasm for planning and questions detailed planning for having too many variables to be useful. These different views imply that military planning and civilian planning may be difficult

56 Rife.
to harmonize. Military planners often want close estimates in areas where civilian agencies can make only informed guesses. In this sense, there appears to be an irreducible tension between military and civilian planning.\textsuperscript{58}

The differences in problem solving between DoD and DoS are also nearly polar. Generally, the DoS is skeptical about planning beyond the programmatic level. DoS personnel use an informal problem solving process akin to brainstorming. DoS personnel build on an open exchange of ideas, concepts, and thoughts provided by all involved in the process, regardless of their position in the hierarchy. Rarely do they proceed in a step-by-step approach; rather they prefer a more fluid approach that is event-driven. The DoS approach regards plans as schedules that are seldom worth the effort, because they may soon be overtaken by events. Because State department officers see many different paths that might determine future events, DoS personnel are hard-pressed to select one plan that they believe is useful to guide action.

The purpose of interagency planning is to synchronize the instruments of national power effectively. Just as in past operations, uncoordinated interagency planning produced differences in assumptions, concepts, policy recommendations, and plans. A lack of interagency coordination was obvious in 1994 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. In the AAR from Haiti, senior policymakers observed that the U.S. government had not sufficiently coordinated planning efforts. More specifically, they found gaps in civil-military planning, disconnects in synchronization of agency efforts, and shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{59} In Operation Uphold Democracy, while strategic interagency planning occurred well in advance of the actual operation, planning at the operational level did not occur until a few days before the operation began. Guidance developed at the strategic level did not filter down to the operational level.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} Pernic, 15, 40.
\textsuperscript{59} Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations Handbook, 2.
\textsuperscript{60} Poole, 61.
Third, DoS personnel have little respect for hierarchy. They are very individualistic, and value individual achievement. Most are happiest when left alone to quietly do their work. In contrast, the DoD is the quintessential hierarchical institution; where rank equates to power, authority, and control. Finally, DoS personnel believe in intuition and psychology. Their most prized skill is the ability to negotiate. DoS personnel are comfortable with the concept of compromise to reach agreement. Because DoS exists to promote U.S. interests abroad, whether those are peace, democracy, or commercial interests, the power of DoS personnel lies in their ability to persuade using the threat of force, economic rewards, or punishments.61

Due to the disparity in resources, coupled with the desire to reduce uncertainty and attempt to control events, recent operations have allowed DoD to dominate both U.S. government planning and execution. This has caused a clash of roles and responsibilities between DoD and DoS, such as the formation and implementation of foreign policy, the disbursement of U.S. funds to foreign entities, and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Worse still, the struggle for departmental dominance has led to the implementation of diverging departmental plans, none of which are under the auspices of one master plan.

In early 2003, dissatisfaction surfaced within the Bush administration over management of the Iraq reconstruction effort. At that time, the President shifted the lead agency responsibility for reconstruction in Iraq from DoS and USAID to DoD, despite protests from both Congress and DoS. Ari Fleischer, press secretary for the Bush administration, said that the President believes that because the military is in charge of security on the ground, it can most effectively deliver aid.62

However, Congress disagreed. Congress said in a bipartisan fashion that the most proper purveyor of foreign assistance is the Secretary of State. The administration’s proposal called for

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61 Rife, 51, 53, 54.
giving all the funds to the Pentagon, “further drawing our armed forces into long-term nation building…(which) would degrade their capacities to fight wars” Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations said. Kolbe added “Bottom line – reconstruction is a civilian role.” According to Kolbe, the House subcommittee believed that USAID and DoS are the correct choice for lead agency “at least you now have an agency, or agencies in State and USAID, that are used to doing this kind of thing. This is their bread and butter.” According to Ray Jennings, director of the U.S. Institute of Peace program in Iraq, “The State Department professionals have experience in the region, or in reconstruction environments – right away that is a plus.” This was a struggle of role relevance within the U.S. government: establishing security on the part of DoD, and reconstruction on the part of DoS. The issue was which comes first: security or reconstruction, when the issue should have been how the U.S. does do both simultaneously. The solution at that time was to make DoD the lead in both security and reconstruction, in hopes that their departmental culture of reducing uncertainty and responding rapidly would make up for their lack of institutional understanding of reconstruction.

State Department officials were displeased at the fact that DoD was made the lead agency for reconstruction, and argued that any reconstruction plan is destined to fail as long as defense leads non-defense functions.\textsuperscript{63} State Department and USAID officials said that distribution of aid under the direction of the military would amplify the perception that the American presence was an occupation force. In an unusual letter to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell asserted that he wanted to retain control of the assistance programs for Iraq. Secretary Powell was also eager to maintain the present situation in which emergency teams of the USAID report to Andrew Natsios, the head of the agency. A USAID official said “Our implementing partners do not want to work with the military.”

\textsuperscript{62} Sonni Efron, War With Iraq: U.S. Boosts Emergency Food Aid for Iraqis; An added $200 million will give immediate help to ‘pockets of need’. Lawmakers say they don’t want the Pentagon handling the effort. Los Angeles: \textit{Los Angeles Times}, April 3, 2003, A16.
Under DoD control, security concerns drove the decisions about implementing public works projects in Iraq. DoS was determined to pursue projects that created more local jobs and strove to find ways to involve Iraqis in the planning process more directly. For example the State Department instructed U.S. contractors that they were expected to hire as many Iraqis as possible for their projects. DoS attempted to co-opt the Iraqi people in the reconstruction effort. DoD reconstruction planners did not often consult with Iraqi people and just wanted fast results. When DoD took over, they just went out and did the reconstruction themselves. The rapid U.S.-centric approach has turned out not to be very effective, and the IAP failed when DoD was the sole agency for all operations, which required expertise beyond its roles and responsibilities.  

After gaining control over reconstruction in Iraq, DoD began to greatly influence U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. In early 2003, the State Department sought to limit the role in Iraq for Iraqi exile leader Ahmed Chalabi, because DoS officials in Iraq viewed him as a fraud with little backing inside the country. When DoD became the lead agency for reconstruction in Iraq, DoD leadership immediately responded by airlifting Chalabi into Iraq, along with hundreds of Iraqi exiles, against DoS advice.

Due to the confusion over who does what in Iraq, in October 2003, the White House ordered a major revision of reconstruction efforts in response to public criticism of postwar operations in Iraq. President Bush attempted to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by empowering his national security advisor as the person in charge of Iraqi reconstruction effort in Washington D.C. Condoleezza Rice assumed full leadership of the coordination and oversight of the stateside element of Iraqi reconstruction, to include counterterrorism, economic issues, creation of political institutions, and communications.

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63 Loxterkamp et al., 12.
64 Loxterkamp et al., 16.
65 Ibid.
In mid-2004 the lead agency for reconstruction changed again, this time back to USAID under DoS supervision. In preparation for this transition, Representative Jim Kolbe (R. Ariz.), Chairman of the House subcommittee that oversaw Iraqi reconstruction funding, asked DoS to begin reviewing the DoD reconstruction program with an eye toward revising it, but DoS refused as long as DoD was in control. DoS was afraid of suggesting an effective reconstruction plan, only to see DoD usurp control once again and implement the DoS plan. DoS revealed its reconstruction plan in June 2004, only after Ambassador Negroponte arrived in Iraq and said “It’s our baby now.” But in late 2004, DoD sought out and gained congressional authority to spend tens of millions of dollars on military assistance to unspecified foreign countries or “indigenous forces”, authority that has previously rested with the State Department. Officials within DoS saw DoD as trying to establish a parallel foreign security assistance program. As proposed, the Pentagon spending authority would not be subject to existing limits on the State Department’s foreign assistance programs, including provisions that prohibit U.S. funds from going to individuals or nations who violate of human rights, sponsor terrorism, or do not repay international debt. Where these monies are spent are now solely at the discretion of the Defense Secretary.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005, section 1208 entitled Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism, the Secretary of Defense has been granted the power to expend up to $25 million dollars during any fiscal year to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by the U.S. special operations forces to combat terrorism. Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, expressed his concerns, saying, “The concerns this raises are less about the sums requested than about the

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66 LaFranchi, 1.
troubling precedent it would set, and that makes this a controversial proposal.” Director Daniels of the Office of Management and Budget stated that “the administration intends to consult further with the committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over defense and foreign assistance funding to assure that the appropriate interests of all agencies are clearly preserved.” The struggle for departmental dominance and relevance rather than interagency cooperation rages on.

Attempts to Improve Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level

The National Security Council System provides a forum to discuss U.S. policy at the strategic level, however there is no synchronized process at the operational level that brings U.S. government departments and agencies together in unity of purpose. There is also no single mechanism for effective policy implementation across the instruments of power at the operational level. Rather, there are two distinct processes, one controlled by DoS and the other controlled by DoD that attempt to implement the IAP at the operational level.

The DoS-led IAP at the operational level is called the country team. The country team is the senior U.S. coordinating body in a given country. It is headed by the chief of mission who almost always holds the title of Ambassador, and is composed of the senior member of each U.S. government agency operating within that country. At the individual country level, effective policy formation and execution does occur. As the personal representative of the President, the Ambassador is empowered to control all representatives of the U.S. government within that country to achieve unity of effort. With the assistance of the country team, the Ambassador develops a country plan and oversees its execution. Under the country team concept, DoS, DoD, and other governmental agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations to promote

policies that will enhance U.S. interests within a particular country. The country team provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. The Ambassador will normally maintain close contact with the geographic combatant commander and his staff. The Ambassador provides recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning directly to the geographic combatant commander. Such close coordination ensures a smooth transition to war should such an event occur. The country team is an invaluable resource to the geographic combatant commander because of its interagency experience and links to Washington.69

At first glance, the country team at any given U.S. Embassy appears to provide a means to control interagency operations, with the Ambassador acting as the key synchronizer of the instruments of national power. However this is not the case. In the event of a crisis, the Ambassador has limited, if any, true power. The Ambassador does not control U.S. combat forces acting inside the boundaries of his assigned country, which limits his operational influence and scope. In the event of major combat operations, the geographic combatant commander and his staff assumes control of operational planning and execution. In terms of resources, the Ambassador wields a fraction of the power that the geographic combatant commander enjoys. This reduces the ability of an Ambassador to synchronize the instruments of national power.

The Ambassador has little actual power over U.S. government personnel operating within his country. While assisting and planning for the Ambassador in day-to-day operations, the personnel from other governmental agencies at the embassy continue to work for their parent organizations, acting in effect as highly trained liaison officers. While it is true that the elements of the country team plan together to assist the Ambassador in accomplishing his objectives, they are not decision-makers. Despite being staffed with the most senior U.S. government personnel residing in that particular country, the personnel on the country team are still relatively low

69 JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I, Revision Final
ranking officials in comparison to their counterparts in D.C. The true power within DoS remains in Washington. Finally, the responsibilities assigned to the Ambassador also limit the functions he is able to perform. While the Ambassador is a master in the art of diplomatic discourse, the IAP at the operational level requires synchronization of all instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives. For all the above reasons, the DoS version of operational IAP, the country team, is not a viable solution for improving IAP efficacy at the operational level. Unfortunately, an examination of the DoD version of operational IAP, the JIACG, gives us the same result.

In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed and authorized the establishment of a DoD-led, multi-functional, advisory element called a Joint Interagency Coordination Group, or JIACG. The JIACG was comprised of representatives from U.S. government agencies and departments, funded by DoD OIF contingency funds, whose purpose was to coordinate, facilitate, plan, and integrate operations between other governmental agencies and the military in support of the Global War on Terrorism at a level below that of the policy coordinating committees. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that attempts to establish regular collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of U.S. government civilian and military experts, and tailored to meet the requirements of a geographic combatant commander, the JIACG provides the geographic combatant commander with the capability to collaborate with other governmental agencies at the operational level, while complementing the IAP at the strategic level. Because there is no overarching IAP structure at the operational level, the geographic combatant commander is left to determine how to implement strategic guidance to achieve national objectives. As such, the geographic combatant commander

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Coordination, Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2004, II-23.


Marcella, 251.
is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination.

JIACG personnel provide three core functions. First, they are liaison personnel who provide vital links between their parent organizations in Washington and the geographic combatant commander, which helps to synchronize operations. The JIACG concept attempts to build habitual relationships among interagency planners. Those relationships will make subsequent planning and execution easier. Secondly, JIACG personnel are advisors to the geographic combatant commander. They provide the geographic combatant commander’s planning staff information about the capabilities, limitations, and cultural perspective of their department. Finally, JIACG personnel participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinate the mission planning that the geographic combatant commander conducts with other governmental agencies, to define strategic aims, identify the means to achieve them, and clarify the end state. In day-to-day planning, the JIACG advises the geographic combatant commander on civilian agency operations and plans, and provides a civilian agency perspective. When a joint task force forms and deploys, the JIACG augments the joint force headquarters political-military planning staff. The JIACG is the DoD answer to plan for and achieve the desired effects, using the full range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power. DoD has attempted to empower the Global Combatant Commander with an interagency capability for the creation and the implementation of Pol-Mil plans.

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74 Ibid., II-21.
76 Bartran, iii.
In February 2003, the Deputies committee formally approved the JIACG concept. The first JIACG was established at U.S. Central Command in 2003, in support of OIF. According to Lieutenant Colonel Terry Sopher, that JIACG learned the core functions and competencies of each contributing agency in order to understand where there were differences and where there were gaps in capabilities. The JIACG then began to develop strong interpersonal bonds that attempted to supersede organizational cultural bonds in an attempt to reduce or eliminate organizational red tape and to improve interagency coordination. As might be expected, the strength of the interpersonal bonds became a source of friction between the JIACG members and their parent agencies. At the operational level, the geographic combatant commander synchronizes the IAP much like the national security advisor does at the strategic level, but only because he represents the sole agency equipped to accomplish this function. The geographic combatant commander is incredibly powerful, in comparison to the leader of the country team. Ambassadors are simply not equipped or authorized to coordinate regional efforts.77

However, there have been several difficulties in turning the JIACG into a smoothly running IAP at the operational level. The first such difficulty was acquiring appropriately trained personnel from other governmental agencies. Despite the unprecedented level of focus and cooperation amongst the interagency in support of the Global War on Terror, it took several months work at the Deputies committee level to resolve how to assign civilian personnel to the JIACG on a temporary trial basis. Even within the DoD, getting military personnel with the right experience and skills to staff the joint billets within the JIACG proved difficult. Military personnel who had qualifications applicable to the interagency process also had skill sets that made them highly sought after within their own military directorates and commands. From its inception, almost all agencies, to include elements within the DoD, immediately proposed alternatives to the JIACG. To participate in the JIACG as called for, each other governmental

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77 JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I, xii., II-20, 8, II-19, II-21.
agency would have to provide experienced, mid to high-grade personnel to each of the five global combatant commands. Because the types of personnel required in the JIACG were already in short supply, the loss of several individuals on a full-time basis was viewed as too costly and difficult.

One solution to the shortage was to send an interagency representative to the JIACG only when required. Other governmental agencies continued to provide liaisons to JIACG on a temporary basis when directed by the Deputies committee in support of a specific event or plan. However, temporary assignments undermined both teambuilding and effective liaison. Those temporary individuals brought an insular vision of their organization, a lack of continuity, and a lack of authority. Assignment on a temporary basis satisfied the agencies’ requirement to participate in interagency planning and operations and provided some relief on personnel requirements. However, temporary assignment of personnel failed to adequately address long-term requirements.78

To address the shortfalls in the JIACG architecture, two proposals have been made. In September 2004, a Defense Science Board study and Marine General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued separate calls for federal officials to consider establishing interagency groups to oversee contingency operations. Under Pace’s concept, an interagency joint task force would be headed by a department secretary of the president’s choosing. Selection of the lead department would be based on the type of operation being planned. Under this concept, the interagency chief placed in charge of a joint task force would see his powers increase beyond a single department. Furthermore, the interagency joint task force commander would be given the authority to direct personnel in subordinate agencies to accomplish the mission.

Another Defense Science Board study proposes creating six interagency task forces that would plan and help implement the transition to and from potential operations around the world.

78 Sopher, 4, 5.
This proposal would create new standing joint task force by corralling roughly 250 regional and functional experts from the National Security Council staff, intelligence community, DoD, DoS, and other agencies. This joint task force would identify a small number of possible crisis areas. The task force would create detailed plans for how the government would handle a period before and during a crisis, and would specify how force would be used and how the post-combat phases of stability and reconstruction would be accomplished. This proposal would inject subject matter experts from throughout the interagency into a structure that currently exists under another name: the contingency planning policy coordinating committee (CPPCC). In December 1999, the national security advisor established the CPPCC, whose major functions include monitoring short-range hot spots that may develop into complex contingencies, making recommendations to the Deputies committee for further Pol-Mil planning requirements, and providing oversight and direction on interagency training and education requirements. Increasing the CPPCC in both size and scope would be a positive step in the direction of effective interagency coordination at the operational level.

**Conclusion**

“Everyone plays the game, which is both irresistible and largely pointless, since the only players who really count are the Chief Executive and a small circle of advisors.”

Madeleine Albright

The changing and increasingly complex post-Cold War environment drives the need to increase interagency efficacy at the operational level. The majority of the friction in the early post-Cold War environment came from a battle between Congress and President Clinton regarding foreign policy and the deployment of U.S. troops to support CCO. After gaining experience in CCO, as well as gaining control of both foreign policy and the ability to reprogram funds to support such operations, President Clinton turned his attention to interagency synergy.

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79 Ibid.
80 Bartran, 8. Also see Poole, 64.
81 Albright, 216.
and approved PDD 56. However, PDD 56 was not used in Kosovo or any of the other smaller CCO that occurred at the end of the Clinton presidency. This was likely due to three factors: insular decision-making, departmental friction, and a lack of an effective supra-departmental IAP.

President Clinton did not believe that there was enough time to allow for lengthy deliberations before a making a decision to commit U.S. forces. To compensate for the lack of time, President Clinton relied on a small, select circle of key advisors to help form his thoughts. This shortfall is not unique to President Clinton; every President from Kennedy to present has relied at times on a small, hand-picked circle of like-minded advisors to provide courses of action. The difference with President Clinton is that he approved a PDD that was meant to include representatives from all the appropriate departments within the interagency in the planning process, and then he did not enforce it. Because he did not believe that he had adequate time to wait until a large group developed a plan, or a consensus, President Clinton felt justified in not seeking the advice of Congress before he ordered troops to deploy to Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo. The resulting operational confusion regarding national unity of purpose was directly related to the lack of departmental involvement early in the decision-making and planning processes. In addition, when the President does not enforce interagency cooperation and instead makes decisions based on briefings from a small, select group of hand-picked advisors, the importance of interagency planning is diminished.

Secondly, the friction caused by differences in departmental roles, responsibilities, and culture inhibited the IAP. One major challenge of interagency cooperation is to correctly define the operational roles of each participating organization within a unifying concept. When the roles and relationships among agencies and organizations are more clearly understood, synergy can be gained between the geographic combatant commander and the U.S. chief of mission in the country team.

DoD and DoS have different planning cultures, which do not lend themselves well to integration. The differences in organizational planning culture impair interagency cooperation at
the operational level. Departmental organizational and cultural impediments have made the notion of unifying doctrine near impossible. To be effective, the IAP must follow well-understood, firmly established procedures, not be continually reinvented with every administration. But it is difficult to establish and implement a holistic decision-making guide as long as DoD and DoS use different processes to plan. This brings to the fore a paradox within the IAP: centralized planning leads to greater integration and more efficient operations, but diversity in planning approach allows for the consideration of different viewpoints which may lead to more effective policy. Interagency doctrine that spans presidential administrations should be considered. It is problematic that with every new administration, every presidential document is rescinded.82

Finally, there needs to be strong, centralized control of the IAP at both the strategic as well as the operational level. Research has shown that once the initial direction had been given by the President, the departments were then on their own to implement that policy. The lack of control from a supra-departmental source allowed the departments to challenge roles, responsibilities, and ultimately policy. The benefits of a centrally controlled IAP include an increase in situational awareness, creation of unified U.S. government policy guidance, transparent agency planning, an increase in accountability, and overall unity of purpose for the U.S. government.

No department or agency of the U.S. government should take control of the IAP; leadership of the IAP belongs to the President. Assigning a single department to an end-to-end task for which it is not designed leads to difficulties with priorities, personality, and ultimately partisan decisions. Having a supra-departmental presidential advisor appointed as the directed leader of the IAP, such as the deputy national security advisor, will assist in curbing

82 Marcella, 240. See also Loxterkamp et al., 3.
organizational infighting. PDD 56 defined an IAP model in which the Director of Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs played a central role, guaranteeing that the National Security Council would remain the lead synchronizer of the instruments of national power. The current lack of centralized control has led to ineffective interagency cooperation at the operational level.

The problem of effective synchronization at the highest levels is an old and apparently intractable problem. The difficulty of getting the DoD and the DoS to work together harmoniously towards national objectives is like untying the Gordian knot; according to Bruce Pernic, even with a strong National Security Council staff, harmony is difficult and sometimes impossible. Untying the Gordian knot can only be done by cutting it – and that requires an Alexander. It must be the President who solves this problem. The bottom line is that all U.S. government departments and agencies must be forced to work together in order to synchronize the instruments of national power. The decisions made with military influence or while the military is in country will carry over when the Ambassador and the country team assume control as the military presence wanes. No organization can accomplish its objective effectively without unity of effort. There must be a single, unifying agent to control both the strategic and the operational IAP.

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