Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions

A Monograph
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AY 03-04

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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14. ABSTRACT

Operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters. Other United States government agencies are engaged in the same area of operations during decisive operations. Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful integration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations. The "War on Terror" has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead role. This monograph asks whether a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role. The monograph presents case study analysis of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti. Each historical case describes the planning, execution, and interagency integration with military operations. Each case is examined according to the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk to provide insights to answer the research question. Several topics are presented to provide background and frame the problem. A brief introduction to the National Security Council System and DOD interagency doctrine is presented to provide an understanding of the interagency organization and process at the strategic and operational levels. A description of the interagency environment follows to describe the internal and external environment of interagency action, including the nature of the interagency requirements and roles during campaigns and expeditions. A brief discussion of organizational and leadership theory is also offered to provide a framework for making recommendations to the interagency process and organizational design. This monograph recommends a balanced adaptation of the organizational structure, the process, and the leadership model for interagency coordination in concert with military operations. This will allow operational level military commanders to improve the application of all instruments of national power from all of the capable agencies during decisive operations. Applying this balanced approach will ensure a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT: 1

18. NUMBER OF PAGES: 58

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions

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We will retain our dominance on land providing the combatant commander with agile, versatile, and strategically responsive forces completely integrated and synchronized with other members of the joint and interagency team and with our coalition partners.¹

INTRODUCTION

Operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters. Other United States government agencies are engaged in the same area of operations during the decisive operations phase of joint operations. Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful consideration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations. The “War on Terror” has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and increasingly financial, intelligence, and legal (DIME-FIL²) elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership.

The United States National Security system provides a strategic level interagency organization and process to coordinate and direct these actions. Unfortunately, the operational level equivalent reflects decades of preparation and organizational design focused on engaging a monolithic threat or reacting to peacetime crisis short of war. Adaptations in the face of the post cold war have focused on interagency integration for peace operations and during the transition phase. Full spectrum dominance during decisive operations and better synchronization and focus for establishing civil control and rule of law during transition operations demand an improved organizational solution at the operational level to manage the requirements established at the strategic level. Joint Publication 1 describes unity of effort with the other elements of national

¹ U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, at the 8 October 2003 Association of the US Army annual meeting. From a personal communication from the United States Military Academy Association of Graduates, provided courtesy of the West Point Society of DC.
² Sometimes also abbreviated MIDLIFE.
power and guiding proper employment of the military as the purposes for military action in
interagency operations.\(^3\) Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant
command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead
role. This monograph addresses the requirement for coordination and action in theater when the
DOD has the lead role.

Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, a respected military theorist,
offers the idea of an interagency task force for future combat operations built around an Army
brigade or Marine expeditionary unit. He envisions it as a full spectrum capable force and
describes it as follows:

\[
\text{…[I]t would have active participation from the Departments of State, Treasury,}
\text{Commerce, Justice, the CIA, the FBI and (as needed) Agriculture, Health and Human}
\text{Services, the Office of Economic Advisors and Labor. It would also have congressional}
\text{liaison teams. At present, most of these agencies of the U.S. government lack a mission}
\text{to assist in foreign policy, but this must change. The elements of national power—the}
\text{integration of which is crucial to effective grand strategy—reside in these agencies. They}
\text{must become players in war and peace.}\(^4\)
\]

This monograph offers an operational level perspective of Leonhard’s tactical level vision. In that
manner, it recommends a first practical step toward achieving the kind of synergistic organization
he describes. This monograph provides insight to help answer whether a lower operational level
headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate
interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead
role.

The scope of this monograph is limited to governmental agencies where established
policy and direction are concerned. Aspects of leadership, unity of effort and cooperation can
apply to any agency working in coordination with the DOD. The focus remains those structures,
procedures, and policies that integrate governmental agencies operating beyond the borders of the

\(^3\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States}, Joint

\(^4\) Robert R. Leonhard, “Sun Tzu’s Bad Advice: Urban Warfare in the Information Age,” \textit{Army
Magazine}, 53 no. 4 (April 2003); available from http://www.usma/armymagazine; accessed 7 August
2003.
United States and its territories. Because of the enduring nature of these agencies and their central strategic direction, these agencies have the unique potential to coexist with enduring procedures, organizational design, and methods that emerge from a commonly understood body of knowledge that provides an operational level framework.

This monograph uses five sections to describe, analyze, and make recommendations for improving interagency coordination in the DOD. The first section describes the current doctrine and practice for interagency organizational structure and process at the strategic and operational levels. The second section describes and analyzes the interagency security environment and the interagency environment within the government. The third section provides organizational design and leadership theories to frame the context of the changes this monograph proposes. It also describes the analytical criteria for the two case studies that follow in the fourth section. The first case study describes and analyzes Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. The second case study describes and analyzes Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The final section analyzes the current interagency environment and the trends from the case studies to make recommendations that apply appropriate organizational design and leadership theories to improve interagency action.

THE PROCESS AND JOINT INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE

This section describes interagency concepts, practices, doctrine, and execution and their particular relationships to DOD at the strategic and operational levels. This section clarifies the prescribed interagency structure and process for the strategic and operational levels. Joint Vision 2020 includes interagency partners as part of how the joint force might achieve full-spectrum dominance over future adversaries. In order to understand how this concept fits into future operations, it is important to examine how the Department of Defense (DOD) approaches it and

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derives its policies and procedures from external directives. Before proceeding further, this monograph must first clarify the meaning of the term *interagency*.

**What is “the Interagency”?**

The term *interagency* is an adjective that conveys something is “of two or more agencies.” This immediately begs a closer look because it is common to hear it used as a noun with a clear and unambiguous intended meaning. However, a reference to *the* interagency offers no referential index to convey its meaning and is simply poor grammar. A user may intend to sound auspicious, allowing the audience to speculate about what agencies are meant and what object they comprise or what action they are engaged in. This confusion demands clarity before any further study.

Joint doctrine is the primary authoritative source for the DOD. The only term defined within joint doctrine under the concept of interagency is *interagency coordination*. This implies the DOD views interagency action (coordination) as its primary nature, but leaves the term *interagency* to its common dictionary definition. Joint Pub 1-02 defines interagency coordination as follows:

> Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

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7 The 10 December 2002 draft Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations” offers the following definition on page II-13 for the term *interagency*: A broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and commercial organizations engaged in a common effort. When officially published, this will further obfuscate the current lack of precision associated with this term.

This definition provides limited understanding of interagency requirements for the DOD. There are requirements for coordination, but the very act of coordination requires processes, organizations, and relationships. The more clearly doctrine articulates these to all involved, the better. The DOD provides Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* in two volumes to further describe options for interagency coordination and organizational design at both the strategic and operational level. The first volume provides the DOD approach to interagency operations within and beyond U.S. borders. The second volume provides a primer of the authority, responsibility, structure, capabilities, core competencies, and interagency relationships of governmental, nongovernmental, and private voluntary, as well as regional and international organizations.  

This who’s who of agencies and organizations underscores the need for providing commanders with a useful method of coordinating action to accomplish objectives. It provides background on these agencies, but for guidance on coordination, commanders and their staffs must rely on volume one as the source of doctrine (versus information) on interagency coordination.

Joint doctrine quickly departs from the idea that interagency coordination is the primary concern. It addresses interagency operations, the interagency process, interagency connectivity, interagency structure, interagency crisis response, interagency information management, and interagency training and readiness.  

From these interagency topics, it becomes clear that this small volume attempts to convey the nature of interagency coordination as a cousin to the nature of joint coordination among the services. A primary difference is that joint coordination exists in law while administration from the executive branch almost exclusively guides interagency coordination.

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9 The listed authority, structure, capabilities, etc. is the format used for each agency. For details on each, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume II*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

coordination.\textsuperscript{11} This distinction is important for a detailed understanding of interagency coordination, but to understand the basic idea of \textit{interagency} in its common usage, the following conclusion in sufficient. The term \textit{interagency} is very much like the term \textit{joint}. While \textit{joint} is an adjective that describes organization or action among the services, \textit{interagency} more broadly applies to any combination of agencies, especially, but not exclusively, governmental agencies. With this grounding in the meaning of the term, a closer examination of the doctrine, structure, and processes of interagency operations is possible.

\textbf{Interagency Structure}

\textbf{Strategic level}

Interagency operations require both a process and an organizational structure. The description of the strategic interagency organizational structure as a “network disguised as a hierarchy”\textsuperscript{12} provides a succinct and profound description of the strategic level reality. The National Security Council (NSC) structure is tailored by each presidential administration to ensure effective advice to the President on policy to achieve the stated purpose of the National Security Act of 1947 to “enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”\textsuperscript{13} The Bush Administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1) in February 2001 to create the structure for this policy advice role. In doing so a similar structure replaced the former one that guided the development of current Joint doctrine.

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\textsuperscript{12} David Tucker, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?” \textit{Parameters} XXXIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), 68.
\end{flushright}
Within the Bush Administration, the strategic interagency organizational structure consists of three tiers of committees below the National Security Council. The Principals and Deputies Committees retained their traditional positions within the NSC structure. The Principals committee has cabinet level representation, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the chair. It is the senior interagency forum for national security policy issues. The Secretary of Defense is a core member of this committee. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) attends the meetings when this committee discusses military issues. The National Security Council Deputies Committee is the next level down and is the sub-Cabinet level interagency policy body, chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser. The Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the DOD members of this forum.\textsuperscript{14}

National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC) replaced Interagency Working Groups, originally created in the Clinton administration by Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) in May 1997. These committees are the third tier, and they handle the routine and habitual interagency coordination of national security policy. NSPD1 established six regional NSC/PCCs and eleven functional ones. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for appointing an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary to chair the functional NSC/PCC on Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning. Military participation in any other NSC/PCC is a function of the requirements established by the individual NSC/PCC chairman.\textsuperscript{15} The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff provide representation at this level of the structure.

The military place in the strategic structure clearly meets the needs of coordinating national security policy requirements through statutory and directed representation of senior members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DOD. This ensures appropriate military input to the

\textsuperscript{14} Interagency Handbook, A4-A7.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., A5-A6.
process regarding the military instrument of national power. While each Presidential
administration modifies the subordinate structure of the National Security Council, the general
construct survives each transition. Military roles change little with each structural change.\textsuperscript{16}
Adapting current doctrine to structural changes over time at the strategic level does not present a
challenge to effective strategic level interagency coordination.

\textbf{Operational Level}

Variety at the operational level replaces the stability observed at the strategic level of
interagency structure. The single body of the National Security Council and its subordinate tiers
of committees expand at the operational level to the military organizations dealing with homeland
security, the Regional Combatant Commands, and every Joint Task Force operating throughout
the world. Each of these organizations requires unique interagency composition from within the
federal government. Concurrently, the Department of State and at least thirty other government
departments or agencies operate outside the United States at any given time.\textsuperscript{17} Each may require
unique military capabilities to support its operations. For military support to civil authorities
within the United States, the relationship is simpler. The Secretary of the Army is the Executive
Agent for the Department of Defense for this function.\textsuperscript{18} While homeland defense is outside the
scope of this monograph, the Army’s role in interagency operations that naturally evolved from
its militia roots is important for developing improvements to interagency operations abroad.

For the Regional Combatant Commander, the current experiment of creating Joint
Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) provides a structure at the upper operational level to
coordinate requirements throughout the region assigned to a Combatant Commander. The JIACG
addresses the complexity of resolving military support when required for the various agencies
operating outside the United States. Agencies essentially staff the JIACG with liaisons to

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., A4.
\textsuperscript{17} Tucker, 67.
\textsuperscript{18} JP 3-08 vol. I, ix.
coordinate military support and to allow the military to coordinate support from the agencies as well. It also allows the Combatant Commander to communicate up the agency chain to coordinate additional capabilities, and to coordinate with agency elements deployed in the Combatant Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). JIACG structure varies and currently has no permanent funding. The JIACG is similar to the country teams the military provides to embassies in order to provide interagency coordination with the Department of State overseas. In the case of the Regional Combatant Commanders, the personnel resources demanded from other government agencies to support JIACGs at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM are much more reasonable than having to staff every embassy with a country team equivalent.

JTF level commanders have the option to approach interagency integration into the structure of the JTF in a number of ways. Joint Force Commanders have the responsibility to synchronize joint operations in time, space, and purpose with nonmilitary organizations as well as other military forces. Joint doctrine provides three primary functional mechanisms to coordinate interagency operations at the JTF level. These functions are humanitarian assistance (HA), logistics, and command and control. Three basic structures provide humanitarian assistance (HA) functions. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) provides a coordination point for agencies involved in a humanitarian assistance operation and a JTF responding to a crisis. A HACC is temporary and replaced by a Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC) or a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) as JTF presence matures over time in the Joint Area of Operations (JOA).

The JTF Commander can also establish a Logistics Operations Center (LOC) to coordinate on behalf of all agencies and the JTF operating within the JOA. It relieves the JTF of coordinating flow and distribution into the JOA for other agencies, including non-governmental

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19 Binnendijk and Johnson, 106.
regional and organizations.\textsuperscript{21} The LOC provides an interagency structure for the logistical function.

A Liaison Section is the third functional mechanism available to the JTF. It provides a broad command and control coordination structure for the various forces; governmental, nongovernmental, regional, and private volunteer organizations operating in the JOA. This structure is the catchall of the options available to the JTF.\textsuperscript{22} While it ensures all stakeholders within a JOA have an opportunity to coordinate for synchronization with the JTF, it has the potential to outgrow its organizational utility.

The structures outlined in joint doctrine at the lower operational level for the JTF commander focus on Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). When the idea for better defined interagency structures gained support in the 1990’s, the military operations requiring interagency integration were primarily of that nature. The requirement for the DOD staff, JCS, and Regional Combatant Commanders to “establish an authoritative interagency hierarchy, considering the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility”\textsuperscript{23} had MOOTW and operations where DOD acts in a supporting role at its heart. The difficulty for the JTF commander engaged in decisive combat operations is that the structure and relationships required for successful interagency integration fall to the catchall Liaison Section. The JIACG structure from the combatant command level does not transfer down to the narrower context of JTF operations.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., III-9.
\textsuperscript{22} JP 3-08 vol. I, III-9 –III-10.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., III-2.
**Interagency Process**

**Strategic**

The Bush administration has not issued the procedural changes originally considered for the strategic level interagency process under draft “NSPD XX” commensurate with the structural changes ushered in under NSPD1.\(^{24}\) The National Defense University curriculum continues to teach the political-military planning process initiated by PDD 56 as the tool for obtaining strategic level guidance for execution of complex crisis operations. This process focuses on the development of Political-Military Implementation plans.

The Political-Military Implementation plan is an integrated interagency product derived using the Advance Planning Process. This strategic decision product was the output originally required by PDD 56. It provides planning guidance, a mission statement, strategic purpose, desired end state, the political-military strategy, the organization, concept of implementation, major mission areas, and how to conduct interagency management.\(^{25}\) This product resembles a military OPLAN in many respects. The structure and functions are parallel in many ways to the five paragraph field order. This adaptation of the procedure from the previous administration is prudent for the DOD. Other processes and products familiar to military officers validate the interagency product, but the lack of a new procedural directive leaves the system open to other adaptations by other government agencies working within the NSC/PCCs. This has the potential to undermine the common understanding of requirements for participants at the NSC/PCC level. However, the seniority of the participants, their tenure in the organization and their ability to influence competing parts of the organization when necessary mitigate and compensate for variance in the processes. The process at the strategic level is flexible enough to provide its primary function to advise the President both for crises and for more deliberate interagency plans.

\(^{24}\) Binnendijk and Johnson, 104.  
\(^{25}\) Interagency Handbook, B3-B4.
It is also adequate to provide the input required for the DOD to develop the strategic plans and guidance necessary to direct planning at the operational level within the DOD.

**Operational Level**

The Regional Combatant Commander also has reliable processes to deal with interagency operations at the upper operational level. Combatant commanders develop joint operation plans through two forms of campaign planning. The two primary processes used to develop joint operational plans are deliberate planning and Crisis Action Planning (CAP). The deliberate planning process is primarily used to maintain operational level plans that meet the strategic requirements laid out in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) issued by the CJCS. Deliberate plans can incorporate interagency coordination as required. CAP is normally time constrained and in response to current events. Both processes yield a variation of the same product.

Deliberate planning products include CONPLANs, OPLANs, or functional plans. CAP produces either a campaign plan or an operation order (OPORD). Annex V within the format for each of these joint plans is the interagency annex. It captures interagency coordination required for the joint force commanders to accomplish the mission for that plan. This is the same plan format for contingency plans, campaign plans, and operation orders at the operational level. Combatant Commanders may not have a specific focus on the interagency nature of the plan, but the inclusion of an interagency annex in the derivative product of joint planning compensates for the shortfall of having no specific interagency component in the process. Given the optional nature of this annex, it may not provide sufficient structure to force planners to always consider interagency options in all cases. In particular, when time constrained planning

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27 Ibid., I-10 - I-13.
demands rapid development of options within an area of operations, obscure annexes do not
inspire thorough integration.

The JTF commander relies on the same Joint Planning processes as the Regional
Combatant Commander to develop campaign plans and OPORDs. While less potential exists for
deliberate planning by JTF staffs, the uniform processes and products allow the same process-
related opportunities to address interagency integration into JTF operations. Procedurally, JTFs
are equally equipped to integrate interagency operations within their assigned Joint Operations
Areas.

**The state of the art of operational level interagency organization**

The relative stability and consistency in both structure and process at the strategic level as
embodied in the National Security Council is a source of comfort to those who rely on this system
for direction and guidance. The positions and roles of DOD representatives are clear and well
defined at the strategic level. The operational level military planner relies on this source of
strategic guidance to provide the objectives for translation through operational art into campaigns
and expeditions.

As strategic objectives work down to the upper operational level, the interagency
coordination by design found at the strategic level becomes less structured and much less a part of
the process with the Regional Combatant Command staff. At the lower operational level where a
JTF staff has even less interagency representation, the process is more time constrained. Positions
and roles for representatives of other government agencies are not well defined or clear. The
diminishing structure at lower levels is not necessarily bad. The distinctions in the process
become more profound as the level of manning diminishes. The ability to compensate for lack of
process through liaisons and creativity is limited at the lower operational level by the capacity of
the smaller staff. The JTF structure and processes give it the least ability to integrate other
departments and agencies of the government with the military services for effective cooperation
in national security matters. This means that the commander in an area of operations where
decisive military action will take place is the least prepared to conduct those operations in concert
with agencies representing other elements of national power. This monograph will further
examine this after turning to the nature of the interagency environment.

GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE—THE INTERAGENCY
ENVIRONMENT

This section describes the internal and external environment of interagency action,
including the nature of the interagency requirements and roles during campaigns and expeditions.
This section clarifies what the combatant commander and his subordinate JTF or JFLCC or
ARFOR commanders can expect regarding other government agency involvement in operational
theaters in the context of the current and expected future security environment.

The external security environment for interagency actions

The interagency environment among U.S. Government agencies has two distinct aspects.
The internal or external orientation of the operation at hand defines this first broad distinction.
Internally oriented interagency operations occur within the United States and her territories.
Externally oriented interagency operations occur outside the boundaries of the United States and
her territories. The scope of this monograph is restricted to those externally oriented and
involving the DOD. DOD operations fall within a range of operations from war to operations
other than war conducted with or without forceful means.\(^{29}\) Externally oriented interagency
operations involving the DOD can occur anywhere in that range.

The strategic environment defines the external environment for interagency action
involving the DOD. In the strategic environment, the United States has continuing global interests
defined by security, economic, and political connections through expanding global
communications, transportation, and information technology networks that maintain U.S. military

\(^{29}\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington
engagement throughout various regions.\textsuperscript{30} The “Joint Vision 2020” concept promotes this idea that forces will remain globally engaged in the future. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations”, gives an impression that military intervention is a distinct choice for when other instruments of national power are “unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests.”\textsuperscript{31} The keystone doctrine of joint operations conflicts with the reality that “Joint Vision 2020” embraces when it says:

The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to win across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.\textsuperscript{32}

That range of operations clearly includes the possibility of interagency operations. The notion of full spectrum dominance includes operating with interagency partners.

The second primary consideration of the external environment is the threat from adversaries. “Joint Vision 2020” describes adversaries who have industrial and technological capabilities that can match the United States while they adapt in areas where they cannot match the United States.\textsuperscript{33} The impact of such technological matching and adaptation on interagency operations is uncertain, as with any concept projected into the future. However, in relative terms the idea that adversaries who prepare to match or adapt to military capabilities will have a more profound advantage over U.S. government agencies that are not resourced to maintain their edge in step with the U.S. military. This naturally increases the importance and value of the DOD interagency contributions as other agencies recognize the need to rely on DOD capabilities to face matching or adaptive adversaries.

The final aspect of the external environment is the existence of sources of friction. “Joint Vision 2020” lists five primary sources of friction. “Human frailties” and the “effects of danger and exertion” can be considered together in an interagency context. These both apply, although

\textsuperscript{30} CJCS, “JV 2020,” 59.
\textsuperscript{31} JP 3-0, I-2.
\textsuperscript{32} CJCS, “JV 2020,” 59.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 60.
not uniformly, to all agencies involved in an operation where military capabilities are required. “Uncertainty and chance” likewise goes hand in hand with “frailties of machines and information” due to uniformly unpredictable affects on agencies present in a given area of operations. The final source of friction, “unpredictable actions of other actors,” has a dual nature.\textsuperscript{34} The first part can be ascribed to actors with other objectives in the area of operations. These actors include adversaries and occasionally even allies. The second part of this dual nature derives from the U.S. government actors involved in the area of operations.

U.S. government agencies have uniform goals and directives from the strategic level of leadership. Upon entering an area of operations with military forces, the degree of coordination determines how much friction all parties perceive. For military organizations in an area of operations, there is real potential to add to the number of “other” actors by simply conducting poor interagency coordination. The more other government agencies become isolated from military plans and operations, the more their actions become unpredictable to the military forces operating in the area. The converse is true for government agencies that alienate the military. The necessary lubricant to reduce this source of friction is a product of good interagency coordination.

**The internal environment of interagency coordination**

In order to avoid the potential for friction from other government agencies, military leaders must understand the environment among interagency participants. This understanding is a good step toward effective coordination. This environment is of a simultaneous nature where multiple government agencies are engaged in some way during military operations. It is a bureaucratic environment where competition for scarce resources, conflicting personalities, and conflicting organizational cultures will undermine unity of effort. The function and authority of interagency actors also has a tangible impact on the perceived amount of friction.

\textsuperscript{34} Joint Vision 2020 lists these five sources of friction in a graphic in CJCS, “JV 2020,” 61.
Joint Pub 3-0 idealizes military operations occurring in a sequential manner after other means of national power fail or are no longer effective. In this model, military operations follow to rapidly achieve national objectives before returning a favorable situation back over to agencies wielding other instruments of power. This scheme of discrete sequential missions is no longer ideal or practical. The external security environment demands greater flexibility and adaptability from all instruments of national power. The traditional sequential approach in which the political powers transition a mission to the military, the military conducts the mission, and then the military turns the mission back over to the political powers is no longer a valid model. Therefore, the interagency environment is one of simultaneous action from agencies representing various instruments of national power. Coordination will not stop to await the conclusion of purely military operations.

The environment of interagency coordination is also one where scarce resources are in high demand. Operational planners cannot ignore legitimate requirements for access to transportation infrastructure, local logistical support, and reasonable security requirements from other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and other legitimate stakeholders. This is an area where the military normally enjoys an advantage in terms of self-sufficiency. It is also an advantage because the military can use its influence; resources; responsiveness; strategic and theater lift; organizing and planning process; training support; and command, control, computers, and intelligence capabilities to ensure military success and to provide assistance for and build consensus with other government agencies. Along with this advantage is a responsibility to ensure, as far as possible, the success of other government agencies where military means are required for them to achieve their part in strategic objectives.

35 JP 3-0, I-2 – I-3.
36 Tucker, 67.
This requires commanders at the operational level to willingly address prioritization from more than a strictly military perspective, while simultaneously addressing requirements of other agencies that military capabilities can uniquely satisfy.

At the strategic level, the interagency environment among government agencies functions as a network unless the President is personally involved in directing events, at which time it functions more like the hierarchy its structure would suggest.\(^{39}\) The personal relationships within this network are everyday fodder for pundits, but this belies the steady nature of the personalities at the strategic level since they provide a steady diet for external scrutiny. The structure of the strategic level organization allows members to develop relationships over time. At the operational level, there is a greater potential for personality conflict simply based on the larger pool of players and the constant change of membership among the organizations. Frequently, operational level interagency representatives meet for the first time in the midst of a crisis, raising the normal tension associated with group formation. This is all a normal part of human dynamics, but it can become a debilitating distraction unless remedied. As with the President at the strategic level, leaders at the operational level must play their role effectively to render the system effective.\(^{40}\)

Beyond personality differences, very real differences exist among organizational cultures. A primary cultural difference is inherent to each agency’s authority and role. For military leaders it is easy to draw a distinction, for example, between a Marine Corps officer and an Army officer. However, when contrasted against the differences between a Central Intelligence Agency Case Officer and a State Department Foreign Service Officer, the differences in military officers appear more nuanced than real. Military service culture differences are not analogous to interagency culture differences.\(^{41}\) The authority and role of military officers are essentially equal among the services. Representatives from other government agencies enjoy no such uniformity.

\(^{39}\) Tucker, 69-70.
\(^{40}\) Mendel and Bradford, 4.
\(^{41}\) Tucker, 71-72.
This is further complicated when command and control procedures, logistical capabilities, doctrine, and ethics are considered.

Direction in other governmental agencies differs significantly from military command and control. Other agencies have very different methods for succession of command. It may flow up the chain and not down to a subordinate, or it may not flow at all. Authority may not exist throughout other agency hierarchies, meaning that members coordinating with the military may have to get permission from outside the area of operations. Dictating a chain of command among interagency players is not the function of military planners. When there is no clear, directed chain of authority, the environment must be one of coordination.\(^{42}\)

Cultural differences are also apparent in the area of logistics. Most civilian agencies have no self-sufficiency capability. Everything from meals to fuel and transportation to office supplies is more often locally purchased. Agencies with this kind of cultural approach to sustainment requirements may have trouble articulating the precise requirements of their manpower contribution to an interagency operation abroad. Military planners must understand that other agencies may have to rely on military logistics in an austere environment. They must also recognize that other government agencies are accustomed to a more flexible environment, which may frustrate attempts to forecast consumption requirements.\(^{43}\)

Finally, the cultural perception between the military and other government agencies lies in the area of doctrine and ethics. The operational approaches of many civilian agencies frequently focus on long-term solutions to root cause problems, while military doctrine seeks short-term stability. Civilian agencies such as law enforcement may value networking with personal contacts more than coordination through official channels. Law enforcement agencies may value experience over adherence to written doctrine, whereas military doctrine compensates


\(^{43}\) Ibid., 7-8.
for relatively narrow experience among military officers. These cultural distinctions offer barriers to good cooperation and create friction among government agencies, despite the fact they all have a common goal defined by the National Security Council.

**FIELD OF DREAMS—THEORY TO SUPPORT ACTION**

Theory informs action. This section describes theories necessary for discussion of the proposed changes to DOD integration of other government agencies at the JTF level. This lower operational level integration represents an organizational design change. This section provides a brief description of organizational design theories appropriate to the interagency environment. The discussion above also demonstrated the need for leadership to ensure effective interagency action. This section provides a leadership theory appropriate for the nature of interagency relationships. The theories presented provide an intellectual framework for analysis, discussion, and recommendation in the monograph. Finally, this section enumerates the analytical criteria for the case studies presented in the next section.

**Organizational design theory for the interagency environment**

Organizational design theory offers insights into both structures and processes for the interagency environment. Organizational design theory provides a context for making organizational changes such as the one this monograph proposes. Given the uncertain environment with the potential for a high degree of friction, organizational design theory suggests an organic structure is ideal. In contrast, mechanistic structures are ideal for more stable environments with low uncertainty. A bureaucracy is an example of a hierarchical mechanistic organization, but the two structures are not synonymous. The German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) developed bureaucratic organizational design to reduce the mechanistic nature of hierarchical organizations. However, in practice most bureaucracies tend toward mechanistic

44 Ibid., 8-9.
characteristics over time.\(^{46}\) It is not accurate to assume that because the environment of interagency coordination is bureaucratic that it is automatically unsuited for the external security environment. A closer look at mechanistic and organic structures will aid in understanding two organizational design theories that apply to the interagency environment.

Mechanistic structures fit best in a stable environment where a low degree of uncertainty exists. They have a simple structure, centralized decision making, and highly standardized processes. Personnel within mechanistic organizations normally perform highly specialized tasks unique to their role in predictable and accountable ways. Communication tends to be vertical, and task control remains at the top of the organization. A clear hierarchical authority structure is the primary integrating mechanism. Individuals in mechanistic organizations tend to value their status and protect their authority and responsibility from others. Leadership is based on formal position with promotion tied to past performance.\(^ {47}\)

Organic structures are ideal in uncertain environments where external conditions constantly change. They have a complex structure, decentralized decision making, and adaptive processes. People within organic structures learn to perform multiple tasks within the organization and fulfill different roles as requirements change. Communication tends to be horizontal across the organization with decision making authority distributed throughout the hierarchy. Organic structures achieve integration through task forces or teams. Individuals within organic structures tend to value expertise and adaptability. Leadership is based on talent rather than formal position.\(^ {48}\)

Two organizational design theories provide a foundation for understanding the challenges of the interagency environment: resource dependence theory and contingency theory. Resource dependence theory says organizations seek to minimize dependence on other organizations for

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 76-82.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., 53-55, 172-174.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 55-56, 172-174.
An organization must consequently manage two competing aspects of resource dependence. First, it must influence other organizations in order to receive resources from them. Second, it must respond with its own resources to the demands of other organizations. The unique capabilities of various government agencies including the military are resources. Government agencies operate with both symbiotic and competitive interdependencies. Resource dependence theory offers an approach to balance these interdependencies within the interagency environment. By understanding the dual nature of symbiotic and competitive interdependence, an operational planner can harness the former and mitigate the latter.

Contingency theory says that in order to succeed organizations must be structured and use processes in ways that are suited for their environment. Designing an organization with purely organic or mechanistic structures and processes is rarely possible. Contingency theory seeks to design an internal environment that is best able to control the external environment. It achieves this by balancing aspects of mechanistic and organic structures to deal with the level of environmental uncertainty. The importance of effective organizational design is clear, considering that structure influences outcome more than any other organizational factors. The organizational structure and the approach to interdependency derived from the structure’s internal norms determine how successful an organization will be in dealing with its environment. These organizational design theories are essential to making sound improvements to interagency action at the lower operational level. As this integration occurs, it is also important to understand the nature of the leadership required.

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Leadership in the interagency environment

The relationships in the interagency environment offer unique leadership challenges. A leadership model is required that accounts for the nature of affiliated relationships in the interagency environment. The environment of interagency action at the operational level has very few routine or standardized options for approaching problems. Each requires a unique solution. When there are very few routine decisions to make and technical administrative solutions are insufficient, organizations require some form of leadership in order to be effective. Since the internal interagency environment involves cooperation among multiple government agencies where lead organizations may not have direct authority over agencies acting in support, a leadership typology that incorporates the nature of authority as well as the nature of the environment is appropriate.

Leadership defined as an “activity to mobilize adaptation” prevents conflation of leadership with a position of authority or with vague personality traits. Adaptation is an important element in this definition. Adaptation or adaptive work occurs in situations when the definition of the problem and the development of a solution both require learning and the expert normally associated with solving the problem must share responsibility with other stakeholders. Technical work occurs in the opposite situation when the definition of the problem and solution are both clear and the established expert is responsible for the work. These technical and adaptive characteristics can also occur in combination, but in that case, the resulting work remains adaptive in nature. This leadership definition also allows a distinction between different aspects of authority, such that a typology of leadership with authority and leadership without authority is possible.

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55 Ibid., 73-76.
Leadership with authority includes the kind of leadership commonly practiced in the military. It includes both formal and informal authority. This is important because informal leadership is not the same thing as leadership without authority discussed below. It can be exercised passively and actively. Authority derives from having an established or accepted relationship to a given environment such as a geographic combatant commanders area of responsibility or a JTF commander’s area of operation. Authority also gives a leader the ability to “command and direct attention” and to control the flow of critical privileged information from the environment to the stakeholders. This combination empowers leaders with authority to “frame issues.” These leaders also “orchestrate conflict and contain disorder” which gives them the power to “choose the decision making process.” It is easy to see that these aspects give a leader with authority a great deal of power.

The second category, leadership without authority, has a subtler basis for power. Authority has inherent constraints, whether based on expected behavior for a person’s position or legal limitations. This creates a need for leadership without or beyond one’s authority when problems require solutions that exceed the constraints of formal authority. Leaders without authority have “latitude for creative deviance” and the ability to focus on a single issue. They also generally find themselves closer to the issues of their stakeholders while sacrificing familiarity with the broader perspective. Leaders without authority often garner informal authority over time, thus embracing some of the power aspects of authority. This framework of leadership with and without authority will aid examination and understanding of coordination within the interagency environment.

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56 Ibid., 103-104, 127.
57 Ibid., 183-189.
Criteria for analysis

This monograph seeks to examine the synergistic application of military power in conjunction with the elements of power resident in other government agencies at the operational level. In order to evaluate the nature of interagency operations in historical case studies to follow, this monograph will apply four criteria fundamental to the practice of operational art. The purpose of this section is to describe briefly the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk for use in the analysis to follow. These four criteria are the fundamental building blocks of operational art. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations says an operational commander must satisfy each of them to practice operational art effectively.\(^{58}\) This section provides concise definitions of each criterion.

Ends describe the strategic goals by defining the conditions desired in the area of operations.\(^{59}\) They frequently extend to include general regional conditions outside of the area of operations, and they account for effects that might result from other global stakeholders. Strategic level directives generally define ends, but operational artists may also deduce them from official statements, speeches, or congressional testimony. The operational planner must first understand the desired goals before proceeding further in planning. The goals or conditions defined by the ends may go beyond purely military objectives, often including social or political conditions. Operational commanders may find the achievement of those goals beyond the normal capabilities expected from military forces. Clearly, this may have implications for consideration of other agency capabilities being included in the plan. Therefore, this aspect of operational art is essential for understanding how commanders approached specific operations in the past, and for helping them cipher the best approach in the future. For analysis in this monograph, ends will include any strategic or theater objectives.

\(^{58}\) JP 3-0, II-3.
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, simply says the idea of ways answers the question, “What sequence of actions is most likely to produce [the condition required by the ends]?”\(^{60}\) This question offers too simplistic a view of ways because it implies a sequencing of individual actions. The simultaneous and high friction nature of the external security environment described above does not accord operational planners the comfort of sequential approaches, yet multiple actions must no doubt occur in order to achieve the ends. The same joint publication goes on to describe facets of operational art, including simultaneity, synergy, timing and tempo, anticipation, and arranging operations.\(^{61}\) Each of these facets describes a detailed aspect of ways because they all relate to the same idea of combining actions to achieve the ends. Doing so sequentially remains an option, but it is hardly the nature of the term ways. For analysis in this monograph, ways are the arrangement of action in time and space to achieve the desired ends.

Means are the joint force resources available to conduct the actions described by the ways within the area of operations.\(^{62}\) Describing means as strictly those of the joint force is misleading and unsatisfactory for a study of improving operational interagency action. There are means in every government agency as sure as there are people. There may not be clear and articulated capabilities such as those found in the Universal Joint Task List. Other agencies may not have units organized along military lines, but all agencies of the federal government that are capable of engaging in activities abroad have means in accordance with the notion found in operational art. Planners exclude their consideration at their own peril. Consideration must clearly go beyond the joint force when considering means. This conclusion may lend some analysis to counterfactuals, but it is a reasonable approach to the historical case studies. The analysis must look beyond inherent military capabilities to draw conclusions about orchestrating interagency means.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., III-9 – III-17
\(^{62}\) Ibid., II-3.
Therefore, for analysis in this monograph, means are the United States government resources available for action in the area of operations.

Finally, risk considers the anticipated cost to the joint force from the proposed or adopted actions. This monograph will examine how the operational level commanders in each case considered risk in the operations conducted. This criterion will determine if a different interagency process or structure could have changed the consideration of risk in the operation. Risk is included as a consideration in this model of operational art to refine the ways and protect the means. In this way, it is a corollary to ends, ways and means, rather than an independent criterion. It shapes the design of an operation, but plays no absolute role. Commanders can acknowledge and accept the risk to their forces instead of always finding a way to mitigate it. In considering risk, this monograph will define it as anticipated factors that can prevent successful completion of desired actions or cause preventable harm to available resources.

**TRAIN WRECKS AND CRASH DERBIES: CASE STUDIES OF INTERAGENCY IN ACTION**

This section illustrates the nature of interagency operations through the analysis of case studies from Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. It is coincidental that both of these operations occurred in the same region. They are included because they satisfy three essential requirements for relevance to current and future interagency operations in campaigns and expeditions. They each had multiple U.S. agencies involved in accomplishing U.S. objectives in a given area of operations. Both occurred after the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, often called the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This watershed legislation is the legal basis for the joint military guidelines and command system still used today. While the joint military environment and internal DOD policies evolve, this overall legal authority provides a common and constraining thread. Finally, each operation has a suitable historical record to support analysis of the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation.

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63 Ibid.
This section clarifies the necessity of interagency action during decisive operations. This section demonstrates interagency effectiveness during contemporary campaigns and expeditions and exposes the need to modify the structure and process identified in the first section given the environment described in the second.

**Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama**

On the night of 16 December 1989, Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers shot and killed an off duty United States Marine Corps Lieutenant at a roadblock in Panama City, Panama. A US Navy lieutenant and his wife witnessed the shooting of Lieutenant Paz and underwent brutal interrogation before their release early the next morning.\(^64\) Months of unraveling control and instability in the corrupt Panamanian government had finally and publicly crossed the line that would unleash the military might of the United States in Operation JUST CAUSE to replace General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the drug-trafficking strongman who ran Panama. In the months leading up to these events, the Bush Administration effectively identified political objectives and a clear vision to guide the military instrument of national power to accomplish those objectives. Meanwhile, a host of other agencies plied other instruments of national power to bring about the shift to democracy with little effect.\(^65\)

The first step in the military success of this operation was the development of a clear vision from President George Herbert Walker Bush. This provided clear articulation of the ends. Before the May 1989 Panama elections, military leaders felt the policy on Panama was unclear. General Woerner, CINCSOUTH, publicly complained about the lack of a policy on Panama shortly after President Bush’s inauguration. The Bush Administration was reluctant to pursue Noriega based solely on his known criminal activities, but had begun laying the groundwork. A


\(^{65}\) Charles Wm. Robinson, “Panama; Military Victory, Interagency Failure: A Case Study of Policy Implementation” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 21-22.
suitable replacement within the PDA would require assistance into power, but all of the choices also seemed to be criminals who offered little hope of a change in the situation.66

The election of Guillermo Endara and the nullification of the election’s results by Noriega provided new leverage in what had become a frustrating policy of subtle persuasion and fruitless accusation. With the un-democratic action of Noriega, the United States could now assert the desire to restore democracy for the people of Panama, unjustly robbed of self-determination by the actions of the criminal PDF leadership. Within four days of the Panama Elections, President Bush laid out his vision for Panama while announcing the deployment of additional troops there in response to violence that erupted against pro-democracy protestors, “I’ve asserted what my interest is at this point. It is democracy in Panama: it is protection of the life of Americans in Panama.”67 This two-fold policy provided the justification for military action by December.

Between the time President Bush articulated his initial vision for Panama and the execution of military operations to carry it out, a military plan had to be developed for the new situation. The military action executed in December 1989 was a feasible, acceptable, and suitable military plan well executed to achieve the vision of the Bush Administration. The set of military plans for Panama prior to the May 1989 elections provided options for defense of the Panama Canal, evacuation of American civilians, civil affairs assistance in establishing a new civilian government, and plans for in-country forces to attack Noriega’s PDF. This final option, code named BLUE SPOON, was the plan the new military leadership modified into and renamed OPERATION JUST CAUSE just before execution. The plan dealing with civil-military affairs assistance, code named BLIND LOGIC, also underwent revision and renaming to PROMOTE LIBERTY just before its start. These two operation plans occurred sequentially, the latter relying on conditions set by the former.

66 Woodward, 83.
67 Ibid., 84, 90.
The SOUTHCOM staff developed the original BLUE SPOON plan, but changing personalities resulted in a complete revision in the months before JUST CAUSE. Even before General Maxwell Thurman’s 30 September assumption of command of SOUTHCOM, on 5 August after he relinquished command of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), he personally directed the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lieutenant General Carl Stiner to take charge of any contingency operations in Panama, saying:

I’m putting you in charge of all forces and you’ve got it: planning, execution, the whole business. I have looked at my staff and I have told the chairman and I have told the chief that it cannot run a contingency operation. He said you can have it, and I’m holding you responsible.\(^68\)

This gave authority for the planning to the commander who would execute the plan. This is significant because the previous arrangement had XVIII Airborne Corps executing, but not planning the BLUE SPOON contingency plan. The commander now had the opportunity to use his planning staff to make the plan fit his philosophy.\(^69\)

Ensuring success through the overwhelming application of military power had the desired effect of creating an acceptable military plan that secured the Panama Canal, protected U.S. citizens, and allowed the duly elected President to take power. The PDF would have continued to control Panama with or without Noriega. The abuse of US Citizens and threats to Panama Canal security guaranteed by the US military could not absolutely be stopped unless the PDF was eliminated as a source of power in Panama. Clearly, PDF leaders could have chosen to leave US citizens alone and allowed the US military to continue its mission, but this would continue to be on PDF terms.

The Bush administration could not accept terms dictated by PDF criminals where US citizens and security interests were involved. Capturing Noriega and eliminating the PDF ability to influence the democratically elected government were the essential conditions for achieving


\(^{69}\) Ibid., 54-57.
the President’s vision. As characterized by General Larry Welch during the meeting in which the Joint Chiefs unanimously agreed to recommend BLUE SPOON, the United States had either to “get out of Panama entirely or get in all the way.”70 The planners at the XVIII Airborne Corps developed a unilateral military plan that got in all the way—and rapidly. As a joint military operation, the JTF South plan remains one of the finest examples of operational art.71 However, the unilateral use of the military element of national power was not sufficient to bring about the strategic goal of democracy in Panama, nor did it suffice for the removal and extradition of General Manuel Noriega.

From the time in 1987 when the United States began to formulate a tougher policy on Panama, a large number of United States government agencies were involved in Panama, directly or indirectly. The Department of Defense contribution included the Armed Forces in Panama, JTF SOUTH and then later the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF). Cabinet level agencies included the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, and the Department of State. The Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Justice department, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), were also involved along with two Federal Attorney’s offices.72 This massive effort over time remained largely uncoordinated, however two common points of interaction existed at the SOUTHCOM headquarters and the U.S. Embassy. SOUTHCOM interfaced with most of the agencies, but without any formal processes or structure.

This informal coordination system was then further undercut by the compartmentalized nature of the military planning. The military plan was actually two plans, BLUE SPOON (JUST CAUSE) and BLIND LOGIC (PROMOTE LIBERTY). This reflected further compartmentalization in addition to the notion that military operations would follow a *veni, vidi,*

70 Woodward, 166.
71 Baker, Donnelly, and Roth, 398.
72 Robinson, 22.
vici, vamoose model. General Thurman focused only on BLUE SPOON, admitting later that if the BLIND LOGIC plan had been included as a phase of BLUE SPOON, he would have given it more attention. This neglect of the plan at the regional combatant commander level invited further neglect at the operational level headquarters. XVIII Airborne Corps ignored all implied CMO tasks that the SOUTHCOM version of BLUE SPOON originally conceived as conditions for the CMO plan.\textsuperscript{73} BLUE SPOON included no tasks to maintain law and order resulting from conditions of the successful destruction or isolation of the PDF.\textsuperscript{74} This factor seemed complicit in generating the conditions for execution of BLIND LOGIC before expected.

As the CMOTF began execution of BLIND LOGIC, the civil affairs plans cell was still revising the plan. BLIND LOGIC remained unapproved by the JCS. A late recognition that the JUST CAUSE plan would not set the conditions for BLIND LOGIC sparked a fresh review of BLIND LOGIC 48 hours before the order to execute it. This crash planning session resulted in compartmentalization of planning by virtue of time constraints, but the civil affairs cell had been constrained by some form of compartmentalization even when there was comparatively ample time. SOUTHCOM forbade the civil affairs planning cell from interagency coordination even with the U.S. Embassy, unless on general issues without specific mention of the plan.\textsuperscript{75} The result was increased friction among U.S. government agencies working in the chaotic quasi-combat and post-combat environment, especially in and around Panama City.

This case study illustrates the state of the art of operational military planning in the late 1980’s. BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC were sequential plans, ultimately linked more by location than by interconnected purpose. The strategic level interagency coordination focused on providing guidance for military operations, despite the potential for robust coordination among so

\textsuperscript{73} The JCS had not approved the SOUTHCOM BLIND LOGIC plan. This is sufficient technical justification for the XVIII Airborne Corps planners to ignore it. However, the oversight in recreating the OPLAN without ensuring the planners for the sequel operation understood the changes remains a valid concern. See John T. Fishel, \textit{The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 20-21.

\textsuperscript{74} Fishel, \textit{The Fog of Peace}, 30-31.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 19, 21, 31-34.
many agencies active in Panama. Understanding how the situation in Panama caused the U.S. to
invade, knowing the military plans developed to address that situation, recognizing the other
government agencies available to provide capabilities, and seeing the illustration of the friction
that occurred due to the planning security measures all provide data for a closer analysis using
this monograph’s criteria. The following analysis of operations in Panama reveals important
lessons for operational commanders and their planners.

President Bush made the ends for operations in Panama clear very early in the first year.
Democracy in Panama and the protection of Americans in Panama were the main U.S. objectives
in what became the theater of operations. Regional goals, while unspecified, remained constant.
Reduction of drug traffic, regional stability, and favorable trade relations were among the less
benign. If drug traffic reduction is included as part of the basic policy for Panama due to the U.S.
legal case against Noriega, then there were essentially three desired ends in Panama. These three
and the protection of the Panama Canal treaties were the reasons given for the invasion by the
White House press secretary as he announced it to the American public.76

The actions arranged in time and space to achieve the ends in Panama did not sufficiently
incorporate all of the U.S. objectives. The military operation effectively protected Americans by
denying the PDF freedom of maneuver. With the overwhelming U.S. combat power applied
against them, most PDF never emerged as a viable force from their barracks, although limited
direct action and some kidnappings occurred. The elimination of the PDF threat and the fact that
the military actions sent Noriega into hiding, also provided a secure enough environment to allow
the duly elected President, Guillermo Endara, to assume formal political leadership.

Other actions related directly or indirectly to achieving the strategic ends did not coincide
in time and space. The search for Noriega by military forces began on D-Day. Instead of

76 Woodward, 184.
synchronizing actions to capture him, the military plan synchronized actions to search for him.77 Noriega evaded capture for three days and then took asylum in the Papal Nunciatura for ten additional days before diplomatic negotiations between the United States and the Vatican, combined with increasing Panamanian public protest led to his capture by the military and subsequent arrest by the DEA. Additionally, military planners did not include actions to restore law and order in the absence of the Noriega security forces. Three days of looting in Panama City undermined the perception of democratic institutions in Panama, rather than restoring them.78

The means available to the United States in JUST CAUSE include JTF SOUTH, the CMOTF, and the twelve other U.S. Government agencies or departments involved in Panama before and after military operations began. The compartmentalization of the military planning process at the operational level prevented effective integration of actions within the capability of other government agencies. There was coordination between SOUTHCOM, JTF SOUTH and the CIA, DEA, and State Department, but very little synchronization with any other governmental agency. The military planning process eliminated the inclusion of contributions from outside agencies to achieve the ends. The plan even failed to account for the simultaneous requirement to destroy the old order and restore a new one by excluding military contributions to achieve the ends from the JUST CAUSE plan. They established an entirely new set of military means under the sequential PROMOTE LIBERY plan, and then deliberately ignored setting the required conditions in JUST CAUSE.

The military plans correctly anticipated the primary risk in this series of combat operations when considering the national objectives. Harm befalling Americans, disruption of trade through the Panama Canal, and the viability of the PDF were all capable of preventing successful completion of the U.S. mission or harming available resources. However, the military

78 Fishel, 29-30.
planning process, with its attendant security, excluded other means available that might have acted, if synchronized in time and space to reduce the friction encountered during and after the major combat operations. A simple example is that use of CIA or DEA intelligence about the location of Noriega might have allowed better targeting for his capture rather than having to wait until the invasion began to start searching for him. The DEA had years of experience tracking and capturing drug traffickers in Central America. They had put together much of the legal case against Noriega. Their capability might have provided tracking of Noriega well before the invasion, perhaps providing an opportunity for the immediate capture of Noriega as the operation began. Such inclusion of outside government agencies has inherent risk because of the potential for the compromise of military plans and the resulting unnecessary harm that could come to military resources, especially personnel.

At the operational level, the military took a risk in operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama because they did not incorporate essential means available from outside government agencies to act in time and space alongside military means to achieve the national objectives. Planning and executing military operations in isolation from other government agencies delayed discrete opportunities for success and contributed to general problems for achieving national objectives.

**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti**

The situation in Haiti progressed from bad to worse from the overthrow of President Aristide in September 1991 through the bloody internal chaos and mass exodus that preceded the U.S. invasion in 1994. The combination of internal political upheaval and growing humanitarian refugee crisis in Haiti resulted in a series of military operations that included operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. These operations responded in various ways to handle the maritime flow of refugees; restore the ousted Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide; restart the Haitian economy; and remove the junta government operating under the protection of Haitian Lieutenant
General Raoul Cedras, then the de facto leader of Haiti. The outgoing Bush administration and the Clinton administration first used other instruments of national power before settling on a military combat option. President Bush began an economic embargo immediately following the coup. President William Jefferson Clinton expanded diplomatic efforts and pursued United Nations options. In March of 1993, he declared his vision for Haiti by stating he wanted Aristide returned to power and the Haitian economy rebuilt.

The United States, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other international political bodies continually sought diplomatic ways to return Haiti to democracy. On July 3, 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras signed the Governors Island Accord. This United Nations agreement offered a peaceful transition to democracy under international monitoring and assistance. The Cedras regime defied and resisted implementation of the accord under peaceful circumstances when the USS Harlan County arrived on October 11, 1993 to disembark the military portion of the monitoring force and was repulsed by blocked moorings, gunboats, and picked armed mobs at the port. The chaotic environment and the whims of a warlord strongman repelled the attempt to act on months of peaceful efforts. This caused the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) to begin developing options that included the use of military force.

Soon after the USS Harlan County turned back from Port Au Prince in October 1993, the staff at USACOM formed the “Jade Green” planning cell. This code name was assigned to the planning cell because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, directed

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80 Ibid., 50.
82 Ballard, 52.
83 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 38-41.
the planning be “close hold” in order to avoid disrupting ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts. The planning conducted by the Jade Green cell primarily used a hybrid between deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP), because the formal national strategy documents did not identify Haiti as a threat. The planners at USACOM were reacting to current events making it like CAP, but the chief planner at USACOM, Marine Major General Michael C. Byron, recognized the need to develop an entirely new plan, thus making it a more like deliberate planning. Since the planners did not expect to have to execute the plan until after the new January 1994 international deadline for General Cedras to step down, they also had sufficient time to conduct deliberate planning. Two plans developed from this cell. The first was an option for invading Haiti in a hostile environment. The second involved the use of interagency capabilities in a permissive entry environment.

The first plan, “Dragon’s Blood,” developed in November later became known as Operation Plan (OPLAN) 2370. It remained “close hold” throughout the planning process. The compartmentalization of this plan frustrated the efforts of military planners to even coordinate among themselves due to variations in access code words and special access classifications used at different commands. Planners at the XVIII Airborne Corps, designated JTF 180 in the OPLAN, literally compartmented their planning when Major Kevin Benson, an assistant plans officer, converted a supply closet for use as a planning area to ensure restricted access by the small number of planners working for Major William B. Garrett to develop their part. In this plan, JTF 180, commanded by Army Lieutenant General Henry H. “Hugh” Shelton, would invade Haiti with the 82nd Airborne Division and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to achieve the following objectives:

…to neutralize the FAd’H and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians’ interests and property; to conduct a NEO as required; to restore

84 Ballard, 63.
85 Ibid., 65.
86 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 46.
87 Armed Forces of Haiti, abbreviation for Forces Armées d’Haiti.
Later planners added a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to the forces designated for the invasion. As execution of this plan began on 18 September 1994, General Cedras signed an agreement brokered by former U.S. President James Earl Carter, Jr. to allow U.S. and international troops to enter Haiti unmolested, obviating the necessity for executing OPLAN 2370.

The Jade Green cell had also developed a second plan, known to the military as OPLAN 2380. It was a political-military plan developed by the USACOM planners, and submitted for approval to the JCS and the National Security Council interagency working group for Haiti. It provided for operations in an environment where the military entered Haiti at the invitation of the Cedras regime. Planners developed this plan to allow easier coordination of issues requiring attention outside DOD. OPLAN 2380 required a lower security clearance than OPLAN 2370, and could therefore be more widely discussed and coordinated among other government agencies. Meanwhile it could also be a sequential operation if the situation required forcible entry under OPLAN 2370. The OPLAN 2380 timeline for military force deployment and assigned objectives allowed outside agencies to plan their military operation support requirements based on the less classified plan, but prepared them to support of both military plans without having to compromise sensitive military operations. The 10th Mountain Division was designated JTF 190 and conducted the required planning for OPLAN 2380 with assistance from USACOM and the XVIII Airborne Corps, its higher headquarters.

After the last minute concession by General Cedras, the military executed a variant of OPLAN 2380, known as “OPLAN 2380 plus.” It incorporated some requirements from OPLAN

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89 Ibid., 50.
91 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 44.
92 Ballard, 73.
2370 and another OPLAN numbered 2375 that JTF 180 planners developed to provide an option for employing JTF 190 under JTF 180 command and control. OPLAN 2375 envisioned a passive Haitian reception after the OPLAN 2370 invasion, and programmed JTF 190 forces to begin their mission within a few days of the invasion. OPLAN 2375 provided a flexible option, indicating the planners were preparing for changing conditions. Neither USACOM nor the JCS had approved OPLAN 2375 before President Carter secured Cedras’ cooperation. The need to reconcile three military plans just as execution began caused confusion within the military and among the government agencies involved. The interagency coordination conducted throughout the planning process helped mitigate the effects of that friction.

During the planning, Major General Byron put his experience as an interagency coordinator in Washington D.C. to good use by hosting a series of interagency planning sessions at USACOM during the summer of 1994. He also met in Washington, D.C. with the NSC interagency working group on Haiti to coordinate an interagency rehearsal and requirements for the mission, including the training of a new Haitian police force. Acknowledging the military was not suited to this task, the interagency working group agreed that the Department of Justice working under the Department of State in Haiti would take that role. The International Criminal Investigation and Training Program (ICITAP) was the specific agency that would take the lead in training new Haitian police.

Many other U.S. government agencies were also involved in Haiti. The planning effort coordinated capabilities under the guidelines provided in OPLAN 2380 from the State Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The following cabinet level departments were also eventually involved in Haiti: the

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94 Ballard, 62, 74.
95 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 44-45.
96 Ballard, 74.
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Treasury. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Peace Corps also contributed capabilities during the operation. The number of agencies involved in coordination under OPLAN 2380 reflects recognition of the need for greater interagency coordination within the U.S. government. However, coordination fell short of eliminating friction in this operation.

A good example of this friction occurred during the 12 September 1994 rehearsal with the NSC interagency working group on Haiti. This meeting was to be a final review of the political-military plan agreed to earlier in the year, but Major General Byron’s inquiry to the Justice Department representative about the plan to train the Haitian police force was met with the disappointing declaration that the Department of Justice could not conduct the mission. Major General Byron’s reaction was to assign the mission to one of his own planners, who planned the abdicated Justice Department roles in only three days time. This apparent breakdown in unity of effort at the strategic level was an indicator that the interagency coordination conducted was insufficient. It should not have been a surprise since only two government agencies regularly attended the mini-interagency planning sessions at USACOM. Other problems were not as apparent until execution.

As the military began executing OPLAN 2380 plus, operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, planners had to merge the competing deployment flow from OPLAN 2380 and OPLAN 2370. This alone was a sufficient challenge, but the reluctance to approach the security environment in Haiti as permissive compounded the problem. They had no assurance that General Cedras would not once again undermine an accord he had signed. This last minute change also required Herculean efforts just to distill an order the available military forces could execute that still

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97 Ibid., 74, 231.
98 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 71.
99 Ballard, 73.
achieved the national objectives. This last-minute effort left the other government agencies as the lowest military planning priority at a time when they most required synchronization with the plan updates. The relatively short time that OPLAN 2380 planning was going on left operational level coordination incomplete. Military logistical and transportation support to other government agencies requiring movement into Haiti was not complete and points of contact were no longer available after the military units deployed.

Despite the drawbacks arising from the last minute changes in operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the level of interagency coordination was unprecedented, and the military operation was executed effectively and in accordance with the established timetable. This case study provides a glimpse at the beginning of the DOD emphasis on interagency coordination. The strategic level interagency coordination between USACOM and the interagency working group on Haiti are of particular note because they produced an authoritative interagency political-military plan for the first time since Goldwater-Nichols. This provided the strategic guidance and directed the efforts of the necessary government capabilities toward the strategic goals in Haiti. The description of the situation in Haiti that caused U.S. intervention, the discussion of the military plans developed to address that situation, the enumeration of the military forces and government agencies available to provide capabilities, and the illustration of the friction that occurred despite the best efforts of many all provide salient points for analysis using this monograph’s criteria.

The U.S. objectives in Haiti remained constant throughout the situation described above. President Clinton declared them the restoration of President Aristide to his democratically elected office and the economic recovery of Haiti. Military planners at the strategic and operational levels easily understood the goals throughout the process. Many international organizations joined the

100 Baumann, Fishel, and Kretchik, 76-78.
United States in seeking these goals, including the United Nations, but the overall tenor of demands remained relatively uniform.

Military planners ultimately had to develop the actions arranged in time and space to achieve the ends at the last minute. While USACOM, JTF 180, and JTF 190 developed the three OPLANs that ultimately became OPLAN 2380 plus, the resolve of the strategic leaders to choose a military option was not clear until May 1994 when President Clinton said he would consider the use of force. Military planning for the use of force had already gone on for seven months by that time, but it marked the first time other government agencies seriously understood they would need to coordinate with the military.\textsuperscript{102} This also instigated the development of OPLAN 2380 at that time for similar reasons. The military effectively coordinated the direction of actions required in time and space from other government agencies by using the political-military plan through the NSC. The rehearsal revealed that not all government agencies were circumspect in their planning and preparation, but the military quickly stepped in to fill the void. The ideal situation would provide the military a mechanism to recognize the shortfall from the other agency earlier and offer military assistance rather than completely taking over the role.

The means available to the United States in JUST CAUSE included a host of government agencies and departments described above. This case illustrates the benefit of the military being aware of and gaining the cooperation of other government agencies with capabilities necessary for the accomplishment of the national objectives in the area of operations. Major General Byron laid a firm foundation at the strategic level. The operational level planners at JTF 180 and especially JTF 190 did not have the commensurate time, resources, or rank to conduct parallel coordination with other government agencies. Regarding military means, it is instructive to note that this case involved a regional combatant command, USACOM, as well as both corps and division level JTFs, all requiring interagency coordination.

\textsuperscript{102} Hayes and Wheatly, 30-32.
The primary risk to the successful completion of the U.S. mission was the ability to generate a viable Haitian police force. This was essential to replace the corrupt security force as military forces removed it to prevent threats to U.S. resources and the mission. Corollary to that risk from a military standpoint is the fact that the training of the Haitian police force was not a military mission, even after the Justice Department balked. This left the U.S. military and the international military force directly responsible for public safety and security until the Haitian police force could be established. The inability to control one or more mechanisms of the disengagement criteria created an uncertain situation for the U.S. military. Operational and even tactical interdependence with other agencies for exit criteria satisfaction is a good formula for never getting to withdraw forces. This interdependence ultimately became decisive as U.S. forces later working under the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) had to develop their exit strategy by balancing the security provided by U.S. patrols and the developing capabilities of the newly formed Haitian National Police.\textsuperscript{103}

The operational risk to the U.S. military mission was a function of the mission of other government agencies. This situation, combined with the limited capacity for the JTFs formed around division and corps staffs to coordinate with other government agencies to ensure the synergistic application of capabilities required from those agencies to ensure military success highlights the need for developing a better way to achieve interagency harmony.

**IF ONLY… ACHIEVING INTERAGENCY HARMONY**

This final section of the monograph offers a brief analysis of the current interagency structure and process to determine efficacy relative to applying national power during campaigns and expeditions. It articulates the ability of the current organizational structure and leadership methods to effectively harmonize interagency means of national power at the operational level in ways that achieve the strategic ends. It provides recommendations from those conclusions to

improve interagency action during campaigns and expeditions through organizational design adaptation and accompanying leadership model integration. This section ultimately addresses how effectively the current coordination of interagency capabilities at the operational level supports strategic aims and how the balanced integration of interagency action at the lower operational level in theater will improve synergistic application of national power when DOD has the lead interagency role.

**The structure**

The present organizational structure for interagency coordination at the operational level resides at the regional combatant command level, embodied in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). This essentially provides a liaison capability, and is of an experimental nature. At the JTF or theater level, the Civil Military Operations Center provides an appropriate adjunct structure to assist the associated command with coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and reconstruction activities. No such structure exists to coordinate capabilities of other government agencies during entry and combat operations.

In both of the case studies, the planners were overwhelmed with military operations at the time they needed to integrate these extra-military capabilities to improve the conditions for military operations. Planners have the expertise to know the interagency contributions that can improve the operation. As the case study on Haiti illustrated, good coordination at the combatant command headquarters does not directly improve coordination at an overwhelmed JTF headquarters. The planners are the best part of the staff to coordinate interagency requirements due to their complete familiarity with the plan. An organizational design solution to improve interagency coordination would include a component that organizes direct liaison between the executing headquarters and the supporting government agencies as early during the planning process as possible.
Organizational theory suggests that since the planning will occur in an uncertain environment, illustrated by the last-minute adaptations required in both case studies, that organic structures are best suited to optimize results. The mechanistic liaison and formal staffing arrangements were insufficient in both cases from the time the military postured forces for combat action until after the combat action subsided. This suggests that having the other government agencies embedded directly in the planning cell at the executing headquarters as part of the planning team could provide more adaptable military force integration with interagency capabilities.

**The process**

The greatest weakness in the process for joint interagency coordination is the tendency by the military to compartmentalize the military plan beyond the point in time when other agencies can effectively plan and integrate their capabilities. Both cases illustrated this. While there is a legitimate need for operational security, the case study of Haiti offers insight into a potential solution. This idea derives from the use of OPLAN 2380 to orchestrate a parallel interagency planning effort that also supported the OPLAN 2370 option. The requirement for a parallel interagency or political-military plan with all joint plans would improve future coordination issues. If the Jade Green cell began development of the interagency requirement for Haitian police force training in the fall of 1993 when combat planning began, the resulting Justice Department plan would have had more opportunities for successful coordination. Current doctrine buries this kind of coordination in an annex to the OPLAN.

It is important to recognize that the continuing political process at the strategic level will hamper some of the process, but the process itself can moderate this if the NSC committees acknowledge the need all agencies have for time to plan and coordinate at the operational level. If the military process encourages involvement and coordination directly at the operational level by the various agencies contributing to a given military operation, then the need to issue clear
guidance to all agencies involved at the operational level truncates the time available to posture and debate the approach in NSC meetings. Integration of direct interagency coordination with JTF staffs at the operational level will generate the need for decisions and direction to all agencies from the strategic level.

**The leadership**

Even when the NSC interagency working group on Haiti issued an authoritative directive to the government agencies in agreement to their roles in OPLAN 2380, the Department of Justice still came to the rehearsal unable to conduct the mission. The authority of the NSC was insufficient to get results from a cabinet level department. All of the characteristics of leadership with authority were present in the NSC, but their application did not get results. Fortunately for operational commanders and military planners, the potential to exercise leadership without authority is ideally suited to them. The JTF level commander and his planning staff are uniquely suited to apply leadership without authority to interagency coordination. First, their purview essentially focuses on a single issue in the strategic context. Their charge to apply operational art within their assigned area gives them latitude for creative deviance because they must do what works. They are also the closest to the issue that gives rise to their operations. Finally, they have the authoritative relationship to the environment, which gives the leader without authority the edge required to emerge as an authoritative leader over time.

The combination of resource dependence theory with the suitability of JTF commanders to the leadership without authority model provides an understanding of how they might exercise this leadership within the interagency environment. The military’s inherent influence, logistical and transportation resources, organizing and planning processes, and the command and control infrastructure all offer something another government agency might need to successfully support operations in the JTF commander’s area of operations. This list of military advantages is ideally suited to application of the resource dependence theory. To receive the support required from
other government agencies to support military aspects of campaigns, the military must use its resources to feed the symbiotic interdependencies of the agencies supporting military plans. Imagine as an example if the military had provided a planning team to the Department of Justice to develop the Haitian police force training plan. If a USACOM staff planner was able to draft the plan in three days under the stress of the impending invasion, how much more could have obtained given the same military zeal applied within the Justice Department over a period of a few months? This kind of creative leadership will help pull the other agencies along without subjecting them to the idea they have become subordinate to DOD, a proposition with little cultural, political, or legal palatability.

The balance

The ultimate recommendation of this monograph is to always consider operational interagency coordination and interagency action as a balance between structure, process, and leadership. Structures are evolving at the upper operational level within the regional combatant commands. The conclusions above suggest that establishment of a structure for interagency coordination at the JTF level will improve the effectiveness of the interagency action. This is not strictly a structure for post-conflict, humanitarian assistance, or reconstruction operations. Each of the cases reviewed showed the need for close coordination during the combat portion of the operations, even if only to adapt to late-breaking changes and ensure the conditions required for post-conflict operations can be set. In the event a JTF is not part of the theater command and control structure, then the land component command should be the default headquarters for this organizational construct due to the relationship to the environment (ground, versus air or maritime) where most interagency operations occur. This would not change the natural relationship established by law for the Coast Guard and the Navy in time of war. Instead, it would mirror it on land. Failing that option, the Army force component is the logical choice; especially considering the Army already has a standing domestic relationship to interagency coordination.
through the executive agency of the Secretary of the Army. Secondly, the Army tends to be the force of choice for durable operations in the post-conflict environment of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.  

The interagency process will balance with the structure more effectively if it begins at the lowest possible level as soon as the combatant command identifies the JTF commander and staff. This primary coordination authority within DOD must be similar to authorizing direct liaison for units apportioned to OPLANs. The JTF, augmented by the regional combatant command, would assume the lead role in further coordination. With a structure designed for integration at the JTF level, the JTF can use the parallel political-military planning process described above to ensure interagency coordination is thorough and supports the military plan. It also will provide the ability to identify and refine military requirements to support other government agencies with capabilities unique to DOD. This operational level process directly supports the balance of leadership in the interagency environment.

Any development of new doctrine for interagency coordination should include the nature of leadership in the interagency environment. Military leadership doctrine also needs to explore and incorporate the notion of leadership with and without authority. The interagency context demands that officers understand the relationship between leadership and authority is not direct. Military service cultures, perhaps with the exception of special operations forces, tend toward formal authoritative leadership. This model suits leadership within a military organization, but future military operations will be joint, interagency, and multinational in nature. Adaptation of military culture to better harness the potential of other government agencies in this environment supports improvements in structure and process.

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104 U.S. Army forces remain engaged in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq among other smaller contingencies as of this writing. While JTFs or other multinational headquarters are in use in each of these ongoing operations, the Army consistently constitutes the majority of the ground forces and the U.S. headquarters elements for ground operations.
Summary

The continuing global war on terror provides emphasis for timely and balanced adaptation of the organizational structure, the process, and the leadership model for interagency coordination in concert with military operations. Providing a team structure within the lower operational level planning cell that directs a parallel planning process to integrate interagency coordination while adapting leadership techniques appropriate to creatively eliciting interagency contributions without alienating interagency players provides the right kind of balance for future operations. The blurring and intertwining of roles between the DOD and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others provides an opportunity to improve the state of operational art. The balanced approach described here offers an opportunity for operational level military commanders to improve the application of all instruments of national power from all of the capable agencies during decisive operations. Applying this balanced approach will ensure a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role.
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