NATO AND FORWARD DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES AND OUT-OF-AREA SECURITY

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June 2005

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This thesis examines the NATO's adaptation of a new security focus towards forward defense in the 21st Century. Until the late 1990’s, the strategic focus of NATO was on mutual defense based on a collective response guaranteed by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Since the adoption of NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), the Alliance has shifted their strategic focus toward a forward defense strategy. As NATO assumed more operational responsibilities, and deployed forces out-of-area in non-Article 5 missions, the disparity of military capabilities, operational challenges, and cultural and institutional differences within the Alliance gave rise to the question, “Is NATO the most effective instrument with which to execute a strategy of forward defense?”

A review of the expeditionary campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq determines the efficiency of the Alliance as an expeditionary security actor. The modernization of European military capabilities are described in relation to NATO, and how these programs either complement or duplicate existing structures and capabilities. Furthermore, inherent structural flaws in NATO’s composition are examined, as well as cultural and ideological differences within the Alliance and their effects on out-of-area operations. Finally, challenges and issues that may confront NATO in the future during the execution of their forward defense strategy are discussed.
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EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES
AND
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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

This Alliance is no longer the static organization of the Cold War. In fact, the very moment the Cold War ended, that old NATO ceased to exist.

_Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, February 24 2005_

From 1989 to 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would experience a period of unprecedented changes and challenges. Having accomplished their established mission with the demise of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the Warsaw pact nations, NATO would undergo a complete transformation of their purpose in order to remain a relevant international security institution. Within this time NATO would evolve from a static, defensive collective security organization ensured by Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, to one that focused on out-of-area interventions, utilizing expeditionary military capabilities with a strategy of forward defense.

NATO’s new approach to security after the end of the Cold War is based upon three pillars. The first element is the undertaking of operations to deal with security risks at their source, before they emerge. The second is the need for new military capabilities. The final element is the requirement for stronger cooperation among the nations within the Alliance and among others.\(^1\) All of these elements are now interrelated in NATO’s out-of-area, forward security strategy, and all would be severely tested as the Alliance implemented this approach in historic interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

As NATO assumed more operational responsibilities, and deployed forces out-of-area in non-Article 5 missions, the disparity of military capabilities, operational challenges, and cultural and institutional differences within the Alliance gave rise to the question, “Is NATO the most effective instrument with which to execute a strategy of forward defense?” This question will be the focus of the thesis. The answer to this

\(^1\) NATO, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: The successor generation, Deputy Secretary General’s Key Note Address, Royal United Services Institute, Conference, London, November 29 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041129a.htm accessed 15 May 2005
question is, “NATO is the premiere international security institution with which to execute out-of-area interventions, and should be utilized as such in a forward defense strategy.”

This argument will come from an analysis of NATO’s out-of-area interventions to date; Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It will be argued that the institution suffered during these interventions from conflicting national caveats of the contributing nations, has a dysfunctional operational command structure during combat, and contains a disparity of military capabilities among its members. Subsequently, it will be argued that the Alliance has been successful in the difficult process of promoting and establishing peace and stability in those regions in which it has intervened.

By further examining NATO’s out-of-area engagements, an analysis of these interventions will demonstrate that these strategic and operational shortfalls were manifested because the Alliance did not have experience in expeditionary engagements. Furthermore, the culture of the Alliance contained a predominate resistance to the use of military force in the conduct of foreign policy. Upon further examination, it will be demonstrated that, not only has the Alliance overcome this aversion, but as in the case of the Iraq invasion, has suffered the adverse consequences of an interventionist foreign policy.

Also, the agreements and commitments adopted and implemented during this time now provide NATO with a dedicated military capability with which to conduct expeditionary operations. As NATO implements the structures, capabilities and organizations that were identified as deficient in their initial campaigns in the Balkans, the Alliance will have the military means as well as the institutional focus to implement forward defense.

The role of the European Union and the European Security and Defense Policy will be reviewed concurrently with NATO developments. The development and modernization of European military forces and the progression of the EU as a legitimate security actor could appear to make NATO redundant. Under analysis, the role of ESDP will be to complement, not compete with the Alliance in European security, especially in a forward defense strategy. As the EU assumed a more active role in the European
security issues, their efforts under the ESDP would promote further improvements in Europe’s military capabilities and the assumption of greater out-of-area security responsibilities. These progressions would provide more professional and interoperable capabilities to NATO campaigns, as well as provide strategic options and operational support.

The further argument will involve an appreciation of U.S. unilateralist foreign policy and its repercussions in Europe and the Alliance. While the United States was able to quickly and efficiently remove the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq, installing functioning democratic institutions in these countries will be a more challenging and long-term endeavor. Conducting a long-term stabilization mission requires prolonged sustainment, and has been a mission that NATO has excelled. It will be argued that utilizing existing multinational security institutions for providing peacekeepers in the stability phase of an out-of-area intervention is an unparalleled strength of such organizations. Consistent support from ad hoc coalition members will dwindle during prolonged engagements, and put a severe strain on the resources and capabilities of unilateral actors.

What makes NATO an effective out-of-area security actor is not its new ability to fight wars, nor its history of establishing peace. What will define NATO as such is the ability to do both. All that remains is for the member nations of the Alliance to utilize the institution in such a capacity. This will constitute an additional argument of the thesis. The inherent weaknesses in the structures of the Alliance resulted in the transatlantic rift in protest of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

While the Alliance has functioned via consensus, no mechanisms existed to prevent unilateral action, or the blocking effects of a few self-interested members. Examination of the transatlantic rift will demonstrate that, while the costs of protesting unilateral action are significant, the costs of conducting it are enormous. Therefore, it is not an option available to all, or to be taken lightly, or that can be repeated frequently. When the members aligned in support or protest of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, this polarization demonstrated that unilateralism was more expensive than working within the
restrictions of a multilateral institution. Thus, the rift would be inevitable because there had not been a significant demonstration of the costs of “opting out.”

The final argument of the thesis will be that the inherent flaws of the Alliance still exist, but in the current security environment, these shortfalls will be able to be managed and overcome. At the Istanbul Summit, the Allies were very cooperative, and renewed measures towards continuing transformation and expanding out-of-area engagements. The reasons for this cooperation are: the threat is too great for the Alliance to remain divided, and the costs are too great to bear alone.

NATO’s continued relevance in forward defense of a new type is directly related to the desire of the member nations to utilize NATO as a crisis management and conflict prevention institution; in the organization’s ability to carry out the requirements of the mission, and in the capabilities and structure/operational ability of the military forces of the member nations. Therefore, the Alliance will persevere because the Allies need each other. It will be due to these reasons that the Allies will utilize NATO as the premiere security institution in a strategy based on forward defense. Such a goal shall continue to be in their best interests.

The Alliance has evolved from a passive, reactive defense organization into one that is actively building security right across Europe.

*General Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, 1999*

A. INTRODUCTION

Between the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the collapse of the World Trade Center (2001), NATO began its first tentative steps towards dealing with the myriad of security threats that rose to prominence in the aftermath of the bi-polar super-power confrontation that had been the focus of the world’s concern for generations. The initial relief over NATO’s triumph over the Warsaw Pact soon gave way to the realization that the methods that had proven successful in deterring Soviet expansion into Western Europe would not prove as effective in dealing with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Humanitarian Crisis, conflicts inspired by ethnically-based Nationalism, and the goals of transnational terrorist organizations that threatened Europe from their periphery. In order to maintain its relevance as a security institution, NATO would have to adapt their collective strategic concept as well as transform the military capabilities of the member nations in order to address these new and emerging security issues. While NATO’s European Allies would display competence and willingness in the former, they would prove reluctant, hesitant and non-committal in accomplishing the later.

The purpose of this chapter is to define the shift of NATO’s strategic focus from collective defense to out-of-area engagement and involvement from 1989 to 2001. During this time, NATO strove to define the post-Cold War security environment through the publications of Strategic Concepts first in 1991 and later in 1999. NATO’s Strategic Concepts identified the new and emerging security threats as well as the methods and capabilities that would provide the best recourse and protection against them. A key realization that will be analyzed is that during this period, NATO’s
diplomatic methods and military capabilities that prevented and/or deterred a super-power confrontation on the European continent were no longer as effective, or in some cases non-applicable, in the modern new security environment or in dealing with the new and emerging threats on Europe’s periphery. The inapplicability of Cold War concepts would be painfully demonstrated in the Balkans conflicts of the 1990’s. As NATO executed their first combat and peacekeeping operations, the institution’s role and existence would be questioned due to the hesitancy of the European Allies to utilize force as a method of foreign policy and the lack of capability to do so once a military course of action had been decided upon. NATO would also be hampered as much by design as by opposition due to the complexity of the multinational decision making process among an alliance of unequal contributors.

Within this time, NATO’s Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 would propose decreased dependence upon nuclear weapons, and would emphasize cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. NATO’s Strategic Concept would further call for an increased reliance upon smaller, professional and flexible military forces, which would contain the essence of the transformation and modernization of European military capabilities and would encourage the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. Also, this chapter will define the development and recognition of new and emerging security threats and the new concepts and doctrine that were proposed to address them within these summit meetings. Finally, this chapter will analyze the issues and challenges of adapting and utilizing these concepts during NATO’s intervention in the Balkans conflicts, as the institution was not only burdened by methods and doctrines more applicable to Cold War deterrence than crisis response, but by a lack of political will and military capability, the design and complexity of the multinational decision making process, and divergent philosophies of conflict resolution and crisis management. This divergence would foreshadow a weakness in the alliance and a growing rift in the transatlantic relationship as the US and Europe developed, promoted and eventually adopted different methods of resolving conflict and crisis management.
B. DEFINING THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

From 1949-1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was primarily concerned with providing political, strategic, and military cohesion in a balance of power alliance against the threat of Soviet expansion and NATO’s communist counterpart in the east, the Warsaw Pact. Changes in NATO’s strategic concept and the very nature of the alliance itself were precipitated by the collapse of communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat that was the principle concern of the Alliance in its first forty years had disappeared. On the heels of success, NATO underwent a significant adaptation as a collective security alliance based upon Cold War concepts of deterrence, balance of power and a defensive strategy that would likely disintegrate in the absence of an obvious threat such as that posed by the Warsaw Pact.

Throughout the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of Germany, NATO played a key diplomatic and political role. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe resulted in significant NATO enlargement, with the majority of Warsaw Pact nations seeking membership into, or cooperation with NATO in one form or another. These mechanisms would be achieved either through membership ascension such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, or initiatives such as Partnership for Peace (1994), The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (1997), the NATO-Ukraine Commission (2000), and the NATO-Russia Council of 2002. In this environment, NATO’s new role became one of promoting cohesion, unity, and enlargement and promised to promote the adoption of the alliance’s essential and enduring purpose: Maintenance of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and rule of law. This central alliance remained the governing principle in achieving a greater, unified Europe that now includes former enemies in

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multiple economic, political and security institutions. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO had dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West.\footnote{NATO Strategic Concept 1991, Part 1, par. 1.} In this void, NATO strove to encompass former enemies, provide leadership and guidance to nations in transition, and provide a forum for integration into new institutions of political and military cooperation. Inclusion, cohesion and consensus became the new by-words for NATO’s strategic focus as the Alliance consolidated its victory over the Warsaw Pact.

With this emphasis upon cooperation as opposed to conflict, NATO’s strategic concepts would replace “massive retaliation” (1957) and “flexible response” (1967) with an emphasis upon open consultation with former adversaries. The institution provided a framework for consultation and coordination of policies among its member countries in order to diminish the risk of crisis, which could impinge on common security interests.\footnote{NATO Handbook, 37.} The alliance pursued its efforts to remove military imbalances; to bring about greater openness in military matters; and to build confidence through radical but balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, verification arrangements, and increased contacts at all levels.\footnote{Ibid.} Reestablishing solidarity and rapport as well as decreasing the vestiges of the threat from a thermo-nuclear exchange would be encompassing strategic themes of NATO for the next twelve years and would result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency and cooperation in Europe.

Conflict and instability were still factors within Europe, and areas outside of the member nation’s territory would concern the alliance during this period. In the 1990-1 Persian Gulf War, several European governments found that they lacked the military capabilities to respond beyond the Northern Atlantic treaty area to distant threats.\footnote{Archick, Kristin and Gallis, Paul, CRS Report for Congress: NATO and the European Union, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 4 January 2005, 1.} While comprising a significant number of European nations within the Coalition, The Gulf War demonstrated embarrassing lack of expeditionary military capability within Europe and...
their continued reliance upon U.S. military and technological superiority. A desire for Europeans to assume a greater collective military responsibility within the alliance would lend more focus to diplomatic consultations among the greater European military powers. The shift towards greater European responsibilities and burdens would result in the first steps towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which would be included in the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 adopted by the European Community (now the European Union).9

1. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept

The importance of enhancing the roles and responsibilities of European member nations was recognized in the strategic concept; “The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.”10 But, in the light of greater unity within Europe, came greater uncertainty and risks from outside the borders, as new and complex security issues threatened promised Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. The alliance recognized that global influences could affect their security interests and a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of NATO members still remained. Two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President Bush and leaders of the other NATO governments in November 1991 agreed in Rome on a “strategic concept” intended to guide the alliance into the post-Cold War world.11 The new risks to allied security were identified as “…less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.”12 This principle would define the new direction of NATO

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10 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, Part 2, par. 2.

11 “NATO in the post-Cold War World”, 2.

12 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, Part 1, par. 9.
in succeeding years as less concern would be placed upon territorial defense and more focus placed upon these new, ambiguous and emerging threats. Collective security, based upon Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, while still valid, would no longer be the dominant approach to security.

But the methods to be utilized by NATO’s Strategic Concept still relied upon methods more applicable to a confrontation of nation states desiring territorial expansion rather than the “spill over” effects from unstable environments on Europe’s periphery. The three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy were “dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.”\(^{13}\) The Strategic Concept states, “In these new (security) circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crisis at an early stage.”\(^{14}\), but relied upon cooperation and a permissive, willing environment to support intervention and involvement. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept predicted the requirement of a United Nations mandate in order to provide international legitimacy to multilateral military involvement and intervention. “… The Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations”. While effective in preventing reestablishment of Soviet/Russian militarism, providing a basis for reduced reliance upon nuclear weapons, and encouraging more European involvement in their security requirements, these elements fail to encourage the mechanisms necessary for effective crisis management and conflict prevention. Unfortunately, crisis management and conflict prevention would be a prominent element of European foreign policy and a reluctant focus for NATO Security Strategy during this period.

Unfortunately, no provisions had been established to deal with the failure of diplomatic and political methods outside the borders of NATO member nations. The focus of NATO’s security strategy was still purely defensive, and not towards exporting security or conducting expeditionary operations. NATO would soon be faced with crisis management due to the failure of conflict prevention in Bosnia, where increasing ethnic

\(^{13}\) *NATO Strategic Concept*, 1991, Part 3, par. 24.

\(^{14}\) *NATO Strategic Concept*, 1991, Part 3, par. 32.
tensions in the Balkans which resulted in the uncontrolled movements of large numbers of people. These uncontrolled movements, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, concerned the security and stability affecting the alliance.\textsuperscript{15} When faced with the “spillover” of massive refuge movements on their borders, a non-permissive environment and the intransigence, and manipulation of the combatants, in particular the Serbians, would severely test the principles of NATO’s security strategy to conduct crisis intervention and out-of-area missions.


During this time, the United Nations was struggling to assert itself as a strategic actor in the new security environment, embarking on a series of diplomatic and peacekeeping missions in several failing nations, such as Somalia, and ethnically troubled regions in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations proved itself to be incapable of conducting humanitarian operations and peace missions in non-permissive or chaotic environments. As the emerging conflicts intensified following the breakup of Yugoslavia, NATO was called upon to provide more direct and assertive leadership in establishing stability within Europe’s expanded borders and to stabilize the ethnic tensions and issues within the new region of responsibility.

However, the United States was hesitant in providing the leadership necessary for effective NATO military operations, desiring a more prominent role for Europe in resolving the crisis.\textsuperscript{16} European diplomatic and political methods of engagement, defined by Joseph Nye as “Soft Power”, as well as a strategy of deterrence, détente and cohesion based upon a credible response (“Hard Power”) had proved to be an effective cooperative security arrangement during the Cold War era. But the threat from the expanding conflict in the Balkans and the rising human rights violations taking place within Europe’s periphery demonstrated that these methods where ineffective and cumbersome in the evolving strategic environment and security challenges and risks. In the former Yugoslavian republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the alliance was


\textsuperscript{16} “NATO in the post-Cold War World”, 2.
confronted with the failure of diplomacy. Political and economic sanctions were ineffective and counter-productive in an environment of civil and human rights abuses and the blatant disregard of the government that conducted supported and/or tolerated programs of ethnic cleansing within their territory.

The threat of widening ethnic tensions spreading from the Balkans, and the growing outrage of the international community eventually led NATO to conduct military operations to stabilize the region after the failure of UN-led peacekeeping missions. These military campaigns constituted the first operational employment of NATO forces in combat. While eventually successful, they brought to light significant weaknesses and other operational issues within the alliance’s framework.

NATO’s first military challenge came after the United Nations finally acknowledged that UN sanctions and arms embargos were ineffective in preventing a growing number of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia. From February 1994 to May 1995, NATO, at the request of the UN, conducted a series of ineffective “pinprick” raids against Serbian positions around Sarajevo. In May 1995, Bosnian Serbs took hostage 375 UN soldiers after NATO air strikes in Pale.\footnote{Judah, Tim, \textit{The Serbs: Myth, History and the Destruction of Yugoslavia}, Yale University Press, New Haven, Ct, 1997, 301.} After the Hostages were released, NATO prepared to react more vigorously to attacks by the Bosnians, finally resulting in massive air raids starting in August 1995 designed to cripple the Bosnian Serb army.\footnote{Ibid. 302.} The Dayton accords negotiated an end to the fighting and the peace was finally enforced with the implementation of 60,000 troops of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) on 20 December 1995.

Bosnia illustrated the fragility of peace and the socio-ethnic environment on Europe’s periphery as instable post-cold war governments struggled to consolidate a hold on power in the political vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of institutional dominance. While ultimately successful in stopping the fighting, NATO’s first expeditionary campaign was a diplomatic and humanitarian failure. The appeal of ethnically inspired nationalism as a means to maintain power and achieve territorial
expansion had resulted in a human-rights catastrophe on NATO’s doorstep. Diplomatic negotiations, sanctions, and arms embargos had failed to stop the violence. Economic sanctions take time to work and inevitably hurt those the most that they are designed to help. The inevitable delays of negotiations only aided the Serbs in consolidating gains in Bosnia and in continuing a campaign of “ethnic cleansing”. What terror did not finish for the Serbians, the coming of winter could assist. Only when NATO belatedly conducted a credible military air campaign against the Serbian army did the Serbs agree to a negotiated settlement, and a sizable military force within the country would be the only guarantee of this settlement. By then, estimates of an ultra-conservative low of 20,000 people and an extreme high of 200,000 had been killed as a result of the nationally inspired ethnic violence.19 Bosnia has served as a precedent for the necessity of out-of-area requirement and capability for NATO. Article V, and collective defense, heretofore the foundation of NATO’s Security Strategy, would be regulated to the role of an ultimate insurance policy. Non-Article V missions, and an emerging European Security and Defense identity, would demand the focus of NATO Security Strategy (1991-1993).


Europe had been progressing towards an independent defense identity despite the political demand for a post-Cold War “peace dividend” and the economic realities of reduced military budgets in the 1990’s. The principle for an independent European defense policy was established by the Treaty of Maastricht which included in principle the “eventual framing of a common defense policy” which could “in time lead to a common defense.”20 NATO was still the essential military instrument in Europe but their focus remained the absorption, consolidation and inclusion of its former enemies of in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the American role in Europe and Europe’s place in American strategy was being redefined. No longer was a massive transatlantic reinforcement of a besieged Europe the primary focus of American Defense Strategy.

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Europeans began to conceive of a defense identity tailored towards their unique requirements in a new security environment.

These requirements for European security and their defense role were identified at the WEU ministerial at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, Germany. The “Petersberg Tasks” formalized the defense roles of the WEU in a focus towards “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. The ‘Petersburg Tasks’ reflected the overall European orthodoxy at the time that, with the Cold War over and no immediate sign of a large standing military threat to the territory of western Europe, Europeans needed to reform their armed forces for frequent, but intensive, small and medium scale military operations.

Meanwhile, the weakness of European dependence on security from NATO in the new security environment had been demonstrated in Bosnia. American involvement and leadership in European security was no longer assured or as natural as before, and Europeans did not have the means to question or really influence Washington’s strategic decisions. Also, the European preference for economic and diplomatic pressures was ineffective in preventing or resolving a war of territorial expansion on their borders, or the resulting humanitarian crisis’s. When faced with the failure of diplomacy, Europe was forced to analyze their political and military weaknesses in order to create a defense identity in which NATO no longer held a monopoly upon European Security issues and would no longer be completely dependent upon participation by the United States.

Without American involvement, NATO could not have intervened effectively in order to deal with the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. A defense institution based upon territorial defense would be inadequate in projecting the kind of mobile,

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expeditionary and professional forces necessary to rapidly and effectively intervene in
during crisis. This was the real tragedy of Bosnia, as an effective military response in the
very beginning of the conflict would have prevented the war and the human rights crisis.
To be effective, an engagement must be backed by force.24 Since NATO did not have
the political focus with regards to strategic purpose in Bosnia, or the means to effective
project military power in the failure of diplomatic efforts, the Bosnian Serbs did not take
the threat of a military response seriously. Without the credible use of force, there could
be no collective security for Europe in the absence of the United States. Therefore,
Europe would be required to acquire and develop a strategic culture and an organization
that could anticipate events and take prompt, effective action to prevent, manage and
resolve them.

Europe continued progression to a common defense policy and the creation of a
foreign and defense policy “pillar” with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997
by the European Union. Even though the risk of large-scale conflicts had fallen
significantly compared to the Cold War period, Bosnia represented a resurgence of local
conflicts that could pose a threat to European security. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the
Petersberg tasks of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, were incorporated into Title
V (CFSP) of the Treaty on European Union.25 The Amsterdam Treaty also specifically
states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including
the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common
defense, should the European Council so decide.26 Finally, the treaty transferred
competences remaining from the WEU to the EU. These measures demonstrate the
member nation’s common desire to safeguard security through the execution (in concept)
of multilateral out-of-area missions as a result of the Bosnian crisis.

24 Gnesotto, 12.
25 Treaty on European Union, Amsterdam Treaty, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article J.7, par. 2
26 Ibid.
The political and military weaknesses demonstrated by lack of political focus and military capability in the post Cold War security environment in light of the Bosnian experience had also inspired the United Kingdom and France to respond with a declaration in December 1998 in St. Malo, France. They stated that the EU should develop “… the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis”\textsuperscript{27} These statements acknowledged the precedent that the EU might decide on and execute defense actions outside the NATO framework and would continue the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that was proposed in earlier treaties. In June 1999, progresses from a European defense identity, continued towards a European defense policy, separate from NATO, at the European Council in Cologne. The EU members declared that the European Union intended to play its full role on the international stage, “… we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European defense policy on security and defense… the union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”\textsuperscript{28}

Eventually, repeated consultations would eventually establish a distinctly European security strategy, which would eventually become the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. This strategy, adapted by the European Union, encompassed their efforts to establish a military pillar within the economic and political institution, and to become an effective strategic military actor in the international community.

Europe was making considerable progress towards accepting, in principle, responsibility towards their security in the new security environment. But European

security identity and policy had not yet translated into modern European military capabilities. And despite the lessons from Bosnia and the progression towards a common European security identity and policy, there was still resistance towards assuming new tasks beyond Europe’s borders due to strategic differences between Europe and the United States. The regional threat was low, and European force planners were still comfortable with a largely Cold War defense strategy. The European NATO member nations were spending an average of 60 per cent of the US total on defense, but they were not buying technologically advanced or expeditionary capabilities.29 By and large, Europe was maintaining a personnel-heavy military with aging equipment that would have difficulties operating in coalition with the Americans, or performing the requirements of an expeditionary/out-of-area security vision.

C. IMPLEMENTING THE OUT-OF-AREA FOCUS TOWARDS NATO SECURITY STRATEGY

Having accomplished their first military intervention as a security actor and encouraged an assumption of greater security responsibilities in Europe by Europeans, NATO was effectively defined and promoting acceptance of a non-Article V role for the Alliance. Furthermore, events in the Balkans, the NATO Strategic Concept, and the developing European Security and Defense Identity were advocating addressing out-of-area crisis management and conflict prevention in a multilateral context. NATO was further encouraging during his time continued consensus and ascension of several former Warsaw Pact nations into the Alliance, further demonstrating the successful utilization of diplomacy and cooperation as the preferred means to address European security concerns.

But the European preference upon these methods was fast becoming a dependency, as NATO’s expeditionary strategy and out-of-area focus were not being reinforced with the military capabilities or defense expenditures necessary to execute sustained expeditionary interventions. Most European defense budgets were not only decreasing during this time, but were used to sustain military forces that contained large formations of non-deployable forces. These forces did not have the advanced military technologies or the logistic and transportation support infrastructure required to meet the

crisis management and conflict prevention requirements of NATO security strategy or to execute those missions identified by ESDI and the “Petersberg Tasks”. This lack of investment demonstrated the reluctance on Europe to depend upon a military alternative in the failure of diplomacy, preferring instead to rely upon American involvement should intervention be necessary. Both this reluctance and the dependency were reflective of a Cold War doctrine of deterrence than the non-Article V focus necessary to prevent or manage conflict out-of-area.

When conflict erupted once again in the Balkans, this time in Kosovo, Europe would be quicker to adapt military intervention as a necessity. Unfortunately, the means to do so were primarily in the hands of the United States. Kosovo would be defined as “campaign by consensus”, as member nation’s national caveats, and preserving the alliance would place severe restrictions on the military’s air campaign and operations that were conducted overwhelmingly by American resources. Upon completion of the air campaign, Europeans would be forced to recognize the inadequacy of their military capabilities, while the United States would question the effectiveness of expeditionary and rapid-response operations conducted under the auspices and inherent restrictions of a multilateral security institution. Thus NATO would suffer the consequences due to the lack of a credible multilateral military response in their new out-of-area focus.

1. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept

During NATO’s 1999 Washington summit, the Alliance reaffirmed the commitment to a broad approach to security. In the development and adaptation of the NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the purpose and tasks reiterated that the alliance “embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe.”30 The European member nations were satisfied with the concept’s provisions of continued support for the transatlantic alliance, with promised US involvement in European security, while promoting the development of the ESDI through making NATO’s assets available for WEU-led operations. Despite fears of an independent European military strategy would take away assets and focus from NATO

30 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, Part 1, par. 6.
goals, the Strategic Concept repeatedly promised NATO assets and assistance towards a growing military pillar within the EU.

While achieving consensus as to the gravity of the threat poised by terrorism and WMD, NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept states that political and diplomatic means should be the main instruments against both terrorism and proliferation. This demonstrated a lack of awareness of, and vulnerability to, these new and complex threats, and also a naïve desire to continue utilizing Cold War era methods to address these issues. The option of NATO conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations was granted, but participation in such operations would be a decision for each member nation of the alliance. Effective military capabilities would be necessary for the alliance to contribute to conflict resolution and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

But a discord would arise within the alliance with regards to the importance and definition of security threats facing the alliance. New security threats were further defined in the Washington Summit as oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the summit committed the alliance to a broad approach to security. The emphasis upon conflict prevention and crisis management within the Strategic Concept would foreshadow a more expeditionary role for the alliance and the growing focus upon out-of-area missions. Also, the first mention of strategic effects of non-state actors within NATO’s Strategic Concept would provide a subtle, but ominous warning towards the future of the alliance and the role it would play in the new security environment. Also, renewed conflict within the Balkans would prove that little had been accomplished towards increasing European military shortfalls, or discarding a Cold War security strategy within much of the alliance since the Bosnian intervention. These methods had

31 CRS: NATO and the European Union, 3.
32 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, Part 2, par. 29.
33 Strategic Concept, 1999, Part 2, par. 29.
33 NATO Handbook, 22.
34 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, Part 2, par. 22.
been proven ineffective in responding to crisis management and ethnic violence in Bosnia, in preventing conflict in Kosovo, and would prove inappropriate in protecting from terrorism and WMD.


The conduct of combat operations in Kosovo underscored growing capabilities gap between the military forces of the United States and those of the European alliance members. Specifically, Europe had adequate ground forces but was incapable of deploying them, making any large-scale military foreign policy dependent upon NATO, and therefore the United States. This weakness of European military capability would be starkly displayed during the 78-day Kosovo air campaign and the different emphasis and priority that the member nations placed upon the credible use of force within foreign policy and a security strategy.

When the familiar pattern of nationalist inspired ethnic violence repeated in Kosovo in 1999, the Alliance responded more rapidly than in Bosnia in 1995. But the improvement in strategic focus, purpose and resolve among the Allies was not backed up with the military means and capabilities in Europe to enforce this policy. Europe was once again dependent upon the superior technology and capabilities of the United States military once the Alliance began military operations against the Serbs. The Europeans lacked the ability to communicate easily or securely with each other or with the Americans; of the communications capability in theater, 90 percent was American. They had virtually no inventories of precision-guided munitions (except for British Tomahawks), and little capability (aside from some French) for all-weather or night fighter operations. As a result, 80 percent of the strike missions in theater (and two thirds of the total aircraft sorties) were flown by Americans. The Europeans depended upon American support aircraft for their sorties, especially for battle control, refueling

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37 Ibid.
and for jamming and destroying Serbian radar.\textsuperscript{38} At the mundane but critical level of transportation and logistics, European force projection capabilities included only two roll-on, roll-off sealift ships, on lease, as compared to 12 for the United States, no fast sealift capability, (8 for the United States); and no large airlift capability (compared to 254 aircraft for the United States).\textsuperscript{39} European military operational shortfalls and lack of modern, expeditionary capabilities had impeded the ability of the NATO’s European Allies to operate at optimal effectiveness with the United States.\textsuperscript{40} The allies placed different importance upon military capabilities, and this transatlantic inequality would have serious repercussions for future multilateral military operations and the role that NATO would play in them. This disparity of focus would lay the foundations for future discord with the Alliance and the creation of divergent security strategies between the major transatlantic security actors.

While the burden sharing was unequal during the air campaign, the Allies were successful in achieving a unity of purpose within NATO. The decision by the NATO members to use force for a purpose other than collective defense without an explicit UN Security Council authorization was not only exceptional, but set a precedent for further out-of-area interventions by the Allies. An intervention in support of collective security without a major power or supranational institutional endorsement signified that the member nations of NATO were convinced of the justness and necessity of their actions, and were willing to assume the additional political and strategic risks in doing so. The decision by the Allies to use force without explicit UN Security Council approval was consistent with their insistence since 1949 that the Alliance is not a regional arrangement or agency in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; defining the Alliance in these terms might be seen as subordinating it to the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{41} In the end, by claiming that its intervention was necessary to halt human rights atrocities perpetrated

\textsuperscript{40} Adams, 8.
against the Kosovar Albanians by Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, NATO effectively declared that the rights of the Kosovar Albanians took precedence over those of a rights-abusive, non-democratic state. The UN granted a left-handed affirmation through Secretary General Kofi Annan’s disapproval of NATO’s decision to act without Security Council authorization while agreeing that the intervention was necessary, and paid deference to the notion that state sovereignty is contingent upon respect for human rights. Though successful, the difficulties of utilizing a multilateral command structure within an alliance of unequal contributors while trying to achieve supranational legitimacy would prove to have later repercussions for NATO and the transatlantic relationship in executing future out-of-area operations.

3. Operational Limitations and a Disparity of Focus and Purpose in NATO

The strategic concerns of each member nation, at times, ran at cross purposes with not only the strategic concept of NATO, but with the strategy of the campaigns, especially in the Kosovo air war. The format of “Campaigns by Consensus” proved exceedingly cumbersome for NATO’s operational commanders and for United States Combatant Commanders. Initially, alliance members desired equal consideration, consultation, and inclusion in strategic objectives despite unequal contributions and capabilities. Furthermore, the NATO institution did not lend itself to rapid decision-making and adaptation to crisis management. While more effective and mission oriented than the prior United Nations’ missions in the Balkans, NATO’s Operational Headquarters had difficulty in establishing unity of command and responding with unity of purpose in combat operations. Member concerns over casualties and the violation of a sovereign nation’s territorial boundaries resulted in severe restrictions placed upon the employment of military combat capabilities and towards accomplishing strategic goals.

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Such was the appeal to the press to publish that the Kosovo air-war was a “war by committee”; many argued that maintaining the coalition took priority over the efficient conduct of the war.43

The emphasis upon consensus and cohesion also demonstrated the European preference for utilizing international organizations in order to legitimize interventions and violating a nation’s sovereignty. Most of the Allies maintain that a UN resolution is still a requisite step, whenever possible, for military action by NATO. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty’s reliance on the consensus method of decision-making further bound the institution to developing a multilateral strategy in military operations. During the Balkans conflicts, the United States’ administration became increasingly frustrated not only with the lack of European leadership, but with the cumbersome and lengthy decision making procedures of the alliance that frequently hamstrung operational planning in a campaign dependent upon American military capabilities and technology. Whereas the European allies carried out only 40 per cent of the air strikes, the latent crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air, political negotiations were necessary to obtain approval for most (807 out of 976) of the sorties carried out against targets in addition to those initially planned.44

But with the resolution of combat operations in the Balkans, NATO demonstrated itself especially adept at prolonged support and stability operations and maintaining the peace in the former Yugoslav republics. These long-term peacekeeping missions coincided with the European view of preventive engagement and a preference for a civic action or police role for their military forces. Also, these missions highlighted European strengths in the greater development of “civilian power”- pre-and post-conflict management, peacekeeping, mediation, monitoring, and foreign assistance.45

preference for “soft power” led credence to the argument that Europeans should concentrate on providing support, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in the post-combat phase of military interventions. This role provided a potential alternative to trying to match the US as a global super power, and developing an independent expeditionary capability, as well as an expeditionary security strategy, for their regional military forces.

This role also worked well with the limited capabilities of the majority of NATO members who wished to participate but lacked the technology or the military wherewithal to do so effectively in a high-tech air campaign. Yet an emphasis upon post conflict peacekeeping ignored the greater requirements of the alliance to be able to conduct prolonged military operations and combat deployments in order to address security threats “out of area”. Through the Balkans campaigns, a minority of the members had provided the majority of the capabilities of which the primary contributor was the United States. This dependency on the United States’ capability was in keeping with the cold war strategy of European dependence upon American military capabilities. With the end of the cold war, this strategy’s relevance came into question as Europe depended upon the military means of the United States to establish the peace within their borders. A strategy was developing that envisioned the Americans as “kicking in the door”, while the Europeans “cleaned up the mess”. This could not continue if Europe was to remain a credible and influential actor in the international community. If America was unwilling or unable to commit the preponderance of forces necessary to conduct NATO military operations, Europe would be vulnerable or irrelevant in times of prolonged US military operations elsewhere.

D. NATO’S FALSE SECURITY: A VULNERABLE DEPENDENCY

Shared democratic values have always been fundamental to NATO’s conception of itself, but constructing a liberal security order on a continent-wide scale requires that NATO not simply defend, but actually promote, its values outside NATO territory.46 NATO’s new mission was no longer to defend an existing order but to construct a new

one, grounded on democratic values and encompassing areas outside NATO’s traditional sphere of defense.\textsuperscript{47} NATO evolved from a passive, reactive defense organization into one that actively builds security. In order to accomplish this, NATO needed to transform into an organization with the means, methods and capabilities to establish, promote and maintain these central values and practices.

NATO was further promoting the development of European military capabilities through the continued support of ESDP. The EU, realizing the requirement for an expeditionary focus and the capabilities to do so, proposed the military component of ESDP in the Helsinki (Dec 1999) and Nice (Feb 2001) European Councils. First, Helsinki established the 'headline goal', that is, the Union's capacity to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year, a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) up to 60 000 persons.\textsuperscript{48} The EU partners underscored the European commitment to ‘develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport’, and welcomed decisions some members had already made to coordinate early warning systems, open joint headquarters, reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing forces and prepare for a joint European air transport command.\textsuperscript{49} Second, new military structures were introduced at Nice, the most important being the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of international developments; helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreed policies. Composed principally of national representatives, it is the lynchpin of crisis management activities.\textsuperscript{50}

NATO and European security and defense transformation was continuing in concept and design, but the investment in modernization of military capabilities was still not forthcoming. By the beginning of 2001, no European Allied member nation, with the


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
exception of the United Kingdom, had proposed any real defense spending increase. While the United States continued to develop and implement sophisticated military technologies and integrated control systems (referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA), reluctance to transform Cold War military models in Europe continued. In part, there was doctrinal resistance and a deep-seated opposition within European democracies to the use of force in foreign policy to stop even flagrant violations of the most basic values and human rights, as Europeans had demonstrated in both Bosnia and Kososvo. Economic realities were also considerations as France and Germany, both squeezed by non-defense needs and political focus upon the growing European Union expansion continued a decline in defense procurement and research spending. Furthermore, the lack of large, system-integrating defense contractors in Europe, combined with low defense R&D investment, and a lack of defense R&D coordination among the Europeans had furthered the transatlantic gap in the RMA. By 1998, the combined R&D spending by the European NATO allies (90 percent of which was accounted for by Britain, France and Germany) was $9.7 billion dollars, as compared to $35.9 billion for the United States over the same period. Europe, falsely secure in the dependence upon superior US military capabilities in the event of unlikely hostilities, were still making choices that would regulate them as irreverent military actors and would question the validity of continued US support for the alliance.

E. CONCLUSION

The international community was immediately plunged into a new reality of the fragility of its security and the growing capabilities of heretofore-insignificant terrorist organizations with the climactic events of September 11, 2001, and the terrorist/WMD attacks within the United States. The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda upon the United States on September 11, 2001 would also highlight the fragile state of the NATO Alliance. With a strong foundation on principle values and goals, NATO was vulnerable to different interpretations of the importance of security threats and the means and methods best to deal with them. Furthermore, the technological and capability imbalance

51 Gnesotto, 45.
52 Adams, 12.
promoted the development of unilateralist foreign policy options within the strongest and heretofore most crucial member of the Alliance. Europe simply did not have the military capabilities necessary to execute either the requirements of NATO’s out-of-area strategy, or the provisions of the Petersberg Tasks in ESDI. American military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and others in the US-led War on Terror would bring into question the strength of the Alliance, the role that it would play in international security, and the future of the transatlantic Alliance.
III. NATO 2001 – 2002: AN UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL - COLLECTIVE SECURITY VS. UNILATERALISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH

With the United States having developed a unique 21st-century military, NATO is an alliance that, having lost an (evil) empire, is in search of a role.

Charles Krauthammer, 22 November 2002

A. INTRODUCTION

The immediate post-Cold War period presented NATO with a security threat that most of Europe was woefully unprepared for owing to a lack of political commitment, inadequate military capabilities and an unwillingness to invest in the defense spending required to adapt new technologies and doctrine necessary to influence security out-of-area. The magnitude of these challenges was first demonstrated by the wars and the subsequent NATO interventions in the former Yugoslavia. These security challenges would take a new precedence in the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship after the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001.

Initially, the international community demonstrated overwhelming support and consensus condemning these attacks and supporting the military response by the United States against the organizations that committed these acts and the governments that harbor and provide for them. NATO, and in effect, the European Union, had presented the United States the combined, consolidated diplomatic efforts of their security institutions, and offered the military capabilities of the collective member nations of Europe for whatever services were required. In addition, the attacks had encouraged both institutions to reinvigorate their efforts to create a viable expeditionary capacity for the security of Europe, demonstrating a marked improvement and focus towards the modernization and “transformation” programs of their collective military capabilities.

In the wake of the United States response to the terrorist attacks, the Bush administration would implement a new unilateralist security strategy and a period of

profound change with their foreign policy and in international relations with the Allied nations of Europe. When presented with the means to conduct a multinational response to the terrorist attacks by the international community, the United States chose rather to respond alone, for all practical purposes leaving NATO to participate in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in a supporting, stabilizing capacity. While this alternative of the U.S. “opting out” was not unexpected, nor unprecedented, the resulting interventionist, unilateralist security strategy and the “Cowboy Diplomacy” of the “Bush Doctrine” would precipitate a transatlantic rift within NATO as the U.S. prepared to apply these methods to achieve a “regime change” under less definitive circumstances in Southwest Asia.

B. NATO INTERVENES: AN “OUT-OF AREA” RESPONSE UNDER ARTICLE 5

On September 11th, NATO stood at the threshold of another era of “tectonic shifts” in international politics, equal to the end of the Cold War and the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of World War Two. The new destructive potential from transnational terrorist organizations, identified in the 1999 Washington Summit, manifested in the appalling terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. The paradigm of national security and defense strategy and doctrine was irrevocably altered. “In the space of an hour, our world was transformed”, as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated in reference to these events, “They brought home the futility of security concepts that focus on amassing tanks at one's borders.” The threat to NATO had come not against their borders, but through them. The post-Cold War potential for NATO to respond as a security actor would be tested, as all the long established alliances and venerable institutions would be tested, as a result of these events.

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56 Rice, “The Coalition”.
1. September 11\textsuperscript{th} and the Invocation of Article 5

On September 12\textsuperscript{th}, when the North Atlantic Council met in response to this unprecedented event in the history of the Alliance, the result was the invocation of Article 5. For the first time, NATO had invoked the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty, which was the foundation of the Alliance’s defense strategy during the Cold War. Ironically, Article 5 would be invoked in support of the Alliance’s most powerful and bedrock member: the United States. A statement was issued by the North Atlantic Council following the terrorist attacks that promised, “the United States’ NATO Allies stand ready to provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of barbarism.”\textsuperscript{57}

As a result of the invocation of Article 5, the member nations of NATO had thus pledged to respond “out-of-area” in order to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor could trigger NATO’s collective self-defense commitment, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.\textsuperscript{58} The attack against the United States was not a war of conquest and territorial acquisition, but an assault by an extremist, trans-national organization against the common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as espoused in the Washington Treaty of 1949. President Bush further emphasized the ideological aspects of these attacks in a speech to the nation on the evening of September 11\textsuperscript{th} when he stated, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”\textsuperscript{59}

The response to the immediate threat of terrorism called for increased collective measures, consensus and cooperation. “Far more than Kosovo or Bosnia,” stated Lord Robertson, “the attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th} brought home the lessons of our interdependence.”\textsuperscript{60} The NATO Alliance, as well as the world, had not only united in


\textsuperscript{58} Transatlantic Transformations, 31.


\textsuperscript{60} Robertson, “\textit{A New Quality in the NATO-Russia Relationship}”.
condemnation of the attacks, but had pledged the political, diplomatic, and in the case of NATO, existing military capabilities of Europe for use in response. But the lessons and frustrations of multilateral operations utilizing established institutions such as NATO during conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the lack of significant European military capabilities to contribute to multinational efforts, would be evident not only in the response to the attacks, but in the developing National Security Strategy and the emerging unilateralist doctrine of the United States.


The military operation to topple the Taliban regime, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), would not be a major multinational effort, but a U.S.-led war which included a very few select coalition partners. The campaign would be waged utilizing the high tech military capabilities that were the predominant specialty and possession of the United States. This capacity, plus the overwhelming support of the international community in the wake of the terrorist attacks, precipitated an operation dominated by the advanced weaponry and expeditionary doctrine of the United States military. These superior capabilities, as well as the threat analysis, determinations, personal ethics and ideological beliefs of the Bush administration, were the military and political reasons that America decided not to ask for NATO assistance in the campaign. Only the United States had the proper equipment to project military forces halfway around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 Allies that could not make unique and/or significant contributions to the operation.61 On September 20th, 2001, President Bush had addressed a special joint session of Congress with the tenets of what was to become known as the “Bush Doctrine”, stating, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”62

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The military forces of most of the European members of NATO still adhered to the Cold War model of large, non-deployable force structures that were intended for use within their contiguous borders. This was the case despite the fact learned in the Balkans that to be effective, an engagement must be backed by force.\textsuperscript{63} The majority of the Alliance did not have the expeditionary capabilities or the interoperable communications or command structures to provide support to the U.S. campaign. Of the European Allies, only Britain had the capacity to provide support that could interoperate with U.S. capabilities, though Canada, Germany and France (in addition to Australia) promised military forces and support to the U.S. as the operation unfolded.\textsuperscript{64}

On October 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, time had run out for the Taliban government to surrender the al-Qaeda terrorists to the United States and to close down the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan as demanded by President Bush.\textsuperscript{65} The unique characteristic of the military campaign to topple the Taliban would be the asymmetric application of U.S. power. Operation Enduring Freedom consisted primarily of U.S. air strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces.\textsuperscript{66} These U.S. forces would provide the liaison, coordination and support necessary for the Afghan militia forces of the Northern Alliance to utilize the high-tech supporting arms and precision guided munitions that would rapidly topple the Taliban government. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan in December 2001 to pressure the Taliban around Kandahar at the height of the fighting, but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers.\textsuperscript{67} Most of the fighting was between Taliban units and Afghan opposition militiamen.

\textsuperscript{63} Gnesotto, 12.
\textsuperscript{64} Singer, 144.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
While providing the diplomatic unity and consensus necessary for a multilateral operation, the lack of capabilities of NATO’s member nations had eliminated the Alliance from participating as an institution of crisis response and conflict prevention. Instead, NATO’s mission would be one of post-conflict support, stability operations, and humanitarian reconstruction in the wake of U.S. combat. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would deploy under UN Mandate to Afghanistan in January 2002. Under the command of NATO members and involving 19 NATO Allies, ISAF’s mission was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in creating a stable and secure environment in Kabul and its vicinity.68 Major U.S combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban until May 1, 2003 when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan President Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended.69 On 11 August 2003, NATO took over command, coordination and planning responsibilities for the ISAF mission. NATO, in effect, had been relegated to a supporting role in the United States’ Foreign Policy. The impetus of the developing interventionism and the security ideology of the administration in the aftermath of the Afghanistan campaign would manifest in the publication of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and the application of its tenets in the War on Terrorism.

Unfortunately, this supporting role would not validate NATO’s existence to proponents of a U.S. unilateralist foreign policy. “When the United States destroyed the Taliban using a handful of men and precision-guided munitions in a wholly new kind of war,” stated Charles Krauthammer, “it demonstrated a military capability so qualitatively superior to that of the Allies that NATO instantly became obsolete.”70 Even proponents of U.S. decline, such as Paul Kennedy, wrote after the Afghan war: “The larger lesson…is that in military terms, there is only one player on the field that counts.”71

68 NATO’s Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism, NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism, NATO On-line Library, 2 http://www.nato.int/terrorism/ accessed 22 April, 2005.
69 CRS, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, 10.
70 Krauthammer, The Bold Road to NATO Expansion.
of the U.S. campaign to topple the Taliban appeared to have serious repercussions for the role of NATO’s in out-of-area missions, as well as for the future of the Alliance itself.

Though in reality, NATO was not completely idle after the September 11th attacks nor during in the developing War on Terror. During this time, NATO had facilitated the requests of the United States for intelligence sharing and permissive over-flight rights for U.S. and Allied aircraft conducting missions in the campaign against terrorism. In October 2001, the Alliance began Operation Active Endeavour, in which NATO’s Standing Naval Forces conducted naval patrols and monitored and escorted civilian shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Eastern Mediterranean.72 Also, in October 2001, 13 NATO member nations provided additional Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft that were sent to help protect the United States.73 Furthermore, the Alliance had extended its support to the United States after September 11th, and once again at the start of OEF, fulfilling its requirements of the Washington Treaty to, “…assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary.” And while the overthrow of the Taliban required only a small number of U.S. troops initially, sustained support and stability operations in Afghanistan have required a substantially higher amount of troops. At present, more than 8,500 troops from 36 contributing nations involved in ISAF are under NATO command.74 This is in addition to the 18,000 U.S. troops that conduct post-war stabilization efforts as well as continued OEF combat operations in Afghanistan under separate command from NATO.75

The scope, scale and nature of the extended post-conflict reconstruction mission in Afghanistan have suited the ethos of European military engagements, with its emphasis upon long–term engagement and post-conflict support. Also, the Allies have been able to support the requirements of this type of mission even with the limited

73 Ibid.
technical capabilities of majority of their military forces. Providing security and police patrols, operating Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Kabul and the immediate vicinity, as well as coordinating numerous civil-military and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) missions has provided and improved basic human needs and rebuilding of existing infrastructures such as hospitals, schools and utility services.\(^{76}\) NATO was demonstrating a strong record of successful conflict resolution and prevention in “out-of-area” missions, even if the preference for the application of “Soft Power” did lack a certain “aggressiveness” that was an increasing characteristic of American National Security Policy in the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict. While NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism had already been significant, further efforts were undertaken to increase the military capabilities of Europe, as well as improving the crisis response and expeditionary potential of the Alliance.

C. EUROPE’S COMMITMENT TO EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

The vulnerability of the United States had demonstrated to Europe the fragility of their security. As the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo had confirmed, diplomatic measures could be insufficient by themselves, without the enforcement mechanism of punitive military action when faced with non-compliant organizations and institutions. The September 11\(^{th}\) attacks further emphasized the necessity for increased efforts towards modernizing Europe’s military capabilities. In order to maintain any influence as a security actor, a collective Europe would have to have the means to enforce policy by the use of force, when necessary, and ideally, as a last resort when all other measures had been exhausted.

1. The NATO Prague Summit, the Prague Capabilities Commitment and NATO Transformation (2002 - 2003)

Billed as the “NATO Transformation Summit”, the November 2002 Summit in Prague ended with the adoption of far-reaching decisions on the Alliance’s future roles and tasks.\(^{77}\) The package of measures adopted by the Alliance were aimed at ensuring that NATO would have the tools needed to meet the new threats and unique challenges of

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\(^{76}\) ISAF Structure, 1.

the post-Cold War security environment, especially those prominent in the War on Terrorism. These provisions established the means and requirements of NATO to better carry out the full range of its missions and to respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WND) and their means of delivery.\footnote{North Atlantic Council, Heads of State and Government, “Prague Summit Declaration,” (2002) 127, Prague, 21 November, 2002, par. 3 \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm} accessed 23 April 2005.} In order to carry out these missions, NATO determined it must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.\footnote{Ibid., Par. 4.} The means that NATO would use to accomplish these missions were established in the Prague Summit, and were encompassed in 4 major transformation initiatives.

The first of these initiatives was the establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force that includes land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly wherever needed, and form the essential element of NATO’s transformation agenda. The NRF is designed to carry out certain missions on its own or serve as part of a larger force to contribute to the full range of Alliance military operations, sustain itself for one month, or longer if resupplied.\footnote{The NATO Response Force: At the center of NATO Transformation, NATO Topics, NATO On-Line Library, \url{http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html} accessed 23 April, 2005.} The missions and tasks that the NRF are likely to concentrate on are those requiring the ability to react with the most capable forces in a very short time. These missions could involve deployment as a stand-alone force for collective defense missions under Article 5, such as show of force and solidarity to deter aggression, or as non-Article 5 “out-of-area” missions involving crisis management or stabilization operations. At full operational capability the NRF would contain 21,000 troops and initially proposed to be fully operational by October 2006.\footnote{Ibid.} These personnel would be assigned from the standing formations and existing units of the military forces of
NATO’s member nations, and would not constitute a permanent NATO “army”. The NRF would also be the key catalyst for focusing on and promoting improvements of Alliance military capabilities, in very close relationship with the second transformation initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

The “Prague Capabilities Commitment” scaled down to 8 the some 58 areas for upgrading and procurement of the 1999 Washington Summit Defense Capability Initiative (DCI). This program reduction was in recognition of the limited resources of most of the member nations’ defense budgets, and would set more obtainable goals for the Alliance members to shorten the capabilities gaps, as well as in the immediacy of the threat of terrorism and the environments that promote it, towards NATO. Also of note was the firm and specific commitment of individual Allies to improve their individual capabilities that would promote and support not only collective defensive measures, but sustained expeditionary missions as well. While identifying capability gaps within the Alliance, the PCC proposed that these shortfalls could be addressed through multinational efforts, role specialization and reprioritization, if the subsequent financial and parliamentary approval could be obtained. The multinational reinforcement, development and support aspects of the PCC would speed up NATO’s ability to obtain the means to effectively execute non-Article 5 and crisis response missions.

The Third transformation initiative was the streamlining of NATO military command arrangements. Recognizing the difficulties and frustrations of Alliance operations in the Balkans campaigns, NATO’s military command structure was to be streamlined into a leaner, more efficient and deployable command structure based upon agreed minimum military requirements among the Allies. This restructuring would facilitate meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions, but in particular, for non-Article 5, “out-of-area” and crisis response missions, which require a rapid response and an expeditionary capability.

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The new command structure would contain two strategic commands more focused towards expeditionary crisis response operations, one operational, and one functional. The functional command would facilitate transformation of military capabilities and the promotion of interoperability of Alliance forces. Two Joint Force Commands would support the strategic command for operations, able to generate a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a more limited standing joint headquarters from which a sea-based CJTF headquarters can be drawn.\textsuperscript{84} There would also be land, sea and air components within the CJTFs, giving these units the full spectrum of military capabilities.

The final initiative involved developing defenses against the new threats of terrorism, WMD and cyber attacks. Included in these initiatives were specific endorsements of Alliance defense capabilities against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as a feasibility study of a missile defense system. This initiative is more focused and applicable towards Article 5 collective self-defense, though methods developed could be utilized in security and force protection measure for deployed units “out-of-area”.

With prompting from both the United States and the European Union, NATO was adopting a serious effort to obtain the concepts and capabilities necessary to execute “out-of-area” missions. While an impressive amount of promise could be visualized by adopting innovative measures and commitments towards increasing military capabilities, NATO, as an institution, had to be utilized by its members in an expeditionary capacity during crisis response in order to achieve its full potential as a security institution. By not having the capability or the expertise to implement the Article 5 defense guarantee, the Alliance had been threatened with irrelevance when the U.S. “opted out” of the mutual defense assurance promise and was pursuing a unilateralist security strategy. If the United States did not see the merits of utilizing the institution for security and crisis response, The more powerful European members of NATO would be tempted to pursue their individual security interests rather than the collective defense of the Alliance.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Prague Summit Declaration}, par. 4b.
NATO would be underutilized and relegated to the margins by policy makers in the same manner as the 55-member nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  


Europe continued in their efforts to assume more of their share of the security burden required within the continent. The EU had previously set up political and military decision-making structures for European expeditionary operations in pursuit of the “Petersberg Tasks”; humanitarian and rescue work, peacekeeping and peacemaking, as well as the fielding of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops by 2003. While viewed optimistically by some as a possible alternative or replacement for NATO, realists within the EU had a more pragmatic view of this aspect of the CFSP. “Neither development would be desirable in my view,” stated EU External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten on March 2001, “More to the point, neither is remotely realistic in the foreseeable future.” Far from wanting to encourage a gradual American disengagement from Europe, the EU was striving to maintain U.S. involvement in European security, and the most efficient means to do so was through NATO. The risk to NATO, to the transatlantic link and to the Euro-American relationship, would not stem from what Europe is building, but from what Europe is not doing.

The EU continued progress towards assuming greater security responsibilities by planning its first out-of-area military missions, proposing to assume control of the post-conflict support and stability operations in the Balkans from NATO. The Copenhagen European Council of 2002 had defined a developing independent EU military identity, and in the provisions of the council, the European Union stated its willingness to take over military operations in Bosnia from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) as well as

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87 Ibid.
NATO operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). A fundamental principle agreed between NATO and EU officials was that any EU mission would be administered under the “Berlin Plus” agreement. The “Berlin Plus” agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, based upon conclusions of the Washington Summit, that was formalized in a “Framework Agreement” on 17 March 03. The Berlin Plus agreement formalized the framework on the institutional and operational links between NATO and the EU that would grant the EU access to NATO planning and assets for operations in which NATO is not engaged. Once the Berlin Plus agreements were finalized in March 2003, the EU took over from NATO in the FYROM. The EU operation in the FYROM, Operation Concordia, was the first test case of the Berlin Plus Agreements, a small and limited mission of 350 troops that provided liaison and monitoring operations as well as providing advice on security and defense to Macedonian officials.

EU officials had viewed the initiative to lead a follow-on peacekeeping force in Bosnia as an outgrowth of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as an extension of the EU’s preference for long-term engagement and conflict prevention as an applicable strategy in the Western Balkans. By assuming these duties in Bosnia, the EU could further develop ESDP on an operational level as well as complement a broader EU integration strategy for Bosnia as it aspired to eventual EU membership. But NATO would not act immediately upon the EU offer. There were initial beliefs that such a handover was premature due to the EU not being able to field the complete force of 12,000 troops required to take over completely from NATO, as well as the desire for NATO to continue pursuing the apprehension of indicted war criminals and conducting counter terrorism operations in Bosnia. The inability of the EU


to field the full complement force of 12,000 troops had demonstrated that Europe was still a long way from fulfilling the requirements of the Helsinki Headline Goals, fielding the EU’s RRF, and from conducting large scale, sustained expeditionary operations. Due to these considerations, NATO would not achieve a consensus on the concept of a EU follow-on military mission in Bosnia until December 2003. Shortfalls aside, Operation Althea would eventually place stabilization responsibilities for Bosnia under a EU military force and would be described as a successful implementation of the Berlin Plus agreements between NATO and the EU.91

In the wake of September 11th, The EU was promoting multilateral cooperation with the U.S. and NATO, the shifting of the security responsibilities from dependence upon U.S. participation, and sharing the burden of dealing with situations of crisis, instability and conflict prevention on Europe’s periphery by procuring the military capabilities to do so. Meanwhile the U.S. administration was developing a national security strategy that would contrast these efforts and evoke tenets and methods that would present the future of trans-Atlantic relations in general, and the Alliance in specific, and with a greater internal political and security crisis than presented either by the terrorist attacks of September 11th, or the unilateralist response of the United States to the Taliban government in the Afghanistan conflict. As the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 placed increasing emphasis on direct military action over political and diplomatic measures to counter threats in the aftermath of 9/11, the differing ideologies and methods between the United States and the European members of the alliance would become more pronounced, non-cooperative, and at times, confrontational.

D. "COWBOY DIPLOMACY": THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROAD TO IRAQ

American *de facto* dominance of NATO was manifest by the amount that the United States spends on its armed forces annually (about $290 billion in 2002) is more than twice that of the combined military outlays of the European allies ($116 billion). After September 11th, American preeminence in military spending and capabilities encouraged Washington to exploit its might by pursuing an increasingly unilateralist foreign policy in which substantive debate would be viewed with suspicion and labeled as disloyal. “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make,” proclaimed President Bush to the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Now that America was conducting a war, it would seek to take advantage of its military supremacy, and wage that war on its own terms. The United States would follow its own agenda, defining friends and foes by the sole criterion of their stance in the war on terrorism, and a sovereign right to attack and change any regime that harbored terrorists while naming countries in a supposed ‘axis of evil’ that was only remotely, if at all, linked to al-Qaeda. These views would culminate in the publishing of the National Security Strategy of the United States in September 2002 (NSS), and the execution of this doctrine would provoke divisions and divisive reactions within the Alliance between Europe and the United States. Critics of the United States’ interventionist doctrine accused the Bush administration of practicing “Cowboy Diplomacy.”

1. The Ideology of the National Security Strategy

The primary justification for the ideologically based doctrine contained of the NSS is that the United States is in a state of war. “The war against terrorists of global

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92 *The Future of NATO Expansion*, 236.
94 Gnesotto, 29.
reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” 96 This focus provides the impetus, and the rational for the assertive, provocative, and intimidating language of the NSS, which is meant as a clear signal, not only as the strategy of the administration, but as a message of intent to all those in the international community; allies, competitors, and aggressors. The U.S. would now view the world through the prism of the war on terror, and would apply a Manichean view of “Being with us or against us” with regards to obligations to support international institutions. 97 The National Security Strategy of the United States had become ideology; a strategy based upon beliefs, convictions, as well as distinctly U.S. interpretations of the security environment.

The strategic objectives as set forth in the United States’ NSS involve promoting the American ideology of defending, preserving and extending peace and freedom. These objectives will give rise to an international environment based upon democracy and free enterprise, according to the NSS, which will then be the central building blocks for sustained national success and peaceful interstate relations. 98 What give these ideas their particularly American locus are the methods prescribed to implement them. “We can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past…” states the NSS, “…to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively” 99

While espousing values integral to democracies, such as political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and the respect for human dignity, the NSS makes distinctly American interpretations with regards to the threat from terrorism, the state of the international security environment, and the methods used to defend against and defeat them. The U.S. of dealing with the threat is to directly engage the terrorists and the organizations that support. Furthermore, the U.S. will make no distinction between these organizations and the nations, regimes or governments that support them. This focus would place the resources of the U.S. against the individual operators and

97 Gnesotto, 35.
99 Ibid., 15.
terrorist organizations that commit the crimes, rather than the socio-economic environment and conditions that promote terrorism.

An additional prerogative issued in the NSS is the justification of U.S. unilateralism in response to security threats, both real and perceived. A strategic distinction within the NSS is that while stating the benefits, as well as the necessity, for international diplomatic and security institutions such as the NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, the U.S. would not require either their support or legitimacy in order to ensure the defense of America. “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community,” states the NSS, “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively…” 100 This proclamation would be more than justification, it would declare an interventionist mandate that would validate rapid and confrontational foreign policy decisions, even when based upon incomplete and/or faulty intelligence and analysis.

2. **Europe Strong-armed: Between Submission and Resistance**

The NSS concedes that America needs support from allies and friends with regard to intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist financing, as well as the building of coalitions both under NATO’s mandate as well as those based upon a specific mission. While acknowledging the benefits of multinational cooperation, the NSS also highlights the shortfalls in capabilities that of these institutions suffer in providing the necessary security against terrorism and in the post Cold-War world. “NATO must build a capacity to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed,” states the NSS, “to respond to a threat against any member of the Alliance.” 101 Therefore, the NSS uses the capabilities gap as further justification for a unilateralist foreign policy and security strategy in the short term, while publicly calling for further investment by the European nations not only in their own security, but also in expeditionary capabilities, in the long term. This proclamation to Europe also implies that by creating the modern, expeditionary capability, it will further maintain U.S. participation and support towards European security. “If NATO succeeds in enacting

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101 Ibid., 25.
these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{102}

This implicit threat was reinforced with the preference being demonstrated by the U.S. to create mission-based coalitions to respond to specific security threats and in crisis response situations.\textsuperscript{103} NATO now ran the risk of being trivialized without continued U.S. support, and having their authority severely damaged by withholding the military capabilities that the Alliance was dependent upon to provide enforcement of the organizations diplomatic measures. Without America, NATO would be powerless as a security actor for a significant period of time, and perhaps could never regain the legitimacy and acknowledgement necessary for the institution to continue in that capacity.

\textbf{E. CONCLUSION}

The U.S. would continue to utilize the public proclamations of intent, as well as the “carrot and stick” approach to diplomacy with friends, as well as with enemies, prior to, and after the publication of the National Security Strategy in September 2002. While sympathetic to the devastation wrought by the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks, supportive of the U.S. military response with the invasion of Afghanistan, and committing to measures that would led towards assuming more of the security responsibilities and burdens of Europe, America’s principle European Allies were losing patience with the particular brand of “Cowboy Diplomacy” being practiced by the Bush administration, which placed a higher emphasis upon compliancy and obedience than of partnership and cooperation.\textsuperscript{104} “The Bush Administration places a higher value on acting on its own authority, and in particular, on the use of American military force.”\textsuperscript{105} This conviction, backed up by their superior military capabilities, resulted in the U.S. preference for \textit{ad hoc} coalitions that were to be the means of implementing a dominant American interpretation of the security environment and foreign policy views.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{National Security Strategy}, 26.
\textsuperscript{104} Hunter, Robert, E., “Beyond Cowboy Diplomacy”, \textit{Baltimore Sun}, February 21, 2005.
\textsuperscript{105} Gnesotto, 35.
Many European countries would not be able to follow these U.S. perceptions when the focus of the War on Terror would shift from Afghanistan to Iraq. While beholden to America for their immediate expeditionary capabilities, Europe would not compromise with regards to their values, convictions and ideals in providing diplomatic and political support to the growing campaign mounting against the regime of Saddam Hussein, promoted by dubious evidence with regards to the presence of proscribed “WMD”. Faced with the polarizing extremes of blind submission or overt opposition to the “hyper-superpower”, NATO’s Allied nations would be unable to achieve the consensus necessary to support a “Regime Change” in Iraq, even in the face of significant human rights violations by the regime, as well as continued non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions in place since 1991. This stance would promote the most serious rift in the transatlantic Alliance, while providing further impetus towards the creation of an expeditionary “out-of-area” military capability within Europe, and a multilateral security strategy with which to balance the unilateralism of the United States.

Long established alliances and venerable institutions are being tested.

Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, 26 March 2003

A. INTRODUCTION

With the implementation of the ideology defined in the National Security Strategy, and as the stabilization mission in Afghanistan became a more multinational and multilateral effort, the United States shifted the focus of their security strategy and foreign policy towards a more ill-defined objective: achieving a regime change in Iraq. When efforts failed to utilize first the UN, and then later NATO, in order to achieve legitimacy and coalition support for this distinctly American objective, the United States would once again choose to act unilaterally, ignoring international norms for intervention and demonstrating a callus disregard for established multilateral institutions. In forming a “coalition of the willing” a line in the sand would be drawn by which the United States would define their supporters in the War on Terror, as well as a distinction between “old” and “new” Europe.

When the United States achieved their objective six weeks later, the speed and efficiency with which “regime take-down” was executed initially signaled another success for the unparalleled U.S. ability to project their military capabilities, as well as ex post facto validation of American hegemony and the Bush Administration’s unilateralist foreign policy. But the cohesive, sympathetic and generous support of the international community, as well as the mandate of NATO’s Article 5, that were the distinct features of the Afghanistan conflict, would be noticeably absent from the war in Iraq. NATO’s future as an expeditionary crisis response mechanism would suffer collateral damage from U.S. foreign policy in Iraq as well, as a trend was developing regulating the
institution’s role towards only post-conflict stabilization responsibilities, being critically referred to as “just one tool in the American tool box to face crises.”

Initially comprised of a coalition of fifty nations, the participating nations would bear increasing domestic criticism and skepticism in the international community for being pawns in a mission that was for all practical purposes a U.S. operation with a weak, ill-defined mandate. This criticism, along with a growing level of insurgency, violence, terrorism and intimidation against coalition occupation forces and the Iraqi people, would lead some of the contributing nations to withdraw their forces from the coalition and for other participants to question their further support of the mission. The weakening coalition, and the growing insurgency would also damage U.S. international prestige and legitimacy and would place a considerable and prolonged draw upon the instrumental U.S. expeditionary capability that was the lynchpin in the execution of the “Wolfowitz Doctrine”.

Because the U.S. disregarded international, transatlantic and European security institutions, significant powers of Europe did not support the intervention, and also would hesitate or withhold support to U.S. stabilization and security operations in Iraq. A Franco-German resistance would attempt to coalesce political and diplomatic opposition against ideological intimidation by the Bush administration, as well as U.S. efforts to trivialize the EU’s role as a security actor. Unfortunately, the result of this resistance movement would be a polarized continent, as the European nations aligned either in support of, or in opposition to, U.S. foreign policy. Not only would the opposition to U.S. foreign policy be divisive for Europe, but also it would prevent them from achieving

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107 Rice, Condoleeza, “The Coalition.”
the institutional consensus necessary to adopt the measures needed to continue the
development of ESDP with the EU, and to progress towards a security role
commensurate with the institutions commercial and diplomatic influence in the
international community.

Out of the discord, renewed efforts towards European, transcontinental and
supranational communication and cooperation would result. The United States would
request a larger role in post-conflict Iraq from the United Nations, a role that the
institution would continue despite a tragic bombing of the U.N. mission’s headquarters in
Baghdad. NATO would become involved in post-conflict stabilization efforts in Iraq as
well. In response to a request from the new interim Iraqi government, NATO would once
again execute an out-of-area mission, after a rapport (of sorts) was achieved within the
Alliance.110

The EU would also continue to refine their efforts to promote the transformation
of their military force and accompanying doctrine in order to achieve a modern
expeditionary potential for the institution, and to define their security strategy. The
results of these efforts would be a distinctly European Security Strategy being adopted by
the EU, and the execution of the institution’s first truly “out-of-area” expeditionary
military mission completely independent from NATO and U.S. oversight.111

Furthermore, these distinctions would highlight an increasing capacity for autonomous
military action by the European Union.

B. IDEOLOGY BECOMES FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. had rebounded with a new focus and vigor
towards an interventionist security strategy and foreign policy based upon the exceptional
expeditionary military capabilities of their armed forces. The United States had been
granted overwhelming consensus and support by the international community towards

110 Iraqi government requests assistance from NATO, NATO, NATO Update, 22 June 2004,

111 First Part of the forty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Activities of the
Council, (for the period of 1 January to 30 June 2003), Document A/1833, Interparliamentary European
Security and Defense Assembly, Assembly of the Western European Union, 6 October 2003,
retaliatory military operations against terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime that supported them. During the conduct of this campaign, the United States had applied a unique, asymmetrical strategy utilizing both high-tech and specialized military capabilities that had rapidly achieved both operational and strategic objectives with minimal involvement of, and risk to, ground forces. Upon completion of “major” combat operations, the U.S. had cooperated with the Alliance in order to coordinate the major involvement of a sustained multinational post-conflict stabilization mission through the auspices of NATO. When command of the post-conflict mission passed to NATO, the hand-over of the continuing multilateral stability mission would represent a here-to-fore unprecedented level of transatlantic operational consensus and cooperation, as well as facilitating the execution of U.S.-led “continuing” security operations missions.

This exceptional level of multinational cooperation was not to last. The publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, in which the White House explicitly emphasized its right of pre-emptive action, was received with great reservations in many countries and raised concerns in numerous European capitals and among European Public opinion.112 Furthermore, the Bush administration began asserting direct links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, instilling a popular belief that somehow Saddam Hussein had been involved in the attacks on September 11, 2001. While both had America as an enemy, any overt collaboration between the regime and the terrorist organization could not be proven. That, and the fact that al-Qaeda and the Regime of Saddam Hussein espoused different ideologies (The establishment of a religious Islamic caliphate by al Qaeda vs. a secular, socialist, pan-Arab society espoused by Hussein’s Baathism) were conveniently ignored as the administration began forming a coalition to conduct the next campaign in America’s War on Terror: effecting a “regime change” in Iraq.113


1. The “Wolfowitz Doctrine”

Saddam Hussein’s evasion and blocking of the UN inspection teams verifying compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 that declared the cease-fire in and required removing Iraqi inventories of WMD from the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War would provide the rationale for the regime change. A growing neo-conservative ideology of “pushing change” in the region, advocated in the so-called “Wolfowitz Doctrine” of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz was demonstrating a profound influence within the Bush administration. Under the previous U.S. administration of President Clinton, in a letter addressed to the president, and including signatures by both Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, the authors had stated that the only acceptable strategy with regards to Iraq, “Is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction…In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power…That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.”

Removing Saddam Hussein from power would allow for the implementation of the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” that advocated a creation of a free, stable and democratic Iraq that would serve as a model to the neighboring Arabic countries. This model would then ideally inspire a subsequent spread of democratic changes and movements across the region. Specifically, Wolfowitz would emphasize that the power of the democratic idea, once established (installed) in the region, would have a profound effect in a part of the world known for its authoritarian regimes. This advocacy and its subsequent execution would set the stage for a clash of cultures and a political confrontation within NATO that would center this time not over a capabilities gap, but over strategic policy goals and the methods used to achieve them. In disagreement over the methods as to how

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best achieve and promote international security, as the Allies would align, and thus be defined, in terms of their support or opposition of U.S. foreign policy goals.

2. A Clash of Cultures

The Neo-conservatives of the Bush administration was not embraced within Europe, as neither was the active installation of democracies through intervention or the preemptive doctrine of the NSS. Having endured a century’s worth of ideological authoritarianism, totalitarianism and/or imperialism implemented from militarism, fascism and communism over the last century, having suffered the consequences or effects of prolonged wars and conflicts, and having removed the dominating specter of the Soviet Union from the borders or as occupiers, Europe as a whole believed that they had finally achieved a strong measure of peace, security and multinational cooperation. “For Europeans, the removal of the Soviet threat brought a new sense of security”, stated Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, “As our borders became secure we cashed in our peace dividend… By contrast, 9/11 has shattered your century-old feeling of security through geography.”

Though sharing common democratic values, and a belief in the security that democracy establishes through the world, the United States and Europe were at odds as how to best achieve this goal. The advocacy of installing democracy through outside force was not in accordance with the European preference of promoting the conditions and establishing the environments from which democratic institutions might emerge. In light of the events of the last century, and especially present in their dealing with the Balkans intervention, Europe was decidedly hesitant to resort to military force to achieve foreign policy goals, preferring the application of “soft power” and long-term “preventive” engagement. The application of “hard power”, military force and an interventionist “preemptive” engagement policy, such as advocated by the NSS, represented to Europeans the failure of diplomacy and foreign policy, not its continuance by other means, and was decidedly not the implied or preferred method such as the Clauswitzian tenets of the NSS proclaimed. Further, while the U.S. had the means to

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project their power and influence, Europe did not, as the necessary measures to fully implement the ESDP in the EU, and to adopt an expeditionary military capability, were still in their infancy. Therefore, in order to project an influence, Europe still had to utilize those means available, or rely upon the cooperation and capabilities of the United States through NATO.


A further preference for military intervention by Europe was to do so under a UN mandate, especially with regards to out-of-area missions. The conduct of expeditionary operations that proposed violation of sovereign territory was a sensitive issue in Europe due to the reference of its exploitive colonial past. While the regime of Saddam Hussein was clearly not cooperating with the inspection provisions of UNSC Resolution 687, there was no clear and irrefutable proof that Iraq possessed or that it was manufacturing WMD. Therefore, at the behest of the European allies, President Bush secured UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002, which would hold Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, affording Iraq a “final opportunity to comply” with its disarmament obligations, while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991).118

When the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441, the transatlantic rift began in earnest as the United States and an opposing coalition headed by France and Germany interpreted the resolution to their own self interests. The Bush administration took quite literally the word “final”; for though acknowledging that there were no automatic triggers for a military response in the resolution, the resolution did not prevent a nation, or coalition of nations from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.119 “Americans would continue to seek security in a threatening world” stated Carl Bildt,


“through asserting what they consider their sovereign right of self-defense.”120 American predetermined foreign policy goals would be further frustrated when Iraq agreed to once again permit the UN inspection teams to proceed.

C. REGIME CHANGE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE: INEFFECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, A DIVIDED EUROPE, AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT

France and Germany, supported by China and other members of the UN Security Council, were taking the view that inspections be allowed to continue in order to establish whether Saddam Hussein had disarmed or not. French President Jaques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated that they were not convinced that a war with Iraq was necessary while UN arms inspectors were still searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.121 This diplomatic opposition led U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to dismiss French and German insistence that everything must be done to avoid war with Iraq, saying that most European Countries stand with the United States in its campaign against Saddam Hussein. “Germany and France represent ‘old Europe’, stated Rumsfeld, “and NATO’s expansion in recent years means ‘the center of gravity is shifting to the East.’”122 Europe was now split between “Old” and “New”, as France and Germany would attempt to align opposition to U.S. foreign policy, while Washington gathered allies from the periphery of the continent and within nations that had formerly comprised the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Against the Franco-German “Maginot Line” of diplomatic intransigence, the Bush administration would launch an “Ideological Blitzkrieg”, resulting in a callus disregard for any institutional legitimacy that the U.N. possessed as a security actor, as well as significant collateral damage to the working relationship of the Allies within NATO. As the U.S. and the opposition aligned their supporters the stage would be set for transatlantic discord and its spillover in Europe.

120 Bildt, Carl, in One Year On: Lessons from Iraq, 24.
122 Ibid.
1. The United States Disregards the Security Council

Unconvinced that Saddam Hussein was cooperating fully with UN inspections, and increasingly frustrated with diplomatic delays by multinational negotiations, the United States proceeded with their predetermined goals. When the Bush administration tried to secure a second UN Security Council Resolution authorizing force against Iraq, the U.S. policy was threatened with a French veto in the Security Council. While their ally Britain pursued the second resolution, the U.S. discovered that the geographic composition of the Security Council favored the opposition, as the measure could not even obtain a majority of the council members. Therefore, the U.S. would not be able to claim any sort of moral authority as a mandate for military action.123 Faced with this multilateral opposition, the second resolution measure was withdrawn and U.S. would chose to act upon the existing resolutions, in effect disregarding the legitimacy of the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council. On 16 March 2003, at the Azores Summit in conjunction with its coalition partners Britain and Spain, President Bush issuing an ultimatum that, “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours, and that their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”124

On 17 March 2003 President Bush stated that, “The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities…so we will rise to ours.”125 Once again, the U.S. would proceed unilaterally, considering the ideology espoused in the NSS superior to the principles and common values espoused by the United Nations Charter or NATO’s Washington Treaty. The United States had rejected the classic international law definition of pre-emption based on imminent danger of an attack by proclaiming the right to ‘anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.126 By proceeding unilaterally on its predetermined goals,

123 Singer, 159.
125 Ibid.
the founding principles of international law were thus considered sorely inadequate by
the world’s greatest military power.\textsuperscript{127}

This position put a tremendous strain not only on the UN’s role in international
security, but on NATO’s as a security actor as well. During NATO’s Prague Summit, the
19 member nations had issued a statement calling on Iraq to, “comply with UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”\textsuperscript{128} While
warning Iraq that they would face severe consequences as a result of their continued
violations of its obligations, NATO as a multilateral institution was committed to
working within the auspices of the UN. When the resistance of France and Germany
within the U.N. stymied efforts to institutionally legitimize U.S. foreign policy goals in
the international community, this subsequently prevented the U.S. from using NATO for
these purposes as well. Correctly interpreting that there was enough resistance inherent
within the NATO Alliance to prevent a consensus, the U.S. once again chose to by-pass
the institution in the execution of expeditionary operations, \textit{albeit} towards a preemptive,
unilateral objective. “Coalitions of the willing” were continuing to be the tool of choice
in order to provide the means of implementing U.S. foreign policy, especially since the
United States military had the capability to support, makeup or overcome technological
or resource shortfalls within the contributing forces of small, but compliant coalition
partners.


Having been trivialized in one supranational institution, France and Germany
would not be cooperative in NATO either, resisting U.S. efforts to utilize the institution
in a strategic and political measure of security for Turkey. As the U.S. proceeded closer
to war with Iraq, the United States tried to gain NATO Article 5 assurances for Turkey in
the event of an attack by Iraq. But by doing so, France, Germany and Belgium insistence
that defensive assistance to Turkey would be tantamount to acknowledgement that war

\textsuperscript{127} Dassu, Marta, in \textit{One Year On: Lessons from Iraq}, 38.

\textsuperscript{128} Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, NATO Press Releases, 21 November 2002,
was necessary and imminent at a time when U.N. inspections were still under way.\textsuperscript{129} With the embarked equipment of the 4\textsuperscript{th} U.S. infantry division (4ID) positioned in the Mediterranean Sea, this contributed to the appearance that that the U.S. was trying to influence Turkey in order to open a second front against Iraq, not deter or defend against an aggressor or an imminent threat to an alliance member.

The self-interests of the member nations were playing havoc with the Alliance’s principle of collective security. “If France or Germany or any other power can block Alliance planning for assistance to a long-standing NATO ally, such as Turkey (and disregard NATO’s Article 5), then an Alliance reaction to a more severe potential threat could prove even more timid.”\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, to ask Turkey to directly challenge Saddam Hussein in this next stage of the war against terrorism would confront the Turkish government with very difficult decisions. The first dilemma would be one of reversing an accelerated trend of normalizing relations with Iraq and recouping some of the enormous economic costs that the continuing embargos against Baghdad were costing the country.\textsuperscript{131} The second would be encouraging stronger recognition of Kurdish elements in Iraq which would have a spillover effect in Turkey.

With these considerations aside, due to the inherent weakness of institutions that require obtaining consensus as opposed to majority approval, the actions of a few nations within NATO were frustrating the intentions of its most powerful member. But this resistance would fail to prevent action by the United States, and would subsequently promote further divisiveness in Europe and within the Alliance. As the U.S. was about to demonstrate, despite the resistance of select members within NATO, the United States wielded a considerable amount of influence in Europe. The U.S. would garner support from nations that shared their views of Iraq’s role in the War on Terror, desired the continued or improved support from Washington, or were suspicious of the self-interests


of the larger European nations that comprised the opposition. The realignment of Europe along the position of Washington’s foreign policy, and in effect, the ideology of the NSS, would have negative repercussions within Europe, and the European Union, as the Bush administration prepared to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom.


By deciding to go to war against Iraq with few supporters and on a false rationale, the Bush administration took a big gamble – effectively making success in Iraq a test of its entire foreign policy. In the early weeks after America’s triumphant and indeed impressive military success against the crumbling forces of Saddam Hussein, there was a fleeting moment when a new and very different international system was imaginable, with the United States at the center; international institutions would serve only to transmit U.S. influence, international alliances would be reduced to U.S. military appendices. NATO, the backbone of the transatlantic partnership, looked to once again becoming “merely a toolbox for an American agenda to which allies have to submit or run the risk of being ignored.”

1. Difficulties in Post-Conflict Stabilization and Installing Democracy

Despite weak evidence of an imminent threat, the lack of a UN mandate and the political opposition and resistance of several industrialized nations, the United States succeeded in occupying Baghdad and toppling the Iraqi regime in six weeks. But the ensuing failure to locate WMD within Iraq would continue debate among the Allies over the legitimacy of any potential post-conflict role for NATO. This eliminated any possibility of duplicating an expeditionary out-of-area stabilization mission such as the Alliance executed after major combat operations ceased in Afghanistan. A lack of

132 Dassa, Marta, in One Year On: Lessons from Iraq, 29.


134 Gnesotto, 32.

consensus in the Alliance had sidelined any immediate involvement by NATO in stabilization efforts in the Iraq, and would limit the institution’s initial involvement to peripheral and indirect support.

The next phase of the U.S. strategy in Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion focused on providing security, stability and the structures necessary to establish a democratic, multiethnic Iraqi government. This active implementation of the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” envisioned a utopian spread of the ideals of democratic transformation through the Middle East, promoting the creation of further democratic institutions, which in turn would stabilize the region. But the vacuum and chaos created within Iraq by the overthrow of the Hussein regime, the collapse of internal security, and the emergence of an intensive and violent insurgency created an environment in which accomplishing this lofty objective would be far more complicated and involved. The immediate reality of post-war Iraq would be “a classic guerrilla-type campaign” involving former regime members, self-interested ethnic factions, foreign fighters and the al Qaeda terrorists of an intensity and scale that would severely challenge the capabilities of the U.S.-led coalition to provide the security necessary to establish democracy in Iraq.

2. The Toll of the Occupation on U.S. Capabilities

The post-conflict insurgency had become more difficult to sustain than was projecting enough American military power to conduct the “regime change”. American technology was being frustrated by asymmetric, low-tech methods such as improvised explosives, ambushes, car bombings and the use of suicide bombers. Influential to these conditions was the instable environment that promoted the insurgency and the influence of internal ethnic factional violence and foreign fighters and terrorists. With the removal of the Hussein regime, the sectarian and tribal divisions within the country, as well as there being no rooted legacy of representative government within the society promoted a rapid spread of protests, confrontations and attacks against U.S., coalition and provisional


Iraqi forces by insurgents. In addition, the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq was increasing overall anti-U.S. sentiments in Muslim countries.\(^\text{138}\) While the NSS had provided effective guidance to enact an interventionist foreign policy, European methods were predicting the challenges and difficulties that such a policy would have establishing a long-term peace. Washington had both ignored and confirmed European warnings by invading Iraq without clear multinational support and was now plummeted into a quagmire of nation-building.\(^\text{139}\) It was now apparent that it was easier to have removed the regime than it would be to establish a secure environment, multiethnic cooperation, Iraqi self-rule and a lasting peace afterwards.

In order to deal with a mounting insurgency and increasing instability, the United States was required to maintain a large occupation force in Iraq. U.S. forces had hoped to be reduced to about 110,000 in 2004, with about 20,000 additional support personnel in the region; however, the instable environment and the frustrations of installing effective Iraqi security structures led the Department of Defense to increase the in-country troop level to 141,000 in November 2004, with a projected increase to 160,000 for the Iraqi elections scheduled for January 2005.\(^\text{140}\) This was in addition to 25,000 non-U.S. troops also in theater, with Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy and Ukraine being the largest contributors at that time.\(^\text{141}\)

The results of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the lack of substantial international support were suggesting that U.S. ground forces in particular were stretched thin in the region. While the combat phase was won with fewer divisions than expected, the occupation phase initially involved over 220,000 U.S. forces in country or supporting from surrounding regions. In March 2004, the U.S. military would be involved in the “largest troop rotation since World War Two” as forces rotated for year-long tours in


\(^{139}\) Moravcsik, Andrew, in \textit{One Year On: Lessons from Iraq}, pg. 190.


\(^{141}\) Ibid.
Iraq. Soon, many of the units and individuals would be returning for subsequent tours, with over one third of the U.S. occupation forces having been involved in the invasion one year previously.

The reserve capacity of the United States was also being over utilized, as almost one third of the U.S. occupation force would be comprised of Reserve and National Guard Forces. This effort could not be maintained indefinitely utilizing U.S reserve forces because of the operational tempo required in Iraq due to the insurgency and the post-conflict reconstruction requirements. The activation requirements necessary to mobilize forces for the stabilization efforts in Iraq left the United States without a true strategic reserve capacity to deal with a major regional conflict when reserve forces are being utilized to sustain on-going operations.

The capabilities necessary to sustain the occupation were being forecast as early as January 2004, when U.S. Department of Defense planners authorized a temporary increase of 30,000 personnel in the end-strength of the military, particularly for Army and Marine Corps units. Further house and senate measures were calling for permanent increases to U.S. military forces, as well, in response to the extended tours and requirements in Iraq. Clearly, the lack of additional support from the international community was having an effect on the vaulted U.S. capability as well. The strain on the U.S. military was demonstrating the limitations of a unilateralist strategy: a sustained international stabilization effort could not be maintained by a post-cold war force structure without the support on the international community. A coalition to build peace must be substantially broader than a coalition to conduct war. The United States was

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learning that in order to achieve the broad support necessary for sustained stability operations, was that they would be required to obtain a consensus within a multilateral security institution, or at least acknowledging the security role these organizations play in international relations. The U.S. could not sustain the on-going stability operation in Iraq without increasing the size of their military forces or enlisting the support of additional European and international peacekeepers.


The United States begins to feel the absence substantial European participation in coalition reconstruction and security efforts as the costs of the Iraq occupation rise. The inability to discover the WMD that was the premise for the U.S. invasion and frustration with the growing insurgency that was hindering implementation of the Wolfowitz Doctrine was having an effect within the coalition and would have further implications for NATO members and in implementing a post-conflict role for Alliance. Now that the invasion and occupation were *fait accompli*, the subsequent frustration concerning the Alliance was that an unstable Iraq was an unsettling force in an already volatile Middle East.147 The growing insurgency also lent credence to skepticism that the United States could successfully install a multi-ethnic democratic institution in Iraq and thus prevent erosion and division within the country along sectarian and tribal lines. Many of the Allies believed that this instability would have a spill-over effect towards settling Israeli - Palestinian issues in the Middle East as well, upon which Europe placed a strategic priority and a higher importance than a war with Iraq.148


Of immediate effect upon the Alliance and the coalition was the al Qaeda bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Spain, one of America’s most steadfast allies in Iraq and one of the top foreign troop contributors with 1,300 personnel, suffered a terrorist bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004 resulting in 190 dead and 1500 injured in


the nation’s capital. 149 Three days later, in scheduled national elections, the ruling Popular Party government was replaced by a Socialist majority in Parliament in what was seen as a protest vote in combination of opposition to the government’s support of the U.S. in Iraq and the view that the Spanish government was deliberately manipulative in mislabeling the perpetrators as Basque Separatists rather than al Qaeda terrorists.150 The incoming Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Zapatero, immediately pledged to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq unless the UN “took control” and the “occupiers give up political control”(sic).

Despite any flexibility in Spain’s stated position, the U.N. was not prepared to take control in Iraq in the midst of an active insurgency. As early as September 2003, President Bush had been calling on the United Nations to take greater control of post-war Iraq.151 The U.N. Security Council had passed Resolution 1500, mandating the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on August 14 2004.152 But on August 19th, the mission headquarters in Baghdad suffered a major terrorist bombing, killing 23 United Nations personnel, including the head of the mission.153 The U.N. subsequently withdrew much of their headquarters from Iraq, though it continued to support the mission through a headquarters in Amman, Jordan. Nevertheless, the security of UNMI staff in Iraq would remain the overriding constraint for all UN operations in Iraq, and the agency would limit their activities only to “essential tasks.”154 With the U.N. unable to

150 Gordon, Philip, “Madrid Bombings and U.S. Policy”.

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take a more prominent role in stability operations in Iraq, loss of Spanish support for the coalition was assured. Spain would withdraw from the coalition and remove their troops from Iraq in July 2004.

The loss of Spain to the coalition changed the alignment of the rift and the dynamics of NATO as well. The Zapatero Socialist government in Madrid quickly aligned with France and Germany, strengthening a continental block towards opposition from the Anglo-American and Eastern European elements in Iraq. Expressing a desire to work with the French and German leaders to develop a new UN framework to end the American occupation of Iraq and calling for greater European unity, Zapatero stated, "There is no 'old' or 'new' Europe, but one Europe that, to be heard, must speak with a single voice and act with a single hand."155 NATO’s plans to play a greater role in Iraq had been thrown into jeopardy as Spain had been due to replace Poland in command of Southern Iraq on 1 July.156

Further damage to American credibility would continue as additional coalition members withdrew, or chose not to renew their missions or support within the Multinational Force. While the coalition in July still consisted of 29 contributing nations providing approximately 25,000 forces, of these, Britain and Poland were contributing over 10,000 troops.157 Critics of the “international” effort could point out that U.S. forces comprised 85% of the troops in Iraq by October 2004.

In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of several of the major nations, such as France, for a greater U.N. role in post-Saddam Iraq, the United States obtained agreement on further U.N resolutions authorizing a “multinational force under unified command. However, some major potential force contributors as France, Russia, India


and Pakistan have viewed these resolutions as insufficient to prompt their involvement on the grounds that they did not end what these countries perceived as a U.S. monopoly of decision making on Iraq policy.\textsuperscript{158} Efforts to “internationalize” the post-Saddam reconstruction of Iraq were still being stymied by the obstinacy of the international community and NATO alliance members in opposition to U.S. foreign policy and in response to the Unilateralist policies of the administration.

2. NATO Stymied: Continuing Discord Prevents a Substantial Out-of-Area Role for the Alliance

NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or in its conduct, which was executed by a coalition force; some were member countries of the Alliance, and others were not. In response to a request from Turkey in February 2003 for assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance undertook a number of precautionary defensive measures to ensure Turkey’s security in the event of a potential threat to its territory or population.\textsuperscript{159} After intense consultations and intransigence by both supporters and opponents of America’s foreign policy towards Iraq, NATO’s Defense Planning Committee approved Operation Display Deterrence, sending AWACs and air defense missiles to protect Turkey, for missions that would be solely defensive in nature.\textsuperscript{160} After the start of combat operations on 20 March 2003, the Defense Planning Committee strengthened the rules of engagement for NATO forces in Turkey, but still maintained a purely defensive posture. At the same time, the Defense Planning Committee was discussing humanitarian and post-conflict issues with its NATO Allies and Partners within the U.S.-led coalition.\textsuperscript{161} On 16 April 2003, Operation Display Deterrence was concluded, and the last NATO elements left Turkey on 3 May 2003.

While not contributing directly to the coalition, NATO was supporting Polish forces conducting stabilization missions in Iraq, agreeing to a request from the Polish

\textsuperscript{158} Katzman, Kenneth, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, 35.

\textsuperscript{159} NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq, NATO, NATO Topics, 18 February 2005, \url{http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/index.html} accessed 7 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{160} Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, NATO Press Conference, 16 February, 2003, \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/02-february/e0219a.htm} accessed 7 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
representative to provide support on 2 June 2003. When Poland assumed command of the Multinational Division in Central South Iraq in September 2003, NATO pledged to continue its support, consisting of staff and logistics planning, movement coordination, secure communications and intelligence sharing. With on-going NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO’s support for Poland was a continuing contribution to non-article 5, out-of-area missions for the Alliance.

The U.S. had hoped for a more robust presence in IRAQ, hoping for that NATO might take over the command of the multinational force, depending on what kind of mandate the Alliance received from the UN. But the withdrawal of Spanish troops from the coalition after the March 2004 change of government had changed the dynamic, as Spain was to be the chief NATO advocate for such a plan. Therefore, assistance to Poland as an Alliance member would remain the extent of NATO’s involvement in Iraq, when in June 2004 NATO would undertake an out-of-area mission at the request of the new interim Iraqi government before the Istanbul Summit.

F. EUROPE EMERGES FROM DISCORD A NEWLY FOCUSED SECURITY ACTOR

While the principles and values espoused within NATO, the UN and the EU coincided with the NSS, the unilateralist and preemptive methods used to implement the foreign policy goals of the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” and Bush Administration caused a divisive rift in Europe as well. European diplomatic resistance to U.S. foreign policy, based on an opposition to these methods conflict of principles and methods, was equally disastrous towards efforts by the EU towards becoming an effective military actor. Though able to stymie efforts of increased participation by the international community and by the NATO alliance, the French and German-led opposition could not provide an effective alternative policy and strategy, or a common position, for opponents of U.S. unilateralism to unite behind. The smaller members of the EU resisted efforts by the larger members to promote a policy because they were suspicious of the larger nation’s

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162 SHAPE News Summary and Analysis, 16 March 2004.
163 Ibid.
intent and were resentful of the high-handed bullying that was similar U.S. behavior towards ‘old’ Europe. Furthermore, the smaller countries were not prepared or capable of funding the costs of replicating security institutions necessary to implement a European Security Strategy and to create a military capability completely independent from NATO and the U.S.\textsuperscript{164}

1. Europe Asunder and Reconciled

Shortly after the Iraq war started, European discord was as pronounced as that in the transatlantic rift. When France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced plans for a European military headquarters at the Brussels summit in April 2003, those governments that had supported the Iraq war, such as Britain, saw this move as an attempt to create a core Europe that would exclude the more Atlanticist countries and undermine NATO.\textsuperscript{165} The rift at Brussels April 2003 EU summit projected the lack of unity within Europe, as the lack of direction and purpose result from opposition to U.S. foreign policy made Europe seem rudderless in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, and pleased those in Washington who wished Europe to remain split so that it could not become an effective international security actor. Early 2003 was probably the low point in modern times for the ambitions of the European Union as a global actor in the field of foreign affairs and security.\textsuperscript{166}

Though the EU leaders viewed ESPD as an integral element of European integration, the Iraq crisis had resulted in an increased focused towards accelerating its development. The Iraq crisis has also provided further evidence that the EU has inherent difficulties dealing with any form of “robust” out-of-area intervention in the absence of a UN mandate; and that EU countries are under great strain when the United States builds ad hoc coalitions: This twin dilemma is decisive for the future of CFSP and the ability of the Europeans to contribute to (and help shape) potential interventions.\textsuperscript{167}

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\textsuperscript{165} Grant, Charles, in \textit{One Year On: Lessons from Iraq}, 65.
\textsuperscript{166} Bildt, Carl, in \textit{One Year On: Lessons from Iraq}, 23.
\textsuperscript{167} Dassa, Marta, in \textit{One Year On: Lessons from Iraq}, 35.
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The EU’s progress towards ESDP and CFSP continued to be haphazard until mid 2003, with the polarization of Europe highlighting the regions’ military weakness and dysfunction. In May 2003, the EU declared that the rapid reaction force possessed the capability to accomplish the full range of “Petersberg Tasks”, but recognized that the force would still be limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls in certain defense capabilities. But in June 2003, the first two steps would be taken towards reconciliation within Europe and towards improving the EU’s role as a global security actor.

The first of these steps would be a demonstration of military independence and expeditionary capability in the conduct of European crisis management operations when the EU executed Operation Artemis; a peacekeeping mission in the Congo. The second, and more encompassing event would be a cooperative and conciliatory mending of the polarization in Europe through the development and adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS). The results of these developments within ESDP would implement the first tentative steps towards establishing a credible EU expeditionary capability, and defining the unique requirements of transforming a European Security Identity into an effective strategy. Also, these definitive measures would work towards repairing the transatlantic rift and reestablishing a working relationship between the United States and the European Union through the auspices of NATO and CFSP.

In June 2003, the EU deployed an international peacekeeping force of 1400 troops, Operation Artemis, to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers. An Interim Emergency Multinational Force was requested by the United Nations Security Council in May 2003 and would be fielded by the European Union with France in a “lead nation” capacity. This force would be charged with stabilizing the situation in the DRC until the United Nations took over the mission in September. This opportunity allowed for Europe to begin demonstrating and refining both an independent expeditionary capability with regard to European crisis management operations, and in pursuing an out-of-area security strategy. The Congo was farther geographically than it had been thought that the EU would decide to become

involved or to project their forces. Also surprising to NATO Allies was that Operation Artemis would be planned and executed without recourse to NATO assets. This aspect allowed further independence because the EU was not required to request NATO assets (and therefore permission) to undertake the mission or to offer a right of refusal to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{169} When the mission was completed in September 2003, Operation Artemis would demonstrate the potential for a new EU out-of-area model with Brussels political leadership, operational command through streamlined national command authority and a coalition of willing and able military forces within Europe.


The adoption of the ESS would represent a significant milestone towards repairing European discord, and would represent a diplomatic victory for a united Europe and invigorate ESDP, while working towards closing the military capabilities and ideology gaps, at least in principle. When Javier Solana presented his strategy paper to the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003, his work would outline a concept that would establish the basis for a security strategy that could encompass distinctly European elements, and could therefore be adopted, and implemented, within the multilateral framework of the European Union. “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free,” Javier Solana would state in June 2003, “The violence of the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.”\textsuperscript{170} This introduction would serve as the preamble for the European Security Strategy (ESS) that would be adopted in Brussels in December 2003.\textsuperscript{171} The ESS would establish three key objectives for the EU: contributing to stability and good governance in Europe’s immediate neighborhood, building an international order based on effective multilateralism, and how to address the old and new security threats to Europe.

In addition to these stated objectives, the ESS would also definitively outline the differences between European and American perspectives in the War on terror, the
security environment and expeditionary interventions. The EU and the United States have distinct political cultures and consequently different ways of dealing with international crises. Therefore, defining the differences would make it possible (in theory) to better understand inherent differences towards security in order to develop the means to implement a cooperative effort towards addressing them, such as was done in the Washington Treaty and in Article 5. If the U.S. and the EU were able to utilize NATO as a successful deterrent against the Soviet Union, it could be possible for these security actors to utilize the institution to implement an expeditionary, out-of-area security strategy that they both acknowledge and advocate.

The publication of the ESS would also represent a consensus of European attitudes and adoption of a common policy necessary for an independent capability for European out-of-area operations. As opposed to solely the “soft power” vs. “hard power” comparison between Europe and American, the ESS would describe how and in what circumstances Europe’s power could actually be used, and how an expanded union of 25 members could exercise global responsibility commensurate with its economic weight and ambitions. In defining and accepting a security strategy, Europe was now doing more than reflecting in depth on possible threats beyond the continent; they were trying to adopt methods to prevent them.

The ESS views the security environment differently from the NSS; it is one of Europe having achieved its greatest level of security since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Europe is not in crisis, but in consolidation. While conditions exist that encourage threats to European security, a long-term multilateral strategy of prevention and involvement will seek to promote the stability that the US advocates through the force of arms. There is no general preference in Europe for military intervention, or the political or financial motivation or means to develop an expeditionary capability of significance to the point of

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172 de Wikj, Rob, in One Year On: Lessons from Iraq, 41.


challenging the United States dominance in this realm. But European military capabilities will be expanded to the point of executing a strategy of prolonged conflict prevention, while maintaining the means to accomplish an occasional ‘robust intervention’. Whereas the NSS often actively promotes military intervention, or at least its implicit threat, the ESS would leave the non-permissive military response as an undesirable and regrettable final option. European foreign policy objectives differ in that they focus upon continuing international engagement based upon preventive vs. preemptive action. This preference for preventive action promotes long-term involvement, encompassing multiple facets of diplomatic, economic, humanitarian assistance, and only when all else fails, military intervention.

Because the EU is committed to a multilateral approach to international relations and diplomacy, the ESS depends on utilizing international organizations, strategic partnerships, and international cooperation, as well as engaging the United Nations as the fundamental framework for international relations. The ESS acknowledges that the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is in stark contrast to the present American penchant for independent action or towards forming coalitions of the willing in order to accomplish unilateralist intentions. The ESS does not see a possibility to act effectively without partners. Achieving unity of purpose and cohesion through recognizing and utilizing international institutions, including NATO, is a major principle in the European Security Strategy.

The element that unites the strategies is the realization that, due to the changing nature of security threats, defense will require an expeditionary capability and an out-of-area involvement; the first line of defense will be abroad. While not accepting the necessity for preemptive engagement promoted by Javier Solana and practiced by the United States, the ESS acknowledges that Europe must be in a state of readiness to act before a crisis occurs. “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters readiness, rapid,
and when necessary robust intervention.” The ESS further acknowledged the requirement to conduct multiple sustained expeditionary military and civilian operations simultaneously, promoting a more active and continuous out-of-area role for European foreign policy.

By the end of 2003, France and Germany realized that they could not build a Common Security and Defense Policy, nor a European Security and Defense Policy, without the help of Britain. And Britain decided that it could not fulfill its ambitions in Europe without repairing the rift with France and Germany. This reconciliation allowed the European Union to present a more united stance to the rest of the world, while subsequently allowing the “Big Three” to guide the EU once it had enlarged to 25 countries. As a result, France and Germany toned down their requirements for a European military headquarters while Britain acknowledged the necessity for such an organization. This consensual agreement upon a European military headquarters would establish the initial accord necessary to accomplish further cooperative security goals in Europe that would complement, rather than compete with NATO, while having a distinctly European identity, and would be attainable with limited defense budgets of the member nations, and within multilateral institutional constraints of the EU.


Had the United States succeeded in its attempts to install a functional democracy and create a secure, stable environment in Iraq after removing the Saddam regime, it would have emerged as the world’s sole authority of interventionist security. However, due to the fact that neither weapons of mass destruction nor links between international terrorism and Saddam Hussein were discovered, the necessity of abrogating the legitimacy of the United Nations and the principles of the international community in order to intervene in Iraq was widely questioned. Clearly the threat neither warranted, nor required, such a response. The invasion of Iraq was a war of choice for America.180


Consequently, the damage to American credibility is such that it will be difficult to gain international support for subsequent interventions outside of established multinational institutions.

While the Transatlantic Alliance experienced the repercussions of the United States’ unilateralist foreign policy, Europe suffered as well. The loyalty, shared convictions, as well as opportune strategic and economic advantages of supporting United States foreign policy were stronger for those further away from the Europe’s established economic, political and military “core.” Choosing alignment with, or against, United States foreign policy polarized European nations, highlighting a lack of unity and consensus towards expeditionary interventions, security strategy and the commitments necessary to implement ESDP.

But European discord also affected the U.S.-led post-conflict coalition in Iraq. Despite the lack of WMD or proof of Saddam Hussein’s link to terrorist organizations, the most urgent issues in America’s Iraq foreign policy are the inability to: stop a persistent insurgency, promote and establish domestic security and stability, and to effectively train and employ sufficient Iraqi security forces to ensure the authority of the newly elected Iraqi Parliament. While additional European personnel support is not a panacea for U.S. and coalition difficulties on the ground in Iraq, a substantial influx of experienced peacekeepers with a focus towards civil-military affairs and police duties would certainly be appreciated by the coalition in light of the instable situation. Also, a robust role for NATO in post conflict Iraq would help to restore NATO’s unity and effectiveness as an expeditionary security actor, as well as install further international legitimacy to the stabilization effort, especially since the U.N. involvement has been limited.

Having learned the difficulties of operating apart, the Allies were ready to begin a process of reconciliation at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004. Attempts would be made to increase the role of NATO in post-conflict Iraq and to reengage the Alliance as an expeditionary out-of-area security actor. The Istanbul Summit would give further shape and direction towards adapting NATO’s structures, procedures and capabilities to
21st Century challenges. Furthermore, the summit would represent an opportunity to mend the transatlantic rift, reaffirming the commitment to shared purposes and principles. In order to reestablish their out-of area security focus, NATO’s Allies would have to reestablish the cooperation essential in defending the common values, and in meeting the common threats facing the Alliance.

V. NATO 2004 – PRESENT: ISTANBUL AND BEYOND - THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

What binds us are the values…We will have differences of opinion … but there is a lot more that we agree upon, and that is the bottom line and the basis for this great Alliance.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

A. INTRODUCTION

Despite the discord resulting from the transatlantic rift, all the member nations of NATO believed that the present security situation was too serious to permit internal quarrels to leave the Alliance divided and adrift. In the aftermath of the bitter flare-up over Iraq, a period of calm had settled over relations within the Alliance. While some believed that the best path to reconciliation was to do nothing, the member nations instead proceeded with continuing communications intending to redefine the transatlantic relationship post-Iraq while encouraging further cooperative security in out-of-area engagements.

The Allies on both sides of the Iraq issue were willing to be conciliatory and were prepared to reestablish the relationship. The discord had proved humbling for both sides of the rift as the negative effects of the polarizing discord demonstrated the complexity of the interrelationship and the interdependence of NATO’s post-Cold War security requirements, as well as the cooperation necessary to maintain a sustained forward defense focus.

The Allies needed each other, for the benefits of cooperation outweighed the freedoms of positions of unilateral action or disengagement. The U.S. had an unparalleled technological and expeditionary capability in its armed forces, and Europe had the history of long-term engagements in conflict prevention as well as a large manpower contribution of experienced peacekeepers that would be available for extended stability operations under the correct circumstances.182 For the U.S., the costs in

manpower and materials of conducting extended out-of-area operations independently or with few coalition members are too great to maintain indefinitely. Within Europe, the lack of a defined and unifying defense concept and security strategy had left the nations of the European Union divided, leaderless and vulnerable to further internal political schisms, as well as to external security threats.

Having suffered through an unfortunate, but necessary, divide over threat assessments, implementing forward defense, and security issues, the members of the Alliance now were ready to work together again with renewed focus towards a common out-of-area expeditionary security strategy. The forum for this reconciliation would be NATO’s Istanbul Summit in June 2004. NATO would also use this reconciliation opportunity to reestablish the momentum towards the transformation process that was initially begun at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 by readdressing these issues at Istanbul. The Transatlantic Alliance, and its role as an out-of-area security actor would survive.

B. THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT (JUNE 2004)

The Istanbul Summit would serve as an opportunity to reinforce the importance of security cooperation between Europe and North America, and the Allies commitment to maintain NATO – the embodiment of the transatlantic link – as their central institution for collective defense, security consultation, as well as crisis management and multinational military actions.\(^\text{183}\) The results of the summit included an expansion of the scope and nature of Alliance out-of-area operations; adopting measures to continue improving member nation’s military capabilities; and endorsed initiatives to enhance relations with existing partners and to forge relations with new ones.

1. Commitment to Cooperation, Transformation and Forward Defense

At Istanbul, the Allies would agree to strengthen NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism, dedicate to international efforts towards limiting the proliferation of WMD, and to expand NATO’s operational role in out-of-area engagements, such as in

Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{184} The transformation and modernization of European military forces was also a center of focus as the Alliance recognized that this effort would be a long term endeavor, and that it must continue for NATO be able to carry out the full range of its missions, including combating the threats posed by terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Specific commitments were also made at the Summit that would ensure the Alliance a permanently available pool of dedicated assets and forces that could be deployed on rapid response missions and expeditionary interventions. These dedicated commitments were important in that they enabled the NRF to go from a concept to an initial operational capability in October 2004, providing a dependable, operational force that provided NATO with a crisis response capability with true war-fighting capabilities able to accomplish the full range of NATO missions.\textsuperscript{185} Also, in a sign that significant differences over Iraq could, if not be forgiven, then be set aside, all 26 Allies would agree to support NATO’s training mission of Iraqi security forces, as well as continuing to assist Poland in their leadership of the Multinational Division in South-central Iraq.\textsuperscript{186}

2. Continued Involvement Out-of Area for Forward Defense

The Alliance made provisions to continue their involvement in the Balkans, as their engagement progressed and evolved into a long-term peace engagement and conflict prevention police mission. In Bosnia, the Alliance would bring its 9-year direct involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the first peacekeeping operation in its history – to a conclusion at the end of 2004. From a high of 60,000 troops that were deployed to the region for the first year under NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995, the total forces deemed necessary at the end of the mission would be fewer than 7,000, serving as a testament to the stability established in the region over the eight-year tenure of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). NATO will continue to support the new stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the operational command of the EU in

\textsuperscript{184} NATO and Afghanistan, Istanbul Summit Media Guide, June 2004, pg. 7.


accordance with the “Berlin Plus” agreements.\textsuperscript{187} While in Kosovo, NATO continued to maintain command of a robust military presence under the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to enhance security in the region and promote the political process. Other NATO measures would focus on a political agenda to promote greater security in the Middle East and to support the Peace Process and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3. **The Middle East Peace Process, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative**

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was established in 1994 with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia in order to contribute to regional security and stability, to achieve a better mutual understanding, and to correct any misperceptions about NATO among MD countries.\textsuperscript{188} Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000 would also join the MD as participants. After numerous fits and starts due to the complications of the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process, the decision was agreed at Istanbul between NATO and the participating countries to undertake a more ambitious and expanded framework, elevating the MD to a genuine partnership along the example of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.\textsuperscript{189} This partnership would contribute towards regional security through practical cooperation by enhancing existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defense reform, and contributing to the fight against terrorism. Further diplomatic cooperation with a broader region of countries in the Middle East would be initiated at the summit with the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.\textsuperscript{190}

Through the agenda of the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance demonstrated a dynamic involvement in forward defense measures and cooperative out-of-area security. After more than half a century, NATO was finally turning into a framework for transatlantic


\textsuperscript{190} NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, NATO Update, NATO, June 29 2004 \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm} accessed 15 May 2005.
action wherever the security interests of the Alliance demanded it. Further catalysts for military transformation within the Alliance would facilitate NATO’s new focus of projecting stability, forward defense and out-of-area engagement.

C. BEYOND ISTANBUL: NATO OUT-OF-AREA ENGAGEMENTS

The opportunity for renewed cooperation has now been opened by the Istanbul Summit. The significant differences within the Alliance over Iraq have not prevented all 26 Allies from contributing to NATO’s training of Iraqi security forces, either in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. Though this involvement is encouraging, there are still remnants of discord within the Alliance, and a desire to balance U.S. foreign policy, as NATO still has only the limited role of a training mission in Iraq. The limitations of this role, and in particular the resistance of France and Germany, prevent NATO from assuming a more ambitious role that potentially could have included command of the Multinational Force. A responsibility of this size would have engaged the Alliance in an out-of-area forward security mission on the scale of IFOR’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995. This responsibility would have changed the dynamics of out-of-area involvement for NATO, and Europe in particular, for the Alliance would have been executing its full range of missions, from stabilization and peacekeeping, to combat operations. NATO’s command in the volatile and controversial mission that has been at the center of world attention since 2003, and in addition to the Afghanistan, would have significantly increased NATO’s prestige in the international community in the aftermath of the transatlantic rift, and would have further maintained the Alliance as the most relevant, active, and experienced security actor in the international community. The dramatic increase in troop, material and financial


contributions to the institution would have further legitimized multilateral security institutions as the instrument of choice in a forward defense strategy and for extended out-of-area engagements. These frustrating limitations in Iraq have prevented NATO from engaging the full range of their capabilities and experience, and have hindered the more dynamic options of U.S. and SHAPE planners. Hopefully, the Iraq training mission will represent a beginning to, and not the extent of, NATO involvement in Iraq.

1. **NATO’s Afghanistan Mission Continues to Expand**

   After NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2004, the next milestone in the war ravaged country would be the presidential elections scheduled in the fall. To prepare for this historic event, NATO increased their troop presence in and around Kabul to 10,000 with the reinforcements including a deployment of 1,000 troops from the NRF prior to the September 2004 elections.\(^\text{195}\) NATO also supported further stabilization efforts by establishing additional Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), organizations of international civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to extend the authority of the central government and facilitate development and reconstruction.\(^\text{196}\) NATO also assumed control of those PRT’s in their area of responsibility that were being operated by different countries and non-governmental organizations. The assumption of responsibility of these PRT’s will facilitate greater security for and efficiency in stabilization efforts in the countryside, as well as coordinate and focus further relief efforts outside of Kabul. The Alliance is also in the process of expanding ISAF further to the West, taking over responsibility of territory as well as those existing PRTs being operated under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

2. **“NATO in Palestine?”**

   The Middle East and the Transatlantic Alliance are becoming increasingly interdependent, as no other region’s development will affect transatlantic security

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\(^\text{196}\) Ibid.
more.\textsuperscript{197} When NATO was being debated as a possible lead role in the stabilization of Iraq, further informal discussions have led to a theoretical involvement in (and around) Palestine.\textsuperscript{198} While no official requests for additional planning for such an event has been tasked to SHAPE, any possible NATO assistance and contribution to the settlement of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict would certainly be a controversial issue.

NATO has been informally discussed serving in a Stabilization mission as part of the establishment of peace between Israel and Palestine as a measure of the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue, in attempts towards improving relationships between NATO and its Middle Eastern Partners, and for the potential security benefits of a third party peacekeeping intervention in the region.\textsuperscript{199} While NATO has stated it’s willingness to serve in this capacity if tasked, the deployment of a NATO force would require the following preconditions that have been determined by the Alliance to be in place before such a deployment is authorized: a lasting peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, an agreement by both parties to the intervention and the declaration a UN Mandate.\textsuperscript{200} Although these conditions do not yet exist, a multilateral agreement to a permissive intervention under these conditions could herald the next substantial out-of-area mission for NATO in its forward defense strategy.

3. \textbf{NATO's Response Force becomes Operational}

After its adoption at the Prague Summit, the NRF was heralded as the centerpiece of the new NATO plan for defense transformation.\textsuperscript{201} The NRF is a brigade-sized, combined arms expeditionary force large enough to make a contribution in modern, high-tech military operations alongside the U.S., but small and agile enough to be deployed


\textsuperscript{200} NATO, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: The successor generation, Deputy Secretary General’s Key Note Address, Royal United Services Institute, Conference, London, November 29 2004, \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041129a.htm} accessed 15 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{201} Binnendijk, Hans, and Kugler, Richard, in \textit{Transatlantic Transformations}, pg. 46.
swiftly, especially when configured in smaller, battalion-sized detachments. The NRF will provide NATO with the immediate capability it requires to influence the processes of defense, security and stability in out-of-area crisis response and conflict prevention. The NRF achieved an initial operational capability in October 2004, and by January 2005 contained 18,000 troops, with a full capability of 21,000 expected by summer 2006.202 Small contingents of the NRF were quietly deployed for securing the European Football Championships in Portugal in July, the Summer Olympic Games in Greece during August, and in September to provide security during the Afghanistan presidential elections.203 To date, the NRF concept has been demonstrated as successful, and is a continuing impetus for NATO’s military forces to persist in military transformation efforts.


The scope of NATO’s involvement in Iraq would remain indirect until Iraqi interim Prime Minister; Ilyad Allawi requested NATO support through training and other forms of technical assistance on 22 June 2004.204 After sending a fact-finding team to Baghdad, the North Atlantic Council agreed at NATO’s Istanbul Summit to establish a NATO Training and Implementation Mission in Iraq.205 A detailed agreement followed on 8 October 2004, and NATO trainers and instructors deployed soon afterwards.206

NATO’s mission in Iraq would not be combat, but instead would focus on training, assisting with equipping, and providing technical assistance for Iraqi Security Forces, Joint Headquarters personnel, and help to build nation-wide, multi-ethnic security institutions. While working closely with the Multinational Force, the Alliance mission

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206 CRS NATO and the European Union, pg. 10.
would be under close and continuous NATO political guidance. To further reinforce the training vs. combat role of the mission, the commander of the Multinational Training Effort would be dual-hatted as the commander of the NATO Training Effort, reporting up the NATO chain of command to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in this capacity instead of the commander of the Multinational Force.207

By December, the mission would be expanded to include up to 300 personnel deployed in Iraq, including trainers and support staff, and with a significant increase in the existing training and mentoring being provided to mid- and senior level personnel from the Iraqi security forces. This expansion would be followed by an additional stage establishing the Training, Education and Doctrine Center near Baghdad in 2005.208 According to U.S. General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), the NATO mission to Iraq could eventually involve upwards of 3000 troops.209

D. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A LEGITIMATE SECURITY ACTOR

The EU has provided substantial financial support for the election process in Afghanistan, providing approximately $80 million by December 2004, about half of the total international contributions to the election process to date.210 Military contributions in Afghanistan by the EU involved 23 member nations by May 2005, and accounted for two-thirds of ISAF’s total deployment.211 Turkey currently commands ISAF with Italy scheduled to assume this role August 2005. By May 2005, EU member nations were commanding five PRT’s in the north and north-east of the country, are scheduled to establish two new PRT’s and take over one existing U.S.-led PRT as part of ISAF’s


209 Katzman, pg. 35.


211 Ibid.
Summer 2005 expansion to the West of Afghanistan. Several member nations were also contributing directly to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan; Operation Enduring Freedom.

1. EU Stability Operations

The five-nation Eurocorps (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg) directly commands the 5000-man Franco-German Brigade and the Multinational Command Support Brigade.²¹² The Eurocorps provided the core of ISAF headquarters in Kabul from August 2004 to February 2005, and assumed command of EUFOR, through which military coalition the EU took over stability operations in Bosnia from NATO’s SFOR.²¹³ Deployment of EU forces to missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resulted in the deployment of approximately 55,000 EU troops between 2003 and 2004.²¹⁴ The EU also remains involved in the Middle East Peace Process as well, maintaining a political engagement through the auspices of the Barcelona Process, established by the EU in 1995.

2. Battle Groups

In June 2004, the proposed concept of European “Battle Groups” was accepted by the European Union as a capability with which the EU can further contribute to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in close co-operation with the United Nations.²¹⁵ The Battle Group is configured around a reinforced battalion of combat troops that in all totals 1,500 highly trained, expeditionary soldiers. The Battle Groups soldiers are supported by combined arms, combat support, service support, air and naval support, as well as the necessary deployment and sustainment capabilities,


²¹³ Ibid.


required for thirty days of independent expeditionary operations. These units will be maintained in a high state of readiness, being prepared to deploy within fifteen days of notification. They are intended to be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crisis areas, under, but not exclusively, a U.N. mandate, and to conduct combat missions in potentially extreme environments such as deserts, jungles and mountains. Besides serving in an independent capacity, they can prepare the ground for follow-on deployments of larger combat forces or peacekeeping missions. The peacekeeping mission to the DRC (commanded by the Eurocorps) established a standard for future EU Battle Group employments.

The European Battle Group represents a modular concept towards developing European rapid reaction capabilities. A Battle Group is built around a battalion-sized unit and represents the smallest self-sufficient military operational unit that can be effectively deployed and sustained independently in a theater of operations. The concept is similar to the United States Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), an infantry battalion reinforced with supporting arms, combat and service support, as well as dedicated air and sea transport and supporting fires. The MEU is a 2,000-troop unit that is routinely embarked aboard amphibious shipping and forward deployed to potential crisis areas in six-month duty rotations on station.

Adopting this concept makes increased interoperability and cooperation among the EU forces with forward deployed United States units more efficient due to the similar composition and mission. Also, the availability of pooled assets within the EU to create a small, manageable-sized and expeditionary focused Battle Groups make this a capability that is not only relevant and applicable in a forward defense strategy, but is also attainable in many aspects within existing military resources, especially those of the more modern forces of the Eurocorps.

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218 Ibid.
The EU insists that the Battle Group concept and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force are complementary and mutually reinforcing. NATO also emphasizes that EU defense and security matters must continue to take place complementary with NATO and without duplication. Despite differences in the past, and potential conflicts of interest in the future, the Alliance would recognize at the Istanbul Summit that the EU had made considerable progress in the transformation of its military forces and their capabilities. NATO was now recognizing the role of the European Union in Europe’s forward defense strategy, and the EU has been recognized as a legitimate security actor by the Alliance.

E. ANALYSIS: THE INEVITABILITY OF THE TRANSatlantic Rift AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AS AN OUT-OF-AREA SECURITY ACTOR

Unfortunately, the rift in the Alliance was inevitable as the faults that precipitated it were inherent in the institution. As the mission of NATO evolved, and its capabilities were transformed, a new role emerged as the Alliance structure transformed to adapt to its out-of-area requirements. Once the transatlantic rift occurred, NATO was able to recognize inherent flaws and shortfalls in the structure of the Alliance, and to eventually move beyond these imperfections. NATO also had to experience these core difficulties in order to demonstrate the importance of adopting the PCC and in achieving a united strategy among the Allies on the mechanisms for out-of-area interventions in its continued transformation upon adopting an expeditionary, out-of-area, forward defense strategic concept. What would emerge from the discord would be a stronger, more focused Alliance who’s increased capabilities would demonstrate an improved potential for future out-of-area operations.

Through its history the greatest threat to the Alliance has not been a unifying external threat, but the internal dissentions and self-interests of its member nations. NATO could survive the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but can it survive itself and

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the members that compose it? There are still flaws remaining in the structures composing
the Alliance that threaten the relevance of the institution and its operational functions in
the execution of the expeditionary military engagements necessary for forward defense.
These limitations will impact future deployments, but in the aftermath of the transatlantic
rift, the on-going military operations, and the ever-present threat of transnational
terrorism encourage an atmosphere of cooperation. If the Allies chose to continue this
reconciliation, NATO has the potential to serve a premier role in international security
and in a forward defense of Europe, if properly utilized. These issues will be discussed in
the sections that follow.

1. NATO will Function Despite Its Inherent Flaws

Both the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions had illuminated inherent shortfalls in
the structures that utilize the NATO Alliance as an expeditionary security actor.
Afghanistan had demonstrated that, while the political consensus of NATO could grant
international legitimacy to non-permissive interventions (and invasions), the majority of
the Alliance did not possess capabilities as a whole that would merit utilizing the
cumbersome structure as an operational command organization. Contributions by
Alliance members in the post-stability phase were welcome, but this role limits the armed
forces of these countries towards low-tech functions such as security forces, police duties
and rebuilding infrastructures. While these duties are a critical part of long-term
preventive engagements, this focus would not encourage European countries to continue
modernization efforts of their Cold War structured military forces if they were only going
to be used as low-tech instructors, policemen and public works facilitators. Unless there
was serious impetus to interoperate with modern (U.S.) forces in true war-fighting
capabilities, Europe would not attempt, or continue, efforts to increase national defense
budgets towards transformation efforts. The results of this lack of investment in defense
would be that commitments of the NATO Prague Summit and the Prague Capabilities
Commitments would be stymied from lack of funds, the gap in the military capabilities
within the Alliance would only continue to worsen, and Europe could not shoulder a
higher portion of its security requirements. Therefore, the United States would be
frustrated in attempts to incorporate European capabilities into expeditionary operations,
进一步鼓励单边外交政策决定。
Iraq, on the other hand, had demonstrated that a lack of political consensus within the international community and a multinational alliance could have serious effects upon out-of-area operations, especially in maintaining and sustaining a prolonged stabilization and reconstruction mission in the aftermath of an unsanctioned intervention. While the lack of a legitimizing mandate from an international security institution cannot prevent independent action by a member that had sufficient capabilities to do so, unilateral action could result in the lack of burden sharing guarantees from Allies that would facilitate an effective exit strategy for the intervention. Thus, withholding international support to stabilization efforts threatens out-of-area interventions with turning into quagmires as ethnic factions and local actors frequently emerge and struggle for dominance and self-interests in the post-conflict instability. In short, there is no effective, or quick, exit strategy.

These interventions illustrated the interrelated shortfalls in both the capabilities and bureaucratic decision-making structures of the Alliance in regards to the conflicting methods espoused in the Security Strategies of both the United States and Europe, and especially in the application and execution of the out-of-area interventions. Europe is still challenged in their ability to initially and rapidly project sufficient combat capability in order to influence foreign policy or execute a large-scale crisis response mission. This lack of capability requires that they have access to the full potential and existing capabilities within the Alliance to execute an expeditionary intervention. Therefore, Europe is dependent upon the consensus of coalitions, alliances and other burden-sharing, collective security arrangements in order to provide, deploy and employ sufficient military forces and capabilities for out-of-area operations. What encumbers this method of asset and command sharing arrangement is the impediments and constraints of a consensual, multilateral decision-making structure that does not facilitate rapid decision-making or effectively function with dissent among contributors.

But once the cumbersome process is complete, the European process is effective towards sustaining a prolonged effort. The Alliance’s efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Afghanistan are examples of substantial multilateral stabilization efforts that were implemented after successful, albeit dysfunctional, military campaigns.
Though the Alliance experienced frustrating delays, inefficiencies, impediments and disruptions in the conduct of combat operations, NATO has demonstrated a European penchant for perseverance in extended out-of-area peace operations.

The U.S. National Security Strategy advocates an independence from, and an ideological avoidance to, the encumbering requirements of collective expeditionary security, if these institutions do not promote a method of strong reassurance for the security and protection to which America has grown accustomed. Though the United States had the ability to hand select particular Allies to participate in the combat phase of the Afghanistan invasion, and thus bypass an existing consensus for the freedom of unfettered operations, it was due to burden shifting of post-conflict stability responsibilities to NATO that allowed the U.S. military to shift their military planning and force projection capabilities towards Iraq. But in choosing the unilateralist choice in Iraq, the U.S. has expended this option. The scope and complexity of the Iraq occupation has effectively made this decision a one-shot alternative.

Without the capacity to shift stabilization efforts, or to recruit a more substantial multinational force, due to poorly managed pre-conflict policies and diplomacy, the U.S. will not be able to extricate their military forces from Iraq until security has been established, a post-regime Iraqi government is functioning, and that government and its security forces are prepared to continue internal security responsibilities. Such an ambitious, ill-defined and complex goal is guaranteed to keep a significant number of U.S. forces involved in occupation duties for several years to come. This daunting requirement, in addition to ongoing U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, affects the ability of the U.S. to significantly involve their forces elsewhere in the world. Unilateral foreign options will certainly be limited for the rest of President Bush’s administration.

2. The EU will Compete with, but not Replace NATO

While the leaders of Europe and the United States acknowledge the importance of transatlantic cooperation, there will be competition for military capabilities within the Alliance, as well as in research and development of defense systems and platforms, with the prospect of potential markets in national and foreign military defense. This competition will present a growing issue within the transatlantic relationship as Europe proceeds in the transformation of their military forces, achieves more modern
capabilities, and establishes a collective defense industry. A current dilemma within the Transatlantic Alliance is how to encourage growth and modernization in Europe’s strategic focus and military capabilities while ensuring availability of crisis response assets, protecting existing and potential national and foreign defense markets, and ensuring the security interests of NATO.

Though some advocates see the emergence of an efficient ESPD as a herald to NATO’s demise, both Europe and the United States acknowledge that NATO is the lynchpin in the transatlantic, hence European, defense strategy. Javier Solana’s comment that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable was incorporated into the European Security Strategy.222 President Bush would also acknowledge the importance of NATO by stating that, “NATO is the “cornerstone” of the transatlantic relationship, and that because of NATO, Europe is “whole, united and at peace.”223 Those in Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen ESDP are only likely to achieve an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world. If they want Washington to support ESDP, they must produce real capabilities and assume real peacekeeping responsibilities, for instance in Bosnia. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening ESDP means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower unable to count on the added capabilities and resources of its allies when it comes to facing new threats and risks (and responsibilities/commitments).224

While European Forces are well experienced in prolonged post-war occupations, stabilization and reconstruction missions, this does not exclude the necessity of being well prepared for the complexities of modern joint/multinational combat operations. For Europe to focus only on peacekeeping is an unhealthy division of labor. European forces can be made fully capable of modern-era combat if they acquire the new assets and

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222 European Security Strategy, pg. 15.
224 What is Transformation and What Does It Mean for NATO?, in Transatlantic Transformations, pg. 21.
doctrines in achievable increments. As with similar U.S. military doctrine, European forces must be capable of both winning wars and maintaining the peace afterwards.

The enabling mission for NATO will continue to be out-of-area, forward security strategy, with the main instrument of this strategy being the NRF. The Alliance sees the NRF and the EU’s Headline Goal Force, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as fully compatible and mutually reinforcing initiatives. The European Security Strategy also makes clear that European defense plans that are compatible with the common security and defense policy established within NATO, such as the Berlin Plus arrangements, enhance the operational capability of the EU. Though at times the role of the NRF and the EU’s RRF will appear similar and duplicative, a competition between these two forces is unlikely due to a different focus towards missions, as well as in the provisions of the European Security Strategy and NATO’s Strategic Concept.

NRF’s primary focus will be rapid deployments and high-intensity combat in both Article 5 collective defense or non-Article 5 crisis response interventions and stabilization missions. RRF will be tasked primarily to fulfill the requirements of long-term preventive engagement and post-conflict peacekeeping duties under the auspices of the Petersberg Tasks. The RRF represents a European option, a regional alternative to the Transatlantic Alliance, and not a duplicate mutual defense institution. Also, it is a European commitment to shoulder a larger share of the security burden that was previously provided by the United States. Finally, the RRF’s focus will generally be towards Europe’s immediate periphery and its unstable Eastern additions. The distance that the EU projected their forces in the case of the Congo, while impressive, will be the exception at present, and future interventions are more likely be short in duration and/or small in scale until more capabilities are established for such missions.

226 The NATO Response Force: At the Center of NATO Transformation, pg. 1
Arguments can be made that both structures have the capacity to perform the same mission. While this is true, currently only NATO has established organizational and command infrastructures with sufficient experience in large scale, out-of-area missions. Though the establishment of a European military headquarters in Brussels provides this capacity to the EU, in reality its structure was reduced from that originally envisioned by France and Germany due to resistance from Britain that the organization was an attempt to duplicate NATO planning capabilities. By compromising on the size of the European military headquarters, the EU has committed to complementing NATO capabilities, not replacing them. Therefore, with the limited size of the headquarters, only small-scale missions, such as Operation Artemis, will likely be planned and executed without recourse to NATO planning assets. With NATO assets available under the Berlin-plus agreements for larger deployments, such an arrangement further encourages cooperation and available options among the operational forces of both NATO and the EU.

There will be instances of dual tasking of forces that are assigned to both the NRF and the ERF, despite guidance to avoid this situation. Also, there will be instances of deliberate secrecy and compartmentalization of planning and executing particular missions due to operational security requirements or regional self-interests. In extreme cases there may be examples of mission poaching as one organization is awarded the mandate by the U.N. Security Council to execute a particular mission at the elimination of the other. But in general, the multilateral decision making processes of both the EU and NATO will manage these issues and prevent serious political and service discord over expeditionary operations. Also, the interrelation of EU military structures incorporated into NATO, such as the Eurocorps and Battle Groups, guarantee a notable EU contribution to NATO deployments. In general, competition within the Alliance will not be at the operational level.

Rather, competition will exist at the strategic level, as Europe attains the capacity to field and maintain a modern, transformed military, and further implement a European strategic focus. In June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense Agency (EDA) devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability. A key
focus of EDA will be to help the EU’s 25 member states to stretch their scarce defense funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in areas of weapons research, development and procurement.\textsuperscript{229} The development of a European defense industry has important implications for the future of transatlantic defense cooperation. While there is skepticism among U.S. defense experts as to the efficiency of European defense industry cooperation, European defense firms have been increasing cooperation with each other rather than the United States.\textsuperscript{230}

The development of a European defense industry will increase the competition with Europe in the global arms market. America’s globally dominant defense industry provides a strong rational for European collaboration to compete internationally and to avoid dependence on the United States. That competition may also increase the likelihood that Europe firms will sell their advanced capabilities to countries in which the United States and Europe have different strategic interests, such as China.\textsuperscript{231}

ESDP will not make NATO redundant, as the EU has chosen, at present, to serve in a follow-on capacity to NATO deployments while developing expertise in expeditionary operations. Operation Artemis notwithstanding, until the EU acquires sufficient experience in out-of-area operations, Europe will not execute deployments equal in scope to large NATO operations, at least for some time. NATO will remain the preferred instrument to implement a forward defense strategy, especially when U.S. assistance is required and in the absence of a more robust European expeditionary capability. Accepting on-going missions, such as in Bosnia and Macedonia, will be the norm for EU out-of-area operations. Independent interventions, as in the Congo, will be the exception, but will provide an opportunity for the EU to develop and maintain an expertise in expeditionary operations, showcase increasing military capabilities, and to demonstrate a legitimate role as a global security actor.


Though approximately 55,000 EU military forces deployed between 2003 and 2004, these deployments exhausted the EU’s limited independent capabilities. Despite having approximately 1.4 million regular troops and 1 million reserves, the nations of the EU were complaining of being over-stretched. This demonstrates that the European Union still has a long way to go towards improving their expeditionary capability and transforming their Cold War structured military forces. Therefore, the EU will not be directly competing with NATO for some time.

Ideally, an increased expeditionary capability and focus in the EU under the ESS will complement NATO’s out of area strategy. Modern, interoperable, capable and expeditionary European forces can provide a venue for increased military cooperation within Europe through deployments, bilateral training and exercises. This example will also encourage and promote further development transformation and modernization of European military forces and their capabilities. As always, European forces will continue to be requested to serve in their historic capacity of experienced and professional peacekeepers, providing relief, or an additional capability, for long term NATO stabilization operations. Finally, European forces, as an independent capability with a European identity, can provide an operational and/or strategic alternative to a NATO deployment in politically sensitive regions, or when the interests of the Alliance as a whole are not engaged.

Though the Battle Group concept is sustainable by the limited capabilities of the member nations of the EU, they will have difficulties maintaining the expectations of between 6 to 10 operational units. Due to the level of readiness and interoperability required to function in this assignment, the EU will have to further increase transformation efforts within of their military forces in order to sustain this level of readiness. Also, the high degree of interoperability required of capabilities and units will naturally eliminate those countries that have not accomplished significant transformation of their military forces to date. Thus the burden will fall upon countries such as Great Britain, France and Germany to provide the support to maintain the capability. Also,

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though a uniform training and predeployment standard may be established, there will be varying degrees of competence and capability between the units of member nations that contribute to the Battle Groups. This variable makes attaining a consistent standard of readiness and capability for the Battle Group a challenging issue.

3. Unilateralism has Run Its Course, at Least in the Current U.S. Administration (2005)

Multilateral Cooperation now appears to be the preferred method, at present, for further controlling the proliferation of WMD. NATO, the EU and the U.S. are addressing the International Community’s grave concerns on Iran’s nuclear activities and is talking with this country on ways to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its program.\footnote{Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Israel on February 24 2005, NATO Speeches, NATO On-line Library, NATO, Brussels, February 24 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050224a.htm accessed 15 May 2005.} Furthermore, the U.S. has been insistent upon a diplomatic format of a multiparty, six-nation framework of talks with North Korea, despite consistent demands from Pyongyang that the negotiations be bilateral.\footnote{James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ensuring a Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, Remarks to The Research Conference - North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework, Washington, DC, February 13 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/29396.htm accessed May 15, 2005.}

The occupation of Iraq has exhausted U.S. capabilities. The US also has to maintain sufficient deployable military forces to respond in a crisis or they are vulnerable to coercion by the same “rogue” nations that they sought to intimidate with the interventionist foreign policy in Iraq. The posturing and rhetoric by Iran and North Korea, the other pillars of the Administration’s stated ideological “axis of evil”, is certainly a result of their assessments the impact of the Iraq occupation on the expeditionary and readiness capabilities of U.S. forces.\footnote{President’s State of the Union Address, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html accessed 17 May 2005}

In the subsequent event of a legitimate crisis, the US should not have difficulties achieving a mandate necessary for multilateral support. But there is no room left for more unilateral interventions in U.S. security strategy. In order to employ a response capability to a significant external security threat, the U.S. will require considerable operational
relief in Iraq, the contributions of interoperable coalition partners, or a united multilateral effort to mass the capabilities necessary to undertake such an endeavor.

The Bush administration appears to have acknowledged the requirement for collective security soon after the replacement of Secretary of State Colin Powell, noted for his dissent to unilateralism, by Condoleezza Rice, an enthusiastic and loyal supporter of the Bush administration’s interventionist foreign policy. Though Powell’s resignation appeared to be a portent of further brusque U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy, soon after her appointment Rice began a trip of reconciliation through Europe. The installation of Rice consolidates the ideological victory of the National Security Strategy without the entrenchment of continued a continued unilateralist foreign policy. The Bush administration will likely practice a conciliatory foreign policy with their European Allies now that they can do so from a position of strength and conviction. After the declaration of victory of the unilateralist ideology, the Administration appears to be working towards a more multilateral approach and is putting the unpleasant past of the Iraq discord behind them.236

A trend of reconciliation was evident during the European visits of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush in February 2005. A year earlier, calls from the Bush administration for a transatlantic crusade to advance the causes of freedom and democracy might have been greeted with open derision in European capitals.237 This time, the reception was warmer than it has been at any time since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Clearly, the carefully choreographed atmospherics of a set-piece presidential visit must be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism. There are encouraging signs, however, that both the Bush administration and its European critics have suspended their more polarizing tendencies, seeking instead to emphasize the common ground between their respective transformational visions.

The administration has begun jettisoning remaining unilateral neo-conservatives to multilateral institutions, where their ability to function in these environments is


certainly controversial. The architect of the Iraq invasion, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, has been accepted as head of the World Bank, following a path similar to Secretary of Defense and Vietnam war proponent Robert McNamara before him.238 Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security John Bolton, a strong conservative frequently at odds with his former boss Colin Powell, but supported by other neo-conservatives in the administration as a loyal Bush supporter, seems destined to be the U.S. ambassadorship to the United Nations, despite his unilateralist convictions and abrasive, confrontational demeanor.239 Donald Rumsfeld will be primarily occupied with the continuing complexities of the Iraq occupation, OEF, the War on Terror, repositioning U.S. forces from Europe to stateside, as well as the latest round of base realignment and closure issues. These concerns, in additional to necessary operational and multilateral planning for highly unlikely putative military operations against Iran and North Korea for violations of nuclear weapons proliferation agreements, should keep the defense department occupied for the rest of Rumsfeld’s tenure.

4. Institutional, Cultural and Ideological Differences Remain in the Alliance and will Impact NATO’s Operations

Differences in the interpretations of security threats, the necessity for out-of-area involvements and national caveats will continue to impede NATO deployments. Furthermore, these differences will effect the assumption of stability operations, especially those resulting from non-NATO interventions. In order to act or implement change in a European multilateral institution, time is required to achieve the consensus and diplomacy necessary within the institutions where multinational decisions are made. For the US to expect immediate compliance with an interventionist foreign policy in Iraq with limited debate, lack of a clear U.N. mandate or exhausting diplomatic measures signaled a profound misunderstanding of, or callus disregard for, European culture and the role this distinct identity has upon decision-making structures. Providing the United States with the means to execute a subsequent unilateral intervention would be one of the


reasons that France and Germany are hesitant to provide NATO leadership and troop commitments in the Iraq stabilization effort. Therefore, these two Alliance members can exercise considerable influence within NATO’s decision-making structure and effectively balance against U.S. foreign policy by adopting a position of limited cooperation and national caveats in NATO. The frustration with the disparity of influence that members can exude is an inherent weakness of such a multilateral structure based upon achieving the consensus of its members. This weakness was a chief reason that the U.S. chose to pursue a unilateral security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11, the invocation of Article 5 notwithstanding.

France’s insistence that Iraq remain a training mission vs. a combat mission prevents NATO from assuming operational control of the Multinational Force. Germany is also convinced that the Alliance may not be the best instrument to establish security and stability in Iraq. The cumbersome command arrangement also serves to separate the Alliance effort from the U.S.-led coalition, preventing a more direct role in the stabilization mission and blocking the deployments of a more robust presence of NATO peacekeepers, whose expertise could be well utilized in the troubled region.

Resistance to combining ISAF and OEF has been an additional Franco/German issue within the Alliance. There has been criticism of NATO foot-dragging in Afghanistan. While extra troops were promised in July to help with election security, the Afghan interim President Karzia asked NATO leaders at the Istanbul Summit that they be deployed immediately. There was also concern that the troops were to be deployed in the largely peaceful North, rather than the more volatile South and East, where scores of election officials and would be voters had been killed. Extra troops promised by NATO leaders have not materialized -- excluding Germany and Canada, ISAF’s other 33 contributing nations have mustered only 3,000 troops among them. And essential


hardware, such as helicopters and C-130 heavy transport planes, remained in hangars because European finance ministries refused to pay for them to be transported to Afghanistan.243

Attempts to further expand the NATO mission have not been successful. While the U.S. prefers a unified command structure in Afghanistan, attempts to merge both ISAF and OEF under NATO control are being blocked by both France and Germany. Both of these Alliance members prefer that there be a distinction between combat and stability forces due to parliamentary restrictions, recruiting concerns, and training requirements.244 There is also concern among the Allies that the U.S. would redirect troops scheduled for Afghanistan to more pressing needs in Iraq should NATO assume control of ISAF. NATO has the capacity to do more, but is once again is politically blocked by the national interests of a few of its 26 members.

Currently in the NATO operations, SACEUR, General James Jones, USMC, has been increasingly critical of “national caveats” that have troubled operations in the Balkans.245 In principle, NATO governments have committed forces to allied missions, and therefore are not technically under national control.246 But national governments have put increasing restrictions on those tasks that their forces may undertake, and have gone as far as to instruct their officers not to carry out particular NATO operations such as in crowd control operations by KFOR in Kosovo. In the face of rioting conducted by Albanians against Serbs, German forces refused to participate in crowd control operations with other KFOR members.247 General Jones sites these cases as highly disruptive of Allied operations, and demonstrates that NATO operations in the Balkans still suffer

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243 Harding, Garth, “NATO Flirts with Afghan Failure,”.
244 CRS NATO and the European Union January 2005, pg. 9.
from the lack of unity of command and purpose. In the midst of crisis management, operational consensus is difficult to maintain and impossible to achieve.

5. **For NATO to Assume a Leading Role as an Expeditionary Security Actor, It must be able to Conduct Rapid Response**

Since its Kosovo intervention, NATO has not been engaged in the lead capacity for a crisis response intervention. The next major crisis to face the Alliance may require a more rapid and direct response than NATO has executed in the past. Either because of a catastrophic act of terrorism resulting in mass-casualties, or as a result of dramatic human rights violations, security threats from rogue nations or failing due to WMD proliferation, or due to a humanitarian crisis or a natural disaster, NATO may have to intervene more rapidly than has been their history. This test will not come announced or expected, and is not looming, but it is always an unfortunate possibility, and one for which the Alliance must be prepared.

Now that the NRF is operational, NATO is equipped with the capability to effectively execute out-of-area rapid response missions and to effectively serve as an operational security actor in crisis management. This capability, combined with the PCC decisions of a streamlined decision-making command structure and national commitments towards military transformation, has provided NATO with a formidable means of implementing a multilateral forward security strategy.

Utilizing the NRF in a rapid response capacity will serve to further validate the expeditionary focus of the Alliance, and their role as an Out-of-Area security actor with the capability to conduct the full range of missions from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. But to validate this capability, NATO will have to intervene quickly enough in a crisis to have a significant and/or beneficial impact. The key factors in NATO’s success in this capacity, and in a leading vs. supporting role, will be speed and cooperation.

The next crisis will likely follow multilateral procedures in a concerted effort by the Allies to utilize and validate the Alliance and demonstrate transatlantic cooperation and unity. In theory the mechanisms exist to execute a rapid response. Unfortunately,
NATO’s past interventions have proven that the Alliance suffers from unity of effort due to national caveats, or is hindered in their consensus by the actions of a few obstinate members and their self-interests. With the inherent flaws extant within the structures of the Alliance, consensus may be difficult to achieve under the duress of a crisis. In the end, the Allies will have to do more than “agree to disagree”, but will have to rapidly arrive at a consensus decision in order to deploy the NRF in sufficient time to have an operational and strategic impact in the crisis.

A strategy that is implemented primarily using mission-based coalitions or dependent upon unilateral freedom of action will not have the ability to sustain an intervention that established security institutions could provide. Also, a unilateral, self-interested course of action is destabilizing and polarizing upon an international community of strategic interdependent security requirements, global economies, and common values. Both the United States and Europe will benefit should the Alliance be consistently engaged as the preferred instrument in implementing a forward defense strategy.

F. CONCLUSION

Through its history the greatest threat to the Alliance has been internal; adapting to changes in the security environment, discord within its membership and in the conflicting cultures and self-interests of Europe and North America has caused the greatest disruptions of NATO’s organization and its utilization as a security actor. After each time of crisis, NATO has recovered, adapted and emerged stronger, albeit still imperfect. NATO has done so once again and can continue as the premier instrument with which to engage the United States in European security and to execute an expeditionary defense strategy that engages the formidable resources of both regions that constitute the Transatlantic Alliance.

NATO’s success in out-of-area missions will be measured, not through success or failure, but through continued involvement. Grand Catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, the proliferation of WMD, Tsunamis & continuing humanitarian crises will offer ample opportunities for out-of-area engagements for the Alliance. NATO has the potential to thrive in a forward security role, especially since the adoption of the NRF and the
conciliatory and cooperative environment towards negotiations since the Iraq crisis. The Alliance should continue to be the central point in transatlantic security, as it has in the past, because of its place as the only transatlantic organization based on the defense of its members. As the only international institution in Europe of which the United States was a recognized leader, NATO can continue to be the institution through which the United States can best pursue its interests in Europe. A NATO that can project power and purpose outside of Europe will greatly enhance the odds of preserving world peace while advancing democratic values that the organization espouses.

Finally, the simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global problems of the contemporary era alone, and neither can Europe. Together, however, they can succeed. This is the main reason for keeping the Alliance together and engaging it in a forward defense strategy.

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250 Binnendijk, Hans, and Kugler, Richard, in Transatlantic Transformations, pg. 43
VI. CONCLUSION

While the United States did not need allies or the sanction by the UN to invade Iraq, it has subsequently learned that that problems of a postwar reconstruction effort are too great for any one country, however powerful, to handle. The U.S. needs money and peacekeepers from other countries to help with the endeavor, and it needs a mandate from a major international security institution to bestow legitimacy upon expeditionary interventions in order to guarantee multinational contributions of scale. To sustain expeditionary operations of scale and substance, such as in Iraq, requires a multilateral effort.

The U.S. needs the fledgling interoperable and expeditionary military capabilities of Europe, as well as the multinational legitimacy, in order to sustain adequate contributions of troops, materials and public opinion necessary to achieve stability and to execute a successful exit strategy that maintains international credibility. Due to the significant costs and impact upon America’s operational military forces in Iraq, the Bush administration is apt to adopt a more multilateral position in future military interventions, at least in the near future.

Europe has learned that it cannot counter or halt U.S. intentions due to the lack of a unified opposition amongst the EU, or a U.S. dependency upon European military hardware. If the EU desires to have influence in forming and executing U.S. foreign policy, it will require a united consensus towards providing or withholding subsequent contributions of troops for extended support and stability operations. The aftermath in Iraq shows how costly unilateral peacekeeping can be: it has sapped U.S. military capability and undermined public support for international policies. The U.S. did not want or need high intensity assistance, but they did, and still do, desire peacekeepers.

The potential rewards for nations that provide political and post-conflict support for future “coalitions of the willing” can be very appealing for poorer countries, such as those in Eastern European. The benefits of supporting a combined EU opposition bloc would have to outweigh the rewards for joining an ad hoc coalition on a specific foreign
policy intervention in the future. Therefore, in order to execute the tenets of the ESS, the EU must achieve the consensus necessary to prevent future defections from a multilateral security policy, such as ESDP.

Also, the EU must continue to create and maintain the means to support expeditionary interventions as a security actor. Europe must provide more than peacekeeping troops for operational relief of forces in theater. While it is not necessary, or possible, for the EU to replicate the full range of capabilities that provide the U.S. its advantage and dominance, European military forces must be able to work in adjacent and supporting roles with U.S. and major coalition operations. This will require the ability to interoperate, as well as coordinate and communicate on a level with the latest military technology. Also, sufficient monetary investment will be necessary in order to sustain and implement those measures agreed to in the ESDP, especially those immediate tenants of the Prague Capabilities Commitments and the European Headline Goal 2010.

As Lord Robertson pointed out, NATO's value as a strategic asset will ultimately depend on three things: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.251

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