

Challenges of Peace Operations:
Into the 21st Century

Concluding Report 1997–2002

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Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century

Concluding Report

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Foreword

The Challenges Project was initiated in Sweden in 1997. Over the years, participants from some 230 organizations and 50 countries have joined the endeavour, exchanging experiences and ideas on how to enhance the planning, conduct and effectiveness of multinational peace operations. To date, nine international seminars have been hosted by a global network of partner organizations in cooperation with their national peacekeeping training and education facilities. The project has benefited greatly from a wide spectrum of national perspectives, cultural outlooks, professional civilian and military expertise, and regional insights. The process itself has generated new cooperative structures.

Multinational efforts to promote peace and stability will continue to be a major challenge for the United Nations and the international community in the 21st century.

I am very pleased to present this report on behalf of the Partner Organizations of the Challenges Project. While the report should not be taken as representing official governmental positions, it is my hope that it will be perceived as a valuable addition to the evolving dialogue in this complex field.

Anna Lindh
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Acknowledgements

The present report is the product of a truly multinational and joint effort. Many dedicated and generous peace contributors have committed to the project over the past five years. They have brought their experience, insight and resources to share with the project effort in our common pursuit of a more peaceful world. Whether acting locally, nationally, regionally or globally, all efforts have been crucial to the overall project effort. Participants from some 50 countries and 230 organizations have contributed to the seminar series as chairs, speakers or seminar participants. Nine international seminars have been held on five continents by Challenges Project Partner Organizations. The findings of the report stem from the general discussions held during the seminars and thus, seminar speakers and contributing participants are in particular to be thanked.

The project held editing sessions in Stockholm, Cornwallis and Buenos Aires, while completing the present report. The Project Partners wish to thank the authors of the present report; Professor Kamel Abu-Jaber, Lieutenant Colonel Donna Boltz, Mr. Derek Boothby, Ms. Alaciel de Campos, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Esper, Colonel (ret.) Douglas Fraser, Ambassador Martin Hallqvist, Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, Professor Bo Huldt, Lieutenant Colonel Nick Keam, Mr. David Lightburn, Ms. Angela Mackay, Mr. Mark Malan, Ambassador Peggy Mason, Dr. Dyan Mazurana, Lieutenant General (ret.) Satish Nambiar, Colonel George Oliver III, Major Bruce Oswald, Navy Captain Lennart Stenberg, Dr. Angela Raven Roberts, Mr. Bakhtiyar Tuzhmukamedov. Editors of the report were Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg (main editor), Professor Bo Huldt and Mr. Derek Boothby. The Concluding Report main editing session was held in Buenos Aires. During this session, the authors group benefited greatly from the valuable experience and insights shared by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Ambassador Chief Arthur Mbanefo, Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, Lieutenant General Evergisto de Vergara, and Major General Timothy Ford.

The Project Partners wish to express their sincere appreciation to the distinguished officials of the United Nations for their unfailing support of the project endeavour, as speakers at seminars, or through the sharing of invaluable advise on developing issues within the subject matter.

Throughout the development of the project, valuable support, as hosts of seminars or parts of seminars, has kindly been provided by the Swedish International Centre, Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy of the Russian Federation, CIS HQ for Military Cooperation & Coordination, Zarqa Peacekeeping Centre of Jordan, Royal Police Academy of Jordan, South African Army College, United States Army Peacekeeping Institute, United Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping, the USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping Training Ground, Pear-

son Peacekeeping Centre of Canada, CAECOPAZ Armed Forces Peacekeeping Training Centre of Argentina, CENCAMEX Gendarmerie Peacekeeping Training Centre of Argentina. The Project Partners also appreciate the cooperation with the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre and the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, and welcome Australia's offer to host the Follow Up Seminar in October 2002.

Each host organization has been the main sponsor of their respective seminar. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish National Defence College have provided resources for the overall coordinating function of the Challenges Project. Crucial and additional support have been kindly received from the governments of Argentina, India, Japan, Jordan, and Norway, the defence and police forces of Argentina, Australia, India, Jordan, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, USA, and including the 14 civilian and military peacekeeping training centres stated above. Human and financial resources have also been generously provided by the Royal Court of Jordan, NATO Information and Liaison Office, Susan and Elihu Rose Foundation, Hans Seidel Foundation, Jordan Radio & Television Corporation, Jordan Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, Mayor of Amman, and London School of Economics & Political Science.

After five years of what became a global undertaking, it would be impossible to name all those who have assisted and contributed to the effort, around the world and along the way. However, they know who they are, and the Project Partners wish to thank them for having committed to the endeavour and made the Challenges Project possible, through their hard work and dedication, to the cause, and in the name, of peace.

Partner Organizations and Hosts of Challenges Seminars 1997-2002

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Executive Summary and Conclusions

1. The present report is the product of a series of seminars held during the past five years in nine countries around the world and attended by a wide range of highly experienced civilian and military peacekeepers and academics from some 230 organizations and 50 countries. The aim of the project has been to bring to bear, in an informal and collegial setting, the collective knowledge and views of participants on the challenges of peacekeeping and peace support as the world enters the 21st century.

2. Part way through the seminar series, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the 'Brahimi' Report) was presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000). The thrust and substance of that report contributed significantly to subsequent seminars in the Challenge Project. The present study, "**Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century**", is intended as an independent contribution to the continuing debate on peace operations reflecting different national and international perceptions, complementing the analyses and recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report. In addition to the present Challenges Concluding Report, reports from each seminar are available from Project Partner Organizations as listed in Annex 2, or the Challenges Project Web-site at www.peacechallenges.net.

3. The aim of the project has been to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership. Discussions on the practice and theory of peace operations were combined with practical issues of training and education involving visits to national civilian and military peacekeeping training academies and centres. The seminars covered a broad horizon of issues, from which the Challenges Project Partners selected fourteen topics for inclusion as separate chapters of this report. This Concluding Report has been written with the following objectives:

- a. to make practical recommendations in order to enhance the international capability to conduct multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations;
- b. to inform on current developments on principal issues in contemporary peace operations; and
- c. to contribute to maintaining the current momentum for enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of international peace operations, as generated by the Brahimi Report and other related initiatives.

4. As explained in the Introduction, the writing of the report is a joint effort by the Project Partner Organizations. The chapters are the product of several hands and therefore reflect differences in style and emphasis. Although the chapters have been circulated for review and comment to all the Project Partners, no attempt has

been made to achieve consensus agreement on the findings and recommendations contained therein. In the informal and vigorous spirit of the seminars, the views expressed are those of the individuals concerned and do not necessarily reflect the positions of their respective institutions or governments.

5. The principal contents and recommendations of each chapter are summarized below and a complete list of the recommendations is at Annex 1.

Chapter 1 – The Changing Concepts of Security

6. Security has never been a static concept. Since the end of the Cold War it has been particularly fluid and this will continue into the 21st century. The increased attention given during the 1990s to aspects of the security of human life and dignity, and the effects this had on more traditional concepts of the military security of the state, have served to complicate the general perceptions of security. At the same time, they have provided an opportunity for elaborating broader interpretations of security than in earlier years.

7. At the time of finalizing the present report, in the light of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, issues of international terrorism have come to the forefront of attention and the military aspects of security are currently being revisited by many. Concepts of security will inevitably prove to be comprehensive, including elements of both military and non-military nature. Given the focus of this report on peace operations and the assessment that other disputes and tensions apart from international terrorism remain unresolved, the need for multilateral peace operations seems likely to continue unabated in the 21st century. Unlike subsequent chapters of the report, the first chapter does not offer recommendations as such, but its purpose is rather to place the discussion on how to deal with international and regional conflict in its wider context, historically as well as substantively.

8. Security remains as elusive as ever. Although the risk of interstate war involving weapons of mass destruction is less than during the Cold War, in a world of nuclear proliferation, the consequences, if such a war occurred, would still be catastrophic. What has risen in recent years has been the concept of threats to the security and well-being of the individual and to the conditions for the earth's survival. During the course of the seminar series, the four essential characteristics of human security identified in the 1994 Human Development Report – the universality of concern for human security, relevant to people everywhere in rich nations and poor; the interdependence of its components; the benefits of early prevention rather than later prevention; and the people-centred nature of the human security concept – have gained greater prominence.

9. The rising tide of globalization has not lifted all boats; some have prospered but many others have been left behind. Many millions of human beings have been left stranded with little prospect of attaining even the basics of adequate food, shelter, health, education and human rights. The gap between the rich and poor has widened. At the same time, we have seen much greater incidence of intrastate conflict frequently involving warlords, paramilitaries and other non-state actors, destroying normal societal life and local economies. Modern and future peace operations find themselves faced with the many complexities of not only ending conflict but rebuilding societies, re-establishing institutions, promoting good governance, restoring infrastructure and the economy and generally assisting in the promotion of human security and building sustainable peace. What is needed is greater North-South cooperation and inclusive rather than exclusive thinking in formulating security concepts.

Chapter 2 – The Roles of the United Nations and of Regional Organizations and Arrangements

10. As the number of intrastate conflicts has risen, and complex emergencies have worsened in circumstances of failed states or the total breakdown of government institutions, the UN has inevitably found itself engaged in issues of internal insecurity. In implementing the Security Council's mandates, the UN has taken on highly complicated peace operations, often with insufficient resources in terms of personnel, materiel and finance. In a word, the UN has become overburdened.

11. As the UN reviews and reassesses its role in peace operations, changes in regional organizations and arrangements offer new opportunities. Different regions and sub-regions are evolving in different ways and their respective capabilities to deal with their problems vary. Regional action can have both advantages and disadvantages. States in the region concerned have national interests in local stability and are more likely to be willing to take part in peace operations that are closer to the homeland. Moreover, they will often be more familiar with regional cultures and attitudes than outsiders. On the other hand, sometimes states in the region may be too close to the issues and may have their own agendas. Conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust may undermine the peace process. There may also be inadequate military and other resources available.

12. With the emergence and improving capabilities of regional organizations and arrangements, there is now an opportunity for the UN to take less on its own shoulders. The UN should consider doing less, and what it decides to do it should do well. The UN will need to recognize what it should retain, what it should pass to regional organizations and arrangements when practicable, and how to best develop effective cooperation to make the most effective use of resources available. In

essence, the challenge is how to best involve regional organizations without regionalizing peacekeeping.

13. In recent years, the Security Council adopted a practice of making fact-finding visits to conflict areas. When contemplating action by the international community to establish a peace operation, there could be much value in the Security Council paying similar visits to relevant regional or sub-regional organizations to discuss how best to share the burden.

14. Despite the load, in many respects there is and will continue to be no organization other than the UN able to shoulder some of the burden. With its global membership, the UN remains the sole world body with responsibility for international peace and security and as such has a legitimacy that is unique. The UN is the highest international body for the establishment of instruments of law and human rights, and it is the Charter that sets the highest standards of peace and justice. While coalitions of the willing, authorized by the Security Council, may be a better expedient for vigorous enforcement actions, in many other circumstances of complex peace operations it is only through the UN that the broadest range of capabilities available to the international community can be brought to bear.

15. It is recommended that Member States should be more consistent with the political and resource support that they offer to peace operations, that the Secretary-General should be invited to offer his views on the benefits and pitfalls of closer cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements, and on how best to improve that cooperation, and that the topic should be a subject for further discussion between the Secretary-General and heads of regional organizations and arrangements.

Chapter 3 – The Legal Dimension of Peace Operations

16. While it is true that “peacekeeping” is not mentioned in the UN Charter, the practice of conducting such operations has created a number of norms that have generally been accepted as forming the legal basis for their conduct. For example, it is now generally accepted that norms such as consent, impartiality and the use of force in self-defence form the basis for some peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, legal norms are created by the application of legal sources such as the status of force agreement for specific missions, guidelines for the conduct of peace operations issued by the Secretary-General, and the guidelines and directives issued by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

17. However, Challenges participants felt that further efforts are required to ensure that to the maximum extent possible legal ambiguities are resolved during the planning and conduct of peace operations and agreed upon by all parties con-

cerned. To some observers, there has been a doctrinal shift in thinking in recent years. In some difficult humanitarian emergencies, action has been taken unilaterally or collectively by a group of States that then receive approval retroactively from the UN. Thus, some analysts are already questioning whether this reflects emerging customary international law. The situation is further complicated by differences in terminology in use by the UN, regional organizations and States, and even within the political, military and social spheres of society.

18. Challenges participants also explored complexities related to the application of rules of engagement (ROE), the legal framework for the conduct of military and or police operations, and the influence and application of domestic law to the conduct of peace operations. The application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to the conduct of peace operations and to a limited extent, issues of international law and landmines are addressed in the chapter on ‘Integrating the Human Rights Perspective’.

19. The resolution of some of the ambiguities could be addressed by the Security Council being more open and transparent in the conduct of its business and in holding broader consultation with current and potential troop and police contributing nations. Among the recommendations made, it is suggested that the feasibility should be explored of negotiating a guideline document on existing practice, based on existing treaties, administrative acts and recommendations, that would serve as an implementing instrument of the UN Charter to provide adequate and sound legal grounds for peace operations. It is also proposed that an initiative should be launched to conduct under the auspices of the UN, a comprehensive study of the legal aspects of peace operations.

Chapter 4 – Integrating the Human Rights Perspective

20. With a full understanding of the importance of the international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Challenges participants examined the subject from the perspective of protecting civilians’ rights during armed conflict, the pursuing of perpetrators of human rights violations or war crimes, the role of the peacekeepers themselves, and other related international efforts. There is a need for the leadership and for personnel engaged in peace operations to have a better understanding of international humanitarian and human rights law, to address pro-actively human rights challenges within peace operations, and to recognize the obligations of peacekeepers and UN personnel under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

21. There was considerable debate on what the roles of peacekeepers should be in the new era of international criminal prosecution. Some participants suggested military peacekeepers do not have the training to use the power to arrest. Others

expressed the view that the military does not have the capacity to exercise the power to arrest, nor did the military particularly desire such a role. A general view from human rights experts was that it was the military's role to provide security, with the role of the police, local or international as appropriate, to make arrests, however, such an executive role must have legal support.

22. A further challenge explored was whether military forces should as a general rule hold detainees, with all military personnel arguing that militaries are trained to deal with prisoners of war (POWs), but detainees are not POWs. Detention during peace operations should, at the very least, conform to the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights law, but in practice there has often been no physical facility to accommodate all those detained. The issue of arrest and detention by peacekeepers military or police, should be further explored. The proposal regarding the establishment of an International Interim Criminal Code and Procedure Code would constitute the legal basis for such actions.

23. For the successful integration of the human rights perspective into a peace operation, much depends on the extent of cooperation and effective coordination between the many diverse civilian elements of any mission, and between these civilians and the military forces and international police. Problems of culture, mandate, areas of responsibility, personality and other factors have mitigated against such effective cooperation in the past and, indeed, the present. In areas such as humanitarian assistance and human rights, this problem is exacerbated: the experts and those with institutional mandates generally disapprove of the involvement of the military in this sensitive area. A great deal of education, training, understanding, tolerance and cooperation is yet required.

24. Two of the recommendations are that all personnel in a peace operation – civilian, military and police – need to have a fundamental understanding of international humanitarian law and human rights law. While this remains a national responsibility, international organizations involved in peace operations, as well as expert agencies such as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the Red Cross should make every effort to supplement national training. Secondly, mission planning and implementation should include the necessary expertise and advice regarding human rights, including in the development and implementation of military rules of engagement.

Chapter 5 – Doctrinal Challenges

25. The Challenges discussions underlined that there are many different, and sometimes overlapping, opinions about doctrine for complex peace operations – but as yet no clear UN guidance on the subject. The aim of this chapter is to focus

on the military doctrine required to provide the safe and secure environment within which political, social and economic development may proceed. The topic is complicated by differences in usage of the term ‘doctrine’.

26. It has long been recognized that no two peace operations are alike, each is distinct and unique. As one of the participants pointed out, they require innovation, flexibility, initiative and moral courage on the part of the individuals involved. The difficulty lies in capturing doctrine without being dogmatic and rigid. The seminars of the Challenges Project served as a useful forum for an open and informal discussion of doctrinal issues, from the lessons learned from hard experience of the past to the sensitive dimensions of the possibilities and limits on the use of force.

27. The Brahimi Report did not address in depth the most vexing doctrinal issue of peace operations – the appropriate and effective use of military force in pursuit of the mandate. Peace operations require “comprehensive and lasting solutions” which call for a complex and multilevel doctrine. The difficulty of achieving such a comprehensive document is daunting even for just a single nation let alone a collection of nations. However, if the doctrine focuses on some key overarching principles, it is believed that consensus could be obtained and adequate guidance provided.

28. Arising from the Challenges discussions, it is recommended that: there should be a multinational and inclusive effort to define the meaning and scope of doctrine applicable to UN peace operations; troop contributing countries should then take steps to build common doctrinal statements into their national doctrines; led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, specific efforts should be made to apply lessons learned in the formation of peace operation doctrine, paying particular attention to the need to enhance military, police and civilian coordination.

Chapter 6 – Preventive Action

29. The importance of conflict prevention was recognized by Challenges participants early in the seminar series and the chapter briefly traces the development of preventive diplomacy to the current and much broader term of preventive action. A main challenge of preventive action is that of convincing governments that it is worthwhile: experience and logic indicate that prevention is sensible and highly cost-effective compared to facing the costs of violent conflict, yet in practice it continues to be an instrument that has been too rarely applied.

30. The fundamental problems affecting many countries in crisis have to do with poor governance, and the lack of equitable rights of all national groups, majority or minority. Often, compounding the crises are ongoing conflicts, poverty and social and economic dysfunction. Such problems are often the sources of in-

terrecine marginalization, alienation, genocide, and in some cases, the collapse of the state involved. Tackling root causes requires establishing a foundation for better governance. Early identification of the root causes followed by early action offers a wider range of options at lower cost than attempts to avoid violent conflict just as the crisis is about to break.

31. During seminar discussions it was suggested that an overall strategy to prevent armed conflict, a global response, international cooperation and common action are required to support sustainable peace. Efforts should be focused on eradicating poverty; promoting human rights; deepening democracy; bringing about disarmament; and supporting regional cooperation. These actions entail expertise to design practical projects in governance, in human rights, and in economic and social development. To supplement official efforts, non-governmental groups can be very helpful in establishing regional and sub-regional early-warning centres and in peace-building activities. Challenges participants also discussed the role of sanctions as a tool of preventive diplomacy and the conditions under which these were more likely to be successful.

32. In concluding that preventive action is an integral activity of peace operations and will become even more so in the coming years, the following elements would seem to have particular relevance: root causes of conflict need to be identified and actions taken to eradicate them through integrated programmes that address human security needs; early warning must be transformed into rapid and early action so as to be most effective; non-governmental organizations can be very helpful to governments in early warning and peace-building activities; sanctions regimes imposed under Chapter VII must have clearly defined aims if they are to be effective, and there need to be clear conditions for lifting sanctions; sanctions should be a tool of policy, not a substitute for policy; mobilization of sufficient political, economic and military resources is essential for preventive action to be meaningful; and, when ‘direct prevention’ is needed, it should be applied by incremental steps from fact-finding, good offices, arbitration, and similar actions before reaching deterrence and enforcement measures, as defined in Charter VII of the UN Charter.

Chapter 7 – Gender Perspectives in Effective Peace Operations

33. There was much debate by Challenges participants on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) in which the Council gave full recognition of the importance of gender perspectives in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building. Resolution 1325 also provided a number of important operational mandates, with implications both for individual Member States, the United Nations system and civil society. The resolution called for practical measures to enhance women’s roles as equal partners in all stages of peace processes, including

peace accords, ensure their protection in armed conflict and bring to justice perpetrators of human rights violations, including gender related violence.

34. The experiences and concerns of men, women, boys and girls before, during, and after wars and armed conflicts are shaped by the social roles of their genders. Gender-based violence in the context of contemporary conflicts has become a critical element of warfare. At the same time, global criminalized forces exploit poverty and weakened authority to assert control over children and women and use trafficking, forced marriage, and prostitution as highly profitable endeavours.

35. It is proposed that a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security should be appointed. Her/his functions should be designed on the model of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. This person should have access to all peace operations and her/his work should be mainly based on an advocacy-oriented mandate.

36. Gender awareness training should be initiated in all peace operations for military and civilian staff at all levels. The senior leadership should be required to ensure that training is embedded within a broader framework that promotes and supports gender awareness in all mission policies, programmes and procedures.

37. An appropriate Gender Unit structure should be built into all peace operations, staffed at a senior level and reporting directly to the SRSG. Staffing should comprise both men and women and the recruitment of local staff should be encouraged. The work of Gender Units needs to be effectively supported through adequate funding to ensure incorporation within mission activities as well as community outreach.

38. Member States should be actively encouraged to identify and promote a roster of qualified women for all levels of employment in peace operations, including high-level appointments. The participation of women in the peace process should be increased. Specialized UN agencies, implementing partners and non governmental organizations (NGO,) should be expected to foster local initiatives and capacity-building activities for this purpose, mainly through funding, training, skills development and the preparation of women for public and political office.

Chapter 8 – Civil-Military Relations and Cooperation

39. Peace operations in the 21st century will continue to demand a very broad range of skills and efforts from those involved. On some occasions in the past decade, civilian, police and military elements have worked together constructively and harmoniously, but on others the inability to achieve an appropriate level of cooperation has seriously weakened the overall effectiveness of the mission.

40. A theme that ran through many of the seminars was the need to improve civil-military relations within peace operations in the light of the all-too-frequent incidence of inability to cooperate willingly, to coordinate effectively and efficiently and to pursue common objectives collectively and professionally. For the most part, these difficulties arise from the complex nature of modern peace operations and a number of obstacles, misunderstandings and other dilemmas that confront military and civilian members of a mission who come from different professional backgrounds and cultures and have to perform their tasks amid conflicting priorities.

41. The manner in which the two communities relate to one another varies considerably according to the type or phase of a peace operation. There are different challenges depending, for example, upon whether security is the focus (the lead is generally with military forces), or humanitarian assistance (where the lead is generally with civilian agencies), or longer-term peace-building (where the military can be tasked to support ‘civil implementation’). It should also be noted that while civilian-military relations can present difficulties in modern, complex peace operations, so too can relations between different sections of the civilian community.

42. The recommendations embrace four main actions that can be taken in order to improve civilian-military relations, to properly acknowledge and address the dependency between the two communities in modern peace operations, and, specifically, to promote possibilities for enhanced cooperation and coordination. These are: first, to begin by building on shared values and concerns between the civilian and military communities; secondly, to address the fundamental challenges (the obstacles, misunderstandings and dilemmas) through, in the main, better training and education; thirdly, to consider a set of basic principles for better cooperation and operational coordination for adoption by principal international organizations and arrangements, UN agencies and major NGOs; and, fourthly, to work at both the strategic (headquarters) level and the operational level to improve civil-military as well as civil-civil cooperation and coordination.

Chapter 9 – Police – In the Service of Peace

43. Today peace operations are often undertaken *inside* societies characterized by power struggles, corruption, criminality and instability. One of the fundamental aspects for the international community to focus on when planning a peace operation is the task of rebuilding societies based on the rule of law. In certain cases, the administration is temporarily taken over by international organizations under the leadership and umbrella of the United Nations, while national law enforcement is being handled under executive mandates.

44. The first challenge identified during the Challenges Project was the difficulty for Member States to meet the requirements for UN civilian police, in quantity

as well as quality. It was suggested that more support should be given by Member States to advance preparation, in the form of comprehensive databases of qualified personnel, coordinated education and training including joint training in regional centres together with other police, military and civilian colleagues from the same part of the world, but also with colleagues from out of area regions should be encouraged the introduction of screening procedures, establishing pools of qualified personnel, and better preparation and coordination of police equipment. Training is especially important in situations in which police are operating under executive mandates.

45. A second challenge concerned issues of planning and operational considerations. It was considered that during a peace operation higher importance should be given to closer cooperation and coordination between the police and other elements, such as the military, the humanitarian and development organizations, NGOs, local authorities and communities. Further study was recommended on the third challenge identified, which was related to the consequences of the growing trend of the Security Council to authorize missions with executive authority. While such mandates may be infrequent, the demands placed on civilian police are much different from those of traditional mandates.

46. Challenges participants drew attention to the issue of providing the necessary platform for the entire context in which the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) operates: the “whole legal chain”. There should be greater recognition by Member States of the importance of improving the whole legal chain, by the presence in a peace operation of suitably qualified and experienced personnel such as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, prison personnel and others.

47. Finally in this chapter, attention is drawn to the development perspective of international policing cooperation. As an important contribution to post-conflict peace-building, there should be arrangements for long term training of local police as an element of development cooperation work. This has to be carried out with the consent of the government of the country concerned, and at its request. There are many ways in which it can be accomplished, through the United Nations Development Program, other international organizations or bilaterally, but it is an aspect of long term assistance to the promotion of sustainable peace that to date has received insufficient attention and support.

Chapter 10 – Planning for Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

48. In recent years it has increasingly been recognized that a major element of post-conflict peace-building must be effective arrangements for bringing former combatants back into normal civilian life as productive members of the local com-

munity. This is much more easily said than done and the Challenges Project explored the needs, the mechanisms and the challenge of successful planning for a comprehensive and integrated programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R). Post-conflict DD&R is a politically, institutionally, technically and logistically complex and sensitive process, demanding considerable human and financial resources to plan, implement and monitor its various components. Given the diversity of actors involved in the different stages of the process, the inter-relation of these phases and their dependence, in turn, on related aspects of the broader peace implementation plan, the requirement for integrated planning and effective coordination is particularly acute.

49. If DD&R is to be successful, significant human, materiel and financial resources are required and specialist expertise is required in several dimensions, from weapons collection and destruction to arms embargo enforcement, and from establishing assembly and encampment facilities to registration and dealing with specific needs such as those of child fighters.

50. An immensely important dimension of reintegration programming is the social, political and psychological reintegration of the ex-combatant. The reintegration stage is, in the long term, the most critical to success. It takes time, persistence and reliable access to resources, particularly funding. Experience has shown that bilateral donors and agencies tend to be more interested in the encampment and disarmament phases, whereas for long term success reintegration has to be part of a broader programme of economic rehabilitation and recovery. Added to this is the vociferous opposition of many developing countries, in dire need of development assistance but not in conflict, to the possibility of a major shift in donor funding to post-conflict situations.

51. As steps towards more effective planning for DD&R, the recommendations include increased joint training in DD&R for all partners in the DD&R process, increased DD&R planning and implementation expertise in the World Bank, and a quest for ways to encourage Member States to give increased support to the funding of long-term peace-building.

Chapter 11 – Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel

52. For most of the UN's first forty years, the most effective guarantee of safety and security for UN peacekeepers and associated personnel in the field was the UN emblem itself, but that has changed. As we enter the 21st century, in some parts of the world where peace operations have to be conducted, the UN emblem has instead often become a target. Peacekeepers, civilian and military, are exposed and often vulnerable. As related by a senior Challenges participant, "We send young

people into the field, without security training and without communications and other equipment, and we expect them to do miracles. ...We say that the host government has the primary responsibility for security, but we send people to places where there is no host government, or where the government cannot even provide security for itself.”

53. There is a conceptual difference between *safety* and *security*: was the person killed or injured by a tropical disease or in a car accident? - or by a bullet or a landmine? More management attention paid to the former would also lead to higher security awareness on the part of personnel. An effective risk management system has to cover both. Providing security to personnel in the field is a difficult task, compounded by differences in approach between military and civilian components, by differences in management responsibilities, and by lack of resources for sufficient security staff and training. The Challenges discussions were informed by firsthand accounts from several peacekeepers who had been involved in security incidents, including being detained by armed elements.

54. The Tokyo Seminar of March 2001 preceded the approval by the General Assembly in December 2001 of most of the Secretary-General's proposals to improve the security management system and his requests for additional resources. At the time of writing, these improvements have yet to be implemented and so the recommendations remain valid. They include the following: Member States should continue to pay close attention to the weaknesses in the present arrangements for safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and associated personnel taking part in peace operations, with a view to providing the necessary political support and financial resources to the Secretary-General to make the improvements that are needed; specific efforts should be made within the UN family to improve coordination and cooperation between the UN Secretariat and UN agencies and programmes, and within the UN Secretariat, to resolve issues of accountability and lack of clarity in command and control; and, a major effort should be made to improve all aspects of training.

Chapter 12 – Information Technology and Peace Operations: A Relationship for the New Millennium

55. Participants in the Challenges seminars raised several aspects of information technology, from practical problems of equipment interoperability to the pressures placed on peacekeepers by representatives of the media reporting on events in real time from the field. In addition, participants with IT expertise were able to point to the opportunities offered by technological advances to provide solutions, either wholly or in part, to some of the operational and training challenges facing peace operations. Information technology is not presented as a panacea to all the problems: on the contrary, it is admitted that its management and policy development

can present problems of their own. However, it is argued that strong leadership and insightful development of IT will be highly beneficial to peace operations in the 21st century.

56. The chapter covers a wide front of these issues from a technologically informed viewpoint. It is observed that one of the greatest benefits offered to peace operations by the Information Age is an increased capability to share information quickly, universally and collectively but it should also be borne in mind that opponents to peace operations are also acquiring cellular telephones and internet communications and may use them to advantage with more knowledge of the local languages and customs than the peacekeepers. Effective information sharing among the military, police and civilian elements of a peace operation places a high priority on overcoming problems of interoperability, in which the Communications and Electronic Services Division within DPKO has a major role to play.

57. The ever-widening availability of computers, telecommunications infrastructures and video-conferencing equipment offers new possibilities for training, whether by distance learning or by computer simulation. Separately, advances in IT offer possibilities for monitoring operationally sensitive areas or conducting other monitoring missions without having to deploy soldiers on the ground. Yet another significant strength of IT lies in its ability to facilitate communication with the general public (for example, the UN website now receives some 6 million ‘hits’ daily). This facility can be of much benefit to a peace operation, but at the same time senior managers of peace operations need to recognize and respond to the fact that journalists are able to report and comment on events in the field with great speed and often before the information can be checked and then communicated to headquarters.

58. Among the recommendations are the following: Member States should be more active in using and refining existing IT in peace operations and press for new and effective IT programmes for peace operations; the problems and challenges of IT interoperability in peace operations should be comprehensively addressed by DPKO CESS with a view to resolving communication challenges and bring the contingents of developed and developing countries more on to a common operational basis; the value and practical possibilities of using IT more extensively in distance learning and computer simulation for peace operation training should be energetically explored; and, the rapidly changing nature of media reporting and the opportunities offered by IT to address the challenges should be identified and strategies designed to respond to them.

Chapter 13 – Training and Education

59. Many participants in the Challenges Project attached high importance to the need to significantly improve training and education. A key to success in conducting peace operations is the availability of a pool of peacekeepers and peace personnel, sufficient in number and quality, for deployment to missions in a timely and organised manner. To this end, Member States can contribute significantly by the preparation of personnel through civilian and military training and education as part of a prerequisite for participating in and contributing to a peace operation.

60. Training and education are influenced by many factors, with content, approaches and standards varying from country to country. The challenge is to develop global norms for peace operations that are acceptable and achievable by all Member States and international organizations. The United Nations is best placed to develop these norms/guidance in consultation with Member States, but the primary responsibility for training and education lies with the Member States.

61. Primary occupational training, as a soldier, police officer or civilian specialist, should be supplemented with specific training for peace operations. The complexity of modern peace operations demands a coherent and cohesive system that covers the full range of training at all levels and stages, that could serve a wide spectrum of military, police and civilian ‘customers’ – all bringing to their tasks a different perspective – while ensuring a common standard that will contribute to operational success.

62. The Challenges participants recognized the existence of differences in approaches to training and education. The chapter recommends the development of a peace operations training and education ‘template’: a basic plan for all levels of training – strategic, operational and tactical – that can be adapted by all Member States to meet their own specific requirements while maintaining a minimum international standard. The requirement is not just for the military and police component of a peace operation, but also includes the civilian components. The template should include an evaluation system, in order to ensure, at least, the minimum level of training for the efficient and professional fulfilment of tasks, with the ultimate objective of achieving successful peace operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Military Division – Training and Evaluation Service (TES) is developing Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTM) during 2002, which will address the need to have such a template available.

63. Issues that should be included in the training are reflected in many chapters of this report, from safety and security to the impact of gender perspectives on peace operations, and from an understanding of the legal dimensions of peace operations and humanitarian and human rights law to ways of improving effectiveness through mutual cooperation and coordination. The widening availability of

information technology offers potential for distance learning, computer simulation exercise and other improvements in training techniques and opportunities.

64. In sum, much is possible but it will need the active support of Member States and the allocation of sufficient human and financial resources in support of training and education at all levels and stages of peace operations.

Chapter 14 – Determining Success in Peace Operations

65. In a sense, the entire Challenges Project is about defining how to succeed in peace operations. This chapter is written from a professional military view, and suggests some practical measures by which practitioners of peace operations can determine whether they are, or are not, succeeding. Much of the chapter applies particularly to the military component of a peace operation, but success depends heavily upon all elements of a peace operation working together in close cooperation. Many aspects therefore apply equally to the many civilians who, together with the military, contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the mission. Indeed, success depends on the cooperation of the total partnership – among others, the Security Council, the Secretariat, Agencies and Programmes, the missions in the field, the parties to the conflict, and, most importantly, the Member States whether as providers of political support and resources, or as troop contributors.

66. It is useful to divide the management and conduct of a peace operation into three levels of responsibility – strategic, operational and tactical. At the level of the decisions of the Security Council, Member States and, in part, the Secretariat, strategic success is determined from the outset by the creation of an achievable mandate at the right time. Among the decisions made at this level, the selection of mission leadership has a significant impact on mission success. Operational success in peace operations is achieved through three distinct factors: first, the development of a comprehensive plan that synchronizes the efforts of all the major players; second, the identification of key measures of effectiveness that assesses all aspects of the mission; and third, effective management and control of major events and transitions from one agency to another. Tactical success may depend on the level of readiness, training and equipment of contingents deployed to the field, and the performance of their duties.

67. Training and education of peacekeepers before deployment is a national responsibility and properly prepared peacekeepers are a condition *sine qua non* for success. But training should not be limited to the military: civilian personnel need training and there is much to be gained from training together. Closer interaction between military and civilians through training and education could promote healthier and more effective civil-military cooperation when deployed. A final and

essential element of success is the consent of the people in the conflict area, reflected by their acceptance and engagement in the peace process.

Conclusions – Meeting the Challenges

68. There are several conclusions of a general nature that emerge from the Challenges Project. First and foremost, the primary audience of this report is the Member States. Many of the comments and recommendations arising from the discussions lead back to the Member States. Without them, the global organization of the United Nations would not exist. With them, peace operations – whether by the United Nations or by regional arrangements and organizations – can be effective and efficient only if the Member States clearly and constructively articulate the purposes and objectives, and then reliably provide the political support and the necessary human, financial and materiel resources to support them.

69. The Brahimi Report offered many sound recommendations on how to improve the internal structures, organization and mechanisms of the UN and served as a valuable and thoughtful contribution in the discussions of the Challenges seminars. The Project Partners warmly welcomed that Report and have been heartened to see the changes and advances that it has already stimulated. Not surprisingly, there is much accord between many of the ideas that arose from the Challenges seminars and those put forward by Ambassador Brahimi and his colleagues on the Panel.

70. Second, given a clear mandate and the resources, the planning and implementation of peace operations fall to the Secretary-General and the men and women at headquarters and in the field. One of the aspects that consistently emerged in the Challenges discussions, as will be seen from the chapters of this report, is the call for much more attention to be given to training and education. The revitalized Training and Evaluation Service of DPKO is already making a major contribution, but in the first place training is a national responsibility. Moreover, whereas training is an integral part of military life, for civilians it is too often perceived as something additional or of secondary importance. The strong message that came time and again from the Challenges seminars is that much more attention and priority needs to be given to training and education as an investment in more effective peace operations. Personnel need to be trained in their skills and in what will be expected of them, and they also need to be trained together as far as practicable, so that they may develop teamwork and a cooperative spirit.

71. A third area that demands more attention and inspired initiative is that of multinational and multicultural cooperation and coordination. The large majority of men and women who contribute to peace operations do so conscientiously and with good intent. But the very complexity of modern peace operations, the multi-

plicity of nationalities, cultures, professions and disciplines and the existence of different institutional priorities can easily lead to misunderstanding, confusion and at times frictions. In part, these problems can be overcome by training, but a large responsibility must rest on the qualities of leadership and high standards of management. There are many factors that can contribute to success or failure: good leadership is not necessarily a guarantee of success, but poor leadership is too often a sure road to failure. Senior managers would do well to give much higher importance in the conduct of a peace operation to improving all aspects of communication, cooperation and coordination.

72. The Challenges project has proved to be a highly useful forum for informal and open exchange of opinions, impressions, practical experiences and conceptual ideas. It has served as a sounding-board for views away from the corridors of official meetings and has brought together for reflection a broad cross-section of military, police and civilian expertise. Beyond the issues focused on in this report there remain many areas that deserve further consideration, such as the challenges of bringing together humanitarian, military and governance priorities, a closer consideration of interaction in peace operations with modern media and real-time reporting, an exploration of the best ways to work with NGOs, a review of all aspects of the economics of peace operations, a consideration of the challenge of ensuring an overall sufficient logistic support capability, and a practical assessment of the hurdles of peace-building.

73. As the 21st century continues to unfold, the nature of peace operations will have to respond to yet further challenges. The Challenges Project Partners offer this report as a signpost to the road ahead.

Introduction

The first UN peacekeeping operation was an attempt to confront and defeat the worst in man with the best in man; to counter violence with tolerance, might with moderation, war with peace. Since then, day after day, year after year, UN peacekeepers have been meeting the threat and reality of conflict, without losing faith, without giving in, and without giving up.

Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations¹

1. Over the past five years, highly experienced and prominent civilian, military and police peacekeepers, from some 230 organizations, 50 countries and a wide spectrum of professions, religions and cultures have participated in, and contributed to, the project now known as “Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century”.

2. The project, in the form of a series of seminars, has sought to provide an inclusive and informal forum to address critical challenges of peacekeeping and peace support in a proactive manner. It has been the collective effort of the project partner organizations, their regional colleagues, and visiting seminar participants that has provided the spirit and essence of the Challenges Project.

3. An important development that took place during the course of the project was the issuance on 21 August 2000 of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, normally referred to as the Brahimi Report.² In the seminars that followed, and in these chapters, the Challenges Project has sought to support the thrust and proposals of the Brahimi Report, and at the same time to explore further on aspects and issues which primarily the Member States will need to address in order to do their share for the realization of an enhanced international peace operation capacity. In this context, the participation of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi in the Challenges Buenos Aires Seminar in August 2001, was particularly beneficial.

I. Objectives and Methodology

4. The present report has been written with the following objectives:
- a. to make practical recommendations in order to enhance the international capability to conduct multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations;
 - b. to inform on current developments on principal issues in contemporary peace operations; and
 - c. to contribute to maintaining the current momentum for enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of international peace operations, as generated by the Brahimi Report and other related initiatives.

5. The report is being made widely available to all who have a close interest in peace operations, and particularly to Member States of the United Nations whose men and women serve as peacekeepers and whose resources are needed to support peace operations. The Challenges Project and the Project Partners will promote the report of the project and its distribution to appropriate national, regional, international and non-governmental organizations for their information and consideration.

6. At the time of finalising the present report, as a consequence of the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the war on international terrorism is a major focus and concern of the international community. One of the objectives of peace operations is to create a sustainable peace in which terrorism will have less cause to breed and grow. Arising from many causes, other situations of violent conflict have been occurring and peace operations have continued to be conducted around the globe. In crises that demand robust peace enforcement action, the international community has increasingly been relying on coalitions of the willing with authorization by the Security Council, to take action. But there still continue to be many situations and crises in which international action in the form of peace operations has to be taken by the UN, or by regional organizations or arrangements with Civilian UN support. Thus, in the interest of promoting global partnership, the project process has been undertaken with the aim of widening and strengthening the international network of influential organizations and individuals focused on tackling the challenges of peacekeeping and peace support.

7. The methodology of the project has in essence been:
- a. to organize high-level seminars and conferences, each meeting with its own particular focus and framework (generating nine separate seminar reports);
 - b. to combine theoretical enquiry with practical issues of training and education;
 - c. to develop a comprehensive Concluding Report with recommendations to be shared with the United Nations system, in particular, its Member States;
 - d. to publish an Executive Summary in multiple languages with a view to increase the pool of peacekeeping literature in languages other than English; and
 - e. to promote and encourage multilateral and bilateral exchanges and cooperation within and beyond the Challenges Project.

II. The Challenges Partnership – a Joint Effort to Promote Peace, Stability and Foster a Culture of Cooperation and Coordination

In an increasingly globalized world, none of the critical issues we are dealing with can be resolved within a solely national framework. All of them require cooperation partnership and burden-sharing among Governments, the United Nations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector and civil society.

Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations³

8. The multitude of actors and nations currently engaged in peace efforts and operations around the world is reflected in the diversity of the Partner Organizations in the project endeavour. The Swedish National Defence College hosted the first seminar in the series, and subsequently coordinates the overall project effort. International seminars have been or will be hosted by the following Partner Organizations:

- a. Swedish National Defence College (Stockholm, September 1997);
- b. Russian Public Policy Centre (Moscow, March 1998);
- c. Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (Amman, October 1998);
- d. Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, November 1999);
- e. United States Army Peacekeeping Institute (Carlisle, May 2000);
- f. United Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (New Delhi, September 2000);
- g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in cooperation with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo, March 2001);
- h. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada (Cornwallis, May 2001);
- i. Armed Forces Joint Staff in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina (Buenos Aires, August 2001);
- j. Partner Organizations (New York, April 2002); and
- k. Australian Defence Force (Australia, October 2002).

9. At the core of the project initiative is an endeavour to encourage and facilitate the development of links between the theory and practice of conducting peace operations with programmes and activities undertaken by national peace operations training centres and academies. Fourteen civilian and military peace operations training academies located on six continents have been engaged in the project, as hosts or part hosts of seminars (See Annex 3).

III. The Challenges Project – Taking a Comprehensive Approach

10. When the Challenges Project was initiated in the mid-1990s, it was recognised that:

Operations launched by the international community and the United Nations in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Angola and Rwanda, in particular, have revealed the need for more comprehensive preparation, training, coordination between various agencies, understanding of the nuances of each situation, more credible decision making in the Security Council and other fora, an effective command and control apparatus, both in the mission area and at the United Nations, and greater stress on ensuring the personal security of the peacekeepers by deploying with the muscular wherewithal necessary, together with assured backup in extreme circumstances.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Stockholm Seminar, September 1997

11. The sheer complexities of violent conflicts and the consequent challenges facing United Nations peace operations in the mid-1990s were substantial. In parallel to the operations and missions being undertaken by the UN, embryonic peacekeeping capabilities of regional organizations were developing, responding to crises and conflicts as they erupted. It was considered essential by the Project Partners to harness as wide and multifaceted range of experiences and lessons learned as possible.

12. The objective of the project's initial seminar was to engage an international group of experts to explore and identify more effective and legitimate ways of dealing with regional conflicts, bearing in mind the importance of good civil-military relations, the impact of information technology, the element of limited resources and the complexities related to integrating diverse national approaches in peace operations. Subsequently, each seminar has addressed peace operations issues of international relevance, but also of particular concern to the respective regional host. For example, the Tokyo Seminar of March 2001 addressed "Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel" (a seminar noted in the UN Secretary-General's Report *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/977 of 1 June 2001).

13. The title of the project has evolved over the years reflecting the changing nature of peace activities, from peacekeeping and peace support to the terminology recently used in the Brahimi Report. The present report, to the extent possible, uses the term peace operations as defined by the Brahimi Report.⁴ **Peace operations** thus:

entail three principal activities: **conflict prevention and peace making; peacekeeping; and peace-building.** Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for

peace. ...Peace making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacekeeping incorporates a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. Peace-building defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to re-assemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building something on those foundations that is something more than just the absence of war.

14. In 1998, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations through the Lessons Learned Unit suggested that the Challenges Project should develop a Concluding Report of the seminar series with a view to sharing the findings with the Secretary-General and the Member States of the UN.

15. It has been the aim of the project to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership. The project is an umbrella process under which civilian, military and police peacekeepers can meet and exchange ideas freely and frankly regarding proposals for the enhancement of international peace operations. Approximately half the participants in the overall series of seminars have been civilians, from a variety of civilian organizations, governmental and non-governmental. The project has sought to facilitate international cooperation and exchanges to take place not only during but also beyond the project effort. Among the spin-offs from the project can be mentioned exchanges between peacekeeping training centres in Sweden and the Russian Federation, Canada and Jordan, while an Early Warning Programme for Africa was established in Pretoria. The New Delhi Seminar coincided with the launching of the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping.

16. Peace operations are a mechanism based upon the concept of burden sharing of resources, both human and financial. Reflecting this approach, the Challenges Project is a truly joint undertaking. Resources have been raised and contributed towards the hosting of seminars, publication of reports and other project related activities by ten partner organizations, six governments, eight defence and police forces, two international and four national organizations including sponsors from the private sector.

IV. Structure of the Report

17. The findings of the report are summarized in the Executive Summary and Conclusions directly preceding the Introduction. The report itself is structured in a set of fourteen stand-alone chapters. The conclusions and recommendations seek to propose pragmatic steps and activities for improving the planning and implementation of international peace operations. The mandate given by the Project Partners

to the primary authors in drafting the individual chapters called for the report to reflect the discussions held during the seminar series. Following editing by the Coordinator and by Project Partners at the editing sessions, the drafts were circulated to the Project Partners for review and comment. The chapters are the products of several hands, hence it should be noted that there are certain differences in style and usage of terms; these illustrate the multinational nature of the project as a whole. The primary authors are stated as a group of authors and not in relation to any particular chapter. Given that the project spans a five-year period, sources have been explored as required in order to place the analysis and recommendations in a current context.

18. Although the report accurately reflects the overall thrust and content of the Project seminars, the findings and recommendations of the report have not necessarily been agreed to by all Partner Organizations and authors. Indeed, the report is the product of a loose coalition of concerned and willing organizations and individuals, determined in a unity of effort to seek ways in which to promote sustainable and equitable peace in the 21st century.

Notes

¹ United Nations Web-site, www.un.org .

² Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000.

³ Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report on the work of the Organization, A/56/1 of 6 September 2001, para. 11.

⁴ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para 10-13.

The Changing Concepts of Security

Throughout the world the search for security is as old as time itself, yet security, even today may seem as elusive as ever. Indeed, it may be argued that man today is more insecure and vulnerable than ever. Total wars and the introduction of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological and chemical – as well as deadly accurate precision-guided weapons make this a reality. Mass communication and the shrinking of distances, making every nation a virtual neighbour to every other, has also tended to increase rather than decrease the physical and the psychological sense of insecurity.

Professor Kamel Abu-Jaber
Amman Seminar, October 1998

I. Introduction

1. The topic of the Changing Concepts of Security was touched upon several times in the Challenges seminar series, and in particular, it was discussed as part of the Amman seminar of October 1998. The Middle East region has co-existed with peace operations since the invention of the peacekeeping mechanism over half a century ago. Through its painful experiences, the region has a particular interest in the changing concepts of security as well as the results of the absence of security, i.e. insecurity at best, all out war at worst. Seeking to identify meaningful concepts of security in order to deal with the challenges of peace operations as we are entering the 21st century, is indeed a demanding undertaking. At the time of finalizing the present report, in the light of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, issues of international terrorism have come to the forefront of attention and the military aspects of security are currently being revisited by many. It appears that concepts of security will inevitably prove to be comprehensive, including elements of both military and non-military nature. Given the focus of this report on peace operations, and the assessment that other disputes and tensions apart from international terrorism remain unresolved, the need for multinational peace operations seems likely to continue unabated in the 21st century. Unlike subsequent chapters of this report, the present chapter does not offer recommendations as such, but its purpose is rather to place the discussion on how to deal with international and regional conflict in its wider context, historically as well as substantively.

2. Security is a matter of facts as well as a matter of perception. The security of yesterday was still largely a question of Roman wisdom: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” – if you wish for peace, then prepare for war. This was the wisdom over the centuries following the establishment of the modern state system in Europe through the Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 intended to secure peace in Europe “forever”. Power and counter power, a continuing build-up of military capabilities and con-

stant repositioning between powers both major and minor had produced both periods of stability through a balance of power and repeated systemic breakdowns.

3. Already after the First World War, doubts about the benefits of the balance of power system had produced a blueprint for a different security system built on collective action through a permanent international organization, the League of Nations. The usefulness of this model turned out to be limited, in part because its initiator, the United States, never joined, while other major powers for reasons of their own left the League during the 1930s. After the Second World War however, the collective security system was re-launched. With the United Nations that was conceived during the height of World War II and born only months after that war came to an end, the concept of security at the forefront of the minds of the original members of the organization was the security of the nation state. The cost of two world wars fought within some thirty years was felt by the combatant nations in massive losses in human lives and national treasure. Declaring as the first purpose of the United Nations the maintenance of international peace and security and, to that end, the intention to take “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,”¹ its Members conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the implementation of that task.²

4. But for much of the ensuing forty-five years, the Security Council found itself often in deadlock as a result of the Cold War and the permanent members using their veto rights. A third World War was averted, not by virtue of the smooth functioning of the Security Council, but by the accumulation of military power by the two major alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the recognition, as their respective arsenals of nuclear and other weapons increased in size, that if a nuclear exchange took place it would lead to mutual destruction. Each side maintained a powerful nuclear deterrent capability. Peace, or more accurately, the absence of global war, was preserved by a careful and highly dangerous balance of threat and the risk of a nuclear holocaust. The concept of security was thus not fundamentally different from that of the European balance of power, although it was now truly global and “permanently” organized through two blocs and a gradually emerging “Third World”.

5. No third World War broke out, but while the two alliances glared at each other in Cold War confrontation, the world was changing. The 1947–1977 period saw the state system in revolutionary change with many new states achieving independence, some after armed struggle and others comparatively peacefully. By 1990, the membership of the United Nations had more than tripled, and global population had increased from some 2.5 billion to 5 billion. Some of the new states found themselves involved in violent conflict, either with their neighbours or with internal uprisings. Several conflicts became proxy wars with the United States and its allies taking one side and the Soviet Union and its allies taking the other.

6. The struggle for emancipation and statehood of the colonies, however, brought a new and important role to the UN. As a substitute for the grander role envisioned by the Charter for the Security Council, and a role not quite foreseen by the contracting parties in 1945, the Organization became an agent for decolonization, providing for transitional arrangements, assistance in organizing referenda, offering development programmes, etc. Thus the United Nations made itself a forum for decolonization and for the decolonized. Decolonization, as established by General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), became a security concept to the non-self governing territories and peoples.

7. Decolonization and nation-building were elements of both regional and global security-building and the UN found both a new role and new instruments. In the necessity to handle colonial and post-colonial situations the idea of peace-keeping was invented in its traditional form of consent and arms used by peace-keepers only in self-defence, although from time to time in practice entering the domain of Chapter VII and enforcement (as in the Congo 1960–64). A new concept had been added to our thinking of security through the combined efforts of peace-keeping and of the UN development of its capacity for long term aid and assistance work to the former colonies. This social, economic and welfare dimension not only saved the Organization from irrelevance during the Cold War, but also prepared it for a future when “security” would be seen as a more complex challenge than during the Cold War, with demands on the “softer” security instruments of the Organization, which will be further explored later in this chapter.

8. It should be noted that the UN, in taking on the decolonization challenge, adopted a mandate in conflict with the claims to sovereignty still maintained in 1945 by the Great as well as many small Powers. Likewise, in condemning apartheid, the United Nations, beyond conventional norms at the time, took a substantial step “into” the domain of internal affairs of a sovereign state. The General Assembly, through its growing third world majority, established at an early stage, a notion of human security against colonial rule and racism, and thus a stand against unlimited national sovereignty. Once independence had been achieved by formerly colonized peoples, however, new states showed every inclination to defend their newly acquired sovereignty against all challenges and challengers. Sovereignty, backed up by military power, was still the fundamental principle upon which international relations was conducted.

9. For the most part, thus, security was still largely measured in terms of national sovereignty, military superiority and protection from external aggression. Already in the 1960s there were analysts who perceived that the historical approaches to security were narrow and sterile in a nuclear age. In 1982, the Palme Commission put forward the concept of ‘common security’, arguing that while both East and West had legitimate security needs, it was not possible to demand security for one bloc based on superior military resources. On the contrary, in the presence of

massive nuclear potential, such a policy represented a threat to universal security. Only by gradually and painfully establishing a balance of deterrence and a certain element of confidence-building by arms control and disarmament was it possible to maintain the overall deterrence system and thereby ensure common security at lower levels of armaments. Security ultimately rested in the realization of a shared vulnerability, recognized in the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), a paradoxical concept of security, which was already beginning to be questioned before the end of the Cold War.

10. During the 1970s and early 80s strategic thinking was under reconsideration by the super powers. The Palme Commission had the misfortune of publishing its report during the “New Cold War” (1979–85), when interest in arms control and disarmament was very low and, instead, there was a predominance of thinking in terms of winning and gaining the upper hand both in Moscow and in Washington. These strategies and counter-strategies, ultimately contributed to the impoverishment and collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

II. The 1990s – from ‘Brave New World’ to Challenging Lessons Learned

With the end of the Cold War, we moved into what the International Institute for Strategic Studies defined as “new dimensions of security”; regional stability, nationalism, fundamentalism, North-South issues, the new risks of ethnic, religious, social, environmental, economic and an endless number of other possible crises and problems, an avalanche of “smaller” problems replacing the previous overwhelming risk of a Third World War.

Professor Bo Hultdt
Amman Seminar, October 1998

11. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the early 1990s seemed at first to open up new and brighter horizons. The prospect of significantly reduced defence budgets appeared to offer a peace dividend that would release resources to address other issues, such as development, health, education, the environment and other problems that needed attention and by many were seen as “real” in contrast to those of the Cold War rivalry. But the break-up of the ice shelf of the Cold War proved to be much more turbulent than anticipated. When the Cold War unraveled, so did the understanding of security itself. Relative ‘stability’ gave way to relative ‘instability’, which was comprised of new threats and challenges, though on closer inspection many of them were old concerns resurfacing to the attention of the world, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, ethnic and religious conflicts, organized crime, and massive migration as a result of wars or collapsing states.

12. Internal conflicts broke out in various parts of the former Soviet Union; declarations of independence by the component parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia quickly led to fighting and ethnic cleansing; the disputes between warring factions in Liberia, Angola, Somalia and elsewhere in Africa became more intense and widespread; fierce and long-standing ethnic enmity led to genocide in Rwanda. As defined by Dr. Mary Kaldor, the “new wars” of the 1990s were different from the “old wars” in every respect. Wars resulted from state weakness and outright breakdown rather than from the ambitions of the powerful to gain more power. In case after case, the state had become terminally weakened, its monopoly of violence had disintegrated, state power had declined, its reach had shrunk back to the enclaves around the capital. The professional armies had broken apart and were replaced by private security forces, civilian militias and bandit gangs that recruit child combatants. The rules and distinctions had disappeared. The vast majority of casualties were civilians. The armed man no longer wore a uniform, there were no front lines, no separations between civil and military, state and private, and war and peace.³

13. The UN Security Council, so often hamstrung by political stalemate and the use, or threat of use, of the veto during the Cold War, was suddenly able to become more active in addressing peace and security issues. With newly found amity among the five permanent members of the Council, peacekeeping missions were authorized where none had been possible before. The number of UN peacekeepers deployed rose from 10,000 in 1988 to almost 80,000 by the end of 1993. However, in rising to the occasion, the UN seriously overstepped its capabilities.

14. In 1992, upon instructions from the Security-Council, the then Secretary-General submitted a report, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, in which he reviewed the UN role in peace operations, peacekeeping and peace-building. His point of departure was the UN Charter and, among other proposals, he recommended reconsideration by the Security Council of the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter whereby Member States would place armed forces, assistance and facilities at the disposal of the UN for the purposes stated in Article 42. *An Agenda for Peace* was discussed during 1992–93 by the membership but the international community as a whole took no action on the proposals, which would have implied both a return to the Charter as the founders had seen it and the establishment of an elaborate and integrated system of UN capabilities for launching various types of peace operations across a wide spectrum from preventive action to enforcement should the Security Council so decide. By not adopting the course of action proposed by the Secretary-General, the Member States of the UN confirmed that they were not ready to support the concept of collective security as envisaged in the Charter. Instead, they chose to accept the existing realities with a continued ad hoc character of the Organization’s methods and conditions of fielding forces, the rising importance of coalitions of the willing and the trend towards regionalization of peace operations. At

the same time, the real world continued to change and the security challenges were mounting.

15. In Africa, the 1990s proved to be an era of much distress and deadly conflict. In 1996 alone, according to a report of the Secretary-General, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons.⁴ The combination of internal and external factors, in particular the massive proliferation of small arms, the lawlessness and greed of warlords and savage infighting between factions, together with the devastating spread of HIV/AIDS, have created a level of insecurity that has severely hampered advances in sustainable development, health, education, the eradication of poverty, the promotion of human rights and good governance. Post-Cold War retrenchment by the major powers left few resources, political and financial, to assist in the establishment of order in Africa. At the same time, the method of tying aid with political reform weakened many African leaders in some cases leading to further instability.

16. Within the larger Southern African region, the availability of small arms was a legacy of several decades of conflict coinciding with and following decolonization. At the Amman seminar, it was noted that yesterday's political symbols of liberation had become the economic tools for crime and violence and the African region had become a small arms bazaar within which state control of small arms was the exception rather than the rule. Resources that should have been directed towards sustainable development efforts were instead often consumed in humanitarian assistance to refugees and the casualties of war.

17. Lightly armed peacekeepers were sent into situations in which there was no peace to keep, often with ill-defined objectives, ambiguous mandates that did not spell out their tasks in clear terms, and without the human and material resources they needed to do those tasks. In the absence of any government authority in Mogadishu, there was no form of security for any of the local population except that which came out of the end of a gun. UN convoys were attacked and robbed, bribes were charged for passage of humanitarian assistance through one warlord's area to another and humanitarian supplies were stolen and sold on the black market. There were tragic incidents that caused major political damage in the capitals of some countries. The fatalities incurred by Belgian soldiers in Kigali and American soldiers in Mogadishu served to discourage the countries of Europe and North America from committing themselves to further peacekeeping in Africa. Other events involving Canadian troops in Somalia and Dutch troops in Srebrenica had similar effects in their respective capitals. As observed by Dr. Funmi Olonisakin at the Pretoria seminar:

Because Africa no longer had a strategic relevance to the great powers, many of the African conflicts that found free expression in a post-Cold War

dispensation did not enjoy extra-African responses, and escalated freely in the absence of superpower rivalry... The world outside Africa looked on and crises escalated. Countries in far regions became unwilling to commit manpower and materiel to conflicts in Africa that had no bearing on their national interest.

18. With hindsight it became apparent that traditional UN peacekeeping was not the appropriate tool for several of the missions authorized by the Security Council, but in the early 1990s there was no other multilateral tool available. None of the regional organizations was able to field a viable peacekeeping mission. The only militarily capable organization at the time, NATO, had not adjusted its policies and posture to the new post-Cold war situation. The new dimensions of security in a post-Cold War era were unclear and widely unappreciated.

III. Human Security

... (without security) there is no place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; ...no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

Thomas Hobbes, philosopher
The Leviathan (1651), Part I, Chapter XIII

19. To Thomas Hobbes in 17th century Europe, for most of humanity life remained a struggle in a setting closer to a state of nature, a jungle rather than a civil society, where "every man is against every man". In modern times, we have come to balance security against values such as liberty and other human rights, but for many millions of people particularly those in developing countries, the perception of their daily lives is little changed from that of Hobbes.

20. In 1994 the United Nations Development Programme, in its Human Development Report of that year, set out new dimensions of human security, which it described as not a concern with weapons, but a concern with human life and dignity. For the majority of people who seek security in their daily lives, security symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. Declaring that the idea of human security, though simple, was likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century, four essential characteristics were identified: the universality of concern for human security, relevant to people everywhere in rich nations and poor; the interdependence of its components; the benefits of early prevention rather than later intervention; and the people-centred nature of the human security concept.⁵

21. Human security was said to have two main aspects: first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and secondly, protection from

sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. It was argued that the concept of security must change urgently in two basic ways – from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security, and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.⁶ Parallel to these developments, support was forthcoming from a younger generation of scholars of international relations and politics taking a new and highly critical view of the old hierarchy of mankind, state and international system. Instead, they placed humanity very much in focus. Fundamentally, security was about the safety and rights of individual human beings and concepts of security should be developed that take this into account.

22. As underlined by Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber speaking at the Amman seminar, action to improve human security entailed a shift in attitude between the developed nations of the northern hemisphere and the developing nations, known collectively as the South. The division of power between the North and the South was not only a gap of skills but of vastly different standards of living and quality of life. The redefinition of security placed a moral obligation on the North to extend a helping hand to the rest of the world in humanitarian terms, and while the initial initiative stemmed from moral grounds it should later develop into a relationship of partnership and mutual benefit.

23. UNDP was by no means unique in making its reassessment of the concept of security. Other analysts in the humanitarian and development fields have been equally vocal on similar themes, but the articulation of the arguments by UNDP among the broad multilateral audience of the UN community enabled them to gain wide international attention. They were also very timely: by the mid-1990s experience of complex emergencies in the field was demonstrating that there was a powerful need for greater cooperation and coordination between humanitarian agencies and peacekeepers. As observed by Ambassador Jan Eliasson at the Stockholm seminar, peace support activities took place in a security context that had changed dramatically: it had become obvious that the notion of “security” was no longer limited to the military security of states. It related as much to the well-being of the individual and to the conditions for the earth’s survival.

24. The conflicts of the 1990s frequently involved local warlords, paramilitaries and other non-state actors, and with large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees needing humanitarian assistance. If human security was to be improved it became increasingly clear that there would have to be closer understanding and interaction between the development community seeking to promote sustainable development, the humanitarian community seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need, and the peacekeeping community seeking to establish and maintain peace while more lasting political solutions were found. One would, in essence, have to “mind the gap”, or, perhaps rather, seek to bridge

the chasm, between the realm of the UN Security Council and that of the UN Economic and Social Council with the Specialized Agencies.

25. At the Cornwallis seminar, the importance of integrating the new concepts of security into the planning and conduct of peace operations was stressed in a message by the UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women:

Given that the concept of security had expanded to include human dimensions, peace and security were no longer solely military concepts. Poverty alleviation, human development, protection of the environment, promotion of human rights of women and men were now included in these concepts. Today's challenges of peacekeeping were not only to end hostilities and rebuild communities, but also to deal with the problems that led to the conflict. It is clear that lack of this broader view of peacekeeping and peace-building provides a breeding ground for the continuation of conflict and instability.

26. However, shifting the emphasis of security from the state level to human security and the level of the individual presents a dilemma. To date, only strong and well functioning states have been able to provide both safety and welfare to individual human beings over time. There are no international organizations, global or regional, that can fully replace the state in the role as "everyday" provider of these goods. International organizations, may step in temporarily when emergencies arise – but ultimately, it is still the state, maybe "obsolete" but certainly not "obstinate", and refusing to go away, that is the organizing structure of societies.⁷

27. Finally, an important concept of security that has emerged in new form and been recognized also as an element of "human security", is that of conflict prevention. Originally, in the sense of collective action, it was an objective that was clearly articulated in the commitment of Member States to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter "...to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ...". But that was written in an era that was fresh from a devastating war between States, whereas the challenges of the 21st century are likely to be oriented towards conflicts within States and also increasingly involve non-state actors, such as terrorists or national liberation movements. In identifying the threats to human security, preventive action is aimed at seeking out the root causes of potential conflict as early as possible and then taking appropriate actions to prevent them from escalating to violence. The paradox of prevention is that if it is successful there is little to show for it. Hence, despite the fact that at the personal level the benefits of prevention are well understood, from preserving good dental health to keeping vehicles properly maintained, at the international level it has been difficult to persuade governments and institutions that an investment in prevention is also an investment in sustainable development and avoiding the costs of subsequent conflict. Preventive action was discussed at a number of the Challenges seminars and is further addressed in Chapter 6 – Preventive Action.

IV. The Impact of Globalization

The security context has changed fundamentally over the last decade, from the threats of the Cold War to the challenges of globalization. ...Globalization means that political, economic, social and environmental aspects, considered to be domestic concerns from the outset, may have considerable regional and international impact from a security point of view.

Ambassador Anders Bjurner
Amman Seminar, October 1998

28. The security context continues to change. In the past few years the impact of globalization has gathered a momentum that was not apparent as recently as only three or four years ago. The end of the Cold War set free the pursuit of market liberalization and deregulation policies and the benefits of rapid global integration were lauded by its adherents. As a result, for example, the new situation in Europe provided much encouragement for the development of non-military social and economic cooperation. It offered the opportunity for the development of a Europe united through long-term economic, social and political processes, which would step by step, by stealth and design, produce a new political entity that would overcome all interstate (and also intra-state) conflicts and contradictions inherited through the centuries since 1648. The result would be a security community of states between which war would be impossible and which therefore among themselves would be able to concentrate on welfare and human security at significantly lower levels of defence expenditure.

29. At the same time, around the world, major advances in technology led to significant improvements in information, communication and transport systems. Transfers of information, money, goods and people became much easier with an unprecedented effect on global output, trade and capital mobility. It has been estimated that more than \$1.5 trillion is exchanged daily on the world's currency markets and nearly one fifth of the goods and services produced each year are traded.

30. What has emerged, however, is that the gap between rich and poor has widened. The major trading nations have benefited but many countries in the developing world have been left behind. As observed at the head of this chapter "Mass communication and the shrinking of distances, while making every country a neighbour to every other, has tended to increase rather than decrease the physical and psychological sense of insecurity." Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America have seen an increase in poverty, mass unemployment, social fragmentation and political instability. According to the UNDP's Human Development Report 1999, *Globalization with a Human Face*, more than 80 countries have per capita incomes lower than they were a decade or more ago.

31. The world's volatile financial system has resulted in crises, for example in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and most recently in Argentina, that have shaken governments, eliminated twenty years of development gains, and aggravated growing levels of economic insecurity. People around the world, particularly in some developing countries, have found themselves vulnerable to changes and risks over which they have no control and confronted with social and economic pressures from which there seems to be no avenue of escape. Falling incomes, rising absolute poverty, declining public services have in turn led to political instability and heightened personal and national insecurity. As suggested by Dr. Christopher Coker at the Amman seminar, there was a strong feeling in many quarters that we should be in the business of managing insecurity rather than security. This is a continuous process. It also requires pro-active approaches. It requires the international community to do more.

32. While globalization offers much promise, it has as yet not been the rising tide that has lifted all boats nor does it seem capable of so doing all by itself and within a foreseeable time span. On the contrary, many millions of human beings have been left stranded with little prospect of attaining even the basics of adequate food, shelter, health, education and human rights. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has frequently drawn attention to these strains on human security. In 1999 he stated:⁸

Globalization offers great opportunities, but at present its benefits are very unevenly distributed while its costs are borne by all. Thus the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor.

In accepting the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize he declared:⁹

No one today is unaware of this divide between the world's rich and poor. No one today can claim ignorance of the cost that this divide imposes on the poor and dispossessed who are no less deserving of human dignity, fundamental freedoms, security, food and education than any of us. The cost, however, is not borne by them alone. Ultimately, it is borne by all of us – North and South, rich and poor, men and women of all races and religions.

V. Security Concerns in the 21st Century

Throughout the years, the direct military considerations of security have had superiority over non-military security issues, due to the direct nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But what is becoming increasingly evident is that old concepts of security, based on military power and balance, must be reformulated to include considerations of environment, demography including population growth, urbanization, migration, domestic insurgencies, and obstacles to economic development. ... The area remains volatile and unpredictable, full of great uncertainties ...

Brigadier-General Mohammed Taisier Masadeh
Amman Seminar, October 1998

33. Insofar as we can gaze into the crystal ball of the 21st century, the security concerns are many. Some apply globally, some regionally, some by state or sub-region and some at the level of individual human beings.

34. At the global level, although the risk of a nuclear exchange or the interstate use of other weapons of mass destruction is less, the consequences of such an event would still be catastrophic. While action to constrain this group of security concerns remains outside the consideration of peace operations, it should nevertheless be noted that there also continues to be the risk that such weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists or other non-state actors who may not hesitate to use them. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were a graphic and alarmingly coordinated demonstration of the lengths to which terrorists are prepared to use the instruments and weapons of modern society in pursuit of their aims. The callous use of sarin nerve agent by the Aum Shinrikyo group in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 and the dispersal of anthrax spores by persons unknown through the US mail in October 2001 illustrate the growing possibility of terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that terrorist groups continue to seek access to weapons of mass destruction and use the globalization of information technology to their advantage.¹⁰

35. As discussed at the Amman seminar, concepts or concerns of security tend to be divided into hard security concerns and soft security concerns, the latter being the non-military dimension. Under the former were highlighted strategic balance and deterrence theory; defence budgets; arms control; terrorism; smuggling activities; anti-peace forces; radicals and extremists; and confidence-building measures. The soft security concerns comprised the mechanisms for investment and development; population; human rights and freedoms; energy resources; reliable water supplies; economic development; cultural misperception and misunderstanding; and social factors such as migration and unemployment.

36. At the regional level, security concerns inevitably vary from region to region, from state to state, and from situation to situation. For example, the increasing use of child combatants including girls, often fed with drugs, in parts of Africa

that are awash with small arms has led to violations of human rights, brutality and ruthless killings among civil populations. Wars in Africa tend to share two common features: the struggle is essentially for control over mineral and natural resources, and is conducted by small arms rather than heavy conventional military weapons. Business continues, but only at the price of lubricating the very conflicts of which the companies and people are captive, by the provision of taxes or ‘protection money’ to local gang leaders instead of, or in addition to, a distant, often corrupt and invariably inefficient, central government. Too often, poor governance provides the ground in which such practices thrive.

37. In such cases, war economies develop a momentum of their own and the actors find opportunities for profit that are far more attractive than might be available from a return to peace. Young men – most of the fighters are young men and teenage boys – with little education and virtually no job prospects see little advantage in giving up their criminal income-earning opportunities in exchange for a return to a life of poverty. Disarmament removes their one and only symbol of power in return for a future with no work, no income and a life of dull tedium. Finding ways to substitute hope, self-respect and self-confidence for despair and personal surrender so that men, women and children may lead better lives will continue to be one of the major security challenges of the age.

38. What is strongly underlined by the events of 11 September 2001 is the renewed relevance of North-South issues even though not necessarily formulated in such terms as by Samuel P. Huntington (*The Clash of Civilizations*) or Kishore Mabubhani (*The West against the Rest*). Afghanistan constitutes a mighty challenge to governments and international relief agencies in support of humanitarian assistance and nation-building efforts. In Afghanistan as in many other places, the North has a responsibility to contribute generously and thoughtfully to the dispossessed and disadvantaged of the South. Peace operations combined with development assistance of the most diverse kind, may be seen as one way of discharging that responsibility.

39. In Europe, through the European Union as well as through NATO, responsibilities have been recognized by initiating enlargement and affiliation processes which seem intended not to leave anyone outside over time. The inclusiveness of the European security concept will also be geared towards its southern neighbours, the Maghreb and the Levant. The outcome of 11 September adds to this urgency. The EU may well turn more of its attention from eastern Europe to the “South”, which may also have consequences for the future focus of peace operations.

40. Further, the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought violent conflict to Europe and the realization that Europe’s concept of security had to be reconsidered. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe) has in recent years functioned as a meeting place and clearing house for security problems in a wider sense. The OSCE has developed a new role as a peace-making and conflict prevention mechanism. NATO has added to its collective defence role a collective security and robust peacekeeping capacity. Since the end of the 1990s, the European Union parallel to, and in cooperation with, NATO is developing a regional capability to tackle conflicts in Europe with a potential to assist in peace operations in other regions should circumstances so demand. The roles of the UN and of regional organizations and arrangements in peace operations, as a phenomena as well as a trend, are discussed further in Chapter 2 – The Roles of the UN and of Regional Organizations and Arrangements.

41. Where security has failed in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere, an important factor has been the absence of regional “cushioning” or restraining forces at work. This absence of regional solidarities or incentives for regional cooperation across a broad range of political, social, economic and military issues must be overcome, thus strengthening regional patterns of cooperation everywhere in the world should be encouraged.

42. Certain security concepts or guidelines have been indicated in this chapter and will also emerge from the succeeding chapters of this report: inclusiveness, global as well as regional security-building using regional forces for purposes of integration and promoting solidarity, the growing relevance of North-South cooperation, thinking about security in several dimensions, involving inclusive rather than exclusive thinking in formulating security concepts. This chapter has been intended to illustrate the historical development of various, successive or coexisting security concepts – from the more simplistic to the more complex. Still, it has to be recognized that in this rapidly changing world no single concept can last forever or cover all challenges. Security will have to be redefined and attained, again and again.

Notes

¹ United Nations Charter, Article 1.

² Ibid.

³ Kaldor M., *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Great Britain, 1999, pp.2-3.

⁴ *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871-S/1998/318, of 13 April 1998, para.3.

⁵ *Human Development Report 1994*, Oxford University Press, pp.22-23.

⁶ Op.cit. p.24.

⁷ Hoffman S., “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe”, *International Regionalism*, Ed Joseph Nye Boston, 1968.

⁸ *We the Peoples – The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, A/54/2000 Millennium Report of the Secretary-General, March 2000.

⁹ Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan’s Nobel Lecture, Oslo, 10 December 2001.

¹⁰ There is a wide range of published materials regarding international terrorism, some of which is highly subjective. A US assessment may be found in *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*, Department of State Publication 10822, issued in April 2001.

The Roles of the United Nations and of Regional Organizations and Arrangements

The challenge rests in how to engage and involve regional organizations, without regionalizing peacekeeping.

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

I. Introduction

1. Just as the concepts of security and the nature of peacekeeping have changed over time, so too have the roles in peace operations of the United Nations and of regional organizations and arrangements. Although there was no specific seminar that addressed this topic as a single issue, it was evident that differing opinions and attitudes on these issues underlay many of the approaches of the seminar participants in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. At the Buenos Aires seminar in August 2001, it was suggested that there should be two separate chapters exploring these topics. In the event, largely because of the complex interface between the two roles and their respective differences and similarities, it was decided that it would be more fruitful to address them together.

2. As the views on this subject sometimes involve sensitive political matters, this chapter will make no attempt to arrive at a common agreement where none exists. However, it is an effort to offer for consideration some of the major elements, approaches and opportunities that are present and need to be recognized in the complexities of peace operations in the new century.

II. Establishing and Keeping the Peace

3. The last decade of the 20th century saw significant changes in the nature and incidence of violent conflict. The Security Council found itself increasingly confronted with situations of intrastate conflict and, as the crises and tragedies in Somalia, the Balkans and Rwanda illustrated, the peacekeeping tools of earlier years were often found to be inadequate for the new tasks. On a number of occasions the Security Council in particular, and Member States in general, found themselves wrestling with an evident need to take action to halt the escalation in violence. At the same time, they recognized that multilateral action would require the international community to become involved in internal matters and therefore had to face the prospect of breaching the important and vital principle of respect for national sovereignty.

4. In the absence of effective military capabilities and other multilateral mechanisms to deal properly with the crises as they occurred, the international community continued to use the one tool that was available – UN peacekeeping – with the result that, as has often been pointed out, peacekeepers were sent into situations in which there was no peace to keep. In sum, traditional UN peacekeeping was sometimes the wrong tool in the wrong place at the wrong time as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in the early and mid-1990s it was also often the only tool available for the application of broadly based international action.

5. To complicate matters further, there were other factors. Situations arose, such as in the Gulf War in 1991 and, quite differently, Somalia in 1993, in which the traditional UN role of interposing lightly armed troops between conflicting forces to preserve a tenuous ceasefire or peace agreement while a more lasting end to the conflict could be worked out, was manifestly inappropriate. For instances of the former kind, highly robust combat capabilities were needed for enforcement tasks. Not only were such capabilities unavailable and held by many to be inappropriate to the UN, but the command and control arrangements necessary for the successful prosecution of such operations were non-existent at the UN. By hard experience, it became clear that action to restore and enforce peace was often more appropriately a role for coalitions of willing States with the blessing of the Security Council, a development later noted in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report).¹

6. This did not remove altogether a need for stiffening the military capabilities of UN military forces. UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia, the Balkans and elsewhere found themselves no longer protected by the political concept of the Blue Helmet. They were subject to attack, to ambush and other violent actions by factional elements and local warlords. Peacekeepers were taking casualties, being taken hostage or detained and used as bargaining pawns. Some of the seminar participants had had direct and personal experiences of this nature, and described the actions that were taken – or not taken – to extricate them from their predicaments. Deciding and implementing the correct response in such operational circumstances is a difficult and heavy responsibility for those in command in the field. This is particularly true when their views are at variance, in both content and time-related urgency, with political views at the UN in New York. These differences of perception were shared in healthy debate on a number of occasions during the seminar series.

7. Central to the dilemma facing the international community during the 1990s was the difficulty of deciding how and when to take action. At the Pretoria seminar, Dr. Jakkie Cilliers expressed it as follows, “While supporters of the UN abhor an approach that effectively seeks to bypass the UN and, in particular, the Security Council, it is the very inability of the UN and the international community to reach consensus and react or act in sufficient time that is the core driving force behind these developments.” Sir Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General for Peace-

keeping Operations and speaking at the Amman seminar, reminded participants that the United Nations has to prioritize its efforts and that it had to be accepted that there were things that the United Nations could not do. He continued "...He [the Secretary General] has to have the courage to say No when governments, parliaments, and the media are screaming for action – and then the patience to do his best if his No is ignored and he is told to do the impossible with inadequate resources." Speaking at the Buenos Aires seminar, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi reinforced the point, and went further by saying "If the UN cannot make a difference, it should not go."

8. Incremental enhancement of UN peace operations continued during the 1990s. An example of this evolution towards comprehensive peace operations, though with a limited military and police component lasting only three months, was discussed at the Amman seminar, and later revisited during the Buenos Aires seminar. The peace settlement for Guatemala took three years to negotiate and provided for the military arrangements of a cease-fire, cantonment and demobilization of the armed opposition and downsizing of the army. It also included a human rights agreement, a standard-setting agreement on the rights of indigenous peoples, a truth commission and a package of agreements on economic, social and agrarian issues. The peace settlement was thus a serious attempt to tackle the underlying causes of a civil war that had lasted 35 years and killed 5% of the population.

9. As is now widely recognized, the activity traditionally described as 'peace-keeping' is only one facet of modern peace operations that demands a complex combination of skills and disciplines, as well as multicultural sensitivity and multinational involvement. The major involvement of the humanitarian community, the ever-increasing importance given to human rights, the need to establish or re-establish institutions of law and order and good governance, the demands of reconstruction and restoring the social and economic fabric, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants – these and a myriad of other tasks all serve to complicate the roles of peacekeepers, military and civilian alike. In many respects, by the end of the 1990s terms such as 'the establishment and maintenance of peace' have taken on a much broader and deeper meaning as shown in the more recently deployed operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

III. A Reassessment of Roles

It should be borne in mind that, regardless of the arrangements made within any particular mission, cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations inevitably poses considerable challenges, which cannot be solved without ongoing efforts by the international community.

Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
A/55/1024, para.105

10. At the same time as these developments have called upon the UN to review and reassess its role in peace operations, changes in regional organizations and arrangements offer new opportunities. The relationship between the latter and the UN itself is set out in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and that relationship, written over 56 years ago and still valid, needs to be considered and interpreted in the circumstances of the 21st century.

11. Chapter VIII is comprised of three articles, 52, 53 and 54. Its spirit specifically allows and encourages regional arrangements or agencies to deal with “... such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action ...” provided that their actions are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 53 directs that the Security Council “... shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority ...” with the constraint that “... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ...”. Finally, Article 54 requires that the Council should “at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

12. When reassessing the roles of the principal actors in peace operations and with regard to the task of strengthening the global body’s capacity for effective international response to violent conflict, some seminar participants considered that there was a twofold challenge. On one hand, it was suggested that developed countries regularly lean towards focusing resources and efforts on selected regional or bilateral arrangements and organizations, thereby diverting resources which could otherwise have assisted the UN capacity to undertake complex peace operations, and thereby enhance its credibility. On the other hand, a senior diplomat from the developing world suggested that the concerns of developing countries often include a fear of dominance of the UN by major developed powers to benefit their own interests. This fear resulted in protracted debates on humanitarian intervention and a general trend among developing countries of opposition to the strengthening of the UN, when in fact their need was for the very opposite. The continued enhancement of UN peace operations capabilities requires serious attention and support by all Member States, from the North as well as the South.

IV. Observations on the Role of Regional Organizations and Arrangements

Peacekeeping missions arrive only after the crises blow up because International Laws and Conventions still recognize that where there is an internal crisis, the nation-state's jurisdiction is of a certain level of absoluteness.

Shri J.N. Dixit
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

13. Different regions and sub-regions are evolving in different ways. In the comparison of their respective circumstances, mechanisms and approaches, it was recognized that because a certain approach is successful or unsuccessful in one region is not necessarily a guide to the application of that approach in another. Indeed, as has been pointed out by Ambassador Yoshikawa, the differences between regions make it difficult to develop any model. For example, with regard to the situation in Afghanistan for the time being, how could any regional organization be asked to play a dominant role?

14. The role of regional organizations and arrangements was considered primarily but not exclusively, in the presentations and discussions at the New Delhi seminar in September 2000. Some regions, such as Europe and Africa, are further advanced than others with their political and security-related mechanisms, and have demonstrated active interest in addressing their problems on a regional, rather than a global, basis. But the respective capabilities of regions to deal with their problems vary significantly and, for the most part, regional and sub-regional organizations are as yet still in the early stages of developing the requisite political organs, functions and practical capabilities.

15. The advantages of regional action are many. The willingness of a Member State to take part in a peace operation has a lot to do with its national interests and there is likely to be more importance attached to regional or sub-regional stability than in contributing to the restoration of peace and stability in an area far distant from the homeland. Moreover, unless there are circumstances of vital national interest, it may often be easier for a government to justify to its public and elected representatives the expenditure of national lives and material resources on operations that are closer to home, as opposed to operations on another continent or the opposite side of the world.

16. Another aspect is related to familiarity with regional cultures and attitudes. The members of regional organizations and arrangements are more likely than outsiders to be familiar with each other's problems, culture, social identities and historical links. The personnel taking part may also be more similar in standards of training and equipment as well as in attitude and motivation.

17. It was argued by some seminar participants that political decision-making at the regional level may be quicker and less subject to confusion and delay than centralized decision-making at the UN in New York, where the Security Council and the Secretariat may be over-burdened with many crises and tasks demanding attention. In the past, political deadlock in New York has proved to be costly in terms of loss of lives and missed opportunities and in such cases regional organizations could be a better alternative in containing emerging conflict within manageable levels. This would still preserve the option for the UN to step in and reinforce the peace process with its broader type of resources and international support.

18. Seminar participants recognized that the involvement of regional arrangements and organizations in peace operations can also have a number of disadvantages. On occasions regional countries are too close to the issues and have their own national agendas: conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust may vitiate the fragile framework of the peace process. In some instances, political convenience or expediency may tempt a regional leader or organization to initiate an action leading to enforcement without the explicit authorization of the Security Council. There may also be lack of political will on the part of important members, thereby jeopardizing the implementation of a peace operation. The regional organizations themselves may have an agenda that is not necessarily in harmony with the global agenda embraced by the UN as a whole. Separately, just as major powers may apply and exercise their weight at the global level, even in regional arrangements there can be undue influence of the regional big power or powers in the decision-making process. There is also a view that undue influence from external powers may be exercised by proxy in pursuit of an agenda that may not always conform to the perception of the international community or be in the best interests of the region.

19. At the practical level, lack of uniform military capability and resources in the region may result in failure, confusion or delay, or actions being taken without adequate preparations. Beyond the need for military resources, the far wider resource needs of complex peace operations almost always require assistance from outside the region. For such assistance and support, the provision of which may take considerable time to activate and arrange, there has to be early recognition within the region that the regional organization or arrangement cannot resolve its problems without external help.

V. Observations on the Role of the United Nations

Where fear had reigned for the past quarter-century, it is now absent. The Timorese are free to criticize their leaders, to criticize the UN, to criticize what they like, without fear of being tortured, imprisoned, or summarily executed. Few peoples in the post-World War II era have ever been given such an opportunity to determine their destiny in relative freedom and security, and with the luxury of an unprecedented amount of international assistance and good will.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operation, United Nations²

20. In comparison to the role of regional arrangements and organizations, which as may be seen above is still emerging, the role of the UN itself has been more solidly established first and foremost by the Charter itself and subsequently by over half a century of practice and experience. What has changed however, in the past ten years and will continue to evolve in the 21st century, are the circumstances and the challenges.

21. During the 1990s the Security Council became very active. It continues to be the principal and pre-eminent international forum and executive decision-making organ for matters on international peace and security. Faced with many crises and violent conflicts, since 1990 the Council has authorized the establishment of 41 UN peacekeeping operations³ as well as addressing a wide variety of items on its agenda, from the conduct of ongoing operations, to weapons inspections in Iraq, to authorizing enforcement actions by coalitions of willing states or sanctions against international terrorism. As the number of intrastate conflicts has risen, and complex emergencies have worsened in circumstances of failed states or the total breakdown of government institutions, the Council has inevitably found itself engaged in issues of internal insecurity. In implementing the Council's mandates, the UN has taken on highly complicated peace operations, often with insufficient resources in terms of personnel, materiel and finance. In a word, the UN has become overburdened.

22. Despite the load, however, in many respects there is and will continue to be no other organization able to shoulder some of that burden. With its global membership, the UN remains the sole world body with responsibility for international peace and security and as such has a legitimacy that is unique. The UN is the highest international body for the establishment of instruments of law and human rights, and it is the Charter that sets the highest standards of peace and justice. Coalitions of the willing, authorized by the Security Council, may be a better expedient for vigorous enforcement actions, but in many other circumstances of complex peace operations it is only through the UN that the broadest range of capabilities available to the international community can be brought to bear.

23. With the emergence and improving capabilities of regional organizations and arrangements, there is now an opportunity for the UN to consider taking less

on its own shoulders. The UN should do less, and what it decides to do it should do well. The challenge will be for the UN to recognize what it should retain, what it should pass to regional organizations and arrangements when practicable, and how best to develop effective cooperation to make the best use of resources available.

VI. Sharing the Burden

The United Nations is seeking, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter, to create a real partnership, with a more rational and cost-effective division of labour, between those organizations and the United Nations.

Major General Timothy Ford
Force Commander UNTSO
Amman Seminar, October 1998

24. The Brahimi Report took a close look at what needed to be done to improve the internal structure of UN peacekeeping and the implementation of its many recommendations is in hand: some improvements have already been achieved and others are in the pipeline. The history of UN peacekeeping, however, has often been that of a pendulum, swinging from times when Member States have given much support and had high expectations, to times when support has been minimal, criticism has been abundant and retrenchment has been severe. In cycles such as these, it is not surprising that Member States have found that the effectiveness of UN peace operations has at times fallen far short of their wishes. A first element, therefore, of achieving improvement is sustainability of support on the part of Member States. In some respects, this proves to be a circular process: donors will be more likely to continue their support if they have confidence in the recipient organization or agency, and the latter will be more likely to be consistent and effective if there is an assurance of resources and support through good times and bad.

25. While the UN, as a world organization, cannot evade or dilute its responsibility by leaving as many peace operations as possible to regional organizations and arrangements, when a crisis situation seems to be developing perhaps the first questions should be: can this be handled regionally, and if so, in what ways might the wider resources and expertise of the UN be of assistance? In Europe, for example, the strengths and capabilities of the regional organizations and the resources of their respective Member States are such that comparatively less UN involvement may be needed. In Africa, however, as stressed by Dr. Patrick Hayford, the regional or sub-regional organizations may well be able to provide troops, but would much appreciate assistance in developing skills and capacities in the civilian or police areas, or in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with the related economic and humanitarian support. Yet other parts of the world may not have any viable regional organizations or arrangements able to deal with peace and security issues at all, and in such instances the UN itself may be the institution that should take

the lead, assisted by such regional and/or extra-regional countries as may be willing and appropriate.

26. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted a practice of making fact-finding visits to conflict areas. When contemplating action by the international community to establish a peace operation, there could be much value in the Security Council paying similar visits to relevant regional or sub regional organizations to discuss how best to share the burden. The recent initiative of establishing UN liaison offices in regional organizations should be encouraged and hopefully evolve into becoming the norm in UN-regional organizations and arrangements relations.

27. On another aspect of burden-sharing, Ambassador Chief Arthur Mbanefo pointed out at the Buenos Aires seminar that though training assistance to the developing countries in the realm of peacekeeping is most valuable, it should not be seen as being in lieu of the responsibilities of the developed countries to participate in UN peacekeeping in regions of particular need.

28. In some distinct subject areas, such as refugees and health, an overarching global capacity is of prime importance and is provided by the agencies and programmes of the world body. In addition there are the issues and actions of principle determined by the international community at the global level the implementation of which are best done at all levels. As suggested in a message to the Cornwallis seminar participants by the UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, the UN is setting a comprehensive intergovernmental agenda for action by Member States and the international community to improve the protection of women and girls and to enhance their participation in peace processes. In short, providing the global leadership for action to be taken jointly at the global, regional, national, local and individual levels.

29. The importance of training and education to the enhancement of peace operations is highlighted and stressed throughout the present report. Being an area in which cooperation and coordination between the United Nations, providing guidance at the global level, and the regional organizations, arrangements, peacekeeping training centres and Member States, integrating aspects into their respective training programmes at the regional or national level, is of particular value.

30. In several seminars, participants noted the growing importance of conflict prevention. In this, too, there is much scope for practical cooperation between regional action and action at the UN. Conflict prevention is a component part of peace operations which, if implemented comprehensively and successfully, will avoid the eruption of violent conflict and obviate the need for the deployment of military peacekeepers. The functions of early warning, information gathering, analysis of root causes and identification of options for remedial action are usually best carried out at the regional level by persons who understand the cultural, so-

cial, political, economic and historical factors. Several regional organizations and arrangements have such capacities, or are developing them, whereas others do not. Some partner organizations in the Challenges Project have established or are in the process of establishing such centres. The UN needs to follow events and tensions as they unfold and correspondingly needs to have points of contact, in the form of early warning units or centres established in regional organizations, as sources of reliable information and analysis. Such regional capacities would not be substitutes for early warning monitoring and conflict prevention activities at UN headquarters, but would be able to supplement them and in so doing help greatly to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, misinterpretation of trends and developments and possible confusion, as was suggested by the Force Commander of UNTSO at the Amman seminar. In turn, this would also mean that the Security Council, if and when it needed to become involved, would have more reliable information from the Secretariat.

31. In the long term, conflict prevention itself and finding sustainable solutions to national problems are national responsibilities. Parties to the dispute, and local parties caught up in the dispute, must have the will to cooperate and move towards sustainable peace. Outsiders can help with ideas and with resources, as pointed out by the Representative of the European Commission to Jordan at the Amman seminar, but they cannot and should not attempt to prescribe the solutions to internal problems, whether of a national or a regional nature. Peace-building, whether to avoid violent conflict or to restore peace afterwards, may well demand skills, expertise, economic and humanitarian assistance, and other resources beyond local and regional capacities. The presence of peacekeeping soldiers and police may be needed to establish and preserve security while peace-building takes root and flourishes. In these and similar peace operation activities there is much to be gained from the synergy of the UN and the regional organizations and arrangements working together.

32. The Secretary-General of the UN has already established the practice of having annual meetings with his fellow heads of regional organizations and arrangements to consider issues of mutual interest. There would be merit in having the subject of improved cooperation in all aspects of peace operations as a subject for a future meeting.

VII. Conclusions

Bearing in mind the primacy of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Special Committee reaffirms the important contribution that regional arrangements and agencies can make to peacekeeping, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, where appropriate and when the mandate and scope of regional arrangements and agencies allow them to do so.

Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
A/55/1024, para.102

33. Efforts to cooperate more closely on a regional basis with regard to peace operations are one of the major and comparatively new features at the opening of the 21st century. It is clear that these efforts will grow and it is in this context that an overburdened UN should see a valuable opportunity for sharing its load where it is practicable and commonsense to do so. While this was recognized implicitly and explicitly during the seminars, there was also a general understanding that the UN itself will continue to be needed for the planning and implementation of modern complex peace operations, and for the global authorization and coordination of such activities.

34. In the chapters of this report that follow, some of the aspects of peace operations are given more focus. It will be seen that a recurring theme is that if Member States really want to see peace operations that are more effective, there is a need for more consistent political and resource support. To this end, regarding the respective roles of the UN and of regional organizations and arrangements, it is recommended that:

1. *Within their respective capabilities, Member States should make greater efforts to be more consistent with the political and resource support that they offer to peace operations.*
2. *The Secretary-General should be invited to offer his views on the benefits and possible pitfalls of closer cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements in peace operations, and on how best to improve that cooperation.*
3. *The topic of ways to improve cooperation in peace operations should be a subject for a future meeting of the Secretary-General and heads of regional organizations and arrangements.*
4. *The establishment of regional centres for early warning and conflict prevention should be encouraged and supported as appropriate.*

Notes

¹ "Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter." A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para. 53.

² Jean-Marie Guéhenno, USG for PKO of the UN, *Reforming UN Peace Operations: New Challenges for Peacekeeping Training*, IAPTC 7th Annual Meeting, United Nations University in Tokyo, 22 October 2001.

³ As at 15 January 2002, according to www.un.org/peace/bnote.

The Legal Dimension of Peace Operations

Peacekeeping is in the spirit and the text of international law...Our sustained efforts in supporting peacekeeping operations emanate from our belief that ultimately law should be the final arbiter. Nations who claim for themselves the dubious privilege of being outside the pale of international legality run the risk of paying a very high price in the future.

Professor Kamel Abu Jaber
Amman Seminar, October 1998

I. Introduction

1. Law in general is of special and specific relevance for peace operations. The conduct of missions in accordance with appropriate and generally acceptable international and national rules and procedures supports the mission's legitimacy and thus its acceptability and credibility. The achievement of this legitimacy will contribute towards the generation of support for the mission by UN Member States, international and national organizations that have the responsibility for determining whether to commit their citizens and employees in support of a mission. Developing and maintaining legitimacy in situations where peace operations are complex and multifaceted is a challenge that must be met when undertaking such operations.

2. The Challenges Project addressed legal dimensions of peace operations as a separate topic at the Moscow seminar in March 1998. The issue was also discussed in conjunction with related topics during most of the Challenges seminars. The project identified a number of challenges arising from the legal dimension of peace operations. Issues of particular interest were the necessity to resolve, as far as possible, the legal ambiguities existing in regard to the planning and conduct of peace operations, a discussion which included the requirement to draft a framework document setting out the legal basis for the conduct of peace operations. Other challenges explored were complexities related to the application of rules of engagement (ROE), the legal framework for the conduct of military and or police operations, and the influence and application of domestic law to the conduct of peace operations. Chapter 4 on Integrating the Human Rights Perspective, addresses the application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to the conduct of peace operations and touches upon issues of international law and landmines.

3. While it is true that 'peacekeeping' is not mentioned in the UN Charter, the practice of conducting such operations has created a number of norms that have generally been accepted as forming the legal basis for their conduct. For example, it

is now generally accepted that norms such as consent, impartiality and the use of force in self-defence form the basis for some peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, legal norms are also created by the application of legal sources such as the status of force agreement for specific missions, guidelines for the conduct of peace operations issued by the Secretary-General, and guidelines and directives issued by the DPKO for peace operations. There is no doubt, however, that further efforts are required, as some jurists have emphasized, to ensure that to the maximum extent possible legal ambiguities are resolved during the planning and conduct of peace operations and agreed upon by all parties concerned.

II. Dealing with Legal Ambiguities

There has been a doctrinal shift in thinking in recent years. In difficult humanitarian emergencies, action has been taken unilaterally or collectively by a group of states that then receive approval retroactively from the UN. Thus some analysts are already questioning whether this reflects emerging customary international law.

Dr Funmi Olonisakim
Pretoria Seminar, November 1999

4. A practical way to reduce legal ambiguities is to develop an all-encompassing document as a general guideline containing the basic legal principles for the planning and conduct of peace operations by the UN. Such a framework document should more ambitiously also cover peace enforcement operations. It should provide all parties engaged in peace operations with a clear statement of the legal basis for the conduct of peace operations and peace enforcement operations, the legal regimes that are applicable to operations and fundamental legal standards that are expected to be applied during the operation. The document should note which international law principles are accepted as customary and which are treaty based and therefore not necessarily accepted by non-parties. These principles should be tailored to suit both the political considerations and the military requirements of the international community.

5. This framework document could also be used by Member States as terms of reference for their own legal guidelines for their involvement in UN, regional or coalition operations. Such a document will need to balance the requirement to reduce legal ambiguities against creating a rigid structure that may have the effect of limiting the flexibility to conduct effective peace operations.

6. As peace operations tend to be conducted by other actors in addition to the UN, the issue of universal and standard use of terms becomes acute. The UN, OAU, CIS and NATO – and their Member States – can be expected to apply different terminology to describe similar phenomena or, conversely, to describe different phenomena using similar terminology. Within the States themselves, the terminology may not be applied consistently across political, military and social spheres of society.

7. The differing uses of terminology create challenges when applying international law to peacekeeping and peace operations. This challenge arises at the most fundamental level – in the application of the UN Charter. The very language of the Charter tends to be somewhat ambiguous: the French, Russian, and Spanish languages use a UN Charter term “maintenance of peace” to describe what the English language identifies as “peacekeeping”. In the first three languages “peacekeeping operations” are described as, respectively, “les opérations de maintien de la paix”, “operatsii po podderzhaniyu mira”, and “las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz”, while “maintenance of peace” (as used in Articles 33, 34, 37 e.a. of the UN Charter) is translated as “le maintien de la paix”, “podderzhaniye mira”, and “el mantenimiento de la paz”. It appears that a more precise usage of Charter terms in three out of five languages in which the UN Charter had been authenticated results in some confusion, whereas in English, another language of the Charter, a more accurate description is achieved at the expense of the treaty-based terminology.

8. The UN Charter provides a most general legal foundation for peace operations. Furthermore, in its interpretation by Member States, the spirit of the Charter may well prevail over the letter. Such foundation is neither sufficient, nor is it stable. In contrast, the resolutions issued by the UN Security Council that authorize the conduct of a peace operation seek to define the terms and conditions under which that operation is conducted. Such resolutions are legal acts of the global organization albeit of limited scope and duration. The result is that there is a lacuna between the general peacekeeping principles that flow from the UN Charter and mission-specific UN Security Council resolutions. One effect ‘on the ground’ is that there is a growing ‘grey zone’ between the two well-defined responses of traditional peacekeeping and that of collective enforcement as defined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

9. Several legal instruments have already been developed. Among other sources, they may be found in the operational principles of peacekeeping operations outlined in the statement of the President of the UN Security Council,¹ the model status of forces agreement (SOFA) for peacekeeping operations prepared by the UN Secretariat,² memoranda concerning contributions of Member States to the UN Standby Arrangements System, as well as the Convention of the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994.

10. Building on these, it was proposed at the Moscow Seminar to consider a dedicated legal document, e.g. a convention drafted under the UN auspices that would translate general principles of the UN Charter into specific norms that could regulate peace operations. It could be a framework document that would include the instruments already developed, providing for the terms of reference and establishing guidelines for the conduct of operations, as well as the definition of the status of personnel. The framework convention could then be annexed with protocols

containing detailed regulation of particular aspects of peace operations. Those could be the model SOFA, as well as special protocols on privileges and immunities, on rules of engagement (ROE) and other provisions.

11. Institutional arrangements that could be a venue for further negotiations are already in place. The UN International Law Commission, which is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly charged in particular with drafting articles of international treaties, may be assigned such a task and work to achieve it in cooperation with the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

12. A suggestion made by some participants during the various Challenges seminars was to improve the planning and conduct of UN authorized peace operations by adopting a broader interpretation of the UN Charter. A seminar participant suggested using Art. 47 of the UN Charter as a basis for the Military Staff Committee inviting Members of the UN to discuss the “efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities” in the maintenance of international peace and security. Perhaps one way for the Military Staff Committee to become active in peace operation issues would be to facilitate the development of doctrine for peace operations.

13. Another issue was elaborated upon more extensively. Attention was drawn to the importance of adapting existing instruments, including the UN Charter provisions, to emerging needs of peace operations. Several issues are relevant in this respect. A way to enhance peace operations through a broad interpretation of the UN Charter is to involve troop contributing countries in deliberations during the planning and conduct of peace operations thus, among other things, increasing the transparency of the Security Council’s deliberations.

14. The issue of the Security Council being more transparent and open was a recurring message at a number of seminars. As stressed by a participant at the Pretoria Seminar:

...the Security Council should be more transparent and open. This would contribute to the acceptance and legitimacy of its decisions. It should be able to hear the views of all relevant parties to a conflict without the implication of a political recognition. The involvement of humanitarian institutions in the Council’s deliberations would enhance the quality of its decisions.

15. As of February 2002, not a single one of the twelve nations whose troop contributions to current UN missions exceed 1,000 uniformed personnel was a member of the UN Security Council. All troop contributing nations (TCNs, also sometimes referred to as troop contributing countries, TCCs) have a vested interest in decisions taken by the Council with regard to operations in which their units serve under the UN flag. The Security Council is not as open to non-members as other bodies of the UN, so troop contributing nations may not even be aware of

how the mandate for the mission is developed. The original mandate of a peace operation, as well as any changes introduced thereto, should be coordinated with the TCNs. The Security Council in its Resolution 1353 (2001) tried to address this issue to some extent, but this has met with mixed reactions from potential troop contributing nations – particularly those within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as the process did not put in place a formal “mechanism” for consultation, signaling an intention on the part of the Security Council not to tie itself into any formalized process of consultation.

16. A consultative process is of fundamental importance when the Security Council requests TCNs and international and national organizations to provide personnel to take part in a peace operation, or when a mandate is changed. Another example was given by Ambassador Prince Zeid at the Tokyo Seminar when he referred to the decision by the Security Council to try the rebel leaders of Sierra Leone without consulting the TCNs participating in the operation. The incident was particularly disturbing because of the fact that in the circumstances, the members of the Security Council chose in large measure not to participate in the mission themselves.

17. Consultation with TCNs could be achieved informally although it would be better to formalize that process by invoking applicable provisions of the Charter. Art. 31 of the Charter provides that “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.” Under Art. 44 “When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Art. 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.”

18. The first provision leaves the invitation of a non-member of the Council to participate in a discussion at the discretion of the Council. The second provision links the invitation to obligations under Art. 43, that is, agreements on the availability of forces, assistance and facilities within the context of the use of force under Chapter VII.

19. Another approach suggested could be for the Security Council, acting within its powers under Art. 29 “to establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”, to establish an ad hoc military staff committee consisting of the chiefs of staff of the major troop contributing nations. The Council may develop generic criteria of eligibility and, as contributions of individual states may vary, going up and down, membership in that committee may be rotating. A similar suggestion was put forward by Brigadier Shiyab at the Amman se-

minar, stressing that a regular and structured dialogue between the chiefs of staff of TCNs could provide a useful mechanism.

20. A final and less ambitious suggestion would be for the Security Council to develop a usage, that is, a continuous practice, of inviting major troop contributors to a respective operation to participate in the Council's deliberations under Art. 31, waiving the discretion provision.

21. This process could be developed alongside breathing new life into Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and especially Art. 53, as a result of which regional organizations would need to assume greater responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter in Art. 53(1) constrains regional arrangements by placing some legal restriction on the type of conflict resolution activity that regional and sub-regional organizations can embark on. In efforts to manage or control conflicts or prevent their escalation to more dangerous and violent levels, it may become necessary to use or threaten to use force. In such a case, the UN Charter places a limit on the role of regional actors. Except in cases of consensus based peacekeeping and self-defence, regional actors must seek the approval of the UN Security Council before embarking on the use of force.

22. There has been a trend in recent years for coalitions or regional organizations to act unilaterally in situations considered humanitarian emergencies as noted in the quotation at the head of the present section. Articulating the existing as well as emerging principles of international law relating to the use of force in intervention in matters that are arguably within the domestic jurisdiction of a State will assist in ensuring the legitimacy of intervention during humanitarian emergencies.

23. A proposal raised by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar at the Stockholm seminar, which could bring closer universal and regional approaches, would be for the United Nations to set up several:

regional headquarters, which in the normal course would monitor and report on the developments within delineated regions and undertake liaison and training advisory visits to countries that have earmarked 'stand-by' forces, and such headquarters can then provide nucleus staff for a mission headquarters at short notice.

III. Peace Operations and Domestic Regulation

Mutual awareness of domestic decision-making procedures would increase predictability, hence confidence in partners in a peace operation.

Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov
Moscow Seminar, March 1998

24. As processes of globalization affect the international legal order, domestic legal frameworks increasingly have an impact on the way in which multinational peace operations are conducted. Constitutions of most States regulate the manner in which a Government may dispose its armed forces. Some constitutions may be more restrictive than others. Some may establish a clearly defined system of accountability while others may be less specific or may refer the issue of peace operations to implementing legislation.³

25. A number of nations that contribute personnel to peace operations have adopted dedicated legislation that sets forth domestic procedures for deciding on foreign deployments, regulates such participation and provides for benefits and compensations for service personnel and civilians that are assigned to missions. Some national acts embrace a broad scope of peace operations (e.g. the Russian Law of 1995 “On the Procedure for the Provision by the Russian Federation of Military and Civilian Personnel for the Participation in the Activities for the Maintenance and Restoration of International Peace and Security”). Some may deal with ‘peacekeeping’ rather than ‘peace enforcement’ action (the Swedish Law of 1992 “On National Troops Serving Abroad” or the Japanese Law of 1992 “On Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations”, as amended). Some may imply, as the name would suggest, a contribution to ‘peace-making operations’, whereas their substantive articles provide for participation in the whole spectrum of peace operations (e.g. the Ukrainian Law of 1999 “On Participation of Ukraine in International Peace-making Operations”). The German case may be unique, in that the substitute for legislation is a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the International Military Operations (German Participation) Case of 1994.

26. Analysis and comparison of domestic regulations may be of practical value both for the UN and regional agencies that coordinate and direct operations, and are partners in combined operations.⁴ Mutual knowledge of national decision-making procedures increases predictability thus contributing to trust between, and confidence in, partners. Worth noting, and requiring further study, is an apparent trend towards a more active involvement of representative bodies of power in making decisions related to foreign deployments.

27. A precise knowledge of procedures in different political systems would also be of definite value. Depending on the governmental system, a decision may em-

anate from bipartisan parliament or may be determined by a single Party. For example, in the United Kingdom or Japan a parliamentary majority forms the Cabinet, whereas in the United States the President who is from one of two major political parties may have to deal with a Congress that is controlled by the other party.

28. A broader knowledge of national regulations that reach beyond issues of foreign deployments could be of practical value as well. Combined operations may bring together units from troop contributing nations that have diverse military traditions embodied in respective national regulations. International legal obligations will therefore be interpreted in the light of domestic law and relevant doctrine. In defining an internal order in a national unit a domestic normative act is most likely to take precedence over any international provision. Moreover, it would be reasonable to expect that a domestic legal act may influence a decision of a unit commander and thereby perhaps affect combined activities.

29. First and foremost, when contemplating a complex operation in which force is likely to be used in broadly defined 'self-defence', it is worth knowing in advance that many nations who volunteer their forces for UN duty do not allow their military (forces) to participate in Chapter VII operations. Some national laws restrict the use of the military as *posse comitatus*, that is, as a temporary law-enforcement agency. An outside observer may enquire whether that restriction is effective only on the national territory, or may it be construed as prohibiting service personnel participating in a peace operation from pursuing and detaining local citizens suspected of committing war crimes, thus assuming essentially police functions. Would domestic laws allow service personnel assigned to peace operations to engage in law-enforcement under the authority of an international entity? In particular, the issue becomes especially pertinent if the national law contains constraints while the international mandate sets a requirement.

30. In the absence of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, there may be uncertainty between potential troop contributors with respect to how logistical support will be provided by units participating in a combined operation. National regulations may restrict the use of drinking water supplies, dining facilities and fuel, let alone the use of their weapons and ammunitions by troops of other countries. In an operational setting it might be prudent to have lawful ways of dealing with such situations in advance in order to save commanders and their legal advisors the trouble of on-site improvisation. An example occurred in Timor where some TCNs did not fully appreciate the requirements for self-sustainment. It is worth noting that when contingents from TCNs are deployed without being properly prepared, the burden will probably fall unevenly upon the State that appears most able to bear it.

31. Complex multi-dimensional operations may involve TCNs in a level of interaction with the civilian community and a requirement to undertake civilian law

enforcement functions. While ideally these functions should be performed by civilian police specially trained to deal with such problems, in many operations this is not feasible.

32. National regulations may prescribe different procedures for employment of riot control means. A sensitive issue could be the deployment and use of riot control agents in the mission area. While it may be assumed that the riot control agents that are manufactured and deployed in various nations do not violate restrictions imposed by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, there is an obligation on the part of the UN to inform TCNs of the functions and equipment that will be required. In turn, TCNs should be allocated tasks on the basis of their abilities to carry them out in accordance with their national regulations.

33. In situations where peace operation forces perform their tasks in coordination and cooperation with local law-enforcement agencies it would be helpful to know local regulations that govern the use of riot control means, as well as the use of force in general. This leads to a more general comment on domestic regulations of the host nation.

34. Peace operations may be conducted on territories where institutions of state power have almost disintegrated and law and order are virtually non-existent. However, even under such circumstances there might still be remnants of a legal system or of legal perceptions among local population. The mission would benefit from knowledge of that legal system. Such knowledge will facilitate interaction with the local population and may help in rebuilding or re-energizing local administrations thus contributing to mission success. It has been suggested that the UN Secretariat would benefit from a data base containing respective national regulations and reviews of implementation, as well as an authoritative commentary.

IV. Use of Force and Rules of Engagement

...the Secretariat needs to develop rules of engagement that cover the entire spectrum of potential threats.

Colonel George Oliver III
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

35. The drafting, interpretation and implementation of ROE by military forces are issues of fundamental importance to the success of a peace operation. The application of the use of force in peace operations does not seem to have been exhaustively examined by the UN. The issue of force being used in peace operations in situations other than in self-defence would benefit from examination by the Office of the Legal Adviser and DPKO. For example what, if any, limits are to be placed on

the use of force to protect property or to ensure that mission objectives are achieved? As observed at the Carlisle Seminar:

previously the UN standard was simple, self-defence if fired upon. Now the rules of engagement are applied to the defence of the mission to include not only the force itself, but protection of humanitarian supplies, disarming armed factions, assisting refugees and defending UN property. While these rules allow for a fairly clear idea of when force can and cannot be used, the individual may be held liable for any deaths or injury caused by the use of force. Hence, troops are in a dilemma that may [have an] impact [on] their decision on whether or not to use force in accordance with the rules of engagement. The problem is compounded by the difficulty of harmonising the rules of engagement amongst multinational contingents.

36. In this context the remarks on humanitarian action in the Brahimi Report should be noted, where it is argued that “United Nations peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles.”⁵ However, the Brahimi Report also argues that “operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out the mandate.”⁶

37. The very use of force in peace operations is a tool of last resort. It was suggested at the Stockholm seminar that it is not applied easily and only after other means have been exhausted. However, if it becomes necessary to apply force, then force should be applied effectively to realize the specific objective. In fact, such use of force (i.e. not in self-defence) is a final step on the escalatory ladder, which cannot be seen in isolation from all previous steps. The ultimate step of use of force can only be credible if the intent and the capability exist. It is a tool that needs to be applied consistently. The mandate must be clear, and the contingents adequately equipped to ensure that the mandated rules of engagement can be supported. Again, the worst case scenario is of key significance to planning and should be considered during the debate of the mandate in the Security Council. Without a clearly defined mandated use of force, peacekeepers are at great risk.

38. It was also argued that ROEs should be based “on more balanced political, humanitarian and military considerations...to ensure protection, credibility and effectiveness of UN forces.” To this list one can add that ROEs must also comply with the principles and spirit of international humanitarian law. In this context it is appropriate to quote the view of one senior military officer, who argued that:

In all operations other than those which fall under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is to be assumed that the use of force will be restricted to the minimum necessary to deal with a given situation. In the light of recent experiences dealing with intra-state conflict situations, it would appear prudent to ensure that all future peacekeeping contingents be equipped

for the ‘worst case’ scenario, so that they can respond with appropriate force in self defence when attacked.

39. Referring to the rules of engagement, the Brahimi Report suggested that ROE “should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to the attackers.”⁷

40. However, it has also been noted that the drafting of robust ROEs may have little effect if the rules are not applied consistently or are interpreted narrowly by troop contributing nations. Brigadier Zia speaking at the Tokyo seminar emphasized that the problem was not the “...rules themselves, but the way they were interpreted to suit certain interests...”. Another Challenges participant expressed a similar view:

Rules of engagement are one thing, but applying these rules is another thing altogether. In East Timor, the important piece is not the rules of engagement but how they are applied and when the troops did not fire. In the Australian Army there are guidelines known as “OFOF” or orders for opening fire. These rules are printed on a card and carried by each soldier; they elaborate on the circumstances when they can open fire. It’s not just the rules of engagement, but also the OFOF that are important.

41. There is no doubt that troop contributing nations will review UN ROE to ensure that they meet their legal, political and diplomatic concerns and this in turn will affect the manner in which their troops will interpret and apply those rules.

42. One approach that could be adopted to keep differences in interpretation and application of ROE to a minimum is for the UN to develop a suite of ROE for planning and training that could be widely disseminated to troop contributing nations. The development of “Training ROE” would have the benefit of developing a standard practice of international as well as national interpretation and application of ROE. At the very least this would provide troop contributing nations with a common reference point for interpreting and applying ROE so that when they arrive at a mission they are not struggling with how to apply UN ROE. As nations become more familiar with the training ROE, their confidence in applying the ROE would also increase.

V. Interim Justice

One very clear conclusion is that, in parallel with any humanitarian assistance that would have to be given, there is an immediate requirement of putting in place a system for the administration of justice. Civilian police, a judiciary and a correctional system have to be developed almost instantaneously. Otherwise criminality will very quickly take hold.

Hans Corell,
Under-Secretary-General, The Legal Counsel, United Nations⁸

43. The administration of interim justice on peace operations is a function that UN and regional forces are increasingly being required to perform during peace operations. This function is often exercised because the law and order in the host nation has collapsed and organizations, which administer law and order have disintegrated. During the Cornwallis Seminar it was argued that the exercise of interim justice by forces conducting peace operations requires the exercise of powers that must be derived either explicitly or implicitly from the mandate given to the force.

44. The exercise of such powers ought to be based on at least four principles. First, the exercise of law and order powers are elastic in the sense that as the operation moves closer to levels of normalcy expected by societies, the less law and order powers may be claimed by the force. Secondly, the interim justice powers exercised by the force must be reasonable and necessary for the fulfillment of the mandate. Thirdly, the force must hand over to local authorities law and order functions as soon as possible. Fourthly, the force must fully respect the principles and spirit of the laws of armed conflict and appropriate principles of human rights law. It is only by adhering to these principles that the force will “maintain its legitimacy through the rule of law”.

45. During the Buenos Aires seminar it was noted that some of the principal measures of effectiveness of a peace operation include such matters as whether a safe and secure environment has been attained and whether the host nation’s functions have been restored. The issue of the UN developing an interim criminal code to apply during UN operations where law and order have broken down and where host nation authorities no longer function was addressed in the Brahimi Report and has been followed up by a working group established by the UN Secretary-General. That group doubted whether it would be practical, or even desirable given the diversity of countries specific legal traditions, for the Secretariat to try to elaborate a model criminal code, whether worldwide, regional or civil or common law based, for use by future transitional administration missions.⁹ However given the continued challenges related to the issues of law and order during the conduct of peace operations, the issue is likely to be the subject of continued research and exploration in the 21st century. During the Buenos Aires seminar it was noted that the International Bar Association was assessing putting a plan at the disposal of the UN and regional organizations of criminal codes and ad hoc legislation in order to

assist States to re-establish the rule of law where law and order has broken down. The International Bar Association is also considering the creation of ‘fly away’ legal teams that would assist such States to re-establish judicial functions.

46. Given the complexities related to the legal dimension of peace operations, training and education in preparation for participating in a peace operation is of great importance. Training packages and education curricula may vary depending on the prospective level of authority of students, and should be targeted at developing either a general legal awareness or a sophisticated knowledge of juridical details pertaining to the planning and conduct of an operation. For a more detailed discussion on training and education for peace operations, see Chapter 13 on Training and Education.

VI. Recommendations

47. The following recommendations arise from the discussions that have taken place at the seminars:

1. *The feasibility should be explored of negotiating a guideline document on existing practice, based on existing treaties, administrative acts and recommendations, that would serve as an implementing instrument of the UN Charter to provide adequate and sound legal grounds for peace operations.*
2. *Ways should be explored to reinforce the legal foundation for the interface between universal and regional approaches in conducting peace operations.*
3. *A data base should be compiled and a comparative analysis undertaken of respective legislative acts and domestic regulations and their influence on the participation of troop contributing nations in peace operations with a view to enhancing unity of effort in peace operations.*
4. *Prior to mission deployment, all efforts towards training and education of the legal dimensions of peace operations should be encouraged at the international, regional, national and local levels.*
5. *As a general recommendation, an initiative should be launched to conduct under the auspices of the United Nations a comprehensive study of legal aspects of peace operations. This may well fit into the framework of follow-up activities to the Brahimi Report.¹⁰*

Notes

¹ S/25859 of 28 May 1993.

² A/45/594 of 9 October 1990.

³ See in greater detail: *Democratic Accountability and International Institutions: Using Military Forces*, Eds. Ku C. and Jacobson H.J., Cambridge University Press (forthcoming in 2002).

⁴ As a spin-off from the Challenges Project, the Swedish National Defence College and the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are planning a project focused on comparative analysis of national legislation that regulates national participation in peace operations.

⁵ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/304-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para.62.

⁶ Ibid, para.63.

⁷ Ibid, para. 49.

⁸ Corell H., *To intervene or not: the dilemma that will not go away*, Keynote Address at the Conference 'Future of Humanitarian Intervention', Duke University, 19 April 2001.

⁹ Corell H., *The Role of the United Nations in Peacekeeping – Recent Developments from a Legal Perspective*, Keynote Address at the Conference 'National Security Law in a Changing World: The Tenth Annual Review of the Field', Washington D.C., 1 December 2000, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰ One of the substantive legal issues that the Report addressed was the "strengthening of rule of law institutions" (para 47b). As a spin-off from the Challenges Project several participants contributed to development of a document that was noted in the Brahimi Report.

Integrating the Human Rights Perspective

Fifty five years after the adoption of the United Nations Charter, the persistence of gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity and genocide, points to a vast failure by a large number of Member States to respect the over-arching treaty that is meant to govern their conduct and the governance of the globe.

Shri Virendra Dayal
Former Chef-de-Cabinet to the Secretary-General, United Nations
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

I. Introduction

1. This chapter addresses the broad topic of human rights and the many dimensions of this fundamental subject within peace operations. Many of the conflicts of the past decade have been characterized by calculated, strategic and tactical, violations of individual human rights. The deliberate targeting of civilian populations, especially females, children and the elderly, has become an instrument of choice for many of those who are waging a conflict and who are pursuing political, economic, ethnic or other agendas. Against an understanding of international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Challenges seminar participants examined the subject from the perspective of the victims, the perpetrators, the peacekeepers themselves, and other related international efforts.

2. Speaking at the New Delhi seminar, Virendra Dayal continued his remarks quoted at the head of this chapter by saying:

It is legally indefensible, for not only is the Charter violated when such barbarous acts occur, but so are the 70-odd international instruments, devised under the auspices of the United Nations, which deal with human rights. These include some 25 major treaties and the work of 8 treaty bodies, that are meant to bind the nations of the world to 'common standards of behaviour' and, indeed, of answerability to each other.

3. International humanitarian law and international human rights law were referenced and/or discussed on a number of occasions during the Challenges series of seminars, in particular at the Cornwallis seminar, dedicated to the issue and held in Canada in May 2001. Throughout the seminar series, participants generally agreed on the need for the leadership and for personnel engaged in peace operations to have a better understanding of international humanitarian and human rights law, to address pro-actively human rights challenges within peace operations, and to recognize the obligations of peacekeepers and UN personnel under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

4. For the international community, in its pursuit of peace and stability, international humanitarian and human rights law constitute the foundation for the legal framework and development of peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Many organizations and other bodies are by institutional or political mandate directly involved in human rights aspects of peace operations, in particular the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and a number of principal non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Official dimensions notwithstanding, it is the responsibility of all Member States, organizations and individuals to respect human rights, to protect the rights of others and to support the laws, conventions and good practices that apply to human rights.

5. Within the UN system, in 2000, the Brahimi Report noted as one of its basic premises "The essential importance of the United Nations system adhering to and promoting international human rights instruments and standards and international humanitarian law in all aspects of its peace and security activities."¹ In 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations promulgated a bulletin to all Member States requiring all forces operating under United Nations command to abide by international laws that protect civilians and govern the conduct of soldiers in war and armed conflict.² In current UN missions advisors and envoys are being deployed to provide the necessary technical expertise to deal with this fundamental yet complex issue. These developments underscore the necessity for those planning and carrying out peace operations, civilians, police and military, to understand more fully their roles and obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law.

II. International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law

As a point of departure, I think we can all take it as accepted that state sovereignty can no longer be interpreted in the way it was recognized in Westphalia in 1648, but has to be construed in the light of later developments. In particular in the fields of human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Hans Corell,
Under-Secretary-General, the Legal Counsel, United Nations³

6. Law in general is of special and specific relevance for peace operations. The conduct of missions in accordance with appropriate and generally acceptable international and national rules and procedures supports the mission's legitimacy and thus its acceptability and credibility. The achievement of this legitimacy will contribute towards the generation of support for the mission by Member States, as well as international and national organizations that have the responsibility for determining whether to commit their citizens and employees in support of a mission. Developing and maintaining legitimacy in situations where peace operations are complex and multifaceted is a challenge that must be met when undertaking peace

operations. The distinct but complementary bodies of international humanitarian law and human rights law draw their power and authority from international agreement on humanitarian and human rights standards; nearly every State is party to the core instruments that form international humanitarian law.

7. Often referred to as “the law of war” or “the law of armed conflict,” international humanitarian law is comprised of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977. International humanitarian law was deliberately created to prevent certain forms of violence and violations during situations of war and armed conflict and, therefore, covers in greater detail than human rights law specific situations, categories, and treatment of persons involved in war and armed conflict. The primary objectives of international humanitarian law are: to protect persons in time of war or armed conflict who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities, e.g. civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, former combatants, refugees, internally displaced persons, etc., and to limit the means and methods of warfare.

8. International human rights law, on the other hand, applies both in times of war and peace. Many practitioners and scholars contend that human rights law is more useful than international humanitarian law, and far more adaptable, for safeguarding the rights of people during armed conflict.⁴ These laws are comprised of international and regional standards that include treaties, protocols, declarations, and other instruments. International human rights law articulates broad guarantees regarding the fundamental rights of all human beings. These guarantees are found in the International Bill of Human Rights which consists of three legal instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). Numerous other conventions, protocols and international human rights declarations, conference documents, and United Nations resolutions and standards add further depth and dimension to human rights law.

9. The most severe violations of international humanitarian law are classified as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Briefly, genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) as any of the following acts that are committed with the intent of destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Such acts include: killing members of the group; causing severe bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Genocide is expressly prohibited during all times of war or peace. Acts of genocide may be considered a war crime, a crime against humanity, or both, and fall under universal jurisdiction, which means

that all nations are enabled and obligated to pursue and bring alleged perpetrators to justice.

10. War crimes are listed in the Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols and the Statute for the International Criminal Court. War crimes can occur during non-international or international armed conflict. Acts that constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict include murder, torture, the taking of hostages, intentionally directing attacks against civilian populations, recruiting child soldiers, rape and other forms of sexual assault. War crimes during international armed conflict include all the former, as well as using starvation as a weapon of warfare, employing poison and poisoned weapons, among other actions. Unlike crimes against humanity and genocide, which need to be widespread and systematic to be defined as such, one act is enough to constitute a war crime. War crimes may be considered grave breaches of international humanitarian law as well as other serious violations of the Conventions.

11. Crimes against humanity are most recently defined in the Statute for the International Criminal Court. Crimes against humanity include, but are not limited to, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution on political, national, racial, ethnic, gender, cultural, or religious grounds, enforced disappearance, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. Crimes against humanity are generally recognized as those that occur during times of war or peace; are of a widespread and systematic character, rather than an isolated criminal act; are directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attackers; and are committed by either government or non-governmental actors. Crimes against humanity have been recognized to fall under universal jurisdiction.

III. Principal Human Rights Issues in Peacekeeping

There is a growing awareness of the extent to which international law – international human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law – provides a supportive framework for peacekeeping operational activities.

Lieutenant General M.R. Kochhar
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

12. Against the background and understanding of the two sets of laws, discussion throughout the seminars generally revolved around the victims of conflict. Massive human rights abuses during a crisis have been characteristic of recent conflicts and the manner in which such abuses are being addressed received considerable attention. It has also proven very difficult within failed states and in the aftermath of conflict to bring perpetrators to justice. A further challenge for the international community is to shape new attitudes and to set in place appropriate policies and systems in countries emerging from conflict in order to guarantee human rights

for the future. In addition, some discussion was devoted to the need for peacekeepers to better understand this complex yet fundamental dimension of contemporary peacekeeping, and for peacekeepers to contribute to building capacity and tolerance in this area and to lead by example.

13. Protecting Civilians' Rights during Armed Conflict. During the Cornwallis seminar, participants acknowledged that in nearly all cases of armed conflict, women and children are increasingly targeted and constitute the majority of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced populations. Additionally, they discussed how in today's armed conflicts strategic and gender-based attacks against women and children are widespread and increasingly form part of the logic and tactics of warfare. For example, during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda women were specifically targeted and attacked by militaries and militias as part of coordinated and planned strategies. Participants in the Cornwallis seminar agreed that it is paramount that those responsible for peace operations and peacekeeping personnel should be aware of the use of gender-violence and gender-crimes as weapons of war and be familiar with the rights of women and children under international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as their obligations as peacekeepers to protect and uphold the rights of these populations during peace operations.

14. One presentation and discussion dealt with historical examples of abuses during World War II, where occupying forces maintained so-called "comfort stations" in which young girls and women were kept as sexual slaves and repeatedly raped. At that time, although the world had both knowledge and evidence that there was a sexual slavery system in place, in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East no one was prosecuted for the sexual slavery system. War criminals were charged with murder, torture, vivisection, and numerous other forms of atrocities, but not for sexual slavery. Some fifty years later during the conflicts in the Balkans similar atrocities occurred. The difference this time is that war crimes of enslavement and rape are now being punished by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Such rulings are likely to play significant roles in encouraging similar prosecutions and should also help set standards for the International Criminal Court, for other tribunals that may be established to prosecute those accused of war crimes, such as those under consideration in Sierra Leone, and, potentially, for national legislation. While the odious pervasiveness of this tragedy continues, the laws, understandings and commitment to deal with such atrocities are becoming increasingly well established.

15. Children are affected by war and armed conflict on an enormous scale. Nearly half of the world's refugees are children, with another 13 million children internally displaced within their own countries. UNICEF estimates that over 300,000 children under 18-years are currently participating in armed conflict. Some 8,000 to 10,000 children are maimed or killed each year by landmines left as

a result of war. UNICEF also estimates that between 1986 and 1996 armed conflicts killed 2 million children, injured 6 million, and left over 1 million orphans.⁵ In the face of such numbers, it is important to recognize that children are to be afforded special protection during armed conflict under a number of international humanitarian law standards. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol, and the Statute for the International Criminal Court recognize the rights of children for special protection during armed conflict and furthermore declares recruitment, conscription, or enlistment of children less than 15 years of age for the purposes of hostilities, a crime against humanity. Yet on virtually all continents, this abuse continues.

16. The Perpetrators. There is now considerable momentum in the international community to bring an end to what appears to some to be “a culture of impunity”. During the Cornwallis seminar, participants discussed the ways in which the international community is acting to end impunity for violations committed during armed conflict. Examples include the actions of the ICTR and ICTY for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia respectively, the Cambodian government’s creation of an extra-ordinary chamber to prosecute people who committed atrocities in Cambodia, and the case of East Timor, where, within the mission itself, a panel has been created with exclusive jurisdiction which will be responsible, with others, for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

17. Seminar participants also examined lessons from the experiences of South Africa and other countries of challenging impunity in post-conflict systems. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission could provide useful lessons for other countries emerging from armed conflict and looking for means to address widespread human rights violations and the linking of peace and justice. Such means, for example, might be of particular relevance to the current situation within the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The conflict in the DRC, which dates from 1981, is widely recognized as significantly destabilizing peace and security in the region and has taken an enormous toll on the civilian population of the country, with considerable impacts on women and children. As suggested by Phenyio Rakate at the Cornwallis seminar: “a domestic truth and reconciliation commission will not only help in exposing gross human rights violations committed within a short space of time, but also help to heal ethnic tensions and divisions between the various ethnic groups in the DRC.”

18. The Peacekeepers. In today’s complex peacekeeping and peace-building situations, peacekeepers increasingly find themselves operating in situations where violations of international humanitarian law are occurring, thus calling them into roles as enforcers of international humanitarian law at a variety of levels including monitoring, investigation of violations, documentation of violations, making ar-

rests, presenting evidence of violations to the courts, protection of witnesses, and so on.

19. At the Cornwallis seminar, there was considerable debate on what the roles of peacekeepers should be in the new era of international criminal prosecution. Much of the debate centred on whom within an operation had the capability and authority to make arrests, with several participants expressing concern about the use of military personnel for this function. Some participants suggested that military peacekeepers do not have the training to use the power to arrest. Other participants expressed the view that the military does not have the capacity to exercise the power to arrest, nor did the military particularly desire such a role. A general view from human rights experts was that it was the military's role to provide security, with the role of the police, local or international as appropriate, to make arrests. The provision of security to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, which is a different matter, has been included in the mandates of several recent UN peacekeeping operations, for example in the mandate of UNAMSIL in Resolution 1270(1999).

20. Military participants and others noted that contemporary challenges are somewhat more complex and thus do not allow a simple and clear delineation of responsibilities. Some pointed to the difficulties that the UN has encountered in deploying international civilian police in a timely fashion, especially in recent operations in the Balkans, and strongly urged improvement in this area. Others noted that law and order, as in Bosnia for example, is a responsibility of the local authorities and that international police are simply there to monitor, mentor, train and, as necessary, restructure or re-orient local police. Civilian police seminar participants agreed with these viewpoints and also stated that they were largely unwilling to enter into areas that the military had not secured. The conclusion, no matter the particular circumstances, is that all involved in the business of security and law and order have a role to play in practicing and protecting human rights, and accordingly need to be well-informed on the fundamental aspects of these laws.

21. For the military, rules of engagement (ROEs) need to take account of human rights requirements. In the Balkans, it was pointed out that some military ROEs initially prevented the military from acting in the face of clear abuses of human rights, unless in a life-threatening situation. Gradually ROEs have been made more effective in this regard, but certain nations still impose restrictions or adopt differing approaches with a view to limiting their military's role in the internal affairs of a state. Generic UN ROEs, for forces deployed under UN command, need to be developed carefully to take account of human rights requirements.

22. One of the key pillars of any peace operation, and much of its success, is based on how well the mission handles law and order issues. Issues of law and order are implicitly issues of human rights. For example, the Geneva Conventions in-

clude explicit rules regarding the treatment of female prisoners and female civilians who are being detained, issues relevant for military and police peacekeeping personnel.

23. During the Challenges seminars there was discussion regarding past cases in which military peacekeepers, international civilian police and others had violated the rights of those they were sent to protect. Some examples high-lighted included peacekeepers' participation in torture and murder in Somalia, systems of sexual abuse of women and children in the former Yugoslavia, and sexual abuse of women and children in Cambodia. In addition to being gross violations of the human rights of women and children, such activities may also increase the spread of HIV/AIDS, killing both civilians and peacekeepers. As reported by Dr. Sandra Whitworth at the Cornwallis seminar: "UNTAC's chief medical officer predicted that as many as seven times more UN personnel would eventually die of AIDS contracted in Cambodia than had died as a result of hostile action."

24. Participants debated the exponential increase in the incidence of prostitution, including child prostitution, which is connected with the influx of internationals associated with international peacekeeping. It was noted that the military can deal with this issue in a disciplined fashion if decisions are made to do so and accountability mechanisms are put in place and enforced; for example, in some countries there are policies of no fraternization. At the same time, participants concurred that the senior levels of military leadership must be seen as forbidding this behaviour and enforcing such policies. In this context, it is noted that the UN has adopted a policy of zero tolerance and has issued a Code of Conduct on the matter. However, concern was expressed that while the focus is often on the military, the UN civilian police, UN civilian personnel, and NGOs are also violators of human rights, yet do not appear at times to have standards of discipline or mechanisms to hold them accountable for their actions.

25. Issues related to international humanitarian law and other human rights aspects relating to maintaining peace and security in host countries are complex for peacekeepers – military and civilian alike. Many recent examples were highlighted. Within 72 hours of the start of the mission in Haiti, the commander of the mission needed a detention centre to detain people who were threatening the military force and civilians. In Kosovo, the NATO-led KFOR also began immediately detaining people who were deemed a threat to the force and to human security; within two weeks, KFOR had a backlog of over 200 detainees, many held for serious criminal offences, including arson, violent assault, and murder. In East Timor, as observed by legal officer Major Bruce Oswald at the Cornwallis seminar, on the first day of the mission, INTERFET detained people for carrying weapons and/or posing a security risk to INTERFET and the civilian population. These detainees were handed over to the Indonesian authorities. However, handing detainees to the Indonesian authorities proved unsatisfactory because of the collapse of the civilian administra-

tion in East Timor. It was apparent that some of these detainees were being released back on the streets by the Indonesian authorities soon after they were handed to them. In order to ensure INTERFET was able to fulfil its mandate and also provide detainees with fundamental human rights, Commander INTERFET set up a Detainee Management Unit.

26. The views of participants were mixed on whether military forces should as a general rule hold detainees, with all military personnel arguing that militaries are trained to deal with POWs, and detainees are not POWs. There was general agreement that detention during peacekeeping missions should, at the very least, conform to the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights law. In cases where local authorities demand that peacekeepers turn over detainees, and where there is concern for the safety and human rights of the detainee if turned over, there was consensus that the mission should not turn over such persons until the UN was satisfied that their fundamental human rights guarantees were maintained.

27. A further complication is that while soldiers and police are educated about what they are supposed to do, in actuality, there has often been no place to put all those detained. In Kosovo and elsewhere, for example, it was considered politically too sensitive to ask donor countries to put money into building detention facilities. Seminar participants agreed that there needed to be much more strategic thinking about the issue of the criminal justice system at all stages in order to avoid such serious problems in future missions and to guarantee the protection of the human rights of all people in the host country, including detainees. Dr. Mark Baskin reminded the participants of the Cornwallis seminar about the challenge of the domestic security dilemma at hand in Kosovo:

Much violence is inter-ethnic, but the most telling incidents may be the intra-ethnic violence associated with organized crime, as well as violence and crime directed against international officials and organizations... Kosovo has continued to be stricken by a series of high-profile murders, violence against minorities, attacks on individuals and convoys, kidnappings, trafficking in women... No Kosovar public figure feels entirely secure today. Minorities feel especially at risk...

IV. Practical Means of Addressing Human Rights Issues in Peace Operations

A genocide begins with the killing of one man – not for what he has done, but because of who he is. A campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ begins with one neighbour turning on another. Poverty begins when even one child is denied his or her fundamental right to education. What begins with the failure to uphold the dignity of one life, all too often ends with a calamity for entire nations.

Secretary General Kofi A. Annan
Nobel Lecture, Oslo 10 December 2001

28. Within United Nations peace operations, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is the lead agency for promoting and monitoring human rights. OHCHR works to promote and protect human rights in a variety of ways during international peacekeeping missions. OHCHR provides training for military, police and legal personnel, and provides advisory services regarding incorporating human rights standards into policy, training, and national legislation. OHCHR also provides training and technical support for human rights organizations and activists on the ground in human rights monitoring, action, and advocacy.

29. The UN Commission on Human Rights (intergovernmental organ, UNCHR) appoints Special Rapporteurs to report on the situation of human rights through out the country, as well as on individual cases. They carry out their work by developing networks, consult with and give advice to governments, NGOs, and local communities regarding international human rights standards. Rapporteurs then report their findings to the UNCHR to act upon.

30. In addition to its work of human rights monitoring, reporting, and promotion, OHCHR may be tasked to support the peace accord, in particular as it applies to human rights elements. Within a peacekeeping mission OHCHR is often given a broad mandate and thus may take on a variety of activities, such as the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is conducting path-breaking work in the areas of gender and anti-trafficking initiatives, social and economic rights, and human rights training. Although OHCHR is the lead human rights organization within peace operations, their personnel work within a framework that includes government offices, national institutions, a variety of United Nations agencies, international and national human rights and humanitarian organizations, civil society, and religious organizations.

31. OHCHR can also adopt the concept of an ad hoc Special Envoy to address specific human rights issues. As explained by Ambassador Henrik Amnéus, the Special Envoy of OHCHR on Persons Deprived of Liberty in Connection with the Kosovo Crisis in Former Yugoslavia, speaking at the Cornwallis seminar, the initiative is a case of ‘human rights diplomacy’, whereby an Envoy raises relevant issues

with local, national, and international authorities regarding detainees throughout the country. The Envoy works to facilitate communication among all parties and thereby help to reduce tensions, by seeking comprehensive solutions to address the nature of the problem, rather than intervening on individual cases. The work of the OHCHR Envoy is to be supportive of other Envoys and agencies within the peace operation working on these issues, in particular, the ICRC and the UNCHR Special Rapporteur for the region.

32. Peace operations are now also being supported by United Nations child protection agents, and many of the humanitarian and development personnel in peace operations are trained to help mitigate the effects of armed conflict and uphold human rights of children, especially regarding adequate nutrition, medical care, schooling, family support, and protection. Military and police peacekeepers also have important immediate roles to play in lessening the impact of armed conflict on children by providing secure environments within which humanitarian and development personnel can carry out their work and children and their families can live in security. There are numerous other ways in which peacekeepers are helping to ensure the rights of children. For example, mine clearance programmes in the Balkans and elsewhere include within them mine-risk education for children, as many mines are small and brightly coloured, making them particularly attractive to children.

33. One principal contributor in the area of human rights is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which works in primarily three areas: those activities that it carries out in order to prevent abuse of human rights; those that ensure the application of international humanitarian law; and those to afford protection and relief to victims of armed conflict. The ICRC Regional Delegate to the Armed and Security Forces in South Asia, speaking at the New Delhi seminar, described the first activity as involving the active dissemination of the content of International Humanitarian Law to the belligerent armed forces as well as the peacekeeping troops. The second activity involves the protection of the victims of conflict, both prisoners of war as well as detained civilians seeking to ensure humane treatment while in detention. Thirdly, the visits to detainees are supplemented by the tracing of persons whose families have no news of them or who have disappeared. The ICRC arranges for exchange of messages between detainees and their families as well as organize family reunifications and repatriations.

34. In addition to these experts in the human rights field, all personnel deployed in an international peace operation, civilians, police and military, have a responsibility to understand relevant aspects of international humanitarian law and human rights law. If properly mobilized, this collective capability can contribute significantly to addressing abuses and setting in place a self-sustaining and democratic approach to human rights in the mission area in question. Much depends, however, on the extent of cooperation and effective coordination between the many diverse

civilian elements of any mission, and between these civilians and the military forces and international police. Problems of culture, mandate, areas of responsibility, personality and other factors have mitigated against such effective cooperation in the past and, indeed, the present. In areas such as humanitarian assistance and human rights, this problem is exacerbated: the experts and those with institutional mandates generally disapprove of the involvement of the military in this sensitive area. A great deal of education, training, understanding, tolerance and cooperation is yet required.

35. A further possibility for influencing future success is the need for the international community to be able to see victims of abuse as key contributors to reconciliation, peace and stability. While it remains essential that justice be sought to bring closure to the abuses perpetrated, nevertheless it is also essential that space be created for these same victims to step forward and contribute to the process of reconciliation. Groups of widows, veterans, former prisoners and others can be instrumental in assuring that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.

36. The human rights agenda can also be advanced through technical means and development assistance. One example is the challenge posed to individuals and by extension, the international community, by landmine contamination in inhabited areas. The topic was addressed at the Amman seminar in connection to which a visit to the minefields in the Jordan Valley was organized. As defined by Dr. Peter Isaacs, the Director of the UN Mine Action Service:

Mine Action refers to all those activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of landmine contamination. It is not so much about mines as it is about people and their interaction with a mine-infested environment. Its aim is not only technical, to survey, mark and eradicate landmines, but also humanitarian and developmental, to recreate an environment in which people can live safely.

Mine Action is essential to undertake in support of the realization of freedom of movement and human rights, and in promoting the principles of non-discrimination and equal rights to victims insofar as health, safety, education and participation in society are concerned.

V. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

We need to start training our peacekeepers now about issues concerning detention, handling detainees and, at the very least, the principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law... We should also train NGOs and other members of the UN family, including the UN itself about these issues.... Matters such as understanding the law of the host country, accessing legal texts, deciding which crimes will be dealt with by the force are just some of the issues which will need to be addressed.

Major Bruce Oswald,
Cornwallis Seminar, May 2001

37. A common feature for all peacekeeping is the goal to guarantee respect for the highest international standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms in its area of operation. This ideal is repeatedly stated by the United Nations Security Council in its resolutions regarding peace operations. It is clear that international humanitarian law and human rights issues pervade all aspects of modern peace-operations and apply, in a variety of forms, to all members of the international peace operation. The challenge for peace operations in the 21st century is to put laws and standards into practice on the ground.

38. It is recommended that in peace operations:

1. *All personnel – civilian, military and police – should have a fundamental understanding of international humanitarian law and human rights law and, while this remains a national responsibility, international organizations involved in peace operations, as well as expert organizations such as OHCHR, UNHCR and the ICRC, should make every effort to compliment national training.*
2. *Mission planning and implementation should include the necessary expertise and advice regarding human rights, including in the development and implementation of military rules of engagement.*
3. *All organizations contributing to a mission should appreciate the significance of dealing humanely and in accordance with existing laws with the issues relating to prisoners, detainees, the missing, and the abused.*
4. *All organizations contributing to a mission should strive for effective co-operation and coordination in support of mission objectives, including the cooperative pursuit of human rights standards, norms and objectives.*

Notes

¹ Report of the Panel of the United Nations on Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para.6(e).

² Bulletin of the Secretary-General, ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August, 1999.

³ Corell H., *To intervene or not: The dilemma that will not go away*, Conference on the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Duke University, USA, 19 April 2001.

⁴ Gardam J. and Charlesworth H., "Protection of Women in Armed Conflict," *Human Rights Quarterly* 22, 2000.

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, A/55/150 of 19 July 2000.

Doctrinal Challenges

Each peace operation is distinct and unique and there are no school solutions for any of these. Peace operations therefore require innovation, flexibility, initiative and the moral courage of the individuals involved. The key is capturing that in doctrine without being dogmatic.

Mr. William Flavin
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

I. Introduction

1. The overarching doctrinal challenge of peace operations during the 1990s revolved around questions of how to act effectively in the midst of humanitarian or “complex emergencies”. A complex emergency is caused wholly or partly by an armed conflict, which tends to combine an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, resulting in large numbers of displaced persons. As such, complex emergencies wreck and destroy national, governmental, social, civil and trading structures within a country.

2. The immediate concern, under such circumstances, was to address conflicts involving violence, particularly those involving atrocities, crimes against humanity, or intentional mass displacement of people. However, both the conditions that gave rise to civil wars and those that resulted from them called for a more holistic approach that went beyond military and security priorities to address issues of governance, legitimacy, political and social inclusiveness, and economic equity. It was widely accepted that international assistance to war-torn societies would have to extend far beyond the initial operation if these issues were to be resolved and the host society made resistant to new rounds of violent conflict.

3. The strategic and operational challenge was both one of how to coordinate the various elements of international assistance deployed across what was conceptualized as a “continuum between relief and development”, and how to leverage the short-term presence of peacekeeping forces to create the building blocks for a sustainable peace. It was in this context that the notion of “post-conflict peace-building” emerged and has proved to be an important instrument alongside other conceptual conflict management tools such as conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

4. Once the potential components of international peace-building had been identified and embraced in notions such as the “new” peacekeeping partnership,

attention shifted from the strategic issues of where, when and how to act, to the operational challenges of linking together the activities of a multiplicity of organizations, agencies and actors with different mandates, budgets and cultures. The ensuing focus on the mechanics and techniques of cooperation and coordination in pursuit of an elusive “unity of effort” has tended to displace efforts at determining strategic and operational doctrine for the conduct of future peace operations.

5. In international discourse on the subject, the focus recently has been based on the notion that the military is but one component of a peace operation, and much of the discussion has moved on to debates about refining the humanitarian and developmental components of such operations. However, promoting reconciliation and making progress with peace-building in a factional civilian population while there is still residual conflict and/or high levels of violent criminality have proven to be virtually impossible. The military peacekeeping force in close coordination with police elements must provide the safe and secure environment that will allow political, economic, and social development to proceed.

6. The aim of this chapter is therefore not to reiterate every aspect of the Challenges discussions on doctrine for peace operations but to focus on the military, and to some extent the police, doctrine required to provide that safe and secure environment. This approach isolates that area of doctrine that was best defined and most discussed during the seminar series – that which impacts the performance of military and, to a degree, police forces in providing the protection and security that is a *sine qua non* for the effectiveness of all other mission elements. The Challenges discussions underlined that there are many different, and sometimes overlapping, opinions about doctrine for complex peace operations – but as yet no clear UN guidance on the subject. Recognizing the intricate and all but impossible task of developing a global, comprehensive doctrine acceptable to all Member States, this chapter does not attempt to resolve the issue. However, the chapter does aim to show why the matter merits further and early consideration, and suggests how the issue could be advanced by taking an incremental, step by step approach, building on the common concern of Member States, when their troops, police and civilians are faced with brutal realities on the ground.

II. Developing Consensus around the Meaning and Scope of Doctrine

Military doctrine has a different content and emphasis at the various levels of application. At the supranational level, doctrine manifests itself in various tenets of international law – most overarching, of course, being the UN Charter itself. At the national level, doctrine is often articulated by white papers that explain broad policy guidelines from a political perspective. Operational doctrine has a somewhat different focus. It concerns itself with the principles that govern the conduct of campaigns and major operations, and imparts understanding. At the tactical level, doctrine focuses more on instruction and training and ensures that commanders have a common foundation on which to base plans for the execution of their mission.

Mr. Mark Malan
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

7. As peace operations are, by definition, multidimensional and multinational undertakings, one of the biggest challenges lies in forging consensus among nations on an appropriate doctrine that would provide sufficient guidance for the preparation, deployment and execution of such operations. In the realm of multinational peace operations, doctrine, like training, has hitherto been regarded as a national, rather than an international responsibility.

8. The starting point for a deliberate process of developing consensus on peace operations doctrine must be the recognition that the term ‘doctrine’ simply means different things in different countries and languages, partly due to the legacy of the Cold War and the separate development of doctrine by the two opposing blocs. The Challenges Project encouraged an inclusive approach. Inclusiveness was combined with a recognition that it might be impossible to reach agreement on comprehensive doctrine all at once, but that agreement on specific issues and on specific principles can still be reached. Consensus on discrete ‘doctrinal statements’ might then be built into national and multinational doctrines in an incremental fashion.

9. The doctrinal dimensions of peace operations were the focus of the Carlisle seminar, hosted by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute. The concepts of doctrinal principles of India, Jordan, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, USA and NATO were presented, following which a comparative analysis of a number of official doctrines obtained in conjunction with the seminar was undertaken by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1 : Doctrinal Commonalities

PRINCIPLES	UN	NATO	UK	Sweden	Canada	S.Africa	U.S.	Dutch	India
Objective		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Unity of Effort	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Perseverance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Security		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Restraint	(X)	X				X	X		
Legitimacy	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Transparency	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Impartiality	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Consent	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X
Negotiation	X	(X)							
Freedom of Movement	X	X		X		X	X	X	
Credibility	X	X	X		X	X	X		X
Civil Military Operations		X	(X)	(X)	(X)	X	X	(X)	
Use of Force	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Adaptability/Flexibility		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Mutual Respect		X				X		X	X
Integration							X		
Offensive Action							X		

(x) discusses principle, but not listed separately

10. In these multinational operations, it is critically important that peacekeepers have generally the same theoretical notion of what it takes to succeed, and thus, what should be addressed by a peace operations doctrine. Among the countries of the world, there are many different formal definitions of military doctrine. For example, the British Army defines military doctrine as “...a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success.”¹ According to the South African Department of Defence, “Operational Doctrine consists of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives. Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and structure.”²

11. While such national military definitions of doctrine vary in form, there is a commonality with respect to the substance thereof. Strategic doctrinal perspectives presented by the various participants in the Challenges series confirmed that the articulation of national “entry criteria” for deploying military forces in peace operations reflected similar aspects. As an example, attention was focused on US Presidential Decision Directive 25 of May 1994, which decrees that the USA will not intervene in future crises unless American national interests are clearly at stake, and the mission has clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy. Similarly, Russia’s position is that it will consider participation in any particular

peace operation in relation to its own political, strategic and economic interests, viewing its participation in international peace operations as an element of its national security policy and international policy, as suggested by General Marshankin speaking at the Carlisle Seminar. Other common dilemmas which face most countries contributing to peace operations, revolve around the quasi-political roles assigned to soldiers in peace operations, and the perceived impact thereof on the professionalism and war-fighting ability of the national military.

12. At a multinational level, it should therefore not be impossible to reach definitional consensus on the nature of doctrine. For example, NATO has agreed on the definition of doctrine as: "... fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their action in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application."³

13. At the global level, doctrine manifests itself in various tenets of international law, under the primacy of the UN Charter itself. However, given the political nature of doctrines, the UN Secretariat has not yet been given the necessary mandate by Member States to develop a comprehensive military doctrine for peace operations. Despite the inherent difficulties, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peace operations, Member States should encourage the further development of detailed doctrinal guidance from the UN on the conduct of peace operations, to be used by troop contributing countries on a voluntary basis. At the time of finalizing the present report (February 2002), the Best Practices Unit of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a Strategic Manual of guidelines and procedures for the conduct of multidimensional peacekeeping.

14. Operational level doctrine has a somewhat different focus as it concerns itself with the principles that govern the conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, each individual case of multilateral operations is unique, and has its own complexities. For example, there may be more than two sides to a conflict, and it may not be practical to deploy troops so that they are physically inter-positioned between these parties. However, the point is that the overarching purpose of all such operations is not to participate in the conflict, but to act impartially so as to bring it to an end. If consensus can be reached at this level, then the next logical step would be to flesh out an operational doctrine based on the experiences in these types of operations.

15. At the tactical level, doctrine focuses more on instruction and training and ensures that commanders have a common foundation on which to base their plans for the execution of their tasks. The importance of standardizing the preparation for peace operations is of utmost importance and the notion of civil-military training in support of unity of effort is gaining ground world-wide. It was stressed at the Buenos Aires seminar of August 2001, that education and training for peacekeep-

ing is a national responsibility. The proper preparation of peacekeepers, military, police and civilian, is vital to the success of an operation and should be given appropriate priority. Given the current absence of a UN peacekeeping doctrine as such, it is useful that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Military Division – Training and Evaluation Service (TES) is developing Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTM) during 2002, which will be available to Member States and their national peace keeping training centres to assess and adopt as appropriate, bridging some of the void in the area of common doctrinal guidance. For further discussion of these issues see Chapter 13 on Training and Education.

III. Lessons “Learned” and Doctrinal Development

Often the ‘lessons learned’ are documented but not implemented. Rather, they become lessons that have been identified and then forgotten. Despite the need to (establish) doctrinal guidance for future missions, the leadership is often consumed with the urgency of doing something, rather than reading something about the recent experience of those performing current missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Nunn
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

16. Successful doctrine is based in part on lessons learned. The theory must be anchored in reality. Throughout the 1990s, there has not been a formal, standardized mechanism for collecting, processing, analyzing, integrating, and promulgating lessons learned. Although a number of “lessons learned” seminars were conducted in the wake of the complex interventions of the 1990s, these focused on operational issues. Moreover, the lists of operational lessons derived from such unsuccessful interventions as Somalia may have led to misconceived political conclusions as to the viability of international involvement in ongoing civil wars. However, operations have continued and past experiences matter, not least because they are supposed to be the platform for doctrine development for future peace operations.

17. While many lessons have been noted and articulated, the notion of lessons learned implies that these must be taken into the collective wisdom of the people, states or organizations in order to affect future behaviour. Often this has not happened and operations have continued to be based on false (and overly optimistic) conclusions about what had worked before. Too often, doctrine has been used to convert practice into theory (legitimization of past failures or successes) rather than to develop a body of knowledge that will enhance future operations.

18. Nevertheless, the common wisdom that has emerged from peace operations of the past decade and in particular, the reports coming out of the tragedies of Rwanda (S/1999/1257 of 16 December 1999) and Srebrenica (A/54/549 of 15 November 1999), is that, if an operation is to be effective, it must be credible as well as perceived as such. The credibility of operations, in turn, has depended on the

belligerent parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Too many instances of a timorous approach of contingents deployed in the first crucial months of an operation, have more often than not damaged the credibility, evolution and future of the whole operation.

19. The second major lesson learned relevant to the development of doctrine for peace operations has arisen from the centrifugal effects of the multifunctional nature of contemporary peace operations. Thus one of the overarching challenges for the "international community" or the elements thereof involved in any particular peace operation is to enhance cooperation and coordination between all the elements in a given conflict area. While homogenous professional cultures tend to mitigate the effects of multi-nationality, there are marked differences in the thought and behaviour patterns of, for example, human rights specialists, police officers, soldiers, developmental specialists and emergency relief workers.

IV. United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine

Fundamental principles, practices and procedures that guide the military component of UN Peacekeeping missions in support of mandated UN objectives. Such military doctrine provides a body of thought that will guide a common approach by Member States in their preparation for UN Peacekeeping activities. The desired result is a degree of consistency that enhances collective effectiveness and develops confidence between troop contributors when operating together in the field in support of those mandated UN objectives.

Major General Timothy Ford
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

20. A number of participants in the Challenges series looked to the United Nations for doctrinal guidance. Participants noted that such experience is ongoing, and that there are at present no agreed-upon, all-encompassing document in the framework of the UN that contain the basic definitions and principles for planning and conducting peace operations. In the late 1990s, UN peace operations "doctrine" consisted of a 17-page document on the conduct of peacekeeping operations, a number of training manuals, and videos covering tactical matters.

21. The articulation by the world body of a clear set of current principles for peace operations, based on the UN Charter, Security Council decisions, and multilateral international agreements, would place peace operations on a sound legal basis. It would exclude the tendency towards improvisation and help to avoid dual standards. The first step in that direction was taken by the enquiry of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 2000, seeking clarification on the definition of military doctrine within the UN peacekeeping environment. The response by the Military Adviser as highlighted at the top of this section, points to a development of thought on doctrine for the military component of UN peace operations.

V. The International Community and the Challenges of the Enforcement of Peace

22. During the last decade of the 20th century, the revered peacekeeping principles of impartiality (narrowly interpreted as neutrality), consent, and the non-use of force in a number of cases prevented the mobilization and deployment of an effective international response in the face of war crimes and genocide. However, as the decade and century came to a close, the application of these principles was being challenged in the wake of a few powerful new “lessons learned” reports, such as that of the independent inquiry into the genocide in Rwanda and the Secretary-General’s report on the fall of Srebrenica.

23. In the latter report, the Secretary-General stated that “errors of judgement were made - errors rooted in a philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia”, but he also underlined that one of the more fundamental mistakes was the absence of “any credible military deterrent.”⁴ The subsequent Brahimi Report indeed begins by stating “... when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”⁵ Further on, the Panel asserts that “... as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.”⁶

24. The Panel did not however address in depth the most vexing doctrinal issue of peace operations – the appropriate and effective use of military force in pursuit of the mandate. The sole key recommendation on this cardinal determinant of success or failure reads as follows:

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.⁷

25. The report offers no new concept of operations that may be applied in situations that require enforcement action. Instead the focus of the report is on how peace is to be made, kept, built, and how violent conflicts are to be prevented. This was confirmed by the Secretary-General, who stated that:

The Panel’s recommendations regarding the use of force apply only to those operations in which armed United Nations peacekeepers have deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. I therefore do not interpret any portions of the Panel’s report as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force.⁸

26. The Brahimi Report confirms that: "...where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states, with the authorisation of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter."⁹ At the time of writing, the situation in Afghanistan is a case in point, where peace enforcement is being carried out by a coalition of willing Member States under a lead nation.

27. In order to assess the direction in which trends are evolving, it is useful to examine recent developments. Beginning in the 1990s, the Balkans, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Africa, emerged as examples of very dangerous and challenging environments for the conduct of peace operations. These regions have thus become the laboratory for doctrinal evolution in support of more effective operations in situations and areas of particularly violent conflict. At the same time, however, the value of more heavily armed, robust peacekeeping in the context of Chapter VII has been proven in the field also by the UN, as demonstrated by the vigorous and successful military operation conducted by UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in July 2000 to ensure the security of UN personnel and their freedom of movement.¹⁰

28. At the Carlisle Seminar, it was remarked that the debate tended to be "Euro-, 'Yugo'- and NATO-centric". At the time there were some 18,000 UN peacekeeping troops deployed worldwide, while some 53,000 NATO-led troops were engaged in peace support in the former Yugoslavia. At the time of finalizing this report, the situation had changed with some 47,000 UN military and police peacekeepers in the field. The emerging partnership between the UN and regional organizations and arrangements for the conduct of peace operations encouraged seminar participants to explore and exchange views on current developments of peace operations doctrine also from regional perspectives. Some of these ideas and issues discussed are addressed in the following three sections.

VI. Regional Developments: the Case of NATO

Addressing doctrinal terminology, NATO has made some important changes... The existing doctrine still addresses peace support operations, but with the addition of crisis response emphasizing crisis management. ...Generally speaking, there is a... move towards more flexibility in terms of response to crisis...

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Nunn
Carlisle Seminar May 2000

29. Given the extensive resources and relative cohesiveness of NATO, NATO has progressed further than other regional organizations in developing a comprehensive doctrine for peace support operations, which is now a subset under the overarching category of crisis response operations outside the collective defence commitment of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter. This category includes a

wide range of crises such as disaster relief, the evacuation of non-combatants, search and rescue and combat operations.

30. NATO has articulated a doctrine that “is to be used as the guidance for planning all NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) and exercises ... where practical, it takes account of national doctrines and UN policies.”¹¹ PSO are defined as “...multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate ... they include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and humanitarian operations.”¹² Within the Alliance, the United Kingdom has been designated as the custodian responsible for writing the operational level doctrine. The British have been able to use their thinking on how to come to terms with the military requirements of complex emergencies by the continuous reappraisal of their doctrine, Peace Support Operations, and in the field with their use of civil-military structures as tools to rebuild communities. The Netherlands has been designated the custodian of the tactical level doctrine and have been able to use their study and reflection on their UNPROFOR experience to feed into the NATO doctrine which focuses on tactics, techniques and procedures.

31. Until recently, the United States’ doctrine for PSO was captured in the US Army’s 1994 publication, FM 100-23, which recognized the utility of incorporating both relevant principles of war and operations other than war into its concept of PSO. This doctrine was under revision in 2001, with a new publication (FM 3-07), based on the Army’s experiences since 1994, placing all operations into one of four categories: offence, defence, stability, and support. The stability operations category includes a range of operations conducted outside the United States and its territories to sustain stability on a regional and global scale. Peace operations come under this category, and the definitions and concepts involved are similar to those of NATO with regards to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. MC 400/2 describes Crisis Response Operations as a spectrum to include those in support of peace, which could range from the most demanding type of peace enforcement to military preventive activities. It “encompasses those political, military, and civil activities consistent with international law contributing to conflict prevention and resolution and crisis management in the pursuance of declared Alliance objectives.”

32. Despite the ongoing revision of national and Alliance doctrine, the important point is that the essential logic of multinational intervention has been agreed upon and has found doctrinal expression among the 19 NATO member countries. Moreover, the extant doctrine is derived from the principles and praxis of multi-functional peace operations, with its emphasis on multiple actors and agencies and the need for end-states that approximate “sustainable peace”, as depicted in the diagram below.


Figure 1: Hypothetical peace operations model



33. NATO doctrine goes far beyond ‘UN peacekeeping doctrine’ in acknowledging the utility of necessary force in pursuit of mission objectives. It states that: “NATO has the unique capability to deploy, direct, and command and control operations mounted to take peace enforcement action against those responsible for threats to peace or security, or who carry out acts of aggression. As such, this is the most likely task for a NATO force in support of the UN.”¹³ The doctrine elaborates on the fact that the link between political and military objectives of peace enforcement must be very close, and that the aim of peace enforcement operations “...will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel or coerce any or all parties to comply with a particular course of action.”¹⁴

34. While far more robust than any guidelines that have emanated from the UN Secretariat, the NATO doctrine still hinges on the consent of the parties for achieving operational success. Crossing the consent divide would transform any operation from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Crossing the impartiality divide would transform an operation from peace enforcement to outright war fighting.

Figure 2: NATO concept for peace enforcement



35. There is an inherent contradiction in the extant doctrine, in that consent is not only regarded as an independent and defining variable in determining the concept of operations, but it is also presented as a sliding scale across the peacekeeping to war-fighting spectrum. The latter aspect does provide some recognition of the fragility of consent, and it does illustrate that the more coercion is used, the less consent can be expected. However, at a conceptual level, consent cannot be regarded as both an independent and dependent variable. The aspect of consent is addressed at more length below.

36. The NATO doctrine identifies two types of Humanitarian Operations. Peace Support Operations consist of the subsets of Humanitarian Aid, Disaster Relief, and Protection of Human Rights. Humanitarian Operations non-PSO comprise the subsets of Disaster Relief Operations, non-combatant evacuation operations and support to civil authorities.

37. Protection of human rights is considered a task in all peace support operations. The doctrine specifically states that "...only a PSF [peace support force] prepared for combat can operate in such an environment..." and "...PSO are increasingly conducted in situations of widespread human rights abuses including geno-

cide and ethnic cleansing associated with collapsed or collapsing states.”¹⁵ Importantly, the doctrine emphasizes that “...in the conduct of Peace Enforcement the link between political and military objectives must be extremely close.” In effect, such doctrinal statements obviate the need to agonize over a doctrine for ‘humanitarian intervention’, for this is integral to present conceptualizations of NATO peace support operations. Some observers have argued that the level of doctrinal elaboration outlined above and the resources underpinning its formulation means that much of the thought on the roles of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security is influenced by the peace operations undertaken in the Balkans.

VII. Regional Developments: the Case of the Former Soviet Union

Russian Armed Forces’ participation in peacekeeping activity may fulfill the following tasks: separate hostile entities’ forces; provide necessary conditions for humanitarian help and evacuation of population and UN civilian personnel from the zone of conflict; isolate the zone of conflict to ensure international sanctions; create premises for a political settlement of the dispute.

Major General Andrey Marshankin
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

38. During the 1990s, conflicts on the territory of the Soviet successor states destabilized much of the peripheral area of the former Soviet Union, and gave rise to a number of “unrecognized republics”. Although most of these conflicts were frozen rather than ongoing by 1997, they still presented potent challenges to regional security. The Chechen conflict shows that part of the Russian Federation itself has also become an unstable arena.

39. The task of keeping the peace in the region is crucial to Moscow, which is mindful of the spillover effects of peripheral conflicts on the integrity of the Russian Federation itself. The international community at large is also challenged by the potential escalation of conflicts that have so far been contained within the borders of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). International responses to these conflicts have been limited, and the principal regional power, Russia, has played a dominant role in stabilising the region.

40. In certain hot spots in the region, Russia has been and remains the only power capable of separating antagonists and bringing them to a negotiating table. It has been noted in UN circles that Russian peacemaking, or “peace restoration”, on the territories of the former Soviet Union has its own distinctive features and does not conform in all aspects to ‘standard’ UN practice. Of specific concern has been that the conflicting sides themselves participate in the peacemaking forces. For example, in the Dniester area of the Republic of Moldova and in Georgia’s South-

ern Ossetia, in addition to Russian military contingents, units of the conflicting sides themselves have participated in the operations.

41. There are both benefits and drawbacks in this approach. On one hand, cooperation with antagonists provides an in-depth knowledge of the situation and of the area of operations and assists in stringent control over observance of the cease-fire. It is the parties who, along with Russia, are the most interested in reestablishing stability in the given region. On the other, it can promote excessive suspicion of the opposing military contingents towards one another, and accusations that the Russian contingent favours one side over the other. For much of the time, however, this policy has worked to stabilize the situation in the Dniester area, in Southern Ossetia, and in Abkhazia, though it should be noted that sustainable solutions to the conflicts have not yet been found.

VIII. Regional Developments: the Case of Africa

Given the reality of a number of existing crises on the continent, the Organization of African Unity expressed the need for a clear vision of what it could realistically be expected to do to ameliorate conflict where the UN was unable, unwilling, or slow to act. The concept that eventually emerged for the conduct of OAU peace operations included the use of African sub-regional organizations. This thinking was based in large part on the experiences, since 1990, of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in attempting to end civil wars in Liberia and then Sierra Leone.

Mr. Mark Malan
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

42. During the 1990s, African multilateral operations developed a momentum of their own, and they increasingly leaned towards some type of peace enforcement rather than regional peacekeeping operations in a benign security environment. Following the unsuccessful UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Angola, it soon became apparent that future forceful conflict resolution action in Africa would primarily have to be taken by Africans themselves. Reluctance to deploy ground forces in combat situations where the distinction between friend and foe, or soldier and civilian, is unclear is far greater when the region in question is of little strategic significance to most external actors – as is the case with most conflict zones in Africa.

43. Although not articulated or presented as such, some basic tenets of African doctrine for peace operations have emerged from the West African region. For example, former force commanders have commented that the ECOMOG task in Liberia metamorphosed into hybrid operations involving peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, and peace enforcement and that the principles of internal security operations were applied in varying degrees, according to their relevance to particular phases of operations.

44. Observations and statements by former ECOMOG commanders do not constitute an official and integrated doctrine. Whether or not such tenets will or should find their way into an African doctrine for peace operations remains a matter for debate and consultation. The “lessons learned” from the ECOMOG operations have not been as widely analyzed and packaged in detail as those that have emerged from the Balkans. However, they do provide a robust and practical articulation of principles and guidelines for the conduct of peace operations in Africa. Progress in the evolution of West African doctrine for peace operations has, as in the case of NATO operations in the Balkans and of Russian operations in the former Soviet Union, evolved less from academic reflection and the deliberations of ‘experts’ than from the harsh experiences of force commanders and peacekeepers on the ground.

45. If certain fundamental concepts and points of departure can be accepted in the broader doctrinal debate, then this is a good starting point. In particular, there seems to be a universal acceptance, in all the various doctrines reviewed, of the fact that military credibility is a *sine qua non* for success in peace operations. Indeed the new emphasis tends to be as much on credibility as consent, and it leans towards international law enforcement rather than peace enforcement.

IX. The Need for a New “First Principle” of Peace Operations

In peace operations there should be no surprises, and this should be a fundamental principle of peace operations. Everyone, the belligerent parties, the local authorities and the local populace, should know what the military is doing and how they are going to do it.

Brigadier General William Mellor
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

46. Sustainable peace demands the restoration or establishment of conditions such as respect for human rights, justice, social harmony and economic health, but the attainment of those worthwhile goals is likely to be a long and arduous process. It is difficult, if not impossible, to secure the higher, more dynamic aspects of peace before the lower aspects of law and order are met.

47. In failed states, the government system has broken down and the rule of law is absent. In such an environment, there is a blurring between crime and war – the type of “neither war-nor crime” situation that characterizes most contemporary complex emergencies. International forces are unlikely to be confronted either by legitimate national armies or by the typical criminals with whom the police are accustomed to deal. Rather, they will face criminal fighters representing non-state entities such as clans, local militias, mercenary forces, private armies, guerrilla movements, corporations and drug or other cartels. Conflicts around the globe over the last decade have shown that sometimes the warlords of the past become the mag-

nates and political leaders of tomorrow. While wars, blockades and exceptional situations are devastating for the majority, they create a breeding ground for certain types of economic activity that prove particularly effective in the absence of order. The people who benefit from such activities see few reasons to support the re-establishment of effective public control. Warlords, therefore, frequently become the spoilers of peace processes.

48. In situations where Member States for various reasons are unwilling or unable to contribute adequate forces to the UN in order for the organization to deploy a credible force in a volatile region, a regional organization, arrangement, coalition of the willing or a lead nation may be authorized by the UN to deploy in order to stop crimes of war against a civilian population or genocide. Shri Virendra Dayal speaking at the New Delhi seminar observed that, though indeed preferred, in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity, consent can no longer be postulated and adhered to in practice as an absolute criterion for an international operation to be deployed. Taking the argument further, Dr. Mats Berdal, a participant of the Stockholm seminar, has suggested that the issue of consent should be resolved on a situation-specific basis. For example, if the military threat posed by the non-cooperation of parties is limited to small-scale resistance, banditry and looting, and the principal parties to a conflict remain committed to an agreement, a peacekeeping force may be empowered to confront it. This implies a type of “policing function”, and should be clearly distinguished from an enforcement action that does not rest on the strategic level consent of key parties, and which involves military operations aimed at forcibly imposing a solution. If consent is no longer tenable as an independent variable, or a definitive and distinguishing feature of multidimensional peace operations, then the present “mainstream” doctrinal approach to peace enforcement is clearly flawed and in need of urgent revision. The notion of a “policing function” suggests as point of departure for conceptualizing peace operations to focus on a law-based approach.¹⁶

49. Peace operations require “comprehensive and lasting solutions” which call for a complex and multilevel doctrine. The difficulty of achieving such a comprehensive document is daunting even for just a single nation let alone a collection of nations. However, if the doctrine focuses on some key overarching principles, consensus could be obtained and adequate guidance provided.

50. Past experience demonstrates that, if the internal security challenge is not handled early, the “old” habits and structures will prevail for a long time, undermining other efforts aimed at enhancing post-conflict settlement. The immediate aftermath of any civil war spawns organized crime, revenge attacks, arms proliferation, looting and theft. UN civilian police officers, deployed alongside military peacekeepers in order to assist in the resuscitation of national law enforcement agencies, have not been equipped to address the issue of law enforcement in a “neither crime-nor war” environment, and the military has remained the only viable in-

strument. This reality has been blurred by thinking of peace as the antithesis of war, and the related notion that the military (as the purveyor of war) is uniquely qualified to create stability and security through “peace enforcement”, rather than law enforcement. These perceptions are slowly changing.

51. Since 1999, the UN has experienced serious problems with law enforcement in Kosovo and East Timor due to the absence of an “applicable law”. The UN Legal Counsel Hans Correll, stated in April 2001;

in parallel with any humanitarian assistance that would have to be given [in Kosovo and East Timor], there is an immediate requirement of putting in place a system for the administration of justice. Civilian police, a judiciary and a correctional system have to be developed almost instantaneously. Otherwise criminality will very quickly take hold.¹⁷

52. In order to provide an institutional framework for the civilian personnel in Kosovo, the Special Representative acting in terms of resolution 1244 passes “laws” in the form of regulations to govern the province. These regulations are of an ad hoc nature intended to deal with specific situations ranging from policing, the appointment of judges, the arrest and detention of criminal offenders, taxes and custom duties, fiscal and monetary policies, among others. However, this arrangement, as well as the notion of an interim criminal code or interim policing procedures is delinked from the military deployment.

53. On the other hand, the Secretary-General has recognized that “internationally recognised standards of protection will be effectively upheld only when they are given the force of law, and when violations are regularly and reliably sanctioned.”¹⁸ This should occur in relation to the indictment and prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity through mechanisms such as the proposed International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, there is still a lack of clarity over who (military or police) should effect the arrest of indicted war criminals. This is linked to the broader issue of which agency should be the guarantor of public security in the wake of multinational military intervention.

X. Police Doctrine

The doctrine governing recruiting procedures and the composition of field missions has remained essentially the same since the earliest involvement of CIVPOL in peace operations, when the police in those missions had no executive authority. Because of this antiquated doctrine, it has been difficult for CIVPOL to adapt to the ever-changing and challenging (peace support) environment.

Mr. Halvor Hartz
Chief UNCIVPOL Unit, DPKO,
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

54. As recently as 1994, there was no doctrine to address exactly what UN civilian police (UNCIVPOL) were supposed to do in a peace operation. Some were simply told to go and monitor the situation, with no further guidance, not even a definition of what monitoring might entail. Consensus has since emerged on one fundamental guiding principle, that police are generally the number one provider and protector of human rights – and the insight that, paradoxically, the police can also be the first violator of human rights.

55. When it comes to law enforcement actions by a multinational police deployment, it must be understood that techniques and powers are very different among the contributing countries. The military enjoys a much higher degree of standardization of operational methods and procedures than the various police forces and agencies of the world. Internationally, the range of police skills and talents varies tremendously. Not all police are armed, not all are trained in community policing. Monitoring, the ‘traditional’ role of UNCIVPOL, is relatively easy and leaves some room for error. However, when UNCIVPOL are asked to conduct law enforcement with the inherent powers of arrest, detention, and use of force, then there is little room for error and the different types of national preparation become apparent.

56. At the operational level, the issue of the public security gap has been defined largely in terms of the respective roles of the international military and police presence, and the challenges of transferring authority for public security from the military to the police. The military component, as the first into a situation such as Kosovo, will unavoidably have to play the role of police. What has emerged, however, is a continued reluctance of the military to reflect in its peace operations doctrine responsibility for policing functions. In Kosovo, as noted by the then Head of the DPKO UN CIVPOL Unit speaking at the Carlisle seminar, the slow deployment of UNCIVPOL, who remained under-resourced and initially without clear authority, created a public security vacuum that could be only partially addressed through the deployment of a specialized unit for policing within the KFOR structure.

57. Particularly challenging have been the two executive authority police missions in Kosovo and East Timor, where there was a significant public security gap

in the wake of military enforcement action and peace agreements, but no clarity on the basis of the law to be enforced by international police. In an area such as Kosovo, where crime is endemic, it is futile to deploy international police officers without any thought to the presence or effectiveness of a judicial system, either national or international. The simple fact is that where there is no functioning judicial and penal system, there can be no functional law. This police challenge is further discussed in Chapter 9 – Police – In the Service of Peace.

58. There may not be common solutions to all challenges of law and order in transition. It can thus be concluded that whatever solution is applied to any situation will take considerable time, patience and resources to develop. Many military organizations remain extremely reluctant to engage in anything akin to policing functions. Crime therefore remains a virtually overlooked issue in peace operations doctrine, the development of which remains dominated by the military. By extension, the public security gap exists not only on the ground, but in the doctrinal realm as well.

XI. Conclusion

People expect more from their rulers than just peace. Therefore factors as the creation of democratic institutions, rebuilding of a working infrastructure, support of the judicial system and other components that form a working modern society are probably more important than just putting and end to the fighting...We, the military, have to see ourselves as just one, often indispensable but nevertheless only one, of the many tools in conflict prevention and conflict solving.

Major General Karlis Neretnieks
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

59. Peace operations have evolved into multidimensional and multi-agency affairs; responsibility has become blurred, as has the ability to actually learn from experience. Thus the peace operations failures of the past decade were generally blamed on lack of compliance by the leadership and armed factions of the host nation itself, or alternatively, on the United Nations organization. On the other hand, public understanding of the politics of these operations has steadily deepened. It is now far more difficult for the Member States to disguise the difference between the failings of the UN to safeguard international peace and human security, and their own failures to do so. This, in itself, represents a considerable advance in the discourse on the principles and doctrine of peace operations.

60. The doctrinal developments highlighted during the Challenges seminars indicate a slow, but steady, move forward to the next level of doctrine development. The golden principles of peacekeeping, consent, impartiality and the non-use of force, have essentially been accepted. There is widespread agreement, if not global consensus, on how to do consensual peacekeeping within a benign security envi-

ronment. A cursory glance at the UN Standby Arrangements reveals that there are also many nations that would volunteer to do this kind of peacekeeping, even with its newfound multi-functionality. The implementation of the Brahimi recommendations is bound to consolidate the consensus on how to improve these operations.

61. An encouraging development is the new emphasis on the credibility of peace operations forces. A remaining challenge is to find a way to link the issue of credibility to the singular strand that would pull together various mission components dealing with protection, human rights and security issues, and lend some credence to the notion of “unity of effort.” That, it is ventured, may be found in a concept of peace operations as law enforcement writ large.

62. From these considerations the following recommendations arise:

1. *The UN should have a clear set of basic principles for the conduct of peace operations, based on the UN Charter, Security Council decisions and international agreements, and applicable to the nature of 21st century peace operations.*
2. *The UN should examine the transformation of entire criminal justice systems in order to provide appropriate legal and practical doctrine for use in transitional administrations.*
3. *There should be a multinational and inclusive effort to define the meaning and scope of doctrine applicable to UN peace operations, as well as a forum for the regular articulation and recording of doctrinal statements based on recent operational experience of military, police and civilian mission components.*
4. *Led by DPKO, specific efforts should be made to apply lessons learned in the formation of peace operation doctrine, paying particular attention to the need to enhance military, police and civilian coordination.*
5. *The doctrinal consensus emerging from this process should be disseminated to all troop, police and civilian specialists contributing countries through a credible intermediary (such as DPKO).*
6. *Troop contributing countries should then take steps to build the emergent common doctrinal statements into their national doctrines, and to keep DPKO updated on the nature and scope of such changes.*

63. Despite the considerable progress in doctrinal evolution reflected in this chapter, much remains to be done. Much doctrine remains, in a sense, ‘oral history’ that needs to be captured, recorded and shared. All mission components must work together to develop the common understanding that is necessary for unity of effort and successful peace operations. It is hoped that the recommendations made above will be seriously considered, and that their implementation will contribute to the progressive evolution and dynamic amendment of a well-conceived and widely promulgated doctrine that will enhance the quality of peace operations into the 21st Century.

Notes

¹ British Army, Design for Military Operations, British Military Doctrine, 1996.

² Republic of South Africa, South African Defence Review, approved by Parliament in 1998, p.8.

³ NATO, AAP 6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2002, p.2-D-2.

⁴ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para.499.

⁵ United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the Brahimi Report).

⁶ Ibid. p. viii.

⁷ Ibid. para.55.

⁸ United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, para.7. (e).

⁹ Op cit, Brahimi Report, para.53.

¹⁰ Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/751/2000 of 31 July 2000, paras.26-28

¹¹ NATO. Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 16 October 1998.

¹² NATO, AJP-3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Ratification Draft, undated.

¹³ Op cit, NATO. Bi-MNC Directive, p.9.

¹⁴ NATO, AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations, Ratification Draft, 20 July 2001.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Berdal M., Armies in International Peacekeeping, Paper presented at a conference on *Taking the South African Army into the Future*, ISS/S.A. Army, Pretoria, 15 November 1993.

¹⁷ Correll H., *To Intervene or not: The dilemma that will not go away*, presentation given at Dukes University, April 19, 2001.

¹⁸ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2001/331), 30 March 2001, para.9.

Preventive Action

United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building... Prevention is clearly far more preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and is a less costly option for the international community than military action, emergency humanitarian relief or reconstruction after a war has run its course.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, paras. 10 & 29

I. Introduction

1. Preventive diplomacy as a conflict prevention mechanism has been applied with varying results for the maintenance of international peace and security for the last four decades. The term “preventive diplomacy” emerged in the UN during the Cold War period. In the late 1950s – early 1960s, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld used it to describe the residual function that he believed the UN could hope to play in a bipolar world. Over the years, preventive diplomacy as an initiative for conflict resolution and prevention has been transformed into a powerful instrument in the hands of the UN and its agencies. The broader term in current usage is now “preventive action”, embracing such other actions as preventive deployment, preventive disarmament, preventive humanitarian action and preventive peace-building, which can involve a wide range of actions in the field of good governance, human rights and economic and social development, but its objective has remained constant, namely prevention of violent conflict.

2. The New Delhi Seminar in September 2000 deliberated upon the conditions or factors that determine the effective employment of this instrument and the use of preventive diplomacy as a tool of conflict prevention by the UN and other agencies was discussed in greater detail. A related issue of the role of sanctions in preventive action was also taken up for a deeper understanding of the subject. The subject of conflict prevention in its wider sense was discussed at the Amman Seminar in October 1998 and touched upon at various times in other seminars. This chapter will deal with all these issues, and briefly discuss the lessons learnt from past experiences in this regard.

II. Evolution of Concepts

3. Political and academic thinking on conflict prevention has evolved considerably in recent years. The term preventive diplomacy at its inception referred to containing regional conflicts, not necessarily preventing them from arising. Hammar-skjöld intended preventive diplomacy to refer to both military and non-military methods. However, earlier versions of conflict prevention generally differed from the distinctive post-Cold War notion. The end of the Cold War generated more interest than ever before in, and support for, the idea of addressing conflicts at an early stage through specific preventive measures.

4. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Report "An Agenda for Peace", which was written at the request of the Summit Meeting of the UN Security Council in January 1992, laid great emphasis on preventive diplomacy and preventive measures of various kinds. Preventive diplomacy, for Boutros-Ghali, was "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur". Preventive diplomacy, Boutros-Ghali continued, was to "ease tensions before they result in conflict or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes."¹

5. Although it opened the way to more serious discussion in the international community, Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" definition of preventive diplomacy was not accepted by all. The definition, Michael Lund of the United States Institute of Peace argued, "spreads preventive diplomacy across almost the entire life cycle of a conflict."² Other scholars suggested that defining preventive diplomacy as actions adopted at virtually any stage of conflict was too inclusive and that it obscured important operational distinctions among the interventions made at different stages of conflicts. These differences tend to affect both how conflict prevention is carried out and its chances of success. In sum, it is true that keeping violence at any level from getting worse is "prevention" in a loose sense, but preventive diplomacy as a tool of controlling the advanced stages of a violent conflict confuses it with crisis management and stopping wars.

6. Another observation was directed towards the methods or techniques outlined in "An Agenda for Peace" and to the identification of the parties who would perform preventive diplomacy. Conflict prevention need not be restricted to the five techniques suggested by Boutros-Ghali – confidence-building measures; fact-finding; early warning; preventive deployment; and demilitarised zones. A variety of diplomatic, political, military, social, economic, and judicial-legal methods might be used. Preventive deployment can be an effective tool to pre-empt the outbreak of conflict provided that it is judiciously applied when a State requests it, provided that there is no hidden agenda, and provided that major powers support it. Other tools such as mediation, track-II or multi-track diplomacy, power sharing, prob-

lem-solving workshops, peace commissions, politically conditioned and targeted economic assistance and indigenous dispute resolution procedures are just a few. Furthermore, in addition to preventive action by the UN and regional organizations, there is a wide range of third parties. They include governments, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, community groups and individuals, as well as the disputants themselves.

7. A more academic, policy-oriented definition of preventive diplomacy was suggested by Michael Lund:

An action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political dispute that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.

The main difference between Boutros-Ghali's conception and that of Lund is the distinction made between preventive action and crisis management. Therefore, the aim of preventive diplomacy is intervention before the violent conflict erupts. If conflict prevention fails and the situation deteriorates into crisis, Lund argues, "the notion of preventive diplomacy ceases to apply, at least until the conflict has abated, in which case it is again needed to avoid a renewal of violent conflict."

8. Since 1992 the attention paid within the UN to the possibilities of conflict prevention has markedly increased. In 1997 soon after taking up the office of Secretary-General, Kofi Annan declared that the United Nations of the 21st century must increasingly become a focus for preventive measures. As observed by Hakan Malmqvist at the Pretoria Seminar in November 1999:

Given the complex deliberations preceding deployment of a multifunctional peace support mission, given the enormous costs of keeping huge forces for long periods of time, given the occasional lack of political will to commit resources – it is long overdue for the international community to try harder and more systematically to prevent violent conflicts.

In July 2000, in his Millennium Report, the Secretary-General called for all engaged in conflict prevention and development to address these challenges in a more integrated fashion,³ an appeal that was subsequently endorsed in the Brahimi Report in August 2000. In June 2001, in response to an invitation from the Security Council, the Secretary-General submitted a report specifically on the prevention of armed conflict to the General Assembly and Security Council, and both bodies have given the report close consideration.⁴

III. Factors Governing Successful Preventive Diplomacy

Nothing seems to work but we all keep trying. Why do we keep failing? It could be because, when issues of great importance are involved for a State over the parties to a dispute, they want to be absolutely sure that the third party is trying to help them. And one of the problems with preventive diplomacy has been the great difficulty of having someone trustworthy.

Shri Virendra Dayal
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

9. At the New Delhi seminar it was observed by Dr. Feodor Starcevic that the most important causes of failure of preventive diplomacy were inadequate foresight or warning systems, lack of interest, lack of conflict transformation skills, and unwillingness of the direct parties to a potential conflict to accept a third party preventive intervention. Remedies that were suggested, included an increased focus on early warning systems, resource mobilisation, relevance of dialogue, representation of minorities, analysis of conflict dynamics, intelligence sharing, ensuring the primacy of the UN, and the development of situations specific solutions.

10. Moreover, Dr. Garaibeh offered the view that for preventive diplomacy to be feasible, four conditions were essential:⁵

- a. “consensus-building” among concerned third parties;
- b. a “convincing” selection of the cases deserving intervention;
- c. adequate leverage in the hands of “preventers”; and
- d. a narrowing of the gaps in principles and values (essentially, in human rights and democracy) and/or in willingness to make state sovereignty and its attributes more penetrable in international action (essentially, interference in domestic affairs in the name of more or less shared principles and values).

11. The above-mentioned conditions are necessary to pave the way for preventive diplomacy, but the success of this intervention is, to a great extent, governed by a set of factors. Preliminary analysis of a range of cases suggests, as Lund argued, that more or less five manipulable factors were often present in the situations in which emerging political disputes were handled through peaceful means (i.e., Hungary, Estonia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Macedonia, Guatemala, Czech and Slovak Republics) and were largely absent in those disputes that resulted in the use of armed force (i.e., Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti).

12. The five factors are:

- a. Third-Party Timing. The earlier third parties (governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and individuals) take preventive measures, the more effective they will be. Ideally, a third party should intervene before any of the other parties mobilizes its political constituency or deploys armed forces or coercion to achieve concrete gains.

- b. Multifaceted Action. The extent to which third parties, acting in a coordinated way, employ diverse instruments, viz, offers of recognition, consultations, advice and provisions for security so as to address various aspects of a dispute.
- c. Support from Major Players. Preventive diplomatic efforts are more effective when major powers, regional powers and neighboring states agree to support or tolerate those efforts and do not undermine them by overt or covert support to one or the other party to the dispute. The participation of one or more relevant regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) or the Organization of African Union (OAU), further enhances the possibilities for preventive success.
- d. Moderate Leadership. Peaceful outcomes are more likely when the leaders of the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions, and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve their issues of dispute.
- e. State Autonomy. Preventive diplomacy is more effective to the extent that the state directly affected by a dispute is autonomous from one or another of the disputants. A sufficiently autonomous state possesses procedures and institutions through which disputes can be impartially negotiated and agreements enforced. The military and security forces of such a state serve the constitutional order and are independent of the partisan aims of political factions vying for control of the state.

IV. Building Capacity for Preventive Action

Preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective. One of the principal aims of preventive action should be to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts.

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Executive Summary, A/55/985-S/2001/574 of 7 June 2001

13. As observed by the Special Representative of UNDP in Jerusalem at the Amman seminar, the fundamental problems affecting many countries in crisis have to do with governance, and the equitable rights of all national groups, majority or minority. Often compounding the crises are ongoing conflict, poverty and social and economic dysfunction. Such problems are the root causes for internecine marginalization, alienation, genocide, and in some cases, the collapse of the state involved. Tackling root causes requires establishing a foundation for better governance. The imperative of focusing our attention and efforts on the early stages of a violent situation through conflict prevention was stressed by General Zaballa at the Buenos Aires seminar of August 2001 in posing the question: how do we prevent such situ-

ations? “Peacekeeping addresses a political problem”, he declared, “and it should therefore, first and foremost, be resolved on the political side.”

14. In view of the multifaceted nature of conflict prevention, developing a preventive action capacity is not an easy task. However, lessons from past experiences show that such capacity-building is not impossible. In addition to efforts already in hand within the UN and some of the regional organizations, a growing number of governments, academic and research institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals are already active. What is needed is to have their activities better focused, coordinated and strengthened. To do so, more systematic and regulated strategic and institutional resources are highly desirable.

15. The importance of timing in preventive action is widely recognized and this applies to latent or potential conflicts in both inter-state and intrastate circumstances. Early identification of the root causes followed by early action offers a wider range of options at lower cost than attempts to avoid violent conflict just as the crisis is about to break. The significance of correctly identifying the deep-seated, structural causes of conflict was underlined on a number of occasions during the seminar series. During the Amman seminar Sir Marrack Goulding pointed out that “because the causes of internal conflict are complex and often economic and social in nature, conflict can be prevented only if the international community can organize and implement programmes that integrate all the different kinds of action to eradicate the root causes.” Ambassador Anders Bjurner suggested that as an overall strategy to prevent armed conflict, a global response, international cooperation and common action were required to support sustainable peace, and the focus of efforts should be:

- a. to eradicate poverty;
- b. to promote human rights;
- c. to deepen democracy;
- d. to bring about disarmament; and
- e. to support regional cooperation.

This entails expertise to design practical projects in governance, in human rights, and in economic and social development.

16. To implement a more deliberate, informed, and coherent approach to deal with latent or possible conflicts, a number of instruments and means can be suggested. To supplement official efforts, non-governmental groups can be very helpful. To this end, there would be much value in encouraging the establishment of non-governmental regional and sub-regional centres for early warning and conflict prevention. During the course of the Challenges Project, two organizations participating in the Challenges series have established such centres, one of which was funded by contacts made through the Challenges Project.⁶

17. It is generally recognized that violent conflict may occur when basic human needs such as the need for sustenance, security, identity, recognition, participation, dignity, or control are denied, frustrated, threatened or ignored. Before suggesting options for preventive action, it is necessary to have a deep understanding of the dispute and the local conditions that may be aggravating it, as well as what each party to the dispute is seeking to satisfy its interests. At the New Delhi seminar it was suggested that it is in this identification of the structural causes that regional and sub-regional early warning centres could implement the following tasks:

- a. ascertaining where and when the most harmful conflicts and crises are most likely to occur in the region;
- b. studying the historical, cultural, economic and territorial causes of potential conflicts;
- c. diagnosing each party's concerns and interest, by answering questions such as: Why is a particular group advocating a given position? What are the fears and concerns that are behind its claims or demands? What are the basic human needs of this group that are being denied, frustrated or threatened?
- d. encouraging opportunities for common work on latent or potential conflicts in the region by means of workshops, think-tanks, research and enhanced information; and
- e. setting up a computerised data base in each regional centre that will be fed by the conclusions of the research/activities of sub-regional centres, to be used as an instrument to provide early warning to governments/decision-makers of the region.

18. The goal of conflict prevention activities would be to determine what kind of actions, methods, and tools would effectively prevent the escalation of a dispute into armed violence. Depending on the resources available to each centre, it was suggested that methods and tools of such centres could include:

- a. assessment of needs that are required to keep the conflict from becoming violent such as lack of process, lack of resources, lack of solutions, lack of incentives, lack of trust etc.;
- b. determination of indigenous capacities, resources and "will" that may be helpful to keep the dispute from intensifying. What kind of institutions and processes are already available? To what extent are they effective? Information about the above mentioned tools might be obtained from the data bases;
- c. fact-finding missions;
- d. local round tables, community discussions, problem-solving workshops and brainstorming to offer recommendations for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice;
- e. multi-track diplomacy;
- f. good offices;
- g. mediation; and
- h. conciliation.

V. Preventive Diplomacy as a Tool

The efficacy of third party preventive actions depends critically on the sense of legitimacy they elicit, not just from domestic constituencies but also from the population directly concerned and the international community at large.

Dr. Feodor Starcevic
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

19. In 1999 Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out three lessons that could be drawn from the failure to prevent conflict in Kosovo and other recent failures in conflict prevention. First, if the primacy of the Security Council in maintaining peace and security is rejected, the very foundations of international law as represented by the Charter will be brought into question. No other universally accepted legal basis for constraining wanton acts of violence exists. Secondly, that conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the UN and regional organizations. Thirdly, that prevention can succeed only with strong political commitment from Member States and if adequate resources are provided.

20. Mr. Kofi Annan later reiterated that every step towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step towards conflict prevention.⁷ The solution for avoiding conflicts is both simple and difficult to achieve in practice, to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.

21. Armed conflict is rarely an isolated incident. It is usually part of a repetitive sequence of events in which a long-standing dispute heats up and cools down and heats up again. The sequence cannot be broken unless the root causes of the dispute are addressed. So what happens after a conflict has been extinguished is even more important than the actual distinguishing of the conflict. Post-conflict peacebuilding is thus a kind of preventive diplomacy. Indeed, it is the most effective way to prevent recurrence of conflict.

22. The Security Council again discussed conflict prevention in July 2000. The Secretary General, speaking at the Council's meeting, suggested that the Council should hold periodic meetings at the foreign minister level to discuss thematic or actual prevention issues; that prevention issues be put on the agenda of the Security Council and the General Assembly; that the Security Council should receive information from UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as envisaged in Article 65 of the Charter; that the Security Council should make greater use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by requesting advisory opinions from the Court. He also suggested that the Council should examine ways of interacting more closely with civil society. The Security Council, in the statement of its President on 20 July 2000, addressed a number of issues, including the importance of adequate, stable

and predictable resources for preventive action. As Ambassador Jan Eliasson had observed three years earlier, at the Stockholm seminar in 1997, prevention is not only a method or a technique, it is a matter of policy, which has long-term implications.

23. There seems to be widespread agreement that unless the government and people of a country are genuinely willing to confront the problems that may cause violent conflict, there is not much that even the best informed and most benevolent outsiders can do. Additionally, the efficacy of third-party preventive actions depends critically on the sense of legitimacy they elicit from the population directly concerned and the international community at large. Undertaking such actions without due regard for their legitimacy can prove counterproductive to the aims of preventive diplomacy, particularly where such actions conflict with established norms of state sovereignty.

24. Speaking about preventive diplomacy as a tool, Dr. Feodor Starcevic drew attention to the 1997 report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict which suggested that building on the thinking of a tool box, it was important to bring the tools together around approaches, and think of skills. The Commission pointed out six approaches, as described below.

- a. Think Collaboration. Interventions and pressures are more effective when issued collectively. Multiple agents should be conceived as elements in a layered process, always leading to the mediator of next resort. Beyond unilateral action, NGO assistance, state coalitions, regional organizations and finally the UN Secretariat and Security Council comprise the layers. Regional attention and consensus fill the need for resources for legitimisation. NGOs and Track II diplomacy are rapidly growing as useful adjuncts to government action and can often prepare the way for official engagement, but they are not a substitute for it.
- b. Think Firebreaks to Conflict. These can be substantive or procedural and include general standards (such as human rights requirements for membership) and principled assurances (such as assurances of territorial integrity).
- c. Think Both Sticks and Carrots. These are measures to make the present course more unpleasant and the future alternative more attractive. Sanctions and other “sticks” are often adopted because of the need “to do something”, when in reality engaging in dialogue could be more productive. As General Sir Michael Rose noted at the Amman seminar “the emotional response of “we must do something” is not a sufficient mission statement for a force commander in the field, or should we (instead) work towards preventing such a situation in the first place? Economic incentives and other carrots to prevent conflict are unlikely to be effective if root causes of the conflict are not addressed. There are also concepts of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and mutually enticing opportunities (MEO).

- d. Think Inside/Outside Handshake. Preventive measures cannot work by imposition, without cooperation from the parties involved. Internal or regional allies need to be enlisted in such cases, and their involvement also builds a base of legitimacy and partnership.
- e. Think Early Awareness and Early Action, Not Just Early Warning. Clear signals and substantive engagement are usually needed early on, before parties' positions have hardened and while escape from a dangerous course is still possible.
- f. Think Principles and Regimes. Interventions should be principled actions rooted in broader norms and values, taking advantage of previous precedents and principles. Standards created by the UN have a high level of legitimacy, as do regional norms, but the latter should not conflict with UN standards. The availability of appropriate legal machinery and consensus standards are important factors.

25. Unofficial or Track II diplomacy distinguishes itself from traditional diplomacy in several ways. The main interlocutors of governmental diplomats are the key political and military leaders in the conflicts. They are persons who either represent themselves and/or the highest representative leaders of the governments and opposition movements in an internal struggle. Track II diplomats, on the other hand, pay much more attention to the civilian space in internal relations. They search for common ground and look for the development of win-win relations. They assume, for the most part, that one cannot resolve conflicts and make peace unless the root causes of the conflicts are identified and dealt with. The basic premise for any preventive diplomacy, official or Track II, should be that for conflicts to be resolved, one must look beyond surface issues and address the structural substantive and emotional issues, as well as the parties' needs and interests, that are at the root of the conflicts.

26. One of the most recent developments in the area of non-governmental diplomacy is field diplomacy. It is characterised by a credible presence in the field, a serious commitment to conflict transformation, a multi-level approach, elicitive engagement, a broad time perspective, attention to the deeper layers of the conflict, preference for an integrative conflict-prevention policy and the recognition of interdependency between seemingly different conflicts. Field diplomacy is comprised of several elements:

- a. Credible Presence. One has to be in the conflict zone to get a better insight. The building of a network of people who can rely on each other is essential to prevent a destructive transformation of the conflict.
- b. Serious Commitment. A conflict should be adopted. Like with a child, it is a long term commitment. An adequate motivation and backup is necessary.
- c. Multi-level Engagement. Not only the highest, but also the middle and grass-root levels of the conflicting groups need to be involved in the peace making, peace keeping and peace building.

- d. Elicitive Approach. This approach requires on the part of the field diplomat listening, learning and understanding the culture within which the conflict is embedded. The aim is to catalyse an indigenous self-sustaining peace process.
- e. Broad Time Perspective. A peace agreement settling "here and now" disputes is not enough. Equally important is a reconciliation that encompasses both the past and the future. Historical wounds left unhealed create further conflicts.
- f. Attention to Deep Conflict. Building peace requires not only attention to the hard layers of the conflict (the political-diplomatic, military, legal, economic, etc) but also to the softer layers of the "deep conflict" (psychological, emotional, spiritual levels).
- g. Integrative Conflict Prevention Policy. Field diplomats do not consider their activities as an alternative to the peace efforts of the parallel official diplomacy. They plead for a better coordination of two tracks.

VI. Role of Sanctions as a Tool of Preventive Diplomacy

The conclusion that inevitably emerges is that sanctions have failed as a coercive or diplomatic tool primarily because of a basic lack of clearly defined aims of the sanction regimes and conditions for lifting sanctions.

Ambassador Prakash Shah
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

27. The part played by the use of sanctions in the field of preventive diplomacy was explored at the New Delhi seminar by Shri Prakash Shah. With the end of the Cold War, the replacement of super-power competition by super-power collaboration, and economic globalisation, the use of sanctions as a tool for preventive diplomacy dramatically increased. Before 1990, sanctions were imposed by the Security Council on only two occasions. However, between 1990 and 1999, there were 11 more instances of Security Council mandated sanctions.

28. Sanctions are measures not involving the use of armed force, implemented by States in order to carry out stated objectives. Art. 41 of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to impose such measures when it determines, under Art. 39, that a threat to the peace has arisen, or that an act of aggression or breach of peace has taken place. But sanctions have been imposed to achieve objectives other than those described in Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. In fact, the Security Council has used its own discretion to expand the range of objectives, largely under the rubric of what has come to be known as humanitarian intervention responsibilities. Examples are genocide in Rwanda, civil conflict in Somalia or terrorism by Libya. What the Security Council has done is to move into the undefined area of the so-called unacceptable behaviour of a State towards its own people, in deciding

to impose sanctions in several instances. In the presenter's view, this was where the question of effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of preventive or coercive diplomacy has come increasingly into question.

29. The most prominent case of sanctions was the imposition of the most comprehensive sanctions in history on Iraq. It is universally agreed that sanctions failed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The use of armed force was necessary, under Art. 42 of the Charter, to re-establish Kuwaiti sovereignty and force Iraq to move out of Kuwait. In the early years of the post-war sanctions regime, sanctions worked for a while to strip Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But despite compliance by Iraq on the destruction of the overwhelming part of its WMD under UN inspection, the unwillingness of the Council to adopt a flexible approach of "carrots and sticks" instilled in Iraqi authorities a sense of futility, leading to increasing conflicts on compliance between Iraq and UNSCOM. Ambassador Shah suggested that after 10 years of sanctions, their effectiveness was in doubt and a very large number of influential countries have argued for the lifting of sanctions.

30. In the ensuing discussion, several participants referred to the harmful effects that economic sanctions had on the general population, with the observation that economic sanctions often hurt those who are devoid of power and influence to change their governments. Indeed, sanctions may possibly benefit the ruling elite by creating conditions that promote smuggling and thereby facilitating illegal profits. These instances underlined the importance of looking for sanctions that could be specifically targeted, such as an arms embargo to curtail a government's ability to import arms and technology and thereby constrain that country's ability to wage war. Specific sanctions might be designed to target the elite, by a ban on travel, on material goods abroad and on their financial transfers. However, as proposed at the Amman seminar, when 'direct prevention' is needed and before reaching the deterrence and enforcement measures set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, there should be an escalating ladder of measures from fact-finding and good offices.

31. While sanctions as a coercive measure have many shortcomings and adverse consequences, in the presenter's view there were several goals, other than coercion, which could be achieved by imposition of sanctions, even though they may be difficult to quantify. The goals of sanctions might include:

- a. a tool for prevention of aggression;
- b. deterring other political aggressors and violators of international law;
- c. signalling international disapproval and concern to the target state;
- d. modifying the unacceptable behaviour of an unrepresentative government towards its own citizens in regard to human rights and abuse of power; and
- e. a warning of military action to follow if the target state does not implement the UN Charter provisions regarding threats to international peace and security or aggression.

32. In order to make sanctions under Art. 41 more effective in the new millennium, several improvements, innovations and improvisations were suggested by the presenter, among which the most important were:

- a. sanctions should be a tool of policy, not a substitute for policy or an end in themselves;
- b. sanctions are not humane or non-violent alternatives to military actions and must be considered only after all options other than the use of armed force are exhausted;
- c. steps should be taken to ensure that conditions exist in a given country for sanctions to achieve their objective;
- d. a prior assessment of the potential impact of sanctions on the target country, its civilian population and its neighbours should be undertaken, at the Security Council's request;
- e. the effects of the sanctions should be measured to enable the Security Council to review them from time to time with a view to minimising unintended suffering;
- f. it is essential to have clarity of the objective to be achieved and precision in the language of the resolution to avoid ambiguity and individual interpretation by powerful Member States; and
- g. above all, a sanctions regime should have a comprehensive and coherent political strategy and garner the broadest possible international support.

VI. The Contributions of Peacekeepers to Preventive Action

Conflict prevention should be one of the United Nations' deepest commitments, yet there is still too little emphasis on preventive action. Preventing potential conflicts from crossing the threshold of violence requires early warning of situations with the potential for crisis, proper analysis, an integrated preventive strategy, and the political will and resources to implement such a strategy. ...Peacekeeping can be a valuable tool for conflict prevention.

Major General Timothy Ford
Force Commander of UNTSO
Amman Seminar, October 1998

33. Peacekeeping forces are generally deployed only after, or during, a conflict and usually under the terms of a cease-fire agreement, and their main task is to prevent violence from flaring up again. They can therefore contribute significantly to preventive action by establishing and maintaining an atmosphere in which peacebuilding and peacemaking can take place. In the current atmosphere, in which increasing attention is being given to preventing violent conflict in the first place – and if it occurs, preventing it from re-occurring – the composite and holistic role of a peace operation becomes very important.

34. The presence of multinational troops and civil police can greatly assist in promoting conditions for peace-building, from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, to facilitating the training and establishment of local police forces to maintain credible law and order, to assisting in humanitarian mine clearance, and to providing a general stabilizing influence in an unstable situation.

35. Seminar discussions underlined the wide array of instruments for preventive action possessed by the United Nations and regional organizations, and the many ways in which external assistance can be provided to assist the peace operation on the ground achieve success. Particular mention was made of the value of civilian policing in a role of assistance and service, not one of control and coercion. It was said that civilian police is one component with the potential for an extended role in future peace support activities. Their potential contribution in preventive action is considerable. Their role in peace operations is dealt with at greater length in Chapter 9 – Police – In the Service of Peace.

36. The linkage between effective peacekeeping and the prospects for success in peace-building deserves closer attention and, in this context, the value of preventive deployment of troops and civil police should be explored further. It has often been pointed out that, to date, little use has been made of preventive military deployments and that it is difficult to measure the cost benefits of a military peacekeeping presence in a preventive role. But it can also be argued that without the presence of UNPREDEP in Macedonia in the mid-1990s, armed conflict may well have started much earlier than it did and developed into a highly damaging extension of the Balkan conflict.

37. In some quarters there has been a view that conflict prevention is not within the mandate of peacekeeping troops and police. Recent experience in the Balkans and in Africa, however, points to the contrary and indicates that the organization, discipline, control, communications, and logistical capabilities of troops and police can make a major contribution to the creation and continuation of stability in a volatile society, and thereby promote the conditions in which peace-building can be carried out. As suggested by the Force Commander of Multinational Forces and Observers speaking at the Amman seminar, “there is no question that both Egypt and Israel have benefited from the state of peace that has existed between them for the past decade and a half. The fruits of peace can be seen in the steady development and dynamic economic growth underway in both the North and South Sinai”. There would seem to be ample reasons for developing an integrated strategy to meet the challenges that lie ahead.

VII. Conclusions

Perhaps the most pitiful lesson of the past decade has been that the prevention of violent conflict is far better and more cost-effective than the cure. The challenge is to apply that lesson so that prevention exists not just at the rhetorical level but also practically.

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict
A/55/985-S/2001/574 of 7 June 2001, para.1

38. Ten months after the report of the Brahimi Panel, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted his report on the prevention of armed conflict jointly to the General Assembly and the Security Council. In that report, which was issued after the Amman and New Delhi seminars of the Challenges Project, the issues of preventive action were extensively discussed.

39. Arising from the presentations and exchanges that took place during the seminars of the Challenges Project, from the comprehensive UN reports and the subsequent discussions within the Security Council and the General Assembly, there can be little doubt that preventive action is an integral activity of peace operations and will become even more so in the coming years. The planning and implementation of one will often significantly affect the course of the other and at times they will proceed with simultaneity. In the light of the aspects discussed during the Challenges seminars, the following conclusions and elements would seem to have particular relevance to preventive action and future peace operations:

1. *Root causes of conflict should be identified and then eradicated through integrated programmes that address human security needs.*
2. *To be most effective, early warning should be transformed into rapid and early action.*
3. *It should be borne in mind that, in addition to governments, non-governmental organizations can be very helpful in early warning and peace-building activities.*
4. *Sanctions regimes imposed under Chapter VII should have clearly defined aims if they are to be effective, and there should be clear conditions for lifting sanction.*
5. *Sanctions should be a tool of policy, not a substitute for policy.*
6. *For preventive action to be meaningful, it should be recognized that the mobilisation of sufficient political, economic and military resources is essential.*
7. *When 'direct prevention' is needed, it should be applied gradually by incremental steps from fact-finding, good offices, arbitration, etc. before reaching deterrence and enforcement measures, as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.*

Notes

¹ Boutros-Ghali B., *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992, para.23, UN New York.

² Lund M.S., *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, p.34, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, 1997.

³ Kofi A. Annan, Millennium Report *We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/54/2000 of 27 March 2000, para.202.

⁴ A/55/985-S/2001/574 of 7 June 2001.

⁵ Gharaibeh M., *Preventive Diplomacy: A Tool of Conflict Prevention*, New Delhi Seminar, September 2000 , drawing on Roberto Aliboni, *Political Dialogue and Conflict Prevention in Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, The International Spectator, No. 1, Volume XXXV, January-March 2000, p.108.

⁶ A Conflict Prevention Centre was established by the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and an Early Warning Programme for Africa was established by the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria.

⁷ Op. cit. Millennium Report.

Gender Perspectives in Effective Peace Operations

The United Nations Security Council urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel...[and] expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
31 October 2000

I. Introduction

1. Warfare has traditionally been conducted according to military strategies, tactics, and rules of warfare and followed certain conventions that afforded protection to non-combatants and civilians. Current warfare and conflict has moved out of the realm of conventional fighting between state-organized military units and into conflicts that deliberately target civilians and civilian structures. At the beginning of the 20th century, 90% of the casualties of war were soldiers and associated military organizations and personnel. This figure declined to 50% during World Wars I and II. Today, the majority of the casualties of war are civilians, including large numbers of children. According to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, in addition to several million children killed, maimed or left with grave psychological trauma in the past decade, over 20 million children are currently displaced by war within or outside their countries.¹

2. As pointed out by Dr. Raven Roberts speaking at the Cornwallis seminar in May 2001, the Challenges seminar at which gender issues were addressed in greater detail, the changing nature of conflict is now an issue of much debate within humanitarian and academic circles alike, though there is no consensus on exact causes. Nor is there agreement on the various terminology and labels used to describe what in effect has been the creation of more or less permanent or protracted crisis situations. "Complex emergencies", "chronic instability", "acute emergencies", "failed states", and "humanitarian crises" are all used to describe situations of chronic political, economic, and social instability.

3. While there may be different frameworks of analysis to describe the root causes of today's conflicts (e.g., a failed political economy as opposed to more internal explanations, i.e. ethnic, cultural, and psychosocial dynamics) there is general agreement on the specific characteristics and outcomes of these situations. The

deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian structures has resulted in large-scale population displacement, depletion and looting of assets, and the creation of situations of persistent and protracted crises that are often characterized by famine. Globalization and structural adjustment have also increased the levels of insecurity, poverty, and marginalization experienced by communities across the globe.

4. The end of the Cold War was supposed to usher in a period of peace and prosperity but instead has resulted in new patterns and forms of violence, poverty and marginalization. Many regions of the world are increasingly being left out of the gains in global trade and investment. As the economies of countries such as Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo weaken (even while becoming more integrated into the global economy), the capacity of and rationale for government leaders to respond to their peoples' needs and to implement effective governance diminish.

5. New forms of political and social structures have emerged led by warlords and heads of criminal networks and paramilitary forces, often working in complicity with government authority. These forces pay little respect to norms of accountability, international standards of human rights or participatory or representative processes and institutions. They also often deliberately destabilize situations in order to consolidate power and gain maximum economic profit from unregulated and uncontested access to legitimate assets such as diamonds, timber and oil. Profitable trafficking in illicit goods such as human beings, drugs and small arms has flourished under such circumstances. These are the new forms of mal-governance where protection and access to resources are distributed according to allegiances to militias or extorted in exchange for protection from other predatory forces.

II. Gender in Today's Armed Conflicts

The issue of equal participation by women, is not simply an issue of gender equality and human rights but could represent the decisive factor in maintaining peaceful development in a troubled region.

Lul Seyoum, Eritrea
Mainstreaming Gender in Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action

6. As defined by Dr. Dyan Mazurana at the Cornwallis seminar, gender refers to socially constructed differences among men and women and boys and girls. Gender is about the social roles of men, women, boys, and girls and relationships among them. The experiences and concerns of men, women, boys and girls before, during, and after wars and armed conflicts are shaped by their gendered social roles. These roles are in turn formed by cultural, social, economic and political conditions, expectations, and obligations within the family, community and nation. Gender plays a central role in the current experiences and consequences of today's armed conflicts.

7. It was stressed that in these "post-modern conflicts", the nature, form and function of violence have distinct characteristics. Gender-based violence in the context of contemporary conflicts has become a critical weapon of warfare. Girls and women are subjected to specific forms of violence in war because, as females, they are viewed as cultural bearers and reproducers of "the enemy". Rape, forced impregnation, sexual slavery, and other forms of humiliation and violence take on powerful political and symbolic meanings. The deliberate initiation and endorsement of these acts by military commanders and political leaders underscores the significance of these acts as more than random assaults.

8. At the same time, because of their special roles and responsibilities within the domestic economy, children may inadvertently be at risk from land mines, abductions, sniper attacks, etc., in the course of collecting water or firewood or engaging in farming or trading. The increasingly militarized nature of many communities, exacerbated by the availability of small arms, has serious consequences for children. Families are destroyed through death and injuries, robberies and raids become more deadly, and traditional forms of community authority are undermined as younger members acquire arms and can set themselves up independently from the disciplining and governance of elders.

9. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna as well as the UN Declaration of the "Elimination of Violence against Women" recognized the specificity of discrimination against girls and women as well as the functions of gender violence and endorsed the principle that protection against these violations was an important human rights issue.² Such a rights-based approach also highlighted how other aspects that affect young girls' security, such as forced marriages, gender-specific torture, sexual surgery, trafficking and forced prostitution are not only threats to an individual's integrity, identity and safety, but are also violations of their human rights.

10. In addition, global criminalized forces exploit poverty and weakened authority to assert control over children and women and use trafficking, forced marriage, and prostitution as highly profitable endeavours. The economic aspects of these activities are underscored by the ways that forced prostitution, bonded labour, and trafficking in women and children are embedded in and connected to international networks of exchange that use legal and illegal networks. They are thus more than aberrations based on traditional and cultural forms of discrimination against women and girls.

11. Recognition of the complexities of these issues and of their intrinsic importance to successful peace operations is now being acknowledged. Populations suffer during war – but men and women, and boys and girls often suffer differently. Their experiences can be a bewildering blend of positive and negative features. The strategies they employ to survive can be both shocking and astonishingly brave.

What they learn is often neither acknowledged nor understood by those who come to their community in the name of peace.

12. Traditionally, distinctions between the experiences and capacities of men and women, as well as their differential access to rights and resources have not been a focus of attention. There has been a tendency to see a homogenous mass of the populace. Women have usually been cast in the role of victim, with little recognized agency or capacity outside their traditional domestic roles. Male-centred concepts of equality, justice, development, violence, human rights and peace have dominated both decision-making and perceptions of the host society.

13. However, the continued development of humanitarian and human rights instruments and the activism of women's rights groups together with the support of progressive national and international government structures have ensured that such limited views of society are no longer acceptable or adequate.

III. The Landmark Resolution

The recognition of these gender aspects of the peace processes is the bedrock of Security Council resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000. This resolution stresses the importance of bringing gender perspectives to the centre of attention of all United Nations peace-making, peacekeeping, peace-building rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. It also provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications both for individual Member States, the United Nations system and civil society. The resolution calls for practical measures to enhance women's roles as equal partners in all stages of peace processes, including peace accords, ensure their protection in armed conflict and bring to justice perpetrators of human rights violations, including gender related violence.

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14. Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000 is a landmark in a process that has consistently advocated international attention and action on women's human rights. It is a continuation of, among others, the work of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Vienna Declaration, the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. When resolution 1325 is coupled with Security Council resolutions 1265 and 1296 on the protection of civilians, resolutions 1261 and 1314 on children and armed conflict, it is clear the Council has acknowledged the need for gender-sensitive measures to ensure that women and men and boys and girls benefit equally from efforts to build peace.

15. Recommendations in resolution 1325 include the expansion of the role and contribution of women in UN field-based operations, especially among military ob-

servers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; consideration of the different needs of men and women in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R); and ensuring the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements.

16. Among the most concrete suggestions – and of the most direct relevance to peace operations - are those which advocate specialised training for peacekeepers and the increase of women’s involvement in peace processes. Neither of these two suggestions is the solution, but they constitute essential elements, which need to take place within a framework supporting gender mainstreaming.³ Training risks being seen as a panacea for all ills, but in spite of its importance it will not, of itself, transform peacekeeping into a gender-sensitive operation. Without support, reinforcement and leadership from senior staff its significance will be limited. Likewise, inclusion of women in peace processes can be a blunt instrument if those women are intimidated, coopted or mere figureheads promoted to salve sensitive consciences.

17. Part of the challenge in ensuring gender issues are treated not only seriously but integrated into all peacekeeping activities, has to do with the very language employed. Gender risks being a loaded concept, and for some exposed to SHARP training (sexual harassment and racial prejudice) there is an expectation that they are being scrutinised, judged and found lacking in their sensitivity towards women and other races in the workplace. This builds an inevitable resistance. Others know ‘gender’ as a grammatical term, or equate it automatically with ‘sex’, using the words interchangeably. It is important to emphasize that gender issues deal with the equal rights among men and women.

18. Such preconceptions complicate the progress of discussion, analysis and appropriate policies and recommendations regarding gender. The challenge lies in developing positive approaches to delivering the message of what is meant by a gender perspective and to ensuring that at all times it acknowledges both women and men. Too often the message has been received that it is exclusively about women. Bringing a gender perspective to peace operations involves looking at the inequalities and differences between and among men and women. Given that many initiatives have overlooked women’s interests, work and priorities, it may be necessary to provide specific resources and focus attention on women’s needs. By the same token, it is recognized that for interventions to have more equitable impacts, programmes will need to be structured in a way that recognizes and corrects inequalities. This is not a matter of setting goals of equal numbers of women and men, or just adding women participants, but of ensuring existing gaps between men and women as recipients are narrowed.⁴

19. Another impediment is the cultural argument that questions the legitimacy of a peace operation within a society, which by tradition or culture supports views

on the treatment of women that undermine their rights. Assumptions about the gender division of labour, who are combatants or how societies reconstitute themselves after war, are misleading. Also, societies are profoundly affected by war and gender and its implications are a part of that change.⁵ Arguments that peace operations have no role in changing cultural norms and practices and therefore cannot intervene in the realm of gender do not mean that the mission should be blind to the importance of equal rights of men and women. The United Nations from its foundation in the Charter advocates "the equal rights of men and women"⁶ and has continued to provide a strong grounding in its conventions for respect for women's human rights.

20. If rights are interpreted as meaning adherence to those international and regional human rights standards and norms, as participation by people in making decisions about their own lives, and as ensuring non-discrimination, that no group or individual is excluded from decision-making or benefits of development or assistance, much of the 'cultural appropriateness' argument can be dealt with effectively.

21. Consequently, cultural norms will shift. The challenge for peace operations is to ensure that respect for the dignity of the members of the host society remains paramount during times of great turbulence. The importation of different cultural values and behaviours will remain a concern at the policy level both with regard to appropriate interventions but also in the realm of standards and discipline for the peacekeepers, military and civilian.

22. Gender has rarely been at the centre of the discussions of peace operations. It has been a struggle to keep it on the agenda, and it remains contentious and still not universally understood as a concept, much less an overriding principle of operation. In spite of the challenges, progress has been made. For progress to accelerate it is critical that the management of peace operations is engaged and supportive. For this to happen, gender needs to be de-mystified, made accessible, comprehensible and, above all, of practical application to those managing peace operations.

IV. Why We Need to Get It Right

The advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and should not be seen in isolation as a women's issue. They are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society. Empowerment of women and equality between men and women are prerequisites for achieving political, social, economic, cultural and environmental security among all peoples.

Platform for Action
United Nations, 1996

23. There are strong arguments for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace operations. In sum, as a long term goal of peace operations is the return of a society in conflict to normal life, a gender perspective is likely to bring better results. Even if moral concerns are temporarily cast aside and the most self-serving arguments applied, there is every reason for peace operations managers to give the issue serious attention.

24. The credibility of a peace operation is not confined to the elimination of armed conflict, to ensuring freedom of movement of all, repatriation of refugees and the disarming of rival factions. Nor is it limited to being impartial and even-handed and restrained when provoked. Carrying out the mandate in a way that contributes to future conflict prevention and ensures a healthy, confident society is not possible without the trust and support of that society. A first step in doing so may well be the establishment of the expectations on all sides by engaging in a discussion with the women and men of the local community, at all levels, to discover what they expect of a peace mission. This demonstrates not only some humility on the part of the operation, but helps to identify leaders, can provide an elementary analysis of the gender relations in any given society, and helps to clarify any gulf between what is expected and what can realistically be accomplished.

25. Developing trust at an early stage ensures access to the population and increases the likelihood of getting the responses right from the outset. The shifts in gender relations during conflict will probably have resulted in large numbers of female-headed households. Women will have taken on new roles and responsibilities and made many new decisions. The networks they have built and the experiences they have faced have enabled their survival, and such strength must not be overlooked by a mission. Women are likely to have taken on roles in public life, and it is essential that peace missions develop ways to guarantee that their voices are heard. If the first question to be asked is why is it important to get these things right, then the next question to ask is what is the price if we fail?

26. The lack of protection for women and girls from gender-based violence contributes to an environment of insecurity. In the volatile, insecure atmosphere of armed conflict, women, as displaced persons or refugees, and often as heads of

households, with all the responsibility that entails, are particularly vulnerable to rape and other forms of sexual violence. In the vacuum created by the breakdown in law and order they are harassed in their homes, on the street, in their search for sanctuary, when crossing borders, in displaced camps and in their search for food and medical services. Applying a gender perspective in such settings ensures recognition of the absence of traditional protection mechanisms for women and girls. Security forces should provide that protection specifically for the health and safety of the women – but also to create a secure environment for all.

27. Failure to deal with rapists and other perpetrators of human rights abuses, supports an environment of impunity. If peace operations do not stop human rights abuses and ensure that former violations are punished, they fail to uphold both the standards and principles of the UN and betray the society they are expected to protect. In such situations, violations are likely to continue, the population, especially women, will remain terrorized – peace and security will remain unattainable and long-term, sustainable development, impossible. Arguments that dealing with such problems will come later once the politics are sorted out are misleading and dangerous. Ensuring the enforcement of human rights sets the tone for the mission, demonstrates to state actors that abuses will not be tolerated and lays the foundation for a future where justice will prevail.

28. Trafficking in women has far-reaching implications. The presence of large-scale trafficking and organized crime is more than a threat to security. The women who are trafficked within and across borders are repeatedly victimized. Impoverished, in need of employment and income, forced into prostitution, they may also be illegal in the country of destination. Their needs are complex and require an understanding of the causes of their involvement as well as a response to their immediate danger. A failure to deal with this phenomenon not only fuels the law enforcement vacuum but exacerbates insecurity for all women.

29. Without a gender analysis, DD&R activities are likely not only to flounder, but contribute to renewed conflict. Narrow definitions of what soldiering entails and who is a ‘soldier’ or a ‘fighter’ often function in ways that discriminate and marginalize women and girls involved in fighting forces. This has direct implications for DD&R programmes, which often fail to make even basic accommodations for females. At the same time, programmes that assume these women and girls will return to domestic spaces may inadvertently contribute to further entrenching poverty and stigmatization. This contributes to current insecurity and potential future conflict. Inadequate DD&R programmes that do not recognize the differential needs of boys and girls and women and men not only fail to develop the human capital, but lay the groundwork for future disaffection and conflict among ill-educated, unemployed and impoverished youth.

30. CIMIC projects lacking a gender perspective can make mistakes. Well-meaning but misguided projects can waste resources. Efforts to re-build damaged schools may be popular and visible, but planners need to ask the right questions. If the area is still insecure, parents may fear to send their children to school at all, especially the girls. If the male population has been decimated by war there may be too much work on the farm or in the home for the children, particularly the girls, if the mother is burdened as a head of household, to be free to attend. There may be pressure on young women to marry young and re-populate the nation, thus making schooling a 'waste' of money. Where are the teachers? Did they flee as moneyed professionals? Are women being allowed to fill teaching positions as men return from the war and seek employment to support their families?

31. Peace operations personnel can contribute to insecurity. Abuse of the rights of local women, exploitation of prostitutes, both women and young girls – often based on the argument that such trade puts money in the pockets of the needy – can readily sap a mission's credibility. In addition, the belief by the population that peace personnel are corrupting or 'taking' local women can lead directly to their personal insecurity. In its most extreme form such behaviour can create an environment of impunity, a fear of harassment and assault and fear of those who came to bring peace.

32. How does the population see the peacekeepers? Especially, how do women see them? A British Army recruiting advertisement on TV showed a woman cowering in a bombed building. As the film runs, a caption reads: "She's just been raped by soldiers. The same soldiers murdered her husband. The last thing she wants to see is another soldier. Unless that soldier is a woman."⁷ The advertisement highlights the fear which many women must experience on seeing yet more men in uniform and positions of authority – peacekeepers or not.

33. One of the greatest challenges of any peace operation is to earn the trust of that affected population. Increasing the number of women in the ranks of not only the military and civilian police but also civilians – and at every level within those structures – remains an ongoing challenge to recruitment and human resource management of the Member States. The inclusion of more women may reflect more accurately the composition of society and will increase the likelihood of access and the establishment of trust between the operation and the community.

34. These examples from the operational level highlight the need for a gender analysis of the roles, relations, responsibilities, experiences and expectations of women and men. In all these cases there are policy level implications that affect the conduct of peace operations. In the examples, the appropriate responses are related to the more typical image of women as vulnerable, victimized and in need of protection. Although conflict increases the vulnerability of both women and men, it is important not to relegate women to the role of victim. This image has truth, but it

provides only a part of the picture. Men and women make choices, develop coping strategies, mobilize scarce resources and play significant but different roles in their communities.

35. Women are agents, actors, influential decision-makers, activists for change, and peace. During times of war they fulfill many of the duties customarily assigned to men and move beyond the usual cultural restrictions. They may have joined armies by choice or through abduction. The experience of conflict may also have strengthened the civil sector where women focus on issues of human rights and peace. In addition to the burden of domestic responsibility, women take on social and political activities and learn the skills to balance and manage demanding agendas. As refugees they have faced the responsibility of the safety and well-being of their dependants, with all the gains in organization and assertiveness that implies.

36. Women's experiences will vary according to the nature of the conflict and they will share some experiences and vulnerabilities with men, but that they will develop skills and confidence there can be little doubt. In some societies this does not merely go unrecognized in the post-conflict era, in fact there is often a backlash against the gains women have made. After the conflict, support by peace operations can be crucial to the survival and progress of women's organizations, which will allow their new skills to blossom and their experiences to take on greater political relevance. Their focus may be human rights, welfare provision, as potential political candidates and public servants or as activists, working across social divisions and ethnic boundaries, in order to challenge oppression.

37. In a post-conflict society when gender tensions are likely to be high and women are often subject to harassment and intimidation there is even greater need for gender analysis – and assurances of effective security for all. Safeguarding the presence of women at peace negotiations will also need consistent support as well as education and training to increase their ability to fully participate, represent the needs of women and put to the best use the skills that they have learned during the years of war.

38. By adopting a gender perspective from the outset, so that questions of social justice, equal rights and sustainable development are addressed, a peace operation is more likely to find success.

V. Addressing the Issues

The primary challenge in the mission is to overcome the view that gender and human rights are 'soft' issues that take resources away from the 'core' functions of the mission's mandate, such as establishing a judiciary or a power authority.

Sherrill Whittington,
Chief, Gender Affairs Unit, UNTAET

39. Resolution 1325 exhorts all actors working in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict to integrate gender perspectives into their actions, specifically in monitoring and upholding human rights, working with local organizations and throughout all peace-building, military and peace support measures. Furthermore, resolution 1325 highlights the necessity to address crimes of sexual violence and violations of women's and girl's rights. Easy to say, harder to do. From a past which demonstrably ignored or failed to understand the need for a gender perspective, to a present where these expectations are fulfilled places heavy demands on Member States, national and international institutions, police, military and NGOs, where, in many cases they are in the early stages of learning 'how'.

40. In 1999, structures to help deal with this problem began to be established. The first Gender Units were established in Kosovo and East Timor through UNMIK and UNTAET. At the beginning of UNMIK, a Gender Unit was planned to be located in the SRSG's office in an advisory capacity to the mission. As Blerta Bejtullahu of Kosovo reported during the Cornwallis seminar, today, after an uncertain past including the absence of a separate budget, downgrading of the most senior position and the re-allocation of the Unit to a position within the Civil Administration pillar, many lessons have been learned about making such Units effective and the need to be adaptive to the specific needs of the mission.

41. Lately the focus within UNMIK has been on preparation for elections and the assumption by women of political office and governance roles. Although Kosovo has a history of women in political life, the scale of change has required the acquisition of organizational, lobbying and administrative skills by many women with little previous relevant experience. The Gender Unit has worked in collaboration with other elements in the four-pillar structure to gather sex-disaggregated data in order to build a picture of gender relations in the mission area, has collaborated in the development of Victim and Witness Protection programmes, and developed a network of Gender Focal Points throughout the regional offices of the UN administration. Gender Focal Points deal with personnel issues at the mission level, as opposed to a Special Gender Advisor, who deals with programmes and activities of the mission (such as the Gender Perspective in DD&R).

42. The most comprehensive achievements in how a Gender Unit can assist and support a mission come from the experience in UNTAET. In order to implement

resolution 1325 effectively, UNTAET has raised awareness about the critical link between gender equality and sustainable development with the mission staff, built capacity to take concrete action towards the goal of equality, and worked with East Timorese women to incorporate their concerns into mission policies.

43. To overcome the view that gender and human rights are of secondary concern, awareness-raising efforts at the highest level and among numerous agencies and civil society organizations have promoted gender equality. The support of the SRSG has ensured the promotion of this goal at meetings at all levels of the mission and at every level of society. The Gender Focal Point network has ensured the development of gender action plans throughout the districts and departments as well as maintaining a focus on gender issues in the media.

44. Consultation with local women's organizations has enabled an understanding of the gender situation in East Timor, which in turn has supported the mission in its efforts to develop strategies and ideas to overcome entrenched barriers to equality. UNTAET has assisted the East Timorese Women's Network to promote, implement and monitor their Platform for Action, which outlines the major societal issues they wanted to have addressed by the Transitional Administration and by the future government. The Gender Unit has ensured that gender is incorporated into UNTAET legislation and assisted in the drafting of gender-sensitive legislation where there are gaps – such as a draft directive on the establishment of Victim and Witness Protection.⁸

45. The Gender Unit has provided advice to the General Prosecutor specifically in relation to the work of the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit in its work investigating gender-related crimes during the 1999 violence in East Timor. Training is also provided to the Timor Lorosa'e Police Force and UNCIVPOL on appropriate responses to domestic violence and interviewing victims of such crimes. As in UNMIK, extensive work has been conducted in the preparation of women candidates for the elections and delivering civic education to enable women's participation in the electoral process. The Gender Unit and the Civil Service and Public Employment Unit worked together to improve the mainstreaming of gender through all stages of recruitment and appointments to decision-making bodies.⁹

46. The lessons learned examples from UNTAET and UNMIK, particularly the difficulties of access to UNMIK senior management created by the demotion of the unit within the mission hierarchy, will help in the current establishment of the Gender Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo through MONUC, the work in Sierra Leone of the Gender Specialist within the Human Rights Division in UNAMSIL and future missions. The establishment of Gender Units ensures access to specialised knowledge and skills by other peace operations staff in efforts to incorporate gender perspective into their work. It also guarantees the promotion of gender

awareness among local institutions and the essential support to burgeoning women's networks.

47. Despite these advantages, there is a risk inherent in this structure that the Gender Unit becomes the dumping ground for "women's issues" with the associated absolution from responsibility by other mission staff. Gender Units should be staffed by both men and women and ultimately, the true test of the success of resolution 1325, Gender Units and all the other efforts to keep equal rights at centre stage will be so effectively integrated into the UN and its work, that specialized offices and staff will be less necessary. The current lack of awareness by senior mission staff and the unwillingness in many cases to attend gender training courses remain impediments.

48. Within the UN system, a significant recent contribution has been the development by the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of "Gender and Peacekeeping" training materials. As seminar participants were informed by Angela Mackay, the TES training materials originator, although initially intended for use by Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) in their preparation of peacekeeping forces, the final product resulted in two courses, one for TCNs and another designed specifically for in-mission use. A crucial feature of the latter is the inclusion of host nation representatives to provide contextual discussion on the experiences of conflict for both men and women. The outcome has been not only shared information, and a mutual appreciation of roles and responsibilities between the population and the military, but the beginning of the development of that essential trust between peacekeeper and civil society in the mission area. The training, originally designed for UN peacekeeping military and civilian police, also includes invitations to UN civilian staff and it is readily adaptable to civilian use.

49. All current major UN peace operations have received this training, which has been made sustainable by ensuring Mission Training Cells are able to continue delivering it, with the assistance of mission human rights staff and local representatives. It is important to note that continued funding of such training is crucial towards ensuring its continuity. Participants have identified the principal benefits as making them aware of how gender affects the life of all members of society, becoming aware of human rights and the connection with gender, helping the development of confidence and sensitivity in approaches to the local population, helping the identification of vulnerable groups and of sexual biases, and improving their performance as peacekeepers. As a participant in the MONUC course concluded:

It will offer me a new way of looking at various aspects of my job be it as a military observer or on staff. It will weigh on my mind as to what actions of mine will have an effect on the gender equation and to take steps to mitigate the problems, which I find.¹⁰

Mackay reported from the operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea that during the UN-MEE training the most successful lessons were the result of the interactions among local civilians and the military peacekeepers, as it enabled all participants to gain a greater understanding of how the conflict and the peace operation affected them and the role of gender within their experiences.

50. As part of the training and education effort of the gender implications on the conduct of peace operations it has been suggested that a Gender Sensitive Code of Conduct should be developed. It would specifically identify unacceptable behaviour and outline the sanctions and accountability mechanisms for behaviour of both military and civilian personnel that are detrimental to the aim of building and maintaining peace.¹¹

VI. Recommendations

The resolution 1325 and its implementation offer a promise of enhancing women's participation in peacekeeping operations and the opportunity of translating peace ideals into reality for women, as well as for men. A vision of peacekeeping where women and men may together contribute their skills without any kind of discriminatory constraint provides a powerful framework for the future

Ms Angela E.V. King
UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
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51. There was much debate on the implementation of Resolution 1325 at the Cornwallis Seminar and within its working group session which was attended by participants from the United Nations, Member States' governmental, police and military bodies and independent civilian gender experts. The following recommendations were arrived at during the working group session:¹²

1. *A Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security should be appointed. Her/his functions should be designed on the model of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. S/he should have access to all peace operations and her/his work should be mainly based on an advocacy-oriented mandate; s/he should promote awareness of the plight of women affected by armed conflict and monitor the protection mechanisms before, during and after a conflict. S/he should promote accession of women at the negotiation table and should help empower local networks of women. These functions should encompass a broad range of situations, extending well beyond the phenomenon of violence.*
2. *Gender awareness training should be initiated in all peace operations for military and civilian staff at all levels. The senior leadership should be specifically targeted in order to ensure that training is embedded within a*

- broader framework that promotes and supports gender awareness in all mission policies, programmes and procedures.*
3. *The appropriate Gender Unit structure should be built into all peace operations. The Unit, staffed at a senior level, should report directly to the SRSG. Staffing should comprise both men and women and the recruitment of local staff is to be encouraged. The work of Gender Units needs to be effectively supported through adequate funding to ensure incorporation within mission activities as well as community outreach.*
 4. *Member States should identify and promote a roster of qualified women for all levels of employment in peace operations, including high-level appointments. International and regional organizations, national governments, the UN family and NGOs should be asked to promote suitable candidates for positions throughout the peace operations world in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of women and men throughout the system. This would both set an example and reflect what is promoted in UN principles and standards.*
 5. *The participation of women in the peace process should be increased. UN specialised agencies, implementing partners and NGOs should foster appropriate local initiatives and capacity building activities, mainly through funding, training, skills development and the preparation of women for public and political office.*

Notes

¹ www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/ffaq.htm

² Central IHL and human rights instruments that support mainstreaming gender perspectives include the Charter of the United Nations (1945), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Geneva Conventions (1949), and their Additional Protocols (1977), International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1993), Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1999), Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, Reports of the Secretary General, the Outcomes Document of Beijing +5, the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations”, and especially UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

³ An Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution was the first to define gender mainstreaming within the United Nations (A/53/3). The General Assembly affirmed ECOSOC’s Resolution and requested the Secretary General work with the Council to strengthen coordination on mainstreaming gender perspectives within the UN. Strengthening ECOSOC’s resolution on gender mainstreaming are numerous UN standards that support integrating gender analysis and equality perspectives into all aspects of Peace Operations, most notably within the UN programming and personnel, recruitment, and management areas. Central standards include the Platform for Action, 1997 Report of the Economic and Social Council dealing with Gender Mainstreaming (A/53/3), the 1998 Supplement to the Report of the Economic and Social Council dealing with Gender Mainstreaming (E/1998/53,54,55), reports by the Secretary General in 1998 (A/53/376) and 1999 (E/CN.6/1999/5), Special Measures for the Advancement of Women (ST/AI/1999/9), and the 1999 Resolution of the General Assembly (A/RES/3/119) supplemented by the Administrative Instruction, “Special Measures for the Achievement of Gender Equality” (ST/AI/1999/9).

⁴ DFAIT/DFID Gender and Peace Support Operations course materials, September 2000.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Preamble of the United Nations Charter.

⁷ De Groot J.G., “Do women make better peacekeepers?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 July, 1999.

⁸ Whittington S., Incorporation of gender into the work of UNTAET/ETTA, May 2001.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ UN DPKO-TES, Course Evaluation, MONUC, October, 2001.

¹¹ Gender Sensitive Code of Personal Conduct, UN Peace University, Costa Rica, October 2001.

¹² Nadine Peuchgirbal, Military-Civil Liaison Officer in the Military Planning Service of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, followed up the Cornwallis seminar by writing a consolidated document of the findings of the working group session and circulated it within the relevant offices of the UN structure, as a response to the invitation made to the Cornwallis seminar participants by Ms Angela E.V. King, UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women.

Civil-Military Relations and Cooperation

...there is no natural meeting of minds between civilians and military: it has to be worked up and coordination is hard work on both sides. Both sides have different roles, different aims, different motives and, what we have to remember, different philosophies, and these need to be reconciled one with the other.

Professor Richard Cohen
Moscow Seminar, March 1998

I. Introduction

1. As peace operations have evolved over the 1990s and into the new millennium, their complexity has grown dramatically. During the Challenges series of seminars this complexity has been highlighted: essentially operations to address the circumstances of a combination of violent conflict, humanitarian tragedy and often failed states. Seminar participants have noted that such crises usually arise from ethnic, religious, territorial or other historical problems, are nurtured and fuelled by opportunistic, ambitious and corrupt leaders and warlords, and are exaggerated by poor if not grave economic conditions, the absence of a tradition of democratic values, norms and practices, poor governance and decaying national infrastructure. To date, the international community's attempts to deal with these deeply-rooted complexities can be described as 'experimental' and have led to significant changes in the ways that the global, regional and sub-regional organizations have sought to deal with these new complex emergencies.

2. One obvious change in peace operations over the past decade has been the increase in the number and disciplines of contributors: international and national, governmental and non-governmental, and military and non-military. The inability, however, of this broad, diverse and complex set of players to conceive, plan and work together in managing a crisis and implementing a peace plan, despite the massive commitment of financial and human resources is a major challenge in crisis management and modern peace operations today. On some occasions, civil and military elements have worked together constructively and harmoniously, but on others the inability to achieve an appropriate level of cooperation has seriously weakened the overall effectiveness of the mission. The reasons are many and, although experience varies, the all-too-frequent instances of inability to cooperate willingly, to coordinate effectively and efficiently and to pursue common objectives collectively and professionally are sometimes referred to as 'the CIMIC issue'.

3. During the Challenges seminar series no single seminar was devoted to this broad and complex problem. It is a factor in all areas of peace operations and, as

such, was discussed at several seminars and touched upon in most if not all seminars.¹ This chapter therefore attempts to draw together many of the diverse thoughts that have been raised in relation to “the CIMIC issue”, to identify the challenges in civilian-military relations and cooperation, and to suggest a number of practical steps to improve the situation.

II. The Need for Effective and Efficient Relations between Military and Non-Military Peacekeeping Partners

There are professions which are victim-oriented in their objective, such as the humanitarian organizations and the NGOs. Other professions, like the military deployments, tend to be more mission-oriented. The two approaches are not always compatible and cause counter-productive agendas and inefficiencies of operations.

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg
Stockholm Seminar, September 1997

4. In the 1990s the UN Secretary General’s ‘An Agenda for Peace’ implied that modern peacekeeping followed a sequence: if conflict prevention failed then one moved on to various means of peacemaking; once there was an agreement to pursue a peaceful solution then traditional methods of peacekeeping could be applied; and, finally, once peace had taken hold, peace-building could begin.

5. The reality of today’s operations, however, is that there is essentially no such tidy sequence. Conflict prevention, diplomatic peace making, peace enforcement actions, classic peacekeeping, peace-building and nation building (development) are often all taking place simultaneously. In addition, humanitarian assistance operations have been required in addressing the consequences of these recent conflicts.

6. In terms of civil-military relations, the cooperation and coordination between the two communities is based on the fact that both contribute in some way to just about all of the functional areas of peace operations. The military, for example, has found itself contributing to humanitarian assistance, although not necessarily in the most comfortable role. NATO-led military elements were involved with UNMIK in conflict prevention in Kosovo. The military now plays key roles in various peace-building activities: for example, in support of institution building, refugee returns, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD & R), security sector reform (SSR), de-mining, and emergency infrastructure repair. It is only in the area of nation building that the military is rarely involved. Non-military contributors find themselves engaged in all functional areas of peace operations, with the possible exception of peace enforcement.

7. The complexity of the interdependence between civilian and military is due not simply to the fact that both communities are engaged in all functional categories of peace operations, but to a number of other complicating factors:

- a. within any one category there are many different activities (e.g. the peace-building example listed above);
- b. within any one activity there are multiple partners (e.g. refugee return can involve up to 12 different UN agencies);
- c. progress (or lack thereof) in any activity, and in any broad category, has an impact on other peace operations (e.g. failure to establish law and order has a serious impact on most peace-building activities);
- d. the change in role of any partner has an impact on what else that partner can do (e.g. the type and magnitude of military support to elections in Bosnia changed significantly over time, thus freeing military resources for other tasks);
- e. there are many obstacles, misunderstandings and other “dilemmas” which affect the ability of the two communities, military and civilian, to work closely together. These will be addressed in some detail in the subsequent section but suffice to say that there is at the outset a fundamental difference in the culture of these two communities; and
- f. the number of countries that have CIMIC specialists among them is small, mostly limited to the United States and some European militaries, and even these contain differences of approach according to national policies.

III. The Challenges of Civil-Military Cooperation

Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion and results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping mission, military and non-military.

David Lightburn
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

8. As yet, there is no single UN definition of civil-military cooperation. The way in which the term is used in NATO leans heavily towards the military commander’s mission, whereas in a UN context the term would seem to have a wider application. There are in fact three principal groups who are dependent upon each other for progress in any peace operation: the military, the international or multinational civilians and the local populations and their organs. This chapter concerns itself with the interdependence between the first two but at all times the relations with, and the involvement and cooperation of, local authorities, organizations and the public in general, are vitally important. In general the civilian partners can be sub-divided into several broad groups: the major global, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements (for example, UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, CIS, OAU, ECOWAS, SADC); the humanitarian community (UN or EU agencies, and many non-governmental organizations - NGOs); and specific disciplines such as politics, police, law, media, and development organizations (which again can be national, international or NGOs).

9. As alluded to above there are three basic sets of challenges affecting the relations between the military and civilian communities. The first is that there is a series of fundamental obstacles, which, if not understood or dealt with, can seriously impede the ability of the two communities to work together. Secondly, over time and based upon simplistic assessments and experiences, a number of misunderstandings have arisen (and have unfortunately gained unwarranted credibility) on the part of elements of one or the other communities. Thirdly, a number of dilemmas confront both communities, in that there are differing views and approaches to a number of issues yet each can be considered ‘technically correct’. These will be addressed in turn.

10. Obstacles. Fundamental obstacles to close and cooperative relations between the civilian and military partners in any peace operation include major differences in culture, mandates, resources, levels of authority and experience, as well as problems of personality (in leadership) and functional areas of responsibility.

- a. Culture – In general military organizations are structured, hierarchical, rigid, authoritarian and orderly, while most civilian groups are loosely structured, decentralized, consensus-based and, in some cases, anti-bureaucratic and unconventional. While there are variations, the fact remains that there are fundamental cultural differences between the two communities which significantly affect the way business is done, as well as having an impact on possibilities for effective cooperation and operational coordination.
- b. Mandates – A number of principal contributors to modern peace operations have institutional mandates that are not clearly understood by others. In some cases they are perceived at the operational level to be overlapping. In addition to their fundamental institutional mandates, the operational mandates set out in a Security Council resolution, or contained in a related peace plan such as the Dayton Agreement of 1995, can also be perceived to be overlapping. The result is that a number of civilian organizations and the military may all be engaged to some degree in, say, human rights, or refugees, or elections. The requirement therefore is for cooperation and coordination, but mandate confusion, together with lack of discussion between organizations prior to an operation, all lead to ‘turf wars’ and other sensitivities.
- c. Resources – A military force is usually adequately resourced and relatively quickly deployed. In some cases elements of the humanitarian community may also be deployed very quickly, but in general civilian mechanisms take longer to deploy and, more importantly, every resource (people, equipment or finances) must be sought from ‘donors’. Accordingly, at a time when the military is usually heavily focused on its security tasks, civilian organizations are seeking either temporary logistic support or other emergency services from the military. This again calls for cooperation and coordination. One other side-effect of this situation is that the civilian dependence upon continuing donor-support, often leads to distorted reporting whereby success is inflated and real problems are minimized or hidden.

- d. Authority – Military and civilian organizations have varying levels of authority vested in the people on the ground, and hence differing capabilities to make operational decisions and to adapt policies. Military forces, especially those outside the UN chain of command, must report back to regional or sub-regional councils in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere or to capitals. Some civilian organizations (for example the OSCE) vest a great deal of authority in the Head of Mission; others work regionally and report back for guidance to the strategic level headquarters (Geneva in the case of UNHCR); others have full autonomy (many NGOs, especially the smaller ones), and are therefore able to make decisions and act without delay.
- e. Experience – Some argue, the military experience in peace operations is greater than that of many civilian participants. In addition the average age of those in positions of authority is older in the military. On the other hand, many of the civilian peacekeepers, bring *a greater variety of valuable expertise* to contemporary missions and may have been working in the operational area for months or even years before the military arrives. These differences, as with cultural differences, quite often pose difficulties for cooperation and coordination.
- f. Personalities – Combined with the varying lengths of time that certain ‘leaders’ are deployed on a given operation, difference in personality can lead to serious difficulties in cooperation and coordination. Some military commanders, for example, are in a theatre of operation for only six months, whereas many of their civilian counterparts can be there for much longer, if not years. It is thus difficult to generate the close personal relationships that could benefit a team approach to a specific operation. In addition, some senior civilians (and some military) are poorly prepared for either the specific mandate, for management responsibilities, or for the operational environment. Sometimes ‘eminent persons’ are offered as special envoys or heads of mission by individual nations simply because they were successful politicians or bureaucrats or civic leaders, and not necessarily able to manage large organizations or teams, or to work cooperatively in a multi-disciplinary environment. This, in combination with basic cultural issues and mandate problems again has an impact upon the ability to achieve effective cooperation and coordination.

11. Misunderstandings. In addition to the above basic obstacles to harmonious and constructive military-civilian relations, as pointed out by Professor Cohen speaking in Moscow, over time a number of misunderstandings have arisen in both the military and civilian communities, and unfortunately, through repetition or lack of experience and perspective, have become ‘fact’ or ‘reality’. Significant misunderstandings include the following:

- a. “Military forces are a manpower pool”, rather than a force being tailored to a mission;

- b. “NGOs can be tasked”, whereas NGOs have their own clear tasks to be done, are responsible only to donors and do not take kindly to being given orders by the military;
- c. “The military is there to support civilian operations”, whereas there are clear military tasks for any deployed force;
- d. “Only one organization can be involved in a specific function”, whereas many can be involved and bring different resources and expertise to bear (up to 12 UN agencies alone with both human rights and refugees);
- e. “*Within means and capabilities* is an excuse for lack of support”, whereas a force is structured and equipped for principal military tasks;
- f. “The objective of military assistance to locals is to make the military feel good”, whereas such cooperation has more to do with force security and the reciprocal cooperation of locals with respect to overall operational objectives;
- g. “Once military support to civilians is given, it should continue”, whereas civilian capacity should develop in such a way as to be able to accomplish the operational objectives of the civilian organization; and
- h. “The military needs more training”, a common conclusion when civil-military relations are discussed, whereas in the eyes of the military a great deal more civilian education and training is desperately needed.

12. Dilemmas. While these obstacles and misunderstandings can generally be addressed through education, training and better dialogue there are a number of fundamental dilemmas confronting military and civilian contributors to modern peace operations. These include:

- a. Civil-military cooperation is essential in order to meet the main objectives of any peace operation yet, at the same time, in the eyes of some locals or parties to a conflict international civilians should not be cooperating with military forces;
- b. Peacekeepers generally strive for impartiality whereas humanitarian providers often insist on neutrality;
- c. Most civilian organizations work on a principle of independence, yet at the same time need to work with military forces for a degree of security;
- d. Military forces tend to place a sense of urgency on accomplishing objectives, whereas civilian organizations in general adopt a longer term view;
- e. There is an urgent need for stability in operations, yet military forces as a policy rotate frequently; and
- f. There is a need to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population, yet most military forces based on availability of personnel and time, tend simply to do things *for* people rather than *with* people, i.e., there is not the time to focus on building capability and capacity. This same dilemma occurs in a civilian sense in that humanitarian assistance sometimes runs counter to developmental objectives.

IV. Civil-Military Relations and Cooperation in Security, Humanitarian and Civil Operations

13. The manner in which the two communities relate to one another varies considerably according to the type or phase of a peace operation. There are different challenges depending upon whether security is the focus (the lead is generally with military forces), or humanitarian assistance (where the lead is generally with civilian agencies), or longer-term peace-building (where the military can be tasked to support 'civil implementation'). It should also be noted that while civil-military relations can present difficulties in modern, complex peace operations, so too can many civil-civil relations.

14. Security Operations. Early in any operation, if there is an insecure or uncertain security environment the military will generally lead. This is likely to require military involvement not only in developing and maintaining a secure environment but also to tax military resources by actively engaging military forces in the delivery of humanitarian assistance or performing emergency civilian functions such as the maintenance of law and order. Until such time as adequate civilian police capacity is deployed this will remain the case, but practical procedures for handing over functions incrementally need to be worked out between organizations on the ground. At this juncture the military is also likely to be involved in developing or repairing emergency infrastructure in order to support military operations, such as roads, bridges and some mine clearing. It is also at this juncture, as the military may be more fully deployed than some of their civilian counterparts, that civilians are likely to be seeking additional military resources such as logistics and manpower. The relationship is therefore significant and requires close cooperation and coordination in both the planning phase and early in the implementation phase.

15. Humanitarian Operations. As noted above, such operations are normally the responsibility of the civilian community, specifically certain designated humanitarian agencies and many NGOs. If the military gets involved it is often a question of capability and timing. Many organizations have not only operational mandates to carry out but also institutional ones, hence military involvement should be a last resort and needs to be carefully considered and coordinated. Normally military tasks should be limited to the development of a secure environment, the protection of certain key installations and convoys, and the provision of emergency service packages such as food, shelter, power, vehicle repair, medical and sanitation. The transition of authority is particularly critical in such operations.

16. Civil Operations. In peace-building the military is often called upon to support civil implementation in a range of areas: for example, in institution building, return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, reform of the public security sector, holding of elections, and others. Within available means and capabilities the military can respond, but support generally during this phase is limited to

the maintenance of a secure environment. In the past few years, in particular in East Timor and the Balkans, the military has tended to employ specialized liaison and advisory elements, known as “CIMIC” specialists, groups or task forces, to assist in the peace-building role. In some missions an over-dependency on the military has become a problem, for example in Bosnia. In both East Timor and Kosovo there has also been a trend in 2000/2001 towards a loose grouping of international civilian and military organizations from the same countries or geographic region; for example UN civilian police groups and NGOs from a certain country operating in the same area as their national or regional militaries. Also, while in the past this has been a practice with respect to principal national aid agencies, an early assessment of the expanded approach to include police and NGOs is most positive and seems to make the cooperation and coordination problem easier. This is a move away from the more traditional UN approach of deploying civilian police of many nationalities.

V. Addressing the Challenges of Civil-Military Relations

Establishing an understanding and respect of each others professional and cultural origin must start early in the training process. Many biases have to be eliminated. We have to understand that the new enemy might be famine, lack of water or food, diseases, gangs, terrorists etc. This is why the process of cooperation in the broad field of training is a necessity.

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg
Stockholm Seminar, September 1997

17. There are four main actions that can be taken in order to improve civilian-military relations, to properly acknowledge and address the dependency between the two communities in modern peace operations, and, specifically, to promote possibilities for enhanced cooperation and coordination. These are, firstly to begin by building on shared values and concerns between the civilian and military communities; secondly, to address the fundamental challenges set out above (the obstacles, misunderstandings and dilemmas) through, in the main, better training and education; thirdly, to consider a set of basic principles for better cooperation and operational coordination for adoption by principal international organizations and arrangements, UN agencies and major NGOs; and, fourthly, to work at both the strategic (headquarters) level and the operational level to improve civil-military cooperation and coordination, and also to improve civil-civil cooperation and coordination.

18. Building on Shared Values and Concerns. Individuals who contribute months, if not years, of their lives to contemporary complex peace operations know that they are offering their services to do difficult and often dangerous jobs in extremely demanding environments. Military and civilians alike who participate in such peace operations have a loyalty to their organization and profession, an

ethic of selfless service, courage, endurance, adventure, and even prestige. Again these are shared values and represent something on which to build at the individual, team and even organizational levels. In a similar way there are shared competences: in both communities one can find a high degree of professionalism, and one can also find varying degrees of quality and preparation for their tasks. Many civilian and military contributors also realize that their efforts in peacekeeping are merely short-term measures, pending real progress in achieving lasting political solutions and in achieving a self-sustaining growth in the economic and social development of the area in question.

19. Using Education, Training and Understanding. In addressing the many obstacles, misunderstandings and dilemmas set out in section III above a key remains better preparation of the participants through training and education, as well as a will on the part of all contributors to better understand their partners in pursuit of what should be common objectives. Education will be needed to explain cultural differences between the many contributing elements, as well as the need to work with such differences rather than making them a starting point for disputes over functional tasks and responsibilities. Education should also play an important role in overcoming obstacles and misunderstandings: in convincing both military and civilian players that obstacles such as experience levels, age differences, reporting channels, levels of authority and ‘personalities’ can be accommodated through patience, understanding, good will, innovation and compromise. In particular, as pointed out in the Brahimi Report, civilian specialists as well as those eminent persons selected for senior posts need better preparation. Skills training is also important, again in particular for civilians as many of the skills in question are covered naturally in the basic training of the military. Training as teams and joint education and training between military and civilians will also contribute to a better understanding of each other. Military planners should prepare their military exercises, national and international, in such a way as to emphasise cooperation and coordination requirements of a peacekeeping mission. Civilians should be invited to contribute to such exercises as resource persons or participants. Primarily, all such basic education, training and understanding is a national responsibility and should not be left for the UN and other organizations to conduct, although these organizations should provide further, mission-specific training.

20. Principles of Cooperation and Coordination. The military community has long valued a number of principles of war in preparing for combat and the UN has long had a number of fundamental principles for peace operations; some NGOs have in the recent past developed codes of good practice for application in response to a crisis. A similar approach might be helpful in drawing together the two communities, military and civilian. One might start, for example, by considering the following list of principles as a basis for inter-community discussion: cultural awareness, communication, unity of effort, shared responsibility, consent, transparency, and patience and understanding.

21. Practical Measures. A number of practical steps might also be applied. At a strategic level the mandates issue requires attention, an issue elaborated upon at the Buenos Aires seminar in 2001. Enforcement and consensual mandates should not be mixed. The institutional mandates of various organizations should be a strength and should aid in better understanding. The early management of a crisis is a serious weakness of major peace operations contributors as there is essentially no real dialogue or cooperation prior to the deployment of resources. At the Amman seminar in 1998, Professor Gene Dewey, former Deputy High Representative of UN-HCR, proposed practical possibilities such as the development of a 'Comprehensive Campaign Plan' prior to a mission being undertaken. This so-called 'CCP' would entail joint campaign plans and an integration of military and civilian resources from the various principal UN agencies into these common "task forces". Subsequently, the concept of Integrated Mission Task Forces was put forward in the Brahimi Report, a concept, now forming a central element of the UN engagement in Afghanistan.²

22. At an operational level, good communication and exchange of information is of major importance. Given the many complexities of modern peace operations and the interdependencies of the various parts of the peace operations puzzle, there is a need for daily close contact between all principal players. In practice, this means liaison staffs, regular meetings (for both daily operations and longer term planning), some form of joint information centre, and regular sharing of ideas, concepts, future plans and changes in deployment or mandates. On the subject of joint information centres, experience has shown that if these are established jointly, and a civilian is in charge or is the principal coordinator, the system often works better than a military directed effort. The experience cited refers to the approach taken in East Timor by, initially, Australian military forces and several UN agencies and NGOs. Some NGOs in particular have an aversion to spending a great deal of time, or in any way contributing to, a military dominated centre.

23. On a regional level, work is under way between major institutions to better understand each other's strengths, limitations, decision-making processes, institutional mandates etc, for example by regular meetings every few months between OSCE and NATO crisis management staffs. Over time, and applied more widely, this should begin to overcome existing criticisms of 'extreme military secrecy' and 'the poor planning capabilities' of civilian organizations. Systematic programmes and procedures for joint consultation, planning and concept development should become the norm, and appear to have already paid dividends for the EU, OSCE and NATO in operations in 2001 in Macedonia. One possible way of enhancing this possibility is to exchange liaison staffs amongst the principal international organizations, preferably staff with crisis management experience in their parent organization.

24. Given the absence at the regional level of one single authority over the various regional and sub-regional organisations and non-governmental civilian organi-

zations, cooperation may prove a particularly difficult challenge. Building loosely structured teams, with representation from all necessary organizations, meeting regularly is nevertheless necessary and should be encouraged and prioritized by all organizations in a mission area.

25. As a sign that a great deal of progress is being made, at least conceptually, two important contributors to peace operations have, over the past two years, made remarkably similar policy statements. The ICRC has stated a number of times that “the organization is convinced that the key to a more precisely tailored response to a crisis is not to merge the activities of the military with the civil, but identify points of contact at which interaction may be consolidated in a spirit of complementarity”. NATO CIMIC policy now states that “in general the military should defer to the expertise of civilians on humanitarian matters; vice-versa, civilian organizations should defer to the expertise of the military on security matters.”

26. The discussions at the Amman and Buenos Aires seminars stressed the importance of a better selection process for senior military and civilian leaders in peace operations, a point that was also underlined in the Brahimi Report, and is currently being discussed in various forms within and outside the UN system.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Increased cooperation is possible through better planning, enhanced joint training, clearer mandates, better UN management of its field operations, more determined attempts to achieve ‘unity of effort’, and proactive efforts by each side to understand, if not concur, in the others culture and outlook.

Dr. Trevor Findlay
Stockholm Seminar, November 1997

27. Cooperative relations between civilian and military participants in a complex peace operation remain a fundamental key to achieving unity of effort and ultimately success. The Challenges seminar series has identified some of the principal difficulties that currently exist in this complicated and sensitive area, as well as a number of elements that could enhance cooperation and coordination both at strategic (headquarters) levels and in field operations themselves. Some of the issues that ran as themes through the seminars were also identified in the Brahimi Report, and *there was a broad agreement in the seminar series, inter alia, that clearer and more precise mandates, as well as better preparation of civilian specialists, are two fundamental steps to improving a better understanding in a theatre of operations.* In addition, the seminar series has highlighted the following four ways in which civilian-military relations might be further enhanced:

1. *Efforts should be made to build on the many shared values, competences and concerns that already exist between the civilian and military communities. This can be done through training and education, by a more deter-*

mined effort at better communication and understanding at both strategic and operational levels and by starting this process on a national basis.

2. *The fundamental challenges to better civilian-military relations – the obstacles, misunderstandings and dilemmas – should be acknowledged and addressed through, in the main, better training and education. This will require a concerted effort by and for many civilian elements whose preparation at present is minimal. There is also a need to improve the understanding of the military regarding the problems and methods of work of the civilians. A concerted effort at joint training and education should use the many international institutions that conduct joint courses, and take advantage of national and international military exercises to put theory into practice.*
3. *Consideration should be given to the development of a set of basic principles for better cooperation and operational coordination, for adoption by principal international organizations and arrangements, UN agencies and major NGOs. Such an initiative should start within the UN system and/or through a sponsor nation or other international organization.*
4. *Specific efforts should be made at both the strategic (headquarters) level and the operational level to improve civil-military cooperation and coordination, and also to improve civil-civil cooperation. In addition to the above mentioned training and education means, other practical steps should include a determined effort to extend the network of expert liaison officials (in both ‘peace time’ and in operations), to establish other regular communications means in an operation (such as regular meetings for both daily operations and longer-term strategies) and to set up joint information centres.*

28. The interdependencies between civilian elements and military forces in a complex peace operation will continue. Whether or not there is one organizational structure under the UN (or another international organization or arrangement), or whether there is just a loose set of key contributors to a mission, progress or failure in any area will have a significant impact on the roles, tasks, structure and resources of every other contributor. The need therefore to improve and make more effective relations between the military and civilian members of a peace operation, as well as between the many diverse civilian organizations themselves, will continue to be a major challenge of the 21st century.

Notes

¹ Separate sessions focused on the issue of civil-military relations and interdependence were held at the seminars in Stockholm, Moscow, Amman and New Delhi.

² Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/304-S/2000/809 of 21, August 2000, para.202-216.

Police – In the Service of Peace

Demand for civilian police operations dealing with intra-state conflict is likely to remain high on any list of requirements for helping a war-torn society restore conditions for social, economic and political stability. The fairness and impartiality of the local police force, which civilian police monitor and train, is crucial to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and its effectiveness is vital where intimidation and criminal networks continue to obstruct progress on the political and economic fronts.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
A/55/304-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para. 118

I. Introduction

1. The Brahimi Report argued for a "doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks. This shift will require Member States to provide the United Nations with even more well-trained and specialized police experts, at a time when they face difficulties meeting current requirements."¹ The message of the Brahimi Report was clear and the challenges to be met are considerable.

2. The first challenge identified during the Challenges Project was the difficulties for Member States to meet the requirements for UN civilian police, or UNCIVPOL to use UN terminology, in quantity, as well as quality. A second challenge addressed concerned issues of planning and operational considerations. As the seminar discussions developed, the third challenge focused on was the consequences of the Security Council authorizing mandates for executive missions. The Challenges participants also turned to the issue of the importance for the international community to provide the necessary platform for the entire context in which the CIVPOL operates, that is the judicial system, seen in perspective as the "whole legal chain." Without a legal framework, a functioning court system and prosecution as well as correction facilities, the police can have only limited success. Finally in this chapter, attention is drawn to the development perspective of international policing cooperation.

3. Twenty to twenty-five percent of the UN military and police peacekeepers working in the field are UNCIVPOL. They are called Civilian Police, in order to distinguish them from the Military Police, who are responsible for internal law and order among military peacekeepers. For clarity, it has been suggested to rename "Civilian Police" to "UN Police" given its central role in modern peace operations. For more than a decade, civilian police have been struggling for general acceptance

of their own identity and status within the peacekeeping community. The civilian police are not a part of, or an annex to the military: they constitute a category of peacekeepers in their own right and profession. The implementation and follow up of the Brahimi Report have already contributed significantly to reorganizing and reforming the role and structure within which the UN civilian police operates. This was clearly recognized by the proposal that the UNCIVPOL Unit of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters, should be given a status equal to that of the Military component.² Consequently, the Unit became the Civilian Police Division (CPD) in October 2000.

4. The history of the UN civilian police is relatively brief, starting in the 1960s, with operations in Congo and Cyprus. The first large operation to include civilian police was in Namibia (1989/90) where some 1500 civilian police officers were deployed. Civilian police officers have played an increasing role in peace operations since the beginning of the 1990s; in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia and more recently in the former Yugoslavia and East Timor. The revival of nationalism and conflicts *within*, rather than *between*, States or military alliances, has contributed to this trend. Today, when peace operations are undertaken *inside* countries, which are fighting civil wars or experiencing other violent conflicts, the dimensions of peace operations have become much wider. These are societies still characterized by power struggles, corruption, criminality and instability and sometimes without functioning State authorities such as the judiciary. The task for the international community is to help rebuild societies based on the rule of law. Only in such societies will democracy and market economy have a fair chance to develop. In extreme cases, as in Kosovo and East Timor, the administration has been temporarily taken over by international organizations under the leadership and umbrella of the United Nations and national law enforcement is handled by the UN under executive mandates.

II. Meeting the Quality Requirement

UNCIVPOL is very active in assisting contributing Member States with selection and training of police officers for assignment to field missions...Our intent is to ensure that police officers sent to peace missions are quality individuals and understand the larger context of a peace mission.

Superintendent Halvor Hartz
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

5. Nowadays, a civilian police task is far more than just monitoring local colleagues in areas of development. The foreign police officer must be able to advise, reconstruct and train the local police, and also function in an executive capacity as a police officer him or herself in the country of deployment, if the UN has so decided. Often working in an unstable society and in dangerous environments where the crime rate is high, the police have to serve and protect a diverse and conflictual

population. Together with the local police, the main task is to ensure that human rights are respected and the crime rate is substantially reduced. They may also be required to take on other duties, such as assisting returning home owners to reclaim their houses and apartments from illegal occupants, participate in weapons collection from the public, and observe or monitor elections. Too often, however, UNCIVPOL is given additional non-policing tasks that it is not staffed, equipped or trained for and which could be performed by other better suited components. These tasks include static guard functions at UN facilities, transport of salaries and so forth.

6. Formed police units, specifically trained and equipped for tasks such as crowd management and other robust police operations, are another type of police asset. At the time of writing, such units known as MSUs (Multinational Specialized Units), are deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina under military SFOR control. In UNMIK, formed Specialised Police Units (SPU) exist as an integrated part of the UN Police concept and, as of January 2002, there were nine such units deployed in Kosovo. Two SPU units are deployed as an integrated part of the UN Police in East Timor. These formed police units are mainly suitable when the mission is given a mandate with executive police functions. Like the military, they normally operate in units and are therefore often not suitable for deployment as individual civil police. It is important to note that formed police units have to be integrated into the overall police concept together with other specialized units (forensic units, investigation units, etc.) and under one clear chain of command.

7. In training the local police, contacts with mass media are an important task for UNCIVPOL. It is important to let citizens in the region know why uniformed foreigners in blue berets are present in the community. The civilian police officers, together with the local police, need to show that they are not in the first place the police *force*, but the police *service* and they exist to maintain law and order and protect the interests of the entire population, not just the powerful individuals and elements in a society. This role is carried out by maintaining public order and security, by combating crime and by community policing.

8. In the past, UN formal requirements for UNCIVPOL officers have not been too demanding. In general, all that has been required was five years of police service, adequate knowledge of English or other official language of the mission, a driver's license and ability to operate a 4-wheel drive vehicle. These requirements were based on traditional monitoring functions. In recent years, experience has amply shown that much more is needed.

9. At the seminar in Amman, a detailed list of suggested requirements was presented by Brigadier Mahmoud Al-Hadeed of the Jordanian Royal Police Academy: a civilian police officer should have basic crime scene investigation skills, know how to conduct an investigation, how to use communications equipment, including

computers, read a map, and write a report. He or she should know the police role in human rights investigations and, in addition, foreign police officers should have a good knowledge of the UNCIVPOL and all other components of the peace operation in order to know their duties. Swedish National Police Commissioner, Sten Heckscher, participating in the Pretoria and Carlisle seminars, listed required qualifications in priority as follows:

- a. high police professionalism;
- b. knowledge of the history and traditions of the country where he or she will serve;
- c. relevant language proficiency;
- d. knowledge of the background to the conflict;
- e. knowledge of relevant legislation;
- f. knowledge of government and other institutions in society;
- g. a sense for cultural background and interaction;
- h. good pedagogical ability; and
- i. certainly much more...

10. Unfortunately, not all contributing countries provide the United Nations with police officers who meet UN standards. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo pointed out that “several detachments had to be sent home because of inadequate training”. For example, some of them were not trained to use firearms.³ Approximately 200 police officer’s duty were terminated before the end of their assignments because they did not meet the standards required. One reason for the difficulty in providing suitably qualified personnel stemmed from the fact that initially the same basic requirements were distributed by the UN Civilian Police Unit to Member States for service in Kosovo as had been sent out when police were to be recruited for service in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is not an executive mission. No attention was drawn to the fact that the new mission was to work under an executive mandate, including the right of police officers to use firearms. It is, however, important to underline that the so-called UN standards are minimum requirements, for certain missions, depending on the tasks given by the Security Council, or the specific phase of a mission, the Civilian Police Division in DPKO can specify in detail what kind of police expertise is needed, as was the case for the missions in Kosovo and East Timor during 2001.

11. Careful selection procedures are essential and UN Selection Assistance Teams can be very helpful to governments who want to send police officers to a conflict area. As pointed out during the Carlisle seminar by Halvor Hartz, Head of the then UNCIVPOL Unit, these teams can help not only by testing but also by giving advice on training in accordance with UN standards prior to deployment. As suggested by Ambassador Martin Hallqvist speaking at the Buenos Aires seminar, a system which could possibly be introduced internationally is the use of so called “blue cards” at present in use in Sweden. The blue cards are issued to police officers who have qualified for UNCIVPOL service, according to standards based on

UN requirements and applicable to other kinds of police service, such as OSCE or EU missions. Once police officers have blue cards, they do not need to be tested before being deployed again, though cards have to be renewed after a certain period of time. The final decision regarding the selection of police officers to be sent to a crisis spot should be taken with the consent of the responsible authority at national level in the respective country, provided that they also meet the minimum UN requirements.

12. A civilian police officer must be properly equipped. Personal police equipment is provided by the country contributing the police personnel, and equipment for common use, such as cars, non-personal police equipment, office supplies and other consumable articles for police use, is procured and stockpiled by the UN. Common start-up equipment kits should be prepared in advance, for establishing headquarters and the UN or regional organizations should take a lead in the coordination of this task.

13. Training is essential in order to improve the quality of peacekeepers. At the seminar in Stockholm, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar suggested that regional training centres be created, as many countries of the developing world do not have “the infrastructure and facilities for the effective training and preparations for contingents and personnel”. It was proposed this would lead to a better standardisation and coordination, and it would also be cost effective. The military and the police should have separate departments, but possibilities should be provided for joint training. Police trained in such a centre, together with other police colleagues from the same part of the world, would function better together in peace operations. This is especially important in situations in which police have been given executive mandates.

14. It should be borne in mind that police officers from countries in the same region as the peace operation is taking place may well have a deeper understanding and appreciation of cultural and other regional aspects than police officers from elsewhere in the world, a point which was made by several participants in the seminar series. Such officers may therefore be able to make substantial contributions to peace operations and should be encouraged to continue to do so also in future operations.

15. A training model was discussed at the seminars in Canada and Argentina. Two courses should be instituted: one for police officers, and one for police commanders. The “commander” level courses should be integrated with courses for military officers and civilian peace support personnel, representing for instance United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross. There is much to be gained from preparing for international work together with participants from other countries and along multifunctional lines. UN Civilian Police Di-

vision has developed a basic training curriculum in order to prepare police officers for service in peace operations (United Nations Police Officers Course, UNPOC). In 1997 Sweden developed the first Police Commanders Course in order to prepare international senior police officers for leading positions in missions and, at the time of writing, the Civilian Police Division is currently developing a model curriculum for the United Nations Police Commanders Course, UNPCC.

15. Once in the operational area, CIVPOL officers need to develop a good knowledge of the local community, personalities, customs and habits as an important part of their police work. This can be greatly facilitated by living closer to the local population than the military and normally the police officers find their accommodation by renting a house or an apartment from local landlords. The development and application of local community knowledge takes time and the Brahimi Report recommended that civilian police officers should serve for at least one year to ensure a minimum level of continuity.⁴

17. In addition to well trained policemen working abroad as civilian police officers, it is vital to have good policewomen, as was pointed out in a Statement by the President of the Security Council in 1997, made on behalf of the Council and elaborated on by Constable Jennifer Strachan during the Cornwallis seminar.⁵ In situations of conflict or high social tension, women are often better suited than men to deal with, for instance, taking care of victims of violence. It was suggested that female police officers are often able to relate better than men to female members of the local population. See also Chapter 7 – Gender Perspectives in Effective Peace Operations.

18. As an added incentive, when a police officer serves to satisfaction abroad, he or she should get credit for it at home, in his/her future police career. This would also be a good way for governments and police administrations to improve the reputation and status of the police, by letting the public know that their police have made important contributions to peace. Debriefing on return from peace operation service is important. Just as the home administration must be capable of preparing its people as required before they are sent out, when officers return home they should be received properly and assisted in various constructive ways.

III. Meeting the Quantity Requirement

There are not enough police resources to fulfil all the needs at this point from any source either regional or international. When considering the needs of all the missions that are on-going and what is potentially on the horizon, the question becomes where will the required police officers come from? Countries are taking steps to contribute more, but there are still only a finite number of forces from which to draw. The police officers are members of functioning police organizations in their own countries. They form the pool of resources from which to draw. There are no trained reserves to augment existing police forces.

Mr Richard Mayer
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

19. In his Statement in July 1997, the President of the Security Council recognized an increasingly important role for civilian police in contributing to the building of confidence and security in order to prevent conflict, to contain conflict or to build peace after conflict. States were encouraged to make available appropriately trained civilian police and legal expertise. The President underlined “the importance of the recruitment of qualified civilian police from the widest possible geographic range.”⁶

20. Several of the countries participating in the Challenges Project and thus enriching the seminar discussions are contributing relatively many civilian police officers to UN peacekeeping missions. As of 31 December 2001, the three countries providing most police officers to the UN, namely Jordan (808), USA (707) and India (636), had all taken an active part in the seminars.

21. As of 31 of December 2001, there were 7,642 UN civilian police officers deployed in eight missions. A large majority of them, 6,193, were stationed in South East Europe (1,674 were in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 4,519 in Kosovo). In Africa there were only 89, of whom 22 were in Western Sahara, 54 in Sierra Leone and 13 in Democratic Republic of Congo. In East Timor there were 1,316, in Guatemala 9 and in Cyprus 35.⁷ This imbalance has aroused critical comments, to the effect that while the industrialized countries in the West may provide much of the finance for operations in developing countries, they prefer to send their own peacekeeping forces to less dangerous crisis spots.

22. In a panel discussion at the Carlisle seminar the difficulties in recruiting police officers as civilian police officers for service in peace operations were underlined. In the United States this problem is mainly solved by engaging retired police officers. This might be a realistic solution in countries with low police retirement age, but not in others where the retirement age is high. It is also important to have people with contemporary policing experience. Contributing factors to the problem in the United States of recruiting police other than retired officers through the International Criminal Investigative Training Program (ICITAP), are the diversified police structure, and the fact that there is no single point of contact within the gov-

ernment structures responsible for coordinating the provision of police personnel to UN peace operations, as recommended in the Brahimi Report.⁸ The recruitment and training of US police officers through ICITAP is conducted by the company Dyncorp. In some countries there are political constraints in contributing police officers to peace operations. The most common problem for Member States is, as expressed in the Brahimi Report, that “the size and configuration of their police forces tend to be tailored to domestic needs alone.”⁹ Moreover, one could add that the police, unlike the military, has a never ending war going on at home – fighting crime and providing public security and order. The Brahimi Report suggested that Member States should establish national pools of serving police officers who are available and qualified for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangement system.¹⁰

23. The UN is encouraging participation by regional organizations under the auspices of Chapter VIII of the charter. In recent years, the OSCE has developed an increasing role in police aspects of peace operations in Europe. Following its assumption of the responsibility in 1997 to finalize the civilian police mission in Eastern Slavonia, the OSCE is now responsible for police education and training in Kosovo, and will have a coordinating role in police development work in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The OSCE cooperates closely with the UN, the European Union and other organizations in the Balkans and has established a rapid reaction capability, to send out observers and others, including police officers, when a crisis arises.

24. Furthermore, there is a written agreement about coordination between the UN and the EU in this field and there would be considerable value for the UN in exploring similar agreements with other regional organizations in the world, such as OAU and ECOWAS in Africa, ASEAN in South East Asia, and the OAS in the Americas. In November 2001, the European Union declared its intention to aim at a capacity to deploy 5000 civilian police officers by the end of year 2003, 1000 of whom should be ready to be mobilised within one month.¹¹ These police officers should be prepared to go to crisis regions primarily, but not exclusively, in Europe and with a UN mandate which would normally precede a deployment. In the Secretariat of the European Council, a Unit for civilian police affairs has been established consisting of 7 police officers.¹² It should be noted, however, that the number of civilian police officers from EU countries deployed in various missions before 2003, should be included in the total target figure of 5000: in other words, there will not be another 5000 police officers suddenly available for service abroad. In a newspaper article in 2000 it was reported that the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers stated jointly that it is a realistic goal to have one percent of the total number of police officers from each country simultaneously available to serve abroad as civilian police officers.¹³

25. A particularly valuable step would be the establishment of comprehensive data bases at global and regional levels of police capabilities and availability for peace operations. As the UN is the lead organization, all information, routines and operational documents should be UN compatible and follow UN standards to the extent possible. Both the OSCE and the EU have developed data bases, and there should be a similar one in the UN. There have been several coordination meetings with the UN, OSCE, EU and WEU concerning information sharing and these organizations are building data bases on police resources. Data bases at the international organizations should contain such information as the numbers of officers that each country could make available, categories of personnel, skills and qualifications, and appropriate background information. To reduce the risk that lists of names in international data bases would become outdated and lose their operational value, national police administrations should have the ability to communicate at short notice with the international peacekeeping agencies, above all the DP-KO in the UN. Information from such data bases could facilitate discussions with governments about potential service in peace operations and also on other occasions, for instance in connection with donor meetings. As stated in January 2002 by the current Head of the Civilian Police Division at UN Headquarters, Michael Jorsback, the division is currently developing a roster of one hundred personnel in close cooperation with contributing countries. This roster is mainly focused on headquarters personnel and specialized categories such as local police development and training. The creation of such a roster will facilitate recruitment of quickly deployable personnel in key categories in order to ensure a more rapid start up of missions. The contributing countries, however, will still have the responsibility to select, train and make them available upon request.

IV. Planning and Operational Considerations

De-linking the military and the police is critically important in the transition from war to peace because the police and military institutions often become closely associated preceding or during a conflict. As the state turns increasingly to the military to shore up the local police's capacity to maintain internal order in the face of civil unrest and conflict, the distinction between internal order and external security becomes blurred. Sometimes, the military comes to dominate the police formally or informally, and the police becomes de-civilianized and militarised, as it falls under military control.

Rama Mani
"Peacebuilding and Police Reform"¹⁴

26. As stressed in the 1998 Amman report by Lieutenant General Johan Hederstedt, it is most important that the UN Civilian Police be involved from the very beginning of operational planning for a peace operation, including during the conception of the mandate. UNCIVPOL, as a natural participant in the advance team, should determine the size of the UNCIVPOL presence and when and how the police contingent should arrive. Bearing in mind the problems of finding available and

qualified police personnel, it is more often a question of “could” rather than “should”. Member States police administrations have to be contacted for recruitment purposes and are encouraged to facilitate deployment as fast as possible. Since 2001 the Civilian Police Division has been actively involved in the planning processes for new mandates and when changes in current mandates are to be considered.

27. Ideally, the peacekeepers should arrive even before the crisis becomes acute, to prevent it from becoming an armed conflict. Civilian police can be most useful before and after a conflict, possibly also during a low intensity conflict, but not during a full war.¹⁵ At the Carlisle seminar, the then Head of the UNCIVPOL Unit of DPKO, argued that since the UNCIVPOL cannot deploy as rapidly as the military, there may be a need for a military constabulary that would relieve the need for infantrymen to conduct law and order and that would begin law enforcement immediately without waiting for UNCIVPOL to deploy. This arrangement can be accepted in urgent cases, but it also underlines the need for the civilian police to arrive as quickly as possible in the crisis area. As stressed by the current Head of the Civilian Police Division, such formed police units require an executive mandate in order to carry out traditional police functions. The experiences from Kosovo have shown that military units can play a crucial and important role in ensuring overall security. The use of rapidly deployable formed police units during the start-up phase would facilitate police operations during the most crucial period.

28. At the Stockholm seminar, it was suggested that differences between professional rather than national cultures present far more of a challenge, as they often create more solid barriers than those barriers based on geographic origin. On the other hand, another participant remarked that traditionally the relationship between UNCIVPOL and the military has been good mainly because UNCIVPOL and the military both wear uniforms, are similarly organized and embrace a broadly similar systems of values. It is essential for the military and the civilian components of a peace operation to cross their professional barriers and cooperate with each other. If the civilian police are unarmed, it might be necessary for the military to take on responsibility for the protection of the police. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, if an UNCIVPOL patrol has to drive down a road with the risk of being attacked, military – or MSU – patrols escort the police officers. At the same time, there is a risk of overprotection, which should not be ignored. Too many soldiers might complicate the possibilities for UNCIVPOL to gain the necessary confidence of the local population, an issue that was raised in the Stockholm, Carlisle and Tokyo seminars. The experiences from Kosovo have shown that military and police can cooperate closely and effectively when the two components have developed a joint concept of operations. These experiences should be more closely analysed and further developed for future concepts of peace operations.

29. Another area in which the military and the police should develop closer co-operation is in the exchange of operational information. Each component has its own, unique sources of information but the positioning of central operations rooms in close proximity to each other at mission headquarters can be a very valuable asset in instances when the local law and order situation deteriorates. In this context, the practice of the UNCIVPOL to have offices in the local police stations and to live among the local population, can also be very useful to the military and can minimize the risk of misunderstandings. Two executive police missions, UNMIK and UNTAET, have joint operation centres and both have developed close co-operation with positive results. These developments should be further encouraged.

30. At the same time as a peace operation unfolds, the nature of the linkage between the military and UNCIVPOL can be very sensitive and subject to change. The conclusion to be drawn is that there is value in demonstrating to the local community that there are reasons to keep a certain distance between the military and the police.

31. It is important for civilian police to cooperate not only with the military, but also with civil society, political, human rights, humanitarian and development organizations, with governmental authorities and representatives, and with NGOs. Normally, these will have arrived in the mission area well before the UNCIVPOL, and possibly have been there for several years. They will often have extensive local knowledge and can be sources of good advice and helpful information. Their work is often done in an idealistic spirit with great commitment and integrity, and they will also be likely to stay long after the military phases of a mission have been completed. The importance of the civilian police understanding the roles and responsibilities of the many civilian actors and components of a peace operation cannot be overestimated, which in turn, often pose a significant load on the leadership capacities of the UNCIVPOL Commissioner and his staff.

32. This list of planning and operational considerations is only a brief reflection of some of the issues that came up during the discussions and exchanges that took place during the Challenges seminars. The nature and extent of UNCIVPOL responsibilities and tasks have increased significantly in the past ten years. The Brahimi Report has pointed out the way towards major improvements in addressing the issues and some advances have already been made, but the strong interest and support of Member States will be needed if the defects and inadequacies of outdated arrangements are to be successfully rectified.

V. Executive Mandates

The police forces have two functions in a peace operation; first, as international police officers in charge of monitoring the local police and ensuring that they are operating according to international rules against human rights violations; and second, where there is no local police force, as law enforcement. It is in the latter area that there are the most problems.

Major Cesar Zorzenon
Commandant, Gendarmerie Peacekeeping Training Centre of Argentina
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

33. In two ongoing operations, in Kosovo and East Timor, the international community, through the UN, in cooperation with international organizations and concerned countries, has taken over the administration under an executive mandate. This means that the international police have executive police powers, including power of arrest and the use of force and firearms. This mandate entails a great responsibility. The culture and rules for using firearms by police differ among countries and therefore the use of force, including weapons, must be clearly stated in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the mission and implemented with great care. Moreover, it has to be recognized that the fact that police officers are armed might provoke their adversaries to use their weapons first.

34. In the circumstances of Kosovo and East Timor, it was considered necessary by the Security Council to issue executive mandates. The language of resolute firmness is sometimes the only language that can be understood by criminals and lawless elements. At the same time, the peacekeepers' work is undoubtedly more dangerous and in such situations it is advantageous to work with known colleagues, whose reactions in a "sharp" situation are foreseeable and reliable. For these reasons there is value in having officers with similar police training and professional backgrounds working together. Police officers from the same part of the world or region can also prepare for the missions and train together. From training together, the next step would be to set up common units serving together in peace operations. This concept would partly mean a shift from present UN policy, according to which nationalities with different cultural backgrounds are mixed quite freely within the various missions. These possible developments would be in line with trends in the EU as well as with General Nambiars' suggestion during the Challenges seminars of establishing regional training centres. The experiences from Kosovo however, have also shown that national deployments do not necessarily mean higher effectiveness. As stressed by the current Head of Civilian Police Division, national deployments can also reveal differences in policing concepts in the respective areas of responsibility which can create coordination problems and confusion in situations when training local police officers. In-mission training concepts have overcome national differences of this nature and resulted in effective units and deployments composed of different nationalities.

35. The opinion was expressed that executive mandates as in Kosovo and East Timor are exceptional cases, and that it will not be necessary for the Security Council to give executive mandates in the future. There is a risk that this might be wishful thinking. Traditional peacekeeping is performed with unarmed UNCIVPOL, and the importance of traditional monitoring and the training task of UNCIVPOL should not be forgotten. But different tools and different approaches are needed for different types of crisis. During a mission the mandate and the requirements regarding UNCIVPOL can be amended by the Security Council. At the beginning of a mission it might be sufficient for UNCIVPOL to carry out monitoring and patrolling, but at a later stage instructors and additional skills might be needed. The experience of the past ten years has shown that police duties in peace operations have gone through considerable and dynamic change, a condition that seems likely to continue in the 21st century.

VI. The Legal Chain

The area around Kosovo, and Kosovo itself, is an area where crime is endemic. For any force to deploy to an area like this without any thought of the presence or effectiveness of a judicial system, either national or international, is a mistake.

Colonel Vincenzo Coppola
Commander, Multinational Specialized Unit (KFOR) in Kosovo
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

36. At the seminar in Pretoria, Rocklyn Williams discussed the issue of “security sector reform” which, he argued, should be seen as a wider concept than traditionally has been the case. This topic arose in several seminars and it was strongly held by several speakers that, when UNCIVPOL is deployed and especially under an executive mandate, there is a need for the whole legal chain to function effectively. This would mean that a much wider range of expertise should be present and so more judges, prosecutors, lawyers and prison personnel should participate in operations, able to take on relevant responsibilities.

37. It is recognized that it may be even more difficult for such persons than for regular police to take leave of absence from their normal work and positions, even for short periods. Nevertheless, their knowledge and expertise are urgently needed in the field as, if these important local elements of the security sector are absent or fail, the establishment of an effective rule of law regime will be difficult, time-consuming and perhaps even impossible. All too often, police can make an arrest and detain the person, but there is no prosecutor or system of justice to take care of the case, or no prison for the convicted felon. In these circumstances, when there is a broken legal chain, the work of the police can be both frustrating and pointless.

38. Sometimes the national legislation in the country in which the peace operation is taking place is obsolete, or non-existent. For example, legal experts from

several countries are still working on the legislation in Kosovo and East Timor where the former Yugoslav and Indonesian legislation, respectively, no longer meets the needs of either the judiciary or the citizens. As pointed out by Vincenzo Coppola, Head of the KFOR Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Kosovo, when a society is being entirely restructured, there is an urgent need for criminal and procedural laws to be put into place as soon as practicable. On such occasions, suggestions have been made to create some temporary law for use until a new national legislation can be introduced. However, this is a delicate issue, as it concerns the heart of a people and the nature of their societal process, hence, it is a matter that demands legal expertise of a high order. Peacekeepers, military or police, face certain categories of crimes during the initial phase of a peace operation. These serious crimes include murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, rape, kidnapping, arson, armed robbery, etc. Regardless of legal systems, these crimes are easier to define and could be part of an International Interim Penal Code. There is a need to establish an Interim Criminal Procedure Code in order to create a mechanism to handle such serious crimes. This would facilitate, during an interim phase, the establishing of basic law and order and it would also be of great assistance in the training of peacekeepers, including international prosecutors and judges.

39. In sum, from the discussions at the Challenges seminars there was a general feeling that these issues deserve further consideration. The international police must be able to cooperate with not only UN legal personnel but also local colleagues and other law enforcement officers, who should carry the responsibility for establishing or improving as quickly as possible the legal system of the country or area in which the peace operation is being carried out.¹⁶

VII. Strengthening Respect for the Rule of Law and Police Professionalism

The model that is being built into the training program in Kosovo is a police officer that is a problem solver, a community builder and a protector of human rights.

Richard Mayer
Carlisle Seminar, May 2001

40. Finally, it is important to look forward in a context of police development. A society that has been torn by war cannot be assisted to return to peace by the international community, then simply abandoned. If the investment costs and efforts of a peace operation are to have long lasting effect the international community must be willing to stand by for several years to assist in post-conflict peace-building by the strengthening of security, stability and respect for the rule of law. Many international police officers who have served in UNCIVPOL capacities are well qualified to return later to the same region as project leaders or participants in police development cooperation projects. Police reforms should lead to the creation of a lo-

cal democratic police whose work must be based on the rule of law and whose officers should also be well qualified to fight post-war criminality. To assist them in developing these capabilities, international instructors should be professional police officers, with teaching experience from police institutions, schools and academies in their home countries. They should work according to established and long term plans of police development cooperation, and not as has often been the case with civilian police, on an ad hoc basis, and for periods that are too short to achieve long lasting gain. There is however a need to define what can be achieved during the peacekeeping phase and the following post-mission period. A closer cooperation with components engaged with more long term institution-building during the peace operation should be further developed.

42. This development cooperation work has to be carried out with the consent of the government of the country concerned, and at its request. There are many ways in which it can be accomplished, through UNDP, other international organizations or bilaterally, but it is an aspect of long term assistance to the promotion of sustainable peace that to date has received insufficient attention and support.

VIII. Recommendations

43. Arising from the suggestions and proposals made in the Challenges seminars are the following recommendations:

1. *In order to improve both the numbers and the quality of civilian police suitably qualified for deployment in peace operations, more support should be given by Member States to advance preparation, in the form of comprehensive data bases of qualified personnel, coordinated education and training, introducing screening procedures, establishing pools of qualified personnel, the issuance of "blue cards" where appropriate, and better preparation and coordination of police equipment.*
2. *To ensure security, law and order during the crucial initial phase of a peace operation an International Interim Criminal Code and a Criminal Procedure Code should be developed. This would highly facilitate involvement of international prosecutors and judges as well as correctional staff in peace operations and the preparation and training of those categories.*
3. *Higher importance should be given during a peace operation to closer cooperation and coordination between the police and other elements, such as the military, the humanitarian and development organizations, NGOs, local authorities and communities.*
4. *There should be greater recognition of the importance of improving the whole legal chain, by the presence of suitably qualified and experienced personnel such as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, prison personnel.*

5. *As an important contribution to post-conflict peace-building, there should be arrangements for long term training of local police as an element of development cooperation work.*

Notes

- ¹ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, para. 119.
- ² Ibid. para.222.
- ³ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report*, Oxford/New York 2000, p 111.
- ⁴ Op.cit. para.122.
- ⁵ Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/1997/38 of 14 July 1997.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ UN-DPKO, 31 December 2001.
- ⁸ Brahimi Report, para.124.
- ⁹ Ibid. para.120.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. para.122.
- ¹¹ EU General Affairs Council Police Capabilities Commitment Conference Declaration, Brussels, 19 November, 2001.
- ¹² As of January 2001.
- ¹³ Lindh A. and Tuomioja E., *Katastrofbjälöp duger inte*, Dagens Nyheter, 30 april 2000.
- ¹⁴ Mani, R., "Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, Rule of Law and Post Conflict Peacebuilding" in Holm T.T. and Eide E.B., *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, Frank Cass, London, 2000.
- ¹⁵ Holm T.T. and Eide E.B., *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, Frank Cass, London, 2000.
- ¹⁶ Brahimi Report, para.225.

Planning for Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

The UN Secretary-General has recently enumerated three key objectives, the fulfillment of which have often engendered successful, comprehensive peace-building: (a) consolidating internal and external security; (b) strengthening political institutions and good governance; and (c) promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation. A comprehensive programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is critical to all three of these objectives.

Ambassador Peggy Mason
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

I. Introduction

1. An effective process for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DD&R) is one of the key challenges of modern peace operations. DD&R was the subject of presentations and discussion at the May 2000 Carlisle and August 2001 Buenos Aires Seminars in the series: "Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century." It was also part of wider discussions at several other Challenges seminars.

2. Given the importance of DD&R for a sustainable peace, and the breadth of its related experience, the United Nations in December 1999 issued a publication entitled. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines."¹ The objective was to capture, in the form of guiding principles and best practices, the hard-learned lessons of some 14 United Nations post-Cold War peace operations and several national experiences in planning, and implementing efforts to disarm, demobilize and facilitate the entry or re-entry of former combatants into civilian life. The result is a document that provides practical guidance on the development, implementation and monitoring of DD&R, using an integrated approach to planning and implementation.

3. Since that time, the United Nations, regional organizations involved in peace operations and the international community in general have continued to refine their understanding of the importance of, and the requirements for, successful DD&R programmes in post-conflict environments. Building on this wealth of experience and relating it to current developments in the "post-Brahimi Report"² context of landmark reforms to improve the efficiency of United Nations peace operations, this chapter does the following: Section II makes the case for a comprehensive and integrated DD&R Plan; Sections III to VIII address core challenges to

its development and implementation; Section IX concludes with a series of recommendations on (1) “selling” the need for a comprehensive and integrated DD&R plan; (2) developing the capacity to do integrated DD&R planning and (3) building donor support for long term funding of post-conflict peace-building.

II. The Need for a Comprehensive and Integrated DD&R Plan

Several of the United Nations system staff who were interviewed focused on the temptation to plan DD & R operations as external interventions, rather than programmes in support of national institutions. This made it even more important to quickly develop a robust analytical and planning capacity at the country level.

UNDP Backgrounder on
DD&R, June 2000

4. Post-conflict demobilization is usually defined as the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Demobilization typically involves the assembly, disarmament, encampment, administrative processing, pre-discharge orientation and discharge of former combatants, who may then receive some form of compensation package and/or assistance programme. In parallel with, or subsequent to, the demobilization process, there is often the creation of a unified national defence force composed of an agreed percentage of former members of the government and opposition forces. The disarmament aspect of the demobilization process involves the collection, control and disposal – preferably through destruction – of small arms and light and heavy weapons and related materiel of the former combatants, and in many cases of the general population as well, as the development of responsible arms management programmes. Reintegration programmes are an essential concomitant of a successful demobilization effort and refer to programmes of cash or, preferably, of in-kind compensation, training and income generation meant to increase the potential for the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families.³ A growing aspect of reintegration comprises efforts to promote both individual and societal reconciliation and democratization.

5. Following the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of a peace agreement between the parties, attention will initially be focused on the implementation of measures to consolidate the peace at this early, sensitive and fragile stage. Failure to disarm and demobilize in a timely manner may lead to an immediate relapse into war or preserve the military option for the losing side in the election arena. As suggested at the Tokyo seminar by Brigadier General Zia, delays in logistical support in turn frequently delayed disarmament operations undertaken by UNOSOM II in Somalia, which ultimately contributed to the tragic and high number of casualties suffered by troop contributing countries (TCCs).

6. Incomplete reintegration creates both short and longer-term security problems. High numbers of unemployed former combatants are a constant threat to the peace implementation process and, over the longer term, may contribute to unacceptable levels of armed criminality and the dispersal of weapons and instability to neighbouring countries. At a minimum, the society may be deprived of the loss of productive inputs from a significant portion of its citizens, thus impeding development and possibly laying the basis for future social unrest. On the other hand, when properly planned, resourced and implemented using a comprehensive and integrated approach, DD&R can be an important instrument in the overall rebuilding of a post-conflict society.

7. The very first phase of the DD&R process involves the assembly and disarmament of the ex-combatants to be demobilized. This in turn necessitates a determination of how many of which forces will be formally demobilized. Is there a need for a certain percentage of the former factional forces to be integrated into a new unified national defence force and, if so, how and when will this take place? In addition to those in the formal demobilization process, who else will be disarmed, where and how? Who will monitor, implement and verify the disarmament process? What will be the disposition of the weapons and who will provide the security for the disarmed ex-combatants while they are encamped and once they are discharged? Who will provide food, shelter, medical and other essential needs while they are encamped? What about their families who, in the case of opposition forces will in all likelihood be travelling with them? What about the special needs of vulnerable groups, particularly child fighters, female combatants, the injured and the disabled? Reintegration programmes seek to prepare the ex-combatant for a productive civilian life. How are his/her capacities and needs to be assessed and desires and aspirations taken into account? Where will the retraining or income generation programmes take place and by whom? Will they be targeted only at ex-combatants or involve the wider community? And beyond economic reintegration, what about the social, political and psychological reintegration of the ex-combatant? Given the degree of attitudinal adjustment required by both the ex-combatant and the civilian population he/she seeks to rejoin, what can be done to offset local opposition and resentment and to engender, instead, support and cooperation?

8. Post-conflict DD&R is a politically, institutionally, technically and logistically complex and sensitive process, demanding considerable human and financial resources to plan, implement and monitor its various components. Given the diversity of actors involved in the different stages of the process, the inter-relation of these phases and their dependence, in turn, on related aspects of the broader peace implementation plan, the requirement for integrated planning and effective coordination is particularly acute. DD&R should be designed, planned and implemented as part of the overall national post-conflict recovery strategy. For successful post-conflict peace-building, the peace implementation process will, optimally, reflect what the Secretary-General calls “comprehensive peace-building”. That is, a broad

scheme for post-conflict reconstruction and reform of political, social and economic institutions and processes. From this perspective, disarmament, demobilization and the creation of a professional, unified, representative national defence force are important components of the reform of the state security apparatus (military, police and judicial/penal system), in furtherance of a broader process of democratization. Similarly, the reintegration into civilian life of ex-combatants should be planned and implemented within the overall reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation strategy; that is, as part of the first stages of the national post-conflict development plan.

9. At this point it is useful to comment on the apparent diversity of terminology used to describe the reintegration function. Dr. Mendelson-Forman spoke at the Carlisle seminar about “DDRR”, with “reconciliation” added as the second “R”. The Secretary-General, for his part, has recently added two new “R’s”, referring in his October 2001 report to the Security Council on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), to the “disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration” of ex-combatants.⁴ In fact, all of these tasks are included in the concept of DD&R discussed above and in the UN Guidelines of December 1999. The desire to include in the title itself more and more sub-components, particularly of the reintegration process, reflects increased knowledge of the many aspects involved and a growing appreciation of the importance of *each* of them.

10. The disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants should take place in the earliest stages of the peace implementation process and reintegration programmes need to be ready when discharged former combatants arrive at their intended settlement areas. Every effort should therefore be made to develop a comprehensive DD&R Plan during the peace negotiations with a view to having it incorporated into the peace agreement. At a minimum, the main components of the plan should be agreed together with the appropriate mechanisms for its finalization after the peace accord has been signed, for its implementation, coordination and monitoring and for making adjustments to previously agreed elements when necessary. To this end, and particularly in light of the monitoring and verification demands of the disarmament and demobilization phases, it is essential that there be as early involvement as possible in the negotiating process by UN negotiators supported by technical experts skilled in the demands of a comprehensive DD&R Plan.

11. Adequate DD&R planning has as its objective the development of a comprehensive DD&R Plan, based on all necessary inputs from all relevant actors that is, optimally, completed during the peace negotiation process and then fully reflected in the peace agreement and in the mandate and budget(s) of the implementing authority. Such a process demands:

- a. timely recognition by all necessary actors of the need for a comprehensive and integrated DD&R Plan;

- b. the necessary resources – human, materiel and financial – to develop and implement it;
- c. the necessary information inputs to develop, evaluate, adjust and “sell” the Plan; and
- d. coordination mechanisms to ensure the plan’s internal coherence and its congruence with the overall post-conflict recovery strategy on which its ultimate success depends.

These are the core challenges that must be successfully addressed for effective DD&R.

III. Timely “Buy-in” to DD&R Planning

Disarmament was the end of the DD&R process in Liberia. There was no demobilization and no reintegration. There were several thousand former combatants on the streets of Monrovia. How can these former combatants be kept from rearming when all the promises that were made in DD&R are not forthcoming?

Colonel Thomas Dempsey
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

12. Despite the longstanding efforts both within and without the UN system to develop best practices in the area of DD&R, there remains a wide gap between lessons learned and lessons applied, between theory and practice. Key actors – whether they be the parties themselves, the diplomats and military advisors facilitating the peace negotiation process, the humanitarian actors providing emergency relief on the ground or the donor community considering the level of funding it might provide for post-conflict peacebuilding – remain unaware of some of the most fundamental requirements for successful DD&R and, indeed, for successful comprehensive peacekeeping in general. In the peace process following the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the UN was not a facilitator although it was to have a substantial role in monitoring and verifying many aspects of the resulting Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.⁵ While the Security Council encourages “...all States and international organizations to support the peace process through, *inter alia*, assistance to facilitate sustainable reintegration of demobilized soldiers,”⁶ the mandate for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) makes no mention of DD&R.⁷ Apparently, the parties felt strongly that, as sovereign states rather than different factions in a civil war, each should independently develop and implement its own national programme. Had a UN negotiator familiar with key elements of a generic DD&R plan been present, he/she might well have been able to convince the parties of the benefits of reciprocal monitoring of each national demobilization effort with the assistance of independent third party observers. Such an approach enables each side to demonstrate compliance with its stated commitments and helps avoid the kind of mistrust and unfounded allegations that apparently arose in the initial stages of the peace implementation process.

13. Nowhere is the tendency to adopt a piecemeal approach more evident than in relation to the disarmament and weapons management aspects of DD&R. Despite the mountain of evidence that peace will not be sustainable if there is not substantial disarmament of ex-combatants, and equally effective means found to collect military-style weapons dispersed in the public at large through a credible, effective process for identifying, collecting and disposing of the weapons in their hands, there is still a propensity to view disarmament merely as a bargaining chip or a confidence builder. As a bargaining chip, meaningful disarmament is traded away as the inevitable price of the deal. Disarmament as a confidence-building measure appears to be based on the premise that even token or symbolic disarmament is enough to indicate the sincerity of the parties. During the Buenos Aires seminar, Ambassador Brahimi drew attention to the Macedonian situation. There an agreement had been reached for NATO soldiers to spend just 30 days picking up weapons relinquished by ethnic Albanian guerrillas and dropped at designated checkpoints to be taken out of the country for destruction. The process was invariably dubbed in the media as an essentially “political” or confidence-building process with the public disagreement of the government and the armed factions over the numbers of weapons held by the rebels dismissed as a rhetorical argument “since all groups could easily obtain new ones.”⁸ At the same time, press accounts also indicated that the Macedonian public certainly believed *actual* disarmament was essential.

14. Ambassador Mason in her Buenos Aires presentation observed that the tendency initially - and alas, recently too, judging from the Macedonian example - was to look at disarmament only in confidence-building terms. Enough disarmament was required to ‘get the demobilization process going’, without much attention paid to how many weapons were actually turned in or to their quality. Even less emphasis was placed on weapons dispersed in the general public. In planning the disarmament of demobilizing fighters, no serious effort was made to secure the parties’ agreement to the provision of detailed information on numbers, types and locations of weapons, to be supplemented by independent information sources and procedures for monitoring, verification and data reconciliation. A serious disarmament process must also include an effort to limit the introduction of new weapons into the territory and, indeed, border controls have been part and parcel of the major disarmament effort by the regional implementation force, KFOR in neighbouring Kosovo. Even in that case, however, the disarmament agreement that NATO initially negotiated with the rebel group did not provide for the destruction of the weapons collected, leaving KFOR with an ever-increasing security problem and manpower drain in guarding storage depots. The UN Guidelines place considerable emphasis on the disposition through destruction of collected weapons,⁹ building on the lessons of UN missions in Mozambique, Somalia and Liberia. In this regard, it is to be noted that KFOR, in its second year, began to destroy not just store the weapons it had collected and/or confiscated.

15. This is not to minimize the difficulties in negotiating an effective disarmament plan. Substantial, as opposed to symbolic, disarmament is the end of the military option and, as such, goes to the heart of the parties' commitment to the peace process. Even if a party genuinely desires peace, they may fear the other side does not and will require a credible guarantor of their security both during and after the disarmament process. Here too significant gains in understanding have been made since the Angola debacle where UNAVEM II lacked the resources to provide a secure environment to demobilizing soldiers both inside and outside the encampments. The security challenge is now increasingly being met by the mandating of military forces to implement disarmament of the ex-combatants and/or to provide protection/stability/security in the encampment phase. With respect to the security requirements post-discharge, considerable attention is now being focused on the essential role of the civilian police and, in turn, of the entire judicial/penal system necessary for their effective functioning, what is described in Chapter 9 – Police – In the Service of Peace as “the whole legal chain.”

16. Returning to the Macedonian situation, it will be argued that this was the best that could be negotiated in the circumstances, and that a measure of stabilization *was* achieved. It is hard not to wonder what would have happened, however, if the international community in the form of NATO, brought in to implement the disarmament deal, had not insisted that it would do so only if the process was a credible one. But a credible process means a substantial one with obvious implications for resources and duration of implementation. It seems clear that at least part of the reason for the very narrow approach to disarmament accepted by NATO in Macedonia was the extreme reluctance of its Member States to commit themselves and their forces to the kind of substantial peace implementation process in which it was already involved in Bosnia and Kosovo. While the result was to help stabilize the situation in the short term, new measures and new commitments had to be undertaken by NATO almost immediately, to avoid a further deterioration in the security situation. Was an opportunity lost by taking such a narrow approach to disarmament? If the time is not ripe for a comprehensive solution or, if the international community is only willing or able to commit to limited assistance, then it should endeavour to do so in a manner that is at least supportive of, not counter-productive to, the longer term solutions that will ultimately be required. In practical terms, this would mean that any agreement on partial disarmament measures as a means to build trust between the parties should be explicitly tied to a longer term process of negotiation of more comprehensive disarmament and weapons management measures.

IV. The Resource Challenge

The biggest failure, as demonstrated in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, has been making the transition from a disarmament process to a demobilization and reintegration process. There are several factors that contributed to this failure: First was the tendency for planners to grossly under-resource the demobilization and reintegration portion of the process.

Colonel Thomas Dempsey
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

17. Significant human, materiel and financial resources are required to develop and implement a comprehensive DD&R Plan. The five main components of a generic DD&R plan are:
- a. the demobilization of all forces not going into the unified national defence force;
 - b. the weapons management programme including disarmament of the demobilizing forces, of irregulars and of the general public;
 - c. the creation of a unified national defence force;
 - d. the reintegration of ex-combatants; and
 - e. the DD&R public information, sensitization and reconciliation plan.

Specialist expertise is required with respect to each of these dimensions. Planning of the military aspects requires expertise in such areas as weapons collection and destruction (including specialist knowledge in relation to explosive ordnance), arms embargo enforcement, as well as in the security requirements during the assembly and encampment phases of the demobilization process. Related technical and materiel requirements include destruction equipment and data management systems and programmers to track weapons collection and disposition and to reconcile these numbers with base line data. In addition to the provision of basic needs (food, shelter, medical care) during the assembly and encampment phases, specialist humanitarian expertise will be required to plan for the specific needs of child fighters, and other vulnerable groups including female combatants, the disabled, substance-addicted ex-combatants and those with acute or chronic medical problems such as HIV-AIDS. Expertise in the large-scale movement of peoples will be required to plan the transport of demobilized fighters to their place of intended resettlement.

18. Demobilization involves detailed registration procedures to identify the ex-combatant and verify his or her military service as well as to screen for war criminals. Information will also need to be recorded on accompanying and non-accompanying family members including the possible need for family tracing. Planning for reintegration requires the establishment of baselines through a preliminary assessment of the needs and capacities of the ex-combatants, to be matched against a detailed assessment at the time of encampment. The scope of the proposed programme of training and income generation projects must be determined together

with the development of priorities, goals and time frames. The extent of institutional, financial, socio-economic and cultural constraints on potential programme components must be assessed. An institutional framework for the delivery of the programme including national, regional and local oversight, and field structures must be developed. Guidelines for reintegration programme design must be developed including mechanisms for implementation oversight and coordination, ongoing monitoring, evaluation and adjustment. Here too, appropriate data management systems and qualified programmers will be essential.

19. An extremely important dimension of reintegration programming is the social, political and psychological reintegration of the ex-combatant. Expertise is needed to ensure that the DD&R Plan systematically addresses this dimension and its equally important corollary in the attitude of the communities with whom the ex-combatants seek to live and work. Particularly important in this regard is the pre-discharge orientation programme for the ex-combatants and their families (which should include, in addition to the details of discharge benefits and community-based reintegration programmes and other support services, civic education components) and the public information, sensitization and reconciliation programme. The latter programme should not only provide basic information on the content of the DD&R programme and the requirements for accessing it, but should also convey to the general public the rationale for the programme and the intended benefits for target communities and society at large. Planning for the public information programme must also include the development of mechanisms to obtain information, sensitization and reconciliation inputs for each of the main components of the DD&R Plan from all relevant sources, including target groups and civil society broadly defined. Active involvement from local community groups and women's organizations in the development of the information plan is a pre-requisite for mobilizing broad support for its key messages. Implementation mechanisms at the national, regional and local level, must also be developed with due regard for local capacity building efforts in relation to an independent media. Growing recognition of the importance of the public information dimension to the peace operation as a whole is reflected in the Brahimi Report and in the subsequent decision by the Secretary-General to include a representative of the Department of Public Information in the new integrated mission planning structures now being implemented in the UN Secretariat.

20. The sheer breadth of the expertise required and the funding to underpin it makes the resource challenge an extremely difficult one to adequately address. Given the scope of a comprehensive DD&R programme, its funding will require substantial involvement of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the donor community. While considerable progress has been made over the past few years in securing World Bank involvement in both the DD&R planning and implementation phases, problems still persist. The Bank's continuing inability to address its serious lack of expertise on the military dimensions of security sector reform, its insistence

on a statutory impediment to the funding of the disarmament component of DD&R¹⁰ and the apparent disarray of the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Unit, established in 1998 as a central agency mechanism to lead the Bank's efforts on post-conflict demobilization and reintegration efforts – all have hampered the Bank's ability to play its full role. The decision to prioritize security sector reform – one taken by the British Department responsible for overseas development assistance in a groundbreaking approach announced in March 1999 – was just the beginning of a major task. In the words of Rocky Williams at the Pretoria seminar, “Considerable political, practical, conceptual and strategic work still needs to be done on security sector reform before a fully fleshed out and sufficiently flexible approach can be developed.”

21. The bilateral donor community, with a few notable exceptions such as the Netherlands and the UK, has also been loathe to divert significant development funds to the risky business of post-conflict activities, particularly to those with a heavy military component. Getting *early* buy-in from donors for DD&R planning is especially difficult. Typically, they want to see tangible signs that the plan will succeed before committing themselves, leading to a kind of ‘catch-22 position’ where donors will not commit the funds necessary to develop a ‘winning’ plan until they have been convinced that the plan will be successful. Donor reticence makes it especially difficult to use a credible DD&R process as a tangible incentive to help end the conflict and bring the parties to a lasting settlement.

22. Even more problematic from the donor's perspective is that a commitment to funding the development of a comprehensive DD&R plan inevitably implies that the donor is in for the long haul and will commit significant funds to its implementation, within an overall framework that leaves the donor with less room for independent maneuver than is generally preferred. The dislike of most bilateral donors to being ‘coordinated’ by an external agency is possibly second only to their neuralgia for their national contribution being ‘buried’ in a multidonor project. Most prefer to ‘show the flag’ on a range of individual, high profile, endeavours. Sierra Leone provides the positive example of sufficient bilateral donor assistance to enable the establishment of demobilization camps, based on a national DD&R Plan, while the conflict still raged. Yet, even as the merit of this approach was proven and more and more rebel fighters sought to trade weapons for training, the United Nations was forced to issue one appeal to donors after another for the funds to keep the programme going.¹¹

23. The continuing problem of inadequate resources for DD&R implementation led authors of the Brahimi Report to make some far reaching proposals for their potential funding out of the assessed contribution of Member States for peace operations, through the inclusion of DD&R provisions in the mandate and budget of complex peace operations in their first phase.¹² This is a bold recommendation, tackling head on the problem of divided jurisdiction that has plagued UN efforts to

implement comprehensive solutions. Starting from the premise that “effective peace-building is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict,” the Brahimi Report proposes the logical next step – that the UN mission be given the means to effectively coordinate all aspects of one such hybrid activity – post-conflict DD&R.¹³

24. The Secretary-General in his first report on the response of the UN Organization to the proposals of the Brahimi Report, wholeheartedly endorsed this approach and indicated his intention to “...include comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes” in his plans for future missions.¹⁴ Perhaps more surprising has been the generally very positive response to this proposal by the other ‘target’ audiences within the UN system including the Security Council, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and the General Assembly.¹⁵ Most recently, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons – agreed by consensus in July 2001 – strongly endorses the integrated DD&R budget approach.¹⁶ As of January 2002, the Secretary-General had not yet had the opportunity to propose such an integrated budget, as there having been no new operations established since December 2000.¹⁷ In the meantime, the acute problems of DD&R funding continue in respect of existing missions, to the extent that the Secretary-General is seeking to limit the DD&R role for MONUC to one of coordination only. For the host of practical tasks associated with the full DD&R process, MONUC “will need to rely on United Nations programmes and agencies, the World Bank and non-governmental organizations.”¹⁸

V. Information Inputs to the DD&R Plan

The estimate of weapons to be collected [in Liberia] was over 60,000. The UN, before they left, had collected between 30,000 and 40,000 weapons, which led some to question exactly how many weapons there were in the first place. What is the measure of success and how do we know that we have gotten most of the weapons?

Dr. Dennis Skocz
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

25. The DD&R planning process is heavily dependent on a variety of very specific information inputs. The numbers, types and locations of forces and their armaments (including stockpiles, depots, and weapons caches) are needed as the baseline data for DD&R planning. The foundation of the DD&R process is the obligation of the parties to provide such inventories or declarations and their willingness to do so is potent evidence of their commitment to the peace process. Even the most committed parties, however, will not be ready, in the pre-implementation period, to divulge sensitive information directly relevant to the security of their forces. Thus, throughout the planning process, the UN negotiators need reliable and independent sources of information, from their own technical reconnaissance – for ex-

ample, from United Nations military observers (UNMOs) monitoring an interim cease-fire agreement or as part of an Integrated Technical Mission (discussed *infra*) – and from liaison with sources on the ground including local elders and community leaders. Reintegration planners need information on the skills, aptitudes, intentions and expectations of the target groups for demobilization. The creation of a unified defence force also requires reliable information on the service records and capabilities of potential candidates and their willingness to join the new force, rather than demobilize. Such information can be garnered only through detailed surveys and assessments of the combatants to be demobilized or transferred to the new unified force, and these in turn can only realistically be undertaken at the encampment or barracks stage (that is, at the beginning of the demobilization implementation process).

26. A central challenge of the DD&R planning process is to devise procedures for the orderly screening and assessment of former combatants at the time of assembly and encampment, based on the acquisition of sufficient information *prior* to the beginning of the implementation process to support advanced planning. The key is information from the parties, including local commanders and from as many local sources on the ground as possible, for example, communities from which opposition forces originate so profiles of agrarian, urban or other backgrounds and skills and levels of education can be made. An indispensable tool for gathering this information is an Integrated Technical Mission dispatched to the field with representation from all parts of the UN system engaged in the DD&R planning.

27. In the earlier discussion on the types of expertise necessary for DD&R planning, reference was made to the importance of broad-based information inputs to the DD&R public information, sensitization and reconciliation plan. It is particularly important that information on the rationale and objectives of the DD&R programme reflects local needs and concerns. To this end, attention must be paid to both local capacity building and the development of coordination mechanisms to permit wide participation from the local through to the national levels.

VI. Coordination Mechanisms for Integrated Planning

To achieve ‘unity of purpose’ in support of the mandate requires an integrated approach, particularly from the leadership.

Major General Timothy Ford
Military Adviser, UNDPKO
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

28. Integrated planning requires coordination mechanisms to bring together all necessary participants, from external facilitators to the parties themselves, to local actors at the community level, and to ensure that the interdependent phases and components of DD&R interact appropriately, particularly in respect of timing.

29. As discussed at the Delhi Seminar there are three basic types of coordination mechanisms for the development of a coherent, integrated DD&R plan: the headquarters planning mechanism for the external partners led by the UN, the national planning mechanism (in situations where there is a functioning government able to take on this task) and the joint planning mechanisms including the parties and external facilitators. These latter bodies are typically called joint working groups and they allow the various parties to the conflict to have direct input into the development of the DD&R Plan.

30. The Brahimi Report made a number of recommendations to improve the capacity of the UN to plan and implement peace-building activities: that is, activities that are essentially a “hybrid” of political and development activities, such as DD&R (which, as noted earlier, was also singled out for special attention in regards to its funding). These recommendations relate to (1) the identification of UN planning and implementation focal points – the Department of Political Affairs and the UN Development Programme respectively and (2) the improvement of the UN’s capacity for integrated planning and mission support through the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept. The bulk of these recommendations received the necessary support within the UN, that is, from the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the Security Council, the General Assembly and, to a lesser extent, in the all important financial sub-committee of the Fifth Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The effect of the IMTF concept, in relation to DD&R planning, is that it brings together at UN Headquarters under the Executive Committee on Peace and Security with the DPKO and DPA leading (para. 50, A/55/502), *all* necessary UN system actors, in planning mode, once the possibility of a UN peace-keeping mission is in the offing.¹⁹

31. The Secretary-General, in his first report on the implementation of the Brahimi recommendations, also made the point that this mechanism will apply not only to the planning of new peace operations, but may also be instituted for support to peacemaking efforts, in which it is envisaged that the conclusion of a peace agreement would result in the deployment of a United Nations peace operation (para. 58, A/55/502). In paragraph 59 of that report, the Secretary-General emphasized the need for the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and IMF) to participate in the integrated mission task force structure and, indicated that, to this end, he would be inviting them to participate. Finally, he noted that coordination in support of peace operations was required even where there was no integrated mission task force in existence, in which case the lead departments (DPKO for peace-keeping operations and DPA for peacemaking and peace-building missions) would be responsible for coordination with all the relevant departments, agencies, funds and programmes. In his second implementation report (A/55/977), the Secretary-General was able to offer examples of both a modified IMTF established to help the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor plan for the next phase of longer term peace-building and a number of “joint working groups”, that is, Headquar-

ters coordination mechanisms in support of DPA peacemaking efforts in Burundi and West Africa. Further examples were provided in his 2001 Report on the Work of the Organization. The UN now has in place a solid mechanism for the establishment of an inclusive DD&R planning group of UN actors and the Bretton Woods institutions during the negotiating phase.

32. To this must be added the field structure. During the negotiation, the parties will be represented in joint working groups on the various aspects of the peace agreement, with UN chairmanship of many of them if the UN is facilitating the peace negotiation. Typically, there will be working groups addressing military and security issues, humanitarian relief and post-conflict peace-building activities. The DD&R plan comprises elements in each of these broad categories. It is essential that there be a DD&R joint working group with each of the parties adequately represented and that this working group be linked (through its head) to the joint working group developing the overall national recovery plan and with a representative on, or liaison with, each of the other working groups that will be addressing elements of, or responsible for inputs on, components of, the DD&R plan. For example, the Military/Security Working Group is likely to be asked to prepare, or at least review, the disarmament plan for ex-combatants and for the weapons collection involving the general public. Similarly, there will need to be close interaction between those developing the reconciliation measures for ex-combatants and the working group focussing on how best to achieve a balance between the peace and justice imperatives for the post-conflict society as a whole. Perhaps the most difficult challenge is to ensure the necessary congruence between the design of the reintegration programme for ex-combatants and the overall post-conflict development priorities and objectives. In each of these areas, external expertise and assistance will likely be needed and one role of the Headquarters Joint DD&R Working Group will be to help ensure it is available during the negotiations.

33. Equally important will be to ensure that local inputs are not limited to the high political and military leaders. Local commanders can provide much needed information and help secure the cooperation of the rank and file fighters under their control. The field structure for reintegration planning must link up to the communities where the bulk of the retraining and income generation programmes will ultimately take place. In the words of a UNDP background paper on DD&R: “Only by working closely with the factions and institutions on the ground...can support be structured and tailored to meet the real needs and match the real capacities of the main protagonists in the peace process.”²⁰ The paper goes on to emphasize that civil society institutions should not be neglected in this process. In order to reach a broad cross-section of national society, the joint working groups should be informed by a variety of broad-based consultative mechanisms. Even the working group focussing on such fundamental military matters as the creation of a new unified national defence force will need to have a civil-military relations dimension reflected in its composition and output.

34. Despite this impressive architecture, a main source of funding, the bilateral donor community, is not part of the formal UN planning process and chooses on an *ad hoc* basis how to interact with specific field structures. The many difficulties in convincing bilateral donors to fund the development of a comprehensive and integrated DD&R plan, and therefore to participate in coordinated planning to this end, have been discussed earlier under the Resources Challenge. As stressed both at the Carlisle and Buenos Aires seminars, experience suggests that donors tend to be more willing to coordinate closely in respect of the encampment phase of DD&R, especially if there is a good UN lead on the ground (e.g. UNDP in MINUGUA). It is with respect to the post-discharge reintegration process that they are least willing to coordinate. And even with respect to the UN actors, there are still ongoing problems with coordinating so many independent players; and each part of the system still jealously guards its prerogatives. The Secretary-General noted in his Second Implementation Report that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in reviewing his proposals for the working of the IMTFs had this to say:

86. The Special Committee recognized the importance of coordinating mechanisms in responding to complex challenges to peace and security, and was encouraged by the proposed creation, where appropriate, of integrated mission task forces. The Special Committee added that the **individual entities participating in the task forces would continue to be guided by their respective mandates, would be responsible to their governing bodies and should participate in the task forces without detriment to their core functions** (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 39). The Committee's recommendations in this regard have been fully noted and shall be adhered to whenever such task forces are formed.²¹ [emphasis added]

These comments constitute neither a ringing endorsement of the IMTF concept of integrated planning, nor an absolute bar to the establishment of such task forces. Instead, the issue is left to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

VII. The “Attitudinal Challenge”

No matter how well-prepared the mission is, the situation on the ground will be different than expected. There is a need to find the middle ground between trying to do too much and an unduly narrow view of the mandate. This is very hard and inevitably there will be unduly high expectations that need to be dampened.

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

35. While the problem of undue expectations is a general one for the Mission as a whole, it can be particularly acute for the ex-combatant. There is a tendency for many ex-combatants to see themselves as more deserving than others and therefore to merit special, even permanent entitlements. To help counter this predilection and to promote instead the view that the DD&R programme, and particularly its re-

training and civic education components, are a unique opportunity for the ex-combatant to acquire the necessary economic, social and political skills to function effectively as a private citizen, it is essential to begin with an inclusive DD&R planning process with mechanisms that include, not exclude, civil society.

36. Direct involvement of local women's groups in the development of the programmes and entitlements for ex-combatants not only helps get the social reintegration and local empowerment messages across to the ex-combatant but also to all of the military personnel involved in whatever capacity, including the international monitors and facilitators. In addition, it helps engender support from the community at large, rather than resentment over real or imagined special benefits and privileges. Such integrated planning is also likely to lead to integrated retraining programmes in the community, rather than separate programmes just for ex-combatants. Similarly, the planning of facilities for the encampment of ex-combatants should seek to identify possible benefits to local communities as was the case with the Lungi demobilization camp in Sierra Leone where the power generation capacity developed for the camp was also made available to the local community nearby. Bridging or quick impact projects for ex-combatants to help sustain them from the time of their military discharge to the onset of their community-level retraining, can also be planned so as to provide immediate benefit to needy local communities. Contrast this approach to that in Guatemala, cited by Mason in Buenos Aires, where the local community groups still had no idea what the DD&R benefits were, long after the reintegration phase had begun to be implemented. More unfortunate still was the tendency of the ex-combatants to exploit their exclusive relationship with the military observers in the UN mission who were charged with verifying the reintegration process by seeking their direct intercession for every complaint they had with their reintegration programming.

37. Integrated planning allows all those handling different aspects of the DD&R implementation process to understand clearly the desired overall end state, how they can contribute positively to it and how they can avoid pitfalls like the attitudinal one just described. In this regard, the development of a comprehensive public information, sensitization and reconciliation plan is not just the key vehicle for getting the message out to the ex-combatants and the locals but also an effective means of getting all the mission components to 'sing from the same song sheet'!

VIII. The Peace-Building Challenge

...the short-term reintegration offered through [DD&R]...programmes does not guarantee longer-term employment or other income generation, which depends on a revival of the economy.

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
Tenth Report on UNAMSIL, S/2001/627 of 25 June 2001

38. This chapter has proceeded from the premise that effective DD&R requires the development of a comprehensive plan, which is internally coherent and appropriately linked to the overall national recovery strategy, to which it can positively contribute and upon which it depends for its ultimate success. Recognition of this fundamental linkage brings with it a sobering new reality: even if the necessary funds are obtained to develop and begin to implement such a comprehensive DD&R Plan, this may well not be enough as the Sierra Leone case so graphically illustrates. What is also necessary, and infinitely harder to secure, is the funding for the broader reconstruction and longer term redevelopment, so as to lead to a functioning economy able to absorb ex-combatants and other war survivors alike.

39. This is what Ambassador Brahimi identified during the Buenos Aires seminar as *the* peace-building challenge and, to date, adequate funding has proven extremely difficult to sustain even in the European context to which major donors have directed more than a little attention. Typically, significant funds for immediate humanitarian relief are generated, at least while the media spotlight is on. As the situation stabilizes and the immediate crisis is past, interest and dollars wane even as opportunities for longer term development begin to emerge. Major bilateral development agencies in particular have failed to dedicate significant resources to long-term programmes in post-conflict environments. Their reluctance can be traced to decreasing national development assistance allotments, the risky nature of post-conflict peace-building, and a deep antipathy within the development community for direct involvement with the defence and public security establishments. All of the donor inhibitions cited earlier in respect of DD&R funding appear magnified even further when applied to the broader peace-building process. To this litany of difficulties must be added the vociferous opposition of many developing countries, in dire need but not in conflict, to the possibility of a major shift in donor funding to post-conflict situations. In their words, as noted in the margins of the Buenos Aires seminar, is there to be a ‘development assistance premium’ for killing one another?

40. The Secretary-General, in his *No exit without strategy* Report (S/2001/394 of 20 April 2001), identified “the weak link of voluntary funding” for programmes which are not part of the peace-keeping operation *per se*, but on which the ultimate success of the mission may depend, as a “critical hindrance” to the ability of the United Nations to implement successfully and efficiently a “long-term, multiphase

mandate approach” that is necessary if peace-keeping is to lead to a sustainable peace. Acknowledging “the inherent problem of moving major, long-term expenditures to assessed contributions”, as the Brahimi Report had urged at least for DD&R funding, he called upon the Security Council members to “exercise their influence to muster the requisite voluntary contributions in a timely manner.” At a minimum, then, the Secretary-General would surely like to see those members of the Council that are in a position to do so, lead by example.²²

IX. Recommendations

Joint military-civilian training is crucial to the effort of learning to work together.

Ambassador George Ward
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

41. Action is needed to sell the need for a comprehensive and integrated DD&R plan, and to develop the capacity to do integrated DD&R planning – two mutually reinforcing efforts – through a combination of training and education initiatives. Building donor support for adequate DD&R funding within the context of meaningful long term funding for post-conflict peace-building will require a variety of innovative steps and some much needed national leadership.

42. Lack of knowledge of the need for effective and timely DD&R planning, as well as lack of experience with what this approach entails, can begin to be overcome through increased DD&R joint training, for all partners in the DD&R process and built around the concept of a comprehensive and integrated DD&R Plan. This would include training for UN negotiators, for senior mission members and particularly for mission planners in the UN Secretariat and in the agencies, funds and programmes who will be called upon to participate in Joint Working Groups or Integrated Mission Task Forces. Given the lead role that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) often plays in DD&R implementation, relevant headquarters and field staff should be a primary target for training. Joint DD&R training programmes should also include negotiators and planners in regional conflict resolution organs such as the Conflict Management Unit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat. With respect to regional organizations with little or no security management infrastructure, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the intersessional peacekeeping seminars for that organization co-chaired by Canada, Japan and Malaysia, offer a possible training vehicle.

43. There is a particularly urgent need to increase DD&R planning and implementation expertise in the World Bank and, in this regard, peacekeeping troop contributing countries on the Bank’s Governing Council need to begin to pay much more attention to this aspect of the Bank’s work. This is a case where more internal

coherence among the economic, security and development sectors of national governments may provide a solid basis for a more concerted strategy among a group of interested states to help guide Bank policy in relation to security sector reform in general and DD&R planning and implementation in particular. If key States make it clear that these are important areas for the attention of this unique multilateral financial institution, the Bank may be inspired to redouble its efforts to develop the requisite expertise. Similarly, these States need to exert much greater efforts to convince their *own* respective international development agencies to participate in joint DD&R training programmes.

44. The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO should be the key player in the development and delivery of DD&R joint training. To this end, it should seek an updating by the Best Practices Unit (formerly the Lessons Learned Unit) of the UN Principles and Guidelines, to focus more directly on the development of a comprehensive DD&R Plan, to reflect the new planning structures at UN Headquarters and to include detailed check lists, other practical planning tools and an Annex of specific DD&R expertise at the international, regional and local levels. UN-led DD&R training activities will require robust support from national and international peacekeeping training centres and institutes that offer joint training for both civilian and military participants in modern peace operations. For a more detailed discussion on the issue, see Chapter 13 – Training and Education.

45. Much emphasis has been placed on local inputs into the development of the DD&R Plan. It follows that training of locals to enable them to fully participate in the planning and implementation processes must be given sufficient attention. The UNDP and peacekeeping training centres and institutes able to offer training in the field are the most likely vehicles for this type of training, perhaps assisted by the Mission Training Cells in the missions themselves. Consideration should be given to a dialogue with donor countries to support specific field training missions, particularly in situations, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a peace process is underway and a UN organization mission (MONUC) is in the field, seeking to coordinate the next steps with respect to the DD&R of ex-combatants.

46. Much work needs to be done with bilateral donors to secure their increased support for the funding of long-term peace-building. As discussed by Ms. Carin Norberg at the Pretoria seminar, the pioneering work of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a body that includes as members or observers all the major donor countries, is a promising beginning. Its 1997 *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development* have evolved into a network, self-described as the only international forum where conflict and peace-building experts from bilateral and multilateral development cooperation agencies define common approaches in support of peace.²³ In April 2001 agreement was reached on a Supplement to the Guidelines entitled

“Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners.” The following statement is made in the introduction to the Supplement:

Development agencies now accept the need to work in and on conflicts rather than around them, and make peace-building the main focus when dealing with conflict situations. This is a significant step toward long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts.²⁴

The problem is that this ‘significant step’ appears to have been taken by only a small group within most development agencies – those in their respective peace-building units – with the bulk of these agencies’ resources still being directed to more traditional development activities. Even the location of these new, post-Cold war entities within the humanitarian assistance funding envelope betrays their primary association with crisis management rather than long-term development. If peace-building really is to generate long-term engagement, then its primary advocates need to be ‘mainstreamed’ within development assistance agencies so that long term country assistance programming is the intended objective from the outset of conflict recovery efforts.

47. To fund long term peace-building countries need either to significantly increase their annual allocations to international development assistance or divert funds away from current programmes. The latter course would provoke an understandably negative reaction from the many needy countries not in conflict and might even contribute to increased instability in some of them – the proverbial example of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’. Some countries – led by the Nordics – have increased the percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on Official Development Assistance (ODA) beyond the 0.7 per cent to which developed countries committed themselves some years ago. Many more have decreased their annual spending, to the extent that foreign aid has fallen to 0.22 per cent of donor countries’ GDP – its smallest proportion since it was first institutionalized with the Marshall Plan in 1947.²⁵ What are the prospects, then, for beginning to reverse this dismal trend? The actions of the international donor community in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 provide some room for cautious optimism. In addition to the many declarations of intent to remain with Afghanistan for the long haul, there seems to be a growing awareness of the need for a fundamental recommitment to development assistance not just in one country or region but around the world. United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in a statement reflective of many other Foreign Ministers, went out of his way to make the link between foreign aid and national security: “USAID is an important part of our country’s foreign policy team. Its work is at the core of our engagement with the world...over the long-term, our foreign assistance programs are among our most powerful national security tool.”²⁶ What is needed now is for a core group of donor countries to lead an initiative based on the principles contained in the 1997 and 1999 DAC Conflict, Peace and Development Guidelines, with the objective of

operationalizing the professed commitment to long term engagement in post-conflict countries.

48. The following recommendations arise:

1. *There should be increased DD&R joint training for all partners in the DD&R process – training that is built around the concept of a comprehensive and integrated DD&R Plan. This should include training for UN negotiators, for senior mission members and particularly for mission planners in the UN Secretariat and in the agencies, funds and programmes who will be called upon to participate in Joint Working Groups or Integrated Mission Task Forces. UNDP planning and field staff should be a primary target for training, together with negotiators and planners in regional conflict resolution units.*
2. *There should be increased DD&R planning and implementation expertise in the World Bank and, in this regard, troop contributing countries represented on the Bank's Governing Council should begin to pay much more attention to this aspect of the Bank's work. Parallel to this process should be complementary efforts at the national level to educate bilateral development agencies on the resource requirements for effective DD&R planning and implementation.*
3. *The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO should be the key player in the development and delivery of DD&R joint training and, in this regard, the TES should consider an updating of the UN DD&R Principles and Guidelines. Particular attention should be paid to local empowerment and capacity building mechanisms to enable local participation in DD&R planning and implementation.*
4. *Member States should recognize the urgent need for the funding of long-term peace-building. To this end a core group of donor countries should lead an initiative based on the principles contained in the 1997 and 1999 DAC Conflict, Peace and Development Guidelines, with the objective of operationalizing the professed commitment to long-term engagement in post-conflict countries.*

Notes

¹ Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations, December 1999.

² Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000.

³ Cash programmes have generally been found to be much less effective than 'in kind' programmes such as the "weapons for development" model used in Albania.

⁴ Ninth Report of the Secretary-General, S/2001/970, Section VIII, subtitle and paragraph 59.

⁵ The UNMEE mandate is found in Security Council resolution 1320(2000). Note that the Secretary-General in paragraph 38 of his 'No exit without strategy' Report, S/2001/394 of 20 April 2001 identifies as the first specific lesson extracted from the experience of UN cooperation with regional organizations that "...those who will be responsible for implementing a peace agreement should be present during the negotiation phase."

⁶ S/Res/1369 (2001) of 14 September 2001.

⁷ S/Res/1320(2000) of 15 September 2000.

⁸ Bonnart F., *Macedonia Is Crucial, and NATO Should Get Ready to React*, International Herald Tribune, September 6, 2001.

⁹ UN Guidelines, *supra*. See para. 75 at p.48, and para. 96, 97 and 100 at pp.54-55. See also Annex C, Guide to Destruction Methodologies, at pp. 111-119.

¹⁰ See the terms of reference for the Unit by following the “Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction” link on the Site index for World Bank posted at <http://worldbank.org>.

¹¹ The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported appeals being issued on December 5 and 7, 2001 and January 10, 2002.

¹² Brahimi Report *supra*, para.47(c).

¹³ Brahimi Report *supra*, para.44.

¹⁴ The Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/502 of 20 October 2000, para. 26.

¹⁵ Security Council Resolution S/RES/1327(2000) of 13 November, Part VI, third para; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/C.4/55/6, para. 7 and General Assembly Resolution A/55/572 of 6 December 2000, para.1&2.

¹⁶ A/CONF.192/15 of 20 July 2001, Section II, paragraph 35.

¹⁷ Second report on Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/977 of 1 June 2000, Annex A, third item.

¹⁸ Ninth Report of the Secretary-General, *supra*, para.70.

¹⁹ See the membership of the integrated mission task force described in para. 53 and 54 of the Secretary-General’s implementation report, A/55/502 of 20 October 2000.

²⁰ Background paper drafted as Preparation for the ECHA DDR Working Group Paper: “Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of DDR of Former Combatants”, 6 June, 2000, pp. 7-8.

²¹ Cited *supra*.

²² See page 6, paragraph 32 of the Report, cited *supra*.

²³ Follow the “DAC Guidelines Online” link from the homepage posted at www.oecd.org.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵ See *Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an inclusive World Economy*, World Bank Research Report, posted at <http://econ.worldbank.org/prt/subpage.php?sp=2477>.

²⁶ From a statement made on 8 November 2001 at a 40th anniversary celebration of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Posted at www.usaid/about/anniversary.

Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel

Staff security is not a luxury. It is not an option. It is a necessity and an essential part of doing business.

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
in an address to UNHCR staff in Geneva after the
murder of UNHCR staff in West Timor September 2000

I. The Changing Threats to Safety and Security

1. For most of the UN's first forty years, the most effective guarantee of safety and security for UN peacekeepers and associated personnel in the field was the UN emblem itself – whether the UN flag, the 'Blue Beret', the UN arm badge, or the white painted vehicle. There were, regrettably, fatalities and casualties in the course of peacekeeping and other field operations, but nevertheless there was a general and widespread respect for the UN emblem that, for the most part, gave UN personnel a sense of protection.

2. In the 1990s, however, circumstances began to change. The nature of peacekeeping operations became more complex. The rise in the frequency of intra-state conflicts, often with more than two parties to the conflict, created more challenging situations. The increased involvement of armed factions and para-military forces, often ill-disciplined and under the leadership of warlords or others with no respect for UN or government authority, posed new dangers. The denial of food and humanitarian aid often became a war aim for one side or another, and deliveries of humanitarian assistance by the UN were sometimes perceived by one or more parties to the conflict as support to the 'enemy'. In addition to combat casualties, recent years have seen increased incidence of assaults, rapes, robberies, abductions and murders of civilian staff working in the field on behalf of the UN, NGO partners and organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières.

3. These and other factors have contributed significantly to a progressive weakening of the traditional respect for the UN emblem. The situation at present is that it is not possible any longer for UN personnel in the field to feel that they can safely rely on the UN emblem for protection. As the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly in October 2000, the current security management system was designed to meet the operational requirements of the United Nations system 20 years ago.¹ Between 1 January 1992 and 15 January 2002, 206 civilian staff lost

their lives in the service of the United Nations and some 240 staff members were taken hostage or kidnapped in 63 incidents since 1 January 1994. Even armed peacekeeping troops have been unable to protect themselves from being taken hostage in large numbers, as occurred in Bosnia in 1995, and more recently, as detainees in Sierra Leone.

4. There is a conceptual difference between ‘safety’ and ‘security’. The condition of ‘safety’ refers to the state of being safe from accident, injury or disease, whereas the condition of ‘security’ refers to the state of being protected from the threat of deliberate danger or act of violence. In other words, was the person killed or injured by a tropical disease or in a car accident? – or by a bullet or a landmine?

5. Threats to personal safety can arise at any time and in almost any place, whereas threats to personal security are more likely to be limited to circumstances of violence. As an issue, safety deserves much greater attention and emphasis at the management level than it has been given in the past: personnel who are safety conscious are likely to be more receptive to the constraints of security arrangements. Moreover, personnel are more likely to read guidance on safety, whereas many may not bother to read guidance on security. Managing one without the other is not enough, and managing them separately is likely to lead to gaps, conflicting instructions and confusion. An effective risk management system has to cover both. Some of the principal issues of safety and security were primarily explored at the Tokyo Seminar of the Challenges Project, in March 2001. The subject area was also discussed briefly at other seminars in the series.

II. Security and Safety Issues in the Field

...The militias are on their way and I am sure they will do their best to demolish this office. These guys act without thinking and can kill a human as easily as I kill mosquitos in my room. ... We sit here like bait, unarmed, waiting for the wave to hit. I am glad to be leaving this island for three weeks. I just hope I will be able to leave tomorrow. ...

Last email from Carlos Caceres
UNHCR officer in West Timor
before he and two UNHCR colleagues were hacked to death by a mob,
September 2000

6. For many reasons, providing security for personnel taking part in a UN peace operation is not easy. The personnel are multinational, multicultural and multi-disciplinary and the operation itself is usually faced with a multiplicity of situations: for example, in the case of the tragedy in West Timor in September 2000, the UNHCR personnel were at risk assisting refugees outside the geographical area covered by the UN peacekeeping operation. Separately, the conditions necessary for the successful implementation of the political mandate of a peace operation are of-

ten identical to the conditions for ensuring safety and security of personnel. Together with the fact that no two operations are ever the same, the task itself is a major challenge to management in the field and to individuals taking part. These factors underscore the need for the inclusion of security issues from the start of completely integrated planning of a peace operation.

7. The security management system of the UN provides for a senior designated official to be responsible for the security and safety of UN personnel, international and locally employed, and their dependants at a duty station. Professional security advisors are posted at more than 60 duty stations, with their positions funded through cost-sharing among the agencies concerned. With some 33 agencies and programmes in the UN family, not all of which will be participating in any one field mission, coordination with regard to security is achieved by placing their field representatives under the authority of the designated official. There is then a geographical allocation of area, under an area coordinator appointed to be in charge of security for each area, and urban areas are further broken down into zones, led by zone wardens for security.

8. The system and arrangements that are applicable when UN field personnel are taking part in a humanitarian mission where there is no peacekeeping operation are significantly different from a situation in which there is a military presence under a Force Commander and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In the former case, there will be unarmed civilians from a number of humanitarian agencies, each of which has its own programmatic instructions and guidance on safety and security under the coordination of the designated senior official. In the latter case there will always be a variety of civilian staff and probably civil police and unarmed military observers as well as troops; the mission's security plan must include them all as, when a peacekeeping operation is established, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations assumes the overall responsibility for security and the head of the mission, usually the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, is specifically charged with maintaining the safety and security of all military and civilian mission personnel.

9. Even then, there are three options. The head of the peacekeeping operation (PKO) may be responsible for the security issues of the entire mission, reporting to DPKO and the UN Security Coordinator (as in Kosovo); or for a certain part of the country (as in Georgia); or the head of the mission may not be the designated official, in which case he or she remains responsible for only the safety and security of the mission personnel, with an agency official retaining the responsibility for agency security matters.

10. A number of factors add to the complexity of the problem of ensuring security. One arises from the extent to which national intelligence organs are willing to share their national information on local threats and risks of violence. Another

arises from the fact that different military components of a PKO often have differing security arrangements and practices of their own, such as the number and nomenclature of security phases, with resultant problems in working with the UN's own security alert phase system. A third predicament is when humanitarian personnel are operating in an area outside the cover of UN military or police assistance and have to rely on the protection capabilities of the local police or army which may not always be provided or may be deliberately withheld. In such instances, a serious management decision has to be taken on whether to evacuate the UN personnel and halt the humanitarian assistance, or to continue the operation. In the latter case, the UN field personnel may be exposed to great risk with no protection whatsoever, as in West Timor in September 2000. Such decisions impose heavy responsibilities on the shoulders of managers in the field and at respective headquarters.

11. Other problems arise with regard to dependants, where there appears to be no consistent policy or, at least, an absence of strict implementation and at times enforcement. On some occasions, civilian staff may have been operating in an area for years, accompanied by their dependants, before the situation deteriorates and staff is instructed to repatriate their dependants. Alternatively, a PKO is established in an area that is declared to be a non-family mission area but some of the civilian staff may decide to be accompanied at private expense. In both cases, dependants may be unofficially in the mission area and cannot be ignored in the provision of evacuation or other security plans. Separately, if UN international and locally employed staff have to be evacuated, the question arises of the extent of mission responsibility for the dependants of local staff who themselves may be at risk if left behind. Yet further complications can occur if, during the process of implementing an evacuation, non-UN civilians from non-governmental organizations or from the media request evacuation assistance.

12. These circumstances illustrate the wide range of circumstances that complicate the difficulties of ensuring security and safety of personnel serving in the field. While some of them do not apply to the military components of a peace operation, as the military are subject to tighter discipline and control than civilians, there may be instances such as firefights or hostage-taking in which the security of military personnel is at high risk. In this regard, the seminar held in Tokyo in March 2001 was given detailed accounts of such situations by military participants in the PKOs in Somalia and, more recently, in Sierra Leone and East Timor and further comments on field security issues were offered by participants with NGO experience or service with UN Volunteers.

13. Seminar participants were given a description, by Brigadier Javed Zia of the Pakistan Army who had served as a member of UNOSOM, of a humanitarian mission that had become a large, multi-dimensional operation, which had later begun to spin out of control. He recounted details of a number of security incidents, in-

cluding ambushes by Somali militia and firefights. In the speaker's view, the lessons learned and recommendations were several. He underscored the need for a clear and practical mandate and criticized the midstream change of the mandate; emphasized the importance of correct timing of operations; noted the manner in which the rules of engagement (ROE) had been interpreted according to different interests and therefore he called for a uniform application of ROE; opined that there should have been clearer command and control and that UN Headquarters should not become involved in detailed operational planning; called for better training in urban warfare and better communications equipment; recommended the establishment of an intelligence centre in DPKO; and urged better media management by the UN, both locally and globally. He also recommended the creation of a dedicated force safety branch in the headquarters of each peacekeeping force, under the close command of the chief of staff and coordinating closely with other branches and local elements, as well as with the Office of the UN Security Coordinator.

14. Major Ganase Jaganathan, of the Malaysian Army, had been taken hostage in Sierra Leone by rebels in May 2000 when he was serving as an unarmed military observer in UNAMSIL. In the light of his experience, he was critical of the lack of action by armed peacekeepers who were present at the time of his abduction. His recommendation was that the rules of engagement set out in accordance with the PKO mandate needed to be well understood and then strictly adhered to by the peacekeepers. More robust action by the armed peacekeepers would, in his view have made the warring parties more cautious and his abduction less likely. He stressed that troops needed to be well-trained, deployed on schedule and committed to their task. He also felt that the military posts established in Sierra Leone were not supported well enough logistically. In the subsequent discussion, it was pointed out that it may have been the absence of a robust response that had saved his life, to which he replied that it had been the peacekeepers' initial inaction on the first day of the crisis that had served to encourage the rebels. This exchange underlined the significance of the existence and application of clear rules of engagement, as well as the importance of sound training and good command and control of peacekeepers who may find themselves in unpredictable situations where a false move could have a fatal outcome.

15. The UN handbook² entitled 'Security in the Field: Information for Staff Members of the UN System' contains a section on how to survive as a hostage, but it is interesting to note that when a show of hands was invited from the participants of the Tokyo seminar to indicate how many had seen the publication, only one hand was raised from participants who did not come from UN Headquarters, New York. The Challenges Project has since been informed that 175,000 copies of the handbook have been printed, in all six official languages of the UN.

16. After listing some of the security incidents during the East Timor peace operations (UNAMET, INTERFET and UNTAET), Major Bruce Oswald, Australian

Army, who had served in East Timor focused his remarks on the legal regime including the application of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, the relevant Security Council resolutions and the status of mission and status of forces agreements. From his experience in East Timor, his recommendations included the following: all states should be encouraged to ratify the Convention as soon as possible; status of forces or mission agreements signed with host governments should, at the very least, state and apply the principles of the convention; the UN itself should use every opportunity to reinforce the application of the Convention; an interim judicial system should be established when local law and order had broken down to facilitate punishment of offenders and thus contribute to safety; the Convention should also apply to peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council but not under UN command and control; and peacekeepers should be trained in their legal rights and obligations.

III. Actions at UN Headquarters

We send young people into the field, without security training and without communications and other equipment, and we expect them to do miracles. ...We say that the host government has the primary responsibility for security, but we send people to places where there is no host government, or where the government cannot even provide security for itself.

Under-Secretary-General Benon Sevan
United Nations Security Coordinator
Tokyo Seminar, March 2001

17. As security incidents, casualties and cases of hostage-taking have mounted in recent years, so too have the expressions of concern. UN staff and associated personnel have been finding themselves increasingly asked to serve in situations where security and safety are at best unreliable and sometimes virtually non-existent. Among the UN staff at large, throughout the UN family, there is a wide and growing concern that staff safety and security has always come a poor second to politics, finance and cumbersome and even conflicting procedures.

18. On numerous occasions, the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the UN Security Coordinator and, in connection with peacekeeping missions, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations have all drawn attention to the need for further resources and improvements to present inadequate arrangements. At the same time, steps have been taken to pay greater attention in the planning phases to security requirements, to identify and apply best practices, to improve both pre-mission and during-mission security training, and to promote better inter agency and civil-military cooperation and coordination.

19. Nevertheless, some improvements can be made only on the initiative of Member States. The mandates given by the Security Council are of prime impor-

tance in that sound mandates with proper forces and equipment could help to deter hostile threats in the first place. Financial resources are necessary to support training, appropriate staffing in DPKO and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator, and also for stockpiling security equipment. Troop contributors themselves should provide their troops with effective flak jackets and similar protective equipment.

20. With the help of the voluntary Trust Fund, as at 1 January 2002 security training had been given to more than 9,000 staff members, including those on five peacekeeping missions, and four training workshops had been held for 155 security officers. But up to the end of 2001 the financial resources made available from the UN regular budget and supplemented by cost-sharing with the UN agencies have been woefully inadequate. Too often Member States have expressed their support for improved safety and security measures, but very few have been forthcoming with the necessary funds. The result has been that personnel are often sent to the field inadequately trained and insufficiently equipped for the conditions and hazards that they may face, particularly in circumstances where the host government is unable to discharge its responsibility to provide security.

21. As at January 2002 the present incumbent of the position of UN Security Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Benon Sevan, also has other major responsibilities. At the seminar in Tokyo he repeated his view that the establishment of a full time UN Security Coordinator is long overdue. He also underlined the need to determine a clear line of authority and accountability in the management of security within the UN system, which at present does not exist due to the complex nature of the security challenges in various parts of the world and the perceived need by some UN agencies and programmes to have their own security arrangements for their personnel in the field.

22. In his report to the General Assembly (A/55/494 of 18 October 2000), the Secretary-General addressed many concerns regarding the security and safety issues and made specific proposals to professionalize the management of security within the UN system. However, these were not accepted in their entirety by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which, among other comments, declined to approve the appointment of a full time UN Security Coordinator at the Assistant Secretary-General level, asked for further details to support the request for additional field security posts, and recommended that the costs of the security management system should be included in the regular budget of the UN only upon a formal arrangement with the concerned agencies, funds and programmes for appropriate cost-sharing.³

23. In a further report to the General Assembly (A/56/469 of 15 October 2001) the Secretary-General reiterated his requests for significant strengthening of the security management system, including a full time Security Coordinator at the Assistant Secretary-General level and a major increase in staffing at headquarters and in

the field, and he described a proposed cost-sharing system among the organizations of the UN system.

IV. Consideration by the Security Council and the General Assembly

There should be nothing discretionary about the financing of staff security: it is neither a luxury nor a perk. It is something we owe those who are willing to serve humanity under the most challenging of circumstances.

Report of the Secretary-General
A/55/494 of 18 October 2000, para. 79.

24. The increased incidence of death, injury and hostage-taking has given rise to mounting concern on the part of UN personnel themselves, whether military, civilian police or civilians, faced with service in the field, on the part of the Secretary-General and his colleagues at senior management level in the UN system, and among Member States. The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel was adopted against the background of a dramatic increase in fatalities; it entered into force on 15 January 1999, but as yet has only 55 States parties (only one of which is a State in which humanitarian or peacekeeping missions are taking place under the auspices of the UN). Separately, in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 the General Assembly adopted resolutions 53/87, 54/192, 55/175 and 56/217 on the issue of safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel.

25. In February 2000, the Security Council addressed the issue of the 'Protection of UN personnel, associated personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones'. The Presidential statement issued on 11 February⁴ included the following:

The Security Council recognizes the importance of ... ensuring that all new and ongoing United Nations field operations include appropriate modalities for the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, and humanitarian personnel. ...

The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General to complete the process of conducting a general and comprehensive review of security in peacekeeping operations, with a view to elaborating and undertaking further specific and practical measures to increase the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, and humanitarian personnel.

The Security Council considers it important that a comprehensive security plan be developed for every peacekeeping and humanitarian operation and that, during early elaboration and implementation of that plan, Member States and the Secretariat cooperate fully in order to ensure, *inter alia*, an open and immediate exchange of information on security issues.

26. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has addressed the issue of safety and security of UN and associated personnel on a number of occasions. It has reaffirmed its position that “safety and security constitute integral elements of the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations” and that the elaboration “of a comprehensive security plan at the commencement of a peacekeeping operation is essential”.⁵ It was also the Committee that encouraged the holding of a seminar on safety and security of UN personnel in peacekeeping operations.⁶

27. In October 2000, the Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly his detailed report on safety and security of United Nations personnel in which he described the current security management system and its limitations.⁷ Working under an Under-Secretary-General who also had other responsibilities, the Office of the Security Coordinator consisted of nine Professional and four General Service staff. It carried a heavy load of duties embracing the coordination of security at 150 duty stations, covering 70,000 civilian staff members and their dependants. It operated on a cost-shared basis, funded by the organizations of the UN system. For the biennium 2000–2001, the Office’s budget amounted to approximately \$1 million for all security expenses.

28. As the Secretary-General pointedly remarked in his report, “the current level of staffing is clearly inadequate to meet the minimum requirements for the large number of staff assigned in all parts of the world.”⁸

29. In 1998, a trust fund for the security of staff members of the UN system was established to supplement funding from existing sources. As of 15 January 2002, contributions had been received from Argentina (\$100,000), Finland (\$102,000), Japan (\$2 million), Luxemburg (\$57,000), Monaco (\$433,500), Netherlands (\$102,000), Norway (\$100,000), Poland (\$20,000) and Sweden (\$190,000) with pledges or indications of intent also received from Canada and Senegal.

30. Following the Challenges seminar held in Tokyo in March 2001, the Government of Japan forwarded for the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council a brief summary of the important issues that arose from the seminar discussions.⁹

31. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations met in June 2001 and, among other considerations in its subsequent report, expressed its grave concern about the growing number of attacks and violence against United Nations and associated personnel.¹⁰ While welcoming the comprehensive review of security requirements in peacekeeping missions, the Committee remained seriously concerned about the apparent deficiencies in the current system. The Committee called on the Security Council to pay special attention to the security and safety aspect when considering the establishment of a new operation or change in peacekeeping mandates, and stated that the UN secretariat must consider the safety and security of

personnel in the mission planning phase of an operation. The Committee also underlined the importance of pre-mission training and in-the-field training, and the need to give adequate attention to the issue in the current efforts to standardize and evaluate peacekeeping training. Among its other recommendations, the Committee considered that the United Nations capacity to enhance the safety and security of UN and associated personnel should be strengthened both at Headquarters and in the field.

32. By its most recent resolution, 56/217 adopted on 21 December 2001, the General Assembly gave its approval to almost all the requests¹¹ of the Secretary-General and there is therefore every reason to expect that there will be major improvements in the safety and security of UN peacekeepers and associated personnel as the new staff arrangements are implemented.

V. Finding a Way Forward

UN missions have become more dangerous and member countries are not recognizing that this is the case and will continue to be the case. ... Many of the belligerents today are lawless warlords (who) do not respect UN troops as peacekeepers.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

33. There can be no illusions about the risks to those who take part in peace operations. While some situations may be relatively benign, the UN and associated personnel concerned are all trying to play their respective parts in restoring stability and peace to societies that have seen, and may continue to see, violent conflict. In addition to threats to their security, individuals may well find themselves in circumstances of poor living conditions, inadequate sanitation, tropical disease and other dangers to their health or well-being. For all these and more, the United Nations has a responsibility to provide as many safeguards as practicable, and the personnel involved have a right to expect maximum effort on their behalf by their senior officers, by their local managers, by the authorities at Headquarters, and not the least, by the Member States.

34. Given the wide range of circumstances, the mix of military, civilian and civil police from different countries and the multidisciplinary nature of peace operations, the provision of safety and security will always be a difficult task. In discharging that task, the Secretary-General, the UN Security Coordinator, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and all others in the security management system need all the help that can be afforded to them.

35. As described earlier, the systems and arrangements that are applied in humanitarian operations are often different from situations in which there is a peacekeeping force of soldiers and police as well as civilians. However, the threats and

dangers to safety and security are often common and so, in considering security improvements that might be made in peacekeeping operations, it is appropriate to bear in mind the experiences of humanitarian operations: some of the lessons learned and measures adopted in one, such as pre-mission security training, might be equally applicable in the other.

36. Improved coordination is needed between the Office of the Security Coordinator and DPKO, and between them and the senior managers responsible for security in UN agencies. To the extent that it is practicable, there may be merit in exploring joint training of staff in basic security and safety matters to enable staff to learn and understand the systems applicable among their colleagues. Security Training Teams visiting each mission in rotation to ensure that training is consistent and kept up to date can be valuable assets. Training could also be provided through a dedicated website which could, in addition, serve as a forum for debating issues such as the proposal for a force safety branch in each mission.

37. Separately, there will always be circumstances unique to each operation and so pre-deployment training, specific to each mission and again conducted in common as far as possible, should be given high priority. For troops, this is now recognized as being a national responsibility before contingent deployment. On arrival in the mission area, induction (sometimes called ‘orientation’) training covering administrative matters, current operations, mission skills and safety and health issues is given before deployment to places of duty. Such arrangements were first introduced in UNTAET, since when training cells have been established in UNMEE, UNAMSIL and MONUC. These training cells have been designed and conducted primarily by military personnel for military personnel, and a start has been made on organizing training cells for civilian staff and police. Such training is of fundamental importance to improving the safety and security of all personnel in a peace operation; it is important that it should be an integral part of the planning process and adequate resources should be provided in the budget. Subject to space requirements, there could also be value in offering the training to implementing partner NGOs.

38. Apart from practical training, there is much to be gained from information sharing not only at the practical level but also between the Secretariat and the Member States. The support of governments, politically and financially, for improvements to the security management system needs to be encouraged and the Secretariat should find an imaginative way to present the issues directly to the missions of the Member States in New York, Geneva and elsewhere to supplement the issuance of official reports and discussions in formal committee meetings. Training of security staff, for example, should be paid from the regular budget of the UN and should not depend on voluntary contributions drawn on the Trust Fund; this point needs the understanding and support of governments.

39. A further aspect of information sharing concerns the handling of public information and improving relations with local communities. Keeping local people informed with authoritative and accurate information on what a peace operation is doing and why creates a much more supportive attitude at the local level, and in turn improves the security of UN peacekeepers.

40. A final aspect of information sharing concerns post-mission debriefing. By the time personnel have served in and completed their time in a mission, they have gained much experience and insight. All too often, there is insufficient debriefing and so much valuable information is lost. Furthermore, personnel exposed to dangerous situations may suffer from stress and trauma and therefore need appropriately skilled attention. The nature of this stress may be that it is psychologically submerged, only to show itself at a later stage. Proper debriefing and medical assessment at the end of mission service should be a part of good management and information sharing.

41. Within the security management system itself, there appears to be a certain lack of clarity in the chain of command and control, depending on whether the field mission is one involving only humanitarian agencies or a broader peace operation involving military, police and civilians. There is probably no straightforward solution to this problem, but as long as it continues there will be issues of accountability that need resolution and also the risk remains of a serious management misunderstanding at a time of security crisis.

42. Security issues of specific relevance to the military include the critical importance of a clear mandate from the Security Council; the significance of unity of command; the need for clear and well understood rules of engagement; the value of a convincing show of firmness and force from the UN when the occasion demands; and the potential value of a dedicated force safety branch in each mission. There is also room for improvement in arrangements for gathering and analyzing intelligence regarding possible security threats so that there can be more reliable threat assessment.

43. As the 21st century unfolds, it seems likely that there will be more, rather than fewer, occasions when a peace operation will be authorized and carried out, whether by the United Nations, regional organizations, or groups of willing states. Men and women will be called upon to take part in missions in which they may be required to put their lives at risk. That fact alone demands that high attention should be paid to providing for their safety and security to the extent possible. Serious failures in those arrangements, with perhaps extensive incidence of personal injury and loss of life, could have major repercussions ranging from loss of confidence and trust by personnel to the withdrawal of political, financial and human support by governments and the subsequent collapse of the mission. If these chal-

lenges are to be avoided, the flaws and inadequacies that exist in the present arrangements need urgent correction.

44. Arising from these considerations, and bearing in mind the major improvements that will be possible now that the General Assembly has approved additional staffing and resources, it is recommended that:

1. *Member States should continue to pay close attention to the weaknesses in the present arrangements for safety and security of peacekeepers and associated personnel taking part in peace operations, with a view to providing the necessary political support and financial resources to the Secretary-General to make the improvements that are needed.*
2. *The aspects of security and safety of personnel should be taken into account from the beginning of the operational concept, that is from the report of the Secretary-General that leads to the drafting of Security Council resolutions identifying the mandate and the subsequent mission planning.*
3. *Specific efforts should be made within the UN family to improve coordination and cooperation between the UN Secretariat and UN agencies and programmes, and within the UN Secretariat, to resolve issues of accountability and lack of clarity in command and control.*
4. *A major effort should be made to improve all aspects of training.*
5. *Greater attention should be given to information-sharing – with Member States in order to encourage more active support; with regional and other organizations to identify best practices; within and among the UN family to improve the security management system; with local people and communities to promote better security for UN peacekeepers; with the men and women who serve in the operations and take the risks in order to promote better confidence and trust in management.*

Notes

¹ A/55/494 of 18 October 2000, para.2.

² UN publication number 98-06245, published by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, 1998.

³ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, A/55/658 of 1 December 2000.

⁴ Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2004* of 11 February 2000.

⁵ Special Committee on Peacekeeping, A/54/87 of 23 June and A/54/839 of 20 March 2000.

⁶ Special Committee on Peacekeeping, A/54/87, para. 89.

⁷ Report of the Secretary General, A/55/494 of 18 October 2000.

⁸ Ibid. para. 30.

⁹ A/55/950-S/2001/512 of 23 May 2001.

¹⁰ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, A/55/1024 of 31 July 2001.

¹¹ See A/56/469 of 15 October 2001 and the subsequent Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions A/56/619 of 13 November 2001.

Information Technology and Peace Operations: a Relationship for the New Millennium

Threaded through many parts of the present report are references to the need to better link the peace and security system together; to facilitate communications and data sharing; to give staff the tools that they need to do their work; and ultimately to allow the United Nations to be more effective at preventing conflict and helping societies find their way back from war. Modern, well-utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of these objectives.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para.246
A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000

I. Introduction

1. This chapter addresses information technology issues and initiatives raised throughout the “Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century” seminar series (from 1997 to present). In some instances, seminar participants presented a direct case of an IT challenge such as problems with equipment interoperability or pressures from news media using IT for immediate broadcasting from the field. In other cases, peace operation (PO) challenges raised by presenters have evident IT solutions or partial solutions as in training discrepancies between troop contributing nations, monitoring missions and interagency/ multinational information sharing. From these discussions, the chapter considers four recurring topics associated with IT application in peace operations.

2. The first section discusses communications within the PO environment.¹ The next section builds on the potential of a global PO communication infrastructure to train military, police and civilians supporting peace operations using distance learning techniques and computer simulations. Extending training to specific tasks in peace operations that could benefit from the introduction of IT, the third section considers IT in monitoring missions using remote sensors and electronic observation devices. The final section examines how policies, techniques and procedures for communicating with publics must be updated to maintain situational dominance in an IT-rich operating environment.

3. In order to set the context for the development and integration of IT in peace operations the chapter begins with two minor sections addressing the historic development of IT and information operations respectively. The objective of this chapter is not to present information technology as a panacea for all the PO challenges. On the contrary, operating within the IT environment may introduce confounding challenges unique to technology, its management or policy development.

However, strong leadership and insightful development toward IT solutions to PO challenges are cornerstones to meeting the challenges of peace operations in the Information Age.

II. Developing Information Technology: the Past and the Potential

4. Countries are acquiring and applying technologies at differing rates. According to the World Bank's recent World Development Indicators, most have Information Age capabilities. Radio remains the most available media for receiving information though in some cases television prevails. Personal computers are available in varying degrees in most countries, although access is extremely limited beyond major cities and economic centres in most developing countries.²

5. Commercial demands are driving the development of information technology at a phenomenal rate in the 21st century, but that was not always the case. Defence technology played a major role in driving IT development through most of the 20th century. In World War I, commanders used wireless telegraph at times to control the movement of forces. Field telephones were developed to facilitate communication in trench warfare. Photo-mapping and reconnaissance missions along with electronic and acoustic sensors provided solutions to challenges in observation, especially for artillery missions.³ In the mid-1940s scientists developed the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) to support the U.S. Army Ordnance Department in World War II. The ENIAC computed 1,000 times faster than any existing device. Although its purpose was to compute the paths of artillery shells, ENIAC also solved computational problems in fields such as nuclear physics, aerodynamics and weather prediction.⁴

6. Given the pressing need to monitor the development and potential deployment of nuclear weapons, developments in information technology continued throughout the Cold War. In the 1960s, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) introduced the predecessor to the Internet – ARPANET. What started as a simple four-node network grew to span the globe, connecting a world of ideas, societies and actors for a host of activities far surpassing its fledgling capabilities.

7. The increasing demand for nations to participate in peace operations also makes clear the need to fund and develop information technologies specifically designed to address PO challenges. However, fitting existing tools of war to peace operations is a slow and imperfect process. In peace operations, from information gathering and analysis to communications with the wide variety of civilian and military actors to relations with the media, the commander cannot wield the same degree of control over information as in war. At the Stockholm seminar held in 1997,

Timothy L. Thomas predicted, “(t)he next era of peace operations may also witness the capability to customize or tailor IT to fit the contractor.” If a lack of consensus in peace operations precludes the driving force of warfare technology, then the United Nations and Member States need to come together to drive IT for peace operations with published standards for equipment interoperability, information management policies, public information guidance and training protocols. One of the greatest benefits offered by the Information Age to peace operations is an increased capability to share information quickly, universally and objectively. At the same time, obstacles to information sharing and equipment incompatibility can threaten IT success and thereby the success of the PO.

8. The U.S. Army maintains that information, when transformed into capabilities, is the currency of victory and that the military objective in Operations Other Than War is to establish situational dominance.⁵ Information technology may be the most powerful tool in the commander’s kit toward achieving PO goals while saving money, manpower and lives, and maintaining the PO fundamentals of legitimacy, impartiality, unity of effort, use of force and credibility. Integrating IT into the operational plan is a critical part of information operations.

III. Information Operations as a Force Multiplier and Deterrent

9. Information operations (IO), a concept that originated in U.S. Army planning doctrine, have great application for actors throughout the PO environment as a tool to foster transparency, build credibility, express impartiality and maintain legitimacy in peace operations. Yet as written in U.S. peace support operations doctrine, IO sounds like a concept that planners and leaders need not apply in the PO environment because of the U.S. emphasis on combat power and weaponry. United States Army Field Manual 100-6 explains that “information operations integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance the elements of combat power, with the goal of dominating the battlespace at the right time, right place and with the right weapons or resources.”⁶ However, the concept clearly is not restricted to wartime application. As William Flavin articulated at the Carlisle seminar, although IO was “developed more for the warfighter than for the peacekeeper . . . it is an area that has implications for peace operations as well as for warfighting.” In peace operations, IO can be both a force multiplier and a guarantor of the peace operations fundamentals. The following vignette illustrates a successful application of information technology to a local situation.

10. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, Major-General Nash serving as the Implementation Force’s (IFOR) Multinational Division North Commander, invited the three former warring faction (FWF) commanders in his sector to observe the monitor display of a real-time down link from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a break in a Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting in the Zone of Separation

(ZOS). General Nash told the commanders he wanted to show them a piece of technology employed by his force to conduct the IFOR mission. The UAV was flying over the ZOS in the area of the JMC and the commanders could see themselves on the monitor. The UAV then covered the road en route to the site. As it moved along it was clear that the FWF commanders understood it could see personnel, equipment and movement with great accuracy and high resolution. General Nash's point was this: I can see what you are doing anywhere, all the time and without deploying the soldiers in sector to do the job. It was clear to the commanders that if they violated the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP/Dayton Accord), IFOR would know, report them and if necessary unleash forces to deal with issues of non-compliance.

11. By using the UAV, the force commander could cover a manpower intensive mission without a considerable commitment of troops. More importantly, by highlighting the technology and its capabilities, he could evoke compliance on the part of the FWF leaders without using force. This example illustrates how information operations can be applied to peace operations. IT was used as soft, impartial power to collect information critical to the mission. Then he added the strategy of informing the FWF leaders to affect their decision-making. All the while his methods upheld the fundamentals of peace operations in that his application of the technology was transparent. His use of the technology demonstrated non-threatening collection abilities. His reliance on information to induce appropriate responses by the commanders reduced the likelihood he would have to use force to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

12. The general could have used the UAV very differently, and with much less impact, had he applied the technology clandestinely, as in war, but peace operations require innovative applications of existing technologies. Peace operations call for well thought out and developed information operations that synchronize technological capabilities in planning from the outset. By the time the peacekeeper gets to the field, information may well have been manipulated by local forces for censorship, propaganda and disinformation. Established actors such as NGOs – and in some cases the media – have historical information that peacekeepers need both for background and for its predictive value. Information operations therefore need to be planned and supported in order to leverage the full power of IT.

13. Information operations - not easily executed - can be enhanced through successful integration of information technology. Local detractors seeking to weaken PO credibility can employ some of the same information technologies that peacekeepers may use to speed information across the PO environment. Cellular telephones, radios, television and websites, when equally accessible to every force and faction within the PO environment, may play to the advantage of the local leader who is more familiar with the local language and culture. Thus it has been suggested that commanders need to develop a decisive information campaign that consid-

ers the array of IT available to the peacekeeper. Failure to use IT effectively threatens the force's ability to gain the knowledge and information required to conduct successful peace operations and to deny adversaries information domination.

14. Information operations touch all the actors in the PO environment. They include the social, humanitarian, economic, cultural and political dimensions of peace operations. Success can be measured by the extent to which peace and stability can be re-established: conditions for a stable environment in which businesses flourish, children regularly attend schools and families live free from the fear of being forced from their own homes. It is clear then, that a relationship of trust and understanding has to be nurtured between the military, police and civilians supporting peace operations, members of non-governmental organizations, representatives of intergovernmental organizations and the authorities and publics of threatened, failing or failed states.

15. The Force Commander, his staff and their police and civilian colleagues have to work hard to establish, then develop functional relationships with the humanitarian agencies. As impartiality is paramount to the credibility and effectiveness of aid agencies, they may be resistant to liaisons with soldiers and police in particular.

IV. Information Sharing

Military units must also be able to communicate with civilian organizations, like CIVPOL. These organizations normally do not have military equipment and their means for communications are very basic. Technically it means that you have to choose the lowest common denominator, or provide the organizations with equipment and operators.

Brigadier General Göran Tode
Stockholm Seminar, September 1997

16. As a tool for training soldiers, police and civilians to manage language and culture gaps, information technology can help span communication gaps of time and distance. For this reason, it is critical that PO planners in the Information Age capitalize upon IT capabilities. The following section highlights the role of IT in information sharing activities for military and police forces, the UN Headquarters and field activities.

17. One of the greatest obstacles to effective information sharing is the introduction of multiple communication systems without an overarching strategy toward interoperability. No matter what the seminar focus or case study, most Challenges seminar participants discussing peace operations mentioned their frustration in discovering incompatible communications systems in the PO environment. Equipment incompatibility creates problems ranging from a failure to transmit crit-

ical information in a timely manner to developing feelings of “haves” and “have-nots” among nations contributing to peace operations. In the Stockholm seminar, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar reminded participants that although the aspect of modern technology in peace operations “receives stress among contingents of ‘developed countries’ due to reasonably ready availability at national level of the type of equipment that assists in the conduct of peace operations, there is an imperative need for a degree of institutionalization of this process to enable ‘developing’ countries to also be covered by this ‘umbrella’”. The inability to share information across the PO environment because of different systems confounds UN administrators, military personnel, and NGOs alike. In a case study on the UNTAG operation in Namibia at the Challenges seminar in New Delhi, the presenter explained that, “It took more than one month for the British Signals Unit to establish radio communications in the mission area and link all military forces outposts in the field.” More than a decade later, the early communication challenges faced by multinational forces in Kosovo was explained by a US Captain as follows:

If we wanted to communicate with one another we either met somewhere or provided national equipment to our multinational counterparts (or received equipment from them). We each deployed with our own communications system, none of which could talk to the other. We need to deploy with a common system that allows us to communicate between nations and agencies from day one.

18. Great advances in telecommunications capabilities in the 1990s, fed by a demand for systems able to support global commerce and education, have resulted in increased commercial information sharing means and methods. Systems that once relied exclusively on cable connections now take advantage of microwave and satellite capabilities. Unfortunate in terms of interoperability, the rapid development of IT sparked competing markets globally, which resulted in widely different systems without an eye toward operating across the multinational, interagency landscape of peace operations. In the absence of a comprehensive equipment interoperability strategy, it is not surprising that communicating with the agency across the street or the force on the other side of the cantonment area has become an irritant at least, and a showstopper in a crisis.

19. The interoperability issue surfaced in a regional battalion-level peacekeeping exercise conducted by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the British Army in 1997, as observed by Mark Malan at the Moscow seminar, the need to enhance the compatibility of communications equipment and procedures was revealed early in the exercise. Similarly, the first force in Kosovo was the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) which was not NATO equipped. The ARRC telephone system, Ptarmigan, was unable to interface with the national systems of most of the other multinational brigades (MNB). To bridge the communication gap the ARRC provided a Ptarmigan system to each of the MNB headquarters. The ARRC also outfitted the UN element, initially arriving without communications, with a Ptarmigan system.

20. Speaking at the Stockholm seminar, Timothy Thomas suggested that the importance of understanding the IT means of non-state actors to coordinate with state actors and militaries to ensure compatibility and a means through which to communicate cannot be overstated. The technical problems confronted by KFOR when the force attempted to communicate with NGOs, most of whom possessed small, earth station communication dishes to support satellite communications, none of which could interface with any of the national systems, illustrate his emphasis. One work-around solution designed in response to developing an IT link to NGOs was Hotmail, which Colonel Capin explained became a depository for routine information regarding supply routes and meetings. Although equipment sharing and Internet mail domains worked as expedient field solutions, the multinational force and related agencies and organizations needed a readily deployable communications package based on an assessment addressing interoperability shortfalls – especially in the early days when stress and uncertainty were at their highest.

21. The communications capabilities of any single player in the scenario described above, though significant, suffered interoperability handicaps. Although there is no “cost-free” cure to the problem of communication mismatches like these, off-the-shelf technology solutions exist. In fact, a communications infrastructure with terrific potential exists within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), Field Administration Logistics Division (FALD) in the United Nations. The Communications and Electronic Services Section (CESS) of FALD has a communications and information technology infrastructure that enables communications between and among all UN peacekeeping and DPKO administered missions, their field offices and the DPKO offices in New York. The system relies on four satellites with near-global coverage, more than 300 small, rapidly deployable, earth stations, communication dishes and some 900 portable (briefcase) terminals supported by the system of international maritime satellites called INMARSAT. Along with a leased digital circuit between the communications hub in Brindisi, Italy, and New York, one public telephone network and secured communications circuits, this network reaches 32 countries over four continents. When military forces are a part of a UN peace operation, the force is included in the UN communications umbrella described above. When working with a regional organization, a memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and regional force addressing communications support and terms for reimbursement must be developed. In the case of Kosovo, where the regional force preceded the UN peace operation, the UN communications infrastructure initially was unavailable. However, as explained by the Chief of CESS FALD, the existence of the supporting DPKO CESS infrastructure suggests a standing agreement that would extend IT capabilities significantly and could contribute to overcoming some of the confusion attributed to poor communications interoperability in peace operations.

22. At the heart of the DPKO CESS infrastructure is an information management system originally developed to support a system of accounting for UN equipment in peace operations. FALD has developed the Field Assets Control System (FACS), described by the project coordinator as the “kernel” for the overall project, to enhance equipment accountability and assist in budget resolution and development. The system introduced a standardized program for tracking the lifecycle of UN equipment in peace operations. Using groupware, which is software that replicates updates in near-real time, the system provides data entries and updates to UN Headquarters within minutes of input at work stations around the world. In 1997, FALD distributed the software to missions, most of which used a “home-grown” tracking system, and simultaneously developed a communications infrastructure to support FACS. Computer bulletin boards encouraged use of the new system and facilitated feedback, though the new system initially drew only weak response from the field. Within three years FALD developed and refined the FACS module as the first module of the Field Mission Logistics System (FMLS). Recently completed or in development as part of FMLS are programs to track maintenance, expendable goods and supplies, contingent owned equipment, memorandums of understanding and field personnel movements.

23. The DPKO Wide Area Network (WAN), which supports FMLS, also supports a mail routing operation that enables communications among and between field missions and UN Headquarters. In fact, by taking advantage of the WAN supporting DPKO, the UN Headquarters Intranet is available to field missions and UN peace operation headquarters. Developers could add instant messaging to the system to create computer conferencing and true dialogue communications.

24. Beyond the UN infrastructure, open source instant messaging software might be another option available to PO actors interested in conducting online dialogue and conferencing. One example of instant messaging (IM) architecture easily accessible via the worldwide web is “Jabber”. Similar to a private chat room, this type of IM allows users with access to the host server via computer or cellular telephone to participate in instant messaging among a dedicated user group. While not suitable for classified information, Jabber could facilitate real-time dialogue for routine communication.

25. However, accessible instant messaging products like Jabber require operational telecommunications. How do actors in the PO environment communicate when commercial telephone links may be compromised? How do they communicate in failed states or undeveloped countries where telephone connections typically do not exist? In the past, these obstacles prevented the PO force from using commercial telecommunications. However, emerging satellite technology soon may offer a solution. In November 2000, StarBand Communications, a U.S.-based company, launched a commercial two-way satellite Internet venture. The company seeks to establish satellites as the leading route for high-speed Internet connections.⁷ This

technology could unleash the “tele-bonds” of non-secure Internet communication and enable computers to be linked to the outside world far from telephone offices and without overriding concern for who controls the ground-based communications hub. StarBand still is working out “bugs” in the system, such as ways to make the satellite system more resistant to inclement weather. Finally, the company must decrease the operational costs of consumer satellites to become a practical application in peace operations. Still, deployed as part of a peace operation communications package, satellite-based Internet technology holds promise as a means to connect PO actors reliably from the start.

26. Long recognized as an issue among forces conducting multinational training exercises, discussions of interoperability raise the possibility of IT solutions to challenges in communication interoperability. Rear Admiral Kevin Wilson of the Royal New Zealand Navy proposed an Internet-based solution during one such discussion. Admiral Wilson explained that the advantage of using the Internet for communication interoperability is that it “allows remote, long-range, dynamic data retrieval and manipulation from any connected source.”⁸ Acknowledging that the problem with using an Internet solution is security, Admiral Wilson predicted that given IT advances, security limitations are temporary at best.

27. Vice Admiral Simpson-Anderson of the South African Navy approached the problem from a more traditional point of view, that of making existing national systems interoperable. However, short of purchasing a single, common system, Admiral Simpson-Anderson suggested a common interface that links existing systems. Viewed as a more affordable solution that uses legacy systems, Admiral Simpson-Anderson acknowledged that any agreed upon interface must link with each individual system – requiring each nation to perform input modification.⁹

28. The U.S. Navy is looking at a digital modular radio (DMR) that may hold the key to enhancing communication between nations because it has a radio interconnection that facilitates interoperability between systems. The digital modular radio, available commercial technology, is attractive because it avoids the high costs and maintenance requirements associated with maintaining legacy communications equipment. It holds costs down by being adaptable to different systems and not requiring an outright replacement or total purchase to provide the desired communications interface. The DMR has an embedded security feature and can operate using satellite communications, line of sight, very high frequency (VHF) and high frequency communications among different channel settings all existing in the radio’s computer software.¹⁰

29. When developing strategy and policy for IT interoperability, leaders and planners must integrate systems currently used with good results at the national and regional level. One such IT is video-teleconferencing (VTC). The United Nations and military organizations use VTC as a cost-effective (in terms of time and

travel dollars) way to convene routine and ad hoc meetings. Swedish Air Force Brigadier General Göran Tode described the value of teleconferences with secure voice and pictures in allowing commanders to confer on their common problems, to relay information on plans and to coordinate their actions. The VTC also enhances the voice message by allowing the incorporation of slides to illustrate briefings and concepts, which “attendees” simultaneously view and discuss. Military personnel using the VTC in peace operations remind potential users that they need to formalize employment of the technology by establishing a protocol for recording (written) meeting minutes, recognizing speakers (especially in a time-constrained, multinational meeting) and staffing information shared following the VTC. Users who fail to attend to the development of such a protocol may find the technology frustrating and disruptive to other coordination processes.

30. The cellular telephone is another information sharing tool that has proven invaluable in linking individual actors to information resources for advance warning, situation updates and changes in guidance. Accessible mobile communications like the cell phone are particularly important as the success of peace operations can hinge on the actions of one or two relatively junior soldiers far from headquarters. These individuals must have up-to-the-minute information for decision-making at the lowest level and, with satellite support, the cellular telephone can be a very useful means of transferring that kind of crucial information.

31. There is no question that today, well into the Information Age, technology exists to support global communications in any environment. That the United Nations already owns and operates a communications infrastructure capable of supporting a global network is encouraging, but it falls short of its potential for three primary reasons. Organizational, administrative and budgetary constraints limit the United Nations’ full exploitation of the potential in IT. First, organizationally, the United Nations operates as a system of parallel agencies and divisions, none of which is empowered to take the lead in developing a standardized, interoperable, IT-based communication system. As a consequence, administratively the United Nations operates several communications networks without an overarching interoperability strategy to connect its own agencies, much less all the actors that truly represent the peace operation environment, the coordination of which is critical to success in peace operations. Finally, tight budgets and varying priorities do not guarantee the availability of funds to develop or support effective communications before initiation of a peace operation.

32. Among the most promising information sharing technologies for the PO environment are geographic information systems (GIS), which are computer systems or software applications with the ability to capture, store, check, integrate, manipulate, analyse and display data related to positions on the earth’s surface. With applications ranging from city planning to tourism and mining information, GIS has an important application in peace operations because of its ability to “layer”

data from multiple sources. The layers come from the expertise and experience of PO actors. For example, in creating a GIS multi-layered map, the terrain and weather data may come through military channels. Non-governmental organizations may provide up-to-date information on the location of various aid agencies, while the UNHCR may add current information on resettlement progress. This example is over-simplified to illustrate the required collaboration. In actuality, several actors may be able to update information in the same area – different teams and organizations travelling between villages and towns can update road conditions, for example. Geographic information systems integrate current information and maps to promote “information sharing, advance planning, operational cooperation and evaluation of progress toward complementary goals”¹¹ and provide data that can be distributed around the world using new Internet software.

33. Cooperating agencies have used GIS with positive results in the Balkans. In Bosnia, GIS was used to “correlate the pattern of ethnic expulsions with information about military lines of control of paramilitary units operating in the area at the time.”¹² In Kosovo, the system combined information about refugee returns, minefields, unexploded ordnance, potable water, housing status and lines of communication.¹³ This helped UN administrators and PO forces manage the immense task of resettlement. This information sharing mechanism drives agencies to collaborate to develop the complete picture.

34. The Russian application of this system, known as project “Sentinel” advanced the Russian sector objectives of preventing the renewal of battle action, creating the conditions for refugee return and supporting demining efforts in Kosovo.¹⁴ Sentinel combined military mapping data with dynamic information about troop movement, training activities, refugee movement, route conditions and demining progress to meet mission requirements. The Canadian reconnaissance vehicle, Coyote - essentially a monitoring technology in itself - has an onboard GIS that combines a television camera, thermal imager, laser range finder, ground surveillance radar (GSR), and modem for wireless transmission of the collected data up the chain of command.¹⁵

35. Nevertheless, simply collecting, integrating and verifying layered information for GIS does not indicate a solid information-sharing regime. In April 2000, the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army’s 353rd Civil Affairs Command co-sponsored an international conference on the use of information sharing to support advanced planning and operational cooperation. Among their conclusions was the finding that an information strategy that addresses issues of data requirements, information security and field constraints should be developed involving all major participating organizations. To elaborate, conference participants reported that relevant data needs and trained individuals to provide accurate data must be identified. They also determined that agreements should exist to inform relationships and mechanisms for identifying and disseminating data. Finally,

they said that information systems that provide input for GIS must be supported within the operating environment - simple and off-the-shelf technology that assumes infrastructure shortfalls.¹⁶ To ensure compliance with these measures, it is clear that responsibility for this type of information sharing must be assigned to a PO actor with IT capability, field presence and requisite expertise.

36. In the Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/977 of 1 June 2001) it was recognized that the humanitarian community has made considerable strides in employing Internet-based systems to accumulate and disseminate knowledge, but that neither the peacekeeping nor the political departments have a chief information manager and/or sophisticated enough technical capability and infrastructure. The internal organizational problem of how best to apply IT expertise to the military and political aspects of PO remains unresolved. Whatever the outcome, it is to be hoped that the unit or office established will take guidance from FALD within DPKO - the office with the technical expertise, talent and vision to make the most of GIS.

37. The United Nations should take a leadership role in establishing a lasting IT strategy for communication interoperability in peace operations. Although there are numerous examples of successful applications of national IT assets, until these efforts are integrated, the value of existing technologies will hide in the anecdotes of national and regional forces. This unacceptable consequence degrades unity of effort and results in organizations being unable to attract the attention of the communication and electronics industry to develop and market peace operations technology.

38. Simply arriving in the field able to communicate between forces and organizations does not guarantee understanding. A common base of knowledge and information is required to develop a framework for an efficient working relationship. For this, participants to the Challenges seminars called for improved approaches to training for peace operations.

V. Using Information Technology to Bridge the Training Gap

It is extremely important, especially as the demands of peace operations accelerate and become more complex worldwide, that training of professionals become more attuned to new technologies, specifically computer-based learning and distance-learning techniques.

Ambassador George Ward
Carlisle Seminar, USA, May 2000

39. Military training exercises for multinational and allied operations have traditionally involved costly movements of personnel to conduct training at a common location. The inherent characteristics of peace operations - international response from multiple agencies and organizations - means that traditional training can be cost prohibitive in terms of both time and funds. For short-notice deployments in particular, a combined exercise at a single training centre is impractical when there is barely time to prepare troops and equipment for movement. Military, police and civilians participating in peace operations can apply some of the same information technologies used in information sharing to support cost effective, integrated pre-deployment training. The combination of computers, telecommunications infrastructures and video-teleconferencing equipment creates a cost-effective interface for education and technology able to span the globe.

40. The level of doctrine development for peace operations generally is newer and less established than doctrine used in training for war. In peace operations leaders must develop some critical skills, including negotiation, relations with civilian organizations, relations with UN Headquarters and an understanding of mission specifics, during preparatory training. At lower levels and among small units, soldiers typically do not even meet or learn about their foreign partners until they deploy. Leaders of past peace operations have likened this approach to assembling the team for the first time on the playing field before the big game. It is easy to see that a teaching approach that fails to develop standardized tactics, techniques and procedures for a multinational force in the course of the operations could threaten force credibility and legitimacy. Using IT for peace operation training contributes to operational success by establishing relationships and standards of professionalism that enhance force credibility and legitimacy, and exercise unity of effort.

41. Once characterized by correspondence courses delivered through conventional postal mail systems, distance-learning today takes advantage of communication channels and media such as computers and associated networks, print, audio, cable, satellite and videotape or systems in combination. Interactive delivery systems account for the growing numbers of colleges and universities using distance-learning around the world to attract students who cannot attend classes because of their locations or schedules. Audio conferencing, video conferencing (using telephone lines and satellites), and webcasting (real-time broadcasts of digital images delivered to websites) make obsolete the old "passive learning" stereotype of dis-

tance-learning. As argued by the Director of UNITAR PO CI, Harvey Langholtz, at the Buenos Aires seminar, contemporary distance-learning approaches have a distinct advantage over traditional education in that they enable a dialogue between students and instructors when the two are located in different places – creating a virtual classroom. Because of its ability to bridge distances between citizens, communities, states, and nations, education specialists recognize distance-learning as part of the international education and training landscape.

42. Another virtual approach to training for peace operations is the use of computer simulations to create not the classroom, but the environment of a peace operation. Designed for training leaders in decision-making for peace operations, these applications allow actors to observe the impact of decisions and refine or modify practices without actually impacting a community moving toward resettlement or a local police force reorganizing in an operation's post-conflict phases. The frequency of peace operations since the end of the Cold War has enlarged the focus on the development of PO simulations ranging from computer simulations specifically designed to support integrated leader training bringing together policy makers, military leaders, NGOs, religious leaders and legal experts to interactive computer software exercising soldier decision-making through packaged vignettes and scenarios.

43. The U.S.-based Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) has developed an experiential simulation that can be used to provide military leaders, policy makers and NGOs - among those operating in the PO environment - insight into the consequences of their proposed actions. The IDA computer simulation, Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates (SENSE), simultaneously addresses economic, social, political and military issues in a virtual exercise. Using desktop computers and interactive software, participants in a SENSE exercise identify potential crises, explore options and test crisis action plans.¹⁷ The computer software accepts the input of participants and allows them to experience the consequences of their decisions and actions. This step of moving beyond discussion and collaboration to experience is one of IT's unique contributions to training. Although computer simulations cannot replicate exactly what occurs in peace operations, they provide invaluable interactive experiences for participants to observe possible outcomes of their decisions, and to analyse and debate the impact with expert advice and input.

44. For the individual soldier or police supporting a peace operation, the impact of a decision in a stressful environment can be the difference between provoking a riot and developing the trust and respect of the local public. However, before deployment it is difficult for soldiers to envision a village that lies halfway around the world, divided by hate and history. The U.S. Institute for Creative Technologies, is developing a virtual environment that transports soldiers from a studio setting with a 180 degree screen to a stressful incident played out in a Balkan village.¹⁸ The vignette plays out to allow the soldier to see and learn from the consequences of his actions. Comments from many participants of after action reviews indicate conven-

tional situation training exercises are the best training methodology to prepare soldiers for operations. The virtual environment builds on this feedback.

45. Having considered both distance-learning capabilities and the value of computer simulations, the obvious potential of combining the two applications is compelling and was suggested by Major General Stigsson at the Buenos Aires seminar. In 1999, the Swedish Defence War Gaming Centre began hosting VIKING exercises, as part of the Partnership for Peace Programme. The scenario manager for that exercise credited the realism of the VIKING '99 scenario to the input of people experienced in peace operations.¹⁹ Working with soldiers, lawyers, doctors and aid organizations with peace operation experience, the manager created the fictitious country of Betaland. Players around the world experienced Betaland from their daily workspaces and local simulation centres. VIKING 01, the second exercise, was conducted as a Command Post Exercise (CPX)/Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) and focused on the multinational brigade level with subordinated units. Governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations worked together with police and military forces from more than 15 countries to restore and maintain peace in a fictitious country. Combining simulation software, computer hardware, telephone, fax and radio, the exercise supported multinational participants using a scenario similar to recent conflicts in the Balkans.

46. The costs of building virtual training centres to support simulated training exercises start at \$15,000 USD. Additional costs include the cost of leasing lines for Internet and teleconferencing to support the system.²⁰ These costs, and the fact that the technology is available using off-the-shelf hardware with specialized software puts within reach a realistic programme that can be tailored to fit the peculiarities of any peace operation environment.

47. The next step is supporting the leaders' training with soldiers who, having discussed a common definition of use of force in a distance-learning programme, are exercising their restraint in a virtual village of rioting and chaos. The powerful benefit of using IT to train peace operations includes its own set of challenges. Common language, technical support, time zone differences and curriculum development to support the exercises present considerable hurdles. Nevertheless, the increased tempo of peace operations over the last decade makes clear the importance nations need to assign to development of IT-supported training. United Nations Member States have to take the lead in developing model training centres. The DPKO telecommunications infrastructure could serve as the backbone for connecting IT enhanced training programmes.

VI. Monitoring

The peacekeeping operation can be vital in supporting and encouraging confidence-building measures which in turn foster an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. For instance, active and continuous monitoring of mutual compliance, such as we undertake in the MFO, contributes significantly to confidence building.

Major General Tryggve Tellefsen
Force Commander Multinational Forces and Observers
Amman Seminar, October 1998

48. All the fifteen UN-sanctioned peace operations ongoing during the writing of this chapter include monitoring as part of the mandate. Monitoring tasks in peace operations serves to detect and deter threats, verify the implementation of agreements or resolutions and supervise or assist with field activities. Military forces supporting peace operations monitor sanctions, military activity, police activity, elections and the physical security of regions, demilitarized zones and PO camps.

49. Non-technological monitoring is a manpower intense task that relies mainly on human detection and observation conducted via patrols, observation posts and checkpoints. Generally speaking the larger the area and more complex the monitoring tasks, the greater the demand for personnel to conduct monitoring missions. Because budgetary constraints, national directives and public support for peace operations all have impact on the resources available, the United Nations and Member States should consider monitoring technologies to enhance human monitoring when possible. In addition to reducing manpower demands, IT applications for monitoring support the PO fundamentals of impartiality, consent, freedom of movement and legitimacy. Monitoring technologies in and of themselves are objective and impartial in the collection of data. When forces share monitoring data with local populations and leaders they demonstrate evenhanded application of the technology and reinforce consent and support for the PO forces and the legitimacy of the peace operation.

50. To understand IT's contribution to monitoring missions, one must gain a common understanding of the mission and related tasks. The Royal Netherlands Army military doctrine, for example, assigns "observation, monitoring and control" as a task cluster for peace operations. Each of these activities requires the peace operation force to acquire, process, share and as required act on information regarding compliance with or violation of agreements and international laws. The level of action and force that Dutch peacekeepers may apply increases for each task in the cluster in the order presented.²¹

51. The U.S. Army peace operations doctrine lists six subtasks to the mission of "observing, monitoring, verifying and reporting any alleged violations of the governing agreements."²² From investigating cease-fire violations and boundary inci-

dents to verifying disarmament and demobilization, each activity affords warring factions the opportunity to observe impartiality in relation to the responsibilities of the peace operations force. Planners should apply monitoring devices not purely as intelligence collectors, but as operational tools - much like radios and vehicles - to appreciate the force multiplier value of sensing devices that enable fewer peacekeepers to cover a greater mission area while increasing the coverage time for the designated area.

52. Interest in the role IT could play in enhancing monitoring in peace operations led to a comprehensive study by Sandia National Laboratories in the United States.²³ In their report, Sandia researchers established a consent/force balance to determine the applicability of monitoring technologies to peace operations. The report defines the variables of consent and force as commonly applied in peace operations: that is, consent is the degree of agreement the parties involved in the conflict hold for the international peacekeeper's activities. Force indicates the force available and the level of use authorized for peacekeepers. Generally peacekeeping operations are high in consent, deploying with lower force levels, while operations with less consent and higher force levels are increasingly likely to be peace enforcement operations.

53. According to the consent/force balance developed by Sandia, operations with a high level of consent and low force capabilities suggest the employment of open and relatively unprotected systems for specific monitoring tasks. Operations with low consent levels and high force capabilities still may support the use of monitoring technologies, although in these cases it may be necessary to protect, hide or add redundancy to the monitoring device. For example, in an environment with a high level of consent and low force requirement, unattended ground sensors of various types - seismic, acoustic, weight, infrared, break-beam, magnetic, microwave and radar - may be employed effectively to monitor facilities, ports of entry, lines of control and weapons' storage. A decrease in consent and increase in force requirement may dictate protective and redundancy measures be introduced for some of the same sensing devices.²⁴

54. One objective of the Sandia study was the “. . . concept of cooperative monitoring, which is the use of monitoring and security technology to acquire and share objective information.”²⁵ It is important to note that hiding the collection device does not suggest a less transparent application of the technology, rather protection from theft or destruction. Those collecting information still can and should share data. The operator can relay information collected from this multi-type, ground sensor system to a monitoring centre for recording, action or reporting as required. Military forces using monitoring technologies are capable of providing a continual feed of assurance by using closed circuit televisions and digital cameras to project the images captured by some key monitoring activities.

55. The Sandia report identified five typical monitoring missions in which technology may play a role in reducing the number of soldiers required for an operation while visibly demonstrating impartiality and enhancing the credibility of military and police forces in the mission. The missions included monitoring movement of peacekeepers and local situations, monitoring facilities, monitoring checkpoints and ports of entry, monitoring lines of control and monitoring weapons transport and storage.

56. The Sandia research team evaluated the potential for various classes of technology to assist in the five tasks based on criteria of affordability, simplicity, durability, reliability and validity. Ground based sensing devices had their greatest applicability in static missions – where there is the greatest argument for reducing manning. Tracking systems were recommended for monitoring movement of people, equipment and weapons systems. The Sandia researchers recommend motion detectors and entry control systems for physical protection of facilities and for weapons monitoring. All these systems have the added advantage of enhancing the protection of actors in the PO environment through early warning and constant surveillance.

57. Recently, the U.S. 311th Military Intelligence Battalion employed the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS) in Bosnia, Multinational Division North, to enhance the task force's ability to monitor assigned areas given identified manpower constraints. The remote ground sensors established a trip-wire system around areas where returning refugees were resettling. The sensor system, deployed during hours of limited visibility, provided information about movement in the area. The engineers captured the information in a summarized report, which they provided to the intelligence section for analysis and trend development. That information helped the force to determine which areas were potential "hot spots" for resettlement – aiding in mission development and force allocation.²⁶

58. One of the criticisms of the employment of information technology in any area of peace operations, but perhaps most significantly at the user level in monitoring missions, is that soldiers do not know how to use the high-tech systems available. In response there are two apparent options. First, when conducting decentralized training for peace operations, whether conducted as part of a planned curriculum or as "just-in-time" programmes, training specific to the capabilities and employment of monitoring technologies should be included.

59. At the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada an annual two-week seminar entitled "Live, Move and Work," introduces potential leaders in peace operations to the types of technology that may be applied to enhance force effectiveness in monitoring missions as well as to technologies for communication, protection and the latest in cutting edge non-lethal weapons.

60. The second option is to “contract out” responsibility for designing, fielding, developing and assisting in operating the monitoring technology structure, each tailor-made for the support of a peace operation. Nonetheless, it may be best to develop a third option as a combination of the first two. This option would employ the distance learning techniques discussed in the training section of this chapter in the development of a global training package that draws on contract expertise in monitoring technologies. Regardless which method an organization selects, there must be a system for fully assessing the value of using monitoring technologies. When the decision is made to use them, trained technicians must operate monitoring devices, backed up by a complete information management system for recording, storing and analysing collected data, and all covered by a comprehensive in-country maintenance capability.

VII. The Power of Information Technology in Communicating with the Public

Peacekeeping operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. By using satellites and other modern communications technology, the press is able to distribute reports and pictures faster than ever before. Incidents, sometimes embellished or slanted toward a partisan viewpoint, are screened on television the same day and the next morning are in the press to excite audiences in those countries that are parties to the dispute, as well as their allies.

Lieutenant General MR Kochhar
New Delhi Seminar, September 2000

61. A significant strength of new IT lies in its ability to facilitate communication with the public. From international reporters recording the deployment of military forces to the faction leader using state-controlled radio to provoke violence, peace operation forces must prepare to respond to and counter these activities. They must do so without jeopardizing the credibility and legitimacy of the operation or violating a profile of impartial mission conduct. The access, filing capabilities and pervasiveness of the modern media corps virtually guarantee reporters will transmit all newsworthy events to a global audience, often in real time. A comprehensive information plan that is part of the overall peace operation planning process needs to address how PO forces should interact with local factions and media outlets. Although arguments continue over the power of the media to lead nations and organizations into or out of peace operations (e.g. “The CNN Effect”), this section focuses on operating with the media and other agents disseminating information in the PO environment.

62. Journalists today enjoy greater access to soldiers supporting peace operations than in any other military operation. Journalists often have communications equipment superior to that of most other actors in peace operations, including the military. Coupled with privately contracted transportation assets this means that

journalists, once dependent on peace operations forces for logistic and communications support, are independent agents and often arriving before the first military response to a peace operation. Add to this changed reporting environment the ability of a number of journalists to file real-time or near-real-time news. Using satellites, cellular telephones and computers, these reporters file their stories and provide simultaneous reports of activities occurring throughout the peace operation environment. Indeed, the speed with which journalists file their stories is faster than the transmission of information up a military chain of command or through an aid organization to its leadership. One vehicle for information - around-the-clock news reporting - has created a seemingly insatiable hunger for newsworthy stories.

63. These three IT-driven characteristics: unfettered access, real-time reporting and the 24-hour news cycle significantly affect peace operations. The media can flatten the traditional organizational hierarchy through unrestricted access and compress decision-making cycles through real-time reporting. As gatekeepers, journalists become the voice from the field providing continuous reporting and analysis.

64. Leaders, planners and managers in peace operations need not be hindered by the IT capabilities of those desiring to communicate with publics. The information campaign developed as part of information operations must address not only our own IT capabilities and how best to apply them, but also the capabilities of other actors and how to support, or in some cases, counter them.

65. Peace operations place tough demands on small units and individual troops operating in remote or isolated locations. They are the individuals asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats, under demanding conditions requiring maturity, judgement and strength of character. They are assigned missions that require them to make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress - decisions that may be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. As observed by Brigadier Henricsson speaking at the Buenos Aires seminar, the actions of the individual may directly affect the outcome of the larger operation both from an informational as well as operational standpoint.

66. Flexible leaders equip and educate their soldiers to interact with journalists within the bounds of operational security. Recognizing their challenges, roles and responsibilities, strategic corporals must be given information, guidance and license to respond to and inform the reporter on the scene. In Bosnia a number of approaches proved effective in empowering the U.S. Army soldier on the ground when dealing with the media. Among those were talking points and commander's messages developed by the Task Force Commander's Information Coordination Group (CICG) and approved by the commander. These were disseminated to Brigade and Battalion Task Forces on a weekly basis via e-mail and facsimile for

use by leaders and their soldiers in media encounters. When emergent issues arose, the CICG provided specific, timely guidance separate from the weekly updates for soldier use. That information was transmitted via telephone, command conference calls, e-mail and facsimile to get it into the hands of the soldiers who needed it as soon as possible. In Kosovo more and more soldiers operate from remote posts equipped with cellular telephones that allow them to receive immediate guidance and updated information.

67. Electronically disseminated messages and open communications provide leaders with confidence that soldiers have the information they require to inform the public. Soldiers in turn, confident in their guidance and empowered by leaders, are able to address journalists effectively. The end state is an informed audience able to balance disinformation with a consistent story from a unified peace force.

68. Together with enhanced access to PO forces and information, journalists also have the ability to file and air stories immediately. This emerging journalistic capacity presents PO personnel with daunting challenges. Without planning for this capability, leaders and managers may feel pressed to act or make decisions based on what the media is about to report. Intensifying the pressure, in some cases guidance from higher headquarters springs from the latest news reported live on television before forces on the ground are able to report through routine command channels.

69. To counter the speed with which stories can be filed, leaders must trust spokespersons to respond to issues of breaking news with available facts before perfectly sterilized words make their way through headquarters. The 100% solution, triple checked and command endorsed, on a press release or statement that lands a day late lands without impact. Addressing the essential elements of a breaking story promotes transparency and fosters credibility and impartiality. Continual feed is what sustains the 24-hours news realm. Although no leader or policy maker should feel pressured to supply information to the news media, there can be little argument after the film has rolled if the facts are still waiting a thorough review on the desk of the chief of staff.

70. The importance and immediate impact of a live-feed visual image have changed the dynamics of the relationship between the spokesperson and members of the press. A common concern on both sides of the table in press conferences has always been time. In the Information Age reporters can leverage a live image in protest when they feel they are not getting information quickly enough. Leaders in turn often feel reporters ask for too much information too quickly, especially regarding breaking news. The ability of the broadcast media to transmit real-time images to an all-news, all the time network can create pressure on leaders to produce answers and solutions as quickly as the press produces pictures. NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea has advised leaders and fellow spokespersons to be responsive to the

media without following it slavishly, to provide timely responses to avoid the accusation of “too little, too late.” Among the “Spokesman’s Rules” proposed in the Stockholm seminar report, dealing with the media in crises and peace operations requires flattening management for quick reactions and response. The pervasive presence of media in peace operations threatens to flatten the organizational hierarchy of military operations. Flexible leaders equip and educate their soldiers to interact with journalists within the bounds of operational security.

71. Despite the characterization of the media as gatekeepers, for the most part the press corps’ application of IT in the collection and dissemination of news is balanced because of its own need to remain a source of credible information. Other agents using information technology to communicate with the public include faction leaders and local activists with distinct agendas to persuade or provoke an active response from the audience. The peace operation mission must be equally prepared to deal with these actors as well.

72. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report said, “The Internet is the fastest growing instrument of communication in the history of civilization, and it may be the most rapidly disseminating tool of any kind ever.”²⁷ The United Nations’ worldwide website, established on 18 September 1996, registered an average of 129,066 site visits or “hits” a day in its first year. By January 2002 the site was receiving an average of 6,000,000 hits daily.

73. The power of the Internet, given its global reach and the speed and ease with which it transfers and propagates information, portends numerous applications for peace operations.²⁸ The Internet provides information on every UN peace operation and on regional organizations’ responses to crises across the world.

74. At the same time, the Internet has introduced a new medium for journalists and propagandists alike. From the screens of computer monitors around the world, “news” is disseminated free from the scrutiny of editors and publishers. Under media pressure to publish the story quickly and with sources unchecked, the opportunity for disinformation looms large.

75. The Internet can assist refugees in tracing their relatives, in the conflict area as well as from abroad. In a public-private partnership, Internet centres established at refugee centres in Europe and the United States have allowed refugees to access information and send e-mail to trace family members, an effort aided by an on-line newspaper distributed in all locations hosting refugees.²⁹

VIII. Concluding Remarks

76. The pace of IT development in the last half of the 20th century clearly outran its application in peace operations. Peace operations scarcely begun to take full advantage of the advanced telecommunications capabilities, information systems and broadcast media that now exist or are being currently developed.

77. The Challenges seminar series brought to the forefront some of the problems and frustrations associated with the application of information technology that exist today in support of peace operations. Similarly, participants raised some challenges that could benefit from IT solutions. Some of those solutions are available today by the use of commercial, off-the-shelf technology. Others point to the need for the development of new, IT innovations specifically produced for peace operations. Although information technology is not the answer to all the challenges of peace operations, it can go a long way toward improving the manner in which actors in peace operations train, implement, communicate, monitor, and explain their actions in pursuing their objectives of establishing and maintaining sustainable peace.

78. It is recommended that:

1. *Member States should be more active in using and refining existing IT in peace operations and should press for new and effective IT programmes for peace operations.*
2. *Governments should seek ways to redirect some of the IT defence expenditures towards peace operation needs.*
3. *At UN Headquarters, DPKO should take the lead, in cooperation with other departments and offices as may be relevant, in developing strategy and policy for the application of existing and emerging IT in peace operations.*
4. *The problems and challenges of IT interoperability in peace operations should be comprehensively addressed by DPKO CESS, with a view to resolving peace operation communication challenges and bringing the contingents of developed and developing countries more on to a common operational basis.*
5. *The value and practical possibilities of using IT more extensively in distance-learning and computer simulation for peace operation training should be energetically explored.*
6. *The promise and potential of IT in monitoring aspects of peace operations should be applied and further developed.*
7. *The rapidly changing nature of media reporting, the challenges this represents to current and future peace operations, and the opportunities offered by IT to address these challenges should be identified by the UN Department of Public Information, in cooperation with DPKO and other relevant departments and offices of the UN system, and strategies designed to respond to them.*

Notes

- ¹ Entitled "Information Sharing," it is important to note that this chapter does not allude to the collection, transfer or management of classified information. Although some communications systems recommended for information sharing could support classified information, the national and legal issues associated with the transfer of classified information are not addressed here.
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- ⁴ Campbell-Kelly M. and Aspray W., *Computer: A History of the Information Machine*, New York: Basic Books, 1996.
- ⁵ Department of the Army, *Information Operations*, Army Field Manual 100-6, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 August 1996, iv-v.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 – 3.
- ⁷ Goodman P.S., "Dishing up a New Link to the Internet", *The Washington Post*, 6 November 2000, sec. A01.
- ⁸ Fourteenth International Seapower Symposium, "Panel Discussion: Interoperability in the Information Age," in *Report of the Proceedings*, ed. Hattendorf J.B. and King E.K., Newport: Naval War College Press, 1998.
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- ¹⁰ Kenyon H.S., "One Box Covers Many Systems: Digital modular tool enhances flexibility and reduces logistics, training requirements," *SIGNAL Magazine*, December 2000; <<http://www.us.net/signal/CurrentIssue/Dec00/one-dec.html>>; Internet; accessed 19 Dec. 2000.
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- ¹² Dziedzic M.J., and Wood W.B., *Information Technology as a Catalyst for Civil-Military Unity of Effort: The Kosovo Test Case*, Unpublished Report, April 2000, p. 2.
- ¹³ Dziedzic and Wood, August 2000.
- ¹⁴ Korse S.G., *GIS in the Kosovo ethnic conflict solution. The project 'Sentinel'*, Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc., at <<http://www.esri.com/library/userconf/proc00/professional/papers/PAP929/p929.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 Jan. 2001.
- ¹⁵ Cyperus, *Global Geomatics' GIS on the digital front lines of military operations*, at <<http://www.cyperus.fr/CyperusFR?FR/Societes.nsf/communiques/C125680A0027195AC12568F7005BBF1D?OpenDocument>>; Internet; accessed 25 Oct. 2000.
- ¹⁶ Dziedzic and Wood, August 2000, pp. 4-5.
- ¹⁷ Institute For Defense Analysis, *Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates*, Research Summaries, Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1999, Executive Summary.
- ¹⁸ Goodale G., "Army Enlists Hollywood to Help Harden its Soldiers," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 Oct. 2000.
- ¹⁹ Central Joint Command, *CIMIC: Viking 99*, Swedish Armed Forces, 1999, at <<http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/represen.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 Feb. 2001.
- ²⁰ Hankins M., "Simulated training efforts foster interoperability, develop common procedures," *Signal Magazine*, June 1999, Vol. 53, Iss. # 10, pp. 40-41.
- ²¹ Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army, *Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication, part I, Military Doctrine*, Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1996, p. 185 – 186.
- ²² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Army Field Manual 3-07, Initial Draft, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, p. 4.
- ²³ Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the US Department of Energy.
- ²⁴ Salerno R.M, Parish R.R., Vannoni M. and Barber D.S., *Peace Operations: The Potential Role of Monitoring Technologies*, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, December 2001.
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- ²⁶ Tolison T.D., Timothy D., "Ground Surveillance Operations in Bosnia," *Military Intelligence*, January – March 1999, pp. 21-22.
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- ²⁸ According to the U.S.-based telecommunications firm, Telecordia Technologies, in mid-2001 there were an estimated 350 million Internet users worldwide.
- ²⁹ Weinstein D., *Lessons Learned*, Internal report of USIA's Information Bureau to the international public (undated document).

Training and Education

The key remedy for the challenges facing peace support operations as we enter the 21st century is the improvement of training and education in the area of peace support.

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg
Stockholm Seminar, September 1997

I. Introduction

1. The overall challenge is to develop a training and education system that can serve a wide spectrum of ‘customers’ – military, police and civilian - while ensuring a common standard that will contribute to operational success. Each culture has its own concept of training and education and any review of this subject must consider a series of geo-political, ethnic-religious and socio-cultural factors. It is useful to begin by defining the terms training and education:

Training is the provision of the technical and procedural knowledge and skills required in the performance of assigned duties; it is the development of a predictable response to a predictable situation.

Education is the provision of a base of knowledge and intellectual skills with which information may be interpreted reasonably and sound judgement exercised; it is the development of a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation.

2. Most organizations involved in peace operation preparation today address the subject from a mixture of both training and education, whether the student body is civilian, police or military. The complexity and intertwined nature of cause and effect in the conduct and implementation of contemporary peace operations require the highest level of command to be aware of the effects strategic decisions may have on the ground, but equally and importantly, the individual aid-worker, soldier, or policeman on the ground must understand the effects a single mistake in the field may have on the strategic development of an operation, should issues spin out of control.

3. For the purposes of this chapter all references to training and education relate to the personnel of a peace operation. As proposed during the Buenos Aires seminar, all training activities should comply with at least a minimum standards, while all are welcome to go beyond those basic expectations. Some aspects of training are included that may be conducted by members of the mission to advance the welfare and reintegration of the resident population, but specialized training is a

separate matter, for example, such as that discussed in part in Chapter 10 - Planning for Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

4. The need for improved training and education of peacekeepers arose on many occasions throughout the Challenges seminar series, either during discussions specifically aimed at such issues or in the context of exchanges of views on other topics. As part of the programme for eight of the nine Challenges seminars, visits to and presentation of the host country's peacekeeping training academy/centre were organised.¹ The final seminar in the series held in Buenos Aires in August 2001 addressed training and education as one of the two main topics and was concluded by a visit to the intra-American "Exercise Cabanas 2001" conducted in northern Argentina. This chapter aims to identify a range of challenges in terms of training and education and to pose some responses and/or recommendations. These challenges are related to the main characteristics of peace operations, i.e., they are multidisciplinary, multinational, complex in nature and influenced by the volatility of the situation on the ground.

5. Regardless of the cultural and other differences in approaches to training and education there is a need to develop a peace operations training and education 'template', an outline plan for all levels of training - strategic, operational and tactical - that can be adapted by all Member States to meet their own specific requirements while maintaining a minimum international standard. The requirement is not just for the military component of a peace operation but also includes the police and civilian components. The template should include an evaluation system, in order to ensure, at least, minimum training for the efficient and professional fulfilment of tasks, with the ultimate objective of achieving successful peace operations. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Military Division - Training and Evaluation Service (TES) is developing the Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTM) during 2002, which will address the need to have such a template available.

6. This chapter has five objectives that will address specific challenges:
- a. to highlight the need for greater coherence in the whole peace operations training and education system;
 - b. to establish the basic peacekeeper's profile in order to determine training requirements;
 - c. to ensure that the training content is correlated with the desired peacekeeper's profile;
 - d. to identify the most effective and efficient methodologies to deliver the required training; and
 - e. to develop an evaluation system that is fair, transparent, clearly understood, accepted and applicable to all.

7. As concluded elsewhere in this report, a key to success in conducting peace operations is the availability of an adequate pool of peacekeepers and peace personnel, in number and quality, for deployment to a mission in a timely and organized manner. To this end, the Member States can contribute significantly by the preparation of personnel through civilian, police and military training and education as part of a prerequisite for participating in and contributing to a peace operation. The United Nations is best placed to coordinate and lead this process of mission generation and enhancement, by continuing to provide the overall leadership in addressing the challenges, and developing the templates required.

II. A Peace Operations Training and Education System

... use the chaplain to learn about religious aspects.

Anthony Anderson
Carlisle Seminar, May 2000

8. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Training and Evaluation Service (DPKO-TES) is primarily responsible for the development and distribution of standardized peacekeeping training guidance. Given the pressing need to ensure operational success in the field, and aware of the critical personnel shortages often experienced by UN missions, the importance of providing guidance, and supporting material, that optimizes the chances for success and delivers the numbers of qualified military, police and civilians required, cannot be overestimated. It is also essential that decisions about who is or is not qualified be made by an evaluation system that is seen to be as fair and transparent as possible. This responsibility has been taken seriously by DPKO-TES, a responsibility that includes offering direct assistance to emerging troop contributing countries or nations (TCCs - sometimes also referred to as TCNs), and to United Nations missions through the Mission Training Cells in order to help them meet the required standards. It also conducts required specialized training as identified in its annual training needs analysis. The TES has developed basic standardized training guidelines during 2001 and will, during 2002, develop peacekeeping training assessment/evaluation criteria. The Civilian Police Division (CPD) assists Member States through the Selection Assistance Team to identify police officers that meet the Civilian Police criteria. DPKO assistance should also be extended to include the civilian components of the missions, as acknowledged by the Secretary-General.²

9. Prior to standardizing training, consideration needs to be given to analyzing the training requirement, i.e., what needs to be done, and then to determining how to do it. This has traditionally been a problem within the UN system where both Member States and, to a lesser extent, the Secretariat have been reluctant to accept the need for 'doctrine', seeing this as an intrusion on national sovereignty. Mr. Mark Malan suggested at the Pretoria and Carlisle seminars, more is required than

training standards and guidelines. For a broader discussion in this area, see Chapter 5 - Doctrinal Challenges.

10. The first challenge is to highlight the need for greater coherence in the whole peace operations training and education system. A challenge to developing a comprehensive system is the unwillingness of some troop contributing countries to abandon their own training practices. This would be a change from the present practice, which is that the DPKO-TES provides guidance on the content for UN peacekeeping training but does not get involved in the methodology of training and does not prescribe any methodology. In order to facilitate acceptance of this approach, it would also be necessary to make the training materials available in all official languages of the United Nations, a process now underway.

11. To the extent possible, as suggested by Dr. Albrecht Schnabel at the Buenos Aires seminar, peace operations training and education should be 'systematized'. Without such systematization, training represents little more than ad hoc responses to mission needs, driven by the 'gifted amateurism' that has no doubt been successful in some areas, but still with detrimental effects on the performance of certain peace operations in the past. It will be necessary to work toward a consensus approach, which goes beyond national or regional efforts, and, it goes without saying, beyond the confines of primarily military training to an integrated approach, partnering military, police and civilian peacekeepers. A step in this direction was made in 2001 by the TES, which introduced the Systems Approach to Training as the process to identify the needs, design, development, conduct and evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping training. This cohesive pedagogical system of training and education consists of the following elements:

- a. requirement definition (analysis);
- b. doctrinal development (guidelines design);
- c. standards determination (development);
- d. implementation plans (conduct);
- e. training assistance; and
- f. evaluation (and then validation).

12. Peace operations training and education cannot be considered either in isolation or as a 'new' entity. There is a body of thought and experience that has developed over the years, both in the broad sense of training and education and, to a lesser and more recent extent, in the particular area of peace operations training. Building on that experience it is possible to envision a consensus-based 'template' to support the training. The template developed must never be rigid, it should be responsive to an evaluation process the aim of which will be to keep the system current, flexible and dynamic.

13. During the process of developing the training and education template, as suggested by the Director of the United Nations Institute for Training And Research - Programme Of Correspondence Instruction (UNITAR-POCI) at the Buenos Aires seminar, it would be necessary to consult training and education expertise from outside the standard peacekeeping family, i.e., use educators and educational psychologists to maintain the goal of a global and systematized approach to training and education for peace operations. In other words: ...use the chaplain to learn about religious aspects, and use the training and education experts to learn about the pedagogical aspects. Access to the required experts raises the issue of making available the necessary human and financial resources.

14. One of the tasks in developing a training and education system, is to provide all those elements that prepare the maximum number of peacekeepers with the skills and competencies that enable them to conduct their operations in a safe and effective manner, and with a knowledge-based understanding of broad mission objectives.

15. In meeting the first challenge it is recommended that special attention be paid to the following aspects:

- a. provision of the human and financial resources to support the following;
- b. development of the criteria for the training of civilians;
- c. continuing the production of training materials in all official languages of the UN system; and
- d. utilization of training and education specialists as part of the development team.

III. Determining the Requirement: Peacekeeper's Profile

It's not a question of sending troops in blue-helmet disguise.

Colonel Mario Nakagama
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

16. Having stated that the training and education system must provide more than training standards and guidelines, it is evident that those 'products' must be relevant to the requirements of the military, police and civilian components of the peacekeeping 'family'. In order to determine the requirement, i.e., what training needs to be done, when and in what manner, one has to first define what the peacekeeper needs to know - and why - in order for him or her to do their job as an individual and as a member of a team. The second challenge is to establish the basic peacekeeper's profile in order to determine training requirements. A profile will have to be developed for each of the three components and, as will be explained later, for each of the levels of training. In this section the intent is to identify a basic peacekeeper's profile for all of the 'family' at the tactical level of training. This pro-

file might provide a model that can be adapted for each component and at more advanced levels of training.

17. Even though there must be a specific profile for the military, the police and the civilian peacekeeper, and even more specific job-oriented profiles, one may trace certain common competencies and traits. A peacekeeper should be capable of interoperating in a conflict or post-conflict area within a multinational and multi-disciplinary environment, respectful of different cultures and guided by a deep understanding of UN principles and of professional ethics, able to avoid conflict-escalation while ready to cope with it, and have a capacity for de-escalation. In addition, as pointed out by General VP Malik at the New Delhi seminar, a peacekeeper should have certain personality traits such as high morale, flexibility, autonomy and initiative, tact, patience and diplomacy. In other words, there is a basic peacekeeper’s profile that can be identified.

18. After the Buenos Aires seminar, CAECOPAZ, following-up their earlier work, developed such a profile, which they termed the “Basic Peacekeeper’s Profile” from which a “training package”, or “Common Basic Content” could flow.

<p>Interoperability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multinational • Multidisciplinary 	<p>Escalation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid • Cope with • Decrease
<p>Respect</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultures/ Religions • UN Principle • Duty 	<p>Personality Traits</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High morale • Flexibility • Autonomy and Initiative • Tact, patience, diplomacy

Figure 1 – A Basic Peacekeeper’s Profile

19. Should the preceding basic peacekeeper’s profile be accepted for the tactical level of training for the three components (military, police, civilian), then it should be possible to develop individual specific ‘common basic content’ for the operational and strategic levels of training. The generic military profile for the military component of a peace operation is generally accepted as reflecting a combat capability with an ‘add on’ peacekeeping capability. The former capability is quite well recognized as common to most modern militaries and does not need to be elaborated here, however without the basic peacekeeper’s profile it is difficult for a soldier who has developed a ‘let’s-win-the-war’ attitude to be successful in carrying out peace operation duties effectively.

20. The generic police profile would include national policing skills and like the military, the basic peacekeeper's profile, would be complemented by the capability of training local police. Additional information on the civilian police profile is addressed in Chapter 9 - Police – In the Service of Peace.

21. The generic civilian profile is the one that is most problematic at this point in time. Training is part of the military and police culture, it is mandatory throughout their professional careers. In the case of civilians, that is to say the civilian staff of the Secretariat, the Agencies, Programmes and Funds, as well as those recruited on short-term contracts for specific missions and tasks, there is a wide variety of skills training. The importance attached to training varies considerably, with the result that some benefit from training while others do not. In addition, for some civilian personnel training may be a more haphazard issue for a number of reasons: often insufficient funding; problems in getting time off for training; short notice recruiting, etc. There is also the issue of the reluctance of 'managers' to release their subordinates for training, an issue that could be addressed by implementation of a strict professional development policy accompanied by incentives, e.g., academic credits for training received.³

22. Civilian competence in a particular discipline, no matter how well developed through previous education, training and experience, does not necessarily equip the individual to perform well in a peace operation environment. In addition to developing the skills required for the specific mission assignment, the individual must be capable of working under pressure and often in a violent and volatile crisis situation. There is therefore a specific requirement to ensure that the required training is identified and delivered.

23. This issue of civilian training is another task for the international community, and DPKO in particular, a task requiring further attention as confirmed in both the Brahimi Report and by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It is the intention of DPKO to move forward on the issue of training of civilian peacekeepers, meanwhile, there have been a number of initiatives taken by some research institutions, by academia, by international organizations and others to 'fill the gap'.⁴ DPKO should consult with those entities in developing its own standards and guidelines for civilian training. In addition, as a result of recommendations in the Brahimi Report, the Staffing Section of DPKO is working on the development of a civilian standby arrangements system to parallel those currently in place for military and police personnel.

24. The basic peacekeeper's profile can also assist in determining the instructor's profile. Brigadier Gupta at the Carlisle seminar recommended that experienced peacekeepers with a training background be used as instructors to ensure high quality and relevant training. The instructors will hopefully display the competencies and personality traits inherent to a peacekeeper.

25. Extended experience of UN peacekeeping, particularly in the complex operations of recent years that seem likely to continue in the 21st century, is that there is more to preparing a peacekeeper than, “sending troops in blue helmet disguise”. Peace operations require a dedicated approach beyond the normal training requirements of the military, police and civilian specialist. Indeed, some would argue that peacekeepers are a breed apart and that there is a need to approach peacekeeping as a profession. This aspect will be revisited later.

26. In meeting the challenge of achieving an overall peacekeeping standard, it is suggested that the basic peacekeeper’s profile at the tactical level is a good start and therefore it is recommended that:

- a. profiles be developed for each of the components;
- b. special attention be paid to the civilian profile;
- c. professional development requirements and incentives be identified for the training of the civilian component; and
- d. in the longer term, the profile be extended to the operational and strategic levels.

IV. Common Basic Content

All training activities should comply withminimum standards, while all are welcome to go beyond those basic expectations.

Albrecht Schnabel
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

27. The third challenge is to ensure that the training content, or common basic content as it will be called, is correlated with the desired basic peacekeeper’s profile discussed earlier. As drawn from the Challenges seminar series, the common basic content is briefly described below:

- a. Language. Each mission usually has a designated official working language. Language barriers create problems and so, as far as possible, it is important for a peacekeeper to have a working knowledge of the mission official language, in order to be able to interoperate. Moreover, if practicable it would also be useful for the peacekeeper to have some rudimentary knowledge of the local language in the mission area in order to achieve empathy with the local population and enhance his/her understanding of the environment in which he/she is working.
- b. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). In order to be able to interoperate, there is a need to understand UN common procedures, which are sometimes different from national procedures. This training block might include: UN logistics and administrative issues, operational procedures such as patrolling, check-point duties, observation post duties, radio communication, driving skills, etc. Although an equipment requirement rather than an SOP

per se, availability of compatible communication apparatus is a tremendous asset for enhancing the SOPs.

- c. Civil-Military Interdependence. The civil-military relations so common to current operations dictate that there be training in a range of skills aimed at fostering cooperation and coordination among the military, police and civilian peacekeepers. Some guidance on the type of training required can be determined by reference to Chapter 8 - Civil-Military Relations and Cooperation. Relevant cultural and religious awareness training will help peacekeepers to work within the society they are to help, avoiding imposing their mindset on others. It should cover the range from general knowledge to the specific situation in the mission area. It also encompasses the ability to work and live with peacekeepers from different nationalities.
- d. UN Background and Doctrinal Principles. This bloc encompasses all those topics that aim at familiarizing the peacekeeper with UN processes. It should cover, *inter alia*, historical considerations, what the UN is, how it works, decision making processes, the UN Charter, UN peacekeeping principles (consent, use of force, impartiality), mandates, Status of Missions/ Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, ethics, etc. The knowledge and capacity to guide one's acts by peacekeeping principles should be complemented by the internalization of ethics dealing with duty, moral obligation and correct action.
- e. Negotiation Techniques. These techniques should be at the core of all peace operations training. Lower ranks should have a rudimentary understanding, while more senior mission personnel should be proficient. Negotiation techniques improve both civil-military interaction and liaison competencies, and promote cross-culture communication, active listening and conflict management skills.
- f. Public Information. This training should provide all peacekeepers with the necessary tools to deal with the media and the public at large while carrying out their tasks efficiently and professionally, rather than letting the media set the agenda, a challenge elaborated upon by Mr. Jamie Shea in the Stockholm seminar report.
- g. Combat / Survival Skills. Military and police peacekeepers need to refresh or improve combat and policing skills up to and beyond what might be required in the mission area. Training to a higher level than may reasonably be expected will enable a peacekeeping mission to cope with escalation. Civilian peacekeepers will require training in survival skills to enable them to operate safely and effectively in a crisis environment. General Al-Tayyeb at the Amman seminar stressed the importance of preparing troops and their equipment for operating in harsh climates and cold weather.
- h. International Law. An appropriate knowledge of human rights law and international humanitarian law (or law of armed conflict), is essential for peacekeepers to carry out their tasks in an ethical way, even though they may find themselves dealing with a complete loss of consent in the mission

area. These topics are covered in detail in Chapter 4 - Integrating the Human Rights Perspective.

- i. Gender. Another subject area requiring attention by training staffs is that of gender issues. This is covered in Chapter 7 - Gender Perspectives in Effective Peace Operations.
- j. Safety and Security. Personnel about to be deployed to a mission area in which there may be dangers for which they are unprepared, should be given safety and security awareness training and general guidance, the importance of which was underlined by Assistant Secretary-General Annabi, ASG for Operations, speaking at the Tokyo seminar. The issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 11 - Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel.
- k. Medical. Medical training should include HIV and other illnesses prevention and physical fitness, with the objective of acquainting the peacekeeper with the necessary measures to carry out his/her tasks in the best physical and psychological conditions, while providing first aid skills to act in case of emergencies.
- l. Attitude. The content block 'Attitudinal Contents' includes values, norms and attitudes to be fostered during the educational process. Education in values or attitudes, such as responsibility, respect, flexibility, critical thinking, autonomy and initiative, should run along all the curricular development.

28. The foregoing list, developed by the military primary authors of this chapter, is not substantially different from a separate list developed by a group of civilian experts.⁵ The list of key elements that the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) recommends should be included in pre-deployment training for civilians is as follows:

- a. general knowledge of the UN system;
- b. knowledge of the specific mission;
- c. security (e.g., mine awareness) and first aid;
- d. stress management;
- e. general field skills (e.g., working with a compass, map reading, driving a 4x4 vehicle, etc.);
- f. cross-cultural communication (working internationally, cultural sensitivity, working with and through local interpreters);
- g. communication (information flow, radio communication);
- h. human rights and democratic principles;
- i. Gender dimension of conflict;
- j. Civil-military cooperation; and
- k. Working with an interpreter.

The two lists are very similar in content, and therefore, being developed separately, can be seen as a form of verification. The following figure blends, as far as possible, both lists and slightly modifies the original list, which matched the basic peacekeepers profile with the common basic content to show the inter-relationship and therefore the ‘why’ aspect of training.

Basic Peacekeeper’s Profile	Common Basic Content
Interoperability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multinational • Multidisciplinary 	Common Language UN Common Procedures Civil-Military Interdependence
Respect <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultures/Religions • UN Principles • Duty 	Cultural/Religious Awareness Code of Conduct UN Background/Doctrinal Principles Gender Awareness
Escalation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid • Cope With • Decrease 	Negotiation Techniques Public Affairs Basic Combat and Survival (civilian) Skills International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
Personality Traits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Morale • Flexibility • Autonomy and Initiative • Tact, Patience, Diplomacy 	Safety and Security Medical Attitudinal Aspects

Figure 2 – Correlation: Basic Peacekeeper’s Profile-Common Basic Content

29. Providing a multidisciplinary analysis of training requirements, Ambassador Ward at the Carlisle seminar stressed that throughout the ‘life cycle of a conflict’ relevant training activities should take place. The type of training activities for civilian as well as military personnel varies according to the life cycle of the conflict and depending on if the training takes place during durable and stable peace, during periods of unstable peace, or during peace operations. During the peace operation, it is critical that civilian and military personnel train together whenever and as often as possible.

30. There has been growing recognition of the requirement for generic training for civilians, training which would then be complemented by pre-deployment training. Indeed there are specific studies ongoing in several countries and regional organizations, and all such undertakings should be strongly encouraged.

31. For the military, much of the common basic content implies giving greater emphasis to the 'soft' aspects of military science, while maintaining 'adequate only' combat skills. As highlighted at the Stockholm Seminar by a former senior official in UNTAC and UNPROFOR, this poses problems for some countries that have traditionally looked askance at soft military options, which is why it is so important to agree that this 'add on' training is a necessary aspect of a peacekeeper profile, not a diminution of the 'warrior ethic'.

32. The extent to which the common basic content can be standardized, and through which mechanisms, is open to debate. Consensus seems to be the most appropriate way of tackling the issue, but, if interoperability is important to success in a mission, the content should be as prescriptive as possible, leaving freedom to add whatever a Member State considers important according to its national paradigms.

33. The common basic content should be constantly updated through UN or national lessons-learned systems. Training should be adjusted to the changing demands of peacekeeping. For instance, DPKO - through its Current Military Operations Service - should provide troop contributors with updated information on missions in a systematized and periodical way. All significant experiences should be placed on record on the spot in order to pass them on to replacement individuals or units.

34. As noted at the Buenos Aires seminar, all training activities should comply with the minimum standards of the common basic content, while all are welcome to go beyond those expectations. The challenge then, expressed differently, is to ensure that peace operations training and education *requirements* are fully understood before programme methodologies and evaluation procedures are determined.

35. It is suggested that:

- a. DPKO-TES reviews the description of 'common basic content' described in Section IV above;
- b. generic training for civilians be accepted as a norm; and
- c. further work be done along these lines at the operational and strategic level to validate the concept described above.

V. Training Methodologies for Peace Operations

We must train together, since we work together.

Major General Tony Stigsson
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

36. Training methodologies are those activities which assist the educational process: in other words, the ‘how’ to teach. Methodological strategies should be attuned to the peacekeeper’s profile and to the nature of the common basic content. Methodologies are directly related to three other aspects of training and education: where to train, at what level, and by whom the training will be conducted.

37. As a point of departure for the consideration of methodologies, it is helpful to draw on the ‘what, where and who’ model now in use by DPKO-TES. The model (see Figure 3 below), slightly modified from UN usage, i.e. it is ‘demilitarized’, illustrates the stages of training and the responsible agency or agencies for the conduct of the training. The model starts with national training for national tasks, in other words training that is not related to peace operations but produces the ‘raw material’ from which peacekeepers - military, police and civilian - may be drawn. The generic training, or common basic content as it has been described above, is that ‘add on’ training that raises the value of the potential peacekeeper. The pre-deployment training prepares the individual or contingent for a specific mission area. That pre-deployment training is then rounded out by induction training on arrival in the mission area and, finally, as the situation changes within a mission, individuals and contingents need to be kept current through continuous refresher training. Responsibility for the conduct of the training is indicated in the right-hand column.

Refresher Training	Mission Training Cell
Induction Training	Mission Training Cell
Pre-deployment Training – Mission Specific	National Responsibility United Nations Guidelines Available United Nations Support Available
United Nations Generic Training – Non-Mission Specific	National or Regional Responsibility United Nations Guidelines Available
National Training for National Tasks	National Responsibility

Figure 3 – Stages of Training

38. Given the range of training to be conducted, the fourth challenge is to identify the most effective and efficient methodologies to deliver the required training.

39. The availability of information technology has been a boon in many ways to peace operations training, as can be seen by a review of Chapter 12 - Information Technology and Peace Operations: A Relationship for the New Millennium. In the

information technology category we can include computer-based learning, the use of web sites and distance learning.

40. *Computer-based learning* can be cost-effectively done at a distance while sharing knowledge and assembling a common base of knowledge. When used for exercising, it can foster technical interoperability. An example is “Exercise Combined Endeavor” (NATO/Partnership for Peace) in which participants connect with each other’s communications and information systems, constructing a giant network through which exercises and other tests are run in different ways. However, computer simulation and other technologies are expensive and many developing countries will not have access to this type of training except with assistance from developed countries.

41. The Tokyo seminar participants stressed the potential of the use of *web sites*, a variation on computer based learning, in which instructional materials are accessed through the Internet or an Intranet.

42. Another training delivery method is *distance learning* which is comparatively inexpensive. It provides unlimited capacity and it can be delivered almost anywhere. It fosters standardization and commonality, because it can be made available to a large number of students while retaining central control over the content. UNITAR-POCI, with its 13 different courses and its Cooperative Training Programme, is divided into three phases (classroom courses, 12 correspondence courses and an individually written research thesis) and may provide an expert theoretical view of peace operations, particularly for the generic training stage. The advantage of this type of programme is that the classroom portion can cover the practical aspects that cannot be completed by correspondence. Information technology, valuable though it is, is no substitute for various types of face-to-face training and field exercises.

43. *Face-to-face* techniques have disadvantages in that they are costly and limited in capacity, schedule and location. But in view of the peacekeeper’s training profile, the benefits are very significant because, if the techniques are well handled, they aim at improving interoperability. Classroom briefings or lectures are very useful to introduce a topic, but static presentations (Power Point, etc.) should not be abused. Training should be as realistic, interactive and comprehensive as possible, and so instructors should be skilled in handling meaningful group work for brainstorming, problem-solving, case studies, role-playing and dramatization, debates and round tables, workshops and seminars.⁶ This type of methodology addresses the serious lacuna among the different actors in a peace operation with the aim of breaking the barriers among different professional cultures. It is ideal for training at national and regional training centres in that the closer the peacekeepers train together, the easier their task will be in the mission area. For such training it is of the

utmost importance to establish training programmes with visiting representatives from a variety of organizations and institutions.

44. A very useful methodological strategy is carrying out *Field Training Exercises* (FTXs) as an essential complement to both distance and face-to-face learning. It is useful to set up scenarios where peacekeepers have the opportunity to drill in true-to-life situations. Role-playing and simulations in the field in real time, and on a large scale, are highly motivating and unquestionably profitable for the success of the training process and particularly valuable for pre-deployment training. Creating real life situations, which are taken from events that troops have experienced give future peacekeepers a realistic understanding of the situations they may face. In addition, by participating in this type of exercise, civilian peacekeepers get a better idea of how it feels to work under pressure in dangerous crisis situations, becoming 'veterans' before ever stepping into the mission area.

45. There are other training methodologies and organizational strategies that, *inter alia*, foster regional or multinational interoperability, cooperation and confidence among peacekeepers e.g., a *division of labour* among countries from the same region - as is the case with the Nordic countries - albeit this is sometimes constrained by geographical characteristics of a region, in particular, long distances. Another possibility is *interchanging instructors, programmes and training materials* among different centres. Interaction among participants during *seminars and workshops* can also lead to further training opportunities. Thus, during the series of Challenges seminars, in the margins of the seminars specific protocols were developed between Sweden and Russia, and between Canada and Jordan. At the Moscow seminar, a participant stressed the benefits of also encouraging intra-professional exchange of programmes between the various peacekeeping disciplines and organizations within, in addition to between, countries.

46. The use of *Training Assistance Teams* (TATs) by national and international authorities is proving to be of great assistance in reaching and maintaining required standards. At the UN, this term has come to refer to teams of military and civilian police. To date, the UNTATs have concentrated on 'training the trainers' programmes that targeted individuals. Recently, consideration has been given to whether this is the most effective means of delivery. High turnover of personnel and random selection of candidates for training have led to questions about the reality of creating a cadre of trained 'stand-by' personnel using this approach. An option being explored is to reorient the UNTAT training to concentrate on building the capacity of institutions, e.g., peacekeeping training centres, rather than individuals. Again, this raises the question of whether peacekeepers need to be identified as a group of professional specialists. Some of the tasks that can be undertaken by TATs during visits to units, as well as national and regional training centres include:

- a. assisting in the development of training objectives;
- b. advising on peace operations training matters;

- c. providing specialist instructional support;
- d. conducting special course serials; and
- e. assisting in evaluation of training.

47. Although not described as training *per se*, with respect to the selection of civilian police, the term *Selection Assistance Teams* has come into use to describe the support provided by DPKO Civilian Police Division to national authorities nominating candidates for UN civilian police positions. Indirectly, the expertise and advice provided by such teams is also a form of training, however, it is strongly recommended that a better approach would be to ensure that training guidance was provided in advance and that Selection Assistance Teams play a role more akin to evaluators.

48. The recent establishment of *Mission Training Cells* as part of a deployed mission addresses in-mission induction and sustainment training, and should not be seen as a corrective methodological strategy. It should not be seen as a substitute for the necessary generic and pre-deployment training. The Mission Training Cells provide, in the first instance, *induction* training for individuals and units arriving in theatre, complementing pre-deployment training. A key purpose of these cells is to ensure standard operating procedures and capabilities within the mission as soon as possible. Broad tasks for the cells include:

- a. current operations updates;
- b. skills particular to the mission; and
- c. safety and health matters.

49. The same Mission Training Cell should also be responsible for supervising or conducting *refresher* training as required, although experience is proving that provision of training guidance to commanders is probably the most effective method of delivering this aspect of training. This approach allows individual contingents to make allowances for differences in language, culture, etc. The Chief of the Training Cell in UNTAET noted at the Buenos Aires seminar that these are not easy tasks as all countries bring with them their own doctrine and training methods and practices. Nevertheless, given strong leadership and dialogue among all the contingents, common goals can be identified. In particular, the mission leadership must be alert to advising contingents of new requirements arising from changes in the operational situation or changes in mandate. The cells are authorized to have direct liaison with DPKO-TES and their SOPs provide guidelines for feedback procedures to ensure that lessons learned are captured at DPKO level.

50. The training methodologies and the nature of the training will determine the type of *teaching materials* to be used. The materials provided by DPKO-TES, as discussed earlier, provide the basis for standardization and come in a number of formats from standard printed material to videos and CD ROMS. It is essential that materials remain current and this is one of the advantages of maintaining ma-

terial on a CD, which is easy and inexpensive to replace. However, changes have to be made by experienced staff and therefore, again, there is a need for sufficient human resources dedicated to the task. Member States should draw on these UN materials to the maximum extent, providing supplementary materials for specific national needs.

51. Training aids, such as administrative forms, communication equipment, vehicles with either left or right hand drive, faction uniforms and weapons are all very useful during the conduct of exercises. They help in creating an atmosphere, which is similar to the mission environment. In this area of training aids, Member States will be primarily responsible for the acquisition of the materials.

52. While DPKO-TES can provide leadership in the design, implementation and evaluation of a globally recognized training and education template, it should do so in collaboration with other UN institutions, regional and national training centres and academic and NGO partners. These potential partners have to be an asset, not a burden and therefore it is worth exploring such collaboration. By virtue of its governance arrangements and membership, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) may take the lead in assisting DPKO-TES in establishing methods of creating standards/certification for regional and national centres.⁷ The centres could agree standards of training and evaluation criteria within the structure provided by IAPTC, a natural forum of debate for all the centres, in a kind of bottom-up approach that would provide advice to DPKO-TES, thus assisting in providing a regular dialogue between headquarters and Member States. The IAPTC could also play a role in the provision of their material in all official languages.

53. In practice, there is a limited number of methodologies that allow training together. The conclusion is that those methodologies facilitating that goal at the appropriate level and time should be the ones exploited. As to which methodologies are the most effective and efficient, and who should be supporting them, it would appear that the candidates are: computer-based learning, Field Training Exercises, regional centre seminars, Training Assistance Teams and instructor exchanges. Mission Training Cells should prove to be invaluable in the mission area.

54. It is therefore suggested that:
- a. every opportunity be taken to confirm those methodologies that allow for 'joint' training;
 - b. study continue to determine the optimum recipients of support from TATs, e.g., institutions *vis a vis* individuals;
 - c. again, training materials be provided in all official languages; and
 - d. sufficient resources be provided to ensure that training materials and instruction remain current at all times.

VI. Peace Operations Evaluation System

The Secretariat should as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy.

Extract from the Brahimi Report
Lieutenant Colonel Bjorn Skjaerli
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

55. Evaluation is an integral part of a training system and should be considered in three steps: defining agreed objectives, selecting a methodology, and evaluation of the 'final product'. The final product could be a trained individual or a trained contingent, therefore the methodology chosen must be tailored to the specific requirement. While a Selection Assistance Team for civilian police may focus on individual skills, a Training Assistance Team for an infantry battalion might be looking at the effectiveness of the unit as a whole. Evaluation in the former case could take the form of a written test, while in the latter case it might require a full-blown Field Training Exercise. Successful results of such evaluations should be a necessary condition for deployment, while serving as feedback to the whole training and educational process.

56. In most societies, when the term 'evaluation' is related to training and education, it immediately conveys a sense of judgement, selection, and even perhaps coercion, sometimes creating a negative response from those who are to be evaluated. It is not surprising that some countries may not welcome the idea of external evaluation, on the basis that training is a national responsibility and therefore only national authorities are in a position to make a valid evaluation. However, experience has shown that deploying under-trained personnel puts the mission at risk. Major Jaganathan, a Malaysian peacekeeper detained in Sierra Leone and speaking at the Tokyo seminar, observed that one of the major problems had been a delay in the deployment of peacekeeping troops and that when they had arrived they were neither properly trained nor prepared. The implementation of an evaluation process needs an education stage which prepares those who are to be evaluated and conditions them for the adjustments to training that may be necessary. Nevertheless, trainers and evaluators need to be aware of the potential difficulty in dealing with these ethical, technical, and cultural issues.

57. In this context, it should be noted that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in its report of 4 December 2000, stated that, "... as a standard practice, an assessment team from the Secretariat be sent to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor and stresses that such assessments should be administered impartially, without geographic bias."⁸ This underlines the fifth challenge, i.e., the need to develop an evaluation system that is fair, transparent, clearly understood, accepted and applicable to all.

58. The stated objective of the Standardization and Evaluation (S and E) Team of the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service is “to *assist* (author’s emphasis) Member States in preparing their contingents to meet the required peacekeeping training standards.” The S and E Team promotes UN peacekeeping training standards and guidelines; and evaluates performance requirements. Its tasks are broken down to include:

- a. developing and implementing peacekeeping training standards;
- b. evaluating peacekeeping training;
- c. providing feedback and recommending improvement and monitoring implementation;
- d. maintaining contact and liaison with peacekeeping training centres; and
- e. providing pre-deployment training guidance to Member States.

59. Proper evaluation is an ethical responsibility of evaluators, so much so that one of the important issues in this field is to determine the evaluator’s profile, that is the qualifications of the person or persons who will design the evaluation and administer it, who will collect the information, analyze the results and report. This process is similar to matching the skills of the trainer to what must be taught. In the case of an evaluation, it is essential that the training standards discussed earlier have been agreed, only then will it be possible to measure performance against training objectives.

60. Given the sensitivities involved in measuring and reporting performance in peace operations and the conclusions drawn on training effectiveness, utmost caution should be applied to make this a constructive process that will not pitch the more successful against the less successful. Ranking performance among Member States should be avoided under all circumstances. Moreover, such information should be shared and discussed only between the evaluators, the country concerned and their training centre.

61. There is also a technical aspect to evaluation. Evaluation is quite similar to scientific investigation: one must choose the paradigm, whether qualitative or quantitative, or mixed. There is also a question of analyzing the different approaches to see which is most applicable in evaluating peace operations training and performance and the choice is quite broad.⁹

62. Whatever the paradigm, the approach and the design, the evaluation has to be made operative with the creation of a suitable instrument: evaluation objectives have to be formulated, dimensions and sub-dimensions stated, and variables expressed in indicators. Even after creating a coherent evaluation system, one cannot be sure that all actors interpret the indicators in the same way. For example, an office in which personnel share ideas and informal chats may be judged as “lack of discipline” by one external observer, and as a “friendly and flexible atmosphere”

by another. Some variables such as avoidance of conflict escalation are difficult to make empirically demonstrable.

63. As in the case of the training and educational template, decisions should be reached with as much consensus as possible. The western pedagogical tendency is to view evaluation as a democratic process because its vitality arises from the participation of all those involved in the process. Not all may be of the same view. This stresses once again that the 'system' must begin with an agreed standard that will allow a wide range of trainers, educators and evaluators to agree on the state of the 'end-product'.

64. The emphasis in this section has been on evaluation as a part of pre-deployment training but evaluation is an ongoing process. Evaluation post-deployment is carried out by validation, i.e., confirmation in the mission area that earlier training has prepared the individual or contingent for the task at hand. Validation is ultimately the responsibility of the Head of Mission but commanders/supervisors share the task. Mission Training Cells are the logical focal point for training required post-validation.

65. Meeting the challenge of a fair, transparent, clearly understood and acceptable system will not be easy. It is therefore suggested that:

- a. discussions should continue with troop contributing countries to arrive at an accepted evaluation system;
- b. the evaluation system should be administered to all troop contributing countries without exception; and
- c. pre-deployment evaluation should be followed by post-deployment validation.

VII. Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

One day I went by a place where a group of men were hard at work. It was obvious that they were starting the foundation of a building, but I could not guess what kind of building it was. I got near one of the workers and asked him what he was doing. He answered he was working on a piece of rock to make it square. I went to another man, and asked the same question. The answer was that he was preparing a post that would support a wall. I repeated the questions again and again, and each man described his precise job. At last, I approached one of the workers and when I asked him what he was doing, he told me: "I am building a cathedral."

Gilbert Keith Chesterton
(reconstructed anecdote as told by)
Colonel Mario Nakagama
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

66. The above quotation was used by Colonel Nakagama to open the education and training session at the seminar in Buenos Aires. It is fitting to use it here be-

cause actors from many backgrounds and skills are contributing to the development of a United Nations training and educational system for peacekeepers, and many of the actors, like most of the workers queried by Chesterton, understand only a small portion of their contribution. The final challenge is to bring together all the actors and elements of a training and educational system to ensure the building of a comprehensive structure for peace operations training and education.

67. In the introduction to this chapter the overall challenge was to determine if it is possible to develop a training and educational system that could serve a wide spectrum of military, police and civilian ‘customers’– all bringing to their tasks a different perspective overlaid with a range of geo-political, ethnic-religious and socio-cultural factors – while ensuring a common standard that will contribute to operational success. From the discussions during the seminars and from subsequent work it is clear that such a system is possible, and much needed, and it confirms the view that the United Nations is best positioned to provide the framework for it. In other words, the “key remedy” as identified in the opening quotation from a seminar participant is attainable.

68. The challenges identified in this chapter were as follows:

- a. the first challenge was to highlight the need for greater coherence in the whole peace operations training and education system;
- b. the second challenge was to establish the basic peacekeeper’s profile in order to determine training requirements;
- c. the third challenge was to ensure that the training requirement/content is correlated with the desired basic peacekeeper’s profile;
- d. the fourth challenge was to identify the most effective and efficient methodologies to deliver the required training; and
- e. the fifth challenge was to develop an evaluation system, which is fair, transparent, clearly understood, accepted, and applicable to all.

69. In meeting these challenges it is recommended that action be taken on the following matters in the near term:

1. *Sufficient human and financial resources should be allocated to implement the following recommendations.*
2. *Criteria for the training of civilians should be developed.*
3. *Training materials should be produced in all official languages of the UN system.*
4. *Training and education specialists should be part of the development team.*
5. *Profiles should be developed for each of the components - military, police and civilian - with special attention to the civilian component.*
6. *The definition of ‘common basic content’ described in this chapter should be reviewed and validated.*
7. *Professional development requirements and incentives for civilian component training should be identified.*

8. *An agreed evaluation system should be developed that would be applicable to all.*
70. The following recommendations are offered for consideration in the longer term:
 9. *Consideration should be given to whether peace operations require dedicated expertise rather than drawing on 'generalists' from the military, police and civilian components.*
 10. *The 'common basic content' concept should be extended to the operational and strategic levels.*
 11. *A study should be made to determine the optimum recipients of support from Training Assistance Teams.*
 12. *Post-deployment validation should be instituted once a pre-deployment evaluation system is in place.*

Notes

¹ Swedish International Centre (SWEDINT), Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy, CIS HQ for Military Cooperation and Coordination, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (main host), Zarqa Peacekeeping Training Centre, Royal Police Academy of Jordan, South Africa Army College, US Army Peacekeeping Institute (main host), United Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (main host), USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping Training Facilities, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada (main host), Centro Argentino De Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones De Paz (CAECOPAZ) (main host), Gendarmeria Training Centre for Foreign Missions of Argentina (CENCAMEX). In 2002, Australian host cooperates with Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law and Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre.

² See para 105.c., Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/502 of 20 October 2000.

³ The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada, has arrangements with a number of universities for recognition of course credits.

⁴ Some representative organizations include Canada's Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Swedish International Centre, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the International Training Programme for Conflict Management based at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Italy, the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In addition UN entities such as UNU, UNITAR and UNIDIR are active in this area.

⁵ See, *The Training of Civilian Specialists for United Nations Peace Operations*, ACCORD Occasional Paper 3/2000.

⁶ Carrasco B.J., *Técnicas y Recursos para el Desarrollo de las Clases*, Editorial Rialp, Madrid, 1997.

⁷ www.iaptc.org/standards.html.

⁸ Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/C.4/55/6 of 4 December 2000.

⁹ House E., *Evaluation, Ethics and Power*, Ediciones Morata, 1995.

Determining Success in Peace Operations

I am firmly of the view that success in peacekeeping operations is not simply dependent upon effective performance in the field, although this is critical, but on the total partnership that contributes to the development and conduct of the field mission. In the UN, this partnership involves, among others, the Security Council, the Secretariat, Agencies and Programmes, the missions in the field, the parties to the conflict, and, most importantly, the Member States.

Major General Timothy Ford
 Military Adviser, DPKO
 Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

I. Introduction

1. In the spring of 2000, BBC America released a documentary film entitled “Peacekeepers”. It tells a story about a diverse group of young Britons and their experiences as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in central Bosnia in 1992. The experiences of these innocent young men portrayed in the film were unsettling to many. An American newspaper writer titled her editorial of the film: “Film Tells Why Peacekeeping Fails.”¹ In 1999, Dennis C. Jett published a book entitled, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* in which he painted a bleak picture that modern day peacekeeping is doomed to failure.² Others do not share Jett’s opinion. Many who have analyzed modern day peace operations, and many who have participated in them, believe that such operations have an important role to play in managing the challenges of the 21st century. Few, however, step forward and speak of success. Through a broad review of lessons learned, both good and bad, this chapter is primarily a professional soldier’s view of some practical measures by which practitioners of peace operations can determine whether they are, or are not, succeeding. As may be seen from the discussions in earlier chapters of this report, modern peace operations are complex activities demanding much inter-disciplinary cooperation and coordination and planning. Success is drawn from three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Once the groundwork is laid at the strategic level, operational leaders can lay out goals and objectives to facilitate success. Well-qualified individuals achieving the goals outlined by operational level leaders will determine tactical-level success.

2. The aim of the Challenges Project is to promote and facilitate increased cooperation and coordination between influential agencies and institutions from a wide variety of nations and cultures focused on seeking creative and proactive solutions to the challenges of peace operations, and to explore, express, and make available ideas of more effective and legitimate ways of dealing with regional con-

flicts. Essentially the entire project is aimed at defining how to succeed **in** peace operations.

3. It is not a typographical error why “**in**” is bold in the sentence above. In August 2001 at the Buenos Aires seminar, the theme was “Determining Success in and of Peacekeeping Operations.” Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, a keynote speaker, began his presentation by stating that he was pleased the seminar organizers had made a distinction between success **in** peacekeeping and success **of** peacekeeping. In elaborating his point, Ambassador Brahimi used Haiti as an example. “In 1996 at the end of my tour as Special Representative, there was almost total unanimity on the success of the UN Mission in Haiti. Now we are not quite so sure.” Success of a peace operation is in the eye of the beholder and changes over time. Just as Ambassador Brahimi saw Haiti in 1996, most would agree that the UN’s efforts in Haiti were a success when the mission ended in March 2000. Yet in August 2001, an ineffective parliamentary process, a return to corruption for the police force, and refugees once again fleeing from economic depression might signal that the UN efforts failed to achieve a self-sustaining country. Major General Evergisto de Vergara, former Force Commander of UNFICYP, speaking at the same seminar, highlighted the difficulties of establishing the parameters of success. Some will say the UN’s efforts in Cyprus since 1964 have been a failure. For many years, there seemed to be no end in sight, while others argue UNFICYP is a success because war has been kept at bay.

4. It is not the intent of this chapter to discuss a mission as a success or failure. The purpose of this chapter is to take a view that the glass is half full, not half empty, and lay out some practical ideas on how to succeed **in** peace operations. Much of this chapter applies particularly to the military component of a peace operation, but success depends heavily upon all elements of a peace operation working together in close cooperation. Many aspects apply equally to the police and civilians who, together with the military, contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the mission.

5. There is fundamental agreement among scholars, practitioners, and governmental policy makers from around the world that the 21st century will be a challenging time. Ethnic, regional, and cultural conflicts will continue to dominate the international scene. The future of the United Nations may well depend on how the Member States of the UN, and the UN Secretariat, deal with these challenges to international peace and security. Multidimensional, multifaceted, and multinational peace operations have come into being only in the last 10 years. Missions in Bosnia (1992-1995), Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola contributed to the notion that attempting a peacekeeping mission may be futile. Peacekeeping successes in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, El Salvador, and Guatemala have clearly demonstrated that the UN can perform the role outlined in the preamble of the UN Charter – “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Once

again, however, success is in the eye of the beholder. The more important aspect of success in peacekeeping is to ask the question: is the international community learning how to conduct peace operations? When one considers that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had only a handful of military and civilians in the early 1990s,³ numerous improvements have been made on how the UN manages these complex crises. In March 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned an experienced panel to review the lessons of past operations and make recommendations for improving UN peace operations. The Brahimi Report, released in August 2000, made some 57 recommendations.⁴ In recent years the UN and the international community have certainly improved the conduct of peace operations, yet comprehensive success can and will continue to be elusive unless governments, international organizations, and those who conduct missions begin to appreciate the lessons of the past.

6. There have been 54 peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council since 1948, of which 41 have been authorized since 1990. The number of international peacekeepers deployed has also changed dramatically over the last few years. In June 1993 there were 77,310 soldiers and civilian police deployed in UN operations; in June 1998, 14,570; and at the beginning of January 2002, 47,095. When one combines the current number of UN peacekeepers with the two NATO-led operations in Bosnia (20,000) and Kosovo (50,000), the number of international peacekeepers is at an all time high. These numbers are revealing for several reasons. First, the number of missions shows a growing willingness on the part of the international community, specifically the UN Security Council, to establish peace operations to handle the growing threat to international security. Secondly, the number of troops deployed in 1993 was due to the fact that the UN was conducting peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping.

7. After the missions in Croatia and Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1992-1995) and Somalia (1992-1994), both humanitarian peacekeeping missions that developed into peace enforcement, there was less willingness to use the UN in complex peace operations, particularly in the enforcement role. Relegated to primarily observer and interpositional peacekeeping (1994-1998), the number of troops declined, only to increase again in the late 1990s in order to meet the growing threats to international security, and as a result of a renewed acceptance by the Member States that the UN was capable of undertaking peace operations and should be supported in its missions. It was pointed out by Colonel George Oliver in the New Delhi Seminar in September 2000, that peace enforcement had become the mission of regional and sub-regional organizations or coalitions of willing states under lead nations. It should be noted that parallel to these developments recent UN missions have also been authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter and been given more robust rules of engagement than was previously the case. Overall, the growth in numbers of military and police peacekeepers clearly demonstrates an increased confidence in the UN's ability to plan, support, and conduct missions. Essentially, this all time

high reflects a belief by the nations of the world, and especially the Security Council, that peace operations can succeed.

8. Well before peacekeeping was invented, a renowned scholar and theorist of warfare, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote the seminal book *On War*.⁵ Military and political leaders have used his insights to conduct successful campaigns for fighting wars, focusing on two levels of operation – the strategic and the tactical. Later, the theory was developed to define warfare on three levels – strategic, operational, and tactical. Leaders who understand these differences, and understand where they fit, can focus their energies and ultimately achieve success. As argued in *On War*:

A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources, doing neither too much nor too little. But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only become evident in the final success.

It can be argued that the short paragraph quoted above captures the essence of success not only in warfare, but also in the conduct of a peace operation. For those conducting campaigns it is important to match resources with objectives. That applies not only at the strategic level (Clausewitz's prince is today's politician), but also at the tactical level (Clausewitz's general is today's captain). More important is the act of synchronizing all efforts into a "smooth harmony." In 2001, the challenge rests in the inclusion of not only military forces, but also cooperation and coordination with the civilian police, civilian governmental, non-governmental and donor communities.

9. Some peacekeeping practitioners and theorists on peacekeeping have picked up on the military's view on the levels of war and described them as levels of peace operations. Like warfare, theorists in peace operations are using the same strategic, operational, and tactical framework (Figure 1.1). The main difference is that the levels are compressed and the interrelationship increased. According to Brigadier General Ulf Henricsson speaking in the Buenos Aires Seminar, this compression is due to the more intense media coverage and considerably improved command and control systems. Of significance is the crossover between the strategic and tactical levels of operations. Where these two relationships cross is the "high visibility zone." A team of soldiers conducting a presence patrol may be confronted by an angry mob right in front of the media. Their actions will be captured for the world to see in real time. The decisions and actions of these soldiers will receive strategic attention long before the situation can be explained to commanders up the chain.

10. At times this can have a dramatic effect on the overall strategic framework. One such situation occurred in Kosovo in March 1999 shortly after the NATO bombing campaign began to pressure President Milosevic to end the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, when Yugoslav forces along the border with Macedonia captured

three American soldiers. The news and their pictures on TV had effect on the strategic decision makers long before any explanation could be made on what transpired. In March 2000, angry demonstrators confronted NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the town of Metrovica. The situation was spiralling out of control, so General Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, approved the decision of the KFOR Commander to commit a battalion from the U.S. sector in the southeast to the French sector in the north. Seeing on television that American forces were being employed out of sector, the U.S. Government sent orders to General Clark to return the U.S. battalion to its sector. Soldiers, and more importantly leaders, in peace operations must think of the second and third order effects of any decision they make.



Figure 1. Levels of Peace Operations

II. Analyzing Success in Peace Operations

11. Analyzing peace operations through a strategic, operational, and tactical lens has tremendous merit in determining success, because it allows practitioners of peace operations to break down the mission into workable pieces. Strategic measures include a thorough assessment of a potential mission; the creation of a clear, credible and achievable mandate that matches the mission with resources; selection of quality leaders to conduct the mission; and an adequate donor base. At the operational level, a critical component of success will include a plan that synchronizes the efforts across the many dimensions of the operation and the management of effective transitions of functions from one organization to another. From this plan, key leaders can break down the mandate and determine goals and objectives into measurable components. Dr. Patrick Hayford, speaker of the Pretoria seminar, stressed another key aspect of success at the operational level, which is that of communicating the peace effort. By communicating the mission's accomplishments,

trust and confidence (consent building) can be gained with the host country's officials and citizens. Lastly, tactical success will be achieved by carrying out the operational plans in a professional manner with well-trained and disciplined soldiers, civilian police, and civilians.

12. Successful businessmen, generals, and politicians know that the first step in achieving success in any task is to assign responsibility. In essence, determine who does what. That means defining who has responsibility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Table 2.1 outlines the level of responsibility of strategic, operational, and tactical actors in a peace operation. By understanding into what level leaders and managers of peace operations fit, they can begin the process of determining how to succeed. This chapter will give some practical measures at each of these levels where those involved can contribute to success.

<p>Strategic Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Security Council • UN Secretariat • Member States • Other International Organizations <p>Operational Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SRSG/Special Envoy and staff • Force Commander and staff • Humanitarian Coordinator and staff • Civilian Administrator and staff • Police Commissioner and staff • NGO managing headquarters 	<p>Tactical Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Units • International Civilian Police Contingents • Cells from International Organizations for specific purposes, e.g. election monitors • NGOs • Special teams from Member States, e.g. justice trainers
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Table 2.1 Levels of Responsibility

13. One key point needs to be mentioned. At the strategic level, instructions, guidance, and procedures are generally communicated downwards. At the tactical level, there is always guidance from above. At the operational level, however, key people must reach both up and down the chain, as well as laterally. Such efforts synchronize and coordinate the overall process. For example the Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) must work closely with the UN Secretariat to ensure smooth coordination and understanding between the strategic level and the operational level. Force commanders, humanitarian coordinators, civilian administrative officers and police commissioners must also reach up and down between the strategic and tactical levels. It is especially important to reach up to the UN Secretariat because the Secretariat tends to have many departments and units with hierarchical chains of command. Key examples include the Force Commander communicating with the Military Adviser in DPKO and the Office of Operations in DPKO; the mission Police Commissioner maintaining close and continuous contact

with DPKO's Civilian Police Adviser and the Office of Operations; and the Humanitarian Coordinator's close association with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and various elements in DPKO. A very challenging and critically important position in a mission is the Chief Administrative Officer. This official and his staff must work closely with many elements within the UN Secretariat, but the most important link is to the Field Administration and Logistics Division. The bottom line is that the Secretariat has a role in determining success well beyond the passing of a Security Council resolution and the selection of the right leaders. The importance of the UN Headquarters remaining engaged throughout the execution of the mandate cannot be overstated.⁶

III. Strategic Success

The true challenge in this arena [success in peacekeeping] is to synthesize from the available information what is key to success for a particular operation, expressing it in a clear achievable mandate, and then focusing resources to accomplish the mission.

Ambassador Chief Arthur Mbanefo
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

14. The Security Council and critical Member States have a role in determining success at the strategic level. In determining what a UN mission should do in a particular situation, one of their tasks is also to determine whether a UN peacekeeping operation should or should not be deployed. The Security Council is well defined, but what about other Member States? Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi stated at the Buenos Aires Seminar: "What is the international community? 189 Member States? It is much more narrow. It is the UN Security Council and all the countries with interest or influence in the region concerned. For example, to solve the problem in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are important. In Sierra Leone, Liberia is more important than one half of the rest of the world." Interested Member States can exert tremendous influence over nations or factional elements engaged in war. Through bilateral diplomatic efforts, interested or affected Member States have an obligation to end the bloodshed. If the right nations exert enough pressure, the parties to the conflict may solve their difference peacefully. Interested Member States also have the obligation to ensure that all members of the Security Council understand the conflict through letters to the Security Council, the appearance of the Permanent Representative before the Council, or communications between Permanent Missions to various parts of the Secretariat.

15. Strategic-level success will be determined from the outset by the creation of an achievable mandate at the right time. The Secretariat shares part of the responsibility in helping the Security Council develop an achievable mandate. That responsibility rests with a thorough assessment of the situation conducted by the Secretariat before any potential peace operation. Suitable conditions for a peace opera-

tion do not emerge overnight. It usually takes months or even years before the conditions for peace operations are ripe. The Congo was in turmoil for several years before the Security Council decided to deploy a few observers. In the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the fighting continued for two years before the international community could bring the parties to a peace agreement, and open the way for peacekeepers. Major General Franklin van Kappen, DPKO's Military Advisor from 1995-1998, used to describe it as follows, "when peacekeepers go in they freeze the situation. If you freeze it too early or freeze it too late the mission is doomed for failure." Too early and the parties have yet to come to grips with the situation and may want to continue fighting regardless of a signed peace agreement. Freeze it too late and the deep hatred for the other side has hardened and there may be no hope for reconciliation.

16. The Secretariat regularly conducts assessments of ongoing conflicts situations where a peace operation may be needed. At times, for example during the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea, members of the Secretariat participated in the negotiations for the peace agreement. Once an agreement seems likely to be achieved, the Secretary-General assembles a team and sends it to the region. A member of the Secretariat usually leads the team, and for complex and politically sensitive missions, the Secretary-General selects a senior civilian. The assessment team should include military planners, logistical experts, civilian police, and humanitarian specialists, but the composition will be dependent on the crisis. Their job is to conduct a thorough and complete assessment of the situation and, if a mission is warranted, develop a concept for the initial phase. Other critical aspects of their assessment include determining the level of consent of the parties, conducting a 'troop-to-task' analysis of the mission (to help identify an appropriate size of the force), assessing the humanitarian needs of displaced persons or refugees, and determining the ability of a host country's or neighbouring countries' economic and industrial base to support a peacekeeping force. When the team returns to New York they present recommendations on whether a peace operation is feasible and, if so, begin to discuss possible concepts with interested Member States.

17. All nations interested in contributing troops, police, or civilian resources should engage at this early stage of the concept development. Ambassador Emilio Cardenas underlined this aspect at the Buenos Aires seminar, by pointing out that this exchange of information helps potential contributors understand the mission and ultimately creates a more workable concept. At the New Delhi Seminar, General Malik summed up the importance of the planning effort by stating: Before launching any peacekeeping mission, a very careful politico-military analysis of the situation should be undertaken by DPKO. It has been noted that lately, learning from past examples, very detailed politico-analysis has been undertaken by the Secretariat, in particular for Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

18. The Brahimi Report recommends that “[t]he Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States ... regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation once it appears likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations might be reached.”⁷ In the past, formal Troop Contributor meetings were held with DP-KO only after the Security Council approved a resolution, however, it would be much better if consultation began formally before the Security Council vote. Ambassador Prince Zeid speaking at the Tokyo seminar, advised that this would allow Member States interested in providing troops the opportunity to obtain critical information that could affect their decision. From that information, governments contemplating participation could begin the process of alerting and assembling soldiers and civilian police, and thereby speed up deployment times significantly. No matter how good the initial assessment of the need, the input of the potential troop contributing countries is essential.

19. The assessment and concept of operations is communicated to the Security Council in a Secretary-General’s report, which outlines the recommended missions for a peacekeeping force, the size of the force, an estimated cost, and a concept of operations. For military leaders, this report provides many of the details commanders need to begin their planning. For members of the Security Council, this report outlines the concept in sufficient detail to begin the debate on the development of a resolution. The deliberations within the UN Security Council are of critical importance in that they ensure that the peace operation is supported politically, that the operation has the consent of the host country or countries, and they determine the timing and duration of the mission. In past missions, in order to find consensus within the Council, the final mandate sometimes lacked clarity in critical areas, and resulted in a mission-resource mismatch. Those debating the mandate must keep unrelated political issues apart from the development of an achievable, workable resolution. As participants during the case study discussion on Sierra Leone at the New Delhi seminar arrived at, it is essential for the success of any UN mission that there is congruity between the mandate, resources allotted, and objectives to be achieved.

20. The Brahimi Report recommends that the Secretariat create a system of selecting key operational leaders, and that they be assembled at the UN Headquarters as early as possible in order to participate in the planning process.⁸ The importance of the quality of leadership of a peace operation was elaborated upon at the Buenos Aires seminar. One of the reasons for the success enjoyed in the UN mission in Haiti was the early selection of leaders and their participation in a staff training exercise hosted by the lead nation of the operation before the mission began. Thus, when the team assembled for work in Port au Prince, procedures, a common understanding of the mission, a concept of operations, and an agreed upon vision for an end state were already decided.

21. The right operational leaders will have a significant impact on mission success. Although political skills are important in the leadership of a peace operation, SRSGs, Force Commanders, and Chief Administrative Officers should not be selected primarily for political reasons. Modern day peace operations require skilled and experienced managers with a capacity for leadership in these key positions. Essentially this means that key leaders should have appropriate expertise. Prior experience in complex contingencies is absolutely essential. Equally critical is an understanding of the UN system and how it operates.

22. The last element critical to success at the strategic level is the creation of an adequate donor base. For a troubled region or country attempting to recover from the human costs and economic ravages of conflict, success will be based heavily on external financial contributions. Contributions from interested Member States that help rebuild and restore infrastructure are critical to the mission's success as the UN peace operation budget will not be able to rebuild local businesses, create new jobs, replant crops, or return children to school. These and many other peace-building projects require the generous assistance of other nations, the World Bank, other international and non-governmental organizations. In June 1999, Under-Secretary-General Sergio Vieira de Mello during the planning for the UN Mission in Kosovo, stressed that while interest in the region was high, he was adamant that interested Member States should commit monetary donations to a UN trust fund. In 2000, now as the SRSG for the UN Mission in East Timor, Mr. Vieira de Mello expressed concern that donor fatigue had set in for East Timor even before the mission began, monies needed for East Timor were already assigned to Kosovo. The lesson here is that strategic leaders within the UN system need to get commitments for donations into a trust fund at an early stage of the crisis, while the interest is high.

IV. Operational Success

["]Success is dependent on a viable and supportive political context, feasibility of the mandate, quality of command, military discipline of troops, and co-operation from parties...

Sir Brian Urquhart
Former Under-Secretary-General⁹

23. If the strategic decision-makers have successfully crafted a workable, achievable mandate, formulated an effective strategic plan, selected quality leaders early, and established an effective donor base for the peace operation, then the corner stones of success have been laid. This does not mean, however, that headquarters can ignore the mission. Headquarters leadership must remain focused on the mission and be ready to support, and more importantly back up, the operational leaders in the field. Such times occur when the situation dramatically changes, the man-

date comes up for renewal in the Security Council, or when the donor base begins to weaken.

24. With the corner stones of success set, operational leaders have a sound basis for their work. Operational success in peace operations will be achieved through three distinct factors: first, the development of a comprehensive plan that synchronizes the efforts of all the major players, second, the identification of key measures of effectiveness that assesses all aspects of the mission, and third, effective management and control of major events and transitions from one agency to another.

25. The importance of joint planning and coordination across the civil and military divide was discussed by Professor Gene Dewey proposing the 'Comprehensive Campaign Plan' at the Amman seminar in 1998. During the initial stages of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the principal deputy to the Secretary-General's Special Representative took the lead in developing a comprehensive plan that managed the various elements comprising the peace operation in Kosovo. The plan synchronized the key pillars of the UN mission - the UN High Commissioner for Refugees responsible for assisting the return of refugees, the European Union responsible for infrastructure repair, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe responsible for reestablishing a government in Kosovo, and various elements of the UN conducting the civil administration. In addition, the efforts of the military arm of NATO and supporting forces (KFOR) also had to be blended in. This was no easy task. The comprehensive plan laid out organizational responsibility and the principal deputy held regular meetings with those concerned to ensure accountability.

26. Other peace operations had plans, but not as comprehensive as the one in Kosovo. It has been argued that there were some missions that had hardly any plans at all and simply reacted to one crisis after another, although it must be recognized that the UN is usually faced with situations of great uncertainty in which planning is very difficult. Peace operations must have identified objectives and progress in a forward direction. It is impossible to make progress when daily peacekeepers are reacting to the "hottest" crisis. With a comprehensive plan the peacekeeping mission seizes and maintains the initiative rather than being defensively reactive. There are no prescribed outlines for a comprehensive plan. Military commanders spend years training for and perfecting planning processes, but this is not the case for civilians, especially for politicians. In fact, some politicians prefer not to develop a plan because it limits their flexibility. Peace operations are complex and a high priority should be placed on the development of an effective plan.

27. The elements required in an operational plan include (at a minimum) the following: a situational assessment which includes the political, economic and military dimensions of the situation; an assessment of the willingness of the parties to resolve their difference peacefully (without which the operational plan for a peace-

keeping mission will normally go no further); a restatement of the mission assigned by the Security Council; a concept of how the mission will be accomplished (which may include any transitions from one agency to another); a prioritized list of objectives to be accomplished and, most importantly, who is responsible for each objective. The plan must also address any key events that will require special attention, for example, elections.

V. Measures of Effectiveness

28. From the comprehensive plan, each subordinate leader (Force Commander, Humanitarian Coordinator, Police Commissioner, Chief Administrative Officer and others) can take these objectives and develop measures of effectiveness to determine how successfully the plan is proceeding. Measures of effectiveness are dependent essentially on the collection of available information that can be tracked over time. The key is selecting the right information.

29. The business world has taken such concepts to heart. Mark Brown, in the book *Keeping Score – Using the Right Metrics to Drive World Class Performance*, lays out methodologies for businesses to achieve success. Essentially Brown describes a process for developing the right objectives and then finding the right metrics (information) that determine whether the objectives are being met.¹⁰ This is essentially what needs to be done in peace operations. Much of the information required is readily available in the mission. Table 2.2 outlines some examples of measures of effectiveness (MOE).¹¹ Showing progress by graphs or depicting these MOEs over time will help leaders determine the level of success of an operation and how the mission is evolving. The key is not to become over-enamoured with collecting information. Secretary General's reports to the Security Council demonstrate that there are literally thousands of bits of information. The key is to collect the right information that is directly tied to the accomplishment of each objective. For some objectives, however, new information might have to be generated.

30. The process begins by reviewing the comprehensive plan and developing goals that achieve elements of the plan. For example if the mission is to restore security, a goal might be to reduce the amount of violence. Data can be collected from soldiers or civilian police conducting patrols. This information is an MOE. Then by tracking the incidents of violence over time, a conclusion can be reached that the amount of violence is going down and therefore, security is enhanced. The type of violent activities can be further analyzed by breaking this information down to greater detail e.g. indiscriminate shootings, mine incidents, ambushes, demonstrations, riots, etc. From this analysis new missions can be generated, such as cordon and search operations, to eliminate hidden weapons.

Measures of Effectiveness in Peace Operations

Security measures

- number of incidents of hostile fire per week/month
- number of violent crimes per week/month
- patrols per week/month
- number of soldiers disarmed/demobilized
- number of weapons collected

Humanitarian measures

- tons of relief supplies delivered
- number of persons in refugee camps
- number of refugees still to be repatriated
- houses rebuilt
- number of mines cleared

Governmental restoration measures

- number of voters registered
- percentage of registered voters who voted
- number of serving judges
- number of cases tried
- number of elected officials

Infrastructure and institution measures

- percentage of homes with electricity/-water/heat
- number of businesses in operation
- number of trained local police on duty
- percentage of bridges/airfields/rail heads rebuilt

Public health measures

- infant mortality rate
- mortality rate
- number of outbreaks of various diseases
- gallons of potable water delivered

Agricultural and economic measures

- percentage of pre war land cultivated
- tons of seed distributed
- unemployment rate

Table 2.2

31. This process takes work and refinement, but once mastered, can be quite useful in determining success. Some measures of effectiveness may be related, so the goal is to select the best method of measurement. Mr. William Lysterly from the United States Agency for International Development suggests that infant mortality rate is a critical item of information. Experience has proven that the infant mortality rate is an indicator of the whole public health situation. The entire process of MOEs, however, is not static. Objectives and measures of effectiveness need to be modified as the situation changes. In Kosovo, for example, a weekly Joint Strategic Committee meeting was held to assess the objectives outlined in the UNMIK plan. If the process works well, crises can often be predicted and plans can be developed before events spiral out of control. One of the key elements in successful peace operations is convincing others that the mission is in fact successful, or that the mission is in trouble. In either case, the transmission of the correct message is essential. If in trouble, additional resources might be required. If successful, then the coherent methodology of determining success will help convince others that the mission is progressing according to plan.

32. The achievement of goals must be communicated to the local people, the strategic leaders, and key visitors to the mission. This is essentially a “selling job”. By describing to others, both internal and external to the mission, key elements in achieving success can be gained. For example, as strategic leaders visit, and they certainly will, both the objectives and the measures of effectiveness can be used to either gain more resources or show progress in the mission area. Another key reason for gathering information on measures of effectiveness is communicating this

information back to the people who were involved in the conflict. In distributing the correct information to the media and to key local leaders, consent for the peace process will be enhanced. Ultimately, the peace operation has to convince the parties to the conflict that resorting again to violence is not the way to solve their concerns.

VI. Transitions

33. Peace operations embrace conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. If the first of this trio is successful, violent conflict can be avoided and the deployment of peacekeeping troops is not needed. If, however, the crisis deepens, the capacity of the local government begins to disintegrate. The international community's ultimate objective is to restore the local governmental functions as quickly as possible in conditions of stability and security. In some cases, this can sometimes be done comparatively easily, especially in interstate conflicts. In intrastate conflicts, however, the destruction of local institutional, social and economic capacity is much more severe and restoration takes time.

34. Every peace operation will undergo transitions of functional responsibility from one actor to another as the operation unfolds and circumstances change. Transitions are key to the success of all peace operations. During the early stages of a peace operation, each functional component will arrive at the scene at varying times with varying capabilities. Development and humanitarian assistance agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually in a conflict area before the crisis erupts; some may leave as security conditions deteriorate but some will remain and become important parts of the peace operation. When the military arrive to deal with a crisis involving violent conflict, they may be followed closely by NGOs who return to resume the work they were doing. The civilian components of a peace operation normally take longer to build up to strength and will arrive over time, according to the expertise that is needed and their availability. The last and most important element is the re-establishment of local government.

35. As a peace operation begins to wind down, the military are usually the first to depart, followed by various civilian components, as their presence is no longer necessary. Depending on the circumstances, elements of the development and humanitarian assistance agencies may remain, together with some of the NGOs. The overall goal is to restore the local functions and leave the country functioning on its own in conditions of sustainable peace. Figure 1.2 depicts this concept.

36. As the comprehensive plan of a complex peace operation, involving peacekeeping troops, police and civilian elements, takes shape at the operational level, the plan should be phased or at least recognize transitions. Almost every element that supports the peace process or restores local capacity will undergo a transition. These




Figure 1.2

transitions are essentially a transfer of functional authority from one actor to another. For example, the military may initially have to be responsible for law enforcement (in which the police normally have primacy), but at some time this task will be transferred to the international civilian police and later to the local police. Another example is the management of critical infrastructures like electricity, railroads, and water systems. The military force may do some patchwork to get systems functioning, but subsequently an international agency will be responsible for the management of this critical service, and eventually it will be transferred to either a private business or the local government. Probably the most significant transition, yet the hardest to achieve, is the transition of the region from dependency on international aid to fully self-governing institutions and a stable market economy. None of these transitions will happen unless the operational leaders plan for them.

37. Transitions, especially to local communities, are significant events and should be publicized. A good example, in East Timor when a local school was repaired by a military engineer unit, the military commander ensured that the local leaders were present at the opening and received the credit for its opening. Such actions help build support among the local people.

38. Finally, transitions can be frustrating encounters among the actors and components involved in restoring peace. The agency that is about to transfer a function to another entity may well know in the comprehensive plan that a transition is supposed to occur at a certain point in time; but when that transition does not take place, frustration and tension ensue. There are many factors that contribute toward the properly organization of a transition. Some of those factors are beyond the control of those actively engaged in the mission area. For example in

Kosovo, at the one-year mark, the international civilian police were only at 77 percent of their authorized strength.¹² This caused tension between KFOR and UNMIK headquarters. The military wanted a quicker transition of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order to the international civilian police component. The problem was the lack of international civilian police on a global scale while, at the same time, there were demands for international civilian police in both Bosnia and East Timor. Such problems need to be raised to the highest levels – for both the UN and the Member States to solve. Patience is often required during transitions, but proper advance planning and communication between the agencies involved may prevent tensions.

VII. Tactical Success - through Training and Education

If we are to reach the spirit of Ambassador Brahimi's report, we must train. Train together since we operate together.

Major General Tony Stigsson
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

39. Those closest to the people affected by the conflict are critical to the success of any peace operation. Table 2.1 outlined the tactical level. This involves humanitarian personnel and NGOs who work in resettlement camps, rebuild people's houses or help them plant crops; international civil servants who work to restore governmental functions or serve as civilian (local) police, military units who conduct daily presence patrols; and contractors working to restore infrastructure, to name only a few, are the most important members of the peace operation. It has been suggested that those at the lowest level have caused the least problems when it comes to determining the success of a peace operation. Failure generally comes at a much higher level where responsibilities are heavier and decisions have a wider impact.

40. There are, however, still problems that need to be addressed. The Brahimi Report made the following recommendation: "The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy."¹³ That recommendation was based on lessons from past operations. The majority of the problems in the past have been units arriving in the mission area without the requisite equipment to conduct the mission.¹⁴ Nations each train their own way. Some train the leaders and allow the leaders to train the soldiers, while other countries send their soldiers, or more specifically the units identified for a mission, to peacekeeping training centres. Whatever the method, it is essential that peacekeepers are prepared before they are deployed to the region.

41. The aspects of training and education are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 13 of this report. However, it is worth emphasizing that proper education on the principles of peace operations can contribute greatly to mission success. The Military Adviser to DPKO at the Buenos Aires seminar stressed that education and training for peacekeeping is a national responsibility, and properly prepared peacekeepers are one measure of success. But training and education solely for military personnel are not enough. Civilian members of peace operations also need to have a similar opportunity for training as the military.

42. The problem, however, goes well beyond just training those identified. There is a shortage of both civilian police and civilian personnel available to work in peace operations. When they volunteer, they are generally rushed to a peace operation to fill a critical void and are left to learn their job in the field. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Member States and Organizations should consider ways of bringing together all prospective members of a peace operation so that they can be given proper preparation for deploying into a particular area or violent situation. Moreover, closer interaction between civilians and military at the training stage could significantly assist in building understanding and morale, and promote healthier civil-military cooperation during the ensuing mission.

43. Virtually all peace operations now require a very wide spread of talents and expertise. Discipline and professionalism are qualities that peacekeepers, both military and civilian, must possess. This means staying focused on the mission and not engaging in illegal or immoral practices, such as black market activities. Breaches of discipline degrade the mission as a whole. One incident can taint the entire operation, and tear away the very fabric of consent in the local community. Therefore, it is imperative that soldiers and civilians perform their duties in a disciplined and professional manner. Actions on breaches of discipline must be taken quickly. To protect due process of the individual, the best technique is to remove the individual(s) from the mission area rapidly, and take action back in the nation's own country.

VIII. The Importance of Consent

One cannot throw peacekeeping operations at every crisis in the world...If the UN cannot make a difference, it should not go.

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001

44. The ultimate factor in determining success in a peace operation will be the consent of the parties to the conflict. Regardless of how well the mandate is written, how well the operation is planned, how good the leaders are, or how well the soldiers, police and civilians are trained, it will all be for naught if the parties to the conflict do

not want to resolve their differences peacefully. This was proven in Angola, where neither the government, nor the rebel group UNITA could bring themselves to agree to a peaceful solution. After nine years of peacekeeping, the peacekeepers were withdrawn, and the country returned to war. At the 50th anniversary of UN peacekeeping held in New York on 6 October 1998, a renowned group of experienced peacekeepers highlighted that the UN should not undertake a peacekeeping mission without the consent of the parties – without a signed peace agreement.

45. A signed peace agreement, however, will not give a clear indicator of future success. Key leaders may well sign the peace agreement, but there may also be factional elements that have no intention of abiding by it. Until the progress achieved in 2001 in the Sierra Leone peace process, previous signed agreements were not worth the paper they had been written on. It appears that the rebels had only wanted more time to refit and rearm before restarting their campaign. As Dennis Jett pointed out:

Many parties in civil wars sign peace agreements for tactical reasons without intending to live up to their obligations. Movements and leaders may define the stakes in all or nothing terms. They may be willing to sign and implement an agreement if it suits their immediate interest, but will defect if the agreement will not bring them complete power.

46. For this reason, part of the assessment at the strategic level must be a thorough assessment of the consent of the parties to the conflict. Should the Secretary General determine that consent is not real or is transitory, the UN Security Council should not go forward with a resolution (which was the point of the remark made by Ambassador Brahimi and quoted above). If the international community believe that the conflict threatens international peace and security, then a Chapter VII mission, peace enforcement, should be authorized by the Council. It has been suggested that, in certain cases, the operation should be undertaken by a regional organization or arrangement or coalition of the willing with a lead nation state, authorized by the UN.

47. In peace operations, operational leaders need to continually assess consent. Consent of the parties may be good initially, but may dwindle over time. All practitioners of the peace process must remain focused on the consent of the parties. Throughout this chapter consent has been an underlying factor at almost every level of success in a peace operation. Consent is essentially behaviour modification, and psychologists will say that behaviour modification takes time and hard work. Initially, the people may long for peace and will welcome the peacekeepers. However, as pointed out by Ambassador Jan Eliasson at the Stockholm seminar, over time, if their problems are not solved, then the peacekeepers will be seen as just another military occupation force. Operational leaders and all at the tactical level are charged with the important task of convincing the local people and their governmental leaders that the peace process is progressing according to plan. When problems arise, actions taken by the international community to respond to them, must

be sincerely explained to the local population. This is the essence of why transparency is a principle in peace operations doctrine stressing that all parties should be fully aware of the motives, mission, and intentions of the operation.¹⁵

IX. Summary

Successful peacekeeping is the brainchild of the interplay of effective military, civilian and political or diplomatic action at all levels of operations between belligerents.¹⁶

Lieutenant Colonel Noble E.P. Bioh
Ghanaian Peacekeeper

48. As Dennis Jett's book pointed out, success of peacekeeping missions is often looked at after the fact, did the mission achieve its objectives and contain the conflict? Waiting to see if a mission is successful, after the fact, is a luxury the international community cannot afford. Conditions for success must be established in the beginning. If practitioners of peace operations want to succeed in their efforts, success must have constant and continuous focus. Success, like a glass of water can be looked at as half full or half empty. Take the half full approach. Be proactive.

49. Peace operations in today's challenging world are complex and must be subdivided into manageable components. The strategic, operational, and tactical focus helps break down the operation, but within each one of these there are areas in which to concentrate. This chapter does not and could not define all the elements required for success in peace operations. It is an attempt to highlight some key issues of the complexities of the task at hand, and seek to formulate thoughts on how to best work toward success in a peace operation.

50. At the strategic level, the initial assessment of a potential mission, the development of a clear and achievable mandate, and the selection of quality leaders will go a long way in setting the conditions for success.

51. Operational leaders must then break down the objectives and tasks assigned to them in order to do an assessment and formulate a comprehensive plan. From that plan key leaders can create measures of effectiveness that help them determine if the mission is achieving success or not. By analyzing these measures action can be taken to correct or head off any potential problems. Communication of the plan and the effectiveness of the plan are also crucial to success. Transitions and major events must be planned carefully and executed with transparency and professionalism. Mission preparation is essential, and this process involves the ability to understand the conflict situation, the peace process and where and how the process may go astray. Finally, success will demand the highest standards of professionalism on the part of all members of the operation.

52. In the end, however, success will only be achieved when the local population accepts and engages in the peace process. The old saying, “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink” is true for any peace operation. If the people demonstrate their consent to resolving their differences peacefully, then they are drinking from the well of success. In the end, when the history of a particular peace operation is written, it is the local population who will ultimately determine success. The civilian, police and military peacekeepers have a vital role to play in developing this consent. By focusing on the current mission, while applying learned principles from previous missions, dedicated peacekeepers will create the conditions that will give confidence to the local people that success will not only be possible, but should also become reality.

53. All who have participated in the Challenges Project seminars have done so because they wish to see success in the peace operations of the 21st Century. From the wide range of experience and knowledge shared in those discussions, only some of which has been captured in the chapters of this report, it is clear that the international community is learning more and more about peace operations. By reading, studying and learning, not just identifying the lessons of past operations, young men and women will be less likely to have to face the terrible dilemmas like the soldiers depicted in the film *Peacekeepers*. As the 21st century continues to unfold, the nature of peace operations will have to respond to yet further challenges. The Challenges Project Partners offer this report as a signpost to the road ahead.

Notes

¹ Geyer G.A., *The Patriot News*, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Monday, April 10, 2000, A18.

² Jett D.C., *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, Palgrave: New York, NY, 2001.

³ Durch W.J., *Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of 1990s in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, St Martin’s: New York, 1996, p.11.

⁴ United Nations, Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations document A/55/305-S/2000/809, dated 21 August 2000, i-ii. (Referred to as the Brahimi Report in subsequent citations.)

⁵ Clausewitz C. von, *On War*, ed. Howard M., and Paret P., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 10-11.

⁶ Erskine E.A., *Peacekeeping Techniques for Africa’s Conflict Management*, Afram Publications Limited, Accra, Ghana, 2000, p. 209.

⁷ Brahimi Report, para.117 (b).

⁸ Ibid, para. 101.

⁹ Urqhart, B., “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and How Their Role Might be Enhanced”, in UNITAR, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, pp. 253-61, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

¹⁰ Brown, M.G., *Keeping Score – Using the Right Metrics to Drive World-Class Performance*, Quality Resources, a Division of Kraus Organization Limited: New York, New York, 1996, pp.10-11.

¹¹ Parts of this list was drawn from a study conducted by Gregory Bozek, Science Application International Corporation, undated and a study done by Center for Naval Analysis, *Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, April 1996.

¹² Yannis A, “Kosovo Under International Administration,” *The IISS Quarterly*, volume 43 no. 2, Summer 2001, p 37.

¹³ Brahimi Report, para. 117.

¹⁴ Ibid, para.108.

¹⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Civilian Police Handbook*, United Nations Department of Peace keeping Operations, 1995, p. 7.

¹⁶ Bioh N.P.E., *Preparing for United Nations International Peacekeeping Operations in the Third Millennium*, (Noble PE Agyemang-Bioh: Accra, Ghana, 2000, p. 70.

Summary of Recommendations

The following recommendations are taken from the individual chapters. It will be seen that there are two recurring themes: a need for more consistent political and resource support from Member States, and a need for greater importance and attention to be given to training and education. Some recommendations are of a general nature while others are more specific. While in some instances those who should take primary action are indicated, in others they are deliberately left unspecified so that decisions may be made at the appropriate management level.

Chapter 2 – The Role of the United Nations and of Regional Organizations and Arrangements

1. Within their respective capabilities, Member States should make greater efforts to be more consistent with the political and resource support that they offer to peace operations.
2. The Secretary-General should be invited to offer his views on the benefits and possible pitfalls of closer cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements in peace operations, and on how best to improve that cooperation.
3. The topic of ways to improve cooperation in peace operations should be a subject for a future meeting of the Secretary-General and heads of regional organizations and arrangements.
4. The establishment of regional centres for early warning and conflict prevention should be encouraged and supported as appropriate.

Chapter 3 – The Legal Dimension of Peace Operations

1. The feasibility should be explored of negotiating a guideline document on existing practice, based on existing treaties, administrative acts and recommendations, that would serve as an implementing instrument of the UN Charter to provide adequate and sound legal grounds for peace operations.
2. Ways should be explored of reinforcing the legal foundation for the interface between universal and regional approaches in conducting peace operations.
3. A data base should be compiled and a comparative analysis undertaken of respective legislative acts and domestic regulations and their influence on the participation of troop contributing nations in peace operations with a view to enhancing unity of effort in peace operations.

4. Prior to mission deployment, all efforts towards training and education of the legal dimensions of peace operations should be encouraged at the international, regional, national, and local levels.
5. As a general recommendation, an initiative should be launched to conduct under the auspices of the United Nations a comprehensive study of legal aspects of peace operations.

Chapter 4 – Integrating the Human Rights Perspective

1. All personnel – civilian, military and police – should have a fundamental understanding of international humanitarian law and human rights law and, while this remains a national responsibility, international organizations involved in peace operations, as well as expert organizations such as OHCHR, UNHCR and the ICRC, should make every effort to reinforce national training.
2. Mission planning and implementation should include the necessary expertise and advice regarding human rights, also including expertise in the development and implementation of military rules of engagement.
3. All organizations contributing to a mission should appreciate the significance of dealing humanely and in accordance with existing laws with the issues relating to prisoners, detainees, the missing, and the abused.
4. All organizations contributing to a mission should strive for effective cooperation and coordination in support of mission objectives, including the cooperative pursuit of human rights standards, norms and objectives.

Chapter 5 – Doctrinal Challenges

1. The UN should have a clear set of basic principles for the conduct of peace operations, based on the UN Charter, Security Council decisions and international agreements, and applicable to the nature of 21st century peace operations.
2. The UN should examine the transformation of entire criminal justice systems in order to provide appropriate legal and practical doctrine for use in transitional administrations.
3. There should be a multinational and inclusive effort to define the meaning and scope of doctrine applicable to UN peace operations, as well as a forum for the regular articulation and recording of doctrinal statements based on recent operational experience of military, police and civilian mission components.
4. Led by DPKO, specific efforts should be made to apply lessons learned in the formation of peace operation doctrine, paying particular attention to the need to enhance military, police and civilian coordination.

5. The doctrinal consensus emerging from this process should be disseminated to all troop, police and civilian specialists contributing countries through a credible intermediary (such as DPKO).
6. Troop contributing countries should then take steps to build the emergent common doctrinal statements into their national doctrines, and to keep DPKO updated on the nature and scope of such changes.

Chapter 6 – Preventive Action

1. Root causes of conflict should be identified, and then eradicated through integrated programmes that address human security needs.
2. To be most effective, early warning should be transformed into rapid and early action.
3. It should be borne in mind that, in addition to governments, non-governmental organizations can be very helpful in early warning and peace-building activities.
4. Sanctions regimes imposed under Chapter VII should have clearly defined aims if they are to be effective, and there should be clear conditions for lifting sanctions.
5. Sanctions should be a tool of policy, not a substitute for policy.
6. For preventive action to be meaningful, it should be recognized that the mobilisation of sufficient political, economic and military resources is essential.
7. When ‘direct prevention’ is needed, it should be applied gradually by incremental steps from fact-finding, good offices, arbitration, etc. before reaching deterrence and enforcement measures, as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Chapter 7 – Gender Perspectives in Effective Peace Operations

1. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security should be appointed. Her/his functions should be designed on the model of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.
2. Gender awareness training should be initiated in all peace operations for military and civilian staff at all levels. The senior leadership should be specifically targeted in order to ensure that training is embedded within a broader framework that promotes and supports gender awareness in all mission policies, programmes and procedures.
3. The appropriate Gender Unit structure should be built into all peace operations. The Unit, staffed at a senior level, should report directly to the SRSG

and staffing should comprise both men and women and the recruitment of local staff is to be encouraged.

4. Member States should identify and promote a roster of qualified women for all levels of employment in peace operations, including high-level appointments.
5. The participation of women in the peace process should be increased. UN specialized agencies, implementing partners and NGOs should foster appropriate local initiatives and capacity building activities, mainly through funding, training, skills development and the preparation of women for public and political office.

Chapter 8 – Civil-Military Relations and Cooperation

1. Efforts should be made to build on the many shared values, competences and concerns that already exist between the civilian and military communities. This can be done through training and education, by a more determined effort at better communication and understanding at both strategic and operational levels and by starting this process on a national basis.
2. The fundamental challenges to better civilian-military relations - the obstacles, misunderstandings and dilemmas - should be acknowledged and addressed through, in the main, better training and education.
3. Consideration should be given to the development of a set of basic principles for better cooperation and operational coordination, for adoption by principal international organizations and arrangements, UN agencies and major NGOs. Such an initiative might usefully start within the UN system and/or through a sponsor nation or other international organization.
4. Specific efforts should be made at both the strategic (headquarters) level and the operational level to improve civil-military cooperation and coordination, and also to improve civil-civil cooperation.

Chapter 9 – Police – In the Service of Peace

1. In order to improve both the numbers and the quality of civilian police suitably qualified for deployment in peace operations, more support should be given by Member States to advance preparation, in the form of comprehensive databases of qualified personnel, coordinated education and training, introducing screening procedures, establishing pools of qualified personnel, the issuance of "blue cards" where appropriate, and better preparation and coordination of police equipment.
2. To ensure security and law and order during the crucial initial phase of a peace keeping mission an International Interim Criminal Code and a Criminal Procedure Code should be developed. This would highly facilitate in-

volvement of international prosecutors and judges as well as correctional staff in peace operations and the preparation and training of those categories.

3. Higher importance should be given during a peace operation to closer cooperation and coordination between the police and other elements, such as the military, the humanitarian and development organizations, NGOs, local authorities and communities.
4. There should be greater recognition of the importance of improving the whole legal chain, by the presence of suitably qualified and experienced personnel such as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, prison personnel.
5. As an important contribution to post-conflict peace-building, there should be arrangements for long term training of local police as an element of development cooperation work.

Chapter 10 – Planning for Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

1. There should be increased DD&R joint training for all partners in the DD&R process – training that is built around the concept of a comprehensive and integrated DD&R Plan.
2. There should be increased DD&R planning and implementation expertise in the World Bank and, in this regard, troop contributing countries represented on the Bank's Governing Council should begin to pay much more attention to this aspect of the Bank's work.
3. The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO should be the key player in the development and delivery of DD&R joint training and, in this regard, the TES should consider an updating of the UN DD&R Principles and Guidelines.
4. Member States should recognize the urgent need for the funding of long-term peace-building.

Chapter 11 – Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel

1. Member States should continue to pay close attention to the weaknesses in the present arrangements for safety and security of UN peacekeepers and associated personnel taking part in peace operations, with a view to providing the necessary political support and financial resources to the Secretary-General to make the improvements that are needed.
2. The aspects of security and safety of personnel should be taken into account from the beginning of the operational concept, that is from the report

of the Secretary-General that leads to the drafting of Security Council resolutions identifying the mandate and the subsequent mission planning.

3. Specific efforts should be made within the UN family to improve coordination and cooperation between the UN Secretariat and UN agencies and programmes, and within the UN Secretariat, to resolve issues of accountability and lack of clarity in command and control.
4. A major effort should be made to improve all aspects of training.
5. Greater attention should be given to information-sharing: with Member States in order to encourage more active support; with regional and other organizations to identify best practices; within and among the UN family to improve the security management system; with local people and communities to promote better security for UN peacekeepers; with the men and women who serve in the operations and take the risks in order to promote better confidence and trust in management.

Chapter 12 – Information Technology & Peace Operations: A Relationship for the New Millennium

1. Member States should be more active in using and refining existing IT in peace operations and should press for new and effective IT programmes for peace operations.
2. Governments should seek ways to redirect some of the IT defence expenditure towards peace operation needs.
3. At UN Headquarters, DPKO should take the lead, in cooperation with other departments and offices as may be relevant, in developing strategy and policy for the application of existing and emerging IT in peace operations.
4. The problems and challenges of IT interoperability in peace operations should be comprehensively addressed by DPKO CESS, with a view to resolving peace operation communication challenges and bringing the contingents of developed and developing countries more on to a common operational basis.
5. The value and practical possibilities of using IT more extensively in distance-learning and computer simulation for peace operation training should be energetically explored.
6. The promise and potential of IT in monitoring aspects of peace operations should be applied and further developed.
7. The rapidly changing nature of media reporting, the challenges this represents to current and future peace operations, and the opportunities offered by IT to address these challenges should be identified by the UN Department of Public Information, in cooperation with DPKO and other relevant departments and offices of the UN system, and strategies designed to respond to them.

Chapter 13 – Training and Education

1. Sufficient human and financial resources should be allocated to implement the following recommendations.
2. Criteria for the training of civilians should be further developed.
3. Training materials should be produced in all official languages of the UN system.
4. Training and education specialists should be part of the peace operations training development team.
5. Profiles should be developed for each of the components – military, police and civilian – with special attention to the civilian component.
6. The definition of ‘common basic content’ described in Chapter 13 should be reviewed and validated.
7. Professional development requirements and incentives for civilian component training should be identified.
8. An agreed evaluation system should be developed that would be applicable to all.
9. Consideration should be given to whether peace operations require dedicated expertise rather than drawing on ‘generalists’ from the military, police and civilian components.
10. In the longer term, the ‘common basic content’ concept should be extended to the operational and strategic levels.
11. A study should be made to determine the optimum recipients of support from Training Assistance Teams.
12. Post-deployment validation should be instituted once a pre-deployment evaluation system is in place.

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2. Asia Pacific Military Law Centre, Australia.
3. Australian Defence Forces Peacekeeping Training Centre, Australia.
4. Commonwealth of Independent States Headquarters for Military Cooperation and Coordination, Russian Federation.
5. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada.
6. Royal Police Academy, Jordan.
7. South Africa Army War College, South Africa.
8. Swedish International Centre, Sweden.
9. Training Centre for Foreign Missions (CENCAMEX), Argentina.
10. United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations Training and Evaluation Service.
11. United Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping, India.
12. United States Army Peacekeeping Institute, United States.
13. Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy, Russian Federation.
14. Zarqa Peacekeeping Training Centre, Jordan.

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11. Susan & Elihu Rose Foundation, USA.
12. NATO Information & Liaison Office, Belgium.
13. Hanns Seidel Foundation, Germany.

14. Jordan Television Corporation, Jordan.
15. London School of Economics & Political Science, United Kingdom.
16. Mayor of Amman, Jordan.
17. Ministry for Tourism and Antiquities, Jordan.

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List of Challenges Chairmen and Speakers

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Ms	Ng	Tisa	Member Executive Committee	UNIFEM	United Nations
Ms	Norberg	Carin	Assistant Secretary General	Swedish International Development Agency	Sweden
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List of Challenges Chairmen and Speakers

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Commander (GNA)	Zorzenon	Cesar	Director CENCAMEX	Training Center for Foreign Missions Civilian Police	Argentina

ANNEX 5

List of acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CAECOPAZ	Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise
CCP	Comprehensive Campaign Plan
CENCAMEX	Training Centre for Foreign Missions of Argentina
CICG	(Task Force) Commander's Information Coordination Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPD	United Nations Civilian Police Division
CPX	Command Post Exercise
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DARPA	United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DD&R	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DMR	Digital Modular Radio
DPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPKO CESS	Department of Peacekeeping Operations Communications and Electronics Services Section
DPKO SGTM	Department of Peacekeeping Operations Standardised Generic Training Modules
DPKO TES	Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training and Evaluation Service
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENIAC	Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer
EU	European Union
FACS	Field Assets Control System
FALD	United Nations Field Administration Logistics Division
FMLS	Field Mission Logistics System
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FWF	Former Warring Faction
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAP/Dayton Accord	General Framework Agreement for Peace
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GSR	Ground Surveillance Radar
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDA	Institute for Defense Analysis (USA)
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFOR	Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IM	Instant Messaging
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
INTERPET	International Force in East Timor
IO	Information Operations
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
JMC	Joint Military Commission
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction

List of acronyms

MEO	Mutually Enticing Opportunities
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MNB	Multinational Brigades
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSU	Multinational Specialized Unit
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFOF	Orders for Opening Fire
OHCHR	The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PO	Peace Operation
POW	Prisoner of War
PSO	Peace Support Operation
REMBASS	Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System
ROE	Rules of Engagement
S and E	Standardization and Evaluation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SENSE	Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
SGTM	Standard Generic Training Modules
SHARP	Sexual Harassment and Racial Prejudice
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPU	Specialised Police Unit
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWEDINT	Swedish International Centre
TAT	Training Assistance Team
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCHR	United Nations Center for Human Rights
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNITAR-POCI	United Nations Institute for Training and Research – Programme of Correspondence Instruction
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOs	United Nations Military Observers
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPCC	United Nations Police Commanders Course
UNPOC	United Nations Police Officers Course

List of acronyms

UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission (Iraq)
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)
UNU	United Nations University (Tokyo)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	Under-Secretary General (of the United Nations)
WAN	Wide Area Network
VHF	Very High Frequency
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
VTC	Video-Teleconferencing
ZOS	Zone of Separation