India’s Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense, and Arms Control

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this fifty-fourth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The focus of this paper is on the strategic context of South Asia, a region that increasingly sits at the center of United States security concerns. India is the world’s largest democracy (in terms of population), a regional power with both realized and additional potential relevance to United States security interests, and a nuclear power still struggling to formalize its national strategy, doctrine, and structure. Stephen Burgess develops the background, progress, and status of these efforts into 2004. He discusses the dynamic interactions across this process with India’s regional rivals—Pakistan and China—and with the United States. This stands as one of the few serious studies of India’s evolving nuclear doctrine that also incorporates arms control and missile defense into the strategic calculus. Therefore, even though India’s electoral process has recently mandated a change in ruling party, the trend lines in strategy and force structure, in strategic thinking that incorporates roles for missile defense, and in careful analysis of the promise and problems of arms control drawn here are valuable baselines for assessing strategic continuity and change as the political leadership shifts.

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JAMES M. SMITH
Director
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

India remains the only country to have released a nuclear doctrine without a security strategy. Domestic politics and internal differences, a lack of vision, and a fixation on its neighboring adversary, Pakistan, have prevented the promulgation of a clear security strategy.

However, since the 1998 nuclear weapons tests and the formation of a National Security Council, India’s security strategy has been emerging. The 1999 National Security Advisory Board’s Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine, the 2000 enunciation of a “limited conventional war” concept, and the 2001 endorsement of missile defenses have touched off debates over strategy within the Indian security establishment and point to the emergence of a security strategy. In the coming years, India may develop a clear and coherent national security strategy in an evolutionary manner, as Indian leaders think through the various issues and act on them and especially if the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remains in power for most of the next decade.

It is not certain that a security strategy would lead to transparency and confidence-building, and even if it does, transparency and confidence-building measures may not lessen the chances of war with Pakistan. At the same time, transparency is problematic for India as it demonstrates its vulnerabilities to China. There will be areas where India is voluntarily transparent to the United States in order to curry favor and other areas where it will not be in India’s interests to do so.

Transparency and confidence-building measures may be essential building blocks to prevent unwanted conflict with Pakistan, but the Bush administration does not see these measures as crucial in India-US relations. Since September 11, the US-India strategic relationship has accelerated and seems to be developing toward partnership, especially in the global war on terrorism, and the United States may find it desirable and necessary to eventually form an alliance with India to confront China.

India’s efforts to develop world-class defense capabilities and implement an ambitious security strategy have been hampered by an inefficient bureaucracy and an economy that is still emerging from state control. Over the past decade, India has been investing more in developing nuclear weapons and missiles than in conventional capabilities. However, India’s conventional capabilities need to be improved substantially if the country ever
hopes to move into the ranks of world powers. Assuming that India develops and publishes a coherent security strategy, a number of issues remain.

Since 2001, the Bush administration has promoted counterproliferation and missile defense in South Asia. India has noted the links between missile defense, arms reduction, and India’s defensive “no-first-use” policy. It continues to explore the acquisition of theater missile defense (TMD) with the United States and Israel, and may have a system in place by 2010. If India is permitted to acquire TMD, it may join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a supplier. Pakistan finds missile defense too expensive and suspects that Indian TMD might neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, which could open the door to an arms race. Pakistan’s ally, China, suspects that missile defenses are meant to minimize its deterrent.

In 2004, arms control in South Asia remains possible but problematic. India remains committed to a moratorium on nuclear testing and a “no-first-use” policy. Pakistan pledges not to test and continues to offer nuclear disarmament if India does the same. However, India wants to keep its nuclear weapons as a counter to China.

While the Bush administration has moved away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has not been negotiated, the United States is active in South Asia. Efforts include facilitating regional stability as well as encouraging India and Pakistan to implement confidence-building measures (CBM), cooperative threat reduction (CTR), and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRM). India and Pakistan both remain open to the CTBT (and India to the FMCT), but not the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). An April 2003 overture by India created the opportunity for negotiations that include the disputed territory of Kashmir, arms control, and implementation of the 1999 “Lahore CBMs.” The United States can assist the process from behind the scenes and help increase stability without changing the balance of power or encroaching on sovereignty.
INDIA’S EMERGING SECURITY STRATEGY, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

India is in the midst of the lengthy process of moving from the status of a defensive sub-regional, middle power, without a clear security strategy, to that of a more offensive-minded major power, with nuclear weapons, with interests to defend in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and with China as a competitor.\(^1\) During this process, Indian leaders and foreign and defense policymakers have been accused of lacking strategic vision.\(^2\)

In recent years, Indian leaders, policymakers, and analysts have turned their attention to the issue of how best to project power and the means to do so. Discussions and deliberations about strategy also include weighing the acquisition of new defense capabilities. Among the possible new capabilities is theater missile defense (TMD), which is being explored in cooperation with the United States and Israel. Also, the Indian government is promoting greater interagency coordination and planning for developing and changing its defense capabilities.

India’s emerging security strategy, changing defense capabilities, and exploration of TMD have been affecting relations with Pakistan and prospects for stability and arms control in South Asia. India’s testing and maintenance of a minimum nuclear deterrent and pursuit of a TMD program contributed to Pakistan’s development of a similar deterrent and reinforced its rejection of a “no first use” nuclear weapons policy and other arms control measures.

US involvement in South Asia since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and its role as mediator in defusing the May-
June 2002 India-Pakistan crisis, have paved the way for negotiations to settle the six decades-old Kashmir conflict and perhaps for arms control measures. Recent revelations of Pakistan’s role as a nuclear proliferator should provide the impetus for the negotiation of arms control agreements, especially fissile materials controls.

This study will address and analyze these issues in depth. First, issues and problems relating to security strategies, defense capabilities, TMD, and arms control will be presented. Second, relevant Indian and South Asian historical background will be provided. Third, India’s emerging security strategy and changing defense capabilities, including TMD, will be considered. Lastly, the exploration of missile defense by India and its impact on arms control in South Asia will be examined.

**Security Strategy and Defense Capabilities**

India remains the only country to have tested nuclear weapons and released a nuclear doctrine without first having a security strategy. Domestic politics and internal differences, a lack of vision, and a fixation on its neighboring adversary, Pakistan, have prevented the promulgation of a clear security strategy. However, since the 1998 nuclear weapons tests and the formation of a National Security Council, India’s security strategy appears to be emerging.

The lack of a published security strategy can be a source of confusion within a government and misleading to adversaries and great powers. Unclear signals nested among noise have been a major source of conflict. In India’s case, unclear signals have been transmitted to its adversaries, Pakistan and China, on several occasions in the past and have contributed to the outbreak or near
outbreak of war. Over the last decade and a half, unclear signals in South Asia could have contributed to the outbreak of nuclear war, particularly in 1987, 1990, 1999, and 2002. At issue is the extent to which unclear signals can be overcome by a published security strategy. A second problem is that, without a clear security strategy to follow, inappropriate defense capabilities can be developed.

The issue of India’s emerging security strategy and defense capabilities has become especially significant for the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks on the United States were organized in the South Asian region and drew the US closer to India than ever before, as the two powers consulted on strategies for combating terrorism. India offered basing and overflight rights to the United States as US forces faced the real possibility that Pakistan would reject overtures for basing and overflight rights and that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan might have been mounted partly from Indian bases. The Indian basing offer helped to improve US-Indian relations.

Furthermore, India’s broader security strategy and defense capabilities became of greater interest to the United States as conditions were evolving for an India-US partnership and perhaps for a future India-US alliance. A US-India partnership raises issues of future weapons purchases, technology transfers, and basing and overflight rights. In this study, the possibility is examined that India may become a major purchaser of US weapons. Currently, the United States is constrained by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions from certain weapons sales and technology transfers but still can sell an array of weapons to India.
US Security Strategies and Defense Capabilities

A security strategy is a statement of a nation’s interests and goals and the ways and means to fulfill them. One example of a relatively coherent security strategy is the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). The NSS is produced in a painstaking inter-agency process, and it has been providing guidance to government agencies, especially the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS), for more than a decade. The NSS categorizes American interests at various levels and details ways and means for securing and furthering those interests.

Well-established powers like the United States, and especially those with nuclear weapons, have found that having a published security strategy is useful and necessary. Most states do not have a formally published security strategy, but statements and documents cumulatively can constitute an informal security strategy. However, rising powers, like India, might learn from the US example and benefit from a published security strategy, thereby lessening the chances of strategic misperception and misunderstanding, failure, and defeat.

On the one hand, a security strategy can provide coordination and coherence among government agencies. It can also transmit consistent signals to adversaries. On the other hand, rising powers may not be ready for a published security strategy. Leaders may not clearly perceive or agree upon what the national interests are, how to achieve them, and what the future may hold. Foreign policy and defense bureaucracies tend to rely on tried and true methods, may not be able to agree on a published strategy, and may not be able to adhere over time to a strategy. Rising states and even established
powers may have problems of internal contention and instability that may prevent agencies and related actors from agreeing on a security strategy. Some government agencies may not adhere to an overall national strategy. Another issue is whether or not a published security strategy can overcome the problem of unclear signals. Furthermore, some states find that opacity in their strategic approach is better than clarity.

Even though the US Congress mandated an annual national security strategy in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, US administrations have not always been able to produce a strategy on time. For example, the Bush administration produced its first National Security Strategy in September 2002, more than a year behind schedule. New administrations have particular difficulty in coordinating actors, agencies, and interests in order to produce a NSS. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the Bush administration’s determination to transform the Department of Defense made the task even more daunting.

In the case of the United States, security setbacks provided impetus for the adoption of published security strategies. US strategic and operational failures in Iran (1980), Lebanon (1983), and Grenada (1983) led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and to the requirement that a national security strategy be published annually in order to provide a clear idea of the resources that the national security establishment required.⁸ Given the US experience, it would be expected that security setbacks would create incentives for other powers, including India, to adopt security strategies. As will be demonstrated in this study, the setbacks that led India toward a security strategy included Pakistan’s 1998 decision to test a nuclear
device after India’s test and Pakistan’s incursion into Indian-held territory during the 1999 Kargil crisis. Of special concern was the failure of deterrence against Pakistan as well as India’s inability to counterattack into Pakistani-held territory to retaliate for the incursion.

A security strategy guides and informs plans for the development of defense capabilities to achieve national goals. In the United States’ case, the NSS guides and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that outline the military ways and means to attain national goals. In turn, the NSS and NMS influence the development and change of defense capabilities. For example, the Clinton administration’s NSS espoused “engagement,” and for the military, this led to a strategy of “shape, prepare, and respond.” The NSS and NMS helped lead to the development of expeditionary defense capabilities, such as Air Expeditionary Forces and Marine Expeditionary Units. The Bush administration’s 2002 NSS focused on “preemption,” a major departure from previous strategies.

**Missile Defense and Arms Control**

Since January 2001, the Bush administration has moved the United States away from a forty-year commitment to arms control and treaties that helped to keep the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War from erupting into a nuclear holocaust. In de-emphasizing arms control, Bush officials have cited the inability of the international arms control regime to deal with the danger posed by “rogue nations” that possess or seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that cannot be trusted to abide by arms control agreements, cooperate with international inspectors, and keep
According to the latest NSS, the alternative to arms control measures is to subject rogue nations to preventive action or, in the case of a pending attack, preemption. In the case of Iraq, non-compliance with demands to disarm helped precipitate a US-led invasion, while in the cases of North Korea and Iran, rogue behavior brought intensified US-led multilateral pressures. WMD “counterproliferation,” including missile defenses, has superseded nonproliferation and other arms control measures in the National Security Strategy as the principal strategy.

Three major indicators of the Bush administration’s shift away from traditional arms control follow: US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and withdrawal from efforts to craft a tougher Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The administration asserted that the ABM Treaty inhibited the development of missile defenses, and Bush officials are now promoting missile defenses internationally as one of the best ways to prevent WMD blackmail by rogue states. The administration rejected the CTBT because it inhibited the development of new US mini-nuclear weapons that could destroy deeply buried targets. The administration asserted that the BWC was difficult to enforce, if not impossible to do so, without highly intrusive verification measures. Also, the administration proposed in 2001 to scale back the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that had been used to stabilize and dismantle Russian WMD programs. These and other Bush administration measures have led many to question the long-term viability of arms control.

One of the best cases that can be made for continuing to emphasize the arms control approach is the need to manage the
ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan that could escalate into a nuclear war killing tens of millions. The two countries have been confronting each other for more than half a century and, especially since their May-June 1998 nuclear weapons tests, have been engaged in two dangerous confrontations and a nuclear arms race. The May-June 1999 Kargil war and the May-June 2002 confrontation that followed the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament were serious crises that could have spiraled towards nuclear war.

Arms control agreements could prevent future crises from escalating into nuclear war and might slow the arms race. They could be used to fortify command-and-control and prevent accidental missile launches, control the production of fissile material and other WMD agents, and stop WMD and missile proliferation, which has been a problem with Pakistan. Arms control could lessen the chances of conflagration in the short and medium term, until the longer-term underlying problems in the India-Pakistan relationship, especially the status of the disputed territory of Kashmir, are resolved.

Since January 2001, the Bush administration has made efforts to build relations in South Asia, especially with India as a rising power. After September 11, 2001, the imperative of building good relations with Pakistan increased dramatically with the need to gain access to bases and overflight rights to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. During the 2002 India-Pakistan crisis, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Secretary of State Colin Powell visited South Asia on peacemaking efforts. These and other US officials impressed on Indian and Pakistani officials the dangers
of nuclear escalation and the horrible consequences of nuclear war, and they advocated nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) that would keep India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons under better command-and-control. These diplomatic efforts demonstrated the Bush administration’s interest in a limited form of arms control as part of an overall campaign to reduce tensions in one of the most dangerous regions of the world.

The US approach towards arms control with India and Pakistan is examined before and after January 2001. First, the extent to which the Clinton administration and India and Pakistan were genuinely committed and making real progress in arms control efforts in the 1990s is determined. Second, an assessment is made of the Bush administration’s approach, based upon interviews and secondary sources, to see if the US commitment to arms control has diminished in the sub-continent and to assess the impact that US promotion of missile defense has made. Third, a determination is made, based upon interviews and other sources, if Indian and Pakistani approaches towards arms control have changed as a result of the transition to the Bush administration with new ways of thinking. For instance, US rejection of the CTBT may have contributed to Indian and Pakistani reluctance to commit more fully to the CTBT and other arms control measures.19

**Definition of Arms Control**

Arms control emerged as a concept after World War I and was manifested in treaties limiting naval power and chemical and biological warfare. During the Cold War, the term applied to nuclear weapons treaties, including the ABM, Atmospheric Test Ban, and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) treaties, which slowed the nuclear arms race between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Arms control is often perceived as a short-term measure, while the underlying roots of conflict are addressed, and disarmament is achieved. The two best examples of disarmament treaties are the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In this study, a broad definition of arms control is used and includes

- limits on WMD use (e.g., the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical and biological weapons), development and production (e.g., the BWC, CWC, and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty [FMCT]), and testing (e.g., the CTBT);
- cooperative threat reduction;
- the implementation of nuclear risk reduction measures, including “hot lines,” systems for transparency, and agreement compliance verification, all of which also serve as confidence-building measures (CBMs);
- nonproliferation, and particularly export controls, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).20

**BACKGROUND**

From 1947 through the 1998 nuclear weapons tests, security and arms control efforts in South Asia were largely defined by the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan. The 1947 partition of British India created India and Pakistan as instant enemies and produced a security dilemma, which made arms control efforts difficult, if not impossible.21

**Early Regional Security Issues**

Before 1947, the British imperial strategy for India entailed the protection of sea-lanes from the United Kingdom to Hong Kong and the maintenance of buffer states in Central Asia.22 Once it was independent, however, India could not maintain such a strategy, given the country’s partition and its vulnerability to further secession. At the same time, Pakistan constantly had to think of
survival, and its claim to Kashmir became a rallying cry that created a sense of Pakistani nationalism.

Following the partition, the most important imperative for India for more than 40 years was to ensure that there was no further secession and that the country was consolidated. Successive Indian governments focused on maintaining internal security. India practiced a self-reliant economic policy, which reduced the importance of trade and the protection of sea-lanes. Instead of maintaining buffer states, India sought to counter Pakistan and its close relations with China and the United States by forging a relationship with the Soviet Union.

For most of India’s history, the principles of founders Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—in particular, peaceful resolution of conflicts and nonalignment—helped to guide security, defense, and foreign policies. Given India’s weakness and Prime Minister Nehru’s moral authority, diplomacy and nonalignment provided means to maintain security and project the country’s image abroad. India maintained its distance from the West and promoted disarmament. India, in 1965, was one of the first states to propose the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, though it later abandoned its support due to efforts by the United States and Soviet Union to designate “nuclear weapons states” that created, in India’s perception, “nuclear apartheid.”

Due to India’s emphasis on diplomacy and its post-independence domestic turbulence, the country acquired the reputation of being a weak state. This reputation was enhanced in 1962, when China handily defeated India in a border war that was started by the latter. Subsequent investigations determined that India’s security apparatus was plagued by poor strategy,
organization, and military equipment. Decisions about defense capabilities had been based more on domestic factors than any strategic considerations or planning.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{India Moves to Exercise Regional Hegemony}

In response to the 1962 debacle, India moved towards the Soviet Union, which began to supply warplanes and other military hardware and helped build Indian defense capabilities in both conventional and nuclear areas.\textsuperscript{26} In August 1971, India signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. In December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan and created Bangladesh, dealing a devastating blow to Pakistan. India and Pakistan subsequently negotiated the 1972 Simla Agreement that stabilized relations until the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{27}

In the wake of China’s 1962 victory and 1964 nuclear test, India developed a nuclear weapons program. In 1974, India conducted a “peaceful” nuclear test of a crude fission device. The nuclear test and the victory over Pakistan began to change India’s reputation from that of a weak state to that of a regional power.

In the 1970s and 1980s, India continued its nuclear and conventional military build-ups. Evidence emerged that Pakistan was developing a nuclear weapons program, which touched off a South Asian arms race. In 1983, India began a ballistic missile program, which led to an India-Pakistan missile race in the late 1980s. In 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to forge ahead with a thermonuclear weapons program. In 1989, the launching of a Pakistan-supported insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir led to a worsening of relations. India’s military exercises in the Rajasthan Desert in 1990 appeared to Pakistan’s leaders to be
the precursor to an Indian invasion of Pakistan and risked the possibility of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{28}

With the end of the Cold War, India shifted away from its alliance with Russia, though relations remained close. India’s military began to cooperate with the West. After establishing relations with Israel in 1992, military cooperation increased.\textsuperscript{29} More than forty years after independence, India engaged with the global economy, as the government enacted neo-liberal economic reforms and as the computer software sector of the economy developed. Consequently, trade and sea-lanes appeared more important to Indian leaders, as did the development of a “blue water navy.”\textsuperscript{30}

In the mid-1990s, the nuclear weapons program was in place and ready to be tested, and the short-range \textit{Prithvi} missiles that could deliver warheads against Pakistan were also operational. All that was needed was a political decision to test nuclear weapons. In 1995, the Indian government planned but then aborted a nuclear test after the United States discovered Indian preparations and applied pressure not to test. Further, that year’s indefinite extension of the NPT was criticized by India for preserving “nuclear apartheid.” While the nuclear weapons program remained largely in civilian hands, the military continued to adjust to the imperative of having to deliver nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Impediments to Arms Control Negotiations}

Why has there been little or no arms control in South Asia? One reason is that, unlike the bipolar balance of power that produced mutual assured destruction (MAD) and arms control efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the confrontation between India and Pakistan is asymmetrical and
pathological, as epitomized by the decades-old struggle over Kashmir. It has also involved meddling powers, particularly China, the United States, the Soviet Union and, later, Russia. Inevitably, negotiated agreements between India and Pakistan, such as the 1972 Simla Agreement, have been rare and have not been well implemented.

India has attempted to exercise regional leadership or hegemony, which befits a nation of more than one billion people. Meanwhile, Pakistan has resisted with outside assistance, especially from China, and has declared its intention to use nuclear weapons in case of an Indian invasion. For more than a decade, Pakistan has offered to give up its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT, if India does the same. India has rejected this proposal, with an eye on nuclear deterrence against China, and has countered with a “no first use” proposal. Pakistan has found that its threat of first use has deterred India and guaranteed survival.

In the late 1980s, India and Pakistan agreed to confidence-building measures and a joint commission, and promised to fully divulge information about their nuclear facilities, but the two sides never followed through satisfactorily. India’s and Pakistan’s rejection of the NPT and coolness towards other multilateral agreements and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections also inhibited the development of transparency between the two antagonists. India and Pakistan’s continuing opacity about their WMD programs has forestalled the establishment of deterrence and arms control. The 1998 nuclear weapons tests and ongoing missile tests have provided additional information but not enough to firmly establish the concept of mutual assured destruction inside the heads of the two countries’ leaders.
Efforts to achieve arms control between India and Pakistan have been complicated by Indian leaders’ perception that they must also seek strategic balance with Pakistan’s erstwhile ally, China, which has hundreds of nuclear warheads and dozens of medium- and long-range missiles that can strike anywhere in South Asia. Consequently, India has responded to China’s strategic profile and has strived to produce intermediate-range ballistic missiles and considerable amounts of fissile material that could be used to produce hundreds of nuclear weapons. Because of competition with China, India has rejected Pakistan’s call for mutual disarmament, even though such a move would provide India with an overwhelming conventional advantage over Pakistan. While China and India have made recent strides in overcoming disputes that are over four decades old, they have not moved towards a treaty and have not entered into arms control negotiations. Part of the explanation lies in China’s superiority in WMD programs and missiles and its long-standing position as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) under the NPT.

US arms control efforts in South Asia started with attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to pressure India and Pakistan to sign the NPT. India’s “peaceful” nuclear test of May 1974 and Pakistan’s determination to build a nuclear weapons program brought US sanctions, authorized by Congress’ 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, as the Carter administration attempted to stop a South Asian arms race. However, with the Afghanistan war in the 1980s, US support for Pakistan against the Soviet Union led to the easing of sanctions and an unchecked India-Pakistan arms race.

The winding down of the Cold War, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, two Indo-Pakistani confrontations in 1987 and 1990,
and economic crises and vulnerability in the early 1990s opened the way for reinvigorated arms control efforts in South Asia. In 1990, the United States acknowledged that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons capability, and the US Senate passed the 1990 Pressler Amendment, imposing stiff sanctions on Pakistan.

There have been two primary problems with the US approach of sanctions and negotiations. First, India wants to be treated like a great power and potential nuclear weapons state and not on the same level as Pakistan. This has made trilateral talks impossible to conduct. US sanctions and pressures to sign the NPT have caused resentment and led to Indian moves towards strategic self-reliance. Second, Pakistan has advocated multilateral negotiations where it believes that it will have US support on Kashmir and nuclear disarmament in South Asia.

**Clinton Administration Arms Control Efforts**

When the Clinton administration came to office in 1993, officials were determined to intensify arms control efforts. Among their early successes were the 1993 CWC and the 1995 NPT indefinite extension. Also of significance was the UN General Assembly’s launching of CTBT negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1993, as well as FMCT negotiations that same year.34

Clinton administration officials were particularly concerned about the rapidly escalating arms race in South Asia. US concerns about proliferation increased, especially on the part of Pakistan. In 1994, India proposed that Pakistan and India jointly undertake not to be the first to use their nuclear capability against each other. However, Pakistan refused and remained prepared to use nuclear weapons first in order to stop any Indian invasion.35
The Clinton administration was a major promoter of the CTBT, which arose in response to pressures to end the arms race in the post-Cold War era, build on the 1963 atmospheric Partial Test Ban Treaty, and protect the environment. Protests against France’s nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the early 1990s brought additional pressures for the CTBT. The negotiations over the CTBT coincided with a de facto global test ban that has now lasted a decade.36

The primary form of arms control negotiations in South Asia involving the United States was the effort to bring India and Pakistan into the CTBT. US pressure was especially intense on India, which was the lone holdout against the CTBT among the 44 member countries in the UN Conference on Disarmament that had the potential to develop and test nuclear weapons. Pakistan expressed its willingness to sign the CTBT as long as India would do so. Multilateral pressures on India came in tandem with US bilateral pressures on India and Pakistan not to test. The pressures led to intense debates within India and Pakistan about the CTBT and nuclear testing. India’s objections were that, as long as the NPT’s distinctions between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” were in place, the CTBT would reinforce privileges enjoyed by the nuclear weapons states. Thus, the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 without any disarmament concessions by the NWS was strongly criticized by India for undermining CTBT negotiations. In 1996, CTBT negotiations concluded in the Conference on Disarmament, and the draft was presented to the UN General Assembly and overwhelmingly approved, over the objections of India, Pakistan, China, and Russia.37 Subsequently, India and
Pakistan dropped out of arms control negotiations and raced to test nuclear weapons.


In the mid-1990s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rose in prominence and replaced the Congress Party as India’s major party. The BJP’s political philosophy of Hindu nationalism contrasted with the Congress Party’s secularism and inclusiveness. The BJP’s political platform promoted the interests of the Hindu majority at the expense of the Muslim minority and rejected external Islamic pressures on India. The BJP’s realpolitik and furtherance of India’s national interests outweighed principles of non-alignment and peaceful conflict resolution. The party was determined to move India toward becoming a morally superior “hard” state with a security strategy and defense capabilities that would enable India to compete with China. The BJP’s concern with strategic thinking was demonstrated with the 1996 publication of the future foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s *National Security: An Outline of Our Concerns*, which critiqued the lack of strategic thinking in previous regimes and offered his own outline of strategic considerations for the future.

In March 1998, the BJP became the major party after parliamentary elections and took power. Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Bihari Vajpayee gave orders to prepare for a nuclear weapons test. The BJP-led government decided to conduct a nuclear test primarily due to domestic politics and secondarily because of the BJP’s new strategic vision that included competition with China.

The week before the test, Minister of Defense George Fernandes called China “potential enemy number one.” Since
India’s defeat by China in 1962 and China’s 1964 nuclear weapons test, India’s strategic thinkers had been focusing on competition with China and the prospect of catching it. In May 1998, they concurred with Fernandes and rationalized the nuclear test decision by referring to the need for a nuclear balance with their potential adversary. China had tested from 1964 to 1995, and India wanted to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to its strategic competitor. After the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to President Clinton in which he named China as India’s principal security concern.43

India’s May 1998 test ended the country’s three-decades-old stance of nuclear opacity. In a statement to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, after the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and he promised to avoid an arms race, which would mean that India would produce just enough weapons for minimum deterrence.44 This nuclear doctrine statement was the first component of a security strategy.

**Nuclear Tests and the Emergence of Security Strategy, Doctrine, and Structures**

The May 11, 1998 test led Pakistan’s government to order a nuclear test, which was conducted on May 28, 1998. On June 6, 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1172, which urged nuclear restraint by India and Pakistan.45 The Pakistani test and subsequent US sanctions and pressures further influenced Indian leaders to formulate a nuclear doctrine and contemplate a security strategy.

Starting in July 1998, a series of negotiations between Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and US envoy Strobe Talbott dealt with nuclear weapons command-and-control and a transparent nuclear
Minimum deterrence meant that India would build enough nuclear weapons to deter Pakistan, and perhaps China, from attacking India. In order to guarantee no-first-use and avoid nuclear accidents due to faulty command-and-control, India would keep the components and the delivery systems for the nuclear weapons recessed and separate, and civilian control would continue.48

On December 15, 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke before the Rajya Sabha, India’s upper house of parliament, and outlined the following main features of nuclear weapons doctrine and policy:

(a) India will deploy its nuclear deterrent;

(b) India’s nuclear doctrine includes a policy of “No-First-Use” and “Non-use against non-nuclear weapons states;”

(c) a policy of “No-First-Use” with a minimum nuclear deterrent implies deployment of assets in a manner that ensures survivability and capacity of an adequate response, in other words the development and deployment of a deterrent with a second-strike capability;

(d) by way of meeting the concerns of the United States and its allies, India was willing to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty-to-come and to make its export control laws relating to “sensitive technologies” more stringent; and

(e) India will continue its missile development program and not accept any restraints on the development of India’s research and development capabilities.49

In spite of Vajpayee’s statement, a contradiction remained between the concepts of “deployment, survivability, and second-strike capability” and the government’s commitment to “minimum recessed deterrence.” The open possession and testing of nuclear weapons, India’s relations with Pakistan and China, and US
concerns about escalation, command and control, and other issues led the Indian government in November 1998 to charge the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) with weighing various options in regard to nuclear weapons doctrine and a national security strategy.

**A New National Security Architecture: The NSC and NSAB**

On November 19, 1998, the BJP government formed a six-member National Security Council (NSC), including Prime Minister Vajpayee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Singh, and Minister of Defense Fernandes, and appointed a National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, who was already Parliamentary Secretary. The government also formed a Secretariat, whose nucleus would be provided by the existing Joint Intelligence Committee, to administer the inter-agency process, and a Strategic Policy Group (SPG), consisting mainly of foreign and defense policy bureaucrats to advise on security strategy.

The government also created the National Security Advisory Board. The NSAB was partly composed of India’s foremost strategic thinkers, including journalists, academics, and former officials, and was charged with assessing nuclear doctrine and security strategy. The BJP government’s creation of a national security architecture was aimed at diverging from traditional policy-making processes in New Delhi and developing a more strategic-oriented culture. The NSC created an inter-agency process, and the NSC, SPG, and NSAB paved the way for the development and emergence of a security strategy. In particular, the NSAB helped bring issues of national security into the open for parliamentary debate and public scrutiny and comment.
A second goal was to bring the military into the national security decision-making process.\textsuperscript{54} In response, the government created a Chief of the Defense Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and a joint staff structure to integrate arms acquisition, logistics, intelligence, and military strategy.\textsuperscript{55}

In the fifty years prior to the creation of the national security architecture, elite groups of bureaucratic “mandarins” in the Indian Foreign Service and the Indian Administrative Service had run foreign and defense policy. Working primarily through the Cabinet Committee on Defense and National Security, they were largely divorced from politics and from strategic thinking.\textsuperscript{56} There was no inter-agency process nor was there an open parliamentary process. Instead, the decision-making process took place largely behind closed doors in the respective ministries and in the cabinet. The armed forces were excluded from the decision-making process due to distrust of the military by Nehru and other political leaders. Traditionally, the minister of defense and other ministers were only asked for clarification on technical matters in parliament, and they were not subjected to probing questions, particularly from parliamentary committees.\textsuperscript{57}

The new national security architecture was aimed at transforming the archaic decision-making process. However, the new architecture and a more assertive media struggled to overcome the influence of bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{58} The Cabinet Committee on Defense and National Security continues to serve as adviser to government for long-range threat assessments, and the NSC has not fulfilled its potential.\textsuperscript{59} Other problems remain, including the continuing marginalization of military leaders and the lack of legislative
oversight of national security and foreign policy matters and processes.

**The NSAB’s Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine**

On August 17, 1999, the NSAB released the *Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine (Draft Doctrine)*. The *Draft Doctrine* called for no first use of nuclear weapons, a “credible minimum deterrent,” survivability against a first nuclear strike, and second-strike capability. The *Draft Doctrine* recommended a nuclear triad of missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to deliver nuclear weapons. In the document the NSAB advocated moving away from a “recessed deterrent” toward one that would “shift to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time.” It called for an integrated operational plan or a sequential plan, in which generals would play a greater and more independent role and in which civilian command and control would be tempered. The *Draft Doctrine* made no mention of tactical nuclear weapons and flexible response command and control. While a triad was mentioned, there was little elaboration regarding nuclear submarines and SLBM capabilities. There was no assessment whether or not the triad could be achieved without further nuclear testing.

After the *Draft Doctrine* was issued, the government was split, with some cabinet members finding it too ambitious. It caused a debate between “hawks” and “doves” concerning nuclear doctrine and security strategy. Ultimately, the *Draft Doctrine* was not adopted as official government policy, and some of the more hawkish NSAB members were not retained after 2000. However, according to one of India’s leading strategic thinkers, K.
Pakistan and China believed that the Draft Doctrine reflected Indian government policy and constituted a plan for a sustained nuclear buildup. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Shamshed Ahmed, said that an international response was needed to arrest India’s “dangerous plan for nuclear and conventional arms escalation.” China’s response to the Draft Doctrine was that India should abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted in June 1998, which urged nuclear restraint on India and Pakistan.

To a large extent, the Draft Doctrine was intended as a device to placate US demands for nuclear doctrine, greater transparency, and command and control. However, the Clinton administration criticized it, commenting that contrary to the drafters’ belief that it would enhance India’s security, it would instead unleash an arms race in the region and further escalate tensions. The Clinton administration also demanded that India indicate how many nuclear warheads it planned to build.

After the Draft Doctrine appeared, the nonproliferation dialogue between Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh continued. In a November 29, 1999 interview in The Hindu Times, Singh clarified the government’s position regarding nuclear weapons. He stated India’s willingness to consider signing the CTBT and negotiating a FMCT. He further indicated in the interview that the NSAB was a group of non-official strategic experts and analysts and that the Draft Doctrine was not government policy. He reiterated previous statements about a minimum credible deterrent, which would remain recessed, no first use of nuclear weapons, and civilian
control. The foreign minister did not see SLBMs as feasible in the foreseeable future and warned against the development of tactical nuclear weapons. The statements by Singh, Vajpayee, and other government officials came closest to constituting a nuclear weapons doctrine. The relationship between nuclear weapons doctrine and an emerging security strategy seemed less clear and remained in a state of formation.\textsuperscript{74}

In a January 2000 interview, Talbott indicated that he was fairly satisfied with India’s nuclear stance and that he was not asking India to roll back its nuclear weapons programs. However, he also commented that the United States continued to be concerned about command-and-control issues, particularly given the level of tension and the rise in terrorism in the South Asian region.\textsuperscript{75}

**Kargil, the Need for Strategy, and “Limited Conventional War” (LCW)**

In the winter of 1998-1999, Pakistan mounted an operation combining regular and guerrilla forces that crossed the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC) in a mountainous area, thereby starting what became known as the Kargil War. The Pakistani forces were only discovered by India’s intelligence services in the spring of 1999, which led to considerable criticism from the BJP government.\textsuperscript{76} Subsequently, the Indian army mounted a counter-offensive, defeated the Pakistani forces, and drove them back across the LoC into Pakistan-controlled territory. Although India won the battle for Kargil, it lost the war of deterrence. Indian nuclear weapons had not deterred Pakistani forces from crossing the LoC.\textsuperscript{77} At the same time, Indian forces did not cross the LoC in any substantial way to punish Pakistan. Thus, it appeared that India had been deterred from counterattacking across the LoC by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{78}
The Christmas 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and subsequent submission of the BJP government to hijacker demands brought protests, particularly from Hindu right wing politicians, against the irresolution of the Indian government. In response to such protests and to the strategic impasse in dealing with Pakistan, Minister of Defense George Fernandes introduced on January 5, 2000 the strategic concept of “limited conventional war” (LCW) at a leading think-tank, the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Subsequently, the Army Chief of Staff and the powerful Minister of Home Affairs, L.K. Advani, backed Fernandes. The LCW concept posited that India could stage a limited retaliatory action against Pakistan, without risking nuclear retaliation. LCW supporters pointed out that China and the Soviet Union had engaged in border skirmishes in 1969 without a nuclear incident. The BJP government was split on the LCW proposal, and no move was made to adopt or implement the concept. However, Pakistani officials believed India’s seriousness about LCW and maintained their posture of nuclear ambiguity, refusing to indicate what their armed forces would do if India engaged in LCW actions.

After Fernandes’ announcement, IDSA conducted research on LCW and came to identify three main options: (1) a low risk operation, one that would be over as soon as it started; (2) hitting guerrilla training camps and larger military installations in Pakistan, resulting in revenge attacks and reciprocation in a “tit-for-tat game;” and (3) a default position to go up the escalation ladder to war. A likely scenario would be for an Indian division to cross the LoC in the south of Jammu and Kashmir and advance on guerrilla bases around Muzzafarabad. After engaging the Pakistan army, the
Indian division would have to be reinforced, which would result in a spiral to nuclear war.82

After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, India mobilized 700,000 troops against Pakistan and sent them to the LoC and to the international border. Once again, India threatened but did not engage in LCW actions for three reasons. First, US pressure against an Indian intervention was significant, especially since US wargaming analysis indicated that any Indian LCW action would spiral into nuclear war.83 Second, the Indian government was uncertain of the threshold that would set off a nuclear war. Third, India also did not possess the capabilities (especially attack helicopters) to undertake low-risk LCW actions, such as raiding terrorist/guerrilla bases and quickly returning to base.84 As an alternative, India maintained a military strategy of attrition, hoping that Pakistan would be unable to sustain a large military presence along the LoC.

The War on Terrorism, Defensive Nuclear Weapons Strategy, and the United States

In December 1998, Russia proposed a partnership, including India and China, which would balance the power of the United States, particularly the US defensive strategy that included ballistic missile defense (BMD). India was initially receptive to Russian overtures, and Minister of Defense Fernandes criticized American BMD plans and supported nuclear deterrence. However, President Clinton’s March 2000 trip to India and the easing of sanctions helped improve India-US relations. Consequently, India became less receptive to Russian insistence on deterrence and opposition to missile defense and became more open to US strategic arguments.85

In January 2001, the Bush administration came to office determined to dramatically reduce the number of US nuclear
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weapons without long, formal treaties with Russia, adopt a defensive nuclear weapons strategy, build a national missile defense (NMD), and promote missile defense systems abroad. Another goal was to improve relations with India as a rising power in Asia that could assist in balancing a rising China. In May 2001, President Bush proposed his missile defense initiative coupled with deep nuclear missile reductions. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee responded positively to Bush’s proposal, indirectly endorsing the concept of a defensive nuclear weapons strategy. On May 2, 2001, the Indian government released the following statement: “There is a strategic and technological inevitability in stepping away from a world that is held hostage by the doctrine of MAD to a cooperative, defensive transition that is underpinned by further cuts and a de-alert of nuclear forces.”

After September 11, 2001, India joined the US coalition against terrorism, provided overflight and port rights, and offered basing rights. One reason India offered basing rights was because the United States was fighting many of India’s adversaries in Operation Enduring Freedom.

On November 9, 2001 in Washington, DC, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke of the United States and India as “natural allies” and reiterated his support for Bush’s proposal. Also, in November 2001, the United States announced that it would leave the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and Russia did not protest. Instead, the United States and Russia agreed to cooperate on deep reductions in nuclear warheads and developing missile defenses. Suddenly, a defensive nuclear weapons strategy seemed more acceptable to the international community. In December 2001, May 2002, and August 2003, the US-India Defense Policy Group (DPG) met in
Washington, DC and discussed defense cooperation and a defensive nuclear weapons strategy. However, issues remained concerning the effect of such a strategy on Asian security and the acceleration of arms races, especially among India, China, and Pakistan.89

Indian strategists studied the probable impact of theater missile defense (TMD) and concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be largely neutralized but that China’s arsenal would not be affected.90 US experts assess that China would probably believe that an Indian missile defense system would be intended to defend against China, and the latter would be able to keep well ahead of India in any subsequent arms race.91

According to some experts, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s support for a defensive nuclear weapons strategy was intended to avoid a much more expensive strategy of developing intercontinental ballistics missiles (ICBMs), as China felt compelled to do in developing a minimum deterrent against the United States and Russia.92 Therefore, it seems likely that India will continue to explore a defensive nuclear weapons strategy as part of its overall security strategy but that it will be cautious in carrying out such a strategy.

Pakistan’s Reaction to India’s Emerging Security Strategy

Pakistan’s security stance and defense capabilities continue to be geared first and foremost toward survival against India’s rising power and its emerging security strategy. Pakistani leaders know that their country is less powerful on paper than India, with fewer nuclear weapons, conventional arms, and troops. They feel they have been forced by this asymmetry to develop all means available to ensure survival, including the building and testing of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of close relations with China.93
Pakistan has developed its nuclear deterrent in the face of sanctions, especially the Pressler Amendment, passed by the US Senate in 1990. In spite of the asymmetry, Pakistani leaders believe that their conventional military is prepared to defeat any Indian attacks. Pakistan has created a streamlined and militarized nuclear force, as opposed to India’s decentralized and civilian-controlled force, which adds to the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent but also raises command-and-control issues.94

Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan was in danger of facing an Indian-US partnership and marginalization. After September 11, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf provided the United States with basing and overflight rights for Operation Enduring Freedom and prevented India from marginalizing Pakistan in its relations with the only remaining superpower. It is likely that both Pakistan and India will continue to draw closer to the United States, which could contribute to a lessening of tensions and lead to a new strategic configuration in South Asia.95

Pakistan takes India’s efforts to launch LCW seriously, especially since Minister of Defense Fernandes, Minister of Home Affairs Advani, and the Chief of Army Staff articulated it. In spite of the LCW threat, Pakistan resorted to asymmetrical warfare against India in the Kargil War and is prepared to do so again. If Pakistan and India are unable to resolve the status of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan will continue to explore ways to destabilize the territory in order to try to draw in the United States and resolve the issue in Pakistan’s favor. On a more positive note, Pakistan seems to be stepping away from its previous strategy of maximizing its threat to use nuclear weapons.96 Now, the scenario is more one of
Pakistan has proposed to India a strategic restraint regime against weaponization and deployment of nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan believes that India is not interested in strategic restraint, particularly as evidenced by India’s embrace of missile defense. Given Pakistan’s strategic posture, India remains confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan’s first-strike, defensive, and insurgency advantages. Some have suggested that the way out of the strategic impasse is for India to renounce its “no-first-use” policy and develop a first-strike capability, which would present strategic problems for Pakistan.

Even if India were to develop a published and seemingly transparent security strategy, there is a good chance that it will have little effect on improving the India-Pakistan relationship. However, the relationship between India and Pakistan is so pathological that having a national security strategy or doctrine really does not shed any transparency because of distrust.

**China’s Security Strategy and Defense Capabilities in Relation to India**

China’s security strategy from 1949 to 1989, which was geared toward survival against the United States and the Soviet Union, included developing nuclear weapons and playing one superpower off the other. China’s victory over India in 1962 established the former as one of the foremost powers in Asia. India’s support for Tibet’s right to self-determination became a principal sore point in relations from the 1960s onwards. After 1989, China’s security strategy focused on contention with the United States over Taiwan, weapons proliferation, illegal trading practices, and other issues, and China has been steadily modernizing its defense capabilities.
The relationship between China and Pakistan is not a solid alliance, and China has a history of not coming through for Pakistan. However, Indian officials still believe there is an alliance intended to encircle their country. Currently, China is backing off from missile cooperation with Pakistan. In regard to the border dispute on India’s northeast border, China is willing to negotiate with India, as it is not a serious issue or challenge for the Chinese.  

China’s overtures to India in recent years can be seen as an effort to prevent the latter from falling into the US camp. As China expands into Southeast and Central Asia, India will have to develop a strategy to contend with the possibility of Chinese dominance. China will also want to become more involved in South Asian affairs, while India would like to exclude China.  

Regarding nuclear arms and doctrine, China will continue to upgrade its second-strike capability, which may lead India into an arms race. Once China has full confidence in the capabilities of its missile systems, the situation in the Asian region may develop toward one of Chinese hegemony.  

India will continue to be inspired to compete with China. However, India may not have the will or the capability to persevere in an arms race with China. In order to avoid an expensive arms race, India instead may try to form alliances with the United States, Japan, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members against China.  

India’s Expanding Interests and Emerging Security Strategy  

India’s interests will feature an increasing need to protect trade routes as trade continues to grow, and to guarantee access to rising supplies of oil and gas as the economy and population expand.
India will be receiving increasing amounts of oil and gas from Central Asia and will have to maintain its partnership with Russia, possibly forming alliances with Russia, Kazakhstan, and other states in order to protect energy flows. India is participating in protecting commercial traffic in the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean in cooperation with the United States and other powers. India needs a significant naval presence in order to (1) protect against sea piracy and fisheries poaching; (2) ensure the rights to disputed islands; and (3) provide security against infiltration into the Indian Ocean by Malaysia and other states.\textsuperscript{106}

In the future, India will probably participate in protection of the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the South China Sea. Eventually, India and China could clash over the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, or the Indian Ocean. India may form partnerships and alliances with Iran, ASEAN, Korea, and Japan.\textsuperscript{107} Its memberships in multi-lateral organizations provide a framework for furthering its interests. India is already a leading member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Governance and poverty constraints could prevent India from becoming one of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries.\textsuperscript{108} However, by 2015, Indian economic expansion will create interests throughout the world. The issue will be how to protect those emerging interests. For example, large numbers of Indian expatriates living in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region could be victimized at some stage and would need protection. In order to defend its interests, India could forge a partnership or alliance with the United States. This is a likely scenario, given rising trade and
improving relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{109} It is also likely that India will forge close relations with Iran.\textsuperscript{110}

On the other side of the argument, there are those Indian strategic thinkers who argue in favor of self-reliance and free agency. Some hawks even advocate targeting ICBMs at Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to enhance India’s great power stature.\textsuperscript{111}

**INDIA’S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES**

India has been following the path of other world powers by trying to develop a nuclear weapons doctrine and a security strategy. An even more difficult task is to develop defense capabilities in order to execute that doctrine and strategy, while meeting the threats posed by Pakistan and non-state actors, and perhaps China.

In terms of conventional capability, India has a large military that is characteristic of a regional power rather than a world power. India has 1.1 million soldiers, Pakistan half that number. India has 738 combat aircraft, Pakistan 353. Indian tanks outnumber those of Pakistan by 3,400 to 2,300.\textsuperscript{112} However, there is a qualitative difference in favor of Pakistan because, for example, India’s 400 MiG-21s are barely airworthy and its T-72 tanks have not been properly overhauled for years.\textsuperscript{113}

At current growth rates, India can only afford a defense budget that constitutes 3\% of their gross domestic product, which will not allow for sweeping modernization.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore, India is faced with the issue of where to invest its defense rupees—in nuclear or conventional forces—and has a long way to go to become a world military power.
When it comes to nuclear weapons, India is moving ahead fastest in the area of fissionable material available for nuclear weapons development. The 1998 tests deepened India and Pakistan’s security dilemma and touched off a fissile materials arms race. In October 2001, India’s nuclear material was estimated at more than 400 nuclear weapons equivalents versus Pakistan, which had only 20-30. The fissionable material race is causing considerable concern in South Asia and among nonproliferation experts. On the other hand, India’s nuclear weapons program remains “recessed” and further tests seem unlikely. Also, doubts arose during the 1998 test about the ability of India’s scientists to build and test reliable fusion devices for thermonuclear weapons. Doubts about the reliability of India’s deterrent will continue if India does not test regularly.

For nuclear deterrence, India will continue to rely on bombers and missiles, especially the short-range Prithvi missile, against Pakistan. The intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Agni II, has been tested but is not yet operational. The nuclear “triad” with SLBMs is still a decade away, as India perfects the short-range Danush or Sagarika SLBMs. However, the issue will remain as to how to operate a submarine close enough to Pakistan’s coast to use short-range missiles while surviving anti-submarine attacks.

In regard to India’s space program and the possible development of ICBMs, the Polar Space Launch Vehicle is the most likely candidate. In March 2002, the head of the Indian space program visited Washington, DC and consulted US officials on space and missile defense technology. India looks to such technology as a means to enter the “most-developed club” with Europe and China. Also, space launch vehicles provide a means for
economic growth. However, the Indian government is debating whether or not it should develop ICBMs. Given the support for worldwide nuclear disarmament within a large section of the Indian leadership and bureaucracy, there is more support for missile defense over developing ICBMs and nuclear technology. For BJP leaders, India’s development of space vehicles with ICBM capability is part of a wider plan for India to leapfrog over levels of development and to possess a symbol of world power in the 21st century.120

The process of development and transformation of conventional forces is slower. In order to fight a limited conventional war against Pakistan, India needs advanced airborne assault capabilities. In protecting Central Asian oil and gas, India will need air mobility assets. India needs a larger navy to patrol the South China Sea, the Gulf, and Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region is a matter of legitimate interest, and the country is vulnerable by sea. In order to protect access to Southeast Asia and Gulf oil and gas, the development of a “blue water navy” has been a priority. By 2010, India should have three aircraft carriers, including one they built themselves.121

In case of a confrontation with Pakistan, the civilian nuclear authorities are supposed to transport the weapons to the Indian Army and to their missiles, and the Army then is supposed to hand weapons over to the Air Force for their bombers. In the 1990s, the Air Force was the slow element in the nuclear delivery equation, and it is only now learning how it can be more deeply involved. Until recently, the Air Force was not clear on how to deliver nuclear bombs. Now, it has focused its nuclear capability around the Mirage 2000.122 In April 2002 India set up a strategic command,
with the Air Force in charge, which is developing nuclear and limited war concepts.\textsuperscript{123}

**US-India Defense Cooperation**

In 2002, American arms sales to India resumed, as India purchased US radar, helicopters, and aircraft engines. US-Indian defense cooperation accelerated, and India increasingly looked to the United States as a partner. India’s Chief of Integrated Defense Staff has been engaging in a trilateral dialogue with US Pacific Command and Central Command, overriding lines of control within the US military structure.\textsuperscript{124} It is significant that top Pentagon planner Andrew Marshall made a stop in New Delhi in 2000 and provided US methodology and views on issues of jointness.\textsuperscript{125} With the development of joint concepts, there is greater inter-service and inter-agency coordination within the Indian government.\textsuperscript{126}

The United States and India are moving toward extended naval cooperation. India has already been escorting high value ships through the Straits of Malacca and protecting the freedom of seaways. They are helping to ensure the free flow of the energy supply to Japan and the rest of Asia. However, the Indian navy is not yet prepared to escort ships through the Straits of Hormuz. Since September 11, India has opened its ports and repair facilities to the US Navy. They also would have provided the United States with basing rights, including access to air bases, had the need arisen.\textsuperscript{127}

India has bought most of its aircraft from Russia, in addition to Mirages from France. They are also developing their own “light combat aircraft,” which will not be a predominant part of the Indian Air Force but will be an important symbolic aspect. While Russian aircraft are cheaper than American aircraft, Pakistani F-16s can
exercise air superiority. It is still uncertain whether or not India will buy American fighters to counter Pakistan’s advantage.

Adapting defense capabilities to fulfill an emerging security strategy is challenging. It is often easier to develop new capabilities than to revamp old ones. Finally, the Indian case confirms that the development of security strategy and defense capabilities is intertwined with shifts in partnerships, alliances, and arms suppliers.

INDIA EXPLORES THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

In May 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee responded positively to President Bush’s arms reduction and counterproliferation proposals and launched India’s exploration of the acquisition of theater missile defense. On November 9, 2001, in Washington, DC, the prime minister spoke of the United States and India as “natural allies” and reiterated his support for Bush’s arms reduction and missile defense proposals. By then, missile defenses seemed acceptable to other countries. Subsequently, the Bush administration began promoting missile defenses abroad, and India had already accepted the concept and was ready to begin pursuing a TMD system. Indian officials expressed interest in acquiring a TMD system and continued to note links with arms reductions. The Bush administration began to explore ways of providing missile defenses to India and perhaps Pakistan, which some Bush officials hoped might provide incentives for the easing of tensions and arms control. However, Pakistan remained concerned about the prospect of the United States providing missile defenses to India alone and possibly nullifying Pakistan’s first-strike nuclear deterrent.

In December 2001 and May 2002, the US-India Defense Policy Group (DPG) had their first meetings in several years and discussed cooperation on TMD. Indian strategists studied the probable impact
of TMD and concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be largely neutralized but that China’s arsenal would not be affected.\textsuperscript{129}

India examined the feasibility of developing a homegrown theater missile defense system, by converting its \textit{Akash} surface-to-air missile system. India also inquired about the purchase of the Israeli Arrow TMD system and the Russian S300-V TMD surface-to-air missile. However, questions remained about the expense and transfer of technology, especially from Israel, which is constrained by the United States from selling certain technologies.\textsuperscript{130} Questions also remained about the Russian S300-V TMD system’s convertibility to TMD.

India began to explore various TMD systems, including the Israeli-US Arrow 2, the Russian S-300 system, and the US Patriot 3. They eventually settled on the Arrow 2 and Patriot 3, which were cheaper than the S-300. However, the sale of the Arrow 2 system to India was slowed by questions raised in the State Department and elsewhere, including issues about the power of the Arrow’s booster phase rocket, which exceeded MTCR Category I limits.\textsuperscript{131}

India is open to cooperation with the United States regarding missile defense technology. If India decides to build a theater missile defense, it will attempt to import US, Israeli, and Russian technology. However, the United States and Israel are constrained by the NPT and the MTCR from exporting certain technologies to India. In regard to a joint missile defense development program with the United States, the limits to technology transfer have largely been determined, and India will proceed as far as the United States allows.\textsuperscript{132} The United States is providing some support for India’s space program, but there are still restrictions on some high tech defense and space exports.\textsuperscript{133}
In August 2003, the US-India DPG met in Washington, DC. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith hosted the meeting, and Defense Secretary Ajay Prasad led the Indian delegation. By this time, the Bush administration had given its approval for Israel to sell India three Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft. The press release mentioned that approval for the sale of the Israeli Arrow-2 anti-missile system, jointly developed by Israel and the United States, would soon follow. The two sides reaffirmed the shared view that missile defense enhances cooperative security and stability. They decided to hold a missile defense workshop in India as follow-on to an international workshop attended by US and Indian delegations at the June 2003 Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference held in Kyoto, Japan. The Indian delegation also accepted invitations to the July 2004 Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference in Berlin and the 2005 Roving Sands Missile Defense Exercise.

**ARMS CONTROL**

In the March 1998 general election campaign, the Bharatiya Janata Party campaigned on a platform that included a promise to test nuclear weapons in defiance of US CTBT pressures. The BJP’s realpolitik and furtherance of India’s national interests as a rising great power outweighed the country’s longstanding pacifist and anti-WMD principles and arms control articulated by Nehru and Gandhi. The 1998 nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 ended the country’s three-decades-old stance of nuclear opacity. In a statement to the Lok Sabha after the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and he promised to avoid an arms race, which would mean that India would produce just enough nuclear weapons to support a
strategy of minimum deterrence. Soon afterwards, he announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{137}

The Indian tests led to intense pressure on Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from the military and radical Islamists for a reciprocal test. The United States sent a team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Central Command commander-in-chief, General Anthony Zinni, to offer an aid package and the easing of sanctions if Pakistan would not test. However, Prime Minister Sharif and the Pakistan government ordered a nuclear test, which was conducted on May 28, 1998.

On June 6, 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1172, which urged nuclear restraint on India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{138} Condemnation came from the five NPT nuclear weapon countries, the G-8, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN regional forum, and also from a number of especially concerned states, including several that had recently given up nuclear weapon aspirations, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine.

The May 1998 tests proved India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and eligibility for admission into the “club” of nuclear weapon states. Once they had tested, both India and Pakistan expressed a willingness to renegotiate the CTBT and continue to negotiate the FMCT, particularly if they were recognized as NWS. If the other NWS accepted India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs, it might pave the way for their inclusion within the NPT as nuclear weapons states.

The nuclear tests and India and Pakistan’s security dilemma accelerated the ongoing arms race, especially in missiles and fissionable material available for nuclear weapons development.
The fissionable material has caused considerable concern among nonproliferation experts, with India moved ahead fastest, possessing today more than 50 nuclear weapons while Pakistan has just over 20.\textsuperscript{139} On the other hand, India’s nuclear weapons have continued to be recessed and undeployed, and further tests have not occurred in more than five years.\textsuperscript{140} In addition, doubts arose during the 1998 test about the ability of India’s scientists to build and test reliable fusion devices for thermonuclear weapons. Doubts about the reliability of India and Pakistan’s deterrents will persist, if both continue to observe moratoria on nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{141}

After the tests, the Clinton administration intensified sanctions against India and Pakistan. However, at the same time, the administration dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, along with other US diplomats, to negotiate a lessening of tensions and to prevent nuclear war in South Asia through diplomacy and the promotion of confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reduction measures that ensured sound command-and-control over nuclear weapons. The series of negotiations between Talbott and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and also with Pakistani officials dealt with arms control (including export controls), as well as with command-and-control and a transparent nuclear doctrine.\textsuperscript{142} Singh expressed India’s interest in joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.\textsuperscript{143} Pakistani officials expressed similar interest. In contrast, US efforts to convince India and Pakistan to adopt the NPT as non-nuclear states continued to be rejected. Pakistan continued to offer to disarm if India did, and India pledged not to strike first with nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan continued to keep its first-strike option open. A
positive consequence of the tests was that India and Pakistan held several bilateral meetings on Kashmir and other security issues. The most notable progress was made at a February 1999 summit meeting in Lahore, Pakistan.

**The 1999 Lahore Declaration and Confidence-Building Measures**

US negotiations and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “bus diplomacy” led to the February 1999 Lahore summit between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif, who discussed Kashmir, nuclear weapons, and other security issues. In the meeting, they agreed to CBMs that could be invoked to stabilize the India-Pakistan relationship. At the end of the meeting, the two prime ministers issued the “Lahore Declaration” that, with its accompanying documents, contained nuclear risk reduction measures to reduce the risks of a nuclear exchange prompted by an accident or misinterpretation of a nuclear or ballistic missile test and to improve nuclear security.

The two states agreed to resolve remaining “technical details” in bilateral agreements by mid-1999 and to take several steps to reduce the nuclear danger on the subcontinent. First, the two sides agreed to exchange information on their nuclear doctrines and security strategies, as well as data on numbers of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and deployment information. However, with both sides still developing their nuclear arsenals and doctrines, the data exchanges could not provide much in terms of the level of detail and the scope of the nuclear weapons programs.

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed to at Lahore called for advance notification of ballistic missile test flights and prompt notification of “any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident” regarding nuclear weapons. It also called for
work on measures to improve control over their nuclear weapons. Finally, the MOU recommended reviews of existing CBMs and emergency communications arrangements such as hotlines “with a view to upgrading and improving these links.”\textsuperscript{145}

The Kargil War of May-June 1999 and General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup of October 1999 stymied the progress that was made at Lahore and ended the promise of the Lahore Declaration and the CBMs and NRRMs. At issue is whether or not India and Pakistan can return to the agreements reached at Lahore and implement the CBMs and NRRMs.

On October 13, 1999, Republicans in the US Senate led a majority in voting down the CTBT. Suddenly, the Clinton administration had lost a major leg of its arms control policy and found it more difficult to pressure India and Pakistan to sign. Even so, US officials appealed to India and Pakistan to sign the treaty as a way of putting the Senate under pressure to reverse its decision. For the next 15 months, the Clinton administration continued its efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to agree to the CTBT.

In spite of the Pakistan coup and the CTBT setback, the nonproliferation dialogue between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh continued. In a November 1999 interview in \textit{The Hindu Times}, Jaswant Singh clarified the government’s position regarding nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{146} He stated India’s willingness to consider signing the CTBT and negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. He reiterated previous statements about a minimum credible deterrent that would remain recessed, maintaining a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and ensuring civilian control over the weapons. The foreign minister did not see submarine launched ballistic missiles—which would

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create a nuclear “triad”—as feasible in the foreseeable future and warned against the development of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a January 2000 interview, Deputy Secretary Talbott indicated that he was fairly satisfied with India’s nuclear stance and that he was not asking India to roll back its nuclear weapons programs. However, he also commented that the United States continued to be concerned about command-and-control issues, particularly given the level of tension and the rise of terrorist groups in the region, especially Al-Qaeda, that sought weapons of mass destruction.\(^{147}\)

President Clinton’s March 2000 trip to South Asia confirmed de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state and emerging great power. His one-day visit to Pakistan demonstrated disapproval for General Musharraf’s October 1999 military coup and alleged proliferation activities.

In sum, the Clinton administration’s arms control efforts in South Asia helped India and Pakistan agree to CBMs and NRRMs, which would lead to greater transparency and improved nuclear weapons command-and-control and safety. However, the administration’s failure to keep India and Pakistan from testing in May 1998 was a major setback. In the mid-1990s, the administration miscalculated by pushing India and Pakistan toward the CTBT and NPT. In regard to treaties, the Senate defeat of the CTBT was disappointing, while the FMCT remained stalled in the UN Conference on Disarmament as the administration left office. In spite of the setbacks, arms control prospects in South Asia were still reasonable when the Bush administration came to power in January 2001.

While the proposal to cut nuclear weapons was significant, the Bush administration rejected the CTBT and the ABM Treaty and
initially backed away from cooperative threat reduction with Russia, which resulted in mixed signals in the area of arms control. The one notable exception was the administration’s support for the FMCT. However, FMCT negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament remained suspended, because of disagreement between countries, including the United States and India, which had substantial fissile material and wanted the FMCT to merely cap each nation’s supply. In opposition, countries like Pakistan, with less fissile material, wanted reductions that would bring greater strategic balance. In addition, China demanded consideration of a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) before it agreed to negotiations on the FMCT, and Pakistan supported China’s position. The Bush administration has been cool towards PAROS, which might restrict the development of its missile defense and satellite defense programs.148

US Mediation Efforts and New Relationships with India and Pakistan

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan led the Bush administration to intensify bilateral relations with both Pakistan and India and to ease sanctions against both countries. As a result, the United States was compelled to abandon its paternalistic approach to arms control and start working on a more equal footing with both governments.

On December 13, 2001, Islamist terrorists, who had enjoyed the backing of Pakistan, attacked the Indian Parliament. In the next five months, India mobilized 700,000 troops against Pakistan and sent them to the Line of Control in Kashmir and to the international border. As during the 1999 Kargil war, India threatened but did not attack into Pakistan-controlled territory for two reasons. First,
Pakistan threatened to use nuclear weapons. Second, US pressure was significant. Any large-scale Indian cross-border action would probably have wrecked Operation Enduring Freedom and spiraled into nuclear war, according to US simulation analysis. At the height of the crisis, in late May and early June 2002, the Bush administration sent Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, followed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, to South Asia as peacemakers. Russian President Vladimir Putin and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw also made visits. They stressed the gravity of the confrontation and Pakistan’s obligation to stop cross-border terrorism. Some top Pakistani and Indian leaders, including Indian Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani and Defense Minister George Fernandes, continued to engage in rhetoric about their countries’ ability to fight, prevail in, and survive a nuclear war.

US officials emphasized the cataclysmic consequences of a nuclear exchange in which millions could be killed. However, some US officials, including Robert Blackwill, US Ambassador to India from 2001 to 2003, cautioned that India, for one, could no longer be lectured to paternalistically about its nuclear weapons program and that working as partners rather was a better approach.

By October 2002 the confrontation had deescalated as Indian troops withdrew and Pakistan made efforts to stop cross-border terrorist activities. Also that same month, India managed to hold successful elections in its part of Kashmir that legitimized its presence. The United States continued its diplomatic campaign to bring the two countries together. By May 2003, relations had improved to the point where Prime Minister Vajpayee made an overture to President Musharraf of Pakistan. The thrust of the new
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Overture centered on restoring diplomatic relations and travel and then striving to negotiate a final settlement regarding larger issues, including the status of Jammu and Kashmir. It appeared that nuclear stability and a revival of the CBMs agreed in the Lahore Declaration were of secondary importance.

In August 2002, British intelligence agents inside the Pakistan High Commission in London found incriminating documents showing that Pakistan was still helping North Korea develop a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in exchange for assistance with missile technology. This report and others came after President Musharraf had assured Secretary Powell that cooperation with North Korea had ended after the 1999 coup. This led to a vigorous inter-agency debate over the next six months, with anti-proliferation experts in the State Department pressing for punishment while top officials in the White House and Pentagon argued that admonishment of Musharraf, one of the key US allies in the war on terrorism, was sufficient. The White House and Pentagon prevailed, and no sanctions were applied against Pakistan. However, symbolic sanctions were levied on a North Korean state-owned company that was supplying missile technology to Pakistan. Public revelations of the case led to calls for greater control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, including the employment of US monitoring technologies in, and on-site US inspections of, Pakistani nuclear facilities as part of a US cooperative threat reduction program with Pakistan (and India) as well as tighter Pakistani (and Indian) government export controls.

In January 2004, President Musharraf revealed that the “father of the Pakistan bomb,” A.Q. Khan had headed a ring of scientists, entrepreneurs, and security personnel who had been selling nuclear
secrets, including HEU centrifuges, to North Korea, Iran, Libya and perhaps other countries.  These revelations reopened the issue of how to control Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. However, US requirements in Operation Enduring Freedom prevented actions against Pakistan.

The Pentagon and State Department Positions on Arms Control and Missile Defense

Organizational politics play a major role in explaining the Bush administration’s strategy towards arms control and missile defense, including efforts in South Asia. Most Bush administration national security political appointees, especially those in the Department of Defense, remain skeptical about arms control and deterrence and have been promoting counterproliferation and missile defenses, especially for India, as an alternative to arms control. This perspective was reinforced after September 11 by the specter of terrorists with WMD attacking the United States and its allies. Over the last two years, the Defense Department has been building relations with both India and Pakistan, using military aid and joint training and exercises. Defense agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are leading the way in tracking down suspected proliferators and terrorists in Pakistan to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

For many decades, the State Department took the lead in South Asia and now is competing with the Defense Department for control over policy and cooperation. State Department personnel, particularly those in the Bureau of Arms Control and the Nonproliferation Bureau, continue to promote arms control efforts, especially between India and Pakistan. However, the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, John
R. Bolton—a political appointee—does not share the bureaus’ enthusiasm for arms control. Many in the State Department would like to see the revival of efforts to influence India and Pakistan to sign the FMCT and the CTBT, and eventually the NPT. There are many who insist that missile defense is destabilizing, and that arms control is the only way forward. Some State Department officials have employed war gaming and simulation analyses and generated findings that missile defense is “destabilizing” in South Asia.\textsuperscript{157}

**China’s Position on Arms Control and Missile Defense**

Pakistan’s ally, China, believes that an Indian missile defense system would be intended partly to defend against Chinese intermediate-range missiles and that China would be able to keep well ahead of India in any subsequent arms race.\textsuperscript{158} At the same time, China knows that it must prepare for an eventual US-Indian alliance, which would put China at a strategic disadvantage. China believes that US missile defenses will force China to upgrade its nuclear deterrent and lead to an arms race and perhaps preemptive action.\textsuperscript{159} In regard to arms control, China’s main efforts take place in the UN Conference on Disarmament, where it has been especially interested in the PAROS treaty, which would slow the development of US space-based missile defense.

**Pakistan’s Position on Arms Control and Missile Defense**

Pakistan remains committed to using nuclear weapons first in case of an Indian attack. However, Pakistan is also committed to arms control and arms reduction and is willing to disarm if India committed itself to do so. While Pakistan has rejected India’s proposal that both sides commit to a “no-first-use” policy, it has stepped away from its previous strategy of maximizing its threat to use nuclear weapons given any provocation.\textsuperscript{160} Now, the scenario is
more one of using nuclear weapons as a last resort and, instead, exhausting conventional options first.¹⁶¹

In regard to missile defense, Pakistan believes that India is not interested in strategic restraint, as evidenced by India’s embrace of the Bush administration’s overtures. A Pakistani strategic expert sees India’s interest in missile defense “as an indicator of Indian designs and ambitions to acquire absolute regional superiority in the nuclear domain.” He warns, “Pakistan would be compelled to respond to Indian ambitions by increasing military cooperation with China and keeping its nuclear option open as the last resort in a war against India.”¹⁶² Pakistani officials think that the United States and Israel are supplying radar—including the “Pine Tree” fire-finder radar and AWACS that can detect cruise missiles—to India in order to help develop missile defenses.¹⁶³

Pakistan’s Deputy High Commissioner (DHC) at its mission in India, Munawar Saeed, commented in a September 2003 interview about prospects for arms control in South Asia, including Pakistan’s acceptance of the CTBT and other arms control arrangements.¹⁶⁴ After the 1998 nuclear tests, he said, South Asia had moved beyond the reach of the nonproliferation treaty. However, both Pakistani and Indian prime ministers made statements that both countries would not proliferate. Pakistan has continued to say that it would accept the NPT if India did. He suggested that, unlike India, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons only for its national security and not to increase its national power.

DHC Saeed continued by recounting the history of the South Asian arms race and what Pakistan sees as India’s leading role. India started working on nuclear power by the late 1950s and exploded a nuclear device in 1974. After the 1971 “national
trauma” of losing East Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulifkar Bhutto felt that Pakistan needed nuclear weapons and called a December 1972 meeting of 25 nuclear scientists. While the meeting was historic, no action really started until after the Indian nuclear test of 1974. Pakistan did not sign the NPT “by default,” though it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. However, since India did not sign the NPT and did develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan did not accede to the NPT. After the 1970s, a nuclear rollback was not possible, and the nuclear genie could not be put back into the bottle. In sum, he said, Pakistan is not averse to the idea of the NPT, but it is now involved in an arms race with India.

DHC Saeed went on to discuss Pakistan’s proposal of a nuclear restraint regime against weaponization and deployment of nuclear weapons. He also reviewed a June 1997 meeting in Islamabad between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, in which they discussed peace and security and Jammu and Kashmir. Besides a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, Pakistan proposed controls on conventional as well as non-conventional arms. Pakistan’s proposal consisted of three elements: first, peaceful settlement of disputes; second, reinforcing confidence building measures at the regional level involving not just nuclear weapons but also ballistic missiles; and finally, a regime controlling ABM systems in the region.

As early as 1992, Pakistan proposed a zero missile regime for South Asia. Pakistan also suggested to India that neither side develop ballistic missiles or ABM systems. Pakistan also stressed the need for structural negotiations to reduce conventional forces and weapons. However, he said, India has not been agreeable to an arms control regime with Pakistan, because of the need to strike a
military balance with China. India’s draft nuclear weapons doctrine of August 1999 demonstrated that force projection was a higher priority, discussing as it did submarine launched ballistic missiles and a “shopping list” that included aircraft carriers. India, he noted, has also stepped up defense cooperation with Israel.

DHC Saeed referred to Pakistan’s refusal to accept the “no-first-use” nuclear weapons doctrine and contended that India’s second-strike capability provided an excuse for larger nuclear forces. In contrast, a first-strike policy requires only minimum nuclear forces. He referred to the progress towards reduction of tensions and arms control embodied in the 1999 Memo of Understanding and the Lahore Declaration. At that time, the two sides agreed to enter into dialogue and consultation regarding security and nuclear doctrine and ballistic missile testing and to formalize relations on a bilateral level. Pakistan hopes that, whenever dialogue is able to resume, these issues can be pursued.

Nuclear realities in South Asia, he suggested, deserve special consideration in regard to the Lahore MOU. At present, there is a limited possibility to restart talks and to establish a limited strategic regime and to address outstanding issues. The only major issue in South Asia is Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has suggested that, for the pacific settlement of disputes, there be an identification of issues and negotiations later. However, India would not accept even the identification of issues on a regional priority basis.

DHC Saeed asserted Pakistan’s support for the FMCT, as long as India reduces its fissile material, and that Pakistan has voluntarily stopped producing fissile material. The problem is that India continues to produce fissile material and that Pakistan has limited trust in India. In 1992, under a declaration of understanding
regarding chemical weapons, the two countries agreed to finalize the Chemical Weapons Convention and their commitment to not possess chemical weapons. Later, India declared they had chemical weapons and were in the process of chemical weapons destruction. This was a breach of trust. Five years prior, India had given assurances that it had no chemical weapons.

The Deputy High Commissioner reported that Pakistan was already implementing the MTCR without being party to it. Pakistan’s record on the export of nuclear-related materials and technology is good, but somehow interesting stories have appeared in the press. There have been stories about Pakistan acquiring nuclear materials from China and North Korea; and now the stories have been reversed and contend that Pakistan is supplying HEU to North Korea.

DHC Saeed claimed that Pakistan had no intentions of proliferating and that the Americans would have acted much earlier if it had been true. He wondered why there were no similar stories about Indian proliferation. India allegedly stole HEU during the Kennedy administration. The HEU allegedly found in Iran recently would probably be of Indian origin. For the past 10 years, India has had good relations with Iran and has been working to establish a coalition or alliance with Iran, China, and Russia to isolate Pakistan.

Pakistan, according to the DHC, looks at missile defense from a regional perspective and believes that it will feed the arms race in South Asia and will start a vicious cycle of escalating conflict potential in the region. However, nuclear weapons have brought strategic parity, and conflict will be a difficult proposition as long as both countries have nuclear weapons that they threaten to use, even if do not actually use them. When India starts cooperating on
missile defense, it is all right with the West. However, when Pakistan would start to do so, he feels it would be blamed for engaging in proliferation. Pakistan’s foreign office is dealing with issues of missile defense involving Germany, Japan, and other countries, but there have been no negotiations. Pumping money into missile defense on a regional basis might be all right, but it is too expensive on a state-by-state basis.

DHC Saeed discussed the new overtures by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and stressed the need for structured negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir. If India showed willingness to compromise, he said, the dispute could be resolved in two years. However, India fails to recognize it as an issue. The Line of Control is subject to negotiations, but Pakistan does not want any territory. Pakistan wants the UN resolutions to be implemented and to satisfy the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. This must be a priority and be addressed. Whatever Kashmiris decide is all right with Pakistan. The LoC is a dagger in the heart of Kashmir. Under Indian occupation, Kashmiris have never been given a voice. There must be a referendum in which Kashmiris are consulted. Everyone agrees that has India failed to deliver on promises made to the UN over past 50 years. Neither government in Islamabad or Delhi can make the decisions. Instead, they need to find the courage within the leadership to allow Kashmiris to decide for themselves. First, he suggested, India has to recognize that a problem exists, but it is in a state of denial. Pakistan always has been willing to discuss this issue, as evidenced by Pakistan’s position on UN resolutions. Pakistan views any international state or group of states that can help bring India to at least start working towards finding a solution as having a crucial role to play.
DHC Saeed counteracted the impression that Pakistan has been a failed or failing state and that the State Department had placed Pakistan on a list of terrorist states before September 11, 2001. Saudi Arabians established madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s that have been a source of extremism. After the Russians left Afghanistan, the Americans left the country “high and dry,” with weapons everywhere, with no funding, and no government. No one cared that Afghans killed each other. Pakistan was concerned about Afghanistan due to the instability on its border. Since 2001, the costs now for the United States in Afghanistan are $1 billion per month. If the United States had spent one to two million dollars per year in the late 1980s, Saeed suggests, this could have been prevented. Perceptions have changed but realities on the ground have not changed. The madrassas are a gift of the West, he claims, so the West needs to resolve the education crisis. Pakistan has suffered more than its fair share as a result of others’ mistakes, says Saeed, and if the United States decides to leave Afghanistan today, then Pakistan will suffer huge consequences.

Indian Government Position on Arms Control and Missile Defense

India maintains that it is committed to arms control and disarmament and continues its efforts to gain recognition as a great power and a nuclear weapons state. The partnership with the United States since 2001 has led India to believe that it has been recognized as a power and NWS. Indian leaders remain committed to developing its nuclear deterrent, because leaders are convinced that a conflict with China is possible in the long run. This includes the development of unified command and control over its nuclear weapons and the production of long-range missiles.
Civilian Government Perspectives. Current Indian views on arms control are reflected in a statement from Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, to the UN Conference on Disarmament in January 2003:

Our doctrine also reaffirms India's readiness to join multilateral negotiations for reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, for an FMCT and for effective export controls. As has been stated before, India is ready to multilateralise its no-first-use commitment so as to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the strategic realm. The residual threats of their accidental and unauthorized use can be addressed by moving towards a progressive de-alert of nuclear forces. These measures should be within our grasp given the non-adversarial relations among major powers. The statement indicates that India is prepared to proceed with the FMCT and the strengthening of export controls and perhaps other cooperative threat reduction measures. CBMs and NRRMs are part of security policy. In regard to the NPT, India remains uninterested in joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and would only contemplate doing so as part of multilateral disarmament by the nuclear weapons states, which remains most unlikely. India emphasizes that it has abided by the nonproliferation norms of the NPT since its inception.

The Additional Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ministry of External Affairs Sheel Kant Sharma, discussed in a September 2003 interview the prospects for bilateral cooperative threat reduction with the US to reduce the danger of theft of plutonium or HEU. In February 2003, Richard Meserve, Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, had visited to discuss issues of nuclear reactor safety. However, there were no discussions regarding fissile material. In regard to nuclear safety and nuclear technology, India has developed it independently in accordance with IAEA regulations. India, says Sharma, is not a
problem state like Russia or other former Soviet states. There is no possibility of stealing Indian nuclear/fissile material. India has highly developed systems with very strong physical security, so the situation is well under control. In regard to the production of fissile material, it has continued steadily over the last five years, because India needs fissile material for its breeder reactor, nuclear power plants, and nuclear weapons. However, India meets all the physical security conditions of the IAEA.

Secretary Sharma referred to the issue of proliferation by using a diagram, with which he demonstrated that India was well beyond the “nuclear threshold stage” and was largely self-sufficient, while Pakistan was still in the stage of development and liable to proliferate. Pakistan was strengthening its nuclear deterrent, which was largely of nuisance value for India. He suggests that Pakistan, as “keeper of the Islamic bomb,” is more likely to contribute to the proliferation of HEU to Iran. The issue of suspected Pakistani proliferation to North Korea and Iran has not been discussed with India, he says, because the United States does not want to hear anything negative about Pakistan.

The Additional Secretary mentioned that India, the United States, and Israel have had exploratory discussions regarding India’s acquisition of a missile defense system. India is a status quo power and a stable democracy without dictatorial rule and does not want to create any instability in South Asia. Therefore, missile defense makes a lot of sense. If one sees India solely through the India/Pakistan prism, he says, then one might conclude that India should not be interested in missile defense. However, India has a larger perspective.
Secretary Sharma referred to multilateral arms control agreements and commented that India does not need to be validated as a nuclear power and does not seek any status in relation to the NPT. He contended that India is interested in being involved in FMCT discussions, but China is holding it up, and Pakistan is fronting for China. With regard to China’s insistence on a space weapons treaty, he wonders why China wants it. It is a substitute for the now-defunct ABM Treaty, which prevented the US from developing space-based weapons for missile defense. Finally, in regard to the possibility that India could acquire missile defense and then be encouraged to join the MTCR, he suggested that if the MTCR would accept India as an equal member, like Russia and France, that would be acceptable to India.

India, he says, is open to overtures regarding to the Lahore Declaration and confidence-building measures. However, everything depends on Pakistan’s response—the continuation of cross-border terrorism is part of a composite dialogue. When terrorism stops, India and Pakistan can pick up the thread.

Secretary Sharma commented that India neither feels threatened by American missile defense nor sees it as disadvantageous for India. The pattern of development regarding missile defense is reassuring, so India feels it is a good thing. This was a result of the Kyoto multilateral missile defense meeting, and the US briefing to India, Japan, and other countries.

Secretary Sharma also discussed US State Department tactics and the perception that it keeps worrying unnecessarily about Indian tactics and motivations. India has tried to disabuse thinkers in the United States in regard to linking India to the situation in Pakistan.
There is no comparison in terms of GDP, exports, and population, and India, he says, has never started a war.

The Bush administration’s more relaxed approach to the CTBT and NPT is seen as a welcome change, but he notes that India does not particularly appreciate US unilateralism. India’s attitude towards CTBT already demonstrates that they recognize its validity and will not block its entry into force. With regard to the NPT, India will neither roll back its nuclear weapons programs nor go back on being a nuclear weapons state but instead can help by being a role model for how a nuclear power should behave. India, he says, has never provided any assistance on nuclear technology to anyone outside India. They will not join the NPT as a special status country and believe that the NPT club rules are unfair, leading them to not accept the treaty. India, he contends, cannot be a non-nuclear weapons state.

The Indian Ministry of Defense. Joint Secretary for Planning in the Ministry of Defense, Gautam Mukhopadhya, commented that India has no interest in proliferation and no security interest in exporting nuclear weapons or missiles. Nuclear weapons are entirely for India’s own defense in a dangerous neighborhood, he said. They believe in arms control agreements; indeed, India helped negotiate the CWC and BWC. India is willing to consider becoming part of the MTCR under certain conditions. However, India did not negotiate the NPT, finds it unfair, and will not sign. India is willing to work with the United States and others on technological and nuclear security, and is not opposed to export controls and “dual use” dialogue.

Secretary Mukhopadhya said further that India will resist intrusive conditions regarding theater missile defense and other weapons sales. At present, the Bush administration is working out its differences on missile defense and other arms sales. In addition,
Congress will have to remove residual sanctions, and the United States must prove its reliability in terms of consistently providing spare parts and not periodically resorting to sanctions. A stable, long-term security pact with the United States might be in India’s interest.

India, he says, is still developing its approach to missile defense, which it views as an interesting force multiplier. From the United States’ side, the US-India DPG relationship is incremental. “No first-strike” and missile defense are complementary. India participated in the Kyoto Multilateral Missile Defense Workshop Dialogue on Science and Technology regarding Arrow 2 and Patriot 3. India, he suggests, is the likely victim of first use of nuclear weapons and needs missile defense against more than just Pakistan. The September 2003 visit of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon was significant, and a discussion on the Arrow 2 system may take place. China is not perturbed by the prospect of Indian missile defense, but the question is how much can Pakistan build up. Also, the prospect of a Pakistani fundamentalist with a quick trigger finger trigger may be implausible but not impossible and is a good argument for missile defense.

There is a convergence, Secretary Mukhopadhyya points out, of security concerns between the United States and India, such as the war on terror, WMD proliferation, protecting sea lanes, and preventing instability. In terms of military equipment, India will continue to purchase primarily from Russia, Israel, and France. India will look to the United States for training, doctrine, logistics, and communications assistance and collaboration on research and development and modernization; there is much in the US arsenal that is dependable. The new US approach to India expects
cooperation but not exact convergence on Iraq, Afghan, North Korea, Iran, and other issues.

The Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defense Staff (IDS), Ministry of Defense, Lt Gen B.M. Kapur, is in charge of defense planning. He reports that India has already done planning for missile defense and has purchased the Pine Tree fire-finder radar and Phalcon AWACS radar to detect missile attacks. Therefore, India will be prepared to utilize the Arrow 2 or Patriot 3 system once a system is acquired. He also discussed the new National Command Authority (NCA) and IDS’ role; the NCA has already enhanced India’s command and control over its nuclear arsenal and will provide greater reliability and safety.

Non-governmental Experts on Arms Control and Missile Defense

Indian non-governmental experts in think tanks and on the editorial boards of newspapers have varying views on arms control and missile defense. The major think tanks, including the Institute for Defence and Security Analysis (IDSA), the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), the Delhi Policy Group (DPG), and the United Services Institution (USI), articulate mainstream views that reflect current BJP-led government thinking on security strategy, defense capabilities, limited support for arms control, and embrace of missile defense. A few journalistic experts, such as C. Raja Mohan, also share these views. More dovish and traditional views that oppose great power aspirations and missile defense and that support arms control and nonalignment are reflected in the Congress Party, the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, and the editorial boards of several newspapers.

The hawkish view is best-articulated by Dr. Bharat Karnad of the Center for Policy Research. He contends that there is a gap
between India as an eventual great power and where it is at the moment. In regard to strategic weaponization, India proceeds by “auto pilot,” not by any direction from government. Issues are seen as technological challenges to be overcome, not as national security objectives. This tendency is inherent in the development of ICBMs and high-yield megaton nuclear weapons. For example, India has been technologically challenged to produce its own ICBM within one year, according to US intelligence estimates. Dr Karnad says Indian scientists see it as a challenge technologically to be able to do it themselves, but the government does not direct them. India cannot leave these matters to scientists and researchers, he suggests, as they may not meet national security needs.

India’s computer simulation and development of software packages compensates for much of the need for nuclear testing. However, Dr Karnad says India needs more thermo-nuclear testing for accuracy purposes. Therefore, India should not sign the CTBT or continue the moratorium on testing. However, there are diplomatic implications behind further testing. The government, he says, does not have the will to resume testing. However, the United States needs India more than in the past. India needs to look at the mutual comparative advantage of cooperation. India, China, and Russia are all waiting for the United States to continue nuclear testing a low-yield device in 2005, and then testing will resume.

According to Dr. Karnad, missile defense is an immature and expensive technology and does not firm up India’s deterrence. It is more a political gesture on India’s part towards the United States. In a democracy like India, either the entire country should be vulnerable or the entire country protected. It is an anti-democratic principle to only protect Delhi and not the rest of the country.
Another issue of theater missile defense is whose hand is on the trigger. With the Aegis system’s coverage, control is still in the US hands. Patriot 3 or Arrow 2 would provide India with greater control. Also, missile defense technology is still unproven, especially the Israeli Arrow 2 system. Patriot 3 also has limitations. Ultimately missile defense is credible, but it is an immature technology and there are more immediate national priorities for India.

Cooperative threat reduction, he suggests, may work with India and Pakistan. In theory, it is not a bad idea, but, in practice, Pakistan is not a threat to India. When it comes to the fissile material produced in India and Pakistan over the past five years, there is concern about Pakistan but not about India. However, notes Dr Karnad, Pakistani weapons are reportedly under American control since September 11 anyway. The United States is concerned with the “mad mullah” and “stray general” theories and an accidental nuclear launch in Pakistan. So, while the Pakistani corps commander becomes the “trigger” man for a nuclear launch, command and control functions have now been spread to lots of different people. In terms of the control of fissile material and the FMCT, there should be a nuclear cap on size for all states at some stage. In terms of the MTCR, it penalizes India, but the United States expects India to support it. In the end, Dr Karnad asks, who are greater proliferators? His answer: the United States and Pakistan.

US Embassy Observations on South Asia, Arms Control, and Missile Defense

The Political-Military Specialist in the US Embassy in New Delhi, Jonathan Wallis, has been closely observing India and Pakistan’s positions on arms control and missile defense. He
suggests that India has undertaken a post-Cold War shift away from its polarized anti-NPT position towards a more self-interested stance on arms control and missile defense. India does not like the MTCR, he says, but might join under certain conditions, possibly with defense trade-offs. Though Pakistan routinely turns down the FMCT, India considers it from time to time.

However, when it gets down to the specifics of negotiation, it might be another story. India perceives a fait accompli regarding arms control treaties; they are a western predetermined product with no negotiation wiggle room. India needs flexibility and respect for it to take its place at the bargaining table with the major powers. India has flip-flopped several times on the issue of the CTBT. A de facto test ban is in effect, but if national security dictates, India will test if necessary.

The perception in India, reports Mr Wallis, is that there can be no future arguments regarding India as a nuclear weapons state. There must be accommodation in the long run with India regarding its nuclear status, and the United States should not engage India in nonproliferation debates. India will be too big a power to ignore. India views Pakistan as a terrorist state and proliferator, where the military has overthrown a democratic regime, a position bolstered by allegations of Pakistan shipping HEU to North Korea.

When it comes to bilateral US-India agreements, nuclear and missile safety issues may see some movement. The US Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission have visited India, and there could be cooperative threat reduction efforts. India cannot agree to anything that hampers its nuclear weapons and missile programs and has not signed any treaties prohibiting such.

However, India is willing to work on nuclear safety and mutual
cooperation and collaboration regarding safety as a precursor to more cooperation in the future. The IAEA it is not forceful—it is present but not too visible in India. India helped to moderate the Nonaligned Movement statement on the IAEA, which was very helpful, but there was no forceful statement regarding Iraq. The IAEA has come to India for nuclear safety collaboration, and India has offered to expand IAEA access to nuclear facilities.

In terms of missile testing and confidence building measures, he suggests it would be desirable for India and Pakistan to publish an entire year’s testing schedule in advance. As it stands, India and Pakistan notify each other 48 hours in advance by mutual agreement. On one occasion India did not notify Pakistan as a result of bureaucratic fumbling, as the person in charge was out of town. On another, a test that was scrubbed in December was rescheduled for March without notification. The US position is that the two countries need to announce testing in advance with a published schedule, which would make it possible to have advance warning. Each country should also publish a Notice to Airmen with coordinates and provide more formal notification to embassies or high commissions. There is a hotline system established that provides military-to-military contact, but not leader-to-leader, which is more essential. India has better command-and-control of its nuclear forces with the recent establishment of the National Command Authority.

In terms of missile defense, the issue of India purchasing the Arrow 2 system or Patriot 3 system has not been decided and is still a matter of debate. India takes its time in terms of acquiring weapons systems, and it could take until 2010 before they buy a missile defense system. The Phalcon AWACS radar system was
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approved in August, and India should move uncharacteristically quickly to acquire it from Israel. On the other hand, India has been negotiating to buy the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for more than a decade. Another question is whether missile defense a genuine military requirement or simply a means for India to draw closer to the United States. Indian think tanks, Mr Wallis says, see it as a means to take the war to Pakistan.

India is very supportive of missile defense, but is the United States willing to go along? Arrow 2 falls under Category I MTCR restrictions, while Patriot 3 under Category II, which is less problematic. The State Department decides what fall into Categories I and II. However, the sale of missile defense to India will be a political decision and not a technical one. India has indicated a willingness to engage in quid pro quo and join the MTCR in exchange for missile defense.

Colonel John Albert Hill, the US Air Attaché and Captain Eric Nelson, the Naval Attaché, commented on the Indian perspective on missile defense. India views missile defense within the context of its “no-first-use” nuclear weapons stance and believes that it benefits nonproliferation in South Asia. Missile defense will support India’s no-first-use strategy and guarantee that its second-strike capability is secure. They report that India wants the United States to tell them more and has sent teams to the United States on missile defense.

What might be Pakistan’s and China’s responses to missile defense? Given Pakistan’s resources and outside help, the attaches feel that Pakistan may still not have enough to be able to overwhelm an Indian missile defense, as Pakistan has only a limited numbers of weapons. The Indian response to Pakistan’s acquisition of missile
defense would be positive and might lead to nuclear and short-range missile reductions. In terms of longer-range missiles, China is the reason for India’s nuclear weapons program as a deterrent. India wants to have a ballistic missile submarine to threaten China from anywhere, not just limited range. India will never have enough strategic capability to gain advantage over China.

Many questions remain in the US regarding the future of missile defense in the region. The debate continues in Washington over whether missile defense will stabilize or destabilize South Asia. There is also ongoing discussion in regard to giving approval for Israel to sell India missile defense via the backdoor. In regard to the debate between the Defense Department and State Department, the Bush administration has thrown India tidbits to maintain the dialogue until analysts can determine real the impact of missile defense in South Asia. Meanwhile, the price tag may not be affordable to India’s government.

India needs to be clearer in defining what should be defended—nuclear weapons sites or cities. The definition of the protected area determines what India would need in terms of missile defense. India has nothing to lose by defining targets, doing studies, and calculating costs. Why, they ask, has India not done this? The officers suggest that India wants a classified briefing on missile defense so that it can join Japan and other US allies.

A science advisor at the US Embassy, Lori Dando, reported on US cooperation with India on nuclear power plants. She reports that US officials are slowly getting clearance to work with the Indians. According to Ms Dando, there was an IAEA meeting in Washington, DC with Indian scientists regarding safety issues and standards. Indian acquisition of missile defense may bring a quid
pro quo of cooperative threat reduction, especially in safeguarding nuclear plants. What will happen? The first step at this moment will be guarding nuclear fuel and plant safety. A Chernobyl-style meltdown possibility must be prevented. The plants are old and of Russian construction, with no spare parts and with intermittent repairs.

Rodney Jones of the United States’ Defense Threat Reduction Agency surmises that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s support for US missile defense and the Indian government’s subsequent exploration of various systems was most likely intended to avoid an expensive strategy of developing ICBMs like China had to do in trying to develop a minimum credible deterrent in relation to the United States and Russia. Therefore, it seems likely that India will continue to explore acquiring missile defenses as part of its largely defensive security strategy but less likely that it will develop or deploy them in the coming five years or so.

CONCLUSION

India has lagged behind other major powers in developing a security strategy and remains the only country to have released a nuclear doctrine without such a strategy. However, since the 1998 nuclear tests and formation of national security architecture, India’s security strategy has been emerging. The NSAB’s Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine, the “limited conventional war” concept, and Vajpayee’s endorsement of missile defenses have touched off debates within the Indian security establishment that have engendered strategic thinking and point to the emergence of a strategy.

For more than fifty years, a lack of strategic thinking, bureaucracy, and domestic political configurations prevented the
promulgation of a clear security strategy. The 1998 nuclear tests underlined the importance of a developing a coherent security strategy. Even so, according to Stephen Cohen, India should not be rushed to develop a clear and coherent national security strategy. It will come in time in a slow evolution, as Indians think through the various issues and act on them. Indian political stability would lead to greater clarity in strategic pronouncements.179

India needs both strategic consensus and capabilities. An inefficient bureaucracy and an economy that is still emerging from state control have hampered India in the process of trying to develop world-class defense capabilities that would allow implementation of any ambitious security strategy. Thus far, it seems that India is investing in nuclear weapons and delivery systems over upgrading conventional capabilities. However, both nuclear and conventional weapons systems need to be improved substantially if India hopes to move into the ranks of world powers.180

Assuming that India develops and publishes a coherent security strategy, a number of issues remain. First, it is uncertain if a security strategy would lead to transparency and confidence-building.181 Second, transparency and confidence-building measures may not lessen the chances of war with Pakistan. Thus far, India has been selectively transparent and will probably continue to be so. India has not been transparent in its agreements with Pakistan and China. Often, when India signals, Pakistan and China see the worst possible intentions. Also transparency is problematic to India as it indicates its vulnerability to China. As for Pakistan, it cannot be transparent; to be so would only provide confirmation of vulnerability.
Concerning relations with the United States, there will be areas where India is voluntarily transparent in order to curry favor and other areas where it will not be in India’s interests to be so. Transparency and confidence-building measures may be essential building blocks to prevent unwanted conflict, but the Bush administration does not see these measures as crucial in India-US relations.

Since September 11, the US-India strategic relationship has accelerated and developed toward partnership and perhaps an eventual alliance. India has assisted the United States through skillful diplomacy, and India’s major contributions to the UN and peacekeeping have led the United States to give tacit support to India’s campaign for a permanent UN Security Council seat. India has been very accommodating with the United States in not attacking Pakistan and is reaping rewards, especially in the defense capabilities realm. Meanwhile, debate in India continues over partnership and alliance with the United States. In the longer term, the United States may find it desirable and necessary to form an alliance eventually with India to confront China.182

The broader conclusion from the Indian case is that rising powers, especially those that develop nuclear weapons and power projection capabilities, need a coherent security strategy. Leaders need to send clear signals to military and civilian agencies. Governments need to send clear signals to adversaries. However, the Indian case demonstrates the difficulties of formulating security strategy in a democracy and where bureaucratic resistance is strong. Developing defense capabilities to fulfill a security strategy is even more difficult. Often, it is easier to develop new capabilities than to revamp old ones. Finally, the Indian case confirms that the
development of security strategy and defense capabilities is intertwined with shifts in partnerships, alliances, and arms suppliers.

US peacemaking efforts in South Asia continue. US rejection of the CTBT and coolness toward a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, thereby stalling the FMCT, have left little in the way of multilateral arms control to negotiate. Furthermore, after the United States drew closer to India and Pakistan in the wake of September 11, sanctions for violating the NPT, the MTCR, and the non-ratified CTBT were eased. The easing of sanctions sent a message to both countries that it was acceptable for them to remain as de facto nuclear weapons states. Therefore, there is no probability that India and Pakistan can be coaxed as non-nuclear states towards accepting the CTBT and NPT. India will not give up its nuclear deterrent because leaders are convinced that a long-term conflict with China is possible, and Pakistan will keep its deterrent as long as India has nuclear weapons.

What is intriguing is the prospect of the United States and the other nuclear weapons states accepting India and Pakistan as NWS, which they have already done in a de facto sense. While such a move may provide an incentive for other states, even North Korea and Iran, to test nuclear weapons and demand acceptance into the NWS club, it seems to be compelling India and, particularly, Pakistan to adhere more closely to NWS standards and has opened the door to more intensive and regular on-site inspections by the IAEA and the United States.

Closer US relations with India and Pakistan over the last two years have opened the door to US-assisted bilateral arms control agreements; to a possible resolution of the Kashmir issue that drives the South Asian conflict; and, to Indian theater missile defense that
will not provoke Pakistan to launch a preemptive strike. The United States can achieve progress in arms control through CBMs, such as cooperative aerial monitoring, assisting with a more rigorous “hot line,” and a cooperative threat reduction program. In regard to other CBMs to stabilize the India-Pakistan relationship, the two countries could do a better job of providing data and strategies concerning their nuclear weapons programs and advance notification of ballistic missile test flights. In regard to CTR, US monitoring technologies and US systems for transparency and agreement compliance verification could be used. Thus, it is possible that India and Pakistan will be brought into a bilateral arms control process and will move toward resolving the Kashmir conflict through US influence.

In regard to South Asia’s role in the US missile defense posture, India—along with Japan, Israel, and NATO states—will provide a test case to see if missile defense can be globalized. Pakistan might be persuaded to join a multilateral missile defense community; otherwise, Pakistan will have to be reassured and perhaps provided with better air defenses and other security guarantees. It is likely that India will successfully adapt the Arrow 2 or Patriot 3 system to South Asia, which would validate the prospects for cooperative missile defense systems among the United States, Israel, India, and other states.

Pakistan will remain a problematic case for some time to come, as demonstrated by HEU proliferation to North Korea, Iran, and Libya; China’s exports of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan; and, the presence of Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the country. However, closer US relations with Pakistan allow for greater monitoring of possible WMD proliferation activities.
The US presence has diminished the chances of Pakistan’s
disintegration but has not lessened Pakistan’s alliance with China.

In the last five years, the United States has helped India and
Pakistan come to recognize the devastating security implications of
war and has demonstrated that it can help increase stability in South
Asia without dramatically changing the balance of power or
encroaching on Indian or Pakistani sovereignty.

What explains the stabilization of South Asia? Neo-realists
would posit that unipolarity and a US administration that has been
prepared to aggressively exploit it, especially after September 11th,
in order to forge new relations (in this case with India and Pakistan)
provides the best explanation. Also, the bilateral approach to
resolving crises and negotiating arms control agreements is easier to
implement than the multilateral approach. What is intriguing is the
long-range US plan for South Asia. The US-India partnership will
lead to greater regional cooperation and arms control in South Asia
to efforts to contain a rising China as the twenty-first century
develops.

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37 Pant, “India and Nuclear Arms Control,” 95.

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41 *BJP Election Manifesto '98*, <http://www.bjp.org/manifes/manifes.htm> Rodney W. Jones and Sumit Ganguly, “Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 2001): 181-189. In campaigning for election in 1998, the BJP promised in its manifesto to test nuclear weapons. When the BJP came to office, it soon became apparent that it would not be able to enact any of its election manifesto proposals and that the government would be short-lived. The promise to carry out a nuclear test was the only proposal that was attainable at the time. The fulfillment of the promise helped the BJP in the next round of elections in September-October 1999.


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Interview with Francis Vaz, Minister for Political Affairs, Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002. According to Minister Vaz, the NSAB was an “outlier” in relation to Indian strategic thinking and that the “triad” notion was “far-fetched.”

Interview with Eric Arnett, Non-Proliferation Expert, State Department, April 29, 2002.

Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, political counselors at the Pakistan Embassy to the United States, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002. Pakistan believed that the DNWD signaled Indian intentions.


Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002.


Cohen, India, 76-77.


Bajpai, Kargil and After.


Interview with Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, April 29, 2002. Schaffer points out that Prime Minister Vajpayee did not initially endorse National Missile Defense (NMD) in May 2001, but in May 2002, India supports NMD coupled with counterproliferation. Counterproliferation is consistent with India’s views to scale down and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. India also has endorsed the process of consultation, which helped lead Russia to live with NMD.

However, Pakistan President Musharraf came forward in October 2001 and offered the United States basing rights, so the United States did not require Indian bases.


Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near East and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002.

Interview with Rodney Jones, April 30, 2002. In an arms race with China, India’s technological shortcomings and economic weakness
would be apparent. The BJP government is not committed to economic reform, which leads to economic backsliding.


95 Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, Pakistan embassy, May 2, 2002.

96 Wojtysiak, *Preventing Catastrophe*.

97 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002.


100 Interview with Stephen Cohen, Brookings Institution, April 30, 2002. Another reason for the limited potential of a security strategy and transparency is that Pakistan lacks good information systems; they are easy to break down and could contribute to escalation and war, especially since India places heavy reliance on information systems. Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near East and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002.

101 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002.


103 Interview with Eric Arnett.


106 Kuldip S. Ludra, *The Defence of Andaman and Nicobar Islands* (Chandigarh: Thakur Strategic Research Centre, 1999).


118 Gupta, “India’s Third-Tier Nuclear State Dilemma,” 1049-1050.

119 Jones, *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia*. Eventually, India could build nuclear submarines with longer-range missiles.

120 Gupta, “India’s Third-Tier Nuclear State Dilemma.”


122 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002.

123 Interview with Eric Arnett.

124 Interview with Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, April 29, 2002.

125 Interview with Ted Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, April 29, 2002.


128 Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, interviewed by the author, April 29, 2002. Schaeffer points out that Prime Minister Vajpayee did not initially endorse missile defense (NMD) in May 2001, but soon came to support it within the framework of counterproliferation. Counterproliferation is consistent with India’s views that all powers should scale down and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. India also has endorsed the process of consultation, which helped lead Russia to live with missile defense.


133 Interview with Ted Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, April 29, 2002.


136 Narendra Gupta, “India’s Days of Nuclear Ambivalence are Over,” The Times of India, July 16, 1997. The BJP was determined to make India a great power and nuclear weapons state with a security strategy and defense capabilities that would enable India to eventually compete with China. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002). Karnad articulates a realpolitik strategy for India, which the BJP moved toward in the 1990s and which would include the development of a nuclear force to rival and target China and other competitors.


139 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 191. Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia, 3, estimates as more than 100 Indian nuclear weapons equivalents (NWEs) and 50 Pakistani NWEs by the latter half of 2001. However, India has the potential to produce more than 400 NWEs and catch up with China’s 450 NWEs. Pakistan has the potential to produce more than 100 NWEs.

140 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 211-225.

141 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 405-408.


143 A brief history of the FMCT, 12.


A brief history of the FMCT, 15-16.


If a Democrat administration comes to power after the 2004 elections, the US position could swing back towards an acceptance of arms control, including the CTBT, and missile defense programs may not proceed as quickly.

Keith Payne and Mark Schneider, Office of Force Planning, Department of Defense, interviewed by the author, May 2003.

Kerry Kartchner, Peter Almquist, Charles D. Frizzelle, Jr., Tom McIlvain, Jerome Bracken, Robert Batcher, US State Department interviewed by the author May 12, 2003. Also, Eric Arnett, South Asian Specialist, State Department, interviewed by the author April 29, 2002.

Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near East and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002.


160 Wojtysiak, Preventing Catastrophe.

161 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002.


163 Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, Pakistan embassy, May 2, 2002.

164 Munawar Saeed, Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, interviewed by the author on September 11, 2003, New Delhi, India.

165 The principal government expert on arms control is Sheel Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

166 Indian Foreign Secretary HE Mr. Kanwal Sibal to the Conference on Disarmament 23 January 2003 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/cd/speeches03/sibal23jan.html


168 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 19.

169 The Additional Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ministry of External Affairs, Sheel Kant Sharma, interviewed by the author, September 9, 2003, New Delhi, India.

170 Joint Secretary for Planning in the Ministry of Defense, Gautam Mukhopadhyya, interviewed by the author, September 5, 2003, New Delhi, India.


172 Series of interviews by the author, September 2-12, 2003, New Delhi, India.

173 C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor, The Hindu, interviewed by the author, September 6, 2003. See also Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon.

Jonathan Wallis, Political-Military Specialist in the US Embassy, interviewed by the author on September 3, 2003 in New Delhi, India.

Col John Albert Hill, the US Air Attaché and Capt. Eric Nelson, the Naval Attaché, US Embassy, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2003 in New Delhi, India.

Science Advisor at the US Embassy, Lori Dando, interviewed by the author on September 8, 2003 in New Delhi, India.

Rodney Jones, interviewed by the author, April 30, 2002. In an arms race with China, India’s technological shortcomings and economic weakness would be apparent. The BJP government is not committed to economic reform, which leads to economic backsliding.


Gupta, “India’s Third Tier Nuclear State Dilemma,” 1048-1055.


Gottemoeller, *Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle*. 