Transforming the Reserve Component

Four Essays

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Introduction

This volume contains four essays on various aspects of the Reserve Component. We publish it at a time when Reserves are serving overseas at historically high rates and when new missions like homeland security demand their attention. In these essays, the authors explore ways in which the Reserve Component might be transformed to face these challenges.

The first essay calls for a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve Component in light of the largest mobilization since the Korean War, which has been fraught with problems in terms of combat readiness as well as pay, morale, and retention. Hans Binnendijk and Gina Cordero argue that a high-level national commission may be needed to design and gain support for that restructuring.

In the second essay, Stephen M. Duncan calls for a complete re-thinking of U.S. security requirements and the related force structure, with an emphasis on the homeland security mission. In the new security environment, the American homeland needs to be considered as part of the battlespace. Duncan explores which conventional and homeland security missions should be assigned to Active Force Units and which to Reservists.

Raymond E. Bell, Jr. argues in the third essay that one of the challenges facing Army transformation is the lack of a shared culture between the Active and Reserve Components. Bell examines how these separate cultures have negatively affected the Army’s effectiveness as an organization and offers recommendations that move towards cultural change.

Civil Affairs units are a central element to stabilization and reconstruction operations that require an integrated military and civilian response. The final essay by Michael J. Baranick, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz proposes several ways to improve the overall effectiveness of Civil Affairs units.

Thanks are due to Neyla Arnas for editing the manuscripts.
Transforming the Reserve Component

Hans Binnendijk and Gina Cordero

The Reserve Component is under stress and its fundamental missions are changing. The stress is a result of the largest mobilizations since the Korean War. The missions are changing as a result of new requirements posed by a changing international system. The Defense Department is addressing the stress by implementing a plan to rebalance the Reserve Component. Yet, is this planned rebalancing sufficient, or does the Reserve Component need to be transformed by a fundamental restructuring to deal with new requirements? This chapter argues that a fundamental restructuring should be considered. To implement a transformational restructuring would probably require a high-level national commission and a procedure like the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) effort to remove politics from the equation as much as possible. This process would be difficult, especially under the current stress of large troop mobilizations, but it probably needs to be done sometime soon.

A new strategic environment

The Reserve Component is operating in a new strategic environment. Reserves are no longer just weekend warriors. They are fighting and dying overseas. The scale of the mobilization is primarily the result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. From mid 1990 to 2001, the Reserve Component support to total force mission was about 13 million duty days. Today it is 63 million duty days, a five-fold increase.1 The mobilization from September 11, 2001 through the Afghan war was 77,000 reservists at peak. By the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, about 223,000 were mobilized, a three-fold increase.2 Over 300,000 of 882,142 Reserve Service members have been called up for operations in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.3 About 40 percent of forces in Iraq are from the Reserve Component. Roughly half of the Army reservists have been called up since 9/11.4

Call-ups are now of longer duration. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm 1990-91, call-ups lasted an average of 156 days. Regional operations in late 1990 averaged 200 days. The average today is over 300 days.5 Reservists are being told they can count on being activated one year in every three to five. The goal for DOD is one year in six.

The impact has been concentrated in so-called High Demand Low Density units. In Iraq, 98 percent of civil affairs (CA) and PSYOPS and 59 percent of military police (MP) were reservists in May 2003.6 The impact on some enlisted ranks was particularly great: 86 percent of those in installation security; 69 percent of those in law enforcement; 67 percent of the aircrews; 69 percent of those in law enforcement; 67 percent of the aircrews;

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1 This essay was originally presented at a September 2004 conference co-sponsored by the Center for American Progress (CAP), the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University (CPASS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).
4 OASD/RA, Rebalancing Forces, 8.
6 OASD/RA, Rebalancing Forces, 8.
7 Information derived from the Army Mobilization Deployment Information System.
65 percent of Special Forces were reservists.\textsuperscript{8} Many units were called up a second time.\textsuperscript{9} Over 20,000 reservist/national guard personnel have been called up twice.

\textbf{Problems with mobilization}

Recent mobilizations were fraught with friction. About 10,000 reservists were given less than five days notice. An additional 8,000 were activated and then sent home; 3,899 in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) were unexpectedly called for 18 months.\textsuperscript{10} About one third of those soldiers asked for a delay, exemption, or failed to report.\textsuperscript{11} A “stop loss” order was put into effect affecting both the Active and Reserve Components so that those covered by the order could not leave when their contract was up. About 95 percent of mobilized Army Guard soldiers had problems with their pay.\textsuperscript{12} A significant majority was married with the associated disruption of family life. There was no predictability as to when and how long they would be called up for duty. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserves, said the system gave the reservists a “pipe dream,” or an unrealistic expectation of the duration and the difficulty of their upcoming duty.\textsuperscript{13}

Many reservists felt that they were second-class citizens, especially in the Army. \textit{Stars and Stripes} reported in August 2003 that 63 percent of those reservists asked said their supplies were “not good or poor.”\textsuperscript{14} This was recorded in testimony before the House Government Reform subcommittee in May 2004. Reservists who testified felt they were poorly equipped and trained. They said they had inadequate body armor, weapons, vehicles, and tents.\textsuperscript{15} And, for the first time since the Korean War, reserves were being killed in action in significant numbers. The lack of reserve training was painfully evident at Abu Ghraib where the 372\textsuperscript{nd} military police unit had not been trained in handling prisoners.

There has been a corresponding negative impact on morale and retention, although the figures are disputed, and the Army believes the problems are manageable. \textit{Stars and Stripes} reported in August 2003 that 48 percent of those reservists surveyed said morale was “low or very low.”\textsuperscript{16} The Army Research Institute in a January 2004 survey reported that only 27 percent of those asked, “firmly intend to reenlist;” 28 percent were unsure; and 35 percent planned to leave or transfer to the IRR when their enlistments ended.\textsuperscript{17} Some 43 percent of the National Guardsmen returning from Iraq plan to leave the Guard.\textsuperscript{18}

Some governors complained that their National Guard units had been stripped and that there was an inadequate reserve for state use in case of a natural disaster or homeland security emergency.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{8} OASD/RA, \textit{Rebalancing Forces}, 8.
\textsuperscript{9} For example 20 military police units were mobilized twice. Greg Jaffe. “Caught Off Guard: As Ranks Dwindle In a Reserve Unit, Army’s Woes Mount; After Tours in Two War Zones, Many in 211\textsuperscript{st} Are Fed Up; Tough Sell for Recruiters; Spc Coggins Skips the Drill.” \textit{The Wall Street Journal}. 4 August 2004.
\textsuperscript{18} Jaffe, “Caught Off Guard.”
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**Pentagon rebalancing plan**

The Pentagon has reacted fairly forcefully to the stress placed on the Reserve Component. Their rebalancing plan is outlined in a 15 January 2004 document, *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserves*. It focuses on three cures: enhancing early responsiveness, resolving stressed career fields, and employing innovative management skills.

The most prominent feature of the rebalancing plan is a shift of unit capabilities from artillery and air defense missions to civil affairs and military police missions. A large percentage of the Reserve Component and all of the services will be affected.

According to the 15 January document, other efforts include creating a “continuum of service” program designed to provide greater flexibility of choice between a 39 day service schedule for non-activated reserves and active duty service of 365 days; promoting volunteerism; enhancing reach-back concepts so that more can be done by reservists at home; fixing pay problems; and creating greater call-up predictability.

All of this will help to fix the current degree of stress on the Reserve Component. But, in our view, the approach is evolutionary, not revolutionary.

**Fundamental restructuring**

Would the Reserve Component benefit from a fundamental restructuring? The answer lies in the analysis of four Reserve Component missions and the current allocation of assets between the Reserves and the National Guard. We will examine the Army, which constitutes approximately two-thirds of all reserve personnel.

The most prominent mission today is stabilization and reconstruction operations. To sustain current operations, approximately 60,000–75,000 Reserve/National Guard troops will be needed each year. If the DOD planning factor of one year in six of active duty is to be reached, this means a force of at least 360,000 troops will be needed for just this mission. That is more than half the Army’s Reserve Component. Rebalancing will shift capabilities in this direction but at nowhere near this level. If operations do not decline in scope, then the call-up rate for this mission could be unsustainable. In addition, the current force is not well organized for this mission. Units with this responsibility need a new joint command and common training to maximize synergies and capabilities.19

A second mission is combat services and combat service support, which is provided mainly by the Army Reserves. After Vietnam, the Army, under General Creighton Abrams, reorganized and placed these functions primarily in the Reserves. As a result, they must be mobilized early in a conflict, which requires politicians to consider consequences of war for their constituents. It is widely believed that Abrams intended that early mobilization would prevent American entry into another unpopular war. There are two problems with this organization. First, in today’s world we need to move troops quickly for rapid and decisive operations, and it may not make sense to wait for mobilization. Second, the Abrams doctrine, if such it was, did not work in the case of Iraq; we are in another war about which public opinion is sharply divided. Any restructuring should consider ending the remaining impact of the so-called Abrams doctrine and moving combat services and combat service support capabilities to the Active Force.

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A third mission is high-intensity war fighting. This resides today primarily in the Army National Guard. The Guard has 8 divisions and 14 enhanced brigades for this purpose, about half of which are heavy mechanized and armor units. They were created during the Cold War primarily to reinforce Europe. There are two problems with this configuration. First, they are transforming much more slowly than the Active force and will be much less capable, especially given their 39 training days per year. We saw this during Desert Storm, when a few National Guard units were deployed to Iraq, though some progress has been made since then. Second, when called up, they would be very slow to mobilize and deploy overseas. Most high intensity wars today are very short in duration. The stabilization effort takes time, but heavy divisions are not needed for that purpose. It is hard to imagine a scenario using these Guard units in high intensity conflict in the future. Some of these heavy units may be needed for unanticipated contingencies, but they cannot be counted on for rapid action. Current efforts to make these units more modular are a step in the right direction.

A fourth mission is homeland security. Since 9/11, Guardsmen have flown combat air patrols over U.S. cities (Operation Noble Eagle) and safeguarded our airports. There is a fundamental debate underway about the role of the Pentagon in homeland security. Civilian officials in the Pentagon take the position that there is a separate new department for this purpose, and the primary realm of the National Guard is overseas.20 Governors and many in the National Guard Bureau take a different view. They want the Guard ready and trained if a catastrophic terrorist event takes place. Lieutenant General Steven Blum, head of the National Guard Bureau, has suggested that half of the National Guard forces should always be available to governors for state use.21 An example of this debate is the effort that has been made to create Civil Support Teams to aid in case of a terrorist WMD attack. Some in the Pentagon have resisted these small 22 person teams, but with Congressional pressure, 55 such teams will be created--one for every state and territory. Capabilities Task Forces will augment some of these teams. But in the face of catastrophic terrorism, many believe a battalion’s worth of this capability in each state is needed.

In addition to considering these four missions, a restructuring of the Reserve Component would consider whether units are properly assigned. If the rule of logic is to place units with similar functions in proximity, then forces in the Army Reserves and National Guard are poorly assigned. If we could start with a clean slate, high intensity war-fighting capabilities might be placed in the Reserves, both combat and support. Similarly, functions like stabilization and reconstruction and homeland security require many similar skills, and they might be placed in the National Guard.

**Conclusion**

The evidence supports a restructuring of the Reserve Component. This would go well beyond the current rebalancing efforts. Timing may be bad now because of the stress on the system caused by massive mobilizations, but timing may never be perfect. Given the political power of these units with Congress and the governors and the likely resistance to change, restructuring would not be easy. Special procedures like a high level national commission and BRAC-like implementation procedure would be needed. But the process should be started soon because the requirements for transformation are enormous.

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20 Interview with senior DOD officials conducted 13 September 2004.
Homeland Security and the Reconstruction of U.S. Reserve Forces

Stephen M. Duncan

On April 23, 1987, I was interviewed in the Pentagon by the then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in connection with my subsequent appointment by President Reagan as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Shortly after the interview, I stopped in the Pentagon bookstore and purchased a copy of the 1986 book Thinking in Time.1 I read it on the plane during my trip back to my home in Colorado.

The authors of the book, two professors at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, urged policy-makers to “inspect the history of an issue so that decision objectives can be defined and the likely results of specific actions foreseen;” to think in “time-streams” by viewing present circumstances as part of an unbroken continuum between the past and the future.

That advice is particularly useful in deliberations about the current use and the future of our nation’s Reserve components.2 To place such discussions in context, it is helpful to remember how the Reserve components were viewed by many senior leaders as recently as the months preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991, i.e., Operation Desert Storm.

As you know from the discussions this morning, in August 1970, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird issued policy guidance to the military services which first articulated in express terms a “Total Force” approach to the design of military forces. Henceforth, force planners were to “determine the most advantageous [Active/Reserve force] mix to support national strategy and meet the threat.”3 The early implementation of the new Total Force Policy encountered several obstacles,4 but by the mid-1980s, tangible improvements could be seen in the number and quality of individual Reservists and military force planners were assigning increasing responsibilities to Reserve and National Guard units.

It was a well-known fact as late as 1990, however, that no American president since the conflict in Vietnam had involuntarily activated a single Reservist for an armed conflict. A limited number of volunteers had served in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989-90, but strong doubts remained among the uniformed Active Force leadership about both the readiness of the Reserve components, and the willingness of political leaders to rely upon them. In its 1990 Total Force Report, for example, the Navy declared that “The limited availability of Selected Reserve personnel is the biggest obstacle that must be overcome in using Naval Reserve

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2 The Reserve components of the Armed Forces include the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. Together, the Reserve components constitute approximately 45 percent of the nation’s total military manpower.
3 Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird, Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, August 21, 1970.
assets to support contingencies short of mobilization. The equipment is there; it is combat-ready. The problem is being able to call up Reservists to man it.5

On August 8, 1990, only six days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, I had a lengthy memorandum delivered to then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney immediately upon his return from a meeting in Saudia Arabia with King Fahd. I made the following point:

As you know from recent…discussions…no military department has ever recommended the use of the Reserve call-up authority, and no Secretary of Defense has otherwise recommended the use of the authority to the President. The current conflict with Iraq presents a unique political opportunity to send a strong message of deterrence to that nation, to ensure the availability of Reserve manpower needed for the execution of military options, and, as a collateral matter, to put to rest the false impressions about the perceived reluctance to use the call-up authority.6

The result, of course, was the activation of more than 202,000 Selected Reservists and over 20,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) for Desert Storm. Some 106,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists served in the theater of operations. While some problems were incurred, particularly in large maneuver units, their overall performance was, by any reasonable standard, excellent. It even surprised many career professionals, especially those who had little association with the Reserve components and who failed to recognize that in the era of an All Volunteer Force, the kind of individual who was volunteering to serve in a Reserve component was much different than many of those who had served during the days of conscription. In an address to Congress shortly after the conflict ended, President George Bush declared that “This victory belongs...to the regulars, to the reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history.” Indeed, it did.

By the mid-1990s, however, the speed of the pendulum in the direction of greater use of Reservists had increased at a rate much higher than was expected in most quarters as the concept of “operations other than war” gained traction. It was no longer a question of whether Reservists would be activated, but rather, how often. Reservists were now routinely considered for a wide range of peacetime operations, including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, treaty verification, non-combatant evacuation operations, security and advisory assistance, arms control, support of domestic civil authorities, shows of force, peacekeeping, counterdrug operations, and others. Pentagon officials announced plans for Reservists to build a pier for fishing vessels in an economically depressed fishing community, to repair housing, to dig wells, to restore the environment, and to survey the safety of dams and airport runaways.7 One Clinton administration defense official even called for Reservists to be used at home to attack “low literacy levels, high unemployment rates, increasing numbers of high school dropouts, unavailability of health care, rising crime, and drug abuse.”8

In 1997, I warned of this trend in my book Citizen Warriors. This is what I said at the time:

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5 A Report on the Navy’s Total Force FY 90, p.ii.
6 Stephen M. Duncan, Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, August 8, 1990.
8 Deborah R. Lee, Remarks to the National Guard Association of the United States, Boston, MA, September 2, 1994

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If the armed forces are diverted from the fundamental mission of war fighting, if we continue to presume upon the patriotism and limited time of our part-time citizen warriors by using them as a cheap labor pool for public needs that do not involve serious threats to the nation’s security, a day of reckoning will slowly but surely arrive. At some point, the high-quality Reservists whose skills and experience make them the seedcorn for future combat leadership will reluctantly but inevitably conclude that they simply don’t have enough time to remain in the armed forces and to adequately fulfill commitments to their civilian careers, to their families, and to educational and other private needs.9

By the time of the presidential election of 2000, the number of Active Army divisions had effectively been reduced from the eighteen which existed at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, to ten, and the intense use of Reservists had become the subject of national attention. It was not surprising that only twenty-five days after his inauguration, President George W. Bush declared at the headquarters of the West Virginia National Guard that he intended to “be careful about troop deployment-judicious use of our troops.” In the continuum between the past and the future, that declaration was made seven months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Few decision makers could foresee then, just how much the nation would be relying upon Reserve forces only three years later.

Six months after the attacks of 9/11, some 80,576 Reservists from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had been activated. That number did not include the National Guard personnel- -approximately 9,000 at the peak- --who had been activated in a Title 32 or “state status” for airport security duties. Almost two years after the attacks, the mobilization was not going well. In an August 21, 2003 report which described “a stark contrast between the mobilization of Reservists during the 1991 Gulf War and in the chaotic post-Sept. 11 climate,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that existing operation plans “did not fully address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with the terrorist attacks or uncertain overseas requirements,” and that the Army “does not have a standard operating cycle to provide predictability to its Reserves.”11

Eleven months before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Secretary of Defense had anticipated the likelihood of a future manpower crunch. It was urgent that the Guardsmen performing security duties at the nation’s airports and along our international borders be relieved, he said, because those duties are “civilian functions, and they ought to be performed over any sustained period of time by civilians.” We train our people, he said, “to be warfighters.”12

In September 2003, six months after the war in Iraq began, defense officials extended the tours of Army Guard and Reserve forces serving there from approximately six months to twelve months. The Chief of the Army Reserve was candid about the implications. “Numbers tell the story,” he said. “Army Reserve soldiers have been deployed 10 times in the past 12 years for operations from Bosnia to Iraq. During the 75 years before that, the Army Reserve had been

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mobilized just nine times. Since December 1995, we have been in a continuous state of mobilization.”

In July, 2004, the Army found it necessary to activate 5,600 members of its IRR, individuals who have a remaining military service obligation but usually are not assigned to a unit and do not engage in regularly scheduled training activities. Unfortunately, by late September, 2004, more than 37 percent of those ordered to active duty had failed to report. The same month, two other relevant and significant developments occurred.

First, a GAO report noted that over 335,000 Reservists had been involuntarily called to active duty since September 11, 2001, and that “the pace of Reserve operations is expected to remain high” in what was described as an “indefinite Global War on Terrorism overseas.” The report concluded that the Army was “not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans,” because the plans contained certain outdated assumptions. The conclusion was not inconsequential, because in recent months, more than 40 percent of the roughly 140,000 U.S. forces in Iraq have been Reservists. By early spring 2005, it is expected that the Army’s Reserve components will make up about 55 percent of Army forces in Iraqi Freedom III.

The second development was a report by the Defense Science Board which contained several relevant conclusions and recommendations. Noting that stabilization operations after the combat phase of a conflict can last longer and require resources as great as the combat phase, the Board concluded that the Armed Forces currently have “inadequate total numbers” of troops, particularly ground troops, to “sustain our current and projected global stabilization commitments.” It recommended that in the future, stabilization operations be accorded higher priority in the force planning process.

All of this has been taking place in the midst of a war that one respected Army analyst asserts “has accelerated change in ways that DoD theoreticians could not imagine.” The change includes “force structuring experiments inside [Army] combat divisions that modularize the brigade and division headquarters and develop smaller brigade organizations.” The idea is to build units that are interchangeable. A specific objective of the “modularity” idea is to reduce the headquarters staffs which have been an integral part of the divisions. Plans also call for the Army National Guard to convert all of its remaining 34 brigades to this modular design. The objective is to relieve stress on the high demand units and to improve the readiness and deployability of larger numbers of units.

Structural deficiencies in the Armed Forces were recognized at least as early as November, 2002 when the Secretary of Defense directed his staff to identify critical skills in the Reserve components that could be transferred to Active force units. Declaring it a “shame” that large-scale operations could not be mounted without the activation of Reservists who possess

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15 The Defense Science Board was established in 1956. Its thirty-two members and seven ex-officio members are appointed for terms ranging from one to four years and are selected “on the basis of their preeminence in the fields of science, technology, and its application to military operations, research, engineering, manufacturing, and acquisition process.”
18 Ibid.
many of the critical skills normally needed, he asserted that “we intend to see that we’re no longer organized that way in the future.” Since then, the Army has developed plans to “rebalance” its Military Occupational Specialties by shifting significant numbers of Reservists serving in field artillery, air defense, engineering, and certain other battalions, to military police, intelligence, civil affairs, information technology, and general security missions, and to further shift Active force personnel into psychological operations, transportation, and other combat support and combat service support jobs traditionally held by Reservists. Widespread agreement exists that the Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, are currently engaged in the open-ended, low-level counterinsurgency operations that define a large part of the Global War on Terror, with a largely Cold War organization and force structure.

Structural deficiencies were also the subject of a July, 2003 memorandum from the Secretary to the military services. That memo ordered the services to structure their Active and Reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary activations during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation and limited the call-up of any individual unit to no more than once every six years. Under present circumstances, even that goal is unlikely to be met. The individual services have taken certain initiatives - such as the seven-state test project at Hill Air Force Base that will combine Active Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve personnel in a single operational unit for certain missions - but the only other department-wide change which has been proposed within DoD for the implementation of current policies on the Active/Reserve force mix, is a streamlining of personnel management practices. A “continuum of service paradigm” has been offered which would permit Reservists who volunteer to do so, to serve on active duty each year for more than the traditional thirty-nine days of training duty. Others could serve fewer days.

To meet short-term manning problems, “stop-loss” orders have been used in all of the Reserve components, as well as for the Active force. Unlike the activation of members of the IRR, however, stop-loss orders affect military personnel who have completed their military obligation. Even though roughly three-fourths of the National Guard is not affected directly by the stop-loss orders, the practice affects more Reservists than soldiers in the Active force. Members of both Houses of Congress have called it a kind of backdoor draft. A respected military sociologist who has met with U.S. troops in Iraq in recent months has declared that the stop-loss orders are “having a tremendous impact on morale.”

A concern for the adverse impact upon Reserve recruiting and retention has caused the Army, which has the largest Reserve components and which has mobilized more Reservists than all of the other services combined, to reconsider its earlier extension of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. While some Army officials continue to argue that longer tours are necessary to maintain troop strength there and that they have the added advantage of permitting troops to gain valuable expertise in fighting the insurgencies, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau bluntly declared in September 2004 that “All the Army leadership agrees that 12 months is too long.”

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20 “Stop-loss” orders are effectively involuntary extensions of enlistment contracts which keep soldiers on active duty until ninety days after the return of their units from Afghanistan or Iraq. The objective is to keep units together for better cohesion during combat. Ultimately, the Army intends to implement a new personnel policy of “unit manning,” under which soldiers in a unit will remain together for three years, instead of being assigned to new duties in a process which continuously moves individuals into and out of units.
Some force planners take the upbeat position that as the current members of the Reserve components grasp the new realities of Reserve service in the foreseeable future, many will leave, to be replaced by more highly motivated Reservists who are fully aware of their likely activation for extended periods of time. This analysis is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it incorrectly assumes that there are sufficient numbers of people who previously left active duty or who chose not to accept it in the first place, but who would be willing to serve almost full time. In December, 2004, the National Guard was 30 percent below its recruitment goals and the Chief of the Army Reserve declared in memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff that “the Army Reserve…is rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.”\(^{23}\) Second, it assumes that the overall quality, including the skills and experience of the new Reservists, would match that of those who leave. My experience suggests the contrary. The high quality of Reservists since the mid-1980s has been due in large part to officers and non-commissioned officers who are sufficiently talented, experienced, and interested in Reserve service that they are able to pursue successful civilian careers and serve in the Reserve components. Almost full time service may well attract only those individuals who can’t compete successfully as a career soldier, and/or those who have no or few options for a successful civilian career.

Not surprisingly, many Reserve leaders also continue to express enthusiasm for any new overseas mission which gives them greater responsibility. Having been treated, or at least perceiving that they and other Reservists were previously treated as second class warriors by the Active forces, they are delighted to find that they are now badly needed. In November 2004, a Major General in the National Guard was interviewed in connection with the redeployment in January to Iraq of the 3rd Infantry Division. Two brigades from the Division are now under the command of a National Guard Headquarters unit. It is the first time this has happened in at least a half of a century. “The significance of this,” he said, “is that the Army is demonstrating we are one team. They are relying on the Reserve components to do what they are supposed to do.”\(^{24}\)

The Senate and House Authorization Committees did, of course, vote recently to permanently increase the Army’s end strength by 30,000 initially, with planned future expansions. But, the Secretary of Defense and others have consistently opposed any such increase. Rather, they assert that the Army’s new “modularity” process will ease the burden on the new combat brigades which the Army is forming out of its 10 Active divisions. The Army Chief of Staff has been quoted as saying that “This [manning problem] isn’t about end strength. It’s about how many deployable entities do you have in the Army.”\(^{25}\) The Army currently plans to convert its 33 Active combat brigades into 43-48 smaller, more modular “units of action.”

On its face, the concept appears to have merit. There is little doubt that the Army’s Reserve components have been overstructured in the past. But, I submit that an increase in the number of units will not necessarily make the Total Force more effective, especially if there are still too few troops on the ground. The Defense Science Board has also concluded that “Modularity, in and of itself, does not ensure an effective stabilization capability.”\(^{26}\) Moreover, the concept will be applied primarily to combat units. It is not at all clear how it will help

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combat service support units which provide critical logistical support. Most of those units are in the Army’s Reserve components.

The concern about recruiting and retention in recent months has not been limited to military leaders. All kinds of ideas were offered in Congress during the election year which would give Reservists additional benefits. Senate Democrats introduced what they called a Reserve “Bill of Rights.” Improvements in health care, retirement pay, GI Bill benefits, bonuses, civilian job protection, and limitations on deployment, were all discussed. The presidential candidates dueled over the extent to which the Tricare system would be made available to Reservists. Lost in the shuffle was the obvious fact that benefits are not free and that at some point, the cost differential between Active and Reserve forces—-one of the main attractions of the Reserve components—-could lose its significance.

Rumors of the resurrection of the draft also continue to make the rounds. Proposed legislation reinstating conscription was introduced in the House and Senate in 2003, but in an unusual legislative action taken in early October, the proposal was defeated in the House of Representatives by a vote of 402-2. Whatever may be said about national service building character, about the need to ensure that the required sacrifices in the War on Terrorism are not borne only by those who volunteer to serve in military uniform, and about the need to appeal more to patriotism instead of economic incentives to build the Armed Forces, there is obviously little political support for a draft. Pentagon leaders are some of the most outspoken opponents and on 4 October, President Bush declared emphatically that “We will not have a draft, so long as I am president of the United States.” No one wants to dilute the uniformly high quality of today’s American warriors.

None of the developments I have described thus far, however, have addressed or relate directly to what I believe to be the fundamental force structure issues. It must be recognized that the attacks of 9/11 initiated a fundamentally different kind of war than those of the past. We are now in a totally new security environment. The new form of terrorism does not start or stop at the waters’ edge or at our land borders with other countries. The lines between “foreign” and “domestic” and between “war” and “crime” are no longer as clear as they seemed to be before September 11, 2001. The American homeland is now part of the battlespace. The term “war fighting” now has an entirely new meaning.

A primary question which must now be answered is what conventional and homeland security missions can, and should, be assigned to Active force units and personnel, and to Reservists, including the National Guard? What Active/Reserve force mix is required to ensure that the War on Terror is successfully prosecuted, that our other strategic challenges are successfully met, and that all necessary missions - - whether they are to be performed overseas or at home - - are performed effectively? What military skills, experience, and resources are critical to homeland security and to what units and personnel should they be taught and given? Should Reservists with unique or critical skills and experience be organized, trained, and compensated differently than other Reservists? To what extent is it possible to allocate manpower, equipment,
training and other resources to the Active and Reserve forces not on the basis of conventional planning principles, political pressure, tradition, or long-standing practice, but solely upon the basis of national needs at home and abroad, demonstrated capability to perform specific missions and operational tasks, and costs? What military units should be dedicated exclusively, or at least primarily, to security missions at home?

During the three years since the attacks of 9/11, it has been the position of the Department of Defense that military capabilities should be used at home only in emergency situations and even then, only for short periods of time. The Armed Forces, so the thinking goes, are the only American institution that can deal with major threats overseas, and that alone should be the focus of the Department of Defense (DoD). So strongly held has this view been that defense officials added a new term to the DoD lexicon, (“Homeland Defense”) to distinguish DoD responsibilities from the “Homeland Security” responsibilities of civilian departments and agencies.

This view was illustrated early in a couple of Pentagon Town Hall Meetings where senior defense officials met with uniformed personnel and civilian employees. In a November, 2002 meeting, a questioner asked about the military’s role in homeland security. The Secretary of Defense declared that “[I]f we’re asked to do an emergency assignment, like [guarding] the airports when there’s no other capability,…it ought to be for a short period of time. We ought to get in, do it, and get out, and get back to doing military assignments and not essentially civilian functions.”29 At another meeting in March, 2003, he said that “the task of defending America was best performed forward by preventing things from threatening our country. It is understandable,” he continued, “that some people would look and say “Well, my goodness, if we have threats right here, shouldn’t we keep forces right here to protect against those threats?” and I guess,” he added, “the answer to that is, Isn’t it better to deal with those threats elsewhere?”30

Whatever the merit of the reasons upon which the Department of Defense has based its distinction between “Homeland Security” and “Homeland Defense,” I submit that the distinction is no longer useful. Like the lines between “foreign” and “domestic” and “war” and “crime,” the line between “military assignments” and “civilian functions” is no longer as bright as it was before 9/11. The National Strategy for Homeland Security rightly characterizes the task of securing the homeland as the most important mission of the U.S. Government and as “a challenge of monumental scale and complexity.”31 Unfortunately, we are still far from being fully prepared.

A recent study by the RAND Arroyo Center illustrates a small part of the problem. Given the willingness and capability of terrorists to conduct mass-casualty attacks within the United States, the study addressed the questions of (1) the circumstances under which military medical assets could be requested by civil authorities, (2) what type of assets or capabilities would likely be required, and (3) whether an effective planning process is in place. Recognizing that “DoD possesses unique capabilities, including detection and decontamination of agents, treatment and evacuation of contaminated casualties, and preventive medicine capabilities,”32 the

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study reached several disturbing conclusions. First, that no effective planning process is in place for determining the requirements of military medical support to civil authorities; second, that no active duty or Federal Reserve component units have been assigned a mission responsibility for support to civil authorities; and third, that there is no comprehensive training program for either Title 10 or Title 32 National Guard units for providing civil support.33

In November 2004, a new report by the GAO highlighted another part of the problem. Noting that recent transfers of equipment within the National Guard to meet short-term requirements have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, and that current Army funding plans call for continuing to maintain nondeployed Army National Guard forces with only a portion of the personnel and equipment required for warfighting operations, the report contained a disturbing conclusion. The Guard’s “preparedness to perform homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the future,” it said, “is unknown.”34 Why? Because the Guard’s role in those missions has not been established, and preparedness standards and measures have not been developed.

Another recent RAND study35 focused on the issue of whether the Army should do more to hedge against the risks of being inadequately prepared for potential Homeland Security tasks. Its recommendations were no less significant than those of the first study. First, it concluded that statutory changes should be made that would permit the National Guard to share its resources more easily across state borders and permit the Federal Reserve components to conduct Homeland Security missions. Second, the study recommended that the Army should dedicate a mix of National Guard task forces to Homeland Security emergencies, including law enforcement duties, and make them ready for rapid deployment and ensure that they are appropriately trained.

It is, of course, understandable that the leadership of DoD is sensitive to the budget implications of any assignment of new domestic missions to the Armed Forces. The War on Terror is manpower intensive and personnel costs in an All Volunteer Force are very high. Congress is quick to assign new missions to DoD, but it often fails to add funding for the missions. The other federal departments covet the DoD budget and are always happy to let military personnel perform tasks that their own personnel should perform. State governors much prefer to let Uncle Sam pay for things which, if they had to pay for them, would require unpopular political decisions.

But, several conclusions in a recent report of the Defense Science Board are also disturbing. Noting that resource constraints must always be considered, the Board nevertheless concluded that “DoD will play a vital role in the overall Homeland Security mission;” that local first responders will be “supported by unique DoD capabilities and assets;” that neither DoD nor civilian agencies have “fully explored the potential role DoD may need to fulfill for homeland security;” that the Department of Homeland Security “has very little understanding” of the role of the U.S. Northern Command; and that at least as of early Spring 2003, the “top DoD leadership [had] not actively sought...partnership with civil agencies.”36

33 Ibid
A hopeful hint of possible change in DoD’s restricted view of “Homeland Defense” has emerged in recent months. In the spring of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a Strategic Planning Guidance to the military services for the years 2006-2011 which expressly placed all potential threats into four categories, one of which is a “catastrophic” surprise attack on symbolic and high value targets, presumably targets at home. In January 2005, it was reported that the Terms of Reference for the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review identified four strategic problems as the focus of examination, one of which is the military’s role in Homeland Security. The DOD continues, however, to reject calls for any form of a permanent manpower increase or major restructuring on the ground that additional “efficiencies” can be squeezed out of the current force.

Meanwhile, it has become apparent to increasing numbers of other policy makers and analysts that the question of manning the forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other locations overseas, is related directly to the question of how we prevent and respond to, major terrorist attacks at home. One analyst argues that the Army has already broken with its “historic cycle of mobilizing, fighting, and retraining after each war” because of the open-ended nature of the War on Terrorism and the resultant absence of any “after war” period.

One of the many things which officials at all levels of government need to know in their efforts to secure the homeland, is what kind of help, and the extent of the help they can expect from the Department of Defense. They need certainty, or at least predictability, about what DoD personnel and resources they can and cannot count on in the event of a major attack. State governors have already been outspoken in their concern about addressing possible terrorist attacks, as well as natural disasters, when large numbers of their National Guard are performing federal missions overseas. Military and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) planners remain uncertain about the relationship between DoD and DHS in the planning for the response to a major attack at home. Planners at other agencies remain uncertain about issues as simple as how many hospital beds DoD could make available.

Some states have more than 75 percent of their Guardsmen on active duty today, and some 80 percent of the Guard will serve on active duty in the next three years. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau declared in April 2004 that “The Guard’s mission has shifted from a strategic reserve built on a Cold War deterrence construct to an operational reserve that must be capable of joint and expeditionary missions.” It has been rightly noted, however, that if this development is permitted to spread and become permanent, it will deprive the Armed Forces of a true strategic reserve that can be used in larger, more conventional conflicts. And, as I noted earlier, removal of the distinction between Active service and Reserve service is likely to ensure that fewer soldiers with Active service experience choose to enter a Reserve component upon the completion of their initial military obligation. It is worth noting that a September 2004 GAO report said that “Much of the Army’s Reserve component force has [still] been organized, trained, and resourced as a strategic reserve that would receive personnel, training, and

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38 Robert B. Killebrew, “It Is a Daunting Time to be a Soldier,” op.cit.
40 Ibid.
equipment as a later – deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for 
continuous overseas deployments.”

Using the argument that the National Guard is now a de facto federal force and that most 
of the Guard is needed to augment the Active Army and the Air Force, some observers have 
recommended reliance on State Defense Forces, i.e., volunteer groups that exist in 19 states to 
assist with local or statewide emergencies. These groups are funded by the individual states. 
The total national membership is approximately 12,000 but they have been criticized for being 
too political and insufficiently rigorous in their training and performance standards. Others have 
suggested a new non-expeditionary Homeland Security Corps, which would serve under the 
governors, but be funded by the Department of Homeland Security. I do not believe these ideas 
have merit except as such groups might be used to supplement better trained responders.

I submit that all of these problems, and the suggested solutions, illustrate the need for a 
complete re-thinking of our security requirements and the related force structure of the Armed 
Forces. No longer can we afford to view our foreign military requirements as distinct and 
separate from our homeland security requirements. Strategies and policies which integrate all of 
our military and civilian experience, capabilities, technologies, equipment and other resources, 
and especially planning, are required. This is likely to require an unprecedented inter-agency 
approach to the assessment of national security and homeland security threats and vulnerabilities, 
including both those threats which originate and have an impact overseas, and those which 
impact at home.

It may also mean that in order to be fully prepared, additional military units and perhaps 
significantly greater numbers of individual Active and Reserve personnel will have to be 
assigned specific, primarily, and perhaps even exclusively homeland security missions 
beforehand, not after a devastating attack occurs. Preparations for a possible terrorist attack, 
especially critically important training, cannot wait until an attack occurs. The Department of 
Homeland Security’s new National Incident Management System - - which was prepared at the 
direction of the President - - expressly declares that preparedness “is implemented through a 
continuous cycle of planning, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking action to 
correct and mitigate.” Unfortunately, the Armed Forces remain organized, trained, and 
equipped to fight overseas military adversaries. When units are also assigned domestic missions, 
they are often unable to practice the various skills which are needed to maintain combat 
proficiency for the overseas missions.

In September 2004, it was reported that the Department of Defense had prepared a new 
draft “homeland defense” strategy that would rely upon the existing force structure and place 
more reliance on the Reserve components. Whatever the scope and ultimate merit of the

42 GAO-04-1031.
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 
45 The draft version of the new “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” reportedly calls for a layered set 
of defenses that would present “multiple barriers” to future attacks. Reservists would be assigned addition missions 
Defense News, September 27, 2004, p.1, Jason Sherman, “Plan adds new roles for Guard, Reserve,” Army Times, 
October 25, 2004, p.31. The Defense Science Board has also recommended that the relationship between U.S. 
Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, and the Guard units of the separate states be “strengthened.” 
various provisions of this proposed strategy, however, it is very unlikely to go far enough since it is limited to “Homeland Defense” as that term is understood in the Pentagon. To any extent that it assumes that part-time Reserve units can be fully trained for both traditional over-seas war-fighting missions and homeland defense missions, it may also be unrealistic.

I further submit that the totally new evaluation of our force structure and of the Active/Reserve force mix which I recommend should be conducted by an independent body. It is no reflection upon the Department of Defense to suggest that it is simply not possible for it to effectively conduct the kind of fresh, fundamental, and objective analysis that is needed, while it is simultaneously engaged in the management of complex conflicts overseas, and the transformation of other important elements of the defense establishment.

In this context, it is important to remember that military manpower systems are inherently political in nature. French Marshal Saint-Cyr captured the idea succinctly in 1867 with his remark that systems of military service must be treated as political institutions because of the “direct, powerful, and permanent effect they have on the dearest interests, aspirations, mores, and practices of the entire population.” Each of the military services and each of the Reserve components has its own special interest pleaders. The National Guard of each state has its own tradition and culture. The House of Representatives is aggressively protective of its constitutional authority to “raise and support Armies,” and to “provide and maintain a Navy.” The Senate properly guards its own prerogatives. The employers of Reservists want to have a say about the use of their employees. Reserve families also need to be heard. My own family is a case in point.

The husband of my youngest daughter is an Information Technology manager. In January 2003, he was fulfilling the requirements of his full time civilian job, completing a Master’s Degree, and anticipating a promotion to Staff Sergeant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He and my daughter were the parents of a three year old and a two year old and they were looking forward to the birth of their third child a few weeks later.

Thirty days prior to the birth, he was mobilized and immediately deployed to the Persian Gulf. A few weeks later, he was part of the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade engaged in fierce fighting from An Nasiryah to Baghdad. He returned home in July with the Presidential Unit Citation and other awards. It soon became clear, however, that his Reserve unit would be mobilized again within the next 12-24 months. His professional and personal circumstances simply did not permit him to leave again so soon. So, only four years short of a military retirement, he found it necessary to remain a civilian when his current enlistment expired. We cannot afford to lose quality Reservists like him.

Under the circumstances I have described, I see no way to address the hard questions that lie before us except through a presidential and congressionally-sponsored commission of bipartisan experts, not unlike those who served on the 9/11 Commission. Subject matter expertise would be essential, but not sufficient for commission members. Credibility, balanced judgment, personal experience, an open mind, and other similar attributes would be required. Precisely because major changes in force structure are political in nature, the best elements of the political process would have to be welcomed.

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47 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 12, 13.
To be clear about what I am suggesting, I propose a commission with a broader charter than that contemplated by the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. The commission I propose would focus on the force structure, roles and missions of all of the Armed Forces, not just the Reserve components, and it would do so not in the context of the current DoD concept of “Homeland Defense,” but rather in the context of the broader concept of “Homeland Security” and the nation’s national security vulnerabilities at home, as well as overseas.

All interested parties would have to be heard. The work of the commission could not be seen as usurping the constitutional role of the President or the Congress. Members of the commission would have to think in “time streams.” Recommendations on the future role and responsibilities of the Reserve components would have to be supported by relatively undisputed facts and first rate, independent analysis. The Department of Defense would have to be given full opportunity to react to the analysis and recommendations of the commission. To the greatest extent possible, however, the worst elements of the political process would have to be excluded. It would be very important to marginalize special pleaders who view any potential change only from the narrow perspective of their particular constituencies.

This kind of idea would appear to be precisely what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has advocated. At a counterterrorism conference in late September 2004, General Myers posed the following question: “Are we being as bold and innovative as we need to be?” He then declared “I don’t want to ask that question after...the next 9/11. The time to ask the question is now.”

In her book on Statecraft, Margaret Thatcher reminds us that “It is always important in matters of high politics to know what you do not know. Those who think they know, but are mistaken, and act upon their mistakes, are the most dangerous people to have in charge.” I submit that on the high politics issue of the most appropriate structure of the Armed Forces for the complex and dangerous new world in which we now live, we do not yet know the correct answer and we don’t have much time to learn it. To put things in perspective, if the “detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs” can be a “high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense” - - and it was so declared by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1989 - - it cannot be reasonably argued that the design of the Armed Forces should not include the clear assignment of resource needed for the protection of the American homeland from terrorist attacks which could involve weapons of mass destruction.

I believe that now is the time to develop a bold and innovative new approach to the manning of our Armed Forces. Now is the time to seek a national consensus on the future composition, organization, and use of our Reserve components. Now is the time to recalibrate

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48 In July 2003, the GAO recommended just such an independent assessment of the force structure. The Department of Defense objected to the recommendation on the ground that “force structure changes should be determined through the ongoing force management processes that will culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.” GAO-03-670, “DoD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions,” July 2003, p.4.


51 On September 18, 1989, while I was serving as the DoD Coordinator of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney issued formal guidance for the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands on the implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy. The guidance defined the drug interdiction mission as a “high priority national security mission.”
the Total Force Policy so that it more effectively achieves its original goal: “the most
advantageous [Active/Reserve force] mix to support national strategy and meet the threat.”

It is entirely possible, of course, that the changes recommended by the commission I
propose, would require increases in federal and perhaps state expenditures for security
purposes. They might also require major changes in the roles and missions of the
Active/Reserve components or the elimination or reduction of military units which are rooted in
history and tradition. Such increases or changes would almost certainly be politically unpopular.
But, political popularity is not the issue. The issue is clearly one of duty.

This point was made by Churchill in November 1936 in a speech on the floor of the
House of Commons. During the course of a defense debate on the rapid growth of Germany’s
air force, he turned to the government’s excuses for delays over the previous three years in
embarking upon a rearmament program. “I have heard it said,” he declared, “that the
Government had no [political] mandate for rearmament until the General Election. Such a
doctrine is wholly inadmissible. The responsibility of Ministers for the public safety is absolute
and requires no mandate. It is in fact the prime object for which Governments come into
existence.”

If we do anything less than face these difficult questions regarding the size, shape, and
use of our Armed Forces directly, effectively, and soon, future generations of Americans will
wonder in astonishment how we permitted parochial interests, tradition, selfish motives,
temporary cost considerations, and simple bureaucratic inertia, to deter us from doing everything
we could to “provide for the common defense.”

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52 One recent estimate is that 5-6 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, or $500- $600 billion per year, would be
required to build the force that is needed. See Tom Donnelly, Vance Serchuk, “A Bigger, Badder, Better Army,”
op.cit.
Toward Cultural Change of the Total Army

Raymond E. Bell, Jr.

Of the various cultures of the Reserve Components of the American Armed Services, those of the Army are the least integrated with their active-duty counterpart. The Marines and Air Force enjoy a common reserve and active-duty culture that enhances their integration and thus their effectiveness. The Navy sees its reserve component principally as an augmentation to its regular establishment rather than as a complementary organization. In the case of the Army, however, the active-duty Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve have marked tendencies to go their own ways. Because these components lack a common culture, an inbred distraction results, which unfavorably influences the perception of Army performance, even within the organization itself. Nevertheless, steps can be taken to establish a common culture, the synergy of which will enhance not only the Army’s total force image but also its effectiveness.

Background

The relationships between the Reserve Components of the U.S. armed services and their active elements stem from distinct service-oriented cultures. At this time of so-called transformation by the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the integration of the reserves with their active components has come to depend heavily on cultures that have developed over the years and that either hinder or enhance the performance of each service. After briefly looking at the other services, this chapter explores the dynamics of the present culture within the three components of the U.S. Army, all of which are now engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and committed to operations in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Korea. This examination leads to the proposal that a change in culture could have a positive influence on the total Army’s performance as it strives to operate effectively in a stressful environment.

Recently, the Chief of the Army Reserve called for a culture change in the component he directs. He postulated that, as a matter of cultural change, soldiers who join the organization must expect to be mobilized during their service.¹ His idea of a culture change, however, does not take into consideration the relationship between the Army Reserve and the active Army. He apparently sees a cultural change only within his own component. His statement implies an adherence to the “stovepipe” concept that “we” of the reserve operate with “them” of the active service. Absent is the concept of a total force. Certainly, he did not mean to imply that the different components should not work smoothly in consonance with each other. But his statement misses the deeper meaning of a cultural change that would affect the Army as a whole.

The Army comprises three distinct cultures, which hinders integration of the Army into one seamless organization and, therefore, hampers its effectiveness. These different cultures have existed almost from the beginning of a standing army in the United States. Each component closely guards its own culture, ostensibly to preserve its character. In contrast, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed cultures that make integration of their organizations relatively complete, with little distinction between their active and reserve components.

To properly focus on how the Army’s three separate cultures impact on the integration of the components and, thus, their effectiveness, it is necessary to look first at how the other services have fostered the culture of reserve elements. This overview will provide a helpful context in which to subsequently consider the Army’s situation.

**Navy and Marine Corps Cultures**

The Navy sees its reservists principally as individual augmentees to the active force. The Navy has reserve air squadrons and Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare units as well as other reserve organizations, but essentially, each reservist can expect to be mobilized as an individual to serve in some capacity within the active establishment. At the same time, because there is no “State” navy, that is, no Naval National Guard equivalent to the Army and Air Force units, cultural assimilation has been relatively easy. Whatever reservist subculture exists, it is effectively subsumed into one overall Navy culture.

The U.S. Marine Corps, nominally part of the Navy Department, has developed a different kind of culture. As a young organization, the Marine Corps Reserve adopted the culture of its active component comparatively easily. Although the reserve was organized on a limited basis before World War II, no definitive distinction between active and reserve Marines appeared until the Korean conflict.

Formation of a common culture also is promoted by the relatively small size of the Corps and the close integration of the active and reserve components. The Marine Corps Reserve numbers approximately 40,000 personnel as compared with the Army Reserve and National Guard combined strength of more than 500,000 men and women. This smaller size makes for a tighter and more manageable organization that fosters the same high standards of conduct and performance in both components.

In addition to being relatively small, the Marines, like the Navy, have only one reserve component. There is no Marine Corps National Guard that reports to a State Governor in the same manner that the Army and Air National Guards do. Thus, the Marines maintain a simpler command relationship because no body of governance intervenes to require duty to both the State and Federal Governments. When mobilized, Reserve Marines report only to the President of the United States.

A fourth factor that has helped foster a common culture is the attention that the active Marines pay to the reserves. The most transparent evidence of the extent to which the active Marines participate in reserve activities is the Inspector-Instructor (I&I) staff of all units down to company size. An active-duty Marine officer with a small staff works full time with the reserve unit. These active Marines are considered part of the organization of the parent unit, the reserve 4th Marine Division. That is, they are in the reserve unit. When the reserve organization is

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2 “The Naval Reserve is actually 100 percent individual augmentees,” explained Vice Admiral Cotton, Commander, Navy Reserve Force. Quoted in “Service Sections,” *The Officer*, April 2004, 44.
3 Naval militias have existed in the past, and exist today, in several states such as New York. But the naval militias are not recognized as being formal Reserve Components of the U.S. Navy and do not receive Federal funding as do all recognized Reserve Components.
6 Unpublished manuscript, “History of the Reserves,” Marine Corps Library, 1. As far back as 1893, some seven States had organized Marine detachments in their naval militias, but, as with the States’ naval militias, they were not recognized as federally funded entities.
mobilized, the active Marines deploy with it, assuming key tables of organization and equipment positions as required.\textsuperscript{7}

The active-duty Marines who are assigned to these staff positions do not consider this duty as career confining. It is expected that to maintain its current standards, the Corps must send its best personnel to these staffs.\textsuperscript{8} This attitude promotes a common culture because it does not penalize an active Marine, as far as promotion and career progression goes, for being a member of the Marine reserve component.

\textit{The Air Force Culture}

The United States Air Force culture is influenced by factors common to its sister services in several respects. Unlike the Navy and Marine Corps, however, the Air Force has three components, the active Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. It therefore faces the same chain of command challenges that the Army does, that is, having a component that must report not only to the President of the United States but also to the Governor of a State or Territory. This factor influences Air Force culture, but the very nature of the Air Force allows for much the same kind of closeness that the Marines and Navy enjoy.

Having been spun off from the Army by the National Security Act of 1947, the Air Force was in the enviable position of being able to make a fresh start in developing its own culture. It took from the Army Air Force of World War II that which it considered most worthwhile at the same time it established new institutions. The most important of these new entities were the Federal Air Force Reserve and the incorporation of the air elements of the National Guard into its force structure. Thus was born a new Air Force culture.

Over the years, this culture has generated a measure of integration that some in the U.S. Army envy. But while the Army is unit oriented, the Air Force is more individual oriented. For example, the transition for a pilot from the active Air Force to the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve is simpler because of the flexibility that the pilot has in making the move; the reservist may continue to fly aircraft identical or similar to the aircraft he or she flew on active duty.\textsuperscript{9}

The integration that has forged the common culture is especially evident in organizations such as the Air Force Reserve associate units, where active and reserve squadrons trade off flying the same aircraft.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, because of the individualist nature of the Air Force, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the components. The proficiency of those in the reserves is such that it is not unusual to see reserve organizations come out on top in competitions with their active counterparts.


\textsuperscript{8} Gunnery Sergeant Orr, “M1A1 Tanks and Fragmentary Ammunition.” Gunnery Sergeant Orr had previously served as a tank platoon sergeant with the 1st Tank Battalion of the 1st Marine Division in a Marine Expeditionary Unit and in Marine Security Detachments in Saudi Arabia and Rome, Italy. He is an experienced and capable Marine who can expect to progress further up the ranks and enjoy future excellent assignments.

\textsuperscript{9} April 19, 2004, interview and letter from Major Jon Ziegler, USAFR who easily transitioned from flying in the active Air Force to becoming an instructor pilot who trains undergraduate pilots with the Air Force Reserve as part of the active Air Force’s pilot training program.

\textsuperscript{10} Susan E. Lukas. “Transformation,” \textit{The Officer}, April 2004, 26. This concept is gaining in popularity.
In contrast to the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves, however, the Air Force must deal with two Reserve Components, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. Although directing activities in the Air Force Reserve is relatively straightforward because of its federal nature, the Air National Guard units are also responsible to Governors of States and Territories. The very nature of flying, however, militates against divisiveness. An Air National Guard fighter squadron, for example, would hardly be expected to confine its activities within a State’s boundaries. Thus, for administrative purposes, the squadron may report to a State Governor (through the Adjutant General), but operationally, the unit must work within the overall Air Force framework.

Finally, unlike the other services, certain of the basic training of active Air Force personnel is in the hands of Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve units. Most of the training for the C–130 transport aircraft, for example, is conducted at Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas by the Air National Guard. Air Force Reservists conduct initial pilot training (termed Undergraduate Pilot Training) for the entire Air Force at bases in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Texas. This closely integrated training scheme practically requires a common culture.

Three Army Components, Three Cultures

The preceding review of the factors influencing the cultures of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force has provided an appropriate context within which to investigate the cultures of the U.S. Army’s three components. Although one might wish that the Army could enjoy the same benefits that common cultures afford the other services, radical differences between the Army and the other services in history, structure, and purpose preclude many comparisons. Nevertheless, certain elements in the other cultures might well be adopted by the U.S. Army. In fact, efforts are underway to do just that.

The Army National Guard, the larger of the two U.S. Army Reserve Components, is, in fact, older than the Active Army. It also is the oldest of all the reserve components by a margin of a couple of hundred years. It traces its history back to the early 17th century when a militia regiment was formed in Massachusetts. Through the years, the Army National Guard has developed its own culture, which is oriented toward the citizen soldier and the state, even as it executes federal missions. This culture does not necessarily mesh with that of the active Army, although the National Guard is more than 90 percent funded by the Federal Government and receives substantial training support from the Active Army.

The Army Reserve is principally a creature of the early 20th century. It gained prominence only after World War I and has had less of an opportunity to develop a unique culture. But because personnel joining the National Guard are also members of the Federal military reserve system, the Army’s two Reserve Components share a strong affinity. An officer in the Army (as well as in the Air) National Guard holds a reserve commission in the Armed Services of the United States, and transfers between Reserve Components occur, especially when promotion opportunities within a State’s National Guard are reduced because officer positions are filled.

11 Major Ziegler, as previously noted, is such an instructor pilot, teaching pilot candidates in Texas.
Together, the Army’s Reserve Components are larger than any of the other services, which has resulted in a diffusion of cultures. The subordinate units are based in thousands of different locations, many of them remote from the more unit-concentrated, active Army installations.\textsuperscript{14} This dispersion of organizations makes it difficult for Active Army units to interact with National Guard or Army Reserve formations to the same extent that organizations of Air Force Reserve components (such as the Air Force Reserve associate squadrons that are collocated with their active counterparts) do. The Active Army, unlike the other services, has divided up primary functions between its two Reserve Components. The Army National Guard is expected to provide primarily combat and combat support organizations to the force structure. The Army Reserve provides combat service support and training elements in addition to many combat support organizations. Fragmentation of functions tends to create competing cultures.

\textbf{The Influence of Associations}

Like the other Reserve Components, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have the support of associations that represent the interests and concerns of their members before the United States Congress. For example, the National Guard Association and its smaller adjunct, the Adjutant General Association, along with the Reserve Officers Association are powerful lobbying organizations on behalf of officer members and the components. These associations have been instrumental in helping to develop separate component cultures—to the disadvantage of their active counterparts. The National Guard Association, for instance, has been energetic in getting Congress to mandate that the active Army and Air Force increase equipment purchases on behalf of the Guard. Thus, the association, in the name of the Guard, sometimes allies with Members of Congress pitted against an often resentful active Army and Air Force.

\textbf{Maintaining Professionalism}

The emphasis on individual performance in the Navy and Air Force and the relatively small size and traditional emphasis on standards of the Marine Corps promote professionalism. In my experience, the size and diversity of Army Reserve Components militates against professionalism. Studies by the Brookings Institution and others have determined that up to 6 months are required to make a combat arms brigade ready for deployment.\textsuperscript{15} The allegation rankled Guardsmen, who contended that the active Army had loaded the deck against them and purposely delayed certification so the brigade would not deploy in time to liberate Kuwait.\textsuperscript{16} Such allegations, true or not, have tended to haunt the relationship of the Army Guard and the active Army and thus affect attempts to develop a common culture.

With respect to the Army the situation is not all that bleak. Recent Reserve Component deployments to relatively benign locations, such as Bosnia and the Sinai Peninsula, but also to

\textsuperscript{14} Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, “First Rate Soldiers Serving the Nation,” \textit{Army}, October 2001, 100. The Army National Guard alone maintains 3,174 training facilities spread out across the country.


hostile environments, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, have caused a reassessment of professionalism within Reserve Components. Programs such as those involving active Army lieutenant colonels commanding National Guard combat battalions have also found a willingness on the part of active Army and the Army Guard to better understand each other, stimulate integration, and foster a common culture.\footnote{Raymond E. Bell, Jr. “Abused Volunteers?”\textit{Armed Forces Journal International}, February 2001, 54.} But the Army still has a long way to go.

\textbf{Finding a Common Army Culture}

The question that arises is: What measures can all three Army components take to enhance a common culture that will, in turn, help to achieve the kind of integration that the other services have? Although its size, structure, and missions will never allow the Army to achieve the same kind of culture to develop that the other services enjoy, it is not too much to expect that a more common culture can be achieved.

The leadership of the Army, including that of its Reserve Components, is adamant that the so-called “one” or “total” Army is working well. At the lowest levels of the officer corps, however, there is a dearth of knowledge about the characteristics and competencies of the three components in the ranks of the officer-producing entities, such as the United States Military Academy and academic institutions with Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units. Whereas a ROTC unit will have an active-duty officer as its commander, for example, there are no Reserve Component officers on active duty on the teaching faculty at West Point.\footnote{It is doubtful, however, that an Army Reserve or National Guard officer teaching at West Point in uniform would be identified as a member of the Reserve Components because there would be no distinction in terms of uniform, bearing, or expertise to identify the reserve officer as such. At the same time, more and more of the instructors of military science at civilian institutions are retired officers back in uniform.}

However, the real challenge for the junior officers, including those through the rank of major, is that, although they may serve \textit{with} a Reserve or Army Guard unit, they will not serve \textit{in} the unit. The distinction between serving \textit{in} as opposed to \textit{with} is important. A junior officer may advise a Guard or Reserve unit, but he or she will not be a member of the unit. The advisor reports up the active-duty chain of command and has no real responsibility for the performance of the unit. Although the officer may identify with the performance and goals of the unit, in the long run, the active-duty officer’s career is not affected by what the particular unit does. One result is the lack of a common culture and thereby a hindrance to the total Army’s effectiveness.

In addition, most active-duty officers see service \textit{with} the Reserve Components as either career limiting or career ending. Just a casual glance at the active Army general officer ranks shows that practically none of them have ever served with a Reserve Component unit. Yet, today, in Kuwait and Iraq, active Army generals command brigade-size Reserve Component units, and some logistical units above corps level commanded by Reserve generals report directly to active Army commanders. Of particular significance is that the commander of the U.S. Army III Corps in Iraq, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, formerly commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which is composed of three Army National Guard “enhanced” brigades. His career certainly has not suffered as a result of commanding Reserve Component units, but it is not clear how much exposure he had to the National Guard before he became division commander.

The case of Lieutenant General Metz nevertheless speaks well for developing a common culture. Likewise, the command of a Vermont Army Guard tank battalion and of a Louisiana
Army National Guard artillery battalion by active Army lieutenant colonels has been a step in a positive direction. These steps have generally been adopted with approval by the National Guard community, although the loss of precious battalion command positions has stirred some discontent among Guardsmen looking for career advancement. Such assignments, albeit on a limited scale, are a move toward force integration and represent successful cultural change.

**Recommendations**

Putting the following three recommendations into action are key steps to achieving a change in culture.

**Dual membership.** Assignment of active Army officers to positions in the Reserve Component units at a level below battalion could work in the following way. Instructors up to the rank of major at the United States Military Academy and the various service schools could be given two or three year assignments as members of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve troop program units commensurate with their grades while they are assigned as instructors. They would attend unit training assemblies (usually one weekend a month) and annual training (2 weeks a year) with the Reserve Component unit. If the unit is mobilized, that officer would join the unit for its federal tour of duty and return to the instructorship on completion of the tour. The officer would be rated by the academic department head with letter input from the commanding officer of the Guard or Reserve unit.20

Advantages of this step are that the active-duty officer learns about the Reserve Components at the beginning of his or her career, not toward the end; the officer keeps current in his military occupation specialty; and, most important, the officer does not suffer the perception that he or she is being sidelined by being assigned to duty with a Reserve Component unit but, instead, is a bona fide member of the unit. A possible additional benefit to the officer is that, if he or she decides to leave active duty and pursue a career in the Reserve Components, then that officer has already made a good start at finding an appropriate position. The disadvantages are the extra time the officer must devote to the alternate assignment; the distance on the weekend the officer might have to travel to his or her unit; and, until the officer has made the transition, resentment by members of the reserve unit where the active-duty officer adopts an adverse attitude on arriving at the unit.

The most important feature of this scheme in achieving a change of culture is that it works toward developing the common culture near the beginning of an officer’s career. It eliminates the stigma of an officer being singled out as being less competitive by virtue of being sidelined in one’s career progressions, which present-day assignments with the Reserve Components imply. Instructors at institutions such as the United States Military Academy are generally captains and majors who have had company commands. They are generally considered the “cream of the crop” of the officer corps. In addition, it is not uncommon for most officers of a West Point class to go back to teach at their alma mater, obtaining at least a master’s degree along the way. Unfortunately, with one or two years in graduate school and three years teaching at the Military Academy, the active Army officer can devote up to a quarter of a 20-year career out of the mainstream of the U.S. Army. A concurrent Reserve Component assignment would

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19 Bell, "Abused Volunteers?,” 54.
20 Typically, instructors have a great deal of autonomy. Their classroom performance is generally not scrutinized in the same manner as that of an officer in a line position.
compensate for the gap thus created while allowing the officer to maintain his or her career military field proficiency and competitiveness.

**Eligibility for promotion requiring participation in a Reserve Component.** The second recommendation, which dovetails with the above concept, is to require every officer to serve in a Reserve Component unit (as did the aforementioned battalion commanders) before the officer can be eligible for promotion to the rank of general officer. This could be done early in the officer’s career, as suggested above, or in the field grade ranks as a key officer in a major Reserve Component unit. At present, by virtue of a congressional mandate, officers must have served on a joint staff or in a joint assignment to be eligible for consideration for promotion to general officer. Assignment to a Reserve Component organization should receive the same mandate.

**Active-duty commander’s accountability for reserve unit performance.** A third recommendation is to make senior active-duty officers who command major Army National Guard and Army Reserve formations specifically accountable for the performance of these organizations. It is interesting to speculate on whether the commanding generals of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)—to which its formerly known “round-out” brigade, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard was assigned—would have reached four star rank had they been held closely accountable for the allegedly less-than-responsive performance of the brigade in preparation for Operation Desert Storm. With the deployment of three Army National Guard brigades to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it would be appropriate to assess the performance of their higher-level, active-duty commanders based on how well the brigades accomplish their missions. In any event, holding senior commanders accountable in this way would certainly bring focus to bear on the integration of the Army’s three components and, thus, would enhance a more common culture in the Army’s total force.

**Conclusions**

A change in culture within the “total” U.S. Army is a very significant part of its transformation into a force that is capable of joining its fellow services in joint operations. With a shift in increased Army Guard and Army Reserve participation in operations involved in homeland defense (e.g., Northern Command and Civil Support Teams for confronting weapons of mass destruction challenges), the need for a common Army culture has become critical. The active Army will be interfacing with its Reserve Components on a full-scale basis more frequently, which will require closer integration of total force activity. Fissures in operational affiliations will certainly be exacerbated if significant steps are not taken to address creation of a common culture soon.

The active Army needs to accept that its reserves deserve to be part of a common Army culture that will enhance the entire service. The Army’s Reserve Components will be willing

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21 When the author of this article commanded the Army Reserve 220th Military Police brigade as a brigadier general, his executive officer was an active-duty Military Police lieutenant colonel. An outstanding officer, the lieutenant colonel was, however, on a terminal assignment. The position would have been ideal for a newly promoted lieutenant colonel who was potentially eligible for battalion and later brigade command.

22 The division commander and other acclaimed four-star generals, including the Central Command theater commander in Operation Desert Storm, had previously commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) while the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) had been assigned to the division. Obviously, these generals’ careers did not suffer as a result of the brigade not being certified for deployment in time for operation in Kuwait and Iraq.
participants in creating this culture. Unfortunately, most of the steps that are key to achieving a common culture—some of which could be those described above—must be taken by the active Army.
Civil Affairs at a Crossroads

Michael J. Baranick, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz

The major threats to U.S. and world order today come from weak, collapsed, or failed states, which in turn form the threads linking global terrorism. These threats have required military responses that include stability and reconstruction (S&R) as well as combat operations. Because S&R operations are becoming more central in U.S. government planning and preparation, winning the peace has become as important as winning the war. The demands placed on the U.S. military, especially the Army, to conduct both combat and S&R operations likely will be greater than ever. The battleground will entail destroying the enemy as well as preserving institutions or defeating threats to the stability of a civil society. This increases the demand for Civil Affairs (CA) capabilities, an essential U.S. military element in the transition from war to peace. The Army provides the bulk of about 6,000 available CA personnel who are largely assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Their mission ranges from direct support to military units on the ground in civil-military operations (CMO) to facilitating reconstruction and nation-building with civilian elements.

Although there is a movement afoot to establish a more robust, interagency civilian capability to respond to post-conflict reconstruction situations, changes are needed within the military as well in order to create an integrated military and civilian response to S&R requirements. This paper will review current strains and challenges in the U.S. Army CA community and propose recommendations for a way ahead.

Setting the Stage

The transformation of George W. Bush from a presidential candidate opposed to nation-building into a President committed to writing the history of an entire troubled part of the world is one of the most dramatic illustrations we have of how the September 11 terrorist attacks changed American politics. Under Bush's presidency, the United States has taken responsibility for the stability and political development of two Muslim countries—Afghanistan and Iraq. A lot now rides on our ability not just to win wars but to help create self-sustaining democratic political institutions and robust market-oriented economies, and not only in these two countries but throughout the Middle East.¹

Over the past decade or so, in order to resolve conflicts and influence outcomes around the world, the United States has tended to rely more heavily on the military rather than on the softer diplomatic, information or economic power. Yet the paradigm of using the military fails to address the complexity of on-the-ground operations. As Anthony Cordesman notes, “a war can defeat a regime, but it cannot create a new culture or set of values, or suddenly create a modern, stable political system and economy.”² Stability and reconstruction operations are more than military actions; they include a substantial

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civilian component that, in current operations, has been shown to be under-represented (in terms of the multitude of agencies required), under-trained and under-resourced for the job. In Iraq, much of this “civilian” work is being performed by the military, a large percentage of that by Civil Affairs (CA) forces. While civil-military operations (CMO) are a command responsibility and are performed by soldiers of all kinds, CA soldiers broker the critical components of the CMO effort, especially for transition to peace and post-conflict operations.

In combat, one task for CA forces is to minimize civilian interference on the battlefield to ensure a rapid conclusion of hostilities and reduce civilian casualties and damage. CA soldiers are also the military’s primary instrument for assessing local needs by identifying and coordinating with host nation authorities as well as and civilian relief and reconstruction agencies, which they seek to empower. As the fighting subsides, they facilitate humanitarian relief and help restore civil order; promote the resumption of basic public services such as electricity, water, police, and medical care; and normalize daily life for the populace. As the emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction, they broker the establishment of governance and public administration to transition more and more responsibilities over to civilian relief and reconstruction agencies and, ultimately, local public administrators, enabling fulfillment of the military exit strategy. The Nation’s current capability to execute this increasingly strategically vital mission is less than 6,000 CA soldiers in Army and Marine CA units of both Active and Reserve Components. About 96 percent of Army CA forces are in the Reserve Component, mainly because of the plethora of civilian skills and experience they bring—skills and experience that cannot be duplicated in the Active Forces without great expense.

The ability to continue to deploy and rotate CA forces in support of theater-directed campaigns of combat and S&R operations is considered by many military analysts to be at a crossroads. During the initial Afghanistan and Iraq rotation timeframe, the total assigned strength of CA personnel within the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was about 5,800. Due to training and qualification requirements, as well as family and medical issues, the actual number of CA soldiers available for deployment was around 4,000.

More than 1,800 CA personnel were deployed in the original one-year rotation in Iraq—the single largest deployment of Civil Affairs forces since World War II. Yet even with almost half of the available CA force deployed to Iraq, the numbers are grossly insufficient for the mission assigned. In Iraq, the 1,800 assigned CA personnel were expected to serve a country with a population of 25 million. In one area, for example, 16 assigned CA personnel were trying to meet the needs of approximately 1.4 million

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4 Press interview with BG David Blackledge, Commander, 352nd CA in Iraq.
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
9 Discussions with LTC Christopher Holshek, USA, CA battalion commander in OIF
people. One needs to be careful, however, not to think of CA only in terms of servicing a portion of the population. Above all, CA supports a mission and the apportionment of CA soldiers depends on a thorough METT-TC analysis of the situation. 

Combatant and force commanders have been demanding increasing CA support for their increasingly non-combat operations. In Iraq, for example, the ratio of support changed from one CA battalion per division-size formation to one per brigade-size formation. With more than 3,700 CA soldiers already deployed in three rotations so far in Iraq and over 1,200 deployed to Afghanistan so far, more than three fourths of all CA personnel have been deployed at least once to Iraq or Afghanistan. This number does not include another 500 to 600 CA soldiers who have been deployed over the past three to four years under different ordering authority to nearly 20 other countries, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Although we are not at war in these countries, CA troops and others remain integral to the post-conflict process. For many Army Reserve units this cycle has meant that some individuals and units have been deployed so frequently that readiness for new deployments has been eroded. New missions keep coming and the old ones don’t go away.

The deployment and rotation of CA forces can no longer continue as such. Without radical changes, we are simply running out of CA personnel for even current mission loads. CA forces as structured cannot support both the burgeoning CMO mission among ground force units along with the need to facilitate nation building. While this problem already has the attention of USASOC, more needs to be done than adding active duty CA personnel, improving CA planning capability in conventional commands, and addressing material and resource problems. For example, ground units down to battalion level need organic CA teams. CA training and education needs to be upgraded, and most importantly, the way CA is employed needs to be overhauled. And it may be time for CA to “go purple,” i.e., become a joint capability. The force structure and doctrinal fixes currently being considered may be too little, too late. In short, there needs to be a “revolution in civil affairs.”

**Background**

The decision to intervene in a conflict is political, and the military mission in support of the intervention reflects the political process. One of the primary missions of the military is to create a safe and secure environment to enable civilian government agencies, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and assume appropriate responsibilities for civil policing, justice, governance, infrastructure reconstruction, and

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10 Ibid

11 METT-TC is the basis for mission analysis under Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. The analysis factors include: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, Troops Available, and Civil Considerations. This implies very strongly that the “C” in METT-TC is an integral to the “battlespace” and not a separate consideration.

12 Press interview with BG David Blackledge, Commander, 352nd CA in Iraq.


jump-starting the economy. The goal of the military and civilian effort is to assist the host country establish its capacity to effectively manage governance, stability and reconstruction.

Various terms have been used to describe these activities. In Germany and Japan they were referred to as occupations. Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans were called peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are referred to as stabilization and reconstruction. In each of these cases, the military has been used to underpin a process of building a stable peace. Yet lessons from recent experiences suggest integrated civil-military reconstruction or nation-building planning has been lacking, and the civil-military structure put in place has not been properly organized and focused—or given adequate field authority, personnel, and resources to do the assigned jobs. Additionally, the over extended CA forces, the strategic asset typically assigned to the jobs of CMO planning, coordinating, monitoring and advising are on the verge of imploding.

As noted, S&R is more than military actions—a substantial civilian component is involved—which like the military is also under-trained and inadequately resourced for the job. While the U.S. military has undertaken recent S&R missions with skill and courage, individuals in institutions such as RAND and the U.S. Institute of Peace have pointed out that certain missions would have been better served by a more involved and effective civilian response, such as civil administration, infrastructure reconstruction, and constabulary and civilian police capabilities to support law enforcement. It has also been noted that recent reconstruction efforts have had a higher than necessary military profile. To counter this trend, effective planning, coordination, and integration of the military and civilian response at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is critical. The complexity of CMO operations integration is inherent in the multiple objectives, and there is yet no effective process to manage and coordinate the planning and execution of the overall effort.

As a nation, we have accepted difficult S&R challenges in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, the U.S. government response has been to cobble together plans, people, and resources in an ad hoc fashion with the Department of Defense (DOD) in the lead for the S&R phase. The military has led these operations primarily because it is the only organization currently capable of mobilizing large amounts of people and resources for such tasks. As a consequence, the Armed Forces have been stretched and deployments of military personnel repeatedly have had to be extended beyond expectations. Improvements in the surge capacity and capabilities of the civilian agencies would facilitate their ability to take over many of the non-security missions that have burdened the military to date. Efforts such as “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004” proposed by Senators Lugar and Biden aim to establish a more robust civilian capability to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations. While such initiatives are promising, adjustments are needed not only in the civilian capabilities but also within the military in order to improve an integrated U.S. civilian and military response to S&R operations. In this regard, the recent National Defense University (NDU) study, Transforming for

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16 Ibid.
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, recommended establishing two new commands in DOD, an interagency coordination group at the National Security Council (NSC), and a multi-agency civilian rapid response capability as an approach to address the current gaps.\textsuperscript{17} Other proposals are also underway, but the importance of a coordinated approach cannot be overstated.

The Challenge: “Déjà Vu All Over Again”

In spite of extensive U.S. involvements in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. ability to conduct S&R operations has not significantly improved. Many of the challenges encountered with each new operation have been experienced in previous operations. The process for collecting and disseminating lessons learned and institutionalizing change has not been effective. The Army has continued to focus exclusively on war fighting at the expense of the S&R requirements that inevitably follow and other crises that call for U.S. military response (such as the recent response to the South Asia tsunami disaster).

Iraq epitomizes the challenges of conducting CMO in a complex crisis environment. Humanitarian assistance, infrastructure reconstruction, governance and other nation-building activities coexist with combat operations. Regrettably, many of the lessons emerging from more than one year of operation are lessons revisited. After action reviews and other articles published on experiences in Iraq point out several recurring lessons, some of which are explored below.

Lack of common policy framework: Traditionally, S&R and nation building have been viewed as distinct phases after combat rather than as part of an operational continuum. Generally, our national leadership, political-military environment, and military culture have been ambivalent about U.S. military involvement in humanitarian assistance and “nation-building.” With today’s rapid, decisive military operations, the phases have become blurred and changes in policy and organizational culture are needed. More than ever, winning the peace needs to be considered with the same degree of emphasis and importance as winning the war. S&R needs to be part of the deliberate planning process at the outset and updated as the crisis planning for the operation is conducted.

Additionally, policy guidance for field operations is often directive in nature and based on assumptions made in Washington or at command headquarters where the views may differ from the reality of the situation on the ground. In many cases, civilian leadership and staff arrive late on the ground and frequently face conditions not planned for or anticipated. As a result, the initial civilian capability often does not meet the needs of the mission at hand. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) deployed late and did not have all of its senior officers in place at the outset.\textsuperscript{18} The personnel who were in place were not given proper field authority to conduct their mission.\textsuperscript{19} Even after the transfer of authority


\textsuperscript{18} Discussions with Dayton Maxwell, USAID and ORHA/CPA, and Colonel Paul Hughes, USA and ORHA/CPA.

\textsuperscript{19} Discussions with Colonel Paul Hughes, USA and ORHA/CPA.
from ORHA to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), CPA policy and mission guidance to the military forces in the field conducting S&R operations was lacking. A contributing factor was the lack of an agreed civil-military road map delineating the functions to be assumed by the military-led Governance Support Team (GST)—a mission originally intended for the CPA but adopted by CA forces due to CPA personnel shortfalls.\textsuperscript{20}

Before the United States embarks on future operations, the capacity to perform non-linear, strategic thinking from the outset of interventions at the field level needs serious attention.\textsuperscript{21} Efforts to replace Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 with a new directive have not yet been successful. The lack of an agreed policy framework for nation building has been a limiting factor in the planning for and integration of the civilian and military efforts in support of post-conflict S&R operations.

Lack of integration of CMO/CA functions: In Iraq, military commanders and planners at upper echelons did not have sufficient experience with post-combat operations and planning and did not fully understand the CA mission and activities. For example, Central Command (CENTCOM) staffs habitually trained together prior to hostilities, but for a number of reasons, the CA career management field officers assigned to them for post-conflict planning were not fully integrated into the planning teams. There were factors that impacted the ability to integrate assigned CA elements. CENTCOM requires a Top Secret/ Special Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance for unrestricted access to critical information and some assigned CA personnel lacked TS/SCI clearances. Additionally, a number of CA personnel assigned lacked command staff training and experience at the combatant command staff level. An underdeveloped post-combat phase IV strategy and plan resulted in no political-military or subsequent CMO campaign plan to provide operational guidance to those in the field.

Decisions to integrate CENTCOM CA personnel into the Kuwait Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), the Jordan Humanitarian Assistance and Coordination Center (HACC), and the CPA were made late, reducing CA effectiveness in supporting planning and post-conflict facilitation of United Nations (UN) and IO/NGO activities.

Furthermore, because CA’s contribution is often viewed as a “force multiplier” or a part of combat support services, many maneuver commanders and staff viewed CA as a means to prosecute counterinsurgency operations rather than as part of a transition to peace operations, or simply divorced themselves from the CMO mission and left it up to CA forces, especially when they got more than their doctrinal apportionment of CA forces in direct support.\textsuperscript{22}

The military command structure and seeming lack of coordination permeating all CMO was complicated by the fact that CMO does not fit neatly under any general staff section and CA never had a seat at the planning table. CMO/CA activities should have the highest visibility, without artificial filters imposed. Because CA did not have a voice at the commander’s table, they were not fully integrated into the S&R planning efforts.

\textsuperscript{20} Discussions with Dayton Maxwell, USAID and CPA, and LTC Christopher Holshek, USA and CA.
\textsuperscript{21} Discussions with Dayton Maxwell, USAID and CPA.
and were not adequately provided for by supported units. On the whole, CA ability to contribute to post-conflict planning and operations was marginalized from the outset and did not improve once hostilities commenced.

**Lack of Integrated Civil-Military Strategic Planning:** No comprehensive methodology for doing integrated civil-military strategic planning was in place before Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Additionally, the differences in culture and experience between military and civilian approaches and capabilities to conducting integrated strategic planning impeded the process. Efforts by the State Department, USAID, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Army War College to plan S&R operations were not fully considered by—and in some cases not made available to—the military operations planners or the civilian and military S&R planners at ORHA/CPA. Within the military, CENTCOM, CA, the Pentagon, and other groups engaged in different and separate planning efforts, often without each other’s knowledge. In the military plans, combat and stability operations were viewed as sequential efforts and therefore, S&R requirements were not integrated because the initial focus was on winning the war. As a result, command relationships and responsibilities for S&R were not clearly defined and the planning for S&R elements such as ORHA/CPA started late.

Similarly, in the civilian government community, each agency initiated planning based on its mandate and anticipated role. The civilian agencies’ planning efforts were proscribed to be within their institutional mandates rather than as full participants of an interactive CMO process. The combined process was ad hoc and lacked effective collaboration and integrated leadership. Although past experience had demonstrated that the early phase of post-conflict intervention is the most crucial for establishing the conditions needed for effective change, planning for post-combat Iraq was not integrated with military combat plans.

By far one of the most important planning oversights was the U.S. failure to develop contingency plans in case the Iraqi state collapsed. It appears the Administration hoped to decapitate the country's Baathist leadership and allow new leaders to take over quickly. Instead, order broke down: as the Iraqi army melted away, the police stopped patrolling the streets, and government ministries stopped functioning. The consequences of this disorder were significant: the government's physical infrastructure disappeared as ministries were stripped of doors, furniture, and wiring and then torched; the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was compromised by the looting of weapons storage sites; and many Iraqis' first impression of their "liberation" was one of crime and chaos, leaving the door wide open for the development of an insurgency.

**Lack of Coordinated/Clear Command Arrangements:** In doctrine and in practice, deployed Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMs) have lacked command and control of subordinate units during combat operations. CA units in the field, now consisting of “provisional” units in Iraq, have been divided up to support maneuver brigades, act as liaison officers or planners, or perform other duties. CA members were sent to work on various staffs and to ORHA/CPA but their efforts and those of other CA members were not coordinated or controlled by the CACOM. Those assigned to ORHA/CPA had to learn on the job within the new organization. Coordination and de-confliction were challenging for the tactical team activities due to the inability of the independently operating teams to communicate and share information.

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At all levels, the command relationships with supported commands were complex and ambiguous. The original CA force structure had no clear lines of command and coordination. The reality of the situation was that the CACOMs often had no command and control of their own CA forces. Many CA personnel were forbidden to report to or coordinate with other CA command elements. In addition to the obvious impact on CA/CMO mission clarity, these shortfalls seriously hampered the ability to provide effective real-time operational CMO guidance and feedback among CA operators. As a result, CA was unable to synchronize among itself and promote CMO unity of effort through information transparency. Sharing information with civilian implementing partners, an essential element of CMO, was also problematic.

Assistance and coordination centers were problematic during the Iraq operation. Doctrine terminology was not adhered to and ad hoc centers were established and given names to identify their purpose. For example, the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC), the Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs), Humanitarian Assistance and Coordination Center (HACCs), Civil-Military Assistance Center (CMACs), and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOCs) were all established to facilitate coordination among the military, ORHA/CPA, IOs, NGOs and the Iraqi people and government. However, roles, responsibilities, lines of coordination and information-sharing templates were not clearly defined, severely hampering unity of effort and overall effectiveness and creating confusion about what each organization was and what it did. The confusion was not only among the CA forces themselves but also between staff elements at CENTCOM, other U.S. government agencies and the international community, in particular, IOs and NGOs. Furthermore, repeated area assessments occurred between teams, units, and CPA, which degraded the overall mission. One central collection point could have eliminated overlap and duplicate reporting, and facilitated dissemination of information to the relevant parties. In addition, CMO reporting formats normally used were changed several times and none were unclassified to enable information sharing with civilian partners. This, coupled with poor communications, made sending information upward and disseminating it outside of military channels challenging and not as effective as needed in a complex multinational civil-military environment. It also precluded any efforts to get the facts out about what was being done to help the Iraqi people and thus win the information war both in Iraq and internationally.

Equipment and Financial Shortcomings: CA unit equipment shortfalls occurred because of inadequate supply of body armor and communications equipment and the USACAPOC internal practice of cross-assigning equipment as well as personnel among units to make up the differences. In one instance, the first CA battalion to deploy to support Operation Iraqi Freedom obtained most of its own M16s and M9s (used the preceding February to support the deployment of another CA battalion to Afghanistan) only days before departing from Fort Bragg. The required night vision equipment arrived after the battalion was already in-theater. Soldiers did not receive their organizationally required squad automatic weapons (SAWs) until seven months into the operation. These delays meant that the battalion’s soldiers did not train with their equipment in the months prior to mobilization. High Mobility Multipurpose-Wheeled

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24 Discussions with LTC Christopher Holshek, USA, CA battalion commander in OIF.
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
Vehicles (HMMWs) were up-armored in theater by makeshift means, which helped improve force protection, especially against shrapnel, but resulted in braking and steering instabilities that were factors in accidents, some of which occurred during hostile encounters, killing and injuring some soldiers.27

The greatest complaint among CA personnel, however, concerned inadequate communications and information systems.28 CA units were unable to establish an interoperable information system at the tactical, operational or strategic levels to track and manage information for CA purposes as well as to assist decision making for supported commanders.

Next to that was the lack of any readily available financial resources for CA team leaders and commanders to fund quick-impact projects designed to gain credibility with the local population, especially in the early, critical months of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds did not come until later, and then were under the control of maneuver commanders who often used them as “blood money” or bribes for actionable intelligence. The project nomination, approval and funding transfer process for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) often proved too cumbersome, bureaucratic, and limited in application for CA teams to use effectively. When the OHRA/CPA personnel finally showed up, funding available to them was subject to even more red tape, resulting in the perception that the U.S. was long on promises but short on delivery, seriously eroding credibility and confidence.

Lack of Language and Cultural Proficiency in CA forces: Availability of qualified and U.S. security-cleared linguists is not a new issue. It was a problem in Bosnia and Kosovo and remains problematic in Afghanistan and Iraq. CA forces need to be more proficient in language and placed in areas where they are familiar with and speak the language. Language training requires extended periods of active-duty time, something the reserves do not have. Because CA lacks soldiers with needed language and cultural awareness skills, the issue of interpreters becomes even more serious. In Iraq, the contractor used to hire interpreters was unable to provide an adequate number of interpreters in the early stages of the operation and of those provided, only a few had the minimum level of U.S. security clearance.29 Those without security clearances, such as local hires, could not be used for operationally sensitive activities.

Lack of Force Protection for CA units: At the tactical level, CA had to provide their own force protection, yet many CA units were not properly equipped or trained for the combat conditions they faced in Iraq. CA units do not normally operate in violently hostile environments; Iraq was violently hostile and the CA casualties attest to the combat conditions the forces faced. CA units were not equipped nor had they trained for the conditions they initially encountered. While leadership and individual soldiers rose to the challenge and reacted quickly to existing situations, CA forces in the future should deploy with appropriate force protection weapons, equipment, and training.

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27 Ibid
28 Ibid
29 Discussions with CA personnel at USCENTCOM Headquarters, MacDill, AFB, FL.
The source of the current problems lies in the scarcity of CA-qualified assets. CA has relatively few personnel and even fewer resources to conduct burgeoning missions, both in direct support of U.S. forces and, more recently, in general support of reconstruction. With concurrent combat and stability operations, CA is having difficulty providing resources to both direct and general support missions at the same time, especially as waging peace has assumed equal importance with waging war.

CA direct support of operational and tactical command missions, such as combat, conflict termination, and transition to peace, emphasizes CA activities called “Populace and Resource Control” and “Military Civil Action,” with some direct involvement in “Humanitarian Assistance” missions. CA personnel working in support of these missions not only need to be better versed in operational and tactical CA, but more importantly, they need to be well-versed in the operational and command culture of the unit they are supporting. Hence, they should be dedicated to their supported command during the planning as well as execution phases of a deployment. CA in direct support should, therefore, rely more on the Active Component than on the Reserve Component which suggests the need for more CA forces in the Active Component.

CA general support to missions such as S&R and nation building involve more complex, “soft power” and civilian-intensive skill sets to conduct CA activities known as “Support to Civil Administration,” in addition to Humanitarian Assistance coordination. These skill sets are found predominantly among Reserve soldiers—because of their civilian skills and training for interaction with civilians. For this general support mission, they need to be task organized specific to the general support mission rather than to specific units or commands. The Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) and especially Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs), used relatively successfully in Afghanistan, with their ability to lash up with civilian interagency capabilities, are good examples of the kind of command and control architectures that can be used at the operational and tactical levels for CA forces deployed in general support of S&R. Moreover, CA forces need to operate relatively independently across the full spectrum of conflict in a diversity of environments, while supporting the interdependent S&R missions, such as civil-military assistance coordination, public administration capacity-building and governance support, civil information and public education. Ideally, they should be self-sustaining administratively and logistically.

USACAPOC is in the process of implementing changes to its doctrine and force structure, to include the following actions:

- Introduction of a new CA manual that updates doctrine to streamline 16 CA mission functional areas into six (rule of law; governance; infrastructure; economic stability; health and welfare; and education and public information) along five logical lines of CMO activities (foreign humanitarian assistance, coordination of populace and resources control, and support to civil administration, nation assistance/civic action, and civil information management). The new manual is still in draft.

- Improvement in deliberate and contingency planning at the strategic and operational levels through the use of embedded CA/CMO staff specialists. For example, creating
a permanent CA strategic element at USSOCOM Tampa headquarters and the
Pentagon; a CA/CMO Directorate at the Joint Special Operation University; and a
dedicated CA element at the Theater Special Operations Commands in support of
each Regional Combatant Commander; doubling CA planning support capability at
the CACOM level with four CA regional planning teams; and placement of a CA-
trained officer at the State Department’s Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU). In
addition to the posting of a CA officer at the HIU, CENTCOM was the first regional
command to create permanent CA planning staff at the joint staff level.

• Creation of a deployable Special Operations Command Joint Task Force to have
command and control of all SOF in a theater, including CA and PSYOP. USSOCOM
has proposed this recommendation and it is awaiting Joint Staff approval.

• Improvement in USACAPOC ability to cover time-urgent CA requirements, while
Reserve Component CA gear up for deployment. The 96th CA Battalion, the only
Active Component CA unit, would be transformed into a CA brigade structure of four
AC battalions with four companies each for a total addition of more than 370
personnel. The assignment of about 280 personnel to begin the process of expanding
the 96th has been delayed until FY08.

• Improvement of the long-term deployment capability, flexibility and staying power of
Reserve Component CACOMs, brigades and battalions by adding over 1,000
personnel. This will take a few years to implement, once authorized and resourced.

• Expansion of the organic communications and information management (IM)
capability of CA units, to include the creation of a G6/S6 section and the addition of a
signal detachment at the CACOM and brigade level. For example, a CA IM
capability for the entire CA force that is compatible with U.S. Government
interagency partners as well as selected NGOs and IOs. This would also improve the
ability to share information with coalition military partners. While an IM staff has
been added to CA units currently deployed as a provisional measure, changes to
tables of organization and equipment are pending publication of the new CA doctrine
and authorization and funding of these changes. This will take years.

• Improvement in the organic force protection capability with up-armored HMMWVs,
 Improved body armor and weaponry, to include the addition of non-lethal weapons
for civil disturbance situations, and better training. Again, while measures have been
taken in the field to address this, it will take years before they are integrated into the
updated CA unit structures.

**Recommendations**

While the ongoing USACAPOC actions will provide needed improvements to the CA
force make-up, they likely will not be enough in time to stave off a crisis in CA capability
at current and near-term levels of demand. Additional innovative changes remain
necessary and some recommendations in this regard are as follows:
1. Provide line commanders with an organic CA capability for both planning and execution of CMO in direct support of line unit operations within the U.S. Army Units of Employment (UE)/Units of Action (UA) concept. In addition to adding Active Component CA personnel at UAs to form the S5, during exercises and deployments, they should be augmented by a tactical CA team under the Reserve Component Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program. UEs of brigade and division size should similarly be augmented by CA tactical and operational planning teams from the IMA. Sustainment and Maneuver Enhancement Support Units of Action, which have considerable interaction with civilian actors, should likewise have an organic S5 staff as well as an IMA CA team; their UEs also should obtain CA augmentation as would Maneuver UE G5s.

Although these organic CA teams would not be under USACAPOC command and control, they would nonetheless be trained under the same auspices as USACAPOC CA forces, as Marine CA Groups are. The main difference is that they would belong to the Army UA or UE, wearing that unit’s patch and being included in their table of organization and equipment, therefore, being fully funded, equipped and supported by them. The CA teams would exercise, plan, prepare, and execute deployments with their UA or UE. Mission focus would be on direct support CMO, centering on CA PRC-related activities. These personnel would provide the direct support CA capability to that commander, regardless of where he or she goes and when. Because they would train and exercise with the unit at combat training centers, there would be a seamless transition of CMO capability from war to peace, improving command and staff understanding of CMO as integral to the overall operation.

The proposed shift of general support CMO exclusively to USACAPOC-provided units would simultaneously relieve the local commander of S&R-related CMO planning and coordination responsibilities and simplify resolution of CMO issues. Another advantage is that line commanders would be guaranteed on-hand CA capability to execute their CMO mission regardless of the phase of the operation—the typical 30 to 60 day call-up period for mobilizing Reserve Component CA at a location separate from the UE/UA mobilization site would no longer be an issue. Active Component CA forces under USACAPOC, many of which can deploy within 96 hours, could be phased into the area early to ensure both adequate coverage and effective handover of the S&R CA/CMO mission to primarily Reserve Component CA forces.

The more robust use of IMA personnel under this concept adds to the argument many have made that Army Reserve Command must overhaul the IMA system. Many CA personnel already under the IMA program have been called up to provide S5s and G5s to maneuver and support units, as well as expertise outside the CA force structure, such as in the CPA in Iraq and other civilian agencies. The IMA program needs to provide CA personnel with greater flexibility to be posted in the IMA or in USACAPOC units. Additionally, if USACAPOC is able to integrate the Active Component and Reserve Component CA enlisted military occupational specialty and officer branch management programs, it will be easier for these soldiers to go back and forth from active to reserve duty assignments and have the same opportunity to experience career progression as their peers, despite heavy operational tempo.
2. Unify the command and control architecture for the employment of USACAPOC CA forces within a theater of operations under a joint/interagency or Special Operations command and control structure for S&R missions. With unit-oriented CMO being covered by organic CA personnel in UEs/UAs, USACAPOC-provided CA units could be employed under a CJCMOTF concept, as was the case in Bosnia and Afghanistan. In both areas, the CJCMOTF was the umbrella organization for CA forces there, although they still had problems with clear lines of command and control, appropriate staff-level expertise, and many of the other lessons pointed out above. However, if the right lessons are applied from these CJCMOTF experiences, it could provide an effective means to synchronize the overall CA effort in a theater of operations conducting concurrent combat, transition to peace and reconstruction operations. Similar applications of the PRT concept should also be considered. If an S&R Joint Command as was proposed in the NDU study\(^\text{30}\) is established, the CJCMOTF concept could roll into that structure. In any case, the ultimate decision as to which CA command and control option is best suited for the mission should be with the combatant commander—as long as it is unified under a joint/interagency command structure.

Regardless, the CJCMOTF or CACOM commander would report to the supported combatant commander. These CA forces should not be under the direct operational control of major subordinate unit commanders, who would already have their own organic CA teams, as explained above. At the tactical level, PRTs consisting of both CA and civilian interagency personnel could come under the CJCMOTF or an interagency command structure. The CA personnel in any case would remain within the CA chain of command reporting along clear lines up to the combatant commander. This mitigates their possible misuse, as well as streamlines and improves lines of CMO command and control, information-sharing, reporting and assessments, and logistics services support. It would squarely place proponent ownership for strategically important CA/CMO for S&R within the Special Operations chain of command, with clear lines all the way up to JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Lastly, it would simplify coordination and liaison for civilian agencies and locals with the military, providing a single point of coordination rather than a myriad of military interlocutors in an organization complex and esoteric to most civilians.

In an S&R mission environment, CA forces would be employed along the lines of a joint, interagency CMO terrain management concept, in parallel to their civilian counterparts, as opposed to being assigned to specific military major subordinate commands. Integration with an S&R joint command and control structure would be along the following lines:

USACAPOC would coordinate and liaise with the National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG) for strategic planning at either the Pentagon or USSOCOM (proposed by USACAPOC), or at both places. CACOMs, which support specific theaters of operation, would have their CA Regional Plans Teams coordinate and liaise with Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) of the Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) for operational planning and coordination. These Regional Plans Teams would then perform the function of transition from plans to operations for

designated CACOM support of the SJFHQ at the geographic combatant command headquarters. CA brigades, under the direction of the CACOM and using their organic Civil-Military Coordination Center teams, would staff the Civil-Military Action Cells (CMACs) of the NDU-proposed S&R Joint Commands for operational and tactical planning, coordination, and execution. CA battalions, under the direction of the brigades, would then provide local CA expertise at the JCOM sub-unit level and be task-organized in accordance with mission requirements – for example, in staffing PRTs.

The determination of required CA forces for deployment in support of an S&R mission would thus flow along the same lines. For example, working at the strategic level, the NIACG and USACAPOC would determine the missions and required budget and resources for a nationally mandated S&R mission. The designated CACOM then would begin civil-military campaign planning, determine specific divisions of labor, and conduct a “troop-to-task analysis” to identify brigades and battalions within its command trace to provide CA capability specific to the required missions. This information would be submitted for planning and initiation of mobilization. Once units are deployed, they would remain in their assigned areas for the duration of their deployment, again under an S&R/CMO terrain management concept, regardless of which line military command moves in or out. This also would affect substantial civil-military situational awareness, information sharing, and relationships and rapport with civilian partners and locals—all of which should be the inherent advantage of CA forces. It also would improve CA command and control, operational responsiveness and agility, and CA unit operational effectiveness rates, enhancing CA/CMO mission clarity and focus, interoperability and resource pooling with civilian agencies, operational legitimacy, and strategic credibility. Ultimately, security and stability in the area of operations also would be improved.

While some major subordinate commanders may find this bifurcation of direct and general support CMO missions at first uncomfortable, it would be mitigated by having the senior CA commander report, either through the senior S&R or Special Operations officer in charge (civilian or military), or directly to the combatant commander. It also would be mitigated by the presence of CA teams in tactical and operational combat units. Having the subordinate CA commanders report along CA command lines under the S&R command structure would relieve major subordinate commanders of the civil-military S&R coordination mission and allow them to focus more on unit-specific operations.

Another thing command changes like this would do is provide much-needed stability and certainty to the mobilization and deployment planning process for Reserve Component CA forces. More than most other Reserve Component forces, CA soldiers face great uncertainty about when they will deploy (often at short notice), where, and for how long. This is having cumulative effects on readiness, mission focus, soldier morale and retention of particularly team-level leadership, which is needed more than ever in post-9/11 CA operations and may be CA’s biggest retention issue. It also impacts family and employer support, all with potential ramifications for retention and recruiting.

In order to improve the ability of selected CA personnel to more effectively integrate into combatant command headquarters operations, actions need to be taken to develop a core of appropriately security-cleared Reserve Component CA personnel to support combatant command headquarters where special access clearances are needed to participate in the day-to-day operational planning activities. This will require obtaining
the necessary special access security billets and a structured process for obtaining and maintaining enough security cleared CA personnel to meet mission needs.

Because CMO is rapidly becoming a joint and interagency function, having Civil Affairs “go purple,” i.e., become a joint capability under USSOCOM rather than just an Army capability, should be considered. In addition to the Army and Marines, the Air Force is looking at the concept of dedicated CA personnel to work base operations and force protection related issues. Doctrine for the employment of joint CA forces should be developed, and clear lines of proponent responsibility drawn for joint CA policy and operational doctrinal development, as well as joint CA training and education.

Last, integrating USACAPOC-provided Reserve Component CA forces under a civil-military S&R command structure would also help provide appropriately security-cleared, dedicated civilian cultural and language expertise to mitigate those shortfalls among the CA forces.

3. Enhance CA training and education programs to include an advanced CA officer course to emphasize operational CMO in support of S&R, CMO campaign planning, and interagency and multinational cooperation. Additionally, institute a civil-military and interagency political-military planning course for both civilian and military strategic planners. Improve language and cultural awareness training as well. Even before the advent of joint, interagency S&R operations, the emerging demands on CA personnel over the past few years have made clear the need for continued evolution of CA education and training beyond the current CA courses at Fort Bragg’s JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The School, in conjunction with USACAPOC and U.S. agencies designated for S&R missions, should sponsor a joint, interagency (and perhaps multinational) center of excellence for advanced training for field and senior grade CA officers, along with their civilian counterparts, that focuses on: operational CMO in support of S&R, CMO campaign planning, and interagency and multinational cooperation, as well as a civil-military and interagency political-military planning. A joint/interagency training center for consequence management at Fort Dix, currently under development, could be expanded to include overseas complex contingencies. It could, in fact, incorporate an interdisciplinary degree program, such as the George Mason University Program on Peacekeeping Policy, in consortium with a troika of U.S. Government academic institutions (NDU, the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, and the U.S. Army War College).

The most important value-added of such a center of excellence and its activities likely would come through the interaction between the civilian and military communities, resulting in improved mutual understanding of respective missions, capabilities, limitations, and concerns. Joint, interagency, and civil-military teambuilding and relationship building would take place prior to rather than during operations, thereby facilitating a much faster ramp-up of S&R capability on the ground. This could significantly lower the civil-military and interagency coordination learning curves in the most critical, early phases of an S&R operation.

If more foreign officers and, for example, UN and key IO and NGO personnel, were encouraged to participate in this kind of training, interoperability and the transitions to S&R and/or nation-building missions among coalition partners and non-U.S. civilian institutions also could be improved.
Improvements are also needed to provide opportunities for CA personnel to more easily participate in the Defense Language Institute training or other means for improving their regional language and cultural awareness skills, expertise and capabilities including the use of technology tools to support culture and language training and mobile, real-time language translators for use by deployed CA elements.

Last but certainly not least, the quality of CA personnel can be improved by a more thoughtful and programmatic effort to recruit the right kinds of personnel with the right kinds of background. Databases exist for recruiters to analyze both military and civilian skill identifiers. However, especially at CA brigade level and below, most Reserve Component CA recruitment is done by recruiting commands and personnel who know very little about CA. From USACAPOC down to CA battalion level, more resources need to be devoted to recruiting and retaining personnel. USACAPOC should have its own recruiting command structure and budget staffed down to at least brigade level.

4. Enhance CA and PSYOP personnel training in concepts, techniques, tactics and procedures for both CA support of interagency Information Operations (IO) and CA-PSYOP collaboration. While this bespeaks the IO issue, well beyond the scope of this paper, there is nonetheless an obvious need for CMO-PSYOP integration on the ground, in order to improve the ability to win hearts and minds. This is especially true when S&R operations become more central to planning and preparation and the importance of information operations, strategic communications, public diplomacy and civil education rise in operational priority. Messages, delivery systems, and assessment and analysis need to be synchronized. In this regard, and because IO is as central to the goals and objectives of a joint, interagency S&R group as to operational and tactical commanders, it may be worth considering the employment of PSYOP forces in parallel to CA forces.

5. Provide USACAPOC appropriate resources to ensure its soldiers are equipped to shoot, move and communicate and conduct their CA mission independently in any mission environment across the full spectrum of conflict. In today’s complex world, characterized by ever increasing numbers of complex humanitarian situations and rapid developments in technology, CA units must develop cutting-edge technical, organizational and human capabilities to operate in an information-rich environment in order to facilitate effective CMO/CA across the spectrum of conflict and during humanitarian crises in support of U.S. Government intervention missions. Last but not least, as with Special Forces teams operating in Afghanistan, CA forces down to the team level, whether in direct or general support, should have their own supply of cash, accountable under similar rules as field ordering officers, for discretionary quick-impact humanitarian relief or reconstruction projects in order to gain credibility quickly with the local population in order to facilitate stabilization and transition to peace operations.

Conclusion

CA is at a crossroads of its raison d'être. If it maintains the same trajectory of force structure, deployment, and employment policies, it will implode in relatively short order. Yet, its strategic value is ostensible: CA is the most expedient and cost-effective means the military has to execute U.S. political-military strategy to win the peace on the ground. It is astounding that less than one half of one percent of the entire U.S. military force structure is dedicated specifically to helping win the peace and leveraging the “end state”
in stability operations – and the budget share is half again that proportion. In short, CA is already a bargain considering its program costs relative to its value-added. The direction CA goes will depend on how much national-level authorities value and support the use of CA to leverage the success of winning the peace as well as the war—and the extent to which Special Operations value CA as a contributor in this regard. If both are emphatically positive, then the appropriate force structuring, resources and command emphasis need to be applied. Like combat operations, however, transition to peace and S&R operations ultimately cannot come on the cheap, especially as the lines between combat and stability operations continue to blur. Preserving this all-important capability will go far to help the Nation win the peace, now and in the future.