A Joint US/Russian Research Project of the

Foreign Military Studies office (FMSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

and the

Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow


An American liaison officer consults with a Russian commander during a patrol.

The views expressed in this study are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the views of U. S. Department of Defense or the Russian Ministry of Defense.


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Foreword by General George A. Joulwan

It is a great pleasure to join Colonel-General Leontiy P. Shevtsov in providing a foreword to this joint publication on US-Russian lessons learned in the course of NATO’s IFOR mission. One of my greatest honors, and challenges, as the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, involved forging with Colonel-General Shevtsov the initial working relationship between NATO and the Russian Armed Forces. NATO undertook a new and unique role in a new Europe. NATO-Russian cooperation proved a vital element in that new role in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This relationship developed in response to the Dayton Peace Accords and under the auspices of the IFOR peacekeeping effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country rocked by three years of brutal war. The American and Russian soldiers who served in Task Force Eagle made a major contribution to the success of the IFOR mission. The Russian and American authors of this volume detail the origins and development of that cooperation, as well as many of the problems and the successes of that relationship. Their analysis provides a unique joint perspective on the IFOR experience and should help future leaders to prepare for and conduct other joint missions in support of peace and stability in Europe.

The success of the IFOR mission, documented here, will reap continual rewards in future partnership endeavors, but our soldiers must not become complacent. During IFOR, our forces patrolled together, trained together, and shared the risks. They learned from one another and came to respect one another. Overcoming the legacy of five decades of Cold War, they contributed to the peace and stability of Europe. The lessons we learned together will help us create better Combined Joint Task Forces in the future. They and the allied and partnership forces from many nations can be justly proud of their collaboration. On the other hand, there remain many obstacles to peace in Bosnia, as the rapidly changing regional situation indicates. This guarantees that new challenges await this and future generations of Russian and NATO soldiers.

I would like to dedicate this volume to each and every Russian and American soldier who contributed to the success of the IFOR mission. Your long hours of service ensured that peace would survive in this region of Europe. This volume addresses your many contributions to the overall success of the IFOR mission. This documentation of joint lessons learned on an international level will stand as a testimony to your work and should assist military planners in preparing for future missions.

Most important, I wish to acknowledge the professionalism displayed by General-Colonel Leontiy Shevtsov, my deputy for Russian forces. General Shevtsov’s role was vital to making this effort a success. We learned from one another through an extremely frank and honest dialogue. Clearly, General Shevtsov took risks for peace and the result was a successful first-ever deployment of Russian forces as part of a NATO-led operation. This unique military-to-military cooperation laid the foundation for the signing in Paris by the heads of state of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 27 May 1997.
Finally, I commend you, the members of the US-Russian team, for completing this superb publications of lessons learned. It is an excellent example of how two great nations can work together to bring peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Well done!

General George A. Joulwan
Foreword by General-Colonel L. Shevtsov

In today’s world, peacekeeping has become an integral part of the foreign policy of many nations, including that of the Russian Federation. International peacekeeping experience has persuasively shown this to be a powerful political lever and an effective tool for maintaining peace and stability in various regions.

Hence, it is my view that the peacekeeping experience gained both in our country and abroad must be summarized in order to develop practical recommendations for forces that participate in multi-national force operations. Peacekeeping is in need of thorough professional study, not only by politicians but also by the military.

The present Russian-American research project, which may be considered unique, represents the first step along the road to realizing this goal. This joint research is based on primary material -- the multi-national force operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Taking this operation as an example, the authors provide a thorough analysis of the conditions and factors that determine what will be needed to prepare for and conduct the peace operations of the future. The authors analyze in detail both the strengths and weaknesses in the whole system of organization and command and control of the peacekeeping force. Their analysis also examines the extent to which the goals of the Dayton Accords have been achieved.

An important element of the present Russian-American research is the summing up of cumulative experience in readying and using a multi-national peacekeeping force. This will help clarify Russia’s position in peacekeeping activity.

Finally, of practical significance for future Armed Forces peacekeeping activity are the chapters devoted to the lessons learned from using a multi-national force, as well as the recommendations for preventing military conflicts and preparing and using peacekeeping forces.

It is my hope that the publication of this Russian-American study will vitalize international efforts in creating a comprehensive system of collective security for mankind in the 21st century.

General-Colonel L. Shevtsov,
Former Deputy Supreme Commander for
Russian Peacekeeping Forces, IFOR and SFOR,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
INTRODUCTION

“Russia’s and NATO’s respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint Russia-NATO peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.”


“The lessons learned on NATO-Russia interoperability should be institutionalized in both the NATO and Russian military planning process through joint seminars, conferences and working groups. These activities can build upon our successes of today and prevent these accomplishments from escaping the next generation of NATO and Russian military leaders. NATO nations, Russia, and all of Europe would benefit from the stability and predictability offered by such regular military cooperation.”

-- General George A. Joulwan
Nato’s Sixteen Nations, Vol. 41, No. 2/96

“The lessons of this operation are now being studied in military academies and planning staffs of different countries. This has already led to the preparation of future common coalition operations. These will be different from earlier military operations because there will no longer be some type of global world war or a major conflict. Instead, we have to prepare ourselves and our armed forces for peacekeeping operations.”

-- General-Colonel Leontiy P. Shevtsov
Nato’s Sixteen Nations, Vol. 41, No. 2/96

This joint Russian-American research project, which analyzes the experience of US-Russian cooperation in peace enforcement operations under IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the first such research project conducted by representatives of military research organizations of the United States and the Russian Federation.

The peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, conducted by the IFOR multi-national forces under NATO leadership, is unique and can be assessed as a case study for the development of a model to resolve future armed conflicts. Taking into account the fact that there
are no past or present analogues for the scale and significance of this operation, the experience of its preparation and conduct is broad and varied. The study and analysis of all aspects and elements of this operation have a broad significance for other peace operations. This makes the bilateral approach to evaluating the lessons learned and future prospects of such operations even more important. Let us hope that this is just the first such joint Russian-American project.

By assessing the US-Russian experience in IFOR the Russian and American researchers have attempted to present the organization and conduct of IFOR through the eyes of those American and Russian officers who participated in the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a few short years these officers have gone from militarized confrontation in the heart of Europe to close cooperation in upholding the peace and security of Europe. Without that cooperation IFOR could not have succeeded, and this study would not have been possible.

The publication of the results of this study should be of interest to a broad circle of military and civilian readers in the United States, Russia and many countries. These readers will find insights regarding the future conduct of peace operations and international security.
CHAPTER ONE

CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: SOURCES AND CAUSES

The Origins of Armed Conflict in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. The end of the Cold War did not bring the end of history. In the wake of that ideologically based, and armed confrontation a host of problems that had been contained and suppressed by the super-power competition emerged. Centuries-old, ethno-national pretensions and claims in Central and Eastern Europe now found new voices and began to give shape to new challenges to international peace and stability. The conflicts, which erupted from these sources, were the first serious challenges to the post-Cold War order in Europe.

The lands that were Yugoslavia, the lands of the South Slavs, have straddled the front lines of competing civilizations, cultures, religions and empires since the dawn of recorded history. The sources of armed conflict in Yugoslavia have deep historic roots in the ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological tensions within the region. In the nineteenth century the decline of Ottoman power and the aspirations of the subject nations for autonomy and independence from the Porte made the “Eastern Question” one of the most difficult and explosive problems before European diplomacy. As repeated Balkan wars demonstrated, the Balkans became “the powder keg of Europe” and the battle ground of many wars. The South Slav Question precipitated World War I. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into being as a result of that war. In 1929 King Alexander renamed the Kingdom “Yugoslavia.” The German defeat and dismemberment of that state in 1941 brought foreign occupation, pogroms, and civil war. The ultimate victors in that struggle, Josef Broz Tito’s partisans, reconstituted the Yugoslav idea in keeping with their Communist ideology. After Tito’s break with Stalin in 1947 Yugoslavia became a non-aligned state astride the confrontation line of the militarized Cold War. Instability in Yugoslavia was a frequent scenario for the sort of crisis that could have set Cold-War Europe ablaze. Indeed, on the basis of their partisan experience during World War II, Yugoslav Communists adopted the system of people’s war as the foundation of their national security concept to meet such a threat. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) provided a professional officer corps and conscripts to form into standing units, and reservists provided the basis for a mass partisan army to contest an invasion. For four decades Tito’s Yugoslavia provided domestic peace and a modicum of prosperity to its peoples.

Political Causes of the Collapse of the Former Yugoslavia. The immediate causes of armed conflict in the lands of Yugoslavia can be found in the failure of the state to adapt to new circumstances and find new methods of managing ethno-nationalist tensions within the polity after Tito’s death. The Constitution of 1974, which had encouraged greater autonomy among the constituent republics, led to a strengthening of republic-party ties at the expense of the Yugoslav identity. Following Tito’s death, the convoluted successor arrangement (a collegium presidency, with the pro forma title rotated annually among regional leaders) proved a recipe for gridlock. Designed to enshrine ethnic harmony, it instead exacerbated discord. Serbs demanded more equitable power sharing, giving them authority proportionate to their numbers. Smaller ethnic groups, especially those in the more developed north, sought decentralization and autonomy.
None found satisfaction. In the same period, uneven economic development created tensions between the northern and southern members of the federation as a weakening federal government proved incapable of providing effective national leadership. The emergence of the dominance of nationalist ideas among the federation’s members undermined collective loyalty to the Yugoslav idea. Attempts at radical economic reform to deal with the national debt in the late 1980s only increased such tensions. By the late 1980s, the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia were seeking to assert their ties with a Western Europe then undergoing a profound transformation associated with the deepening of the European Union. They increasingly viewed their ties to the other, poorer republics as an economic liability.

In 1990 all the republics conducted multi-party elections for the first time. Political leaders in Slovenia and Croatia spoke of their fear of the Serbianization of the Federation. This fear grew in intensity after the suspension of political autonomy within the Kosovo region of Serbia. Serbs watched the rise of Croat nationalism and equated it with a return to the Ustashi excesses of the Second World War. In Slovenia and Croatia there was strong support for the end of the Yugoslav federation and its transformation into a loose confederation. In Serbia, political leaders opposed the idea of confederation and began to call for the application of the principle of national self-determination and the creation of national governments by revising republican borders within the Yugoslav Federation. The six constituent republics broke down into three groups under the formula 2+2+2. Slovenia and Croatia wanted a confederation of independent states. Serbia and Montenegro wanted to sustain the federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia preferred a commonwealth based on confederation but at the same time wanted to maintain a unified state. In this context the leadership of Slovenia and Croatia both opted for independence and moved to secure all attributes of sovereignty, including the formation of national military formations. On 25 June 1991 both states declared their independence.

With the end of the Cold War external restraints on internal actors disappeared, making possible even more sweeping national claims and a willingness to resort to arms to achieve sovereignty. Thus, the end of the militarized confrontation across Europe brought the conditions where ethno-national conflicts could be resolved by use of force. In the case of Slovenia, which was ethnically homogeneous, the war of the border posts was short and relatively bloodless. On 18 July 1991, under pressure from the international community to end the fighting, the Presidium of the Yugoslav Federation announced the withdrawal of military units of the Yugoslav People’s Army [JNA] from Slovenia, effectively ending that conflict. In the case of Croatia, where there was a significant Serbian minority in the Krajina, Western Slavonia, and Eastern Slavonia, the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia to Croatia ignited a civil war that brought with it ethnic cleansing on a scale that shocked Europe. In Croatia the JNA took upon itself the defense of the Krajina and Slavonia Serbs as loyal citizens of the Federation, thereby committing itself to the Serbian national cause. This war transformed the JNA into a Serbian Army which became involved in the ethnic cleansing in East Slavonia. The international community refused to recognize the independence of the Serbian enclaves or their desire to joint the Yugoslav Federation.

By the end of 1991, significant pressure mounted within the European Union under German prodding to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The efforts of the UN
and the European Union brought an end to fighting in Croatia but no political settlement. On 21 February 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution No. 743 providing for the establishment of the UN Protective Force [UNPROFOR] to act as a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease-fire between Croat and Serbian forces in Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia.

Resolution of the conflict in Croatia created the conditions for the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the embodiment of the Yugoslav idea in miniature, a state composed of three ethnic factions [Bosnian Moslems, Croats, and Serbs], where the Moslems were the largest group, but none composed an absolute majority. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina came a step closer in November 1991, when Macedonia declared its independence from the Yugoslav Federation, leaving it, in effect, a rump Serb state. While Bosnia’s Serbs voted for incorporation into Yugoslavia, the Moslem and Croat population voted in late February 1992 for independence. International recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 brought the outbreak of large-scale fighting. The JNA withdrew its units from Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992 but not before transferring a large portion of its armaments to the local Serb forces of the self-styled “Serbian Republic.” The War in Bosnia pitted Serbs against Muslims and Croats, and later Muslims against Croats. The fighting was marked by the same ethnic cleansing that had occurred in Croatia. All sides sought to extend the territory under their control. However, the military balance favored the Serbs during the first years of the war, and by 1994 their forces controlled 70% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The political objective of the Serbs was the creation of a mono-ethnic Serb state by the unification of the territories held by the self-styled Serbian Republic and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Their ultimate objective was unification of this entity with Yugoslavia to form a Greater Serbian state.

**Economic Causes of the Collapse of Former Yugoslavia.** Uneven economic development within Communist Yugoslavia created serious tensions between the more affluent northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia and the other republics of the south. Slovenia and Croatia were richer and more industrially developed republics with more powerful export and tourist-driven economies. Their drive for independence was fueled by their perception that the distribution of the federal budget involved the transfer of their wealth to the less-developed south. The situation became explosive because of the onset of an internal economic crisis, marked by declining industrial production, the flight of western investment, a severe foreign debt problem, and the end of Yugoslavia’s role as an intermediary between East and West with the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the end of the Cold War.

In the midst of the economic collapse of the late 1980s and early 1990s the various ethnic groups were willing to blame other ethnic groups for their hardships. Nationalist leaders sought to exploit these feelings by proclaiming that the only viable answer to the crisis was a new political order based on national self-determination and sovereignty. Thus, the economic crisis became a powerful driver in the acceptance of the idea that an end to the Yugoslav state was both necessary and inevitable. In that context, religious, ethnic, and historical factors came into play as a source of dispute, especially in those regions of diverse ethno-demographic composition.
Historical memories of pogroms by one ethnic group against another were rekindled and fueled popular fears. It was in this manner that the economic crisis of Yugoslavia served as a cause for political collapse and set the stage for ethno-national conflict.

Cultural, Religious, and Demographic Factors and Their Role in the Origins of Conflicts in the Balkans. The Balkans have been both a Euro-Asiatic crossroads and a battleground of competing civilizations and empires. Through it passed the boundary between the Eastern and Western Roman Empire. In the Middle Ages it became the borderland of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim worlds. The Balkans and later Yugoslavia especially became a point of contention between East and West. The cultural, religious, political, and historical experiences of the various peoples inhabiting the region have served as an important factor in making the region explosive. The idea of unifying all South Slavic peoples within one state, even in the face of these differences, emerged with the national cultural revivals of the nineteenth century and found expression in 1918 with the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. That state was the product of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the peace settlement at the end of World War I. However, inter-war Yugoslavia quickly saw the emergence of rivalries for power and influence among the larger nations, the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats. That rivalry turned into a bloodbath during World War II with the creation under the auspices of Hitler’s Germany of the Independent State of Croatia. Some of worst ethnic massacres occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period and have had a continuing impact on inter-ethnic relations there.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was not and is not the homeland of one people, but three ethnic communities: Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. The pogroms and concentration camps of the World War II altered the ethnic composition of Bosnia. The number of Serbs, who had formed a pre-war plurality, was reduced, while the Bosnian Muslims became the largest ethnic community. The pattern of settlement of the three communities had a profound impact on their relations. In a mountainous country, the Muslims have lived in the large cities and fertile valleys. The Serbs have lived as farmers and herdsmen on the hillsides. The Croats have lived in Herzegovina, close to the Adriatic coast and Croatia proper.

In Communist Yugoslavia, Tito attempted to balance the competing claims of Croats and Serbs in order to sustain the Yugoslav idea among Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, who dominated in five of the six republics that made up Yugoslavia. But this did not resolve ethnic tensions, especially within Bosnia-Herzegovina. To this end Tito created the “ethnic” category of Bosnian Muslim to create a balance among the three nations living there. To undercut ethnic tensions in Serbia proper, Kosovo and Vojvodina with their respective Albanian and Hungarian populations received autonomy. The Serbs living outside Serbia proper, especially those in Krajina and Bosnia, continued their identification with their fellow Serbs, which had been their objective under Ottoman rule and the Yugoslav Kingdom. Internal borders within Tito’s Yugoslavia had only a secondary importance under the nationality policy of the Communist Party. Once national self-determination became an accepted political goal, these borders became a source of increasing inter-ethnic tensions and rivalries.
Thus, the intense crisis within Yugoslavia leading to its political, social, and economic collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s had a number of internal causes. The end of the authoritarian system of personal power after Tito’s death set the stage. The intense social, political, and economic crisis of the late 1980s proved unresolvable because of the struggle for power at the federation, republic, and local levels. That struggle undermined attempts at internal reform and set off the demands for national self-determination. In the late 1980s the Milosevich government in Serbia terminated the autonomy of Kosovo and undermined the then-existing political balance in Yugoslavia. The richer republics of Slovenia and Croatia saw independence as their only road to escape the deepening crisis and viewed the international situation at the end of the Cold War as favorable to such a course of action. Former Yugoslavia, having lost its role as intermediary between East and West, Slovenia and Croatia were intent upon asserting their ties to Central and Western Europe. The collapse of one-party rule brought both democratization of the electoral process and the creation of numerous political parties. The leading parties pursued narrow, ethno-national goals. The Federation’s monopoly on the instruments of organized violence in the JNA was challenged by the paramilitary formations raised and funded by those republics bent upon confederation and/or independence. Once conflict began in Slovenia and spread to Croatia it quickly became internationalized. Western governments found themselves confronted by two immutable and contradictory principles: the right of national self-determination and the defense of the territorial integrity of states. In post-Cold War Europe the management and resolution of the Yugoslav crisis became a recognized legitimate objective of the international community and a manifestation of the national interests of the intervening parties in the peace and stability of the Balkans and Europe.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

An Overview of the Role of International Organizations in Managing the Yugoslav Crisis. Virtually from the moment armed conflict broke out on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it has been under the constant attention of international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU). Because future security mechanisms will be created within the framework of existing organizations, it is useful to analyze the evolving roles of these organizations and to assess their effectiveness in resolving the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

The international community was, however, slow to recognize the seriousness of the Yugoslav problem and proved unable to sustain a common position that would have imposed a peaceful resolution of the conflict by a confederative solution before the outbreak of hostilities. There was a serious underestimation of the problem that ethno-national conflicts would pose for Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era. In the summer of 1991 the international system itself was fraught with instability after the termination of the Gulf War in the Middle East and the onset of the final crisis of the Soviet polity. In this context neither Washington nor Moscow was in a position to provide the attention and leadership to what was perceived, initially, to be a
manageable European problem. Instead, the international community responded to each crisis in a piecemeal fashion. The Slovene phase belonged to the European Community, which managed to broker an end to the fighting, but the nature of that settlement set in motion the outbreak of fighting in Croatia in the summer of 1991. When the EU proved incapable of dealing with the Croatian civil war (because of its intensity and protractedness), the United Nations took on chief responsibility. It did, indeed, achieve a cease-fire and deployed a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, to monitor the cease-fire between the opposing sides.

In the fall of 1992 as the European Union moved towards the adoption of measures to ensure its own deepening in monetary and defense matters, Germany began to lobby for the immediate recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which the Union accepted in December. At the same time, these politics within the European Union over recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia made the status of the other parts of the Yugoslav Federation an immediate and volatile issue. Macedonia opted for independence, but this led to concern over Yugoslav intervention, strenuous Greek objections to the state’s claim to the word Macedonia in its name, and speculation over internal political stability in Macedonia among the Slav and Albanian populations. And the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status became a pressing concern to the contending parties already in the fall of 1991. The Serb minority wished to continue the relationship with Yugoslavia and so voted in their own plebiscite. The Muslim Bosniacs and Croats voted to leave Yugoslavia. The Croat vote seems to have been not for an independent Bosnia but for the incorporation of their areas into Croatia. On 2 April 1992 international recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the spark that set off a bloody, intense and protracted civil war that would continue for the next three years. The international community through the United Nations sought to take on an ever-expanding set of tasks in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict. Over time, the Security Council’s mandates charged UNPROFOR with seeking to limit the conflict, embargo arms deliveries, impose economic sanctions on Milosevich’s Yugoslavia, impose a no-fly zone over Bosnia, prevent ethnic cleansing, provide and protect safe havens, police the concentration of artillery around Sarajevo, and ameliorate the conditions of refugees and civilian populations. In this context, in support of the UN-imposed no-fly zone, NATO emerged as a subordinate, but active player in the management of the Bosnian conflict and became a key element in the debate over the use of force to impose peace in Bosnia. The various UN mandates passed by the Security Council amounted to an impressive list, but UNPROFOR lacked the means and proved unable to fulfill those mandates and to contain the conflict or to put an end to ethnic cleansing. Trapped in a situation that seemed to demand a peacekeeper’s impartiality and a peace-enforcer’s determination, UNPROFOR had to deal with an ongoing war. The effort of Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany to mobilize the CSCE/OSCE to control and resolve the conflict in Bosnia around the principle of “all members minus one” failed in Helsinki in the spring of 1992. At the same time, pressure within the international community mounted for an imposed settlement, which condemned the Serbs for ethnic cleansing. The joint EU-UN effort under the Vance-Owen plan failed in early 1993, and no effective conflict management solution was forthcoming for the rest of 1993.
Instead, the international community confined its efforts to conflict containment in the hope of preventing its spread. The situation turned sharply towards intervention in the spring of 1994 and brought to life new efforts through the five-power Contact Group [the US, Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain] to seek a common approach to resolving the conflict, which culminated in the peace proposal of 13 May 1995. Although there were clearly distinct national interests involved in each power’s position, they shared a common recognition of the need to bring the fighting in Bosnia to an end. There was also an increasing recognition that UNPROFOR was an insufficient instrument for the peace-enforcement mission, and during the winter of 1994-1995 it appeared that the national contingents of UNPROFOR would have to be withdrawn from Bosnia while fighting was still underway. In late May 1995 France again threatened to pull out of UNPROFOR.

Events of late spring and summer 1995 brought the war in Bosnia to its tragic climax and moved NATO to undertake large-scale air operations against the Bosnian Serbs. The cease-fire around Sarajevo, which had been brokered the preceding winter, started to collapse as the spring campaign season began. In response to renewed Serb shelling of Sarajevo, the United Nations command authorized the use of NATO air power. The strikes, however, were quite limited and emboldened the Serbs to take UNPROFOR personnel as hostages. In securing the release of the hostages, the UN seemed to be sending a signal that further air strikes were out of the question. This led to an increase in hostilities, and the Bosnian Serb military sought to exploit the international disarray and confusion. UNPROFOR’S credibility was further impaired. In this context, Serb forces mounted operations against the “Safe Havens,” which culminated in the fall of Srebrenica and the massacre of Muslims, figuratively under the eyes of UNPROFOR. The UN could not find the will to ask NATO to resume its air strikes, and it looked as if UNPROFOR might even collapse. Under these circumstances the Clinton administration, in consultation with the Contact Group, mounted a round of shuttle diplomacy led by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. The mission’s first visit to Sarajevo ended in tragedy even before the team reached the city. The French APC carrying the team crashed on the treacherous Mount Igman route into Sarajevo, and three of the team members were killed. The Clinton administration decided to press ahead with its diplomatic initiative. In the meantime, the freeze on air operations, which had begun with the UNPROFOR crisis of May, came to an end. NATO now assumed responsibility for the execution of air strikes.

At this time the military situation in Bosnia took a turn against the Serbs. Croatian forces launched an offensive against the Krajina Serbs, which culminated in the capture of Klin and the re-establishment of Croatian control. This exposed Serb forces in western Bosnia to the very real threat of further attacks. At the same time, the Milosevic government did nothing to support the Krajina Serbs, signaling its reluctance to intervene militarily. In this context, with the Holbrooke team’s shuttle diplomacy under way, there was another mortar attack with mass civilian casualties in Sarajevo on August 28. Within two days NATO mounted sustained and systematic air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets. The air strikes, although lasting only a few days, provided proof of the powers’ will to intervene effectively and brought rapid movement on the diplomatic front. A cease-fire was achieved, and the process of setting
up direct negotiations among the Croatian, Bosnian and Yugoslav governments, acting as the representative of the Bosnian Serbs, began.

Over the year preceding these developments NATO had moved forward with the development of its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, built around the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. NATO planners had been addressing the possibility of intervention in Bosnia for several years and under the threat of the collapse of UNPROFOR had developed an operational plan to support the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. In the new context, these plans were quickly adapted to fit the requirements of a peace enforcement mission to support a military presence in support of an end of hostilities and the political resolution of the conflict.

As the war in Bosnia raged, NATO was itself in a process of evolution to adapt to the new security environment in Europe. This adaptation involved opening dialogue with the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1993 NATO members began to consider the issue of partnership with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which was institutionalized as the Partnership for Peace in January 1994. At the same time, NATO enlargement with regard to timing, costs, and potential new members became a topic of hot debate within the Alliance and across Europe. NATO also began the process of adapting its force structure to post-Cold War security challenges, including ethno-national conflicts. This led to the organization of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps [ARRC] and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force [CJTF] concept. On his assumption of his duties as SACEUR, General George Joulwan brought to bear in his NATO assignment the expertise and skills that he had honed in fostering engagement and cooperation in the US Southern Command. These skills proved of crucial importance in working out the command relationship that would cover Russian troops deploying with “Task Force Eagle,” Multi-National Division North of IFOR.

There was a considerable increase in tensions within the international community over the fast pace of events in Bosnia in the fall of 1995. Serious tensions existed between Washington and Moscow over the nature of NATO’s role after the air strikes. In this context the close, working relationship forged between Secretary of Defense Perry and his Russian counterpart, General Grachev, proved invaluable. Perry and Grachev found a way to explore Russian participation in a Bosnian peace operation as the negotiations went forward. In the final analysis General Joulwan found the unique command arrangement under which via operational control [OPCON] and tactical control [TACON] Russian forces could serve in Task Force Eagle inside the 1st Armored Division’s headquarters as part of Multi-National Division (North) under General Joulwan, as SACEUR, and through his Deputy for Russian Forces, Colonel-General Leontiy Shevtsov. This OPCON arrangement bypassed the ARRC Commander, Admiral Smith.

During October a series of steps led to the negotiations among the three states (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia [for the “Serbian Republic”] under U. S. sponsorship in Dayton, Ohio, 1-23 November 1995. These negotiations took place under the observation of representatives of the Contact Group and the European Union. Their success was a triumph of timely and determined diplomacy in which NATO’s military professionalism, represented in person by General Joulwan and the Commander of the US 1st Armored Division, Major General
Nash, played a valuable role at Dayton. On November 23 the parties initialed the General Framework Agreement and set the stage for the final signing of the agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995. With UN Security Council Resolution 1031 in hand, mandating the execution of the civilian and military tasks provided for in the agreement, NATO conducted the actual deployment of IFOR to Bosnia, for which it had been preparing under various contingencies for several years.

As this overview suggests, the roles that the various international organizations played in attempting to resolve the Yugoslav conflict evolved. An assessment of the performance of these organizations’ performance sheds much light on means available to the international community for conflict management and resolution in the post-Cold War era. The rest of this section will evaluate that performance.

The United Nations. The UN played a central role in the attempts to settle the armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The UN, at that time, had assumed an expanded role in conflict management, going well beyond its traditional peacekeeping functions in such places as Kampuchea and Somalia. In Yugoslavia, the UN made use of virtually the entire arsenal of means defined in the UN Charter, including political-diplomatic measures, economic measures and force. The nature of the UN’s actions to resolve the Balkan crisis may be conditionally divided into three stages.

During the first stage (from 1991 through 1992), traditional political-diplomatic, economic and other non-coercive means were used in an effort to settle the conflict. Negotiations between the warring parties began and culminated in a cease-fire. The UN Protection Force was deployed (beginning January 1992) to protect the cease-fire line around the Serb-controlled areas of Croatia. UN protection zones were established here. In July of 1992 UN forces were also sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This force included a headquarters, eighteen infantry battalions and support units, for a total of 23,000 personnel. UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina deployed in three sectors: “Sarajevo,” “Southwest,” and “Northeast.” Its tasks included: safeguarding the delivery of humanitarian aid; creating the conditions for the evacuation of refugees and the exchange of prisoners of war; and protecting the Moslem population in six so-called UN security zones. These zones had been formed in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 836 of 4 June 1993 and were as follows: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Bihac. In order to stop the fighting quickly in the Yugoslav crisis area (pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 781 of 9 October 1992), a no-fly zone was imposed in Bosnian airspace, and UN observers were placed at airfields in the Union Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

UNPROFOR’s mandates expanded to meet new contingencies and crises. It was given the right to use standard-issue weapons and military hardware to prevent attacks on security zones, to monitor implementation of cease-fire agreements, and to monitor the withdrawal of armed formations that posed a threat to the civilian population from controlled areas.
The second stage (1992 to 1994) showed a gradual increase in coercive measures, which included establishing a total blockade of the conflict region. Beginning in 1994, all contacts with leaders of the Serb Republic were halted. NATO and WEU combat air and naval forces deployed to the conflict area. Their mission was to support implementation of the UN Security Council resolution calling for an embargo on arms deliveries to the conflict zone and banning all flights over the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A large grouping of allied air forces (more than 200 combat aircraft) provided air cover for the peacekeeping force. These aircraft were located at air bases in Italy and aboard ships in the Adriatic.

On 15 June 1993 joint operation SHARP GUARD established a maritime blockade of the former Yugoslav Republic. This action was taken in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 820 of 17 April 1993, and a decision of a joint session of the NATO Military Council and the Council of the WEU on 3 June 1993. The basic goal of the operation was to assure the unconditional implementation of the embargo on deliveries of weapons and strategic raw materials to the warring parties. The constant presence of a powerful grouping of multi-national strike and assault forces in the immediate vicinity of the conflict area exerted psychological influence (and in the event of an uncontrolled development of the military-political situation, coercive influence) on the warring parties.

The distinctive characteristic of the third stage (1994-1995) was the purposeful use of force against the Bosnian Serbs as an instrument of “peace enforcement.” These methods were used because the past measures employed by the world community to settle the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina through peaceful means had failed. The negotiations within the framework of the Geneva conference on the former Yugoslavia had not yielded positive results or reduced tension. This lack of success was due to the unyielding positions of the leaderships of the warring parties. The dead-end situation that arose during the negotiation process strengthened the positions of those who favored using force to resolve the Bosnian problem.

The following conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the UN activity to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. The primary shortcoming was the absence of a comprehensive approach to solving the problem on the part of the UN. The UN Security Council did not fully utilize its capabilities, nor did it implement its requirements effectively and in the shortest possible time periods, as is required by the UN Charter when undertaking effective measures to settle a conflict. The Security Council did not create an integrated mechanism that could function on the basis of a unified concept and clear system of responsibility for resolving various aspects of the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

Experiencing significant difficulties, the UN effectively removed itself from the performance of its direct functions and placed responsibility for their execution on a multitude of groups, conferences, individuals, and various European organizations within the framework of the EC, OSCE, NATO and the WEU. The latter organizations had only limited mandates that provided for performing those functions with which the UN had charged them, and they had no comprehensive plan for conflict resolution. Disagreements among the nations which provided
the forces and means to execute these functions precluded a collective and comprehensive approach to the conflict that took into account the interests of all the parties involved.

Fundamental principles of the then-existing European order were in conflict, e.g., national self-determination, the inviolability of borders, and the priority of international borders over internal administrative borders. The resolution of those contradictions resulted in international legal precedents being set. In furtherance of the right of national self-determination, internal administrative divisions acquired the status of internationally recognized state borders. Under conditions of ongoing ethno-national conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the UN recognized the independence of its republics within the former administrative borders, as well as the results of the election in Bosnia-Herzegovina and imposed majority role over the existing constitutional principle that no fundamental change could take place without the agreement of the representatives of the three ethnic factions. Rather than helping resolve the Yugoslav crisis, this situation precipitated open warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.** The OSCE played a definite role in solving the Yugoslav crisis. Born with the Helsinki Act of 1974, the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe had played a constructive role during the Cold War through creation of a number of confidence-building measures. With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union the CSCE came to include many new member states and, as the OSCE, took on a more permanent structure and assumed a more active role in European security. Its contributions to resolving the Yugoslav crisis were as follows:

---Organizing and conducting control trips (missions) to observe and gather information;
---Establishing (in 1992) representations and missions in Kosovo (the first preventive mission of this organization), the Sanjak and Vojvodina;
---Deploying OSCE observer missions to the Republic of Croatia to observe and assist in the implementation of UN sanctions.

An assessment of OSCE activity in the former Yugoslavia reveals that the tasks accomplished by the OSCE primarily involved monitoring compliance with the sanctions imposed against the Serbs. Analysis of OSCE activity in the Balkans revealed a lack of effective conflict settlement capabilities, despite the seemingly impressive statutory tools of this regional organization. This limited its ability to react appropriately to developing crisis situations and military actions.

**The European Union and the Western European Union.** Both the EU and the WEU were undergoing profound changes when armed conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia. For the EU this process involved the process of deepening their economic and political integration, associated with Maastricht Treaty and the preparations for the European Monetary Union, and broadening, associated with the admission of new members. In June 1992, the EU enunciated its Lisbon Principles, which included a role for the EU in the prevention and settlement of conflicts. The WEU, which had existed from 1948 as a European security organization, composed of some members of the European Community, had become revitalized in the 1980s. At a meeting
of foreign and defense ministers of the WEU member-states at Petersberg, Germany, (prior to the
meeting of the European Council in Lisbon) the WEU embraced the “Petersberg tasks,” which
included humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management. While
distinct organizations with some overlapping membership, the EU and WEU functioned in
tandem during the Yugoslav crisis and practiced a limited but effective division of labor, based
on their respective roles in the European order. The approaches of the EU and WEU to settling
the crisis in the former Yugoslavia were shaped by two factors: their common interest in
restoring peace and stability in the Balkans and their growing roles in the evolving European
order.

At the same time, the member-countries of these organizations had their own interests in
the region, and these interests determined their degree of involvement in the efforts to resolve the
conflict. This fact had an impact on the effectiveness and impartiality of the work of these
organizations. Officially, the EU and the WEU favored settlement of the armed conflict and
differences through peaceful means. At the same time, under powerful pressure from Germany,
they supported a number of decisions that led directly and substantially to an escalation in the
use of force. One example was their recognition of the national independence of Slovenia and
Croatia. They also actively participated in implementing measures involving forceful pressure
against the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, usually against the forces of the Serbian
Republic. These actions also included the enforcement of strict economic sanctions against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Krajina Serbs, as well as military measures.

In practice, the EU and the WEU lacked a developed mechanism for crisis response. On
the whole, their practical contribution to the resolution of the armed conflict was limited
primarily to observer and intermediary functions and to resolving common and humanitarian
tasks. These included supporting the international sanctions, delivering humanitarian aid to the
civilian population and exercising an intermediary role at negotiations between the warring
parties.

For the first time, WEU forces were employed to implement UN Security Council
sanctions. Under the UN Security Council resolution to impose an embargo on arms shipments,
WEU forces took part in a coalition naval operation in the Adriatic, SHARP GUARD. The
WEU member-countries provided NATO with a detachment of WEU warships, and deployed
units of the police and customs services on the Danube.

When fighting erupted between Moslems and Croats in Herzegovina, the EU gave
priority attention to searching for ways to stabilize Moslem-Croat relations in this region. To a
great extent, the existence of the Moslem-Croat Federation itself depends on these efforts. The
EU has allocated significant financial means for this purpose.

Analysis of the course of the military-political situation shows that, in the mid-term, the
role and influence of the EU and WEU in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entire post-Yugoslav
space will grow. This fact is due primarily to the economic, political, and military interests of
the European countries.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Yugoslav conflict erupted at a time when NATO was in a process of transformation associated with the end of the Cold War. In the new atmosphere, when the Warsaw Treaty Organization had ceased to exist and the risk of general European war had been sharply reduced, NATO began reaching out to former members of that alliance via the North Atlantic Consultative Council. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the successor states were invited to join the NACC. At the same time, it began a process of adjusting its organization and commands to the new challenges to European security.

For the first time, the conceptual bases for using NATO forces for “peacekeeping activity” have been formulated at the conceptual level at a session of the North Atlantic Council, which took place in Oslo in June of 1992. In accordance with the principles of the accepted theory of “crisis management,” participating in the resolution of crisis situations and military conflicts, as well as conducting humanitarian operations within NATO’s zone of responsibility and outside of it, now became NATO functions. There were three stages in NATO’s efforts to settle the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

During the first stage (1992-1993), NATO forces performed tasks that were defined in UN Security Council resolutions on monitoring the weapons embargo and controlling airspace. Combined NATO naval units (1992) and NATO air force units (1993) were formed to perform the aforementioned tasks. SACEUR directed the creation of a special air task force to carry out these tasks. The force included units from the US, France, Great Britain, Turkey, Spain and the Netherlands. The 5th Joint Tactical Air Command, Allied Forces Southern Europe exercised command and control over the task force.

The second stage (1993-1994) of NATO involvement began when the UN Security Council sanctioned the use of NATO forces to carry out new tasks: protecting the security of UN peacekeeping personnel and providing air cover for the so-called UN safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO command and headquarters began gathering information and created the conditions in which the air force could execute its assigned tasks in specified areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In August 1994, for the first time in NATO history, NATO air forces bombed actual targets. These were the Bosnian Serb army, including the airfield at Udbina in the Krajina region of Croatia. A unique feature of this activity was that NATO command coordinated its actions with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, rather than with the Security Council. Air strikes were employed to force the Serbs to implement the UN Security Council decision on the status of the UN safe havens.\footnote{Attacks by the armed forces of the Serbian Republic on the safe havens provided the immediate cause of these air strikes. However, according to data from UNPROFOR sources, raids by Moslem irregular forces based in the Safe Havens in Bosnia and Herzegovina helped to provoke the Serb attacks. The Russian team members note that the Croatian Army’s offensive actions in the “Serb Krajina” (a UN protection zone in Croatia) coincided with the renewal of the NATO air strikes.}
The third stage (1995) of NATO’s involvement was precipitated by the crisis of UNPROFOR’s inability to perform its missions and the distinct possibility that UNPROFOR would have to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO’s involvement began with the need to plan to support the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Fighting in Croatia resumed, and within Bosnia-Herzegovina a new wave of ethnic cleansing, associated with the fall of the UN-mandated safe havens in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, brought increased international pressure for action. NATO escalated military preparations and prepared to compel the Bosnian Serbs to desist from further attacks.

On 30 May 1995, NATO’s multi-national ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was activated. Its personnel strength numbered up to 10,000. The UN granted NATO broad powers to use force to resolve the conflict. In August and September 1995, in response to Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo, NATO air and naval forces launched a series of air strikes on key installations of the Bosnian Serb Army. These targets included command and control systems (command points, communications nodes), air defense systems, logistics, transport lines and infrastructure.

An analysis of NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia reveals that, in practice, NATO implemented its post-Cold War strategic innovations and took on the function of resolving crisis situations and military conflicts “out of area,” i.e., beyond the territories of the alliance’s members, but in areas defined by the alliance as “vital” to the security of Europe. In practical terms this involved an advance of NATO’s infrastructure southward into the zone of crisis with the objective of being able to react more quickly and decisively to a potential crisis in the southeastern Europe.

Observations on the Roles of the International Organizations. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia came at a time of profound changes in the international system and the transformation of key institutions involved in global and European security. These institutions had to adapt to a serious challenge in a new environment. An analysis of the activities of international organizations trying to resolve the Yugoslav crisis reveals a substantial redistribution of functions and roles to various international organizations. There was a significant growth in the role of regional organizations and their forces in resolving conflicts.

Given the clear trend toward a reduction of the UN’s direct role in overseeing the use of military force in peace operations, it seems necessary to rethink this organization’s traditional approach to the exercise of its peacekeeping function. This approach was based on monitoring the sides’ compliance with the obligations to which they had agreed. The basic problem now is the substantial blurring of the differences between traditional peacekeeping actions and those of peace enforcement. Drawing countries and organizations of the Moslem world into the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had a certain impact on the development of the armed conflict there.

The member-states of these Moslem organizations, although divided on many issues, found a basis for united action in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the solidarity they felt for their fellow Moslems there. This common policy involved financial assistance and active military aid.
to the Moslem side. In demanding that the entire republic be returned to the control of the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Moslem leadership, the members of the Islamic Conference, in the December 1994 Declaration in Casablanca, essentially sent an ultimatum to the world community. They called for the employment of military power against the Bosnian Serbs, including NATO’s military power, and stated that the Conference members would, in the case of no such action by NATO, reserve the right to offer direct and substantial support to the Bosnian state against the Serbs. This coordinated policy had a significant impact on the evolution of the views of various European countries toward the method of resolving the Bosnian conflict, and it was the driving factor in their consent to the use of NATO forces. While the American researchers note the concern of the ICO and LAS for the cause of the Bosnian Moslems and the financial assistance provided by their members, they do not see these organizations as playing a vital or decisive role in the resolution of the conflict. However, the Russian researchers have some basis for stressing that the widespread employment of foreign Mujahideen added certain elements to the combat, including terrorist acts against the civilian population.

**IFOR’s Goals and Tasks in the Former Yugoslavia: The International Legal Basis for Its Activities.** Over the last half century a fairly broad spectrum of forms and methods of peacekeeping has developed within the framework of international law [as defined by the UN Charter (Chapters VI, VII and VIII)]. In the post-Cold War era changes in the international order have brought into play new elements in peacekeeping.

The current study demonstrates that peacekeeping/enforcement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has evolved in accord with the shift away from “classical peacekeeping” to peace enforcement. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the sequential transition from classical peacekeeping operations to peacemaking and peace enforcement was evident. The IFOR operation represented a definite frontier that reoriented the world community towards compelling the warring parties into peace.

The IFOR mission was carried out on an international-legal basis that had been worked out in detail. IFOR was given the necessary one-year mandate (status) based on UN Security Council resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995. Pursuant to this resolution, the regional organization, NATO, was tasked with creating a multi-national peacekeeping force. IFOR performed the first peace operation in history in which NATO had the lead role, while the UN’s role was somewhat reduced. The UN approved the operation and adopted the appropriate resolution in its Security Council. The NATO Council exercised direct political leadership of the operation. Therefore, all the forces designated for its conduct had to act in strict conformity with the policy developed by the North Atlantic Council.

At a conference on Russian and US/NATO cooperation, former Deputy Chief of Staff of SACEUR for Operations and Logistics LTG Patrick K. Gamble observed: “The IFOR was created as a result of three years of planning NATO’s operational activity in support of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

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Guided by the political decisions of the 1994 NATO summit and the acceptance in principle of a role for NATO in peace operations, SACEUR developed a concept for employing an international peace force. This concept took into account the fundamental principles of the Partnership for Peace program, as well as the Combined Joint Task Force concept, and served as the conceptual basis used by SHAPE in organizing and carrying out IFOR. Because of the situation, the multi-national armed force could not execute its mission until authority was passed from the UNPROFOR commander to the IFOR commander. This left its mark on the goals and tasks that lay ahead for IFOR.

The basic goal of IFOR was to provide for the implementation of the military aspects of the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex 1-A of the Dayton Accords). In addition, because of the rapid withdrawal of the UNPROFOR, IFOR tasks also included the creation of secure conditions for performance of all other tasks by civilian organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The military aspects of the peace settlement, as set forth in the Accords’ Annex 1A, reflected in detail the basic tasks of the peace-enforcement force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pursuant to the peace accord, IFOR’s basic military tasks included: separating the warring parties; assuring a cease-fire; monitoring the withdrawal of troops and weapons to their designated zones; and creating stable and secure conditions for the activity of the civilian organizations in fulfillment of the tasks called for in the peace accords.\textsuperscript{3}

During implementation of the Dayton Accords, IFOR was to devote primary attention to performing a number of tasks relating to the halting of military actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including:

--Achieving a long-term halt to the military activities;
--Establishing a zone of separation along the coordinated line of cease-fire, approximately two kilometers deep on either side;
--Providing the immediate liberation and hand-over of combatants and civilians detained in connection with the conflict, as well as the liberation and hand-over of any prisoners being detained (within thirty days);
--Providing for the withdrawal of all the warring parties’ forces to beyond the zone of separation;
--Liberating territory transferred from one state formation, existing within the framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to another;
--Providing for the withdrawal of heavy weapons (over a 120-day period) to collection areas and other points designated by the IFOR command;
--Disarming and dispersing all armed civilian formations, except for authorized police forces;

--Resolving the issue of demobilizing the armed formations that could not be placed in collection areas (barracks).\(^4\)

During preparation for the operation, special attention was devoted to: monitoring the implementation of the treaty (along the 1,075-km line of separation and in the zone of separation in an area of 4300 sq. km.); checking that the troops of the former warring factions (FWF) were located in specially designated areas (more than 700 locations); checking the anti-aircraft weapons storage areas; monitoring the elimination of fortified facilities; establishing the facts of violations of the cease-fire and armistice and investigating them.

In addition, a great many tasks were also to be performed in: the mine-clearing process; transport issues (maintaining approximately 5,000 km of roads in passable condition); providing the security of bridges and tunnels; setting up control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as control over basic movement along land routes; monitoring the implementation of sanctions; providing for the security, freedom of movement and placement of the civilian population; taking sanitation and epidemiological measures to prevent massive infectious illness and epidemics in the conflict region.

The tasks for implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace accords consisted primarily of: creating the conditions necessary for the work of humanitarian organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina; assisting in the withdrawal of those UN forces that did not receive an IFOR mandate; assisting the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian tasks operating in the conflict zone pursuant to the peace treaty and assisting them in their movement through the conflict zone; creating the necessary conditions for the holding of free and fair elections; helping refugees, and persons forcibly interned in their return to their previous locations; creating the conditions for negotiations and other measures for peaceful conflict settlement; establishing law and order, as well as the normal operation of state institutions; providing security for official visits at all levels; and helping establish normal contacts between the populations of the warring parties.

As these lists suggest, IFOR had to accomplish numerous and diverse tasks. As the analysis shows, because of the specific nature of the peace operation, some of these tasks were unrelated to the training the force had received for its direct mission, and this required the attention of the IFOR command. Because of this, the countries providing troops for IFOR had to meet the required level of combat training and combat readiness before they were allowed to participate directly in the operation. In the opinion of the authors, this process has great significance for future peace operations. In future military cooperation it would be advisable to continue developing and clarifying common tasks that can be used in the training of troops and staffs designated for multi-national peace operations.

\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 85, 86.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PLAN FOR FULFILLING THE DAYTON ACCORDS

Planning the Operation. Planning began at SHAPE in 1992 in the form of multiple, detailed contingency plans. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) began contingency planning and reconnaissance for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993. The US 1st Armored Division began contingency planning, coordination and drills in the spring of 1994. On 21 September 1995 the 1st Armored Division was alerted for possible deployment to Bosnia. This began a tough, very intense division training program which tested the plans and incorporated a series of command post exercises (CPXs) and fire coordination exercises (FCXs). During exercise IRON WARRIOR, they trained to establish a zone of separation, to separate factions and conduct joint military commissions (JMCs) -- all elements of the plan. The division conducted a series of reconnaissance visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina. SACEUR General Joulwan took MG Nash, the 1st Armored Division Commander, to Dayton to observe the negotiations. Once the Dayton Accords were signed, detailed final planning was conducted by USAREUR and 1st Armored Division with consultations with SHAPE. The British and French did the same for their sectors.\(^5\)

The Russians were brought into the combined planning process late. Following the “Peacekeeper 95” combined Russian-American exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas, Secretary of Defense Perry and Minister of Defense Grachev agreed to the commitment of an unspecified Russian force. At subsequent high-level discussions at SHAPE, Minister of Defense Grachev agreed to the commitment of the Russian Brigade. The Russian Army did an excellent job in planning and moving the brigade in a short period of time. What makes it even more remarkable is that Russian forces were still engaged in Chechnya while this planning process was going on.\(^6\)

Detailed planning for the IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina began and was accomplished pursuant to NATO Military Committee Directive 111931Z concerning NATO’s participation in the process of re-establishing peace, and pursuant to the decision of the North Atlantic Council to conduct an operation to carry out the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Based on these decisions, SACEUR ordered the operational planning for several areas that would accommodate the various possible situational developments. Judging by the planning materials, these instructions and recommendations were consistent in nature and were based on achievement of the assigned goals from the very beginning.


\(^6\)Interview with General-Lieutenant Nikolai Staskov, Moscow, 9 December 1997.
The basic planning document for IFOR was SACEUR’s Operations Plan 10405. It consists of a set of combat documents written by the SACEUR’s staff based on the authority to conduct the operation as granted by UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995. The actions of the Russian contingent are reflected in the “Plan for the Participation of the Russian Peacekeeping Contingent in the UN Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Military specialists have given high marks to the organization, planning and level of detail contained in their planning documents.

All plans reflect the general principles for the conduct of the operation, the primary and secondary military missions, the assessment of the degree of risk, the procedure for conducting the operation, the concept of the operation, the missions of subordinate commanders, coordination measures for tactical missions, logistics procedures, and command and control. Further, the operation plan annexes provided detailed coverage of command and control, reconnaissance, intelligence exchange, force protection, employment of aviation and naval forces, communications, and information, military-legal, logistics, medical and transportation support.

Informing the public was a significant part of the IFOR operation. To a large extent, public support for the actions of the peace-enforcement force depended on openness and publicity. Future peace-enforcement operations will require planning to gain and maintain international public support from the very beginning of the planning process. In multi-national peace enforcement operations, informing the public is a pressing issue that requires thorough and detailed attention.

The rules of engagement had a significant impact on the subsequent execution of the mission by making completely clear under what conditions weapons could be used. Since a clear understanding of the rules of engagement ultimately determines the peace-operation force’s own security, future peace operations demand rules of engagement that are clear and precise.

Preparing for and conducting the IFOR operation followed the usual logic of military operations. The plans were based on the principles of the Dayton Accords: the need to monitor the pull back of the troops of the warring parties within the agreed time period and to establish a line of separation; the need to support the organized and safe withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force and the need to create the conditions for implementation of the civilian aspects of the Accords.

Based on the strategic goals, the availability of well-prepared forces, the physical and geographical features of the zone of the operation and the specifics of the peace operation (in particular, the presumed absence of countermeasures on the part of the warring parties), SACEUR issued the following parameters that characterized the operation:

**The Composition and Strength of the Participating Forces.** Pursuant to the decision of the NATO Military Committee, the plan would activate military units from fourteen NATO countries (excluding Iceland and Luxembourg) and ten non-NATO countries. Subsequently, the
The composition of the peace operations force was redefined. In accordance with the confirmed operation plan (Number 10405) military contingents from 36 countries were activated (fifteen NATO countries, excluding Iceland, and twenty-one non-NATO countries).

The total number of ground forces implementing the accords was approximately 84,000, not counting support-services units located outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of these, approximately 71,000 personnel were from NATO countries and 12,000 from non-NATO countries.

The zone of conduct of the operation was bounded by land and air borders of part of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia), the international waters and air space of the Adriatic and the Ionian Seas, and by the territorial waters of Albania, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, it included the territory and air space of the NATO countries of southern Europe, as well as certain other zones and routes.

The length of the operation was determined by the peacekeeping mandate and was calculated not to exceed twelve months.

On the whole, the operation plan conformed to the principles and requirements set forth in NATO planning documents. The basic portion of the operation plan reflected the decision to conduct the operation. It laid out the concept, the troop missions, the bases for coordination, support, and the organization of command and control.

According to the concept, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the area in which primary efforts would be concentrated.

The operation was planned in five stages:

Stage 1 -- Readying and deploying the advance units of IFOR to the conflict zone. This stage included all the actions to specify the number of troops, their combat training, and the preparation and deployment of advance forces. The deployment of advance forces was a key element in the first stage.

Stage 2 -- Insertion of IFOR and deployment to the assigned areas in the conflict zone.

Stage 3 -- Execution of the mission.

Stage 4 -- Transition to peace. The goal was for IFOR to take complete control of the lines of separation of the warring parties and the zones of separation of their armed formations, and organize the restoration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Stage 5 -- Withdrawal of the IFOR. IFOR was to hand over remaining tasks to the appropriate international civilian organizations. IFOR was to withdraw from the conflict zone.

The plan called for the combined peace-operation forces to be deployed as a group of ground, naval and air components under the operational command of CinC Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).
The ground forces component of the peace-operation force was included in the multinational divisions: “North,” based on the U.S. 1st Armored Division; “Southwest,” based on the Great Britain’s 3rd Mechanized Division; and “Southeast,” based on France’s 6th Light Armored Division [Armored Cavalry Division]. In addition, a combat support group, including the special operations forces of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (forward command post in Sarajevo) was constituted. Operational reserves, outside the boundaries of the operation, were created and readied for possible deployment.

The ground forces component of the peace-operation force would initially create strong points in the zone of operation and then subsequently take control of the entire zone. The planned communication zone was a two-echelon structure that included a “forward communications zone” and a “rear communications zone.” The naval component grouping was based on NATO’s naval task forces of Allied Forces Southern Europe, consisting of task force groups, a rear-services support group and an amphibious force group. The IFOR air component was based on NATO’s allied air forces, which had been formed earlier for Operation Deny Flight.

The chain of command originated with SACEUR. Command of the peace operation force came under Allied Forces Southern Europe, which had the following tasks:
– Exercise operational-tactical control of subordinate ground, air and naval groupings of armed forces from both NATO and non-NATO countries;
– Support the protection, self-defense and freedom of movement of IFOR;
– Determine the assembly and storage points for the former warring factions’ heavy weapons moved away from the line of contact, as well as the location for their personnel;
– When necessary, compel the warring parties to halt armed clashes;
– Control demarcation lines and zones of separation in accordance with the Accords;
– Provide security for the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping contingent;
– Create joint military commissions and coordination bodies with civilian organizations;
– Provide close air support for the UN peacekeeping forces, including in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baraniya and Western Srem, based on the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions;
– Assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and assist other international humanitarian organizations;
– Monitor the actions of the sides to mark and clear mine fields, neutralize and remove obstacles, prevent the laying of new mine fields or obstacles;
– Control movement along the road between Sarajevo and Gorazde;
– Control radar emissions, particularly anti-air defense systems in the operation zone and, if necessary, suppress them with radio-electronic warfare assets;
– Control the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When planning the operation, much attention was devoted to coordinating actions among headquarters within the conflict area and also among external commands. Allied Forces Central Europe and Allied Forces Northwestern Europe cooperated with Allied Forces Southern Europe by designating reinforcing forces and assets for IFOR and by training the brigades and divisions
assigned to the peace-operation force. This included units from non-NATO countries. They also moved and regrouped the designated forces in their areas of responsibility.

The command of the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) would command the peace-operation ground forces component and would coordinate the training of the brigades and battalions. The ACE Mobile Force was prepared to support Allied Forces Southern Europe. SACEUR had overall jurisdiction of support.

Agreements stipulated the participation of non-NATO countries, limiting them to one quarter of the total number of troops from NATO countries and to comprising no more than one single tactical unit subordinated to a higher command (for example, a battalion as part of a brigade, a brigade as part of a division). To the greatest extent possible, existing NATO standards for troop training and combat employment were applied to the non-NATO contingents.

Non-NATO countries participated in the operational planning. They provided representatives proportional to the number of troops designated for the peace-operation force. Responsibility for logistics, finance and other types of support for the national contingents would remain with the national commands but would be coordinated by SACEUR, according to the terms of the agreement.

In keeping with the principle of unity of command, SACEUR had full operational control. Non-NATO forces and assets were integrated into the NATO structure. The chain of command and control ran: SACEUR --> IFOR Commander --> commanders of the IFOR components (commander of the ARRC, commander of the naval task and support forces, Allied Forces Southern Europe) --> subordinate troops. Close cooperation with staff organizations and parallel planning made it possible to coordinate strategic, operational and tactical plans swiftly.

NATO and the Russian Federation agreed on principles and organizational procedures to integrate the Russian contingent. On the whole, joint NATO and the RF planning was successful. The difficulties that arose were due to the fact that the representatives of the RF Armed Forces were not brought into the IFOR operation planning until its final stage. This affected the degree of detailed planning conducted for deploying Russian forces.

**Deployment of the IFOR.** The decision to deploy IFOR was not made until the General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The operation, brokered by the Dayton Agreement of 21 November, was anticipated by NATO for several years, if contingency planning is taken into account, and by several months of deliberate planning. The US 1st Armored Division began training for deployment in Grafenwoehr on 21 September.

Practically from the onset of hostilities, the US military was intimately involved in planning for an eventual peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They had studied the successes and failures of the UN attempts at bringing peace and had incorporated these lessons into their training plans. Military leaders were well aware of the particular challenges which confronted them in the Bosnian theater and had developed a rigorous training program to handle every
possible contingency. US military leaders closely monitored the situation and were intimately involved with the crafting of the Dayton Peace Accords. For the mission to succeed, it was clear that the Implementation Force (IFOR) should possess overwhelming combat superiority. As a result of the Paris Settlement, NATO faced a particularly challenging calendar for initiation of its mission. The transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR was to be accomplished by D-4.

The IFOR had both specified and implied missions. They included:
--Conduct pre-deployment training;
--Bring about cessation of hostilities among the Former Warring Factions (FWF);
--Ensure cooperation of the FWF with the Implementation Force (IFOR);
--Separate the FWF by ensuring withdrawal no later than D+30 -- from a zone of separation over 1,000 miles of the confrontation line in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
--Ensure freedom of movement in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
--Supervise the transition of control between the elements of FWF in designated areas of transfer by D+90;
--Monitor the status of forces (demilitarization, weapons stockpiles, training) throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina;
--Deploy the entire 60,000 personnel (from 30 nations) of IFOR, along with their equipment and logistics by D+120;
--Transition to peace by D+270.

During the pre-deployment phase, IFOR forces trained while commanders tailored their forces and logistics and allocated centers. While forces were certified ready for deployment, command and staff elements conducted reconnaissance visits into their areas of concern. Information operations were conducted. Planning was conducted for deploying enabling forces, but since no deployments were allowed before the treaty signature, enabling forces were not deployed. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) was created at an Intermediate Support Base in Taszar, Hungary for the multinational Task Force Eagle (based on the tailored 1st Armored Division).

During the deployment phase, the French, British and Task Force Eagle deployed according to division planning. The plans were similar. The US deployment of Task Force Eagle consisted of seven deployment packages:

1. Deployment of command and control elements by air to Tuzla to prepare to assume control of selected UNPROFOR units (Swedish battalion, NorLog battalion, Turkish battalion and two Pakistani battalions--which later redeployed). The 3-325 IN (Airborne) secures Tuzla airbase;

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8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
2. Open the lines of communication (LOC) and deploy force from Germany by rail to Kapsvar, Hungary, and then conduct road march south through Zupanja, Croatia, and cross the flooded Sava river;
3. Send Task Force Eagle forward;
4. Send 1st Brigade Combat Team forward;
5. Send main body forward (2nd Brigade Combat Team and Division Main);
6. Send Task Force support elements forward;
7. Send remaining elements forward.

The execution phase ran virtually simultaneously with the deployment phase. The decision to commit overwhelming combat superiority prevented hostility and allowed the IFOR to quickly move into position and on D+4 begin carrying out its assigned missions successfully. The Russian Brigade deployed from 12 to 30 January 1995 and took over its sector from American units.11

**Decision.** There were a number of factors which finally prompted the US and other major European powers to decide on using a NATO-led force to compel an end to the fighting in Bosnia. After three years of failure, it was apparent that the UN forces had neither the firepower nor the mandate to force the Former Warring Factions (FWF) to lay down their arms. Although the UN began to rely upon NATO forces to coerce the Serbs into submission, it soon became apparent that without Serb political compliance, NATO air attacks were insufficient to bring about a lasting settlement. Motivated by a mixture of war weariness, fear of more NATO strikes and effective diplomacy, the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia and Yugoslavia met and initialed a peace treaty in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995.

Practically from the onset of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, US political and military officials had been intimately involved in NATO planning for a wide spectrum of possible missions. US political and military leaders had studied the successes and failures of the UN attempts at bringing peace and had incorporated these lessons into their overall strategy. Some of the key lessons included the necessity of overwhelming force, objectivity and legitimacy. Military leaders were well aware of the particular challenges which confronted them in the Bosnian theater and had developed a rigorous training program to handle every possible contingency.

The majority of the peacekeeping action participants judge the deployment of IFOR to have been one of the most important and successful phases of the operation. The attention with which the IFOR command approached the deployment is confirmed in the SACEUR’s instructions to his staff. These instructions were given during the planning of the operation. “By the organized way in which we will begin the deployment, the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina will see that they are confronting totally new approaches from the world.

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11Ibid.
community…that we are fully determined to carry out the task assigned to us -- to force them to comply with the principles of the peace accords.”

Two basic factors contributed to the effectiveness of the IFOR deployment. The first was a detailed study of the situation in the region with a thorough analysis of the possible threats. The second was the successful preliminary deployment of support and control structures.

Deployment of the advance IFOR group began on 2 December 1995. Its basic goal was to establish the communications of the rear-services organizations, airfields, ports and the staffs that would exercise command and control over the deployment of the IFOR grouping. The advance IFOR forces were deployed as follows: individual organizations of the IFOR staff (approximately 350 people); the corps staff of the ARRC (about 400); organizations for combat support of the ARRC (about 100); divisional elements of the multi-national divisions “North,” “Southwest” and “Southeast”; staff organizations of the special operations forces (about 100); individual elements of communications, intelligence and control of the transfer in the rear of the conflict zone (about 200 people). A particular feature of the advance group deployment was that the Allied Forces Southern Europe were to be ready to deploy the advance forces from the armed forces of NATO countries before the conclusion of the peace negotiations (the actual signing of the accord). These actions demonstrate that NATO sought to be in position to execute its decision immediately upon the signing in Paris and the passage of the Security Council’s resolution.

SACEUR determined the priorities in the strategic deployment of the coalition contingents in the conflict zone. Further, SACEUR coordinated and controlled the IFOR deployment via the Mobility Coordination Center and the appropriate allied centers of the subordinate commands. The carefully developed troop deployment plan played a decisive role during this first stage. The document, “Organizing the Deployment and Actions of Allied Forces,” formed the basis of this plan. Pursuant to this document, each country, depending on the conditions, would independently determine and report to the IFOR command the exact date on which it would transfer its contingent of forces to IFOR. This guaranteed the creation of a balanced IFOR group capable of carrying out the assigned tasks.

NATO leadership devoted particular attention to the operational deployment of the IFOR command-and-control organization. Thus, during the first few days, the staffs of IFOR and

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13 Russian researchers see in these pre-deployments evidence of NATO’s implied pressure upon the former warring factions in support of the Dayton Accords, as well as a forcing of the event in order to present the international community with a fait accompli. The American researchers, on the other hand, view these pre-deployments as a necessary and appropriate step towards the speedy and effective transfer of the peace operation mandate from UNPROFOR to IFOR in keeping with the spirit of the Dayton Accords.
NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) were to be placed in Sarajevo. The staff of NATO’s ARRC was to be fully developed in four days.

The basic forces, including the staffs, began deployment after passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1031 on 15 December 1995. On 16 December 1995 “D” Day arrived, the day the order was to be issued to begin deployment of the main IFOR forces. The date of 20 December 1995 was set as the transfer-of-authority date (the day the IFOR operation would begin), when UN authority would be handed over to NATO (IFOR).

The primary IFOR forces consisted of the following:

The **IFOR ground forces component** was NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps with three multi-national divisions (thirteen brigades, and also combat and rear-services support, for a total of 57,300 personnel). Its assets included: 475 tanks; 1,367 field artillery pieces, multiple-launch rocket systems and mortars; 1,654 armored combat vehicles; 66 air defense missile complexes; and 180 attack helicopters;

The **IFOR air component** was made up of units from the 5th Joint Tactical Air Command, NATO tactical aviation temporarily based in Italy, E-3 aircraft of both the NATO AWACS Command and the national UK and French Airborne Early Warning Commands, and auxiliary aircraft. In total the IFOR air component had 139 combat aircraft, 19 auxiliary aircraft and 20 helicopters;

The **IFOR maritime component** had part of the forces from Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, and the task forces of the Allied Naval Forces (6th US Fleet) Southern Europe, which coordinated with the British Navy’s aviation search and strike group, and the French Navy’s multi-purpose aircraft carrier and amphibious-assault groups; also included in IFOR’s maritime component were submarines from the allied submarine forces in Southern Europe (from the US, British and French Navies, two or three atomic submarines in combat patrol areas). In total, IFOR’s naval combat component consisted of 35 combat ships and 52 carrier aircraft.

Deployment of the primary IFOR force was by sea, air and ground transport. The IFOR commander was tasked with supporting the reception of the troops and their movement out to the designated areas. Appropriate reconnaissance was organized and conducted to resolve and coordinate individual issues. During this reconnaissance special attention was devoted to the coordination of reporting procedures, crossings of boundaries, identification signals and markings, gaining permission for passages of convoys, and other important issues. In addition to the advance units of IFOR, UN elements operating in the area of the conflict zone were enlisted to carry out preparatory measures and facilitate the deployment of the main force.

During the deployment, the NATO command used a special procedure for organization and coordination among the countries participating in IFOR, as follows. Certain countries were given the status of “leading nations.” In addition to deploying their own forces, these nations also
made available the airfields and naval ports they had at their disposal in order to facilitate the
deployment of the forces of other countries. This was done on the basis of a bilateral agreement.
They distributed the port facilities based on coordination with the local governments. For
operational control, movement-control teams were created at each airfield, at the naval ports, key
railway stations, reassignment points, waiting areas and areas of concentration. These teams
were assigned to control troop movement within the bounds of the forward communication zone.

On the whole, the experts’ assessment of this organization of the deployment of the
multi-national force was quite positive. It fit the unique circumstances of the force, the theater
and the situation. By 6 February 1996 some 56,000 military personnel were concentrated in the
zone of the Bosnian conflict. This number comprised approximately 80% of the total strength of
IFOR.

Deployment of IFOR involved a significant transport effort, which included 2,600
sorties by transport aviation, 50 ship movements and 380 train movements. Aircraft transported
22,000 personnel and 33,000 tons of cargo. Ships moved 3,000 personnel and 65,000 tons of
cargo. Railroads carried 15,000 personnel and 107,000 tons of cargo. This is a total of 40,000
personnel and 205,000 tons of cargo.

Deployment of the Russian force began slightly later than that of the main NATO force
(12 January 1996). The Russians moved by air and rail (75 air-transport flights and 11 trains).
By Transfer-of-Authority Day plus 45, the Russian brigade completed its deployment and began
carrying out its assigned security task in the controlled region. The success of the deployment of
the Russian contingent was due in large part to successful cooperation with the movement-
control elements.

The team of Russian officers doing the operational-strategic planning coordinated closely
with the Mobility Coordination Center at SHAPE. In addition, at the 5th Joint Tactical Air
Command in Vicenza, Italy, a team of four Russian officers from the General Staff of the RF
Armed Forces worked out the details of the movement. A second team of officers from the RF
General Staff was located at the airfield in Tuzla. It also coordinated the arrival of Russian
troops. During the deployment, direct coordination between the receiving division and the
Russian brigade was accomplished by liaison teams working on the staff of the American
division. The division commander was U.S. Army MG William Nash, and the commander of
the Russian brigade was COL A. Lentsov. In the opinion of the Russian participants in the
operation, it was this close coordination at all command levels that resulted in the successful
deployment of the Russian brigade in their zone of responsibility.

Legal Relationships of Military and Civilian Control Elements and Organizations in
Peace Operations. In the opinion of both the Russian and American participants, the peace
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to resolve both military and civilian aspects of the
peace accords together. The simultaneous and parallel actions of military and civilian
organizations (control elements) in the conflict zone required that the appropriate legal
documents be drawn up to legitimize the peace actions and the exercise of the required specific
functions.
As the experience of the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows, this legal underpinning is essential. First, the principles and accepted norms of international law served as the basis for regulating the aforementioned legal relationships. The principles were those that define the legal relationships of international and national organizations (control bodies) during peace operations. This basic point was recorded in Article 1 of the “General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (GFAP): “The sides, in their mutual relationships, will act in accordance with the principles set forth in the Declaration of the United Nations, just as in the Helsinki Final Act and the remaining documents of the security organization....”

The legal mechanism was further internalized during the peace negotiations and recorded in the text of the peace accords. Within the framework of the general peace agreement, several points concern the legal side of relations between the military and civilian command authorities. The agreement sets forth the general consent to IFOR’s right to monitor and assist all sides in carrying out the requirements set forth in the agreement. The agreement also gives priority to IFOR in its right to select and establish the necessary mechanism for communication with the local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations, based on the requirements of the operation.

Within the framework of these principles the IFOR command adopted a number of measures to organize coordination with civilian and military elements. Their basic purpose was to ensure that the operation was conducted in accord with international law, to maintain the freedom of action of subordinate forces, to provide a united civilian and military effort and to support the planned transfer of control to civilian elements in the event of an IFOR withdrawal. Close contacts with the appropriate civilian elements were established and maintained via coordination centers in the Joint Military Commission. This commission served as the basic instrument for regulating the relationships of military and civilian control elements (national and international) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IFOR commander (or, in some cases, his deputy) headed the commission. It included representatives from each of the warring parties, representatives of the civilian authorities, and representatives of international civilian organizations.

Within the legal framework defined by the peace accords, the IFOR command had the ability to internalize individual legal points and establish definite rules regulating the use of the peace-operation force. It could grant the following rights: the right to establish check points, the right of military personnel to carry personal weapons, to conduct police operations in the zone of separation, to stop and disarm groups of civilians carrying weapons, the right to search for missing representatives of non-governmental organizations, etc. In addition, the practical activity of IFOR during the operation required the drafting and adoption of individual laws on specific issues, such as:

--Giving members of civilian organizations and civilian personnel the right to carry weapons, as well as defining the procedure for trying these individuals in a court of law in the event that they violated these rules;
--Establishing a special status for civilian contract workers in the military garrisons and setting special rules for the work and conduct of these individuals;

--Resettling civilians who mistakenly settled in the zone of separation;

--Presenting mutual claims/petitions between military and civilian organizations;

--Using certain facilities of the military infrastructure.

Coordination with non-governmental organizations was regulated depending on their status and functions and was organized on the basis of permission from the NATO Council and instructions from SACEUR. In accordance with these decisions, a number of restrictions were placed on the coordination of military and civilian organizations. This primarily concerned a clear definition and limitation of the number of military organizations that assisted civilian organizations in certain issues requiring the support of IFOR troops: taking photographs during an inspection; checking barracks and inspecting weapons sites to record the serial numbers of various weapons; searching houses and other buildings without search warrants; escorting convoys carrying weapons and other military property; registering the populace’s firearms; and employing forces to provide security for the election process and the country’s infrastructure in general (protecting people and establishing clear rules of engagement); intervening to stop criminal activity (looting, arson, etc.); and creating static guards or escorts to ensure freedom of movement and crowd control.

One aspect of the legal framework for IFOR’s operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was making adjustments to operational law (ability to establish police checkpoints, carry sidearms, or conduct police operations in the zone of separation; ability to stop or detain or break up armed civilian groups [defined as two or more civilians carrying one or more weapons]), searching members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (treating NGOs as any other civilian going through checkpoints, with certain exceptions); allowing vehicles to pass safely unless special circumstances dictated that the vehicle should be searched. Such adjustments were often the result of memorandums of understanding between the multi-national force and civilian agencies.

The role of judge advocate officers was crucial and an important source of advice to commanders. Attorneys were offered a front row seat in the division main operations center and were essential in maintaining continuity and unity of effort in working with the civilian community. They played a key role in:

--Deciding whether members of civilian agencies, DA civilians, and local nationals working for IFOR could be armed, under what circumstances they could be armed, who would be authorized to punish offenders for crimes or misconduct involving weapons, and how to deal with other civilian crimes unrelated to weapons;
--Establishing a clear understanding of the status of contractor employees and the rules and regulations under which they must abide when working in a military environment; determining the status of contractors who might be an element of Status of Forces Agreements;

--Establishing ROE for each force, since different rules applied for Hungary and Bosnia;

--Advising the CG and staff on the General Framework Agreement for Peace and on IFOR policy;

--Establishing the legal authority to expel civilians who wrongfully settle in the zone of separation;

--Establishing IFOR responsibility for offering security to civilian agencies;

Other important issues included the legal basis for claims adjudication in Bosnia between military and civilian agencies, the legal basis for leasing Tuzla air base, and the role of the judge advocate participants in the Joint Military Commission (ensuring joint and interagency compatibility).

In evaluating the effectiveness of the coordination of military and civilian organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the operation participants noted the importance of coordinating with elements of the warring parties in order to carry out their assigned tasks successfully. In the experience of the Russian contingent, such coordination had to be differentiated for a number of different areas (coordination with the local police, coordination with the civilian administration of the sides).

Coordination with the local police was carried out as follows: in informing the sides as to their compliance with the Dayton Accords, clarifying and compelling (in the first stage) compliance with the essential points of the Accords, as well as conveying information from one side to the other based on their mutual consent; in resolving civilian conflicts jointly with the police of the sides as an intermediary and monitoring fulfillment of the Accords, particularly the requirements placed on the police formations of the sides. In addition, coordination was accomplished for the following: jointly provided security for mass events in the zone of separation (rallies, Serbian-Moslem meetings, exchange of detainees, etc.); settling various types of incidents that arose between the Serbs, Moslems and military service personnel of the brigade during the course of daily life (traffic accidents, petty theft, damage to crops, cutting down trees, etc.); helping the police support the negotiation process; conducting joint investigation of the facts involved in various types of extraordinary events (the blowing up of bridges, injuries caused by mines, illegal deals between brigade personnel and the local population, attempts by the local population to penetrate to outposts, etc.).

As a rule, coordination with the civilian administration of the FWFs was accomplished by informing the sides as to their compliance with the Dayton Accords in the areas of law,
economics, humanitarian aid and in providing assistance in administrative matters that facilitated achievement of the civilian aspects of the Accords.

In the final stage of the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the importance of developing clear laws on the relationships between military and civilian organizations will only grow as responsibility passes to civilian organizations.
CHAPTER THREE

PREPARING A PEACE OPERATION BY A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

Preparing Forces for Combined Action and the Experience Gained from Joint Exercises and Maneuvers. The Russian-American involvement in a peace operation as a part of a multi-national force (MNF) provided copious material for future consideration in preparing for such operations. This applies especially to the specific aspects of training troops of differing nationalities.

The organization and nature of troop training were determined by a number of factors. The key factors included: the scope and nature of the missions; the particular features of the conditions in the conflict zone; the size and composition of the forces and assets allocated to IFOR; and the need to organize joint actions. The views and principles of the various states regarding peace operations were an additional factor. The amount of hands-on training depended on the amount of time available for the training period. All the participating countries acted very responsibly in regard to the training of their IFOR contingents.

The training of the US military contingent prior to its deployment to Bosnia was marked by its thoroughness, redundancy and intensity. The training process began nearly three months prior to movement to theater and the projected crossing of the Sava. The training continued during deployment. This training involved gunnery, civil-military affairs, mine awareness, soldier skills, commander conferences, and several reconnaissance exercises (engineer, etc.). The list of the most significant train-ups included: on 21 September units participated in Iron Thunder (crew gunnery); 10-13 October, Iron Warrior (an internal CPX that developed Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and unit procedures to separate warring factions and develop IFOR doctrine); 14 October, a political-military exercise that was designed to sensitize the deploying leadership to the history, geography, and current conditions of the area; 15 October, a Deploeyx; 16-18 October, a CPX; 16 October-8 November, a CMTC (STX/FTX, Combat Maneuver Training Center); 25-27 October, a validation exercise; 3 and 4 November, CPX II; 1 November and 6 November, FCXs; and on 8-10 November Arcade Fusion (joint warfighter). At the end of this phase of the train-up, which was as exhausting and time consuming as any Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) in the past, the force was close to being mission ready. With the completion of this stage of the physically demanding and time-consuming preparation, most participants felt that the contingent was wholly prepared to execute the assigned tasks.

November 17, 1995, marked the beginning of the pre-deployment phase of the train-up. Much of the initial training was repeated, and additional commanders’ conferences and the following exercises were held: 26 November - 1 December, Chief of Staff reconnaissance; early December, Issue Iron Endeavor and Iron Endeavor Rockdrill (a certification program that included family support, rear detachments, and equipment readiness, among other issues); 3-6 December, Engineer and Logistics Reconnaissance; 3-7 December, Brigade Commander’s
Reconnaissance; 9-15 December, CPX III; and from 15-19 December, a final Brigade Commander’s Reconnaissance. This was followed by the deployment phase known as Iron Endeavor.

The exercises allowed the Implementation Force (IFOR) to adjust to the plan based on lessons learned during the train-up. They also allowed treaty implementation and work with the Russian force to proceed smoothly. Elements of the Russian force were brought into the planning process in Germany.

The training of the Russian peacekeeping contingent personnel for IFOR was conducted within the parent divisions of the Airborne Troops. The training was conducted in accordance with the operative rules and regulations, the Guidelines for RF Armed Forces Actions as UN Troops, and the training program for the peacekeeping units of the Airborne Troops. The training program called for teaching various approaches to mission accomplishment, starting with observing, serving at a regimental command post, patrolling and concluding with rendering humanitarian assistance and other actions. Special attention was devoted to unconventional actions in emergency situations and to coordinating with the military contingents of other countries. An important component in the training of the Russian peacekeeping forces was working on the professional-psychological selection of service personnel and on the manning/staffing of all the authorized units. Psychologists assisted in this area. These specialists gave careful consideration to psychological compatibility when forming squads and teams, avoiding assigning candidates who showed signs of moral-psychological instability. The following were practical components of this psychological work: methods of moral-psychological analysis, observation, study of data from student diaries [Russian school records containing, among other things, any negative teacher comments --Trans.] and letters addressed to the unit command, synthesizing independent profiles, as well as psychological testing and the socio-metric method of determining the level of a team’s group cohesion. Only personnel who had served at least six months were selected for the brigade.

Legal training for the Russian participants was strongly emphasized. This training consisted of legal briefings and consultations with international lawyers and members of the judge advocate branch [military procuracy]. In addition, legal requirements and normative-legal documents were clarified during special legal-awareness days, evening question-and-answer sessions and meetings with the top staff. All of this provided a good basis for assuring legal literacy on the part of Russian MNF service personnel. The training period was six weeks for the enlisted and non-commissioned officer ranks and eight weeks for officers.

Direct training of the Russian brigade for its tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina began on 1 December 1995. The following steps were taken over a one-month period: manning of the brigade was completed and weapons and equipment were provided; individual training and unit combat teamwork training were conducted; command-and-control and coordination teams were formed, as were task forces for overseeing the dispatch and receipt of personnel and cargo.
First, the combined arms training was completed. Next, a two-stage (Separate Airborne Brigade/Airborne Battalion) command post map exercise was conducted, including communications to direct units upon their arrival at the departure airfields and the loading stations, at the base-camp areas and during the execution of various peace-operation tasks. Simultaneously, during the period of 18-25 November, a commanders’ reconnaissance was conducted of the base-camp area and of the area for the impending brigade actions. During the reconnaissance, coordination was established with the command of the US 1st Armored Division and the military-political leadership of the warring parties.

Considering the need for coordinated actions by the contingents of various nationalities, great attention was devoted to conducting joint training events. Among the noteworthy events during the preparation period was the participation of Russian officers in the command post exercise conducted in the 1st Armored Division in Germany. Jointly analyzing, studying and coordinating helped clarify certain details of the joint tasks and better define the situation in the conflict zone in greater detail and in its many aspects. The practice of conducting such joint peacekeeping forces training was continued during the actual conduct of the operation. This training included joint firing exercises, seminars and trips for the exchange of ideas and experience, as well as clarification of lessons learned from the coordination and mission execution.

Nevertheless, according to operation participants, time and circumstances did not permit enough joint events. Therefore, in the future, as Major General William Nash, the Commander of the 1st Armored Division pointed out, “We must seek all opportunities for organizing and conducting joint training sessions and command post exercises…” Not only are the joint actions important, but so also is the joint preparation for them, “so that soldiers will see face to face the people on whom they will have to rely in a difficult moment…”

Joint troop training for peace operations is extremely desirable from a military and political point of view. This is particularly true for U.S. and Russian forces, which had engaged in only two peacekeeping FTXs (Totsk, Russia, in 1994 and Ft. Riley, Kansas, in 1995) prior to the Dayton Accords. While valuable, this experience was not sufficient for the task at hand in Bosnia-Herzegovina and could not replace more extensive and intensive training among the deploying forces. Such training, however, not only contributes to the effectiveness of the combined force but also encourages a united effort in the interests of international peace and security.

Military Means for Containing the Conflict. Correlation of Military and Non-Military (Political, Economic, Diplomatic and Informational) Measures in the Course of Containing the Conflict. In the opinion of the operation participants, one of the chief lessons the world community has learned from the peace operations of recent years is that troops must not only be present in the conflict zone, but that they must also act decisively and firmly in carrying out the peace-operation missions, using all the capabilities provided them by the

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operation mandate. This fact was once again confirmed during IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the use of a significant multi-national military contingent supported the implementation of the Dayton Accords and put an end to the military actions between the warring parties.

![MND(N) AREA OF INTEREST](image)

**Figure 1. The Three Divisions**

The military effort succeeded in containing the conflict through a mixture of NATO and non-NATO forces. The ratio or correlation of NATO to non-NATO forces was set initially at 80% to 20%, respectively. Participation was based on the level of training and familiarization with NATO procedures. This latter percentage will go up in all likelihood after the follow-on force mission is determined. The military means for containing the conflict were utilized in a “peace enforcement” mission agreed upon in Dayton. These means included infantry, engineer, military police, armored cavalry, armor, ground-based air-defense forces, special forces, aviation (transport, combat, helicopters), and some maritime forces from many NATO and non-NATO countries. The military means also included the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which controlled units and formations. The ARRC’s mission includes “Corps troops and up to four divisions under OPCON/OPCOM for military operations in support of SACEUR’s crisis management options.” Training for Bosnia-Herzegovina actually began with the Vance Owen Peace Plan, which NATO forces were expected to implement if it ever came to pass. This was followed by planning for the UN withdrawal/rescue mission at the end of the UNPROFOR mission, and finally by planning for the IFOR ground component. The latter included input into the campaign plan, identifying the mission, end state and centers of gravity for the ARRC, and from these were developed a series of decision points, time lines and an information plan for the operation.

The deployment proceeded after reconnaissance missions, site surveys, and the approval of a campaign plan; and after a thorough “information-based” depiction of the entire area of operations using Powerscene technology. Thus, the military means for containing the conflict ranged from the use of information operations to a show of force.
Military forces are a necessary but insufficient factor for the success of peace operations. Even with the passage of a significant amount of time, it is difficult to determine the exact correlation of military, diplomatic and other measures and to quantify their significance in resolving the Yugoslav conflict, since success is not always defined by quantitative indicators. To a large extent, success depends on intangible concepts, such as the desire to further the settlement process on the part of various non-governmental organizations and the OSCE, the willingness of the military contingent to use force if necessary, the legality of IFOR’s presence in the region, and impartiality vis-à-vis the warring parties, etc.

However, there is no doubt about the increasing role of the military in resolving conflict situations as part of the world community’s peace operations, as was clearly demonstrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was independent of an exact correlation of military and non-military measures at any particular stage of the peace process. Because of the circumstances, civilian organizations were not capable of carrying out their tasks in Bosnia without the presence of an international military contingent. This was due to a number of factors.

First, over the two years of their activity in Bosnia, the international organizations were unable to implement their own plans for stabilizing the situation in the region. To a certain degree they compromised themselves in the eyes of the warring parties.

Second, after completion of the military aspects of the peace accords, assigning tasks for stabilizing the situation to civilian bodies did not bring swift success. This is because the civilian organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked authority with the local population, had no ability to influence the course of the situation and were not capable of acting effectively. The efficiency of the international organizations is not helped by the lack of coordination in the civilian organizations or by the conflict region’s undeveloped infrastructure.

The third factor is one that must be thoroughly understood. A forcible approach to resolving a conflict situation in an individual country, so-called “peace enforcement,” contains and stops the growth of the area of tension. However, it does not eliminate the cause of the tension in the first place, nor does it resolve the contradiction itself. Hence, if there is a great deal of hidden conflict potential, entrusting the entire complex of tasks to non-military organizations will only provoke a new escalation of the conflict, unless there is a powerful instrument in the form of a peace-enforcement force. In transferring authority away from IFOR/SFOR, the world community would leave a great many unresolved problems in the region and would put the implementation of the civilian aspects of the accords in doubt.

These factors resulted in an expansion of IFOR tasks in the conflict zone. In addition to the tasks defined in Annex 1-A of the peace accords (the military means for containing the conflict were used in accordance with the task that came to be called “peacekeeping with elements of enforcement”), separate tasks of the civilian aspect were assigned to IFOR, such as providing for free elections, helping resolve the refugee problem, etc.
Regardless of the exact correlation of military to non-military measures or the specific phase of the peace process, civilian agencies have appeared impotent to act in the near term in Bosnia without a military presence. According to military officers interviewed, this was due to three factors: the civilian agencies in the area (OSCE, etc.) have been unable to implement their own stabilization plans after two years of work; the internal police forces are essentially toothless with no authority or weapons, and consequently no respect (it may be helpful to expand the mandate of the police so they can perform some local acts, such as fighting corruption, etc.); and the installation of municipal governments through elections is behind schedule and needs to be completed (less than 20% are in place at this time).

Operation participants have various assessments of this tendency to redistribute the tasks and expand the spectrum of issues to be resolved by using the IFOR. In one participant’s opinion, a peace force must be used in strict and exact accordance with a definite mandate (in accordance with the “prescribed tasks” in this strictly “literal interpretation”). Other operation participants feel that the IFOR tasks should be viewed more flexibly and that the involvement of the peace force in carrying out tasks of the civilian aspect of the accords does not contradict the IFOR mandate.

At present this problem is rather pressing. It seems that any complex multi-national operation requires measures involving an amalgam of actions, ranging from humanitarian aid to full-blown peace enforcement operations. A number of peace-operation specialists feel that such a “mixed situation...is the central problem that must be considered when developing rational mandates, in order to orient the multi-national force engaged in peace operations. The problem is most intense in situations in which a broad spectrum of UN-sanctioned actions is carried out in the same place at the same time.”

**Forms and Methods of Conducting a Multi-National Operation and Features of Using the Ground, Air and Maritime Components in a Multi-National Force.** With regard to the military aspects of peace operations as conducted by multi-national forces, specific approaches have gained prominence in organizing and carrying out the basic tasks involved in the employment of a peace-operation contingent. These approaches were developed during IFOR and determined the distinctiveness of the forms and methods of its conduct. The most characteristic feature of IFOR was the flexible combination of peacekeeping actions (without the use of heavy weapons) with the forcible actions of peace enforcement.

Analysis of the experience gained in organizing and planning the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina made it possible to clearly distinguish the forms and methods of conducting the IFOR operation. These methods can be defined as the basic forms and methods of using a military peace-operation contingent within the framework of the world community’s peace-operation efforts to settle low-intensity conflicts. These methods include:

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--Peace-enforcement actions to prevent or halt armed clashes between warring groups, to separate the warring parties and to intern the conflict participants;
--Actions to force the warring parties into peace, including the conduct of large-scale combined-arms operations, using standard weapons and equipment and traditional methods of armed combat, in order to disarm the armed groups, separatists and outlaw formations;
--Special operations involving the most diverse and non-traditional methods of using armed forces groupings to contain armed conflicts; the selection of one method over another will depend on the composition, equipment and capabilities of the opposing groupings, the nature and tactics of their actions, and the assigned task.

These actions fit fully into the three-level system of multi-national force peace actions (or operations) proposed by certain western specialists. Under this system, all possible actions by peace forces are divided according to the intensity of the military actions employed and the extent to which the peacekeeping force is utilized in resolving the conflict. To the first level belong purely observational missions, as well as peacekeeping operations without the use of enforcement measures. These latter measures must be capable of maintaining compliance with specific conditions of the peace agreement and not merely an on-site monitoring of the situation. To the second level belong: preventive deployment actions and actions to restore and maintain an acceptable level of peace and personal safety; operations to provide cover for the delivery of humanitarian cargo; operations to guarantee or prohibit movement in particular areas and along roads. The third level includes actions to impose and maintain sanctions, as well as high-intensity operations.

Based on the proposed classification and the level of involvement of the peace forces, IFOR should be classified as a high-intensity operation. Hence, the list of ways the peace contingent was used during the operation was rather long and included demonstration of power, blockades, armed presence and armed challenges. The latter included actions to demonstrate armed power without inflicting damage on the conflicting sides and actions involving the direct use of military force for a direct purpose. The IFOR operation involved all the types of operational actions characteristic for peace operations: military support of diplomatic efforts; monitoring the cease fire; humanitarian aid; supporting and restoring law and order; supporting implementation of sanctions.

The great majority of tasks carried out by the peace force during the IFOR operation, according to the responses of the participants, was related to shows of force, blockades and the armed presence of forces in conflict regions, which on the whole supported the achievement of the assigned goals.

To provide freedom and safety of movement in the conflict zone a system of observation points was created. Depending on the situation these points operated in three modes: observation, control and blocking. The difference lay in how freely various means of transport

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passed through a post. An observation post performed visual monitoring of boundary crossings and kept a record of the intensity of the movement. A control post monitored and selectively checked the most suspicious transport means and persons for the presence of weapons, ammunition and narcotics. A blocking post operated as a “closed barrier,” i.e., it did not allow transport vehicles or pedestrians to pass in any direction.

Patrolling in the area of responsibility was the most common use of the ground forces component of the peace-operation contingent. The goals of the patrolling included: investigating the areas beyond the limits of the control posts in the base areas; demonstrating the presence of IFOR troops in the area of responsibility; gathering essential information; and protecting freedom of movement. Patrol teams generally consisted of ten to fifteen men mounted on two armored combat vehicles.

In addition, much attention went into escorting various transports and representatives of international organizations in the lanes (or zones) of responsibility. The escorted representatives from the international organizations were helping resolve the conflict and were carrying out their peacekeeping functions. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations were planned and conducted in order to support accomplishment of assigned tasks and to provide for their own security.

On the whole, it should be said that the unique feature of the actions of the ground forces component of the IFOR contingent lay not in some exceptionally distinct forms or methods of using the ground forces units. Rather, it was that these forms and methods were used in the context of concentrating joint efforts for efficient accomplishment of assigned tasks by contingents of various national allegiance (joint patrolling, joint service at control posts, etc.).

US-Russian cooperation extended into the areas of air and ground logistics. The Americans and Russians used rail and air movement to deploy their forces in theater. The Russians had an air liaison officer at Vicenza, Italy, coordinating air movement, and Russian officers also coordinated rail movement with the Movement Control Center. The Russian Brigade relationship within the task force was somewhat different in that they brought most of their logistics with them -- to include a bakery. The IFOR provided water and medical evacuation support to the Russian Brigade and occasionally provided fuel.

The Russian Airborne Force was good and their commitment to teamwork was very impressive. The Russian-American relationship worked because both forces had a common strategic mission. They were professional and had a professional bond; both sides had studied the other for many years and respected each other. The Russian component within IFOR did not include tactical aircraft or a maritime component. Therefore, there was no shared air and naval experience. At the same time, the naval and air components played a capital role in defining the operational environment of IFOR.

For the first time in the history of UN peace operations to compel warring parties to comply with the requirements of a UN Security Council resolution, NATO introduced specially
formed aviation groups. During the operation, the air component of IFOR was used for the following tasks: conducting air reconnaissance to monitor compliance with the conditions of the accords and for combat support of IFOR; guarding (or isolating) air space (area of combat actions), including the use of fire power; air support of IFOR when the latter were conducting combat actions, including close air support and, if necessary, striking ground targets (command and control points, combat hardware, rear facilities, etc.); and suppressing the anti-air defense of the warring parties in the event of a direct threat of countermeasures against IFOR aviation.

In addition to combat missions, the IFOR aviation also performed auxiliary tasks, including assignments to deliver humanitarian aid, provide cover for humanitarian cargo transports, conduct search-and-rescue missions and evacuate military personnel and civilians.

Air reconnaissance was conducted around the clock by planes with long-range radar spotting aircraft [AWACS], tactical and carrier aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]. The “Predator” system was deployed in Albania. This consisted of UAVs that could patrol at 5000 meters for twenty-four hours, monitoring the situation in Bosnia.

In accordance with the UN Security Council decision, NATO forces achieved the isolation of the combat area during the UNPROFOR period of operations. Its goal was to prohibit flights by aircraft of the warring parties in the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina, including by using fire power against aerial objectives. No such cases were noted during IFOR. However, earlier, in February of 1994, four light Serbian ground-attack planes were shot down. They had conducted bombing strikes against a military factory in the city of Vitez.

In destroying air targets the aviation operated by sequentially bringing combat aircraft into the battle off their airborne duty status, then from airfields as well.

Striking air and land targets was not a typical activity for IFOR, because the deployment of the large IFOR ground force made it possible to neutralize the negative development of the conflict in its extreme manifestations. Hence, the possible methods for using aviation during the operation may be judged by the actions that preceded IFOR. Thus, in the summer of 1993, NATO aircraft were authorized to inflict strikes on ground objectives. During execution of the assigned mission, NATO aircraft struck the following ground targets: Serbian positions in the area of the Moslem enclave Gorazde (April 1994); basic and reserve runways of the Krajina Serbs at Udbina (21November 1994); positions of the radar posts and anti-aircraft missile sites of the Bosnian Serbs near Sarajevo (end of August 1995).

The primary methods of NATO aircraft actions in destroying ground objectives were the following: simultaneous and consecutive destruction of previously assigned and newly identified ground targets, either from duty status at an airfield or in the air in coordination with forward air controllers, or without such coordination; patrolling and destroying newly identified targets in the assigned area.
Naval units participating in IFOR supported the conduct of all stages of the peace
accords’ implementation plan. They provided “presence” and support in the maritime areas of
the operation, using their own combat capabilities if necessary. Within the framework of IFOR
the following tasks were assigned to the naval component: protecting naval communications,
including through deployment of mine-trawling forces; supporting the deployment of the main
IFOR forces in the conflict zone; conducting operations of naval strike forces in support of the
air and ground components of IFOR. During the operation, naval forces were permitted to attack
ships that displayed hostile intentions.

The following should be noted. In contrast to the ground forces component, the air and
sea components of IFOR were formed exclusively from NATO forces, which means that they
operated in accordance with NATO rules. In organizing and carrying out their tasks they were
guided by a common set of manuals and instructions. Hence, the entire inventory of the methods
and forms of their actions fit within the framework of NATO requirements. The actions of the
ground forces component were distinguished by the diverse approach of the national formations
to the execution of related tasks.

Hence, based on the results of the expert survey, the operation participants are especially
concerned with the problem of unifying the rules of engagement for peacekeeping forces, i.e.,
particularly questions relating to the use of armed force. At present, this problem is most
relevant for the ground forces. However, in forming the naval and air components on a multi-
national basis, including the involvement of non-NATO states, such problems will have to be
addressed in the context of the combat use of these forces as well. It is very important that these
rules be coordinated not only with the principles and instructions of the organization under
whose aegis the operation is conducted, but also in accord with the principles followed by each
country participating in the peace operation.

Experience in the Coordination of Russian-American Actions in the Course of the
Operation (Role of Liaison Officers and Coordination). Russian-American coordination
during IFOR covered a broad range of strategic, operational and tactical issues. Considering the
involvement of various international organizations and national structures in the IFOR operation,
US-Russian coordination was organized in the general context of the coordinated activity of the
world community to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Many of the forces committed to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR were from NATO
countries and were accustomed to operating under NATO command using NATO standard
agreements. Other nations had some exposure to NATO procedures from Partnership-for-Peace
activities. Due to political considerations, Russian forces were placed under General Joulwan
but not under NATO IFOR operational command through Admiral Smith and the ARRC.
Instead, General Joulwan exercised OPCON through his Deputy for Russian Forces, Colonel-
General Shevtsov. The Russian brigade deployed to Task Force Eagle and acted under the
tactical control (TACON) of Multi-National Division (North).
The strategic level coordination involved the efforts of the peacekeeping force and the executive structures of the UN Security Council, the leading elements of the warring parties (those with real influence on the situation), as well as the military agencies of the countries that provided a military contingent for the peacekeeping forces. Coordination at the operational level consisted of coordinating the efforts of the large, combined units of the ground, air and naval contingents of the peacekeeping force, operating under NATO’s auspices, according to the individual stages of the operation. At the tactical level, coordination of the following was established: command and control elements (staffs); large and small units of the multi-national and national contingents of the peacekeeping force; as well as the warring parties (at the appropriate level) for the execution of particular tasks of the peace operation.

Coordination of Multi-National Division (North) and the Separate Airborne Brigade of IFOR was accomplished on the basis of a bi-lateral agreement between the government of the RF and the leadership of NATO, the Russian statute covering the conduct of peacekeeping operations, the operations plan of the SACEUR for the implementation of the peace accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina (specifically, as it pertained to the Russian brigade), and the accord on the military aspects of the peace settlement. The procedure for Russian-American coordination was developed directly during the preparation and planning of the operation. Traditional approaches to national armed forces formed the basis of this procedure. As is accepted practice in all armies, coordination issues were worked out according to goals, tasks, regions (boundaries) of actions, stages of the operation and the time of completion of individual peacekeeping tasks. Special attention was paid to coordinating the procedure for decision making by the peace force commander (a member of the US Armed Forces) with the participation of the deputy commander (a member of the RF Armed Forces). Several options for actions were considered, and these fell into two schemes: a) when there was insufficient time to make the decision and organize coordination; b) in the normal situation given the necessary time.
When there was insufficient time for coordination, the procedure called for three possibilities: the commander briefed his deputy about his plan; the commander, based on the situation, led a discussion of the options; the commander immediately made a decision. In the normal situation, it was assumed that the deputy would take equal part in preparing the decision, and the draft of the decision is initialed by the deputy. Considering the prevalence of the political aspects in working out the procedure for the Russian-American coordination, special importance was attached to the mechanism for taking into account the opinion of the deputy, a member of the RF armed forces, in resolving possible contradictions. Taken as the basis for regulating the relations between the US/NATO and the RF representatives were principles that called for all draft decisions (documents) to be initialed by the deputy, with the deputy having the right to inform the higher command regarding any important disagreements. In turn, the commander was also obliged to inform his higher command about important disagreements. The final authority for resolving disagreements rested with the political body, in which a decision is made based on a consensus. At that point the commander is obliged to accept the coordinated decision within a strictly defined time period.

A formal interpretation of the coordination issues was made based on fundamental concepts of command and control adopted by the armed forces of the US and NATO. The terminological interpretation of the concepts differed significantly from the interpretation accepted in the Russian Federation armed forces.

Thus, the term “interoperability” was understood to be the capability of systems, units and armed forces to offer their services and use the services of other systems, units or armed forces, as well as use the exchange of services for the conduct of effective, joint military operations.

The term “control” was defined as the power exercised by the commander in leading certain types of activity of the units subordinate to him, as well as activity of other organizations not usually subordinate to him. This power concerns the responsibility for executing orders and directives.

“Administrative control” was defined as leadership or exercise of power over subordinates or other organizations in regard to resolving administrative issues, such as control of personnel, supply, providing various services, as well as carrying out certain tasks that are not part of the operational assignment of subordinate or other organizations. “Tactical control” was defined as detailed leadership or control of the movement or maneuvering of troops on a small scale in order to accomplish common or particular tasks assigned to them.17

On the basis of its own military experience, the Russian side perceived the meaning of these terms as ambiguous. This perceived ambiguity created premises for mutual misunderstanding of the authority and responsibility of the national and multi-national structures

17“Glossary of Terms,” United States Navy War College, Newport, R.I.
within the framework of joint actions. These had to be worked out on the ground on a practical basis.

The issue of organizing coordination at all levels of command and control was resolved at the initial stage of execution of each of the peace operation tasks. In the opinion of the operation participants, the best and most effective way to organize coordination was to establish personal contacts with representatives of the interacting organization and to work jointly to clarify the procedures for carrying out tasks.

During preparation for IFOR an organizational scheme was worked out and put in place that put this method into practice. Thus, to increase flexible and continuous coordination between the Russian brigade and the Multi-National Division (North), liaison teams were set up on their staffs. These teams were then responsible for everyday coordination at the operational and tactical levels. An RF Defense Ministry task force was set up under the Deputy SACEUR for Russian Forces in the IFOR Coordination Center. This team supported communications and liaison at all levels of control.  

For the period of force projection and deployment, a Russian liaison team was put in place on the staff of the 5th Combined Tactical Air Command to coordinate the activity and all issues involving support of the flights of the Russian Air Force’s military transport aircraft. Another team from the Russian Air Force was located at the base airfield in Tuzla to coordinate the arrival of Russian aircraft.

Task Force Eagle provided Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), Maneuver Control System (MCS) and Warlord Command and Control System to the Russian Brigade and other multinational brigades. This facilitated synchronization of forces. Nightly battle update briefs teleconferenced to Task Force Eagle Rear Command Post kept logistics current. Liaison officers were provided to each of the multi-national brigades. The liaison officer to the Russian Brigade spoke Russian. Liaison officers were also exchanged with ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 3rd (UK) Division and 6th (FR) Light Armored Division. The Former Warring Factions (FWFs) also provided liaison officers to Task Force Eagle. There were no Russian liaison officers to the adjacent US brigades. Instead, the Russian liaison officer worked at the Task Force Eagle Headquarters. Liaison officers need to be exchanged wherever two brigades join.

The following forms of joint work were widely employed in organizing coordination: clarification of the governing documents of higher headquarters and of the basic principles and requirements in their national interpretation; conducting joint reconnaissance and CPXs during which the main problems of coordination, deployment and support were resolved; conducting joint meetings, commissions, information classes, discussions, press conferences; holding working meetings of the heads of the branches of arms and services and conferences on the most difficult and responsible tasks (such as special international conferences during which intelligence tasks were clarified for the upcoming period and controversial issues were discussed), etc. The following were jointly determined and coordinated: the issues involved in the reception of military-transport aircraft; the procedures for unloading personnel, weapons
hardware, and materiel; entry routes; placement of command and control points; and the procedures for execution of individual tasks.

In the course of everyday work a tactical coordination mechanism was worked out, the success of which has been especially noted by the Multi-National Division (North) command. This primarily involved fire support and the care and evacuation of the sick and wounded.

Especially significant in the coordination was the resolution of issues to harmonize the military planning mechanisms of two military systems previously divided by a wall of mistrust and confrontation. At the operational and tactical level, a cycle of jobs was conducted to accomplish the following: to coordinate the procedures and methods for writing and presenting documents, reports and urgent information; to define the procedure for sending requests up the chain on various issues in the execution of peacekeeping tasks; coordinate briefing issues, etc. Pursuant to the coordinated procedure, the commander of the Separate Airborne Brigade was supposed to provide daily information to the commander of the Multi-National Division (North) on the operational and particular situation in the area of responsibility, the measures taken during the past twenty-four hours, and those planned for the next forty-eight hours. At the same time it was assumed that the Separate Airborne Brigade staff was supposed to receive daily information on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the situation specifically in the zone of the MND’s responsibility. Correspondingly, the heads of the branches of arms and services were supposed to receive information on their services from division staff officers.

On the whole, the system of Russian-American coordination implemented in IFOR made it possible to accomplish the Russian and American peace-enforcement tasks. During implementation of the accords, the established principles and mechanisms of coordination were continually improved, and new opportunities were sought for close, joint activity.
CHAPTER FOUR

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

Assessing the Effectiveness of a Multi-National Force’s Actions and the Consequence of its Use. IFOR’s successes and SFOR’s subsequent contributions have been aided by the fact that neither IFOR nor SFOR had to face open military opposition to the execution of its tasks. This was testament to its inherent capacity to engage in coercion and its ability to sustain its legitimacy vis-à-vis all the former warring parties (FWP). At the same time, there was far greater progress towards the achievement of the military tasks than in the civil-political tasks arising out of the Dayton Accords. One consequence of this situation is that the peace operation has not being unduly stressed or military cooperation tested under extreme conditions. This lack of stress has probably left undisclosed flaws and shortcomings in military cooperation. IFOR and SFOR cannot by themselves solve the Bosnian problem, rather military forces can create the conditions for the implementation of political and economic solutions. The solution to the Balkans’ problems rests with the commitment of the international community, the civilian organizations, and the peoples of the region itself.

An analysis of the execution of IFOR’s operational tasks leads to the conclusion that the goals as a whole were achieved. The military portion of the issues defined in the Dayton Accords were carried out. The primary IFOR outcome that characterizes the results of the multi-national force’s actions was the halting of the four-year civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Three of the operation’s five stages have been successfully concluded: the armed forces of the warring parties have been separated by the distance defined in the accords and completely removed from a two-kilometer zone that abuts the line of separation; and heavy combat equipment and weapons have been removed from a ten-kilometer zone. These weapons and hardware were then concentrated deep in the rear of the territory in bases, dumps, and arsenals that are controlled and inspected. The military measures that have been taken have deprived the warring parties of their offensive potential and brought their military activity under control.

The basic goal of the fourth stage has been achieved. In addition to the military tasks, IFOR brought about the conditions for holding general elections and preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial integrity as a single state consisting of three ethnic groups and two national communities. IFOR made it possible to set about restoring the national economy and return to the normal activities of daily life. This process has continued under SFOR. (The national elections were successfully held in 1996).

In the opinion of operation’s participants, air power was the most effective IFOR component for restraining the warring parties from the temptation to renew their combat actions. This included the fixed-wing and rotary aircraft that proved so effective in neutralizing the development of the conflict. The highly maneuverable, well-armed, well-prepared ground forces were an additional factor in the success.
In the initial stage of the operation the high level of effectiveness of the following was noted: the armored units, the self-propelled howitzer units, the infantry fighting vehicles and the armored personnel carriers, accompanied by the flights of attack helicopters with highly effective strike power. Their use for shows of force and the decisiveness of the peace-operation force played a defining role in sustaining the cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina and assisting in the execution of operational tasks.

As noted above, the military aspects of the accords were successfully executed. However, this still did not make it possible to get the parties to agree to implement the political conditions of the accords and form new mechanisms for cooperation between the ethnic communities in the republic. If this had happened, it would then have been possible in an orderly manner to transfer the basic conflict settlement authority from IFOR to civilian organizations and to withdraw personnel, weapons and military hardware from the conflict zone, as called for in the operations plan. Instead, when IFOR completed its mandate in late 1996, SFOR with a significantly reduced force deployed and assumed the task of sustaining military stability up to the present.

Analysis of reports, documents, and intelligence information shows that the situation that developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the IFOR operation still did not preclude the possibility of a new armed confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was not possible to resolve the problem of freeing POWs and interned persons within the time lines set forth by the accords. It was also not possible to obtain exhaustive information from the warring parties about mine fields in the zone of separation or in areas subject to exchange or transfer to the control of a different ethnic group. Nor was it possible to carry out the accords concerning the detention and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

These tasks were not resolved for both external and internal reasons not directly related to IFOR activity but that had a significant impact on its use. The operation’s military success was essentially a transitional one with no guarantee that the goal of a final peaceful settlement would be achieved. To some degree the peacekeeping forces were hostage to the political situation in the region. Several factors combined to make the political situation particularly difficult. They included:

--The diverse national orientation of the former warring parties and the preservation of the nationally oriented parties’ decisive influence in their political life;

--Attempts by the Bosnian Moslems to achieve a dominant position in the framework of a single Bosnian state, which spurred active countermeasures on the part of the Serbian and Croatian populace;

--The ongoing religious-ethnic confrontation, the instability of the political settlement process, the divergent views of the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic (sometimes diametrically opposed) as to the essence of certain problems of civilian settlement (particularly the problems of refugees and alleged war criminals), and the resistance of local officials to the refugee-return process;
--The initial, disproportionate approach of international organizations in providing economic, political, and information assistance to the former warring parties, especially to the detriment of the Serbian Republic, which increased distrust toward the activities of international organizations;

--The marked criminalization of Bosnian society, the increase in criminal activity and the use of terrorist methods in political activity.\(^\text{18}\)

As the actions of the peace force have shown, due to the small number of personnel and the inadequate equipment level of the international organizations involved in the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR performed tasks that went far beyond the military functions assigned to it. The peace force made an especially significant contribution to the arranging and holding of general national elections (which were basically the responsibility of the OSCE) and in assisting the UN’s International Police (IPTF) in stabilizing the situation in the crisis areas. An analysis of the situation reveals that to this day the relative stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina is due to the presence of the multi-national force. If that force is withdrawn, a new flare-up of combat actions cannot be ruled out. Indeed, in October 1997 a national television pole of viewers of all ethnic identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed overwhelming approval (18,100 vs. 450) for the continued presence of peace forces and approval for the idea of the international community imposing solutions in disputes among the three sides if they could not resolve them on their own.\(^\text{19}\) Only their active assistance in the region can assure the effectiveness of the measures carried out by the UN, the OSCE and other international peacekeeping organizations.

The Implementation Force with its combat and numerical composition and with the significant authority vested in it concerning the Rules of Engagement has become the guarantor for the execution of the Dayton Accords. The successful Russian-American coordination has played a special role in this. The results and significance of this coordination are confirmed by all operation participants.

**Assessing the Results of Russian-American Coordination During the Operation.**

**General Achievements in the Conduct of Peace Operations.** Russian-American cooperation during the preparation for and conduct of the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has received high marks from officials of the highest levels of military leadership in the Russian Federation, the United States, and from foreign military specialists. “In Bosnia-Herzegovina the

\(^{18}\) The Russian researchers for this report stressed several other factors involving bias of the international community towards the Serbian Republic: open, inappropriate interference in the internal affairs of the Bosnian Republic (mostly the Serbian Republic); and he favoritism seen in IFOR policy and in certain actions of the world community vis-à-vis the former warring parties. The American researchers, on the other hand, concluded that IFOR had consistently practiced impartiality toward all ethnic groups and sustained the legitimacy of its mandate.

Russian and American military demonstrated a high degree of responsibility in executing the tasks before them. Ultimately, this fact was evident in the successful achievement of their assigned goals.\(^{20}\)

When one considers the legacy of mutual hostility and suspicion left over from over four decades of Cold War, it is truly phenomenal the degree to which these mental and professional barriers could be breached so quickly and effectively. There were a number of reasons for this success, but one of the most important was the willingness of both Russian and American political and military leaders to trust each other. This political aspect arose from the very fact that for the first time in the post-war period, Russian and American combat units had an opportunity to resolve assigned tasks jointly in close coordination and under a unified command. On the whole the objective data confirm the high degree of effectiveness of the joint Russian-American actions during the course of the operation.

One key element of IFOR’s success was the military-to-military relationship that was forged. The principle design of the command-and-control mechanism for Russia’s peacekeeping forces is based on the coordinated Principle on the Obligations of the Deputy Supreme Commander for Russian forces. Sensitive to the Russian concern that Russian forces not fall under the tutelage of NATO, a special command relationship placed the Russian brigade under tactical control of an American division (1AD), while operational control remained within the Russian chain of command. This design supported the basic principle of unity of command for the armed forces of NATO and Russia, and it could be adopted as the basis for organizing command and control in future peace operations. The unprecedented process of military consultations between the SACEUR and the Russian delegation at SHAPE strengthened mutual understanding and created a unified approach to the conduct of peace operations at the strategic level.

The warm professional relationship which developed between General Joulwan and General-Colonel Shevtsov established this professional degree of trust. Both stressed the concept of “One Force, One Mission.” As General Nash commented during his interview, the senior political and military leadership were adamant that this relationship should develop and prosper. Once it was clear that all were committed to the success of the Russia-American military cooperation in Bosnia, lower level military leaders understood that they had to make it work.

As mentioned above, even before the Dayton Accords were initialed, the US and Russia had completed much of the preparatory work in developing a common understanding of military operations. This took place during the peacekeeping exercises at Totsk and Fort Riley. This point cannot be over-emphasized. Despite whatever goodwill may exist between nations, there can be no vibrant military cooperation until the mechanics of interoperability are developed and tested. The meetings, discussions, and exercises between US and Russian militaries prior to the

\(^{20}\)Steve Covington, Briefing, Mons, Belgium, 13 December 1997.
IFOR being deployed were absolutely critical to its success. Without the prior development of this language and understanding such cooperation would have been impossible.

As both Russian and US units were deployed into the theater it soon became clear that professional soldiers (even ones who had spent much of their military careers viewing the other as a potential enemy) could effectively cooperate in working toward a common goal. As mentioned by one of the political advisors to the SACEUR, in nearly two years of working within the exacting theater of IFOR/SFOR operations, there has not been one unsolved problem between US and Russian forces. Nor has the relationship been static. Both US and Russian military leaders have been insistent upon developing, planning and carrying out a robust series of combined training exercises within the Bosnian area of operations. US soldiers have provided fire support for Russian platoons, while Russian units have served as a covering force for US infantry.

Prior to the deployment of IFOR, there was some concern that Russian units might be drawn toward protecting their traditional Serbian allies. Measures were therefore taken to sustain the impartiality of the Russian contingent. While one of the Russian battalions would be located on Serb territory, the other would be positioned in the Muslim region. This method was used for other multi-national contingents as well. The Russian contingent demonstrated its impartiality in practice.

In the course of the operation, understanding and trust increased at all levels of military leadership and among the soldiers who were carrying out their difficult duties shoulder to shoulder. This mutual trust is a natural result of partnership in carrying out the common mission of establishing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian peacekeeping contingent gained practical experience in participating in a multi-national-force operation. This experience now needs to be thoroughly studied for improvement and future application.

The roles which liaison officers played is still another key factor in assessing the success of the American-Russian military cooperation. These officers served as the communication conduit between the two forces. As relationships developed at the personal level, these officers developed a keen understanding as to how each side operated. At the same time, the participants stressed that liaison arrangements are not a substitute for close relations among the commanders themselves.

The organization of the coordination between the Russian and American contingents at various levels contributed to the execution of the assigned IFOR tasks. The current study was conducted based on the opinions of direct participants in the operations of the multi-national force. This made it possible to identify a number of points in the coordination between Russia and the USA/NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina that could provide lessons for organizing future peace operations.

The primary lesson learned from the Russian-American coordination was that if there is political will, Russia and the US can participate jointly as a part of a multi-national force to settle
conflicts that endanger peace and stability. This applies to the conduct of peace operations within the framework of NATO structures, as well as within the framework of other regional security structures.

The effective actions of IFOR proved that NATO and Russia can conduct joint peace operations, including operations with elements of peace enforcement. The troops of NATO and Russia conducted a number of integrated operations to resolve military aspects of the accords. In the course of these operations mutual trust developed and increased. In the overall opinion of the operation participants, the partnership of NATO and Russia in Bosnia symbolized the obligation that the world community had taken upon itself to end the war in there. It was also a signal to the warring parties as to the impartiality of IFOR in fulfilling the military principles of the Dayton Accords. It is particularly important that despite a certain competitiveness in pursuing national interests in the region, the priority of peace determined a high level of coordination and cooperation.

However, it must also be noted that there were both positive and negative aspects in implementing coordination within the multi-level command-and-control system of the MNF in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Coordination proved most effective at the strategic and tactical level. It was less effective at the operational level. The command-and-control system used did not always provide the fullest possible flexibility and efficiency of command. Therefore, in the opinion of the operation participants, individual elements of this design must be optimized to emphasize the following: the unique features of multi-national cooperation; the scope and complexity of the MNF missions; the quantity of information and operations documents developed and used for troop command and control and for troop coordination.

An important condition for the operation’s success was that the UN Security Council had sanctioned its conduct. Further, the groundwork and final decision were in the hands of one person, the MNF commander, under whose leadership an optimal plan was developed for the MNF in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The command-and-control elements of the Russian military contingent participated and gained experience in the planning and conduct of the largest MNF operation in Europe since WW II. For the first time in the experience of Russian and US/NATO military activity, elements of the following were conducted: the joint planning of a peace operation, the planning of the deployment of a multi-national force and its movement and deployment by air, sea and land. At the same time, the decision-making procedures and the planning process need improvement. The improvement should take into account the role of Russia and other countries in the peace process, as well as the unique features of the staff culture and military practices of the states participating in the operation.

One of the lessons from the Russian-American coordination reflected during the operation was the improvement in the organizational structure and manning of the Russian brigade. This manning was tailored to reflect completion of various aspects of the peace accords and took into account the specifics of the region and the unique features of operating and coordinating with the armed forces of various countries.
The organizational structure worked out for the peace force was developed in accordance with the specifics of the peace tasks and the unique features of the combat use of the peacekeeping force. Analysis of the operation shows that for the future this organizational structure will be more flexible and more adaptable to real-world situations. This experience is unique and should be studied more fully and in greater detail.

In the course of conducting joint operations, Russian and US troops broadened the spectrum of military cooperation, including joint combined-arms training. They identified unified procedures and standards, thus improving their performance. They also increased tactical-level liaison. These achievements open up new possibilities in the development of partnership, while providing common security. The results of the operation coordination brought an understanding of the need to develop and test a unified program of operational (or combat) training of peace-operation contingents. This training would involve various nations with various military-technical equipment and command-and-control systems.

Successful completion of tasks in a peace operation is not possible without the collection and analysis of intelligence data. For the first time since World War II, Russian and American military personnel jointly collected, exchanged, and processed intelligence information in their zone of responsibility. Coordination at this level was sufficiently developed and highly successful. The mutual sharing of information and experience at Russian-American intelligence conferences was useful. During these conferences controversial issues were discussed, and the situation in MNF’s zone of responsibility was presented. Efficiency was achieved in MNF intelligence thanks to clear, precise briefing requirements and reporting document standards, as well as the mutual use of the intelligence capabilities of units of various nationalities.

In addition to these positive examples, it should also be mentioned that some coordination issues involving the gathering and exchange of intelligence on the area of the operation were not always resolved effectively and did not always correspond to the reality of a given situation.

To a great extent, the results of the joint actions were driven by an increased focus of the American and Russian command on coordinating units of various branches and specialties at the tactical level. The jointly developed training of Russian artillery units provides a positive example. Joint integrated exercises were conducted using a battery of M109 A2 howitzers from the US 1st Armored Division. The Russian brigade was given the coordinates of the American positions and radar sites, which could be used by the Russian brigade for its own benefit.

Joint mine-locating and clearing activities offer another positive example. More than 14,000 mine fields were located and marked by the treaty implementation forces during the operation. Work to clear these fields was also begun. This work will not be finished in a year. Experts estimate that about 3.6 million mines and unexploded pieces of ammunition remain to be disarmed. There are 1,000 mine fields in the Russian zone alone.
In future peace operations greater attention must be devoted to the problem of mines. Only clear and coordinated joint work, as well as continuous experience sharing, can assure the execution of this large and complex job.

An important lesson gained from US and Russian coordination in IFOR was the need for specially trained personnel in regions where the warring parties might utilize toxic substances. Chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) defense units were represented in the Multi-National Division (North) by a CBR defense company in the division and a CBR defense platoon in each brigade. Working contacts were set up between the Russian and American CBR defense services, and continuous coordination was maintained. This coordination included periodic environmental checks at the permanent base camps of the brigade and smaller units.

A comparative analysis of the functioning of the rear-services support for Russia and the US in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that substantial work is required in respect to support services for the Russian contingent. Improving the infrastructure became an important aspect of rear-services activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This infrastructure included the air and sea bases, roads and railroads, etc., that were designated for use by the forces implementing the accords.

Joint experience in resolving the tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated the importance of establishing coordination with civilian authorities. The Russian and American units exercised regular coordination with police formations in their zone of responsibility and with civilian administrative structures via liaison officers.

For the first time in the history of the resolution of the Balkan wars, a group of representatives of the 1st Brigade of the USA (zone of responsibility -- the Brchko area), and the Russian brigade conducted regular talks with the Tuzla chief of police on all matters requiring coordination and decision making on the part of the local Moslem administration. On the whole, the assigned tasks were accomplished through joint efforts thanks to the successful coordination of units within the MNF and between the MNF and representatives of the leadership of the warring sides. There was a common strategic commitment of the sides to the performance of their duties.

An analysis of the elections held in Bosnia-Herzegovina under IFOR and SFOR, as well as a general assessment of the military-political situation, offers proof that the armed forces can and must be intensively utilized in support of civilian aspects of the accords. However, it appears that police functions should not be assigned to the armed forces.

An assessment of the coordination lessons during the operation, as well as the results of the operation, would be incomplete without a word about the objectivity of the evaluation data presented. It should be admitted that a totally objective evaluation of the operation is difficult at present, since there is no single methodological approach, and because various approaches to a system of specific criteria and indicators are being employed. Analysis of the experience of conducting the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the UN and under NATO demonstrates the acute need to develop the basis and principles for assessing the
effectiveness of using an armed force for peace operations (including the degree to which the results achieved conform to the mandate, the expenses involved, etc.). Thus, it is extremely important to study and coordinate the methodologies for assessing the military, political, economic, and social results of operations involving the use of a multi-national armed force in conflict regions. The effectiveness of decisions to improve peace operations will directly depend on the availability of such a coordinated scientific-methodological basis.

To this end, various forms could be used. This would include organizing regular joint studies and the publication of combined military-theoretical works on conflict resolution and on the building and use of a multi-national force.

The joint actions of the multi-national and the Russian-American coordination during IFOR provided many lessons for organizing future peace operations. These lessons also have important significance for the future cooperation of all countries of the world in peace operations. Neither the Russian nor the American participants in the operation doubt the importance of the joint actions and coordination. However, no matter how obvious this is, the prospects for the development of cooperation between Russia and the USA/NATO in joint actions to settle modern armed conflicts will depend to a great degree on the resolution of the problems, including the problems of Russian peacekeeping, that became evident during the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Problems Relating to Russian Peacekeeping Identified During the Preparation for and Conduct of the IFOR Operation and Possible Solutions. These problems can be divided into three basic groups, according to their particular features and the sphere in which they appeared. These are primarily military-political problems that are especially urgent, the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the first coordination of NATO and non-NATO states. The military-political problems of peace operations doubtless have significance for future peace operations. However, effective coordination of a multi-national force is impossible without considering the strategic and operational-tactical problems caused at the present time by national differences in the military sphere.

The most important gap in today’s peace operations, as identified during IFOR, is inadequately developed common normative/legal documents on organizing and conducting peace operations (particularly peace-enforcement operations) using a multi-national force. In some spheres and areas there is a total lack of common documents. This situation makes it difficult to implement fully all the capabilities present in existing collective mechanisms. In the case of Europe, the lack of a developed legal basis does not allow the OSCE to adopt a peace operation role as the basis for the effective European security model. This gap, in the opinion of the Russian researchers gives rise to “definite antagonism” toward OSCE leadership of peace operations among the NATO countries and other countries of the region.

The Russian national leadership views the OSCE as an organization that represents the interests of all European states. Hence, it best meets the requirements for modern peace operations. In order for the OSCE to fulfill its role as a “regional peacekeeper,” its peace
operations potential should be institutionalized. The first stage in this process is to develop a
detailed world view for multi-national force cooperation in European peacekeeping. A number
of international legal documents should provide the basic premises of this world view. Such
documents could include OSCE concepts and manuals, for example, a “Concept for the OSCE’s
Peacekeeping Activity” or “Manual for Halting (or Preventing) Conflicts in the Region.”

Joint drafts of these documents could be developed at the level of the Atlantic bodies of a
Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council (JPC) with subsequent discussion and expert panels at
OSCE sessions. The adoption of conceptual peace operation documents at the regional level will
represent a big step forward in building a European security system and will provide an adequate
normative-legal basis for future peace operations conducted by a multi-national force in Europe.
The next step should be for all European countries to adopt their own laws in accordance with
the norms adopted by the OSCE. For Russia, this step would mean the development of its own
RF Peacekeeping Concept that in its primary principles would conform to the requirements of
international law and would also take into account the particular features of Russian approaches.

Strengthening the OSCE’s role in international peace operations would undoubtedly
bring about a transformation and limitation of NATO functions in this area. In the Russian
authors’ opinion, this process is constructive and would benefit all the peoples of Europe.

The next problem that became evident during the MNF operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
was the development of common approaches to the use of force in peace operations. Many
issues related to the use of an armed force having no underpinnings in international law.
Currently, the coalition participants must conclude special accords or rely on their own national
legislation for rules of engagement. The situation as it exists leads to significant ambiguities in
coordinating the combat use of forces. Thus, for example, Russian and US rules of engagement
varied, the Russians being more restrictive on the use of force.

This situation is the result of Russian national legislation. In particular, Article 2 of the
Personnel for Participation in Peacekeeping and the Restoration of Peace and Security,” states:
“The current Federal Law understands peacekeeping activity or activity to restore international
peace and security with the participation of the Russian Federation to be peacekeeping
operations or other measures undertaken by the United Nations Security Council pursuant to the
UN Charter, by regional bodies or within the framework of regional bodies or accords of the
Russian Federation, or on the bases of bilateral or multi-lateral international treaties of the RF,
do not constitute forcible actions as defined in the UN Charter.” Based on the foregoing,
during the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Russian service personnel did not have the right to
take forcible actions, including using force or weapons. This ran counter to the Operational
Directive of the SACEUR, which the Russian contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina is obliged to
follow. This ambiguity caused discord among the interacting units of the multi-national force
and had a negative impact on the results of carrying out various tasks.
In future peace operations, in addition to common rules of engagement, adherence to the principle of impartiality toward the ethnic communities of the warring factions will be extremely important. Though nobody disputes this principle, experience shows that this basic peacekeeping principle demands continuous practical efforts to sustain it. An analysis of the MNF operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that the policy of the NATO countries, Russia and other nations of the world community toward the former warring factions was not always completely balanced and therefore at times had a destabilizing effect on the situation.

A perceived “double standard” toward the warring parties can cause distrust regarding the intentions of the national military contingents in different ethnic areas. The operation participants feel that this problem could be resolved by introducing clear legal guarantees implemented in the peace force’s mandates, which would prevent conflicting interpretations and the possibility of interpreting the guarantees in favor of one side or the other.

An analysis of the implementation plan of the Dayton Accords revealed that, during the planning of a peace operation, a more detailed and coordinated development of the military and civilian aspects of the peace action is needed.

In planning the military component of the operation the forces should aim not only at halting the armed clashes but also at creating the prerequisites for eliminating internal sources of conflict. Achieving the temporary stabilization that is the focus during the operation planning phase is a temporary solution and, because of its temporary nature, is probably not worth the cost in human and material resources devoted to the operation. The process of establishing peace must be planned and calculated in such a way that the transition away from power-based peacekeeping would mean the beginning of an irreversible process of normalizing life in the conflict zone.

The selection of the means and methods of peace activity is driven by the availability and effectiveness of the permanent monitoring of the political situation in the region. The lack of a common system for monitoring the military-political situation in a region often makes the timely prevention of local conflicts impossible and renders ineffective the preventive measures of the countries of the world community. It also has a negative impact on the effectiveness of using peace forces.

The IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is illustrative of the foregoing. The execution of the military portion of the operation stayed within the planned time lines and went well, while political, socio-economic, and administrative processes did not produce immediate guarantees for the peaceful development of the situation in the region. This situation made the status of the MNF ambiguous; it necessitated the continuous renewal of the force’s mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina; it increased the expenditure of the material and financial resources set aside for the operation; and it caused losses among peace operation personnel. There was an ambiguous (according to time lines and the forces and assets employed) interlinking of the military and civilian aspects in the implementation of the peace accords. As a result, after the MNF had carried out its tasks, it was forced to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina for an indefinite
period to assure the implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation. To assess the extent to which tasks have been completed at each stage of the peace operation, it is advisable to work out a system of indicators for measuring the degree of achievement of the intermediate goals of the peace action. Definitiveness in evaluating the effectiveness of the peacekeeping force’s actions allows a well-founded correlation of the military and civilian stages of the peace operation by timelines and by the degree to which the military and civilian organizations are involved.

No less important in the planning process is the issue of defining the circle of participants brought in to develop the plan of the operation. The Russian authors believe that this should be the only body that would be made up of all the countries participating in the peace operation with all members on an equal footing. Which country will participate in the operation and to what degree (what forces and assets it is providing for realization of the operation’s military and civilian aspects) should be considered. In addition, the staff officers who plan the military component of the peace operation should be included in developing the civilian aspects of a peaceful settlement. Only in this way can the continuity of the plan’s military and civilian components be assured.

Because of the circumstances, the general planning for the IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was done at NATO headquarters, with virtually no participation by representatives of the Russian Armed Forces. Colonel-General Shevtsov, the Deputy SACEUR for the Russian Contingent, upon his arrival at SHAPE, was included in the operation planning’s final stage. Indeed, it was during the final stage of planning that General Joulwan worked out with Minister of Defense Grachev the special status of the Russian contingent. The OPCON arrangement defined the command and control arrangement between SACEUR and the Russian contingent. The form of coordination with NATO forces at the tactical level was also a product of the Joulwan-Shevtsov-Perry-Grachev conversations of 8 November 1995.
The intent was to retain unity of command and to sustain the concept of “one team, one mission.” In his solution to the deployment of the Russian brigade within Task Force Eagle, General Joulwan developed his “nyet/da” diagram of 10 November 1995, which stressed the need for deployments reflecting impartiality and unity of effort on the ground.
Indeed, during a visit with General Grachev in Moscow where Colonel-General Shevtsov was present as a member of the Russian delegation, Joulwan immediately pointed out the anomaly of the situation. Here was his deputy sitting on the other side of the table.

In order to ensure the functioning of this unique operational and tactical control arrangement, General Joulwan stressed the need to build a close working relationship between the Commander of the 1st US Armored Division, Major General William Nash, and the Russian brigade commander, Colonel A. Lentsov. In the process of executing the mission, certain problems appeared in the command and control of the Russian contingent. These problems were due to the breach in the composition of the unified command control at the operational level (Russia was not represented on the Multi-National Force Staff in Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as to the ambiguous definition of the chain of command of the Russian brigade that is part of the multi-national division at the tactical control [TACON] level. These difficulties were overcome thanks to the persistent efforts by General Nash and his staff and by Colonel Lentsov and his staff to make TACON work in practice.

One of the key pieces of guidance that General Joulwan provided his commanders in conceptualizing the command and control arrangement for the operation was to move from the formal hierarchy of strategic, operational, tactical to a set of three concentric circles with tactical control at the center, encircled by the operational level, which was in its turn encircled by the strategic. Outside the three concentric circles was the overall political environment surrounding the operation, defining the mission, affecting popular support, and confirming the legitimacy of the mission. This model reflected the international context surrounding NATO conducting multi-national peace operations.

In order to avert this problem in future peace operations, an in-depth and complete examination is needed. Issues of Russian participation in the MNF operation were defined in the SACEUR operation plan. In accordance with the established procedure, the Russian brigade’s tasks were to be executed within the framework of the established plan. The military-political tasks were to be carried out upon coordination of the appropriate parameters with the Deputy SACEUR for the Russian Contingent. This approach left open the question open for discussion as to whether a significant number of the orders were narrow tactical issues or military-political issues. Thus, during the period when the internal political crisis in the Serb Republic (SR) was worsening, the Russians perceived that a significant number of the orders to assure the stabilization force’s control over the facilities of the SR state infrastructure crossed over into the category of military-political tasks. Under the resulting conditions, the Russian contingent often ended up unable to react efficiently to the orders as they came in. This in turn provided grounds for friction between the command of the Russian brigade and higher headquarters.

This problem cannot be disregarded by the military-political leadership. Tactical misunderstandings in the face of differing national interests can lead to serious political consequences. One of the routes for solving this problem for Russia is the active participation of members of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces in the planning structures of NATO at all
stages of preparation and direct planning of peace operations in potentially dangerous areas of the region. As a preliminary step, the potential could be tapped for joint participation of Russian representatives in Partnership for Peace (PfP) command post exercises. In these exercises, one issue to be worked could be creating and pulling together a mobile RF/NATO staff team for emergency deployment to conflict regions. During these command post exercises the primary efforts should focus not only on issues of coordinating staff organizations but also on coming up with practical recommendations on the use of military force and on the basic premises for assessing the effectiveness of its use.

Among the issues involved in improving coordination are the various concepts, terminology and staff procedures adopted in the armed forces of the different countries. Differences in the approaches to planning currently exist in NATO and in the RF Armed Forces that complicate coordination at the level of the national staffs and troops. This problem requires a thorough approach. Writing a dictionary of military and political terms, as was done by the SACEUR language-services staff, was only a first step. Work is needed on a clear coordination of common interpretations of the leading operational concepts and definitions of various military terms in the practice of the national staffs. Both the strategic and the operational level require jointly developed standards and procedures for writing staff documents.

Each contingent in the MNF is prepared for the peace operation in accordance with the national military culture, traditions, and general principles of the directives and manuals of the armed forces of its country of origin. The laws of various countries call for various methods, means, and procedures for the use of armed forces units in the execution of their assigned tasks. The difference in the requirements placed on the preparation of personnel, weapons and military hardware significantly affects unit capability and drives the estimated time frames for mission execution by the national contingents and the estimated degree of completion. This is due to some of the difficulties in managing the national units, large and small, in the multi-national force.

In the structure of the MNF mono-national units were provided both as brigades and platoons. Therefore, the problem of the command and control of mono-national units in the MNF structure manifests itself variously, depending on the level of the interacting structure. In some cases coordination is required both for operational and tactical questions. In other cases coordination is only necessary at the tactical level and for the actions of individual groups of service personnel. Common to both cases is the need to work out common standards for the fundamental and special training of the personnel and units of the national contingents and then, based on these standards, clarify the national instructions and manuals for conducting peace operations. The lack of unified peace operation training programs for NATO and non-NATO troops often resulted in weak coordination of units during the performance of common missions.

The language barrier is a particular problem in preparing peace-operation troops, and causes problems in command and control and coordination issues. A differentiated approach is needed to solve this problem. It should consist of various levels of preparation: troops should be intensively training in the official language for the operation. Staff officers and liaison officers
should receive in-depth training in special language programs. In addition, in order to improve coordination among the national contingents in the common zone of responsibility, phrase books should be used that provide information essential in carrying out common or shared tasks. Planned, coordinated bi-lingual communications tables should be included.

One avenue for solving the problem of training peace forces would be to develop, within the context of PfP, a plan for a common system to train peacekeeping contingents for joint actions in operations. Without a coordinated training program, multi-national peace-operation forces will continue to encounter situations in which the national military contingents will be guided by the practices of their home countries rather than by a common approach to peace operations. In future operations joint programs should be developed for operational and combat training of peacekeeping forces. Based on these programs, analogous programs should be clarified at the national level. Joint command post exercises and computer simulations on peacekeeping could be conducted. The regular exchange of troop training experience and the use of joint training courses and curricula would also be useful.

It would be a good idea to explore the idea of creating regional training centers for training peacekeeping units. For direct training of peace-operation units it is desirable to use national centers physically and geographically similar to the areas of the impending operation. Creating and using such centers could be discussed at international conferences and at Russia-NATO SFOR meetings.

Although the problem of training peace forces has great practical importance, it has not yet been sufficiently studied. Considering the multiple aspects involved in using a multi-national force, resolving this problem inside our own national structures is probably not possible. Hence, the study of this problem should be brought out into the international arena. The following topic could be discussed at international military-science seminars and conferences: “The Problem of the Correlation of Multi-National and Mono-National Peacekeeping Units and their System of Command and Control.” Based on the conclusions drawn, it should be possible to make recommendations to the OSCE on the procedures for providing national contingents for peace operations and on their command-and-control system.

The highest, first-order priority is assuring compatibility of command-and-control systems of NATO armed forces and the armed forces of other countries (including the armed forces of Russia). This question could be looked at within the framework of joint Russia-NATO commissions. This presents a broad field of activity for scientific research and for experimental design work that could be conducted by interested countries.

Command and control of the non-NATO country peace forces was complicated by problems of the supply of information. The availability of a system for informing the MNF, no matter how sophisticated it was, did not insure the command of the Russian contingent against an information deficit. There was no common monitoring system for watching the military-political situation or the military-strategic and tactical situation. In order to obtain essential information the commands of the national contingents were forced either to further augment their own
reconnaissance-information system or depend entirely on the information received from NATO. An analysis of the information arriving at the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade shows that not all the tasks performed by the units of the Multi-National Division “North” were reported to its command, even in the RF Separate Airborne Brigade’s zone of responsibility. Thus, in one instance, without informing or coordinating with the command of the Russian brigade, units of the American division worked on equipping a field camp large enough for a battalion tactical group. This oversight could have been perceived by the Russian side as an indication of a lack of trust.

For future peace operations it would be essential to create (or improve) a common system for monitoring the military-strategic or tactical situation in the conflict region. Such a system would be based on the national intelligence systems (air and satellite) and would call for a common scheme for providing reconnaissance data to the national military contingents. It is also important here to avoid the infamous “dual approach” in the system for informing the forces, depending on whether they belong to a particular bloc or are outside of it. The danger here is not so much that non-NATO troops would be inadequately informed as that such an approach can increase distrust in the relations among participating states.

The problem of providing information is closely tied to coordination issues, particularly in the work of liaison officers in the staffs of large, interacting units. In evaluating their work, the aspect of coordination with the former warring parties remained somewhat murky, and that aspect had special significance in the context of the coordinated execution of the military and civilian aspects of the accords. An analysis of the course of the implementation of the Dayton Accords showed that in their work with the former warring parties, the MNF liaison officers (or teams) failed to establish the work of the joint organs of executive power on a permanent basis, with the exception of periodic work by joint committees. Since such a problem is likely to recur in future peace operations, it seems essential to develop early the principles for creating integrated control structures made up members of the former warring parties. These principles can be discussed in detail at international seminars and conferences.

Analysis of the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed the weak legal protection for peace-operation personnel in the event of unexpected contacts with the warring parties. This problem is a pressing one and requires that international organizations develop international laws and legal mechanisms for protecting the safety of personnel. If peace-operation personnel are killed by hostile actions, punishment for their deaths should be mandatory. Further, the normative-legal documents of nations should be improved in order to protect the lives of the national peacekeeping contingent.

An important element in increasing the effectiveness of MNF peacekeeping activity is the organization of joint analytical work to sum up the experience gained in preparing for and conducting the operation. Unfortunately, the analytical elements of the armed forces of the countries that participated in the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both those inside NATO and those outside NATO, carried out their informational-analytical work independently, without a joint plan of action. This could result in differing interpretations of several factors, as well as a
less than full evaluation of already existing experience in the peace operations of the future. The best option for setting up an analytical effort would be to create combined analytical teams to collect, synthesize and analyze the information from the peace activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This work could be set up based on unified assessment methodology developed to evaluate the effectiveness of conducting peace operations. Such methods should be developed through combined efforts of organizations of the ministries of defense of the countries of Europe under a partnership program, embracing the Russian concept of “Science for Peace” and involving a virtual Atlantic-European center for peace operations and conflict resolution. In order to determine the lessons and conclusions for future peace operations, it would also be advisable to work out a common plan for collecting and synthesizing the results of preparing for and conducting a peace operation.

In conclusion, the funding of peace operations is a critical issue. In the past there was no such question regarding operations conducted by the UN, because the operations were funded out of the UN budget via UN member-nation contributions. The peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina raised the financial issue, because the entire burden for the financing was placed on the direct participants in the operation. These countries not only provided forces and assets, but they also bore the expenses for maintaining them. In the future, other nations should not remain on the sidelines in peace operations. Their participation, even if it takes the form of financial support, will make an important contribution to the common cause. Today this problem seems quite serious, and it needs study and work.

**Role of Civilian Management Bodies and Organizations during a Multi-National Operation.** The primary role of civilian agencies was to “recover, reconstruct, repatriate, and reconcile.” To coordinate this aspect, the IFOR commander created a principal staff directorate known as the combined joint civil military cooperation (CIMIC). Through this agency, commissions were developed to establish and maintain liaison with affected civilian organizations, freedom of movement was coordinated, the capabilities of NGOs, PVOs, IOs and host nations were leveraged, and many civil-military tasks were identified and transferred to non-military agencies. The focus was on unity of effort and not unity of command. CIMIC ensured that priorities were consistent with policies of the host nation, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the OSCE and U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and a myriad of other governmental, civil, and international agencies. In Sarajevo, the International Council of Volunteer Agencies and CIMIC set up a walk-in center as the focal point of NGO coordination. CIMIC also augmented staffs of the OHR, OSCE, World Bank, and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). Finally, a joint civil commission was established in Sarajevo that focused on the constitution, freedom of movement, telecommunications, infrastructure, refugees, and police. Technical subcommittees were formed for gas, electricity, water/sewer/solid waste, economic development, urban transport, roads, and bridges, cemeteries, and railways.21

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21Pamela J. Brady, “Joint Endeavor--the Role of Civil Affairs,” *Joint Forces Quarterly,* (Summer 1997), pp. 45, 46, 47.
Mistakes identified by the military command in a report prepared by Booze Allen Associates on a conference at the U.S. Peacekeeping Institute included the following:

--Military focus on the peace-enforcement mission at the expense of military support to civilian agencies at the start of the IFOR mission;
--Poor civil-military planning was blamed on compressed planning times, strict force cap, and early classification of OPLANs by military planners, among other factors;
--Difficulties encountered during the establishment of the CIMIC staff element, in lieu of the internationally recognized Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC).

Regarding these criticisms, the following points should be made. First, the military focus during the initial stage of MNF mission was appropriate and had to be the primary focus of IFOR, since its success was the precondition for the execution of the civilian tasks. Regarding the CIMIC, the primary problem was that it was not properly staffed and acted more as an operational staff than a neutral CMO coordination forum. Moreover, Civil-Affairs functions, a vital component in any peace operation, did not appear to fit well into the IFOR and ARRC command structure. Because the Russian armed forces do not have designated civil-affairs units, Russian cooperation in this area was limited.

Perspectives on Russian-American Participation in the Founding of a System of European Security. Russian-American military cooperation in NATO’s IFOR mission provided a key element in imparting legitimacy and assuring even-handedness in the execution of the military elements of the Dayton Accords. The cooperation underscored a shared interest in the enhancement of European peace and stability under new and radically different conditions. That cooperation can be said to have been a clear indication that, while Washington and Moscow have fundamentally different views on the issue of NATO enlargement, they share sufficient interests in the importance of peace and stability in Europe to find appropriate mechanisms for cooperation in the area of conflict management and resolution. Both have a clear interest in making future multi-national peace operations more effective. This includes both the strictly military tasks of conflict regulation/termination and the civilian tasks of political, social, and economic reconstruction, repatriation, and reconciliation.
CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS ON PREVENTING MILITARY CONFLICTS, AND ON TRAINING AND EMPLOYING MULTI-NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Introduction. Peace operations are fast becoming a recognized part of military art and theory. Concepts like peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, operations other than war, and military operations other than war have entered the vocabulary of soldiers around the world. As in other aspects of military art, there are two equally vital but distinct aspects: theory and practice. Different military cultures approach these concepts differently. U.S. military art throughout the history of the republic and its armed forces has been pragmatic, with practical experience usually guiding the development of concepts. In the Russian case, theory as the foundation of military science has had the dominant position. While theory must necessarily be guided by practice, it should also guide the development of new concepts. This chapter presents two distinct approaches for the development of recommendations. In the first section, the American authors offer recommendations based on their analysis of the practice of multi-national peace operations and U.S.-Russian military cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the second section, the Russian authors have sought to develop a theory of such multi-national peace operations to guide future operations.

The Practice of Peace Operations in Light of IFOR Experience

The Context for Success. The experience of UNPROFOR provides a cautionary tale on the insufficiency of internationally mandated peace operations, where political conditions, ongoing hostilities, and ineffective command and control preclude effective conflict management and resolution. The United Nations lacked the effective command-and-control arrangements and means to fulfill the numerous mandates voted by the Security Council. UNPROFOR, which was created to monitor the cease-fire in Croatia, found itself pressed into service to manage an intense and bloody civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were serious differences among the major powers as to the nature of that conflict and the role of those mandates in resolving it. The major powers could not agree on the role that they should play in the execution of those mandates. As Susan Woodward has observed, UNPROFOR found itself trapped between the requirements of traditional peacekeeping and the realities of ongoing hostilities. Its commitment to impartiality robbed it of sufficient credibility among the contending parties who sought to use its presence for their own ends. As long as the contending sides saw a military solution as a viable means for achieving their political ends, humanitarian assistance and attempts at combat limitation were bound to fail. The international community attempted to contain the conflict in the hope that it would burn itself out, but this hope proved illusionary. Further, such an approach imposed great risks on neighboring states who had to face the prospects of new influxes of refugees and the extension of hostilities into their territories. Only a significant shift in the military situation in the summer and fall of 1995, which made a military solution impossible,
could set the stage for the negotiation of a cease-fire. In this regard the Dayton Accords created a new situation under which the Security Council could terminate the UNPROFOR mission and give NATO’s IFOR a mandate to execute the oversight of the cease-fire, the delineation of the contesting sides, and the demilitarization of the conflict.

The vote of the UN Security Council provided the enabling mechanism for NATO to deploy IFOR to execute Annex 1A of the Dayton Accords. As permanent members of the Security Council, the United States and Russia played a significant role in the granting of this mandate. The United States and Russia likewise provided support for the roles assumed by the United Nations and OSCE in executing the civilian tasks of the Dayton Accords. But in that case the absence of mature and robust civilian institutions made the execution of those tasks more protracted and problematic. Moreover, those tasks were intrinsically more complex because they involved the political resolution of those issues which had been at the heart of the conflict from the beginning: the organization of the interaction of the three ethnic communities composing Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Decision to Deploy Multi-National Forces for Peace Enforcement. As Colonel Greg Fontenot, former commander of one of the U. S. Brigades in MND(N), remarked during his interview, the initial success of the IFOR deployment was predicated upon two major factors: (1) the warring sides had agreed to the Dayton Peace Accords; and (2) the force that was deployed into Bosnia left no doubt among the former warring factions that it possessed overwhelming combat superiority. Though on the surface these may appear to be mundane principles, they are often easily overlooked.

As its name implies, the use of peace-operation forces presupposes some sort of peace to keep. There must be agreement among the combatants to lay down their arms and work toward political resolution of their differences. While third parties can do much to coerce the fighting sides to seek peace, until the factions themselves agree to a cease-fire/peace treaty, any outside armed effort is fruitless.

Over the course of 1995 the Croatian Army, without any countermeasures on the part of UNPROFOR, conducted large-scale combat training, the result of which was a well-planned and executed operation to seize the territory of Serbian Krajina (an UNPROFOR protection zone in Croatia) in August of that same year. The Croatian Army’s advance, which was accompanied by “ethnic cleansing,” caused a humanitarian disaster, since the stream of refugees (the entire Serbian population) rushed into the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and further into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, in Bihac, an enclave bordering Croatia, the Bosnian Muslim army stepped up its actions. All of the foregoing exacerbated the crisis and provoked vigorous actions by the Bosnian Serbs, including the massacre at Srebrenica, to which NATO finally responded with air strikes. As a result of this air support the Bosnian Moslems appropriated a significant part of Serb territory, which appreciably altered the positions of the parties on the eve of the Dayton talks.
There are a host of both objective and subjective factors to be considered prior to the actual deployment of peacekeeping forces. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the support of the people is as absolutely essential to the success of a peace mission as it is to the conduct of war. The term “people” in this sense, however, is more complex, for it implies the populations of both the countries employing peacekeeping forces and the local populations into which the force is to be deployed. In the Bosnian case, U.S. involvement would not be possible without the support of the American people. They had to be convinced of the utility and wisdom of risking American lives in bringing peace to Bosnia. This is equally true for Russia as a democracy and for the other national participants in IFOR. Here the mass media plays a key role.

On the other side of the equation, the actual time at which IFOR deployment occurred coincided with a number of specific historical factors. Leaders from the three warring sides each perceived certain benefits in agreeing to a peace settlement. The Croat-Muslim Federation forces had just taken a significant portion of territory from the Bosnian Serbs. The peoples of all the warring sides had grown weary of fighting, and the political leaders of these peoples understood that a cessation of hostilities was in their best interests. Given these conditions, IFOR forces deployed into Bosnia almost unimpeded, and they met with only minor resistance in carrying out the military portion of the Dayton Accords.

The third, and perhaps most important aspect in planning for this type of operation is the absolute requirement to include all participating nations into the planning process. The success of IFOR was due to a large degree to the established working relationships that existed within NATO, and to a lesser, but no less important degree, to the working relationship that had matured between the U.S. and Russian militaries. Without this established base upon which to build, military cooperation within the complex Balkan environment could never have been executed.

Each of the above factors must be considered when planning for this type of operation. Militaries do not exist in a vacuum. More than anything else, the IFOR operation demonstrated clearly that soldiers of any nation can work together provided there is strong political support. While it is true that one country must take the lead and unity of command must be maintained, even former enemies can work well together if there is goodwill and a common goal.23

Training Multi-National Forces for Peace Operations. There were several factors during the pre-deployment training that must be captured and utilized in future operations. First, individual training is as essential as ever. This was best demonstrated by the fact that everyone in theater (from privates to generals) received a minimum of three days of mine awareness training before deploying. Second, rehearsals were key to ensuring that everyone understood his or her mission. These included rehearsals and briefings based on the military-political situation, and on the use of the rules of engagement. Third, it was apparent early in the Dayton process that the

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23The Russian researchers believe that the lead role should remain in the hands of recognized international organizations.
deployment could occur at any time, since there was no clear indicator when the Dayton Accords would be signed. This served to speed up the training, and made planners aware that they may have to deploy and begin operations almost simultaneously. In the future, political leaders need to be acutely sensitive to deployment time lines. Finally, it was essential to read, comprehend and be able to interpret the military aspects of the Dayton Accords, even at the platoon leader/soldier level. In future peace operations, where bitter conflicts are the source of the crisis, force protection must figure prominently in training the multi-national force. At the same time, the training must address the particular reality of modern peace operations that each soldier is inherently a strategic asset, whose conduct can affect the overall prospects for the success of the mission.

Providing All-Around Support. Each of the nations involved in the IFOR operation was responsible for providing logistical support to their contingent. The Russian Brigade located within MND(N) was supplied through Russian log channels, with coordination being conducted at division and NATO levels. On occasion, U.S. forces would provide log support to their Russian colleagues, and vice versa. For instance, since the Russian airborne brigade lacked helicopter assets, the U.S. provided them with air-transport, air-assault and attack helicopters to support their scheme of maneuver. Russian engineers were critical during de-mining operations inside and outside of their sector.

In the future, however, U.S. and Russian military planners must consider the various requirements involved in developing mutually compatible logistics, especially within the CL III (POL), V (ammo), and IX (repair parts). For instance, the Russian 7.62 mm round cannot be fired by NATO forces. Logistic planners must analyze which classes of supply can be provided to non-NATO forces and develop the necessary contingency plans.

Communications is another key support area needing improvement. Secure communication is often not possible at the tactical level due to differences in radio systems between NATO and non-NATO country armies.

In the case of protracted peace operations, the practice of funding national contingents out of national funds may limit the future availability of forces for such operations. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider other methods of funding national contingents, including the solicitation of funds from states, who support the principles involved in such international peace operations, but who cannot provide their own contingents.

Prospects for Developing the Forms and Methods of Conducting Future Multi-National Peace Operations. Early detailed political guidance allows for proper planning and training and prevents wasted effort. This was lacking and created major difficulties while preparing to deploy for Joint Endeavor. The Joint Endeavor organization was different than the standard force used by American units. Task Force Eagle was based on a single U.S. division organized with multi-national brigades, numerous corps-level support units directly under division control, a non-U.S. corps as operational headquarters and USAREUR (Forward) as the National Support Element. Several corps-level and above units were sent to Task Force Eagle --
including a military police brigade, a military intelligence brigade, a signal brigade, a medical brigade and a combat support group. Task Force Eagle incorporated a Turkish Brigade, a Russian Airborne Brigade, a NORD-POL Brigade (Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Luxembourg, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia), plus two U.S. brigades. The Joint Military Commission was incorporated into the Task Force Eagle staff. In the field, the Americans and Russians worked closely together, since the Russian Airborne Brigade was flanked by the two U.S. brigades. Staff functions migrated to lower echelons. Functions normally requiring a staff officer now required a staff section. Joint Endeavor demonstrated that staffs, as well as units, must be tailored for stability operations.

Future multi-national forces must have extensive combined interoperability planning and training before a crisis develops. Trying to do so during or after deployment is difficult, inefficient and hazardous. There must be permanent collaboration between Russia and the United States, Russia and NATO, and Russia and other likely future partners. A regional planning and peace operations center, which would conduct regular combined exercises with these forces is a good idea. Peace operations require a great deal of flexibility at the lower tactical level. Junior officers and sergeants have to be given a great deal of latitude and given maximum initiative. This may prove a problem to draft-based armies and armies without a professional NCO corps. A regional planning and peace operations center could provide the setting to develop the lower tactical flexibility required.

The combined lessons learned, gathered by this project, should be assessed and then distributed, since much of the experience will disappear with the rotation of personnel. Combined peacekeeping procedures (multi-lateral or bi-lateral) should be drafted and agreed upon before distribution to all members and partners. Otherwise, the lack of a common approach to training and tactics could produce inflexibility when the combined force meets military resistance.

**Recommendations on Working with the Mass Media.** The capital nexus for public awareness and support of multi-national peace operations is the national and international means of mass communication. As in past conflicts, so in peace operations, the media is an important element in that process of public information and support. Media coverage in Bosnia provided evidence that relations between the U.S. military and the media are warming. On the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Army appeared more comfortable with the concept of an “embedded media,” where a reporter is assigned to the same unit for an extended period of time. On the other hand, the media were still required to get advance approval before quoting any soldier by name. This remained a source of irritation for the media.

However, the media noticed significant developments in their relations with the military. The Army credits this to several factors: senior-level military officers now participate in media training; media training has been integrated into the curriculum of the war colleges; there is an increased professional status for public affairs officers at divisions, corps, major command and Department of the Army levels; senior military leaders have made time for reporters during key events or as part of their routine scheduling; senior uniformed leaders are more willing to take
reporters with them on visits to places such as the National Training Center; and the media seems to be more willing to hire former U.S. military personnel.

As an example of the manner in which the Army prepared itself to work with the media, staffs and PAOs received instructions on “how to prepare the commander for a media interview.” In short, the commander must read prior articles written by the reporter in question; contact the subject-matter-expert on his staff to list potential issues; put himself into the position mentally of a reporter, and develop questions the reporter might ask; investigate possible answers; and the commander must rehearse.

After Bosnia, the embedded media concept is undergoing a close look to see if it really worked. There were clearly instances when it did not. For example, on one occasion a relationship between a reporter and a commander was exploited by the reporter. The reporter had given his word to a U.S. commander not to report on any item offered “in confidence.” The reporter kept his word. However, the reporter’s close association with the commander was viewed by the commander’s troops as proof that they confided in one another. This allowed the reporter to obtain more than the usual amount of information during meals with soldiers or officers in the command who viewed the reporter as “one of ours.” Such situations prove that we still have much work to do in the area of media-Army relations. In any case, “like the weather, the media will always be there—just another feature on the battlefield terrain.”

Lessons learned by the U.S. military over many years in organizing and conducting relations with the media in the context of an open and democratic society can prove valuable to the Russian military in organizing relations with the press during multi-national peace operations.

TOWARD A THEORY OF MULTI-NATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

A Set of Measures to Manage Conflict. Conflict management is understood to be the purposeful activity of one or several sides (of an international or regional organization) that is intended to: deter the undesirable development of a situation; create the conditions for de-escalating a conflict at an early stage of its development; and help establish peace in the region.

For a conflict to be considered under control, the following elements would be required. One element would involve systems that analyze the current situation and allow timely discovery of the indicators of the genesis and development of a conflict. These systems should also be capable of forecasting the possible course of the crisis’ development. Another element for crisis management is a command-and-control system for the peace forces. This system should provide for comprehensive troop support, the coordinated employment of troops, and coordinated

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interaction based on a common intent and plan in accordance with the assigned tasks at each stage of the conflict.

It is advisable for the world community to conduct active politics to prevent and de-escalate possible military conflicts. First and foremost, the world community should first use its entire arsenal of non-military measures, while resorting to military measures only in exceptional cases. The conflict management process must include:

-- A predictive evaluation of the conditions that give rise to conflicts and the conditions that lead to their resolution;
-- A definition of the whole aggregate of methods available to prevent and de-escalate conflicts; these methods could be implemented sequentially or in some other order through non-military and military means and methods.
-- A definition of the reaction algorithms at various stages of in the origin and development of the conflict;
-- The organization and implementation of a complex of measures to prevent a conflict, or, if one occurs, to quickly contain and halt it at the earliest possible stage of its development.

The dynamic nature of the military-political processes that are occurring, as well as the vague and unstable situation in individual regions, have greatly increased the urgency of making an operational evaluation of the military-political situation and the timely identification of the causes and origins of conflict situations. The effectiveness of UN (OSCE) leadership in sanctioning the mandate for the peace operation to normalize a situation in an unsafe region will depend to great extent on the results and objectivity of the operational evaluation.

To this end the following are needed: continuous reconnaissance; thorough analysis of the military-political and military-strategic situations and a forecast of how they may develop; timely discovery of any armed attack that is being prepared or any threatening development of the situation; conveying this information to the top levels of international organizations that have the authority to issue a mandate to conduct peace operations; a clear program of actions in various conflict situations.

The effective accomplishment of the tasks of an operational assessment and forecast of the military-political situation and identification of crisis situations at the earliest possible stage is currently linked to the formation of a multi-level, inter-state system of monitoring the military-political situation. This system would be based on unified organizational and methodological principles and on the combined functional structure of the existing information and analytical elements in various agencies.

Monitoring the Military-Political Situation. The positive experience of preparing Russian forces for peace operations and their successful conduct was a result of the completeness and reliability of the situational information. For this purpose a system for monitoring the military-political situation should be created, one capable of handling a broad range of tasks.
Russian peace-operations experience shows that a monitoring system needs to consider the regional and local levels of investigating and assessing the military-political situation. The basic tasks in monitoring the military-political situation include:
  --Timely identification of changes in military-political relations, military potentials and the direction of military-political activity in the basic regions of the world;
  --Definition of the real-world factors that influence change in the military-political situation;
  --Identification of the tendencies and patterns of the development of military-political processes;
  --Evaluation of the most likely course of development of the military-political situation and the expected results for a definite period in the future;
  --Determination of the hotbeds of international tension, probable conflicts and conflict-like situations;
If it becomes necessary to investigate the course of a situation more thoroughly in order to prevent possible military conflicts, the following are needed:
  --Evaluation of the levels of military danger and any trends in their change;
  --Determination of the conditions under which conflict situations develop into armed conflict and war;
  --Determination of the possible nature of the war or armed conflicts, the methods by which they would be unleashed and conducted, the probable goals and plans of the sides, the possible participation of outside forces in the military actions, the possible start time of the military actions, and their possible consequences;
  --Identification of possible conflict countries (an individual country or coalitions of countries);
  --Determination of the countries allied with the hostile sides;
  --Evaluation of the consequences of the decisions on military force structure and policy.

In analyzing the military-political situation, the primary focus should be on making recommendations to limit the military danger, prevent conflict, or find ways out of the conflict at the earliest possible stage.

When the UN (or OSCE) leadership is making a decision to authorize the use of appropriate measures to prevent military conflicts, it is essential to consider the causes of the conflicts, the unique features, the nature of relations in the state where the conflict arose, and the possible consequences of the conflict.

Defining the goals and working out the algorithms of reaction to the conflict situation should be done for the various stages in the conflict’s development. The stages are identified by the specific features inherent in each: first stage -- the inception; second stage -- mounting tension; third stage -- period of threat; fourth stage -- crisis; fifth stage -- resolution of the conflict. Peace restoration could also constitute a separate and distinct stage.

It must be noted that this division of the stages is rather conditional. The course of events in the Persian Gulf affirm that a conflict can still be resolved by peaceful means during the fifth
stage. That is what the Bush administration did after military actions had already commenced, and after limited military objectives against the aggressor had been achieved.

For each stage of the conflict, in addition to the goals, it is desirable to determine: the active tasks: the complex of measures and their planned effect and cost; the composition and tasks of the essential and available forces and means; the planned results of their actions; and the possible consequences at each stage. Such an approach offers the possibility of making the conflict resolution process manageable at any of the stages, as well as the possibility of taking steps toward the conflict’s resolution by peaceful means.

International experience in resolving military conflicts of the post-war period shows that measures aimed at conflict resolution through peaceful means encompass primarily the first three stages. Military means as a deterrent is inherent in the first and second stages of the conflict. Direct preparation and employment of an armed force begin with the third stage.

In developing the action algorithms at each stage of the conflict, escalation of the conflict must be foreseen as a possibility. Likewise, the possibility and conditions for resolving the conflict through peaceful means, as well as the creation of conditions to achieve goals at the next stage, must also be anticipated. This work must be done by the central command-and-control element for managing the conflict and also by the regional headquarters at the operational-strategic level. These regional headquarters rely on the appropriate sub-systems of command-and-control and monitoring.

The chief goal, which is preventing or resolving the conflict, can be achieved through a complex of measures carried out sequentially or in any other order, depending on the situation, using informational-psychological, political, diplomatic, legal, economic, or, in the extreme case, military means.

Measures to Prevent Military Conflicts and to Stabilize a Situation. International and Russian peacekeeping experience has confirmed the consensus opinion that non-military measures are extremely effective in the early stages of conflict development.

Informational-psychological (or ideological) measures. These measures can be very effective. However, sufficient skill is still lacking in their application, as was vividly seen during the Vietnam and Chechen conflicts. The following such measures deserve particular attention:
--Shaping public opinion (via the mass media, diplomatic services, or international institutions), revealing the true intentions of a potential aggressor (or the warring parties);
--Exerting informational-psychological influence on states in order to dissuade them from helping countries that are preparing the conflict (or participating in the conflict);
--Neutralizing the adverse consequences of psychological operations conducted by the opponent, etc.
Political measures. The spectrum of political measures for influencing the military-political situation is rather broad and includes the use of the political institutions of one’s own country, as well as those of the world community.

Diplomatic measures. These measures are traditional and extremely effective. They include the following:
--Establishing (expanding, deepening) diplomatic contacts and conducting talks on the issues that caused the strained relations;
--Taking steps to increase trust;
--Organizing (rescheduling, canceling) visits from political leaders and state delegations;
--Conveying (to the national leadership and diplomatic services) notes, requirements, memoranda and clarifications relating to the current situation;
--Reducing the number of personnel at embassies, consulates and representational offices; summoning home the family members of diplomats;
--Breaking off diplomatic relations, etc.

Legal measures. Legal measures are based on the requirements to comply with international law, the principles of treaties and accords, and on the use of international legal institutions, such as the International Court of the UN.

Economic measures. Economic measures have the greatest impact on the course of conflict situations, especially in the case of economically vulnerable countries that are participating in the conflict.

Since conflict management is a bilateral or multilateral process of struggling to achieve the assigned goals, it must possess the qualities of a self-sufficient system: sub-systems for monitoring, command and control, support, and for the operating forces and assets brought in to accomplish a complex of military and non-military measures.

During the first three stages it is possible to utilize the mass media, diplomatic services, the state’s international institutions, social organizations, cultural institutions, and state services and agencies for political warfare and special services. In taking political-diplomatic and international-legal measures, it is advisable to use the agencies of international institutions (the UN, including the International Court of the UN, the OSCE, etc.). To impose economic measures, international and regional economic, financial and commercial organizations may be used, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the European Community, etc.), as well as the armed forces for carrying out air, sea and land blockades of the borders.

During the third to sixth stages, forces operating under a UN mandate and unified plan may be brought in to take military measures. An international armed force enlisted to conduct peace operations must be thoroughly prepared to carry out tasks in the operation. If necessary, the following should also be accomplished: create a national legal basis [adopt legislation] for actions of the armed force outside the state’s borders; define the possible composition of the
force; define the principles of leadership, coordination and comprehensive support; develop the appropriate programs; define the sequence of troop training and use.

The following factors attest to the UN’s vulnerability, in the opinion of the Russian researchers, and limit its ability to manage such conflicts effectively: the incomplete process of understanding priorities in national interests or the methodologies of evaluating military threats in various strategic areas; the opposition of destructive forces within the affected country; the undeveloped theory of conflict management on the inter-state level; the lack of a system of international monitoring; the lack of a system of the algorithms of the actions of international agencies according to the conflict stages; economic crises and the inadequate funding mechanism for peace operations. The decision-making process and the planning of operations play an important role in the successful training and use of peacekeeping forces.

Improving the Decision-Making Process Regarding the Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces and the Planning Process. For peace operations the state can make available military (or civilian) observers (or specialists), as well as large or small military units. Individual states can also support such operations by offering transportation, equipment, food and other financial or technical help.

It is important that the ideas and approaches for employing military contingents in operations to maintain or restore peace and security (peace enforcement) be developed in close cooperation with the legislative bodies, executive authorities, and the public of the states taking part in the peace operation.

The success of peace operations, as confirmed by experience gained in conducting them, depends to a large extent on timely, high-quality preparation. The experience of Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces (AF) in peace operations attests to the fact that usually one to four months are required for force preparation.

In accordance with the practical experience of the RF AF, preparation for an operation generally includes the following:

1. Making the decision to conduct the operation;
2. Formulating the missions of the forces and other organizations participating in the operation;
3. Planning the operation;
4. Organizing comprehensive support;
5. Organizing the command, control and coordination;
6. Preparing the peacekeeping contingent and staff.

In the current system of RF governmental control, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the Russian President’s lead organization for conducting Russian foreign policy. This ministry bears responsibility for the overall political leadership of peacekeeping missions.

The mechanism for making the military-political decision to conduct a peace operation with Russian participation operates as follows:
After a request is received from the UN Secretary General that Russia participate in a peace operation, the RF President instructs the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the RF Ministry of Defense to jointly develop a recommendation as to the feasibility and advisability of such participation.

This recommendation is sent to the RF President. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense recommend such participation and if the President decides to support the UN request, he sends his recommendation to the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly.

This recommendation indicates the mission of the peacekeeping contingent, its area of operation, size, weapons, chain of command, length of stay and schedule of replacement (or extension). It also defines additional guarantees and compensations for the military service personnel.

Parallel to this, the Ministry of Defense issues preliminary instructions to prepare the military contingent for participation in the peace operation and to plan the operation. The Minister makes available -- to the organization instituting the operation -- candidates for the position of commander of the collective peacekeeping forces (in the Commonwealth of Independent States). He also makes military service personnel available to the operation’s command-and-control elements under UN aegis (or under the OSCE).

An analysis of this decision-making process concerning Russian participation in peace operations leads to a number of recommendations on ways to improve that process among the military-political leadership of other states.

In making the decision to send military contingents into a peace operation, the following must be considered:
--Is there a real threat in the region to international peace and security?
--Does participation coincide with the national interests of the participating states, and is there a clear political goal and mandate for the operation?
--Do the governments (or, in an internal conflict, the combatants) concur with the establishment of a peace operation?
--What is the degree of risk for the peacekeeping personnel?
--Does representation in the command of the peacekeeping force correspond to the role and size of the military contingent in the operation being planned?
--What is the link between the planned peace operation and the political process of settling the conflict?
--Are there forces, means and financial resources for participating in the operation?

Once a political decision has been made that the Russian contingent will participate in the peace operation, the decision as to which forces are to be used in the peace operation is made in the Ministry of Defense.
The substance of the decision may include: the tasks for the peacekeeping force contingents; basic issues of coordination between the peacekeeping operation participants and the warring sides; the organization of the command and control, logistics support, as well as medical and financial support.

In his plan for using peace forces in the conflict region the commander must determine the following, taking into account the particular features of the peace operation:

--On which tasks of the peace operation should he concentrate the efforts of the troops under his command?
--What are the methods for accomplishing the tasks at the various stages of the operation?
--What is the sequence of actions if the warring parties violate an armistice and the armed confrontation escalates?
--What are the groupings that are created from the national contingents of peacekeeping forces and what are their zones of responsibility?

Based on the decision, a combined peacekeeping force staff prepares a directive defining the missions for the operation participants. Effective planning is an important criterion in the preparation of a peacekeeping operation. As a rule, parallel planning is the usual method used at all command levels by the Russian contingent.

For operational planning it is essential to have an analysis of the political, economic and military situation in the zone of armed conflict, as well as information about the government, the civilian population, and the military and civilian facilities that may be used by the peacekeeping forces during the conduct of the operation.

Using this information, the peace-force staff studies and evaluates the populace and the terrain in the conflict region. In evaluating the population, it is first essential to clarify its ethnic roots, language, local customs, religious beliefs, devotion to ethno-nationality (a clan, a family, a tribe, social group, etc.), the political allegiance to the national government (or to the regional administration, the military leader, the local leader, etc.), feelings about marking national holidays and religious rituals, and the extent to which the population is armed. It is also necessary to determine what social protections exist and obtain information about the monetary system, the foreign currency in circulation, black market activity and other issues.

The following are usually determined from the analysis:
--Whether the situation in the conflict region is favorable, somewhat favorable or hostile towards the peacekeeping force or toward any one of the national contingents;
--Whether the population supports the peacekeeping force and what this support depends on (or if only part of the population supports, then which part);
--The extent to which the warring sides are armed and organized, as well as their attitude towards the conditions of the armistice that has been achieved;
--The existence of dissident groups within the population that will support the peacekeeping force publicly but resist it underground;
The existence in the region of bands and terrorist groups, as well as the extent to which they are supported or led by government organizations (and which ones specifically);

–The morale of the combatants, their willingness to accept the armistice, their will to resist, their ability to endure hardships and deprivation, and their capacity for self-sacrifice;

–The likelihood of support from warring sides in other regions (which ones and using what forces).

In evaluating the terrain and infrastructure, it is necessary to look at the relief, the vegetation, hydrography, etc. The following should also be studied: the road network, transportation, power plants and power lines, communications, population points, street maps of these points, the dominant blocks and buildings, industrial concerns, particularly those engaged in military production, medical institutions, religious and cult buildings, bases or warehouses containing material supplies, the trade network, etc.

Planning the peace operation is a process of developing a set of documents on the use of forces and assets designated for participation in the peace operation. Peacekeeping operation experience shows that the planning documents in use in the Russian Armed Forces are sufficiently universal in content. Hence, it can be reasonably assumed that they may be used in peace operations of the future.

The basis of the Russian peace-operation plan is the operations portion, which is developed on a map (or a diagram) with explanatory commentary. In addition to these documents, the following are generally also prepared:

--A calendar for ramp-up for the operation;
--A directive from the peacekeeping force commander;
--A plan for reconnoitering the armed conflict region;
--A plan for moving the peacekeeping force into the area;
--A tabular coordination plan with a chart for command and control of the peacekeeping force according to operation tasks;
--A plan for defending the peace force;
--An engineering plan;
--A communications plan;
--A logistics plan;
--A plan for replacing or rotating the peacekeeping contingent;
--A plan for evacuating the peace force in the event of renewal of large-scale combat actions by the warring parties or the host country’s withdrawal of its consent for the presence of the peace force;

--Other plans developed in accordance with the peace-operation missions and the conditions of their execution (e.g., delivery of humanitarian shipments, evacuating the population from the conflict region, holding of elections for local officials, etc.)
A similarly thorough development of various operations documents allows a flexible response to any non-standard situations. This prevents unnecessary losses in personnel, weapons and combat hardware and reduces the length of the military actions. The operations portion of a peace operation is developed on a map. The following are the most important elements which should be reflected:

--The region (or the area of the armed conflict);
--The populated areas in which the warring sides live together;
--The stand-off line between the hostile or warring parties, as it has been stabilized as a result of peaceful negotiations;
--The operations structure (or order of battle) of the troops or armed groupings of the warring parties and the possible nature of their actions if the armistice is violated;
--The airports, including the planes and helicopters located there; areas or points where hardware is concentrated (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs, etc.); artillery fire positions, including mortars, anti-tank weapons and air defense weapons; warehouses or bases containing weapons (ammunition, material stores, etc.) of the warring parties; and engineering facilities that have been set up by the warring parties, as well as mine fields and other obstacles;
--The points or areas where UN representatives are located, diplomatic missions, and the administrative offices (or leadership, command) of the combatants;
--The command-and-control points for the peace operation, such as command and logistics points, delivery and distribution points for humanitarian aid, etc.;
--The zones of responsibility of the national contingents; the locations of their units and command-and-control elements;
--The buffer zone between the warring parties;
--The check-points or observer points and posts in each zone or sector of responsibility;
--The movement routes for the peace forces during their deployment in the conflict region, as well as when patrolling or delivering humanitarian aid;
--Potentially dangerous facilities in the conflict region (atomic power plants, chemical concerns, oil and gas lines, river dams), as well as the expected environmental consequences in the event of their destruction (zones of contamination, flooding, fires);
--The airfields (guarded by the peace force) that are used for air transport of passengers in the conflict region, peace-operation participants, delivering logistics materials, humanitarian aid, etc.;
--Air corridors (or zones, lanes) that are no-fly zones for aircraft of the conflicting sides;
--Air patrol zones (or routes) of the peacekeeping forces;
--Base-camp sites of peacekeeping forces logistics units and subunits, as well as bases (or dumps) of material supplies;
--Medical facilities available in the region of conflict and peace-force deployment;
--Additional information about the conflict region and the actions of both the combatants and the peace force.

The explanatory commentary of the operations portion of the peace-operation plan should indicate the following:
--Conclusions about the situation in the conflict region and the conditions of the armistice reached by the combatants;
--The plan for using the peace force;
--The composition of the forces and assets taking part in the operation and their distribution by sector (or zone) of responsibility (or security);
--The nature of the population and the infrastructure facilities in the conflict region;
--The sequence in which the peacekeeping force will execute its tasks;
--The rules and procedures for investigating instances of violations of the conditions of the armistice;
--Basic questions of operations (or combat) support, logistics support, medical and financial support;
--The organization of coordination between the peace contingents and the warring parties;
--The organization of the operation’s command and control;
--Rotation procedures;
--Other issues that allow for the specific features of the operation.

The preparation calendar for the operation is developed to help assure that the leadership’s work is well-organized and that all preparatory measures are executed in a timely fashion. It reflects the steps to be taken during operation preparation, the time frames for completion of each measure and those responsible for their accomplishment.

The reconnaissance plan for the peace-operation region is annotated on a map. Such annotation may include: the purpose of the reconnaissance; the composition of the reconnaissance teams; the points from which the reconnaissance will be carried out; the work
times; the questions to be answered; means for delivery to the reconnaissance area; and how communications will be organized.

The force-insertion plan establishes the following: the method for delivery of the peace forces; what is being transported; the stages and length of the transport operation; the stations (or airfields) for loading and unloading; the sequence for entry into the peace-operation area and the implementation of the transport actions.

The annotated coordination plan indicates the command-and-control points of one’s own forces, of the headquarters that is instituting the operation, of neighboring contingents, of the international organizations that are operating in the area, and the composition of liaison-officer teams and the procedures for exchanging liaison officers and teams.

In order to coordinate actions during the conduct of the operation, coordination is organized between the peace contingents and higher command-and-control elements, as well as with the former warring parties (FWPs).

The most detailed coordination is organized for the period in which the following occur: moving the peace force to the area; its deployment within the conflict region; separating the combatants; and occupying the buffer zone between them. After that, coordination is organized just prior to the peace force’s execution of each in its series of operational missions, taking into account the developing situation.

Depending on the administrative-territorial division of the conflict region and the difficulty of the missions the peace force is to carry out, during the planning phase of the operation the region may be divided into sectors. If that is the case, then a headquarters may be created for each sector. Their structure would be analogous to that of the combined peace staff for the overall operation.

The effectiveness of using peace operations in the future will depend to a great extent on the level of coordination among the countries participating in the peace operation as conducted under UN leadership. In the opinion of the U.S. researchers, this underscores the effectiveness of placing a UN mandate for peace operations in the hands of a regional security organization with an established international infrastructure, multi-national military staff and partnership program with other states in the affected region, as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Organizing Coordination Among Countries Participating in a Peace Operation Under UN Auspices. Peace operations over the past ten years have pointed up a number of serious shortcomings in establishing coordination among participating countries. The cause has been the lack of an optimal mechanism within the structures of the UN itself.

A primary reason was the lack of attention given to coordination, both in the sense of creating a special agency and in the sense of organizing appropriate procedures. Second, until the appropriate commanders and staff are appointed, the countries that will be participating in an
upcoming operation cannot work coordination issues, since they have no information as to who
their neighbors will be, their missions, force composition, etc. Accordingly, a coordination
mechanism must be developed for the aforementioned areas in order to optimize the coordination
time frames (up to one month) and to maximize efficiency, thus preventing disruptions in the
contingent’s tasks as formulated in the UN Security Council mandate).

The current difficulties in organizing coordination among the peacekeeping contingents
of countries participating in a peace operation include:

--Lack of knowledge about the strict procedures for exchange of information within the
UN;
--Language problems at the unit commander level;
--Mindset of the national contingents;
--Bureaucratic procedures of protocol and communications;
--Lack of special UN instructions with formalized coordination documents.

An analysis of the weak spots in UN coordination activity pointed up several areas for
improvement in the stages of preparing for and conducting an operation.

Organizing the Work of Countries that Are to Participate in an Upcoming Peace
Operation. The UN Security Council (and other UN organizations) is the main governing body
that determines the goal and nature of a future peace operation, its tasks and methods of
execution, the composition of its participants and the operation’s length. The UN’s military staff
committee will probably also be involved with these issues. Once the appropriate political
decision is made, a special UN staff or department for setting up the coordination goes into
action. The special department must:

1. Inform all the operation participants as to the goal, time frame and tasks of the
operation, as well as their role in the operation;

2. Send survey forms to the participants with questions regarding intentions, composition
of the contingent, its capabilities, ethnic, religious and climatic limitations, as well as technical,
transportation and financial limitations, conditions of the contract with the UN, time and place of
the contact group meetings for clarifying information, and the procedures for maintaining liaison
among the contact groups.

3. Dispatch a reconnaissance team to the area of the planned operation to organize a
command-and-control (or coordination) point for the time period of the advance deployment of
the contingents’ units;

After collecting the survey forms and processing the responses, the UN will have to make
adjustments in the operation plan. The coordination staff must substantiate the requirements for
participating military contingents. The requirements include:

--Professional competence in areas such as security, transport, and communications;
--Morale to endure potential losses in personnel and materiel;
--All essential qualities of peace force personnel, especially impartiality.
--Interoperability within the international contingent (e.g., if choosing a motor transport
battalion for transporting humanitarian aid was chosen, from among those offered to the UN, the
successful candidate must have the good equipment, drivers and maintenance facilities that are compatible with those of other national contingents).

No participant should:
--Have reason for conflict with the other operation participants;
--Be capable of influencing the warring parties in any way that would be counter to the UN decision;
--Discredit the high mission of the UN through any action or lack of action.

Mutual briefings and reports by the operation’s participants should play an important role during this period. The briefings by the participants should be about one another, about intentions and capabilities, about preferences in neighbors in the zones of responsibility, etc. The “Mutual Information Sheet” is one option available for such information sharing.

Naturally, the following two points are very important criteria for the military-political leadership of the UN:
--Willingness to work in English as the command language;
--Confidence that none of the operation participants will leave its zone of responsibility without following appropriate standard UN procedures.

Organizing Coordination during Operation Planning. It is recommended that the UN coordination staff maintain a set of operations documents for setting up coordination. Based on Russia’s experience in establishing such coordination, these documents should include:

1. A list of requirements for those cooperating that includes:
   --Contingent’s TO&E structure showing the following departments: personnel; information; operations; liaison, etc.;
   --Technical model of the communications system that includes frequencies, call signs of officials, and important requirements for reliable communications; communications lines with neighboring contingents, aviation, and the warring parties; back-up lines of communication, including secure lines;
   --Flow-chart of actions under emergency circumstances (natural or technical disasters) that provides the procedures for evacuation, mutual assistance, self-help, as well as coordination with local government, rescue agencies, troop garrisons, the police and non-governmental international organizations.;
   --Flow-chart of actions in the event a political decision is made to halt the operation and redeploy the contingent;
   --Diagram of organizational and TO&E structure of the non-military portion of the contingent indicating interrelationships at various levels and among various links, e.g., the department for humanitarian aid or civil administration;
   --Possible additional diagrams in accordance with the ethnic, climatic or geographic features of the operation area.

2. A coordination planning chart, which should reflect the most important elements of the contingent that will require action coordination, as well as the stages of the operation according to tasks and time lines.
3. A technical coordination sheet reflecting the most important issues in the comprehensive support of the peace force during the operation, particularly whenever mutual help among the national contingents is involved. This sheet would include such things as the type and characteristics of fuel, lubricants, technical fluids, as well as weapons, engineering communication equipment, medical support, food supplies, etc.

4. A list of UN standards defining what is strictly prohibited unless coordinated with the UN coordination staff: firing for effect, except in cases of self-defense; laying or setting out various types of mines and other explosive devices; taking any actions that could be perceived by the local population as a violation of their rights by the UN contingent.

5. Brief instructions on the training and work of liaison teams, both for the UN leadership (“vertically”) and with neighboring contingents (“laterally”). Examples include: a clear understanding of directives “from above”; conveying these directives without distortion to the appropriate officials; the ability to filter out the most important information and make sure it goes “up the chain”; achieving complete mutual understanding that takes into account the national interests and mindsets of the various sides, etc.

As mentioned earlier, coordination within the UN military contingent is organized by the coordination staff. This coordination will be clarified to each of the participating countries’ military contingent leader sequentially upon arrival in the operation area. Direct personal contact is more effective than sending of documents that define coordination issues. If handled personally, most issues can be cleared up on the spot.

Prior to local deployment, the controlling agencies of the national contingents must determine and clarify first and foremost:
--Approximate zone of responsibility, as well as the airfields (or ports, train stations) where the first wave will disembark;
--Their contingent’s neighbors and the boundary lines they will share with them;
--Procedures for sending reports upwards (to whom, when, how);
--System for mutual identification of all units, large and small, of the UN military contingent, including aircraft and sea vessels;
--Forbidden or dangerous zones.

Organizing Coordination During Deployment of Advance Elements. This period is the most challenging in terms of setting up the coordination. It begins with the arrival of the national contingent units (such as recon teams or advance command-and-control personnel) and ends with the handing over of coordination documents from the UN coordination staff to the actual commander of the multi-national contingent. This period may take from one to two months, depending on the situation, the scope of the operation, geography of the area, etc.

The most complex aspect of this period is the close coordination of all the elements of the arriving troops (combat units, logistics units, finance and administration elements, media representatives), as well as the national contingents that must be optimally distributed in accordance with the capacity of the infrastructure of the country of arrival (airfields, ports, railroad stations, etc.).
The most difficult aspect here is preventing any overload of the infrastructure and avoiding “stacking.” The latter could result in accidents, as when two or more flights approach for landing simultaneously, etc.

The dispatcher service plays an important role at this time. The UN coordination staff must assist the dispatcher service, and at the same time it must manage the distribution of the arriving contingent elements in their assigned assembly areas. A separate “Coordination Planning Chart” is developed for this period.

Next, based on the concentration of troops in the arrival country, in accordance with the plan (which is continually updated), the troops are split up according to their zones of responsibility. Here coordination among the troops is only roughly outlined by the coordination staff. The commanders refine and enter the coordination in the operations plan and its annexes.

At approximately the same time, i.e., after the arrival of the participating nations’ contingents, the coordination staff must deliver to the staff of the peace-force commander the most important documents concerning coordination of the individual contingents.

In the opinion of the Russian side, the list of coordination documents for the national contingents should include: diagrams of the “top-down” coordination by staff departments; diagrams of the political and administrative lines of coordination with the UN leadership; diagram of coordination with the warring parties and neighboring contingents; coordination planning charts; diagrams of coordination with the local leadership and non-governmental organizations, including the media and other interested agencies.

The following are the most important coordination goals of this period: the personal and collective security of personnel; preserving the image of the UN as the world’s most authoritative organization; preserving the integrity of the material means of the UN that are not the property of the participating nations (light vehicles, computers, communications gear, etc.). It is namely to implement these tasks that coordination is set up for this period. Again, a separate “Coordination Planning Table” for this phase is recommended.

Establishing Coordination As the Operation Winds Down. Once a decision is made on the time for completion of the UN operation and the drawdown of the military contingent, the coordination staff must immediately draft the appropriate “Contingent Drawdown Plan.” Once the plan has been approved, the staff must set about the business of organizing the coordination during this final phase of the operation.

Many factors are considered in making the decision on the departure sequence of the national contingents, the most important of which include:
--Political advisability of the departure of certain contingents prior to others;
--Assuring stability;
--Greater or lesser mobility of some contingents; availability of their own means of transportation;
--Any risks or security threats, etc.

The following factors that influence the coordination process during operation wrap-up should be considered:

--Operational capacity of the departure country’s infrastructure (for optimal distribution of units returning home);
--Possible aggression by opposition forces in the country of the conflict, since history has shown that these forces attempt to seize the greatest possible amount of material assets during an operation’s completion stage;
--Mandatory preliminary agreement with the local authorities on the procedures for the drawdown of the contingent and the delineation of authority for this period;
--Maximum efficiency of the UN financial-auditing service prior to signing the summary acts of each of the participating nations;
--Close contact with law enforcement agencies of the departure country (or arrival country) and with the civilian and military police.

The experience of completed UN peace operations shows that after withdrawal of the various national contingents, the UN’s liquidation committee needs one to two months of work on-site and two to three months of work at staff headquarters in order to conduct a complete inventory of all property and documentation. Participation by specialists from the coordination staff is needed during this phase of the operation as well.

Regarding optimization of the coordination process during a new UN peacekeeping operation, the following conclusions can be drawn:

--The existing mechanism for organizing coordination could be improved upon by creating a small, special coordination staff under the head of the military staff committee;
--A set of standard documents could be created that incorporates all the best features of the national militaries of each country; these would be universal and would benefit the UN as a whole, as well as each country participating in the peace operation.

Recommendations on Preparing Forces for Peace Operations (Russia’s Experience). The Russian Federation’s experience in preparing the armed forces for peace operations indicates that as the operation’s participants are trained, the media must fully and broadly inform the people in the conflict region on the goals of the operation and the impending deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region.

Unit personnel designated for participation in the peace operation should be trained in a special program for peace units. This program should include combined arms training and special training for carrying out tasks in the areas of armed conflict. The accepted practice in the RF Ministry of Defense is to train each category of personnel and unit in two stages, as follows:

--First stage: training is conducted at the home base (or in training centers) over a five-month period if the units are to be sent to the zones of armed conflict according to plan, or over a one-month period if the time frames are compressed;
--Second stage: personnel are trained during the execution of their peacekeeping tasks; units that are in reserve or on leave are brought in for the training.
The staff is readied for command and control of units in a two-stage joint-staff training program. This training is conducted during a six-day field exercise under a regimental (or brigade) commander. The regimental staff takes the role of a peace-force task group in the area of the upcoming exercise.

Russian military observers and liaison officers are trained within the appropriate programs in the advanced officer courses at the Vystrel military college near Moscow. Training lasts for two months (300 hours) and covers thirteen topics: history of UN peacekeeping activity; functional duties of military observers; English language; tactical-special, vehicular, engineering, computer, medical and physical training; topography; identifying weapons and combat hardware; security; and psychological training.

Liaison officers are part of the multi-national system of command and control. They perform liaison functions among the following: staffs of the national contingents; the command structures of the multi-national force; local authorities; international agencies; and the warring parties. They must know the missions and capabilities of all their units, be familiar with the operational-tactical situation, and keep everyone informed.

Staff officers of the UN force and of the combined command are also trained at Vystrel in a three-week advanced officer course. The requirements of the Russian Ministry of Defense state that personnel completing this course shall:

1. Possess a thorough knowledge of: the laws of the host country; the basic terms of the official working language of the peacekeeping mission; the goal of the operation and their role in it; and mine awareness issues.

2. Be able to: use topographical maps and technical communications means; prepare and type reports; work as a part of a task force made up of representatives of different nationalities and disparate religious beliefs; and render medical assistance.

In addition, military observers, liaison officers, and officers in command-and-control and other units must: strictly follow the norms of international legal documents on peacekeeping; be able to organize service and inspections in their zones of responsibility; be able to assess the operational-tactical situation; make well thought-out decisions; prepare reports in English; identify weapons and hardware systems in use in the mission area; conduct negotiations; and operate a vehicle.

In addition to this, a special instruction is developed for each mission participant. This instruction specifies the actions of the participants and includes:

--Goals and tasks of the peace operation;
--Functional duties of each operation participant;
--Geographic and climatic conditions in the conflict region;
--Political structure of the state on whose territory the operation is being conducted, its administrative divisions, governmental structure, history and national heroes;
--Characteristics of the population, customs and religious beliefs, permitted behavior and any prohibitions;
--Rules of engagement;
--Security measures;
--Indirect and direct commanders (or managers) and procedures for communicating with them;
--Call signs, flags, signals, etc., of the operation participants and the warring parties;
--Other essential reference materials.

Upon completion of all the preparatory measures, the commander reports on the readiness of the Russian peace force to participate in the operation. This report is made to the agency of the international organization that appointed the commander.

Improving the Organization of Command and Control (C2), Coordination and Comprehensive Support. It should be mentioned that organizing the C2 and coordination of the Multi-National Force (MNF) are two very complex and labor-intensive processes. Control of the operation’s conduct, as well as the outcome of the operation, depend on this organization and coordination.

As an analysis of the MNF operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows, at the initial stage of the operation, the organizational work of the MNF commanders and their staffs was not fully coordinated, nor was it uniformly understood at various levels. It also needed additional legal formulation. Political, military and technical differences were the cause of the aforementioned lack of full coordination.

The Russian view on organizing C2 and coordination is as follows. Organizing C2 refers to a whole complex of measures aimed at creating a C2 system and assuring its dependable and uninterrupted operation both during the preparation and conduct of the peace operation. These measures include: a definition of the tasks to be carried out and the work procedures for the C2 elements of the MNF during the various preparatory stages and during the course of the operation itself; the composition, positions, deployment procedures and work procedures for the C2 points of the peace force; the means of communication and automated control systems; development and implementation of measures supporting the readiness of the C2 system, as well as its reliable, uninterrupted operation and rapid restoration if required.

Command and control consists of deliberate activity on the part of the structures of the organization that instituted the operation, the commander-in-chief, the commanders, directors and the staffs responsible for preparing for the peace operation and for seeing that the peacekeeping contingents carry out their assigned tasks.

The organizational-technical basis for command and control is comprised of a C2 system that includes:
--C2 elements (headquarters);
--C2 points (combined or national, stationary or mobile);
--C2 means (communications and automated systems).
The basic feature of C2 of forces and assets during the conduct of a peace operation is that it includes both state and military C2 elements.

An analysis of the MNF C2 in Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals that the C2 system for the forces in the operation included three levels:
--High-level, which provides C2 at the level of the organization that “institutes the peace operation (UN headquarters, the OSCE, the CIS) and the combined staff of the Mission”;
--Mid-level, which provides C2 at the level of “combined staff of the Mission and the staff of the national contingent”;
--Executive level, which performs C2 at the level of the “staff of the national contingent and the subordinate units.”

Thus, it should be concluded that in a peace operation C2 is understood to be the deliberate efforts of international, state, military, and other agencies to organize the execution of the assigned tasks using the allotted forces and means. Experience shows that the following may be the basic C2 tasks during preparation for a peace operation:
--Continuous collection and analysis of data (political, military, economic, social, etc.) on the situation in and around the conflict region (i.e., monitoring the military-political and military-strategic situations);
--Decision making by international and state organizations on whether or not to conduct the peace operation [whether to use an armed force];
--Assigning missions to the forces and assets being mustered for the operation, in accordance with the decision of the managing elements;
--Planning the peace operation;
--Maintaining coordination among the national (or international), military and other C2 elements, as well as the forces and assets being brought in, in order to coordinate the methods and variants of the actions;
--Directly managing the actions of the forces and assets being used, including those of subordinate C2 elements;
--Organizing international, national, and military monitoring of the preparation for the operation and its conduct.

Management of the actions of the operation’s forces and assets is accomplished via specially created C2 elements, including: the command group, staff, C2, departments, and permanent, and temporary C2 organizations for management of the peace force. These comprise the basis of the C2 system and represent a mixture of state and military structures.

The primary C2 body of the military contingents involved in the operation is the organization that instituted the operation. The basic C2 element at the mid- and executive level is the staff.

During the conduct of the operation the military C2 elements do not basically differ from the standard C2 elements for forces. Generally speaking, they are located at established field C2
points. In order to coordinate peace-operation actions during the conduct of the operation the national staffs exchange liaison officers or liaison teams.

A communications system is created at each link in the command-and-control system. The primary type of communication is multi-channel space communications via Artificial Earth Satellite (AES). As a back-up, short-wave communications are deployed. If necessary, radio sets and retransmitters are utilized.

At the level of the “combined mission staff -- national contingent staff” a short-wave and ultra-short-wave network is set up, as are multi-channel microwave-relay communications and, if needed, a space communications line.

At the level of the “national contingent staff -- units and sub-units” the basic C2 means are ultra-short-wave, radio, and land-line communications. At this level, unlike the standard military communications set-up, a special operational radio network is set up that includes all command posts, observation posts, patrols, etc. Radio communications is accomplished by means of pre-arranged message codes.

In setting up coordination for the MNF, experience shows the need to define rules for mutual notification, identification and target designation. Common C2 signals are established to assure that the national contingents clearly understand their missions and the sequence and means for their accomplishment during the operation.

The extent and substance of the organizational measures for C2 and coordination depend largely on the scale and nature of the missions, the level of preparation of the C2 elements, the condition and equipment level of the C2 means for all the MNF’s units and subunits, their comprehensive support, and chiefly, on the amount of time devoted to preparation for the operation. Engineering, technical and rear-services support make up the basic types of support for peace operations.

**Engineer support** includes: checking for and clearing explosive devices on main roads and in the areas where the peacekeeping force is operating; fortification jobs in base-camp areas and at command and observation posts; restoring damaged sections of roadways; setting up equipment for field water points; and other tasks.

**Technical support** keeps weapons and hardware in working condition and sees that they are properly used and kept in a constant state of readiness.

Based on the experience of technical support to the RF AF Separate Air-Assault [airborne] Brigade, in assigning technical support tasks the following are usually indicated: the composition of the forces and means of technical support; the stockpiles of military-technical equipment; the make-up of the mobile means of service and repair; support for ammunition and equipment during mission execution; the procedures for repairing or reconditioning weapons and hardware; and command and control.
Rear-services support is accomplished based on a decision of the commander to provide timely and total support of the peacekeeping contingent. It includes the following types of support: material, transportation, medical care, daily-living issues, housing and finance.

Based on cumulative experience, the RF Ministry of Defense includes the following when assigning rear-services support tasks: make-up of rear-service forces and assets; requirements for materiel, as well its availability and location; refueling procedures; personnel disposition, food services, bathing and laundry services; and equipment available at warm-up points.

Generally the organization instituting the operation supports the national units and provides compensatory payments to offset the cost of the equipment put in place. Experience from the conduct of the operation suggests that the peace contingent should be prepared to actively execute tasks for a period of at least sixty days after arrival.

Prospects for Developing the Principles and Methods of Conducting Peace Operations. In its participation in the MNF peace operation the Russian Federation strictly adhered to the universally recognized norms and principles of international relations, as well as to the specific norms and rules for carrying out peacekeeping activity. In the latter the RF includes the following: appropriateness of the peacekeeping steps planned for the particular situation; the priority of political over military means and methods of settlement; strict observance and protection of human rights; use of military peacekeeping contingents only with the permission of the warring parties and approval of the international community; and mandatory reimbursement for expenses incurred in carrying out the peacekeeping activity.

The main directions of Russian Federation peacekeeping activity in the context of the above norms and principles include:
--Mediation in settling crisis situations and preventing expansion of conflicts;
--Using diplomatic means first and foremost, or in extreme cases, military means, to influence the warring parties, in order to provide a just and peaceful settlement of disputed issues;
--Taking measures to preserve peace by separating the warring parties using military contingents of the RF AF operating under UN aegis or brought into the crisis zone with the consent of the warring parties pursuant to a UN mandate;
--Defining and supporting organizations that work to strengthen peace and prevent renewal or continuation of the conflict.

At the basis of RF peace activity lie an understanding and recognition of UN-mandated peacekeeping activity as a whole and interdependent system. As it operates, such a system relies on sovereign states and on close interaction with regional and sub-regional peacekeeping agencies and organizations.

This means that in the matter of maintaining international peace and preventing wars and armed conflicts, the Russian Federation views as partners all states whose policies neither harm
RF interests nor conflict with the UN Charter. The Russian Federation will cooperate on the regional and global levels.

On the regional level the RF will cooperate with member-states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as with other states and military-political organizations in adjoining regions that already have or are forming collective security systems.

On a global scale the RF will cooperate with all UN member-states, chiefly within the framework of the Security Council, based on the norms and principles of international law. This is the reason behind the RF’s growing and increasingly active involvement in UN actions, as well as in regional and sub-regional peacekeeping organizations that seek to settle crisis situations and restore and maintain peace in the planet’s hot spots.

The following qualitative trends have developed over the past decade in the military aspect of Western peace operations:

1. A flexible combining of peace operations (without the use of heavy weapons) with peace-enforcement operations -- the planning of the operation’s military phase takes into account a “smooth transition” from one type of operation into the other;
2. Bringing in forces and contingents that are not strictly part of the peacekeeping personnel, for example, NATO and a Western European Union (WEU) contingent during the last stage of UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia;
3. Using an increasing number of precision weapons, as well as non-lethal weapons and pyrotechnic means;
4. Attempting to professionalize national peacekeeping contingents and units that have served in numerous hot spots;
5. Improving the tactics and strategy (in the “Western” sense) of peacekeeping operational art; and a growing interest in such operations in military academies and colleges of various countries.

Increasingly, political-diplomatic measures, sanctions, and other non-military means of settlement prove ineffective. Hence, not only are peace operations not becoming less important, but rather they are gradually becoming the dominant means for containing and de-escalating conflicts and crises, if not settling them.

Because of the new reality of the contemporary international situation, for the first time ever Russian military doctrine now states that Russia “assists in the efforts of the world community and various collective security organizations that seek to prevent wars and armed conflicts, assists in peacekeeping or peace enforcement...considers it essential to have Armed Forces and other troops and to utilize them for...the conduct of peacekeeping operations based on a UN Security Council decision or in accordance with the international obligations of the Russian Federation.”

Russia has an interest in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN and other international organizations in preventing conflicts, maintaining peace and -- only in the most
extreme cases -- enforcing peace. In this regard, the RF favors the renewal of mechanisms and procedures for collective security under UN aegis, based on such principles as:

--Political leadership by the UN Security Council;
--Effective military command subordinate to the Secretary General of the UN and controlled by the Security Council;
--Sharing the responsibility and burden with regional organizations (chiefly, the OSCE, as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC], NATO, WEU, CIS, and others);
--Availability of adequate funding (this is particularly timely given the great difficulties with the UN budget).

The operations being conducted must be closely linked to the political efforts to settle the conflict. Without such a link, a dangerous “syndrome of distrust” arises toward the UN, countries providing contingents lose their motivation to participate in the given operation, and public opinion in these countries begins to exert corresponding pressure on governments.

The largest peace operations of recent years (Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia) demonstrate the importance of having a well-honed mechanism for elements to function in series: planning, command and control, and monitoring of the peace operation. Russia favors strengthening the UN’s monitoring and inspection mechanisms.

It now seems important to reinforce the existing UN Secretariat structures involved with peace operations. Russia supports the work that has already begun to create a unique “General Staff” under the UN Secretary General. This “General Staff” is understood to be a team of military and civilian experts responsible for the functions of the planning, coordination, and rapid deployment of peace operations. The strengthening of the UN Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping should continue.

The concept for creating UN “reserve forces,” developed under the UN Secretary General, is extremely timely. Russia stands ready to assist in its implementation and has agreed to provide the necessary number of personnel. The concept must allow states the right to refrain from participation in a specific operation. It must also allow states to add to any treaties that they sign certain additional conditions regarding the personnel they are providing.

All units of these reserve forces should receive training in a special program and have primarily light weapons, as well as highly maneuverable, air-transportable hardware and modern means of communications, to include satellite communications.

In meeting the challenge of forming a reserve UN force, one of the most important priorities would be to enhance the training systems for command staff. It seems to the authors that primary efforts should be aimed at:

--Instilling strong moral qualities;
--Building reliable professional skills and a high degree of general cultural awareness;
--Assuring a high level of military-professional qualities and providing moral-psychological and special training.
Russia assumes the necessity for a clear allocation of functions between the UN and the OSCE in crisis management and resolution. Despite its well-known organizational and structural weaknesses, the OSCE has realistic possibilities for becoming one of the key links in the security and stability of Europe. The OSCE could focus attention primarily on preventive actions and for the time being not create its own material basis for peace operations.

The Russian Federation regards the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a transitional organization on the path to creating a system for security and stability on the continent. It is based on the need to establish cooperative relations with NATO in the interests of peace and security in Europe. However, enlarging NATO to the East compels Russia to view differently the possibilities of her further participation in PfP. Russia is interested in a level of partnership that would be appropriate for the status of a great state and that corresponds to her real weight and role in resolving key problems of world development, including settling crisis situations.

NATO and its partners, acting within the framework of the EAPC and with the consent of the UN and OSCE, can play an effective role as a military instrument of European security in instances when the situation requires the use of coordinated, peace-enforcement methods.

The most promising methods for conducting peace operations as a part of an MNF include: negotiating; giving and receiving military briefings; monitoring, intelligence gathering and observing; patrolling; providing reports; exerting information-psychological influence; performing liaison with the civilian population; providing rear-services support to isolated ethnic groups; preventing forbidden demonstrations; monitoring means of transportation; guarding warehouses and important facilities; carrying out shows of force; monitoring possible disturbances; intervening, e.g., separating the warring parties; and various combinations the aforementioned methods.

With rare exception, the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina used virtually the entire spectrum of the methods listed above. Particularly standard were: negotiations with the warring parties and local authorities; liaison activity; humanitarian aid; civilian coordination of the UN and warring parties; engineering support; escorting materiel and VIPs and assisting in taking care of them; monitoring and control functions; guarding important areas or sensitive facilities; gathering information from observations posts, command posts and patrols; anti-sniper activity; and gathering and controlling the heavy weapons of the warring parties.

**Recommendations for Working with the Mass Media.** It is no longer possible to achieve the assigned goals in international peacekeeping through the use of military-technical means alone. Increasingly, the effective prevention or resolution of conflicts depends on the right combination of military and non-military measures. This includes the skillful and correct use of information-psychological actions in which coordination with the media plays a particular role.
In accordance with the TO&E structure of the RF Separate Airborne Brigade/Airborne Battalion, the brigade command staff had a team for working with the media. This was the first time such a team had existed in a Russian peacekeeping unit.

The main reason for the team’s creation was that Russia’s joint participation with the NATO MNF in Bosnia became a unique event. This led to a huge potential interest on the part of the media from other countries, and interest that eventually proved justified. During the first stage of forming the brigade, journalists from nine countries came to the training center in Pesochnoye in the Yaroslav oblast. The director of the Airborne Troops’ press center served as the host to the visiting journalists. These journalists took part in a press conference on the training of the Russian peacekeepers.

In order to support the journalists’ work on the training field and at permanent locations, the team chief and the officer journalists had to synthesize a large quantity of reference material and take a whole series of steps: from arranging photos to arranging working and recreational conditions for the members of the foreign media.

In the initial period close cooperation was clearly noted between the media-relations team and education units. This connection was largely in two areas: providing moral-psychological support and information for peacekeeping personnel.

Looked at in more detail, the moral-psychological and information support provided by the media-relations team consisted mainly of developing reference materials on the operation area, writing memoranda on the execution of marches and on security measures, conducting briefings and informing the public.

The organizational aspect basically included the team’s involvement in the preparation and conduct of ceremonies, meetings with IFOR and SFOR service personnel, press conferences, interviews and roundtables.

As a part of the brigade’s relocation team, the chief of the media-relations team moved out to the operation area in the coordination and support group. He immediately established communication and coordination with the Task Force Eagle press center. From then on he arranged all his work through that center.

During preparation for the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina good communications were initiated with representatives of the following media organizations: ORT, RTR, NTV, the Associated Press, Reuters, and others. The second stage in the work of the media-relations team began on 1 February 1996. Pursuant to the brigade’s plan of events, a general work plan was developed for the media-relations team, and personal plans were developed for the officer-journalists. The main focus of this period was familiarizing the members of the media with the life and duties of the brigade service members and on maintaining public confidence in the effectiveness of using the Russian contingent. More than 150 journalists from more than 50 media organizations visited brigade units.
The Peacekeeper (*Mirotvorets*) newspaper, created under the leadership of the Airborne Troops commander, was a great help to the media-relations team. With the appearance of the first issue, the problem of informing brigade personnel was solved. It also solved the problem of bringing them operational information. The newspaper also published the experiences of the units’ best specialists and included both medical and legal advice sections.

Through the efforts of the media-relations team and the education section, the first issue of Peacekeeper was prepared and printed by May 9. The issue was devoted to Victory Day. Its pages covered the stages in the formation of the brigade, the history of the Yugoslav conflict, etc.

Experience indicates that clearly planned and well-organized information and psychological influence can localize the conflict in its beginning (genesis) stage. In certain cases it can neutralize the conflict. As a part of this process, public opinion is shaped via the media as to the injustice and unnecessary nature of the military conflict that is coming. Through the media, public confidence is undermined in those governments that intend to achieve their goals through purely military means, i.e., by using armed force.

The capabilities of the mass media also make it possible to lower morale among the combatants, the command and the C2 elements. One of the essentials in working with the media is to create a psychological climate that will maximize the possibilities for reconciliation of the warring sides.

If there is a transition to military actions, primary efforts, in coordination with the media, should focus on undermining the combat morale of the warring parties and the moral endurance of the enemy’s population. Doing so lowers the combat potential of the warring parties and their formations. The media can be used to mislead the enemy, and elements of disinformation can be used in official sources.

After the warring parties have been separated, the media must be actively used to help form new organs of power, the army, and the police, to restore the operation of the local media, and to provide information aimed at halting the spread of false rumors, etc.

It is advisable to organize coordination with the media through special bodies that are organizationally a part of the peacekeeping force. In an MNF operation the actions of such bodies must be closely coordinated and reflected in the appropriate plans for the operation. The tasks and coordination procedures of the media-relations groups should be reflected in regulations and the responsibilities placed with specific officials.

In summary, as the above recommendations suggest, there is much basic agreement on the need for sustained, serious study of multi-national peace operations as a factor in enhancing the peace and stability of Europe. Continued dialogue and institutional forums for such study deserve serious attention and can be a valuable area of discourse in the evolution of U.S.-Russian
military-to-military cooperation and in the development of NATO-Russia relations under the Founding Act.
CONCLUSION

OBSERVATIONS ON RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE CONDUCT OF FUTURE MULTI-NATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS: TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS FORCES

Today as we stand at the threshold of a new millennium, we can expect that the early years of the twenty-first century will become years of close cooperation for Russia and NATO in the area of peace operations and in creating a new European security system. The joint operation within the framework of NATO’s IFOR conducted by Russian and US forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina has created a precedent for close Russian-American cooperation. It has shown that two former enemies can work together and achieve peaceful goals in the name of the common good of all the peoples of our planet. The joint performance of tasks by Russian and American soldiers has significantly deepened the mutual understanding and trust that were a natural result of our partnership.

Strategic-Operational Observations. This partnership was made possible by practical steps taken by the national leaders of both countries and was brought to fruition through the cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the US Department of Defense. These steps have achieved an openness between of our defense agencies. The development of a Russian-American dialogue has also been influenced to a significant degree by the generally positive course of our mutual relations, as expressed in important achievements and in other areas of military cooperation. Such achievements include: improving the exchange of information; improving the coordination of military activity, including defense planning and the formulation of defense budgets; joint efforts to bring the main principles of our military doctrines closer together; productive cooperation at international seminars on military problems; and many more.

Future Russian-American military cooperation and trust can be a key factor in long-term peace and stability in Europe. Building trust is a full time, major task among professional soldiers in combined operations following the Cold War. Both militaries should strive to build upon the trust created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the officers and men with Multi-National Division (North) managed to transform partnership into active cooperation among “a band of brothers” in the execution of a new and demanding mission.

Russian-American military commanders must develop and implement the principles that insure successful military operations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina these principles included: common mission; common rules of engagement; unity of command; a single air traffic control system; a single land traffic control system; exchange of intelligence; coordination of public information; and national systems of logistics support.

The military part of peace enforcement and peacemaking is relatively easy compared to the social, political, and economic tasks required of civilian organizations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the military mission was very successful, while the civilian implementation still has far to go.
There is a profound need to develop and improve the ability of international civilian organizations to implement the required steps to develop a permanent and stable peace.

Each side should take the necessary steps to incorporate the lessons and experience of IFOR into their methodology for conducting future peace operations. This study of the IFOR experience provides good reason to pursue a similar Russian-American study of subsequent joint operations. In light of the new NATO-Russia relationship created by the Founding Act, such a study should also address US and Russian perspectives on the development of the international security system of contemporary Europe.

**Tactical Observations.** Future peace operations must continue to employ the three principles that governed the use of the combined peace making forces under IFOR: legitimacy, impartiality and force protection. For effective combined planning and deployment, an understanding of each other’s staff culture is needed. Multi-national cooperation requires far more written products, more conferences, more visits and more private discussions than normal tactical activity, but they pay off in team building. Liaison officers are important but cannot substitute for commanders talking to commanders and staff officers talking to staff officers. The US and Russia need more combat arms officers who are immersed in each other’s language and culture.

Patrolling and other visible tasks need to be combined to build unit cohesion and show that the opposition will not be able to drive a wedge between the forces. Russian forces need to learn to work in a more decentralized mode, while American officers need to be more patient in their quest for information. Russian soldiers need to train to deploy from US helicopters. Americans need to understand Russian concepts of fire support. Liaison officers need to be exchanged wherever forces share a common boundary. Combined training should stress patrolling, live fire, fire support and contingency execution. Russia and America need to conduct follow-on conversations between the tactical and operational officers who have IFOR experience and those who are training for or anticipate participating in future peace operations. These discussions should address the main lessons learned on tactical issues in peace operations employing multi-national forces.

**Intellectual Cooperation.** The authors of this study owe a great debt to the American and Russian soldiers who took part in IFOR. Without their inspiration and cooperation this study could not have been undertaken and completed. We owe a special debt to General George Joulwan and Colonel General Leontiy Shevtsov, who did so much to encourage this effort. A special thanks goes to Dr. Catherine MacArdle Kelleher, who as Under Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, supported this joint research project. The authors were aware from the beginning that they were involved in a ground-breaking undertaking, testing whether such a Russian-American research project could be completed. This study could not have been completed without the support that it received from the U. S. Army Combined Arms Center and its Commander, LTG Montgomery Meigs, and the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the Russian General Staff and its Director, General-Lieutenant Potemkin. The authors would also like to express their appreciation to Robert Montgomery of the National Defense University.
Library, who assisted in obtaining copies of several of the illustrations for this work from the General George Joulwan collection. Working side-by-side on this project in both Russia and the US, the researchers benefitted from a unique opportunity to meet with members of US and Russian political, military, and academic communities. Insights into the problems that may lie ahead for our two countries and for the world, as well as a joint search for solutions, give reason to believe that we are becoming partners, not just in word but in deed.

Like the Russian and American soldiers in IFOR/SFOR, the researchers became one team with one mission. The project leader would like to express his personal thanks to the team members: General-Major Leonid Vasilyevich Luzhkov, Colonel Yuri Vasilyevich Morozov, and Colonel Yuri Nikolayevich Dubov, LTC (Ret.) Timothy Thomas, LTC (Ret.) Lester Grau, and MAJ Raymond Finch. Whatever the task, they willingly devoted their time and talents to its completion. All of us owe a special debt to Mr. Robert R. Love, who served so diligently and effectively as translator and interpreter for this project.

Because of their positive experience in conducting this joint research project, the authors can confidently assert that future joint projects are both feasible and potentially valuable. The team demonstrated an ability to work together. At the close of this unique effort, the authors can say that they have gained a deeper understanding of one another. Future joint projects should aim at resolving common tasks for the US and Russian militaries -- supporting international peace and stability through the joint efforts of Russia and the USA. The Foreign Military Studies Office of the U. S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the Russian General Staff brought unique capabilities to this undertaking and possess the intellectual and organizational capital to sustain future joint research projects. We look to the future cooperation with optimism in the knowledge that through our joint efforts barriers can be overcome.
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http://www.balkaninstitute.org/
The Balkan Institute is a non-profit organization dedicated to educating the public, the media, and policy-makers about the conflict in the Balkans and related security and defense issues. It provides up-to-date news and analysis concerning Bosnia and the Balkans, the Dayton Accords, and related events.

http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/
BosniaLINK is the official Department of Defense information system about U.S. military activities in Operation JOINT GUARD, the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.

http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm
This website provides information relating to NATO's role in bringing peace in the Former Yugoslavia (NATO Basic Fact Sheet) under the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR - Operation Joint Endeavor - 20 Dec. 1995 - 20 Dec. 1996) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR - Joint Guard - 21 +Dec. 1996 - ) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/
This is the premiere site for current information about the events in the American sector of Bosnia which is known as the Multi-National Division North area of operations.

http://www.ohr.int/
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative is responsible for implementation of the 1995 Dayton agreement, which ended the 3-year war in Bosnia.

http://www.oscebih.org/
The Official Website of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Security Cooperation in Europe) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This site provides information about all aspects of the Mission's work, general information about Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provide links to relevant local and international sites.

http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/bosnia.htm
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Peruse an overview of the refugee situation in Bosnia.

http://www.un.org/icty/bl.htm
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Links to major stories and resources on the Balkans from The Washington Post.

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