THE MISSING PHASE: THE NEED FOR A NEW STABILITY PHASE IN MODERN COMBAT OPERATIONS

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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**The Missing Phase The Need for a New Stability Phase in Modern Combat Operations**

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**See attached.**
The U.S. public has come to expect that its troops will rapidly return home following decisive military victories in foreign lands. In Iraq, however, U.S. troops have not been able to rapidly return home. On the contrary, the U.S. has more troops deployed to Iraq now, during the stability operations phase, than it did during the major combat operations phase. Furthermore, although U.S. forces suffered approximately 150 deaths during the initial weeks of major combat operations, they lost almost seven times that number during the first year and a half of postwar stability operations. The unanticipated number of troops lost during stability operations indicates that a combat phase is missing. A new combat phase must be incorporated to address stability operations in order to both reduce U.S. casualties, and inform civilian and military personnel of the length and intricacies involved in reaching stability.

With rapidly advancing technology and an absence of equally equipped foreign threats, it is likely that stability operations will last longer and be more difficult than major combat operations. This paper proposes adding a new phase termed “major combat stability enforcement” to follow the current third phase “major combat operations” and end prior to the beginning of the current fourth phase “post war stability operations.” Additionally, this paper discusses adjusting Joint Guidance to reflect stability operations and the coordination required between the military and interagency organizations to facilitate better planning and execution of stability operations.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. David Jablonsky for the tremendous amount of time and effort he put into teaching me how to write a research paper. The instruction he provided in Course Two laid the foundation for all of the students in Seminar 12 to understand U.S. grand strategy. His instruction in Course Two and throughout the Strategy Research Project will serve me well in my assignments following Army War College.
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THE MISSING PHASE: THE NEED FOR A NEW STABILITY PHASE IN MODERN COMBAT OPERATIONS

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. suffered approximately 150 deaths during the initial weeks of major combat operations. The nation has since lost at least seven times that many troops during the postwar stability operations in that country. The U.S. currently has more troops deployed to Iraq during the stability operations phase than it did during the major combat operations phase. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the commander of all land forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), recognized the crux of the problem: “A lack of effective coordination among military forces (that toppled Saddam Hussein) and civilian agencies sent to rebuild Iraq slowed initial efforts to bring stability to the country…” Moreover, he pointed out, prewar planning and coordination with other government agencies had been inadequate and did not allow U.S. troops to properly conduct stability operations. When McKiernan’s replacement, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, assumed command of coalition forces in 2003, his mission was to defeat an insurgency just beginning to take on momentum and to establish a secure and stable Iraq. When Sanchez relinquished command a year later, that country, in one observer’s description, “was all but coming apart at the seams.” In short, as the two commanders discovered, the longer it takes to stabilize a country, the longer the insurgents have to gain local support.

In past conflicts, the U.S. has inadequately planned post conflict and stability operations. Following Operation Just Cause in Panama, General Maxwell Thurman admitted that he did not pay attention to the post-conflict planning effort because he was too concerned with fighting the battle: “I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic [the post-conflict plan]…” As recently as Operation Desert Storm, the post conflict planning faced significant obstacles. The commander responsible for that phase of operations was unable to obtain any useful staff support to plan for post-conflict issues. The pattern did not significantly change for OIF.

The stakes for improperly planning post conflict operations are extremely high. Ignoring post combat operations or stability planning can reverse ground gained in the first phases of heavy fighting. A victorious long-term outcome lies vulnerable to the small remaining opposing force if stability is not achieved. The U.S. experience in Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, and OIF demonstrated that achieving decisive military victories are easier than what follows. The American way of war, Antulio Echevarria notes in this regard, “tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes.” Iraq has shown that the United States can no longer afford to indulge this tendency. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate
that current military doctrine and governmental processes are inadequate for stability operations in the modern era and that a new combat phase and new interagency procedures are essential to the success of such operations.

CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES

In recent Congressional hearings the service chiefs were asked what they had learned from their experience preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Commandant of the Marine Corps explained that if he had to do it all over again, “I would think more about phase four, the stability portion.” That type of thinking, however, first requires an examination of the current doctrine and procedures associated with stability operations. Joint Doctrine is the guidance that combatant commanders and their staff use when developing campaign plans. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, signed by President Clinton in 1997, is the guidance that drives much of the interagency coordination that occurs today. Currently, Joint Doctrine and PDD 56 provide only a skeletal outline for campaign planning and interagency coordination for stability operations.

JOINT DOCTRINE AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, directs Joint Force Commanders to use four phases when planning major theater operations: “deter/engage, seize the initiative, decisive operations, and transition.” Stability operations take place during the transition phase. Ideally, stability just happens as a result of military success. In this phase, Joint Doctrine suggests that the joint force commander now has time to “focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion” thus achieving a “self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law.” By assuming the transition phase will be characterized by self-sustaining peace, Joint Publication 3-0, dated 10 September 2001, continues to reflect the days when the surrender of a fielded military force resulted in a termination of hostilities. (Figure 1: Phases currently recommended in Joint Publication 3-0.)

A self-sustaining peace did not occur in Iraq, where high-technology weapons allowed the U.S. military to eliminate the leadership while basically leaving the infrastructure and a majority of the population untouched. A major reason that a self-sustaining peace did not occur was the difficulty in Iraq of determining the termination point of hostilities—a characteristic of modern warfare. “[T]he line between war and peace,” Jeffrey Record observes, “was never as clear in the non-European world, and has been steadily blurring for the United States since the end of the Cold War in part because it is difficult to obtain conclusive military victories against irregular enemies who refuse to quit precisely because they cannot be decisively defeated.”

The
irregular enemies the U.S. is facing in Iraq did not quit because their government was replaced following major combat operations. They continued to organize their forces to destroy the stability operations, while the U.S. and its coalition partners tried to figure out how to combat an unexpected insurgent threat.

Along the same lines as Joint Doctrine, the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) does not account for the blurring between peace and war. It does, however, make a clear distinction between major combat operations and stability operations: “The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously.”10 The terms “major combat operations” and “stability operations” imply that once the operation transitions from phase three to phase four, offensive combat operations have terminated and that any combat that occurs in phase four will be defensive in nature (reactionary). Although General Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander and Joint Force Commander for Operation Iraqi Freedom understood the transition period would be very difficult in Iraq, he followed the guidance established in Joint Pub 3-0 and the NMS. Yet his plan called for a four-phase campaign plan with slightly different terminology than what is called for in Joint Publication 3-0: setting the conditions for war, the air campaign, major combat operations (the ground offensive), and postwar stability operations.11 By referring to the fourth phase as “postwar stability operations,” a more peaceful, peacekeeping type of terminology, General Franks may have contributed to the confusion about when the war ended (shifting to defensive combat only) and when peace and stability were expected to occur.
There was insufficient guidance concerning the coordination between the military and the Interagency until the late 1990s. In 1996, Joint Publication 3-08 defined interagency coordination as the "vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and /or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government as well as nongovernmental agencies." In 1997, President Clinton's PDD 56 called for government agencies "to institutionalize lessons learned from recent experiences…to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations." This PDD was the catalyst for a process that now causes all of the entities of the interagency to work together in advance of contingencies. But it did not adequately or regularly force the interagency to address the challenges brought forth during stability operations.

PDD 56 was successful in that detailed interagency planning occurred prior to the war in Iraq. The following working groups conducted post war planning almost a year before the invasion took place: Interagency Iraq Political-Military Cell (National Security Counsel [NSC], State Department [State], Department of Defense [DoD], Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Office of the Vice President [OVP]); Interagency Executive Steering Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP); Interagency Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP, Department of Treasury, Department of Justice [DoJ], U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]); Interagency Energy Infrastructure Working Group (State, DoD, CIA, DoE); Interagency Coalition Working Group (DoD, State); Office of Global Communications (State, DoD, USAID, DoJ, Treasury, the U.S. military, and coalition partners). These groups focused on reconstruction of the Iraqi infrastructure and establishment of a working Iraqi government following combat operations. The basic assumption upon which these groups worked was that they would be conducting their tasks in a peaceful environment. They did not expect or plan to accomplish them in the midst of combat operations. "In fact, the Pentagon was forced to scrap its original plan for rebuilding [Iraq] as violence increased against U.S. forces and basic services were slow to resume."

In addition to the interagency working groups meeting, nine months before the Iraq war, CENTCOM planners conducted detailed planning for postwar operations, which they called "Phase IV." In December 2002, the initial concepts were turned over to an operational planning team based in Qatar known as Joint Task Force IV (JTF-IV). JTF-IV was comprised of all applicable interagency organizations including representatives from the departments of Defense, State and the Treasury, USAID, CIA and, from the White House, staff of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Nevertheless, this detailed
preconflict analysis of postwar requirements did not result in timely and effective stabilization efforts following major combat operations. Like Joint Doctrine, the interagency planning and training that occurred prior to the war mistakenly focused on postwar reconstruction in a stable and peaceful environment.

ANALYSIS

The Christian Science Monitor accurately described the results of the four-phased campaign for OIF: “In Iraq, shock and awe from the air allowed for US ground troops’ quick dash to Baghdad. But it also sent most of Saddam Hussein’s loyalist forces underground, thereby setting the scene for an insurgency that continues to seriously undermine efforts at reconstruction.”

The fact is that no combination of CENTCOM's war plan and guidance provided by the NMS and Joint Doctrine is adequate to plan and execute stability operations if an insurgency occurs. The brutal combat characteristics of this phase and the force required to successfully mount stability operations are simply not sufficiently addressed.

Prior to the war, some military leaders recognized these deficiencies, arguing that while a small coalition force moving rapidly and supported by adequate firepower might well defeat the Iraqi army, a larger force would still be necessary for the ensuing stability operations. The objective of providing security and stability in Iraq, in other words, was going to be more difficult than achieving a quick military victory. From this perspective, several active duty and retired military and civilian leaders believed that the postwar stability operations phase was not receiving the proper attention and planning prior to the beginning of hostilities. Their reservations proved to be accurate. “This is not what they were selling (before the war),” the secretary of the Army Thomas White said, describing how senior Defense officials downplayed the need for a large occupation force. “It’s almost a question of people not wanting to fess up to the notion that we will be there a long time and they might have to set up a rotation and sustain it for the long term.”

The growing insurgency and a lack of security more than a year and a half after the fall of Baghdad demonstrate that a stability combat operations phase is missing in military campaign planning. A new phase termed MAJOR COMBAT STABILITY ENFORCEMENT will allow the military to improve its planning and execution of stability operations. The primary objective in this new phase is to maintain the initiative and conduct offensive operations to stamp out insurgent activity before it escalates. In a similar manner, the INTERAGENCY PROCESS should be an essential part of the planning for all phases of any future military campaigns, not solely the postwar phases. “Recent American experiences with post-conflict operations,” one
recent study concludes, “have generally featured poor planning, problems with relevant military force structure, and difficulties with a handover from military to civilian responsibility.”

NEW JOINT GUIDANCE

In the midst of an unstable environment during OIF, partial authority was handed over to a government-like organization that competed with the military commanders concerning who was in charge in Iraq. This competition remained unresolved and following major combat operations in Iraq, a combination of interagency and DoD control prevailed. When General Franks declared Iraq’s liberation, he announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA served as the acting government pending the Iraqi people’s creation of a new government. Although General Franks initially headed the CPA, that position was soon assigned to retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner and then to L. Paul Bremmer. Instead of reporting to the State Department, the CPA reported to the President through the DoD. The rationale was based on lessons learned from Bosnia. In Bosnia a dual reporting and command structure existed: The United Nations was in charge of civil reconstruction, yet the U.N. did not report to the same authorities to which the military chain-of-command reported. As a consequence, the dual reporting and command structure did not allow for unity of effort and caused confusion concerning who was in charge. In Iraq, however, the situation was different. The U.S. should have had unity of effort since it was in charge of both the civil reconstruction and the military operations. Moreover, one agency, the Department of Defense, was the lead for the overall operation. Nevertheless, in Iraq the dual reporting of the military and the CPA to the DoD proved ineffective as well, and in fact diminished the military’s capability to perform combat stability operations. A major problem was that the CPA made decisions about stability and security that should have been made by military commanders. The military should have had priority over the CPA until stability and security were assured. Additionally, the CPA was unprepared to deal with overall reconstruction operations while combat continued throughout Iraq. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey noted the confusing nature of the relationship between Lt Gen Sanchez and the head of the CPA. “I think Rick got sucked into Bremer’s CPA and rarely broke out of his orbit,” he commented.

Lines of responsibility from the Secretary of Defense to the President were clear; however, lines to the Secretary of Defense were complex, adding confusion and ambiguity to the situation in Iraq. The head of the CPA reported to the Secretary of Defense for non-military issues. This added time and needless bureaucracy to his already challenging job. Many of these types of problems could have been resolved by adding a new combat phase clearly defining the
military and civilian roles, chain of command, and necessary tasks involved in converting a combat environment to a stable one. The new “major combat stability enforcement” phase should be inserted following the major combat operations phase but prior to the postwar reconstruction phase. The result is a five-phase campaign plan: setting the conditions for war, the air campaign, major combat operations (the ground offensive), major combat stability enforcement, and postwar reconstruction. This new phase is needed because technology has altered the way wars are prosecuted. Throughout the history of warfare, enemy leaders and military commanders tended to be the last to be killed or defeated, normally after the defeat of the fielded military. New technology allows great powers like the U.S. to directly attack the leaders and military commanders before the fielded military forces have been defeated or even engaged in some cases. This method of decapitating the opposition before defeating the majority of the forces has created an environment in which insurgent operations can reorganize and flourish. The proposed new stability phase acknowledges this situation by addressing the inevitability of fighting combat stability operations following the fall of government or military leadership.

Figure 2 shows a proposed chart for campaign phases that could be included in Joint Pub 3-0.

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<td>ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL AND RULE OF LAW REDEPLOY</td>
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**FIGURE 2. PROPOSED CAMPAIGN PHASES**

The ends (objectives) of adding a major combat stability phase are to provide stability and security through the appropriate use of military power and to facilitate proper prewar planning for this phase. Prewar planning for a new “combat” phase helps emphasize its importance in
relation to the first three phases. This is true because prewar planning for combat operations always receives more attention and priority than planning for postwar operations. In addition to improving planning for this new phase, adding it allows commanders and politicians to show progress by advancing the entire operation to a new phase without losing the combat initiative and offensive nature of the main effort. Fighting an organized insurgent enemy is different from fighting an organized fielded military. A new combat phase acknowledges this fact as well.

The 2003 Joint Operations Concept, signed by the Secretary of Defense, defines stability operations as “military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability.”

In calling for stability operations to “maintain” and “reestablish order” this definition suggests that stability operations are defensive, law enforcement type operations. The Joint Operations Concept’s definition of stability operations did not envision that major offensive combat operations would be necessary to reclaim hostile cities. When major combat operations are necessary during the stabilization phase it causes confusion within the military and within the U.S. public. A new combat phase, prior to a “postwar” demarcation, would help to clear up the picture. Additionally, the four-phase model outlined in Joint Pub 3-0 adds to the confusion about when the end of major combat occurs by referring to the fourth phase as the “transition phase,” when major combat in many cases continues or escalates during this period.

The ways (concepts) include planning and conducting stability operations in a combat phase, not a “postwar” operations phase. The concept that stability operations would take place in a combat environment was not expected in Iraq. The situation in that country is an example of the reluctance of U.S. civilian and military leaders to consider the establishment of political and economic order (establishing security) as a part of war itself. Prewar planning for this additional phase should emphasize insurgent operations, threat of terrorism, border security, ammunition accountability, training security and defense forces, and securing U.S. national objectives before transitioning to a postwar phase. If CENTCOM planners had had these considerations in mind, the “Shock and Awe” air and ground campaign might have been planned differently. Planners concerned with a combat stability enforcement phase might have focused on more fully defeating the enemy and not so much on speed in achieving a quick military objective. This is more than just an academic point. The combat linkage of a stability enforcement phase to a decisive operations phase can become pivotal to effective reconstruction strategies in future wars with important implications not just for military planning and command arrangements, but for the implementation of governance operations as well.
Obtaining resources [means] for the post-conflict plan tends to be the final and most difficult step in the planning process. The ability to obtain the resources for this new phase should be the critical factor when deciding whether the U.S. has the ability to conduct military actions in the future. This new phase will likely require more forces than those for the major combat operations phase. In Iraq, the primary coalition question should have been whether there were enough forces to secure the country, not to defeat Saddam and his army. Prior to the beginning of the war, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army both called for significantly more troops for the stability and security phase. Having this new phase written in Joint Doctrine and thus a major part of the campaign plan would have given their argument more weight.

A new “combat” phase in Joint Doctrine will demand the same level of attention and priority that the first three phases receive. This is a suitable alternative to the four-phase model and should have a positive impact on the way stability and security operations are conducted. It will help commanders maintain the initiative and focus on winning the war before making the transition to postwar operations. In Iraq, the postwar stability operations phase concentrated on defending against insurgent attacks for well over a year. Not until commanders began offensive combat operations to reclaim cities and towns did the U.S. and Iraqi forces begin to reclaim the initiative in the war. This delay allowed the insurgents and terrorist to organize and gather supplies to fight an effective guerrilla warfare campaign.

Even though the new phase may require more forces than the major combat operations phase, it is feasible for the current force structure to support it. This is true because adding more forces to conduct offensive stability enforcement should result in more rapidly gaining a secure and stable environment. The U.S. strategy “should include the rapid stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force (but larger is usually better); [and] a shift to minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible.” Thus, the need for more forces immediately following major combat operations to stabilize and secure victory should result in fewer forces required to remain for an extended period of time. However, if the country is not quickly secured and stabilized following military victories, force levels and deployment times are likely to increase proportionately. One recent study concludes: “The longer a U.S. occupation of Iraq continues, the more danger exists that elements of the Iraqi population will become impatient and take violent measures to hasten the departure of U.S. forces.” As predicted, the lengthy occupation has led to violent measures that require more forces than expected to provide stability and security. Had Iraq been secured and stabilized in the summer of 2003, the number of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq today would be far fewer.
The acceptability of adding a new phase and thus more forces following military victories is the biggest challenge since it will require a change in the way Americans think about foreign military interventions. The experiences in Vietnam and subsequent interventions such as Lebanon and Somalia have lowered U.S. public and congressional tolerance levels for inconclusive conflict. President Bush acknowledged as much when he stated that "Americans want nothing more than the troops to return home following decisive battles." And yet planning for a major combat enforcement stability phase implies the potential for a protracted campaign even before the commencement of hostilities.

The picture, however, is not so grim. To begin with, the new phase will provide more complete and realistic information on which policy makers can gauge whether to pursue policies concerning the use of force. Much of this more complete information will come from the U.S. military, compelled by the requirements of the new phase to focus more thoroughly on resources and concepts for combat stability operations. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has acknowledged the need for this focus in his recent guidance which requires combatant commanders to devote more resources and attention to post hostility planning in their war plans. At the same time, the arguments that form the basis for the feasibility of the new phase can also apply in gaining public and congressional acceptance. Simply put, the more forces used in the new phase, the more rapid the stability and security achieved in the environment, and thus the less protracted the requirement for military forces during the establishment of civil control and rule of law in the transition phase.

At the operational level, the risk of adding the phase is that it will add complexity to the overall campaign plan. This is true. But the small amount of added complexity should reduce the ambiguity associated with the current stabilization efforts taking place in the so-called "postwar" phase. The traditional four-phased model clearly does not adequately address considerations for successful stability operations—a development that should not continue. "Given today’s realities," one analyst points out, "failure to prepare adequately for present and future political-insurgency war contingencies is unconscionable." The U.S. tendency has been to prepare inadequately for insurgency warfare. The five-phase model addresses the critical issues that will help the U.S. and coalition partners of the future prepare more effectively to conduct this type of operations.

NEW INTERAGENCY PLANNING AND ACTIONS

Military planning using the new phase will benefit from interagency involvement from start to finish. The successful campaign will have an organization that aggregates military and non-
military agencies into one unified command able to adapt and utilize resources efficiently. However, interagency involvement does not mean that any U.S. agency other than the DoD should be in charge until stability and security have been achieved. Having both a military commander and civilian provisional authority running operations in Iraq at the same time in the same area added confusion and violated the principle of unity of command.

Combat operations should be the priority during the planning and execution of the new phase with security and stability operations driving requirements. Logistical requirements aimed at nation building and redeployment of troops and equipment should shift to the fifth and final “transition” phase, involving postwar reconstruction. A formal handover of command from the military to the State Department should mark the transition from war to this “postwar” reconstruction phase.

The ends (objectives) of this strategy are to ensure all means of the federal government are used to plan and execute all phases of military campaigns in the future. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 the military was not in a position to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan without the help of the Central Intelligence Agency and several other government agencies that make up the interagency. The military relied on the groundwork the CIA had previously accomplished to plan and execute operations in Afghanistan. It relied on the interagency to cut off the terrorist’s money supply and other means of waging terror. This interagency coordination and cooperation with the military occurred because the military did not have the required time or the ability to strike the landlocked country of Afghanistan on its own. Operation Enduring Freedom is a good example of how the military and the interagency should execute operations in the future. Although, “there was no interagency plan developed before OEF launched into Afghanistan, the military cooperated with the interagency out of necessity.” The advantages gained by cooperating with the interagency for OEF, however, did not carry over to planning of OIF. Some analysts have noted that during the planning for OIF, “the Defense Department kept civilian agencies largely out of the process...” This was unfortunate. To be successful in Iraq and in other such operations in the future, the military must have the cooperation of the interagency and work as an integrated team in that process for the entire operation. Iraq has demonstrated that it is less than ideal to keep the interagency out of the planning process for the first three phases of such a campaign. Those phases are concerned with defeating a holistic threat. Counterinsurgency efforts must, therefore, have similar characteristics. The addition of a phase that combines combat and stability operations will only accentuate the need to include interagency involvement throughout the entire planning process to ensure a holistic effort from start to finish.
The ways (concepts) are to create an integrated team from the appropriate agencies to plan and execute operations in the future. Since interagency planning and coordination with the military in Iraq was lacking for the first three phases of the campaign, the plans for the war and postwar periods were largely developed separately. Secretary Rumsfeld noted that this was a problem and has taken the initiative to correct this problem with a new directive to the combatant commanders. Inherent in this directive is the idea that commanders will plan the high-intensity part of the war differently if they are also thinking about how to stabilize the country after the major fight is over. This idea will be further enhanced with the creation of a new phase that combines combat and stability operations. Moreover, the fact that combat commanders will remain in command during stability operations will provide a consistent and unambiguous focus for interagency participation until the Department of State assumes control in the fifth and final phase.

The means (resources) for the interagency to be involved in all phases of future operations already exist in the sense that all necessary agencies are already in existence. However, the rest of the organizations that make up the interagency are not manned or financed to the level of the DoD. These inequities must be addressed for the interagency process to better assist the military in the first four phases of future campaigns and for the Department of State control in the fifth phase. For in the end, the military must rely on the resources and expertise available within the interagency to make the new five-phase campaign effort successful.

Interagency involvement in planning and executing all phases of future military operations is highly suitable to the holistic achievement of the objectives. According to one high level Joint Staff officer, an interagency review of all DoD plans will be an integral part of the new Adaptive Planning process being implemented by DoD. Combatant commanders should ensure interagency involvement in campaign planning from beginning to end because, “leadership at all levels must understand that generating a more complete unity of effort [with the interagency] and concomitant strategic clarity is imperative.”

Interagency involvement is also feasible throughout the entire five-phased planning and execution process for future military operations. Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has accentuated the need for the military to involve the interagency in the process. The addition of a new phase makes this need more urgent because of the unique expertise that many in the interagency provide to the military to better plan and execute stability enforcement operations. All this is in keeping with the fundamental philosophy of PDD 56 that “military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management.
and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.\textsuperscript{43}

As was the case with Joint Doctrine, the acceptability of interagency involvement in the planning process of future military operations is a real challenge. The military is known for keeping plans under tight security. Trust of other government agencies will have to be built for this option to be effective. Both the military and the interagency are known for conducting operations in isolation from one another, within “stovepipes”, according to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace.\textsuperscript{44} These stovepipes must be eliminated to achieve unity of effort throughout the planning process. To break into the military planning process as more than a superficial review, the interagency must be given a real voice that includes the ability to raise concerns about military plans to the appropriate levels of government.

The risk of adverse consequences from interagency involvement in military campaign planning using the new five-phase campaign planning process is real. Leaks to the press or mistakes attributed to the interagency that result in less effective military operations would be hard to overcome. The risk that a lack of trust between agencies of the federal government and the military may develop or increase is also a concern and must be acknowledged. However, since planning and coordination to use all aspects of national power (military and the interagency) is essential to win future wars against holistic threats, this risk must be taken.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study does not suggest that stability and security operations in Iraq would have been easy if that operation had contained a combat stability enforcement phase and if the interagency had been involved throughout the planning and execution of all of the phases of the campaign. “Yes, the Pentagon botched the planning for the Iraq occupation,” one national-security specialist observed, “but no amount of good planning could have surmounted the herculean task of remaking an entire society from the ground up, especially a fractious one like Iraq with no experience with democracy.”\textsuperscript{45} But this study does conclude that adding a new phase to Joint Doctrine and ensuring interagency involvement in planning and executing all phases of future military campaigns will be the more effective way to plan and execute such operations for the foreseeable future.

At the end of World War II, the German and Japanese militaries were thoroughly defeated; their will to fight had been eliminated and their means to do so, in any case, was
completely diminished after years of war. This was not the case when Baghdad fell. Many in Iraq did not lose their will to fight after just weeks of war. Many, who knew they could not face the U.S. and coalition forces head on, retained the means and desire to fight an insurgent war after the U.S. and coalition forces concluded major combat operations. The U.S. did not anticipate the large number of insurgents or their ability to wage an unconventional war. Adding a new combat phase is a way to minimize the effects of unanticipated problems following major combat operations and to manage expectations. In other words, it is better to prepare for an insurgency that may or may not occur than to react to one that was not anticipated.

Proper interagency coordination was lacking in the planning for and conduct of the first three phases of OIF. The slow start of stability operations following the fall of Baghdad may have been minimized with interagency coordination throughout these phases of the campaign. Without such coordination, no amount of fixes and addition of new phases will close the gap between conflict termination and conflict resolution.

A symbiotic combination of a new combat phase and proper interagency involvement are essential for successful military operations in the future. Seeking to achieve quick and decisive military victories is natural; seeking to achieve lasting national objectives is more difficult. “Successful conflict termination, post-conflict peace operations, and conflict resolution” one analyst notes, “depend on the civil and military leadership recognizing that the end of the conflict is as critical as the conduct of war.”

WORD COUNT=5,753
ENDNOTES

1 Ron Martz, “Power Vacuum Hurt In Iraq, General Says: Officer cites persistence of 'chaos';” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 14 October 2004, p. 3B.


4 Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), 2.


7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001), III-19. Phasing is further defined in this pub as, “a basic tenet of campaign plan design. Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives that cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations.” III-18.

8 Ibid, III-21.

9 Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003), 4.


11 Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters, (Autumn 2003): 91. Schadlow further points out in terms of Operation Iraqi Freedom that “this temporal approach to war planning has permitted civilian and military planners to allow CENTCOM to pay less attention to the final phase [transition] of the war.”


15 Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. rushed post-Saddam planning,” *The Washington Times*, Available from <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030903-120317-9393r.htm>. Accessed 28 January 2005. Scarborough cites a Joint Chiefs of Staff report that discusses the lack of interagency planning prior to the war itself. “Planning for the post-Saddam period, the interagency process, such as between the Pentagon and State Department, was not fully integrated prior to hostilities.”


17 Ibid.


19 Echevarria, 15.


21 Crane and Terrill, 1.

22 United States Department of Defense Home Page, *Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq*.

23 Ibid.


26 Schadlow, 86.
Ibid.

28 Flavin, 108. For more information on war termination see, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” James W. Reed, Parameters, (Summer 1993) 41-52. Over ten years before OIF in the wake of the first Gulf War, Reed called for a greater emphasis on planning the post conflict operations phase of war: “Recent events…suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters.”


31 Crane and Terrill, 34.


35 Max G. Manwaring, Shadows of Things Past and Images of The Future: Lessons For The Insurgencies In Our Midst (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), 40.


37 Flavin, 103.

38 Jaffe and Cloud, 2.


40 Jaffe and Cloud, 2.

41 Ibid, 2.

42 Manwaring, 44.

43 Clinton, 1.

45 Knickerbocker.

46 For a comparison to WWII’s insurgency and U.S. nation building see James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2003) xxix and 244. For further comparisons see Flavin, 95-112.

47 Flavin, 281.
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Reed, James W. “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning.” *Parameters*, (Summer 1993) 41-52.


