AMERICAS COMMAND: PROMOTING REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

by

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Americas Command Promoting Regional Stability in the Western Hemisphere**

**John Angevine**

**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050**

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The United States is becoming more economically integrated with the countries in the Western Hemisphere, which means greater commercial movement of people and materiel across our borders, over the land and sea, and in the air. Our government is currently negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement with Canada and Latin American countries for implementation by 2005, conducting bilateral trade agreements in the interim. This policy seeks to create a Western Hemisphere economic community. Accordingly, we should adopt a unified hemispheric approach for military cooperative security to achieve coherent and synchronized economic, homeland defense, and homeland security policies and strategies.

Current DoD homeland defense strategy is no longer balanced to protect the homeland as well as to promote economic security, because the strategy of partitioning the Western Hemisphere no longer accounts for the new operating environment. Because transnational threats and natural disasters do not recognize geographic or political boundaries, we must question the efficacy of a military strategy that narrowly focuses on geographic borders in an era of globalization and interdependence. The responsibility for conducting military security cooperation, promoting an economically stable environment, and providing for homeland defense has been divided between two unified commands. This division of responsibility unnecessarily increases the risk of uncoordinated and confusing implementation of policy.

Instead, the United States needs to improve cooperative security and obtain cooperation with our neighbors to support effective homeland defense and security strategies as a whole throughout the hemisphere. Consequently, the Western Hemisphere should be viewed as a single theater of operation to ensure the effective defense of the homeland, since current threats do not recognize or honor boundaries. Establishing a companion cooperative security framework to the FTAA economic framework would rebalance the U.S. strategy to promote regional stability and protect the homeland.
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The future of this hemisphere depends on the strength of three commitments: democracy, security and market-based development. These commitments are inseparable, and none will be achieved by half-measures.

—President George W. Bush, January 2002

Three years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States is still fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), expecting the war to last many more years. The United States is now more aware of transnational terrorists' and non-state actors' behaviors; it recognizes the need to work with other nations to reduce terrorism to the realm of local law enforcement jurisdiction. The Department of Defense (DoD) has identified 11 terrorist organizations within Latin America—including Hezbollah, Al Gam’ at, and HAMAS.\(^1\) Given increasing risks from terrorism and other transnational threats, the current U.S. objectives are to maintain security and stability in the Western Hemisphere. These transnational hemispheric threats—terrorism, narco-terrorism, illicit immigration, insurgencies, arms smuggling, document forgery, and others—represent continuing problems for fledging democracies and weak economies. These threats undermine security and stability in the Latin American region, as well as in the hemisphere. To respond to these threats, DoD seeks to professionalize the Latin America militaries to remain subordinate to civilian rule, to improve their capabilities to become coalition partners, and to defeat transnational threats within the region.

In addition, we seek to increase prosperity in the hemisphere through trade, with the ultimate goal of implementing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Expanded trade will increase regional wealth, quality of life, and development—leading to increased hemispheric stability. Consequently, U.S. policy seeks to create an interdependent hemispheric economic community. Our leaders should likewise adopt a unified hemispheric approach for military cooperative security to achieve coherent and synchronized economic, homeland defense, and homeland security policies and strategies.

However, the United States has divided the Western Hemisphere into two regional unified commands—Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)—without an integrating mechanism to achieve its strategic ends of maintaining security and stability in the Western Hemisphere. The United States should now establish a permanent unified command that views the Western Hemisphere as a complete system.

With an understanding of the historic foundation of key hemispheric relationships—especially those with Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—we can overcome decades of suspicion by
collaborating with them to build a new cooperative hemispheric security architecture to secure U.S. ends by rebalancing our strategic ways and means. This paper describes changes in the strategic environment that affect hemispheric stability in an emerging interdependent hemispheric economy. It proposes changes our leaders should make to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in order to enhance hemispheric stability and security—thereby meeting the new challenges of the 21st century.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

LATIN AMERICA

The United States involvement with Latin America—broadly defined as South America, Caribbean Basin, Central America, and Mexico—is long and tumultuous. Latin America’s perspective on the United States’ pursuit of its interests over the last 181 years is one of U.S. intervention in their internal affairs, lack of U.S. sensitivity to their needs, and support of authoritarian regimes over their democracies. Failing to gain mutual respect and cooperation over the years, the United States has created an atmosphere of distrust between the most powerful state and the other states of the Western Hemisphere. Since 1823, when President Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine that dissuaded European colonial interests in Latin America, to President George W. Bush’s current free trade negotiations that seek to create a hemispheric free trade zone, Washington has coercively intervened in Latin America 22 times. These policies and interventions demonstrate Washington’s interests in the hemisphere. Mexico is especially sensitive because of its vast territorial losses to the United States and encroachment of its borders by U.S. forces. In response, countries of Latin America have sought to balance U.S. power and influence by embracing international accords calling for non-interference in internal affairs, for respecting sovereignty, and for promoting democracy. Latin America will justifiably view future U.S. efforts with suspicion—frustrating Washington’s efforts to negotiate with transparency, to explain its motives, and to develop future relationships based on mutual interests, respect, and reciprocity.

Mexico

The 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border is the economic and cultural nexus for Mexico and the United States, demarking the relationship and attitudes of both countries. While Mexico seeks partnership with the United States on common interests, it also attempts to balance the asymmetrical power relationship by strongly championing “the principles of nonintervention and self-determination.” Mexico City and Washington currently enjoy a maturing economic
relationship; however, their military relationship remains in its infancy.\textsuperscript{8,9,10} Much U.S.-Mexican cooperation focuses on “law enforcement, immigration, counterdrug activities, and border control operations.”\textsuperscript{11} Attempting to repair the U.S.-Mexico military relationship, Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “communicated to the Mexican military authorities...[that] we are looking for a much closer level of engagement” to improve cooperation in counterterrorism and consequence management of a catastrophic attack on civilians.\textsuperscript{12}

The Bi-National Commission, a cabinet-level forum for U.S.-Mexican activities, seeks to cooperate on common interests—migration, law enforcement, security and border control coordination, foreign policy, trade and economics, science and technical cooperation, and energy. This group could serve as a forum to create an interdependent military relationship that converges with the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) economic framework.\textsuperscript{13} During the Cold War, the United States did not include Mexico and Canada in its UCP. John Cope, National Defense University strategist, asserts that Mexico’s objection to the United States assigning it to NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) is a major reason why Washington did not establish an U.S. Americas Command (AMCOM).\textsuperscript{14} Both Joseph Núñez, Army War College strategist, and Cope insist that until Washington accepts Mexico and other Latin America countries as full partners and seriously considers their interests, they will remain disinclined to participate fully in hemispheric cooperative security and economic endeavors.\textsuperscript{15,16}

Brazil

Within Latin America, Brazil exerts tremendous influence. With the world’s ninth largest economy, Brazil spends more on its military than any other Latin American country and sets the region’s international political agenda.\textsuperscript{17,18,19} Brazil’s sphere of influence includes close cooperation with Chile and Argentina. While Brazil aspires to be the subregional leader, many countries of Latin America question whether Brazil is a “huge neighbor rather than a leader.”\textsuperscript{20,21,22} However, Mario Galofre Cano, former Colombian ambassador to Brazil, stated, “You cannot deny Brazil’s nature, size, influence, and moral standards.”\textsuperscript{23,24}

Brazil is lobbying hard for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, having served five previous terms as a non-permanent member.\textsuperscript{25} The United States and Brazil have enjoyed friendly relations since 1822, when the United States was the first nation to recognize Brazil’s independence.\textsuperscript{26} Like many Latin American nations, Brazil is willing to accept U.S. leadership in a reciprocal relationship, but it does not want to be viewed as “the U.S.’ deputy.”\textsuperscript{27}
Since the naval disarmament and the demilitarization of the Great Lakes under the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, the United States and Canada have enjoyed a lasting peace that has evolved into an interdependent relationship that is "perhaps the closest and most extensive in the world." Through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command, the Canadian and U.S. defense relationship serves as a model for creating an interdependent security framework; it treats the northern half of the Western Hemisphere as a single theater of operation. Thomas D’Aquino, Canadian Council of Chief Executives, emphasized that “North America economic integration is irreversible and North American economic and physical security are indivisible.” However, the long-term success of the U.S.-Canadian defense interdependence is founded on mutual interests, reciprocity, and a partnership described by President Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, as an equal partnership that identified and pursued a “shared vision.” The Permanent Joint Board on Defense serves as a forum to discuss and explore new ideas, manage alliance conflict, and provide alliance conflict resolution—presenting its recommendations to its respective political leaders. In the near future, the Joint Board will have to deal with such common concerns as consequence management of attacks, intelligence sharing, and Mexico’s future role as part of the U.S.-Canada interdependent relationship.

UNITED STATES’ HEMISPHERIC INTERESTS

The United States is again at a crossroads in specifying its interests in the Western Hemisphere. Defense of the homeland is this nation’s highest priority. To ensure maximum flexibility to fight terrorism, the United States will have to take the fight to all parts of the world, using all of the elements of its national power—taxing Washington’s financial, diplomatic, and military resources. Specifically, President Bush’s policy calls for “working to transform our forces to more effectively confront the dangers of the 21st century and better protect America and our vital interests.” The end of the Cold War offered Washington an opportunity to redefine its relationship with Latin America based on mutual interests, but the 9/11 terrorist attack established a new urgency for the United States to define and secure those interests.

Currently, the United States has not developed a unified hemispheric approach for military cooperative security to achieve coherent and synchronized economic, homeland defense, and homeland security policies and strategies. Even so, the United States is becoming more economically integrated with the countries in the Western Hemisphere, which means greater commercial movement of people and materiel across our borders, over the land and sea, and in
the air. While the FTAA represents Washington’s means to deal with hemispheric poverty and economic development issues, DoD is attempting to improve Latin American countries’ military capabilities to defeat transnational threats within their borders and to increase regional security cooperation to defeat transnational threats within the Latin American region. This cooperative security effort serves to defend the United States because it enables us to defeat and interdict these threats before they can enter into the United States.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has charged defense planners to take into account U.S. interests and objectives, specifically peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere, security and well-being of allies and friends, and vitality and productivity of the global economy. A principal DoD objective in the Western Hemisphere focuses on preventing crises or insurgencies from spreading across borders and destabilizing neighboring states, thereby placing U.S. economic and political interests at risk. A destabilized region could serve as “fertile ground for non-state actors engaging in drug trafficking, terrorism, and other activities that spread across the borders.” According to Thomas Barnett, Naval War College strategist, portions of Latin America and Caribbean states are part of a non-functional gap that terrorists will exploit to attack the United States if these states remain politically and economically isolated. A DoD military objective seeks to promote regional stability to defend the homeland by entering into alliances, as well as bilateral security arrangements, which ensure American security.

U.S. military resources have shrunk since the end of the Cold War. After the 9/11 attack, even fewer resources are available to help create a stable hemisphere. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review panel will have to address impending fiscal constraints when formulating future military strategies—which must respond to a “wider range of challenges, including irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.” Michèle Flournoy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that at some point in the future the Pentagon will have to “make difficult choices about the way forward at the same time you’re trying to shift and change.” In formulating a hemispheric strategy to secure national interests, U.S. leaders should deal with Latin American countries as equal partners while helping them to understand that regional stability and cooperation is important to them, too. Sharing this responsibility as equal partners would alleviate some U.S. resource constraints and enhance hemispheric stability by encouraging other states to be more effective. The benefit to the hemisphere is increased security, strengthened fragile democracies, and bolstered economies. A stable hemisphere increases U.S. flexibility to commit maximum resources to fight the GWOT outside of the Western Hemisphere.
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The U.S. military has not focused intensely on homeland defense and support to homeland security since the War of 1812. Núñez observes that we have now learned that our homeland is not an isolated island and that dire threats can indeed harm us. Hence, hemispheric stability will contribute to our homeland defense, enabling us to view the hemisphere as a single theater of operation. Thus, we should endorse a cooperative security concept and implement a coherent regional security cooperation strategy.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS A SINGLE THEATER OF OPERATION

By partitioning the Western Hemisphere into two unified commands, DoD’s current strategy is no longer balanced to protect the homeland as well as to promote economic security, because this strategy does not account for the new operating environment—which includes globalization, FTAA, NAFTA, and numerous trade agreements. This partition increases the risk of uncoordinated and confusing policy implementation. Describing the new strategic environment, Joe Nye asserts that strategic planners are dealing with increasing levels of globalization and interdependence; he observes that “effects of events in one geographical area, …[in] the economic or ecological dimension, can have profound effects in other geographical areas, on the military or social dimensions.” Because transnational threats and natural disasters do not recognize geographic or political boundaries, we must question the efficacy of a military strategy that narrowly focuses on artificial geographic borders in an era of emerging globalization and interdependence.

The Defense Department must take into account the incipient and maturing transnational threat capabilities, just as during the World War II era the U.S. War Department had to take into account Germany’s increased military aircraft capabilities in the late 1930s, which threatened the Western Hemisphere. Expanding German aircraft capabilities forced the War Department to approach homeland defense in the context of a single and holistic theater of operation, that is “a complete system”: the Western Hemisphere. Once again, today’s enemies pose a direct threat to hemispheric stability and the U.S. homeland. If threats do not respect boundaries, then the United States must approach the Western Hemisphere as a single theater of operation to provide effective and efficient use of its collective means to bolster homeland defense and to promote hemispheric stability. For example, illegal drugs transit from Colombia through the Caribbean into the United States. Smugglers, illegal immigrants, and other illicit actors use this same infrastructure; their activities transcend boundaries and destabilize the hemisphere.
through political and governmental corruption, bribery, narco-terrorism, terrorism, and other
criminality. This infrastructure can penetrate the United States, if it has not already done so.

Recognizing no boundaries, natural disasters are currently dealt with on an ad hoc and
often erratic international basis, often forcing victims in poorer countries to suffer needlessly
until regional countries may organize and coordinate relief efforts.\textsuperscript{56} This inability to quickly and
effectively deal with natural disasters can erode regional or hemispheric stability and jeopardize
economic security and growth in the hemisphere, providing a window of opportunity for the new
enemy to foment discontent among the people of the affected region and destabilize democratic
institutions within the affected countries.\textsuperscript{57} The Central American floods of the 1990s and the
2004 hurricane season’s severe impact on Caribbean islands serve as recent examples of the
region’s slow responses to natural disasters.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{COOPERATIVE SECURITY}

Cooperative security will enhance hemispheric stability within the Americas; it should be
built on trust, shared values, and mutual interests.\textsuperscript{59} States can promote hemispheric stability
by standardizing and improving national and international movements of people and materials to
prevent terrorists and weapons of mass destruction from entering the hemisphere and then the
United States. This cooperative effort would deter terrorists from traveling to and through the
Americas. Countries can improve information-sharing on suspected terrorists and illicit trade to
prevent their freedom of movement. A corollary to information-sharing would involve states
coordinating intelligence-gathering and -sharing to provide early warning of potential sources of
conflict and of gathering threats. Governments can implement hemispheric coordinated
education programs to improve awareness and preparedness, and to combat and respond to
acts of terrorism.

By deterring potential regional conflicts— intra-state or inter-state—states can establish
and coordinate military confidence- and security-building measures to enhance trust,
understanding, and interoperability. To quickly alleviate peoples’ suffering the effects of natural
disasters or crises, states can increase effectiveness and efficiency by coordinating proactive
responses, by sharing resources, and by burden-sharing to respond to natural disasters and to
prevent or react to other crises within the hemisphere. Increasing governmental transparency is
key to stability and to a stronger FTAA economic framework; transparency creates a supportive
environment for business and economic activities throughout the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{50, 61, 62}
Partnerships with other states of the Americas can provide an interdependent hemispheric
security and economic system. It also enhances peace, prosperity, and sovereignty. Likewise,
cooperative hemispheric security would enable the United States to monitor first points of entry of suspected terrorist throughout the region, rather than at U.S. borders and ports of entry.  

SECURITY COOPERATION

Security cooperation—executed in part through U.S. military programs—provides a viable way for the U.S. military to promote regional stability by reinforcing democratic values and principles, by demonstrating respect for human rights, by securing territories and defending borders, by ensuring regional and hemispheric security, and by dealing with transnational threats. Effective use of security cooperation programs will foster closer working relationships among the hemisphere’s states, enabling them to work side-by-side to promote regional stability. Linking DoD’s security cooperation to a holistic theater operational system will provide our hemispheric partners with a coherent understanding of the U.S. objectives in the Western Hemisphere.

Although SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM are conducting security cooperation within the hemisphere, it is not integrated or coordinated to achieve coherent hemispheric results. Most notably, illicit trafficking easily enters the United States, transcending both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM borders. Additionally, there is no common doctrine for peace operations, which hinders joint training, exercises, and command and control. The hemisphere has no systemic process in place to generate forces to deal with natural disasters or to engage in peace operations, except on an ad hoc basis. The hemisphere has not developed a single voice on such matters, so we have no ready means to gain regional approval for needed security issues. U.S. efforts in counterdrug operations have pushed the problem from one country to the next, enabling transnational threats to finance their operations and to penetrate U.S. borders. Within the region, border conflicts persist. Most importantly, there is no common vision for hemisphere security, resulting in uncoordinated or ad hoc efforts.

Hemispheric states can easily increase interoperability through exercises such as multilateral peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and counter narco-trafficking, in order to validate joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. We can ease regional tension by assisting in military-to-military confidence-building measures—advance notice of military exercises; policy, doctrine, education, military, and observer exchanges; military exercises; high-level military meetings; natural disaster programs; arms control; border coordination; and visits to military installation. The Defense Department can promote regional cooperative security by expanding anti-ballistic missile defense cooperation where applicable and by integrating port and air and sea conveyance security into a coordinated hemispheric security program. The Defense
Department can reaffirm our shared values through national assistance programs, which assist host nations to develop, restructure, and reinforce democratic institutions; by financing reconstruction programs for roads, bridges, schools, medical clinics; and by preparations for disaster relief. Through foreign military interaction, U.S. leaders can demonstrate civil control and oversight of the military and ensure that regional military organizations incorporate this principle into military training. Further, learning from the other militaries, U.S. forces would gain valuable experience and new perspectives that would increase our leaders’ ability to adapt to different cultures and environments.

STRATEGIC RESOURCES TO SECURE REGIONAL STABILITY

The means needed to support the strategic concepts of a hemispheric theater of operation, cooperative security, and security cooperation is the creation of an Americas Command (AMCOM). The idea of a hemispheric command is not new. In December 1997, the National Defense Panel for Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century recommended the formation of an AMCOM to be responsible for the Western Hemisphere. When DoD activated NORTHCOM on 1 October 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed a subsequent UCP review of a hemispheric command. In April 2004, the Joint Staff again reviewed the merging of SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM into a single command to achieve coherent policy coordination and execution. While NORTHCOM is open to a merger, SOUTHCOM has recommended disapproval of merging SOUTHCOM into NORTHCOM, giving the following reasons: Merger sends a wrong signal to Latin America; merger offers no gain in efficiency; and NORTHCOM should remain focused on Homeland Defense. On the other hand, advocates of AMCOM assert that the current UCP does not holistically address U.S. homeland defense, cooperative security, military security cooperation, and economic interests within the Western Hemisphere. NORTHCOM focuses too narrowly on the North American continent to effectively deter and prevent attacks on the homeland far from the borders. The SOUTHCOM strategic plan lacks clear ends to integrate security cooperation into homeland defense; likewise, observers of the security cooperation community in Latin America do not understand “why the United States wanted to work with the militaries in the region,” which reflects a failure of the theater strategy.

SOUTHCOM’s argument for opposing a U.S.-oriented hemispheric command is weak. First, Latin America would still be in a unified command area of responsibility of AMCOM, which assures that Latin America is still a vital U.S. interest. Second, AMCOM would provide efficiency and effectiveness as a hemispheric-focused command by planning and executing a
coherent strategy that brings all hemispheric states into play, by avoiding duplication of efforts, and by cooperating on common goals across the hemisphere. SOUTHCOM’s multilateral exercises rarely include Canadians and Mexicans with participants from South America, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin. For example, a successful terrorist attack on the Panama Canal would negatively impact the interests of all hemispheric countries. Because SOUTHCOM has a sub-regional focus, it is unable to bring together all of the hemispheric states and their resources to implement a hemispheric security strategy. Currently, hemispheric plans are not in place to deal rapidly with humanitarian crises, and individual states lack the means to deal with such crises. Finally, AMCOM can be organized to provide a homeland defense focus and concurrently maintain security and stability in Latin America, but within a hemispheric context.

The Defense Department is now the common controlling headquarters responsible for synchronizing and coordinating hemispheric security and ensuring synergy of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM efforts to contribute to U.S. security policies while collaborating with Homeland Security and other U.S. departments. Further, DoD is currently confronted with hemispheric issues which jeopardize the homeland defense strategy. Today, many countries in the region have weak democratic institutions, weak economies, and deep social and political problems, making them incapable of good governance and assured domestic security. Consequently, transnational threats are posed by terrorists, narco-terrorists, insurgents, drug traffickers, and others that operate freely throughout the region. They are clearly capable of penetrating the United States: Consider the tremendous amount of drugs entering the United States, crossing both SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM borders. Additionally, on-going competition in the region from Europe and Asia is eroding U.S. influence in the region.76

These risks increase the imbalance between ends and ways of the DoD’s current homeland defense strategy. To better achieve the ends of protecting the homeland and supporting homeland security and synchronizing efforts of two different combatant commands, creation of AMCOM can provide DoD with an interdependent, hemispheric-oriented command to rebalance the homeland defense strategy.79,80,81 Directing an AMCOM combatant commander to deal with homeland defense in a hemispheric context will increase integration and synergy of U.S. policies and strategies. Just as we are integrating the region’s economies, we need to integrate security so we can defeat the threats before they enter the United States. This hemispheric approach would also complement the current U.S. policy to integrate the hemisphere economically.

The Defense Department’s first and fundamental commitment—the defense of the homeland of the United States—is a singular objective.82 At the strategic level, the principle of
“unity of command” is especially applicable to formulating a homeland defense strategy: For every objective, “ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.” The most effective defense of the homeland against a transnational threat will require close, coordinated security cooperation with nations of the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, DoD should avoid the appearance of American imperialism by sharing leadership responsibilities among the other American states. The United States can work side-by-side with the hemispheric states through a regional organization such as the Organization of American States (OAS). The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), representative of the OAS membership, would share planning responsibilities for hemispheric security that address the needs of the Western Hemisphere.

WHAT IS IN IT FOR LATIN AMERICA

For the United States to successfully pursue its global interests, it must be reasonably sure that its immediate sphere of influence is secure and stable. Otherwise, it will have to divert already limited resources from the GWOT that it is waging outside the Western Hemisphere to stabilize the region closer to its borders. Washington has not given Latin America the attention it needs to strengthen alliances, which poses an unacceptable risk to its GWOT strategy and its hemispheric strategy, especially since 9-11. The United States must rebalance its ways and means to achieve its ends—to ensure a successful strategic economy of force for the Western Hemisphere. Failure to do so may enable transnational threats to continue to erode state sovereignty and security, possibly leading to the collapse of an interdependent hemispheric economic community and ensuring the spread of terrorism within the Americas. However, implementing a new strategy will take time because the United States must earn the trust and confidence of other governments and peoples. But with mutual patience, respect, trust, and reciprocity, countries of the Americas can jointly achieve their respective interests—peace, security, and prosperity. Despite these shared interests, each nation has its own perspectives. A super power, the United States has global interests and responsibilities, whereas lesser or middle powers among Latin American countries are attempting to maintain and exercise sovereignty. Yet the strategic objective for all the states of the hemisphere is regional stability. The way to this objective is to be determined, and the means are not agreed upon.

Our security is at risk because of weak democracies in the Americas and Caribbean Basin. These states are weakened because of transnational threats and internal insurgencies that violate sovereign control and borders. Also, insurgents use globalization as a means to conduct illicit trade and obtain funds to support their ends. Weak states react by clinging to as much sovereign control as they can while rejecting international assistance which can preserve
their sovereignty. Populist Latin American leaders are capitalizing on public discontent and exploiting latent anti-U.S. sentiment under the guise of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs to retain control or to avoid international obligations. Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Néstor Kirchner of Argentina offer examples of current reluctance to regional cooperation. Their approach could provide non-state actors an opportunity to exploit nationalist governance.

To stop this erosion of state control, the United States must obtain partnership with Latin American countries in a relationship that offers what they want most—sovereignty. Our efforts in Latin America to this point have focused on counternarcotics operations through a bilateral strategy. This approach simply pushes the problem from one country to the next, never resolving it. What is needed is a regional approach that enables Latin American countries to work together to enhance their control. They need to understand that cooperation will not weaken their sovereignty, but in fact such cooperation strengthens and protects it in a changed strategic environment of globalization. The United States must support a rebalanced strategy that meets hemispheric interests while achieving U.S. objectives of promoting greater stability. The Western Hemisphere currently lacks the leadership and resolve to implement this concept. There is no mechanism to effectively link hemispheric political leadership to military capabilities to achieve security, while supporting good governance and growing economies.

Unless American states prefer an isolationist model of rejecting the outside world, they will be obliged to adopt a new approach to maintain and reinforce their sovereignty. Modern nations in Europe, North America, and most of Asia are preserving their sovereignty through cooperative regional economic and military arrangements. If the states of the Americas want to secure what they value most, they must agree to work together in a cooperative environment, viewing regional partnerships as a way to rely on one another to resist intimidation from threats, thereby enhancing their security and strengthening their sovereignty. As the United States leads efforts to form a hemispheric cooperative security architecture, we should expect some Latin American states to seek greater parity with the United States. However, American states recognize that they do not have the means to deal with transnational threats that are destabilizing them and the region. Recognizing the threats, they are beginning to realize that cooperation, coordination, and integration offer the best way to deal with transnational threats. So they are more accepting of U.S. support and open to a hemispheric approach to promoting stability and security. For example, a recent SOUTHCOM exercise to defend the Panama Canal included nine Latin American states. In Haiti, Brazil is leading the U.N. peacekeeping force with cooperation from other Latin America countries. Indeed, regional cooperation is
underway. But the United States must not necessarily lead each cooperative endeavor. Americas Command would provide a formal structure for ongoing regional collective security. Due to their size and economic power, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico are subregional leaders; they often set the subregional political agenda, thereby influencing their neighbors. Partnering with the hemisphere’s sub-regional leaders, the United States may be able to persuade the other hemispheric states to make hemispheric security cooperation a higher priority. Canada is likely to support a hemispheric relationship to extend its defense interdependence with the United States. Mexico and Brazil, as well as many other Latin American states do not share the U.S. priority for hemispheric security cooperation. However, the subregional leaders and other Americas states recognize the need to cooperate, knowing they have limited means to effectively address transnational threats. As hemispheric awareness of the advantages of integration increases among the subregional leaders, they are more likely to work with the United States to incrementally develop a hemispheric security approach based on common interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Incorporating the security of the Western Hemisphere into a comprehensive system will provide the United States with the stable hemisphere it needs to protect the homeland and to project power to fight the GWOT and to strengthen the Americas security partnership. To enable the United States to change its vision of the Western Hemisphere and to view it as a complete system, DoD should establish an AMCOM as a means to proactively respond to security issues in a cooperative security environment. To gain Latin American support for regional cooperation, U.S. leaders must demonstrate that Latin America countries will benefit from such cooperation. Americas Command provides the impetus to develop and implement a strategic vision that is consistent with other departments’ strategies. Likewise, both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM billets can resource AMCOM with two sub-unified commands. As a corollary to Núñez’s call for multinational forces, AMCOM would be capable of forming a combined joint task force for contingency or crisis operations within the Western Hemisphere. To effectively interact and coordinate with the Americas’ political-military leadership, AMCOM should coordinate its policies and activities with the OAS. A single command focused on the Americas as a whole would more readily strengthen relations and coordinate with the OAS (and the IADB) on hemispheric security issues, rather than a joint staff relationship. One possibility is a security council as proposed in Philip Battaglia’s monograph, “The OAS in the 21st Century: How it Must
Battaglia’s proposal calls for a security council comprised of permanent members—United States, Brazil, and Mexico—without a veto power and of four regional rotating members. This working group would set the agenda with majority rule and make recommendations to the General Assembly. However, the United States will need to seek support of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to negotiate the membership of the OAS’ permanent security council, ensuring the broadest support for hemispheric cooperation.

Consider the following AMCOM organizational structure:

![Diagram of AMCOM organizational structure]

The deputy combatant commander for the Homeland Defense (DCCDR/HLD) sub-unified command would be responsible for the defense of the United States, roughly equating to North America. This individual would plan for deterring, preventing, and defeating threats against the United States within the assigned AOR; likewise DCCDR/HLD would plan for military
assistance to civil authorities for consequence management operations as directed by the Americas Command combatant commander. The deputy commander for the Joint Interagency Task Force-Americas (JIATF-Americas) sub-unified command would be responsible for interdicting transnational threats throughout the hemisphere as well as for cooperative security throughout SOUTHCOM. In time, the JIATF-Americas may become a combined JIATF-Americas by including representatives from hemispheric security forces to work side-by-side on hemispheric interdiction and security cooperation. The Americas Command combatant commander would ensure coherence of U.S. policies and strategies throughout the Americas, while maintaining Western Hemispheric stability through close coordination with a joint interagency working group for homeland defense and homeland security. The service component commanders would be responsible for U.S. Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities to train, integrate, and provide forces. The Joint Special Operations Command would conduct operations throughout the hemisphere in support of AMCOM.

CONCLUSIONS.
The Western Hemisphere is becoming more interdependent—economic and political events throughout the region increasingly affect U.S. interests. The 9/11 terrorist attack established a new urgency for the United States to define and secure those interests—to promote regional stability, to create a new economic community, and to protect the homeland. Protecting these interests requires a new cooperative hemispheric security architecture as these interests converge. A redefined hemispheric relationship founded on mutual respect, equal partnerships, and reciprocity would bolster new cooperative opportunities among the Americas. Accordingly, the United States should adopt a unified hemispheric approach for cooperative military security to achieve coherent and synchronized economic, homeland defense, and homeland security policies and strategies.

Our leaders must first initiate the cooperative effort by creating an AMCOM. This cooperative effort is a long unfulfilled goal of the OAS (and the IADB). Americas Command should work closely with the OAS (and the IADB) to achieve hemispheric cooperative security. Because homeland defense is a vital U.S. interest, DoD should establish a permanent unified command to approach the Western Hemisphere as a complete system. The new command should then develop a regional cooperative security strategy based on mutual economic and military interests, as well as democratic values. Creation of AMCOM will provide integrated homeland defense in a hemispheric context. Americas Command will align the UCP with the post-9/11 United States homeland defense/homeland security government reorganization,
thereby facilitating sub-unified command coordination with other U.S. departments and agencies. Americas Command will expand U.S. homeland defense operations by means of regional military-to-military programs. Americas Command will enhance our “strategic economy of force,” enabling us to sustain operations against transnational and conventional threats outside the hemisphere by working side-by-side with other states as equal partners and by contributing capable and interoperable forces for international peace and security operations.

By eliminating duplication of resources and thereby increasing efficiency and effectiveness, AMCOM will consolidate all U.S. military activities in the Western Hemisphere under one command. Americas Command will allocate resources to support selected activities throughout the Western Hemisphere—thereby improving interagency and international coordination and cooperation, since AMCOM’s AOR would be similarly aligned with the OAS, Department of State, and FTAA economic framework. Finally, AMCOM will coherently integrate all subunified commands’ cooperative security, security cooperation, and other military-to-military programs in support of the National Military Strategy, thereby extending U.S. homeland security protection throughout the hemisphere. This strategy envisions the Western Hemisphere as a holistic community and creates an interdependent alliance to realize opportunities of the 21st century and defeat threats to a democratic hemisphere.

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ENDNOTES


4 John “Jay” Cope, professor National Defense University, telephone interview on 2 November 2004. Between the intervening years of the Monroe and Bush administrations, successive U.S. administrations’ policies raised and dashed Latin America’s trust, confidence, and friendship with the United States. For example, consider the 1901 Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution, reserving the U.S. right to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs; Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting the U.S. right of intervention in any Latin American country; the 1903 Panama Canal project, separating Panama from Colombia; Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 Good Neighbor Policy that renounced interventionism and abrogated the Platt Amendment; Reagan’s 1980s doctrine, “rolling back communism” with several U.S.’ incursions; and George H.W. Bush’s 1990 Enterprise for the Americans Initiative, which envisioned a single hemispheric economic community. Throughout its history, the U.S. staved off foreign challengers to ensure regional stability—fighting the Spanish-American War kept Spain out; fighting War World I kept the Europeans out; fighting World War II kept the Germans out; fighting the Cold War kept the Communism out—and now terrorism must be iced out.

5 Hillman, 175-182. The United States continuous involvements in Latin America demonstrate its interest—1820s to 1900s, limiting European power and expanding U.S. influence; 1900s to 1940s, enhancing U.S. military power and economic influence; early to mid-1940s, staving off Germany and its Axis partners’ entry into the hemisphere; mid-1940s to early 1980s, containing communism and socialism during the Cold War; early 1980s to early 1990s, rolling back communism; and 1990s to 2000s, accessing economic markets and strengthening democratic institutions.

6 Peter N. Stearns, Donald R. Schwartz, and Barry K. Beyer, World History Traditions and New Directions (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1991), 566. Mexico’s territorial losses included—Texas annexation in 1845, the occupation of Mexico City in 1847, the Mexican cession of southwestern territory in 1848, and the pursuit of Pancho Villa throughout northern Mexico in 1916 and 1917.


8 Roger F. Noriega, “U.S. Relationship with Mexico,” 23 March 2004; available from <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/30790pf.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2004. Mexico’s maturing democracy has nurtured its economy since nationalizing United States oil companies’ interests in 1938. Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico is now the second largest United States trading partner after Canada, tripling trade from $81 billion in 1993 to $236 billion dollars in 2003.
Department of State, “Background Note: Mexico.” Mexico exports 88% of its goods to the United States and imports 62% of its goods from the United States in 2003. The United States is very reliant on Mexico’s oil exports, making it the world’s third leading exporter of oil to the United States. Mexico is developing markets and closer relations with the European Union, Japan, Canada, and China to balance its extensive exports and imports with the United States.

Jason Sherman, “U.S., Mexico to Cooperate,” 8 November 2004; available from <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=489901&C=America>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2004. The closest military ties are between the Mexican navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The United States Chief of Naval Operations has a close working relationship with his Mexican counterpart, cooperating on counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations during 2004. Much of the U.S.-Mexican government cooperation is in the areas of “law enforcement, immigration, counterdrug activities, and border control operations.” But beyond these activities, “defense-to-defense cooperation” remains constrained by fragile military relations. John Cope, National Defense University strategist, argues the Mexican military wants to be treated as an equal partner, seeking a relationship based on mutual respect and reciprocity rather than the Pentagon’s historical “paternalistic” relationship.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Roger F. Noriega, “U.S. Relationship with Mexico.”

Cope, telephone interview by author. Cope related that DoD is sensitive to Mexico’s political concerns of creating Americas Command. Considering their concerns, DoD decided not to create Americas Command for the time being.

Ibid.


Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Brazil-Mexico for Regional Leadership Viewed,” 27 August 2000; available from <https://portal.rccb.osis.gov>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2004. Within Latin America, Mexico is seen as competing with Brazil to set the regional international agenda.

World Bank. Leading contender for Brazil’s Latin American leadership role is Mexico, with the world’s 12th largest economy.

Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Mexico spends about half as much on defense than Brazil.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Brazil-Mexico for Regional Leadership Viewed.”


Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Brazil-Mexico for Regional Leadership Viewed.”

Department of State, “Background Note: Brazil,” November 2004; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640pf.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2004. Brazil continues to be a leader in the regional community—co-chairing the FTAA negotiations with the United States; leading the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Haiti in 2004; and contributing troops to earlier U.N. peacekeeping missions, which include those in the Middle East, Belgian Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, and East Timor. Brazil's largest trading partners are the European Union and the United States, representing about half of Brazil's total imports and exports between the two trading partners.

Ibid. Brazil's form of government from 1889 to 1930 was a constitutional democracy until a military coup placed Getulio Vargas, a civilian, into power. A series of dictatorships ruled Brazil until 1945, ending with the election of Jose Linhares as president. In 1961, Vice President Joao Goulart succeeded President Joao Goulart who resigned. Goulart's administration's policies produced high inflation, economic recession, and an increase in racial political parities. Once again the military staged a coup, installing a series of senior army officers as presidents from 1964 to 1985. During this period (1977), U.S.-Brazil relations soured when President Carter directed human rights criticism toward Brazil's military government.


Department of State, “Background Note: Canada.” Ottawa has increased its presence in Western Hemispheric affairs by joining the Inter-American Defense Board in 2002.


Ibid.

Ibid.


George W. Bush, “Revitalizing National Defense,” 16 August 2004; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2004. The president’s new policy to revitalize the national defense to fight and win the wars of the 21st century includes—expanding the U.S. defense relationship with allies and building new partnerships, developing flexibility to contend with uncertainty, providing for both a regional and global forward presence, enabling rapid power projection, and focusing on capabilities instead of numbers. The U.S. policy seeks to create a Western Hemisphere economic community.


Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 5.


46Rumsfeld, 5.


58 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


63 Chambers, 5-7, 69. Coordinating and harmonizing economic policy and military security within a cooperative security framework will improve the effectiveness of the U.S. homeland defense and promote regional stability.

64 U.S. Southern Command, “Operational Overview.”


67 Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategy Clarity (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003), 32.


69 Eberhart, 13-14.

70 U.S. Southern Command, “Operational Overview.”


74Senior U.S. SOUTHCOM Staff Officer, Interview by author, 7 October 2004, Carlisle, PA.


76Chambers, 69.


81Odeen, 72.


83Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), 4-44.

84Marcella, 2.

85Ibid., 2.

86Ibid., 2-3.

87Ibid., 32.

88Senior U.S. SOUTHCOM Staff Officer, Interview by author, 7 October 2004, Carlisle, PA.

89U.S. Southern Command, “Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South Fact Sheet,” 21 January 2001; available from <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.html?cgFact>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004. To engender cooperation from Latin American states, especially Brazil and Mexico, Americas Command would develop a hemispheric security cooperation plan that carefully details the U.S. interests and objectives in each of the subregions and explains how these U.S. interests and objectives serve the integrated hemispheric interests. Americas Command combatant commander, in coordination with the Department of State, would dialogue with the Latin American and Canadian governments to determine overlapping interests and mutual areas of cooperation, focusing on a hemispheric perspective as compared to a bilateral approach. This would ensure a coherent Americas Command approach. Americas Command and the regional partners would understand each others needs, explore areas to share leadership responsibilities, develop areas to increase interdependence, and expand
transparency. Americas Command, working with the subregional leaders, can model the hemispheric cooperative security approach after the SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-SOUTH), headquartered in Key West, Florida. For example, the JIATF-SOUTH established a joint operations command center, fusing intelligence and operations information for military or civil action to interdict drug smugglers. The JIATF-SOUTH is a multi-agency organization with Latin American liaison officers assigned, providing an integrated, international task force, which includes participation from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Caribbean Community. Exchanging liaison officers with OAS (and its IADB), Americas Command would fuse and coordinate intelligence and operational information to interdict and combat transnational threats throughout the hemisphere. A possible U.S.-OAS relationship could transform into a NATO type of system with Americas Command being the U.S. structure to engage a future OAS’ IADB—seeking interoperability; sharing intelligence; enhancing command, control, communication, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance; establishing logistics hubs; planning contingency operations, peace operations, humanitarian operations, interdiction operations, counterdrug operations, counterinsurgency operations, anti-terrorist operations, etc.; and imbuing civil control over the military. The OAS would authorize the IADB to plan for a number of operations among member states. Americas Command would provide the U.S. portion of the OAS planning cell with other OAS member states providing planning cells on missions which fulfill their respective states’ interests.

90 Pedro V. Delgado, Luis Bitencourt, and Henry M. Uribe, Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), 14-29. This monograph offers a good overview of Latin American hemispheric cooperative security perspectives. After the Malvinas/Falkland War and after the end of the Cold War, the Latin American community reassessed the existing hemispheric security arrangements—questioning the validity or role of the Rio Treaty and questioning the reoccurring U.S. national security theme. Despite these questions, Bitencourt argues the efforts to update the inter-American security system have “languished, resulting in no important redefinition of policies.” Bitencourt offers three reasons for Latin America’s difficulty to modernize the OAS and the Defense Ministerials: (1) “…no consensus exists on which concept of security is adequate for the region,” (2) no perceived common threats, and (3) “…ambivalent and guarded in their relations with the United States on matters of international security.” Consequently, Latin America’s view of the United States “has made them overly cautious in their discussions on multilateral hemispheric security arrangements.” Joining a new regional security architecture is not a priority from the Brazilian perspective because—Brazilians do not feel threatened with over 100 hundred years of peace with their 10 neighbors, Brazilians downplay regional security out of concerns for the United States role in the region, and Brazilians believe that the United States “exaggerate the relevance of security...to the detriment of...trade and economic development.” However, Bitencourt concludes that Brazil wants to become more active in shaping international security and to secure a seat on the U.N. Security Council. An incremental step to these two goals would be for Brazil to participate in shaping any regional security arrangement in partnership with the United States. Colombia is open to a new hemispheric security arrangement and more aid because of its ongoing battle with the “synergistic effects of a guerrilla conflict and a drug war.” While Chile and Argentina “show enthusiasm” for a hemispheric security arrangement because it “could help to legitimize their new domestic arrangements, pushing the military away from domestic politics.”

Mexico in March 2002. In addition, Canada’s bilateral defense and security relationship with the United States since World War II—member of NATO and integrated into North American Aerospace Defense Command—and joining the OAS demonstrates Ottawa’s broadening hemispheric security views. Benítez-Manaut suggests that the principle difference between the United States and Canada “regards the role of the UN in the international system.” Benítez-Manaut adds the policy differences between Canada and the United States “has neither affected Canadian-U.S. bilateral security relations nor will it affect further homeland security collaboration.”

92Delgado, 50.

93Pablo Bachelet, “Rumsfeld, Counterparts United Against Terror,” 18 November 2004; available from <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/americas/10209929.htm?1c>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2004. During the November 2004 conference of Western Hemisphere defense ministers, Rumsfeld presented a hemispheric security concept, exposing gaps between policies of the U.S. and the largest countries in Latin America. Rumsfeld and 33 counterparts agreed “to coordinate security efforts to combat drug trafficking, terrorism and other nontraditional threats.” Some Latin American officials “expressed reservations about a U.S. initiative to increase the coordination between the region’s military and police forces.” Venezuela defense minister, GEN Jorge García declared his country “supports all actions that favor the eradication of terrorism and all that can alter the order of a country.” Brazil and Argentina express concerns about the military becoming involved in internal affairs and law enforcement due to recent memory of military dictatorships. Brazil would have to make changes to its constitution to permit the military to become involved in internal affairs despite recent military support to police’s efforts in fighting gangs in Rio de Janeiro, recognizing the problem is getting out of hand. The Caribbean states voiced support for “a collective approach against [drug and arms traffickers].”

94Raúl Benítez-Manaut, 35-53. Mexico seeks to balance the asymmetrical relationship within North America. Benítez-Manaut insists that “the differences among Mexico, Canada, and the United States are the result of asymmetrical economies, societies, and politics as well as different security, foreign policy, and defense outlooks,” fearing the United States will assimilate Mexico’s voice into the United States’ positions on the international stage. Because of the Mexican-U.S. history, Mexico resists deepening the foreign and security relationship. During the Cold War, Mexico remained nonaligned and refused to establish a security relationship with the United States. However, Mexico began in the 1980s to broaden defense cooperation with the United States, developing military programs “to re-equip the Mexican military and strengthen the Mexican military education programs.” Cooperation has continued since 11 September 2001 on a bilateral basis in “matters of security, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement and it supports the possibility of future trilateral [Canada, Mexico, and the United States] agreements on these issues.” Benítez-Manaut points out that “Mexico’s foreign and defense policies are isolationist and nationalist, and it does not participate actively in the international security system.” Mexico considers national security as its top priority vis-à-vis hemispheric security. According to Benítez-Manaut, Mexico organized it security agencies for domestic purposes and precludes its military from participating in foreign conflicts. Mexico opposed the U.S. doctrine of preemption, which they consider “a threat to the international norms” and culturally offends their principle of noninterference in internal affairs and supremacy of state sovereignty. The United States wants to strengthen the commitments to the Rio Treaty—Mexico abrogated in 2001 and Canada has not signed it—the OAS, and the Inter-American Defense Board to protect the hemisphere from transnational threats. Mexico wants to restrict cooperation on security, defense, intelligence, migration, and policing to exchanging information. Benítez-Manaut
concludes that “as trade relations deepen and security issues continue to arise, a North American regional security relationship will continue to evolve among Mexico, Canada, and the United States—and a more comprehensive framework... [North American framework] will become necessary.” By working with other Latin America countries and Canada on hemispheric defense, the United States, through the OAS, may be able to encourage Mexico to consign its isolationist and nationalist defense policies to the past.

95 Pablo Bachelet, “Rumsfeld in Regional Talks,” 16 November 2004; available from <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/americas/10190880.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2004. Latin American leaders agree there is a need for regional defense cooperation to address transnational threats, declaring that their limited means impede some areas of defense and security cooperation. Some of their stated limitations include resources (money and forces); proscribed military involvement in law enforcement activities; and loss of foreign investments due to crime, which has reduced their incomes.

96 Committee on Hemispheric Security, “Work Plan 2004-2005: CP/CSH-647/04,” 23 September 2004; available from <http://www.oas.org/csh/english/documents/cp13556e07.doc>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2004. The United States and the other hemispheric states’ common security interests include: (1) Security in the Americas—transparency and confidence- and security building, military spending limits, cybersecurity, extreme poverty, inequality and social exclusion, natural disaster mitigation, transnational organized crime, counterdrug operations, greater transparency in the acquisition of arms, and anti-personnel land mines. (2) Disarmament and nonproliferation—illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosive. (3) Support for Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and Caribbean and biological and chemical weapons. (4) Natural disasters—disaster mitigation, reducing vulnerability to populations and economic and social infrastructures. (5) Promoting democratic governance—terrorism and transnational crime (especially crime linked to terrorism, such as that involving illegal drugs, laundering of assets, and illicit arms trafficking), border and finical controls, transportation security (maritime, port, and aviation security), criminal intelligence sharing, establishing a terrorism database, and awareness and preparedness to combat and respond to acts of terrorism. (6) Human rights and HIV/AIDS.


98 U.S. Americas Command would derive its basic personnel resources from reorganizing NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM billets. According to NORTHCOM webpage, NORTHCOM planning headquarters consists of about 500 personnel with another 450 planning personnel assigned to Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Task Force-North, and Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security, as well as 5,500 planning and operational personnel assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). According to SOUTHCOM webpage, SOUTHCOM planning headquarters consist of about 1,125 personnel, totaling about 3,000 assigned personnel in its component commands, joint task force, joint interagency task force (JIATF) and 26 Military Groups (MILGP)/Liaison Offices (MLO). JIATF-South, Joint Task Force-Bravo, Joint Task Force-Guantánamo, Security Assistance Organizations (MILGP, MLO, Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Defense Assistance Office (DAO)), and Joint Task Force-North merge to form the core of AMCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force-Americas sub-unified command.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support and Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security with close association of NORAD would serve as the core for AMCOM’s Homeland Defense sub-unified command. Americas Command’s respective service components would subsume U.S. Army South, U.S. Air Force/12th Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, and Marine Forces South. SOC-Americas would enfold U.S. Special Operations Command South. Americas Command and its joint interagency task forces would coordinate with U.S. government departments and agencies, such as Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, and Department of State, and the Intelligence Community. Americas Command would coordinate with allied countries and OAS (with an IADB) on an ongoing basis.

Núñez, A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power, 32-35. Núñez proposes establishing two multinational units to serve as the “cornerstone for hemispheric security cooperation.” Canada, the United States, and Mexico would form the “First Special Service Force (North)” (FSSF (N)). Brazil, Argentina, and Chile would provide forces for the “First Special Service Force (South)” (FSSF (S)). These rapidly deployable brigade task forces—containing combat arms, combat support, and combat service support with fixed and rotary wing aviation assets—would execute a wide variety of missions. OAS with a security council provides command and control of the FSSF, comprising of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers and airmen. Núñez advises, “to respect the sovereignty of states that have military forces within an FSSF, each state must provide express consent for each mission chosen by OAS.” The OAS could not deploy the FSSF unless all states agreed to the mission. Contributing states of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere would operationally nest FSSF (N) under Northern Command. Núñez furthers advises the states of the southern half of the Western Hemisphere select a Brazilian brigadier general as the commander, with deputy commanders from Argentina and Chile for FSSF (S). The Western Hemisphere states will use the FSSF forces within the hemisphere and make these forces available to the U.N. for peace operations.


Ibid. Canada, Argentina, and Chile are likely to object to Battaglia’s OAS’ Security Council proposal that limits permanent membership to the United States, Brazil, and Mexico. The actual council makeup would be subject to considerable negotiations.


U.S. Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command Fact Sheet,” undated; available from <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.factsheets#usnorthcom>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004. The creation of Homeland Defense sub-unified command would be a logical descendant of Northern Command’s Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) and Joint Task Force Civil Support. It would be a joint interagency task force, able to accept liaison officers from Mexico and Canada; to coordinate the land and maritime defense of the continent; to coordinate military assistance to U.S. civil authorities; to provide command and control for DoD forces in support of civil authorities managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incident in the United States; and to coordinate actions in response to natural disasters. The new homeland defense sub-unified command would be able to coordinate planning and exercises with Canada and Mexico to improve transparency and interoperability, to improve coordination of the Smart-Border
Agreements, to provide a forum to standardize procedures and training for common trilateral interests, to establish closer ties for intelligence coordination, and to jointly assess potential vulnerability of targets for aggression, such as terrorism. Likewise, the United States and Canada could invite Mexico to participate in NORAD, as well as NORAD-like arrangement for maritime operations. If they wish to participate in an integrated planning process, Canada and Mexico would coordinate more closely with the United States, which would give them direct assess to the U.S. operational decision-making process.

Military-to-military programs would include multilateral exercises such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and counter narco-trafficking, which validates joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; military-to-military confidence-building measures—advance notice of military exercises; policy, doctrine, education, military, and observers exchanges; high-level military meetings; natural disaster planning and assistance programs; arms control verifications; border coordination; and military installations visits. Also, the Defense Department can promote regional cooperative security by expanding anti-ballistic missile defense cooperation where applicable and by integrating port and air and sea conveyances security into a coordinated hemispheric security program. Americas Command can reaffirm our shared values by means of national assistance programs, which assist host nations to develop, restructure, and reinforce democratic institutions; by financing reconstruction programs for roads, bridges, schools, medical clinics; and by preparations for disaster relief that would avoid or mitigate the devastating effects suffered during the 1998 and 2004 hurricane seasons, the 1999 Venezuela floods and mudslides, the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador or the Canadian 1992 cold wave. Military-to-military programs would include managing the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incidents in the Western Hemisphere, such as the Soviet Cosmos 954 nuclear-powered Satellite that crashed on 24 January 1978, spewing radioactive material over the Canadian Northwest Territories, Alberta and Saskatchewan.

General Accounting Office, *Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern Command Participation in 1995 Review* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, November 1996), 3 and 13. The recommended UCP changes: Creating an Americas Command, proceeds along the similar CJCS’ rational and principles of May 1995 UCP changes. The CJCS approved the Joint Staff’s principles for analysis to evaluate potential UCP changes: “(1) any changes must support the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and public law; (2) the UCP must maintain strategic focus to support national security interests; (3) the UCP must consider diplomatic and international obligations; (4) geographic boundaries must support enduring joint operations in peace and war; (5) AORs must optimize span of control; and (6) changes to the UCP must conform to the ‘art of the possible’—be doable, realistic, sellable, and affordable.” Hence, the president approved the CJCS and SECDEF recommendation to change the UCP in 1996, transferring responsibilities for the Caribbean Basin and surrounding waters from Atlantic Command to Southern Command for the following CJCS’ reasons: “(1) improve the Southern Command’s interaction with navies of Central and South America, (2) make the UCP consistent with the way the rest of the U.S. government is organized to interact with Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, and (3) eliminate a seam in DoD counterdrug operations and military-to-military relations in the region.” The SECDEF added “that the UCP changes affecting the Atlantic and Southern Commands would place all U.S. military activities in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America under one command.” Since 1995, DoD created NORTHCOM in response to 9-11 terror attacks, the U.S. is becoming more interdependent with other countries of the Western Hemisphere, and the U.S. is at war—representing a changed strategic environment that requires an integrated command to promote hemispheric stability, which the “1995 CJCS rational” remains applicable.
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