

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL OBJECTIVES
IN *THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA***

by

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ABSTRACT

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President George W. Bush's 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS) insists America must "stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property." NSS objectives of a moral nature have major implications for the military as an element of national power. Currently, the U.S. military is being heavily employed in the pursuit of a foreign policy of democratization. Leaders in the U.S. Armed Forces who are responsible for and responsive to the National Military Strategy must understand the international relations theories that undergird foreign policy and the corresponding moral foundations and facets of the NSS that directs the promotion of our national values abroad.

Ethical questions of military support to moral objectives can be viewed through the lens of nation-building efforts that follow major combat operations. Classical and modern theories and definitions of democracy are evaluated in this research alongside the moral underpinnings of the U.S. foreign agenda. Assessments of the "ends, ways, and means" of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are offered as measurements of the military's effectiveness in furthering national interests. Difficulties with consistent application of values-based foreign policy are addressed. Finally, leadership metacompetencies required for globally strategic policy formulation are discussed.

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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL OBJECTIVES IN THE *NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA*

America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.

—President George W. Bush
Inaugural Address, January 2005

The current *National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)* was developed and published in the months following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The strategy presents moral themes rooted in national values, such as the belief in human dignity and open, democratic societies, and juxtaposes these with practical efforts to spur free trade, build strong alliances, and transform security institutions.¹ The *NSS* is replete with objectives for security that dictate benevolent humanitarian actions. The message from the world's only superpower is that it will defend, preserve, and extend peace globally through deliberate integration of rights and freedoms as objectives for U.S. foreign policy. President Bush's January 2005 inaugural address unequivocally emphasized the union of beliefs and interests.² Therefore, an evaluation of roles and missions to fulfill the range of *NSS* objectives is required by strategic leaders of the elements of national power, whether political, military, economic, or informational.³ This research project will evaluate the moral content of the *NSS*, review historical precedents for ethical objectives, and consider the challenges facing armed forces commissioned to fulfill values-laden purposes. Moral facets of military strategy will be assessed within the context of democratization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper will also stress ethical situations and dilemmas confronting the military establishment.

VALUES DRIVE POLICY

An essay of security strategy should begin with revelation and description of its source. In his first inaugural address, George Washington stated that "the foundation of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality, and the preeminence of free government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens and command the respect of the world."⁴ The United States Army War College's Strategy Formulation Model affirms that "an understanding of the nation's purpose, as defined by its enduring beliefs, ethics, and values"⁶ is the starting point for development of the nation's

security strategy. An awareness of national mores involves consideration of principles, standards, and moral attitudes commonly held by the members of a nation. Underlying laws and assumptions support systems of thought or belief, creating a lens through which people or societies view themselves, their actions, and their world. Studies consistently identify the most important values to Americans are freedom, individual integrity and dignity, equal rights for all, and democracy.⁶ Phillip Gordon of the Brookings Institution has considered the Bush Administration's vision for the Middle East, and told of a "particularly American optimism about being able to reshape the world through the application of American power and ideals."⁷ Expressions of U.S. values on a national level are found in political speeches and their implementation is observed in governmental operations. This serves to promote abroad that which is highly regarded at home.

It is essential to recognize America as a nation founded under principles of faith if the origins and objectives of egalitarian policies are to be understood. Michael Novak provided six vignettes illustrating the importance of faith to leaders of the fledgling nation in his essay, "Sacred Honor: Religious Principles in the American Founding." He described changes to Thomas Jefferson's draft of the *Declaration of Independence*, whereby delegates required additional references to "Nature's God," the Creator who endows us with "unalienable rights," "divine Providence" upon whom we rely, and the "Supreme Judge" who hears our appeals.⁸ George Washington endorsed religiosity in an eloquent farewell address and said, "reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."⁹ In his address at Gettysburg, President Lincoln asked for the people's dedication and devotion, "that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom...."¹⁰ President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Thanksgiving Day proclamations in the 1940s continued a tradition of sanctioning prayers to the "Almighty God, who hast given us this good land for our heritage."¹¹ Moral values derived from religious beliefs have enlightened the efforts of leaders within the political arena over the course of the United State's growth and development.

Realists may debate the merits of associating foreign policy with religious issues, but contemporary American leaders have determined that religious freedoms are a matter of national interest. Legislators are willing to apply the power of economic sanctions under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.¹² The U.S. State Department will intervene in cases where other nations are found to be violating spiritual liberties through its Office of International Religious Freedom.¹³ Samuel Huntington maintained that "politics and religion cannot be disentangled"¹⁴ and finds the roots of modern democracy in Protestant Christianity. His observations on the emergence and influence of religious nationalism in all areas of the

globe *except the West* outline an increasing cultural gap facing U.S. leaders struggling to win multinational support for the War on Terrorism (WOT). Great pains are taken to identify the WOT as focused on radical factions rather than against nations and people who align themselves under the Muslim religion. Strategic leaders seeking to advance the cause of freedom are certain to face issues of religion as diplomacy is undertaken and war is waged to achieve peace between *and within* sovereign nations.

Central to any deliberation of standards and ethics in the 21st century is the “replacement of time-honored universal values with a relativized system of morality in which values are individually designed and self-authenticated.”¹⁵ A more dramatic shift in the dialogue over moral life replaces the question of “Whose values can be advocated?” with uncertainty over the relevance of values across cultures. The *NSS* does not entertain such speculative diversions and instructs United States leaders to look beyond their borders, to “defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”¹⁶ It goes on to say all nations are bound to uphold “these aspirations,” and as such takes a moral stance, postulating these principles as more upright and just, in contrast to the actions of oppressive nation-states. The 2002 *NSS* insists America must “stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.”¹⁷ These points are underscored by the President and were presented in his 2002 State of the Union Address, firmly establishing moral objectives and ethical ends as central themes of the United States’ national purposes and resulting policy. The existence of moral aims at the heart of American foreign policy is the subject of much debate, but is presented by Philip Zelikow as a necessary counter to the current convention of relativism. A reunion of “power and principle”¹⁸ is necessary to produce stability and security for our nation and world. The Bush Administration has chosen to place execution of governmental power under the guidance of moral principles that reflect those embedded in our founding documents.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Development of strategic military objectives supporting a morally infused national security strategy must be evaluated in the context of the international relations undertaken by the nation. Today, the U.S. military is being called upon to conduct not only combat operations, but also to serve as an instrument for stimulating democratic reform during and after conflict, and to act on a world stage where global opinion is currently critical of America’s foreign policies.¹⁹ This exemplifies an ongoing tension of political currents between the realists’ “balance of power” and

idealistic liberalism²⁰ that has been operative throughout American history. John Kane explored the notion of “virtuous power”²¹ and questioned the uniqueness and universal relevance of American values, traditionally described as “American exceptionalism.” His review, in response to Henry Kissinger’s book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, added contemporary insight to the varied interpretations of presidential goals and the characterizations of their foreign policy. Strategic leaders need to grasp the multiple schools of thought on foreign policy and the wide range of perspectives that have evolved during U.S. history to find those that will serve as an effective framework.

Alexander Hamilton’s guidance in the establishment of a new nation opposed didactic endeavors and pursued balanced power relations “solely for the sake of national interest.”²² Kane said these were later illustrated by the policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon. Walter Mead asserted the Hamiltonian traditionalists saw commercial capitalism as a promising source of peace,²³ revealing some seeds that bear fruit in the current *NSS*, which says that “A strong world economy enhances our national security..., and it reinforces the habits of liberty.”²⁴ In addition to wielding economic power, Hamilton emphasized a professional diplomatic and military capability to ensure the United States advanced its interests through active foreign policy. Simply stated, the Hamiltonian view is consistent with the realists’ emphasis on primacy of power in international relations.

Some founding fathers regarded involvement in European affairs to be entangling and surmised that America’s future depended on avoiding such associations.²⁵ Independence, however, did not eliminate attention to foreign policy by those who would model themselves after Thomas Jefferson. In 1805, French diplomat Louise Marie Turreau observed the “first fact” of Jeffersonian politics was to conquer without war.²⁶ Liberalists return to these principles in their efforts to promote American security and democracy, but “without building a centralized, war-making government.”²⁷ Liberty for Americans is the rallying point for the Jeffersonian, but to encourage it abroad would require unacceptable elements such as a large military, extensive federal government, and high taxes. America’s history has not revealed strategic leaders mirroring Jefferson in toto, but aspects of his foreign policy such as the avoidance of war and an economy of interests²⁸ continue to have a profoundly limiting effect on national goals.

A Jacksonian would object to global interventions for the sake of other nations, but would commit to total war in support of American interests.²⁹ Mead also analyzed Jacksonian principles and found the aim of military capabilities was strictly for purposes of internal security. “Jacksonians do not think, for example, that American troops can bring democracy to places like Haiti and Bosnia.”³⁰ Globalization³¹ has rendered the Fortress America model obsolete, yet

isolationism retains some influence as the national will for international involvement ebbs and flows.

Woodrow Wilson initiated the League of Nations under the premise that liberal reason and universal rational principles could support the peaceful endstate envisioned by followers of the Enlightenment movement.³² He developed an American form of liberalism, identifying the defense of individual liberty as the purpose of government. Modern adherents extend Wilsonian idealism and advocate a liberal internationalism, which G. John Ikenberry says is typified by the recent positions of the Democratic Party. The objective would be an “international order aris[ing] from the coupling of American pre-eminence with its liberal founding principles, with the United States wielding its power to craft consensual and legitimate mechanisms of international governance.”³³ Presidents Carter and Clinton’s policies of preventive diplomacy and humanitarian intervention evinced Wilsonian rhetoric by focusing on human rights and the universal values of a global community.

President G. W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are identifiable as the most outspoken champions of the “neoconservative” school, a label which Charles Krauthammer reexamined for clarity. A “democratic globalist,” Krauthammer said, “understands that, as a rule, fellow democracies provide the most secure alliances and most stable relationships. Therefore, the spread of democracy – understood not just as elections, but as limited government, protection of minorities, individual rights, the rule of law and open economies – has, ultimately, not just moral but geopolitical value.”³⁴ Francis Fukuyama assessed the post-Cold war environment as proof that “there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people.”³⁵ Leading thinkers in the field of international relations have extensively debated the current administration’s approach to foreign policy vis-à-vis democratization since the Bush *NSS* came to be operationally implemented in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The democratic processes and elections being undertaken in both Afghanistan and Iraq are sure to foment more concentrated and passionate deliberation of what is the most appropriate foreign policy.

A limited exploration of international relations theory and basic categorizations have been offered as an orientation for further analysis of the Bush administration’s values-based security strategy. Elucidation of the essentials of democracy and discussion of the ends, ways and means of the armed forces should be accomplished before confronting the questions of military strategy development and implementation of moral national objectives.

OLD AND NEW DEMOCRACIES

"If justice is the goal, then democracy is the answer." This proclamation by President Bush in his address to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) summit in June 2004 is indicative of the outward focused, values-based themes at work in U.S. foreign policy. Advancing the argument before the 59th U.N. General Assembly in September 2004, President Bush singled out democracy as the most active and capable system of government for expansion of minority rights and engenderment of peace. He accepted that representational government could take different forms, but emphasized that "the desire for freedom resides in every human heart."³⁶ The U.S. has sponsored a Democracy Fund within the United Nations, because "the advance of liberty is the path to both a safer and better world."³⁷ Support for democratization will remain an influential policy affecting governmental departments.

Classical theories have defined the source of democracy in terms of "the will of the people" and advancement of "the common good" as democracy's purpose. These ideas should continue to serve as an essential starting point for examination of the policies present in the *NSS*. Analysts of global democratic growth in the 20th century, however, claim to have "effectively demolished"³⁸ the classical theories and have shifted the criterion for measuring democratic success. The determination is now based on establishment of a popular vote giving select individuals the power to make political decisions. This methodology is consistent with the United Nations' focus as a collective voice of 191 nations that seeks to be unbiased and does not attempt to persuade member states pursuing democracy to adopt specific forms of government.³⁹ Among the U.N.'s membership, the non-governmental organization (NGO) Freedom House designates 54 percent as "Not Free" or "Partially Free" in its "Freedom in the World 2005" report.⁴⁰ Paradoxically, the "unbiased" U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2001/41 on "Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and consolidate democracy."⁴¹ Government based on the free expression of ideas and values still finds merit in the benefits to society that result.

An elections-oriented gauge is too narrow to fully assess the U.S. "neoconservative" agenda for democratization, which extends well beyond provision of the opportunity to vote. Open elections after U.S. military action during OEF and OIF are landmark events, but the *NSS* reaches further to "champion aspirations for human dignity" and "promote freedom of religion and conscience."⁴² American leaders have called their nation to exemplify moral values ever since John Winthrop preached to the Puritans who set sail from England for a New World in 1630. The work they were undertaking, Winthrop said, would position the colonists "as a city upon a hill,"⁴³ under the observation of all peoples. The founders of our nation broadly outlined

their new government's power as derived "from the consent of the governed." Government's purpose, they wrote, was to secure the inalienable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Foundational republican virtues established the advancement of democracy as a special concern for the nation whose commitment to these values is central to its national identity.⁴⁴ It is an American mindset that democracy is more than governmental structure and to intentionally express this view through an active Wilsonian foreign policy.

Critics have described American efforts to promote and export our democratic values as imperialism. Therefore the effort should be made to define the highly symbolic words: democracy and freedom. This clarification is germane because Americans have a propensity for judging other nations by their own democratic principles. The existence of democracy as an ideology springs from "the values of freedom, equality, and individuality"⁴⁵ that reinforce our constitutional system. The synergy of these three elements in a way that allows human culture to thrive is necessary to identify a "liberal democracy."⁴⁶ Contemporary political scientists have chosen to rely upon a procedural and more quantifiable definition as the condition where certain rules guide the uncertain outcomes of elections and legislation.⁴⁷ The nature of our current security strategy, however, requires defense leaders to formulate relevant military strategy in terms of the fundamentals and objectives of democracy in addition to its processes.

Similarly, freedom is almost synonymous with democracy for Americans, and serves as a national rallying point. The security strategy places freedom in opposition to destructive totalitarianism and calls upon America to "translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty."⁴⁸ Krauthammer announced the "unipolar moment"⁴⁹ of American power in the wake of communism's fall in 1991. Almost fifteen years later, with the threat of asymmetric terrorism rising, the U.S. intends to take advantage of its prolonged hegemony to influence global events toward increased freedom. An American view of freedom is captured in the personal freedoms specifically added to our Constitution in the Bill of Rights. As the country's new president, Thomas Jefferson identified that circumstances "have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members."⁵⁰ American's expect each individual's liberty to be expressed in such a way that all of society's members have equal access to freedom.⁵¹ Dialogues on the increase of democracy and freedom must focus on building mutual understanding as U.S. leaders strive to honor the values and interests of allies and partners. The world is watching to see if the nation's work done in the name of democracy is consistent with the words chosen for the NSS.

FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM – “THE ENDS”

Leaders are faced with the challenge of obtaining or developing “clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objectives”⁵² for Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). Historical examples of democratization and endstates driven by national values have been ably summarized by Nadia Schadlow in the *Parameters* article entitled “War and the Art of Governance.” She identified thirteen episodes in which military personnel managed and executed political and economic reconstruction in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. She noted that “The United States entered virtually all of its wars with the assumption that the government of the opposing regime would change or that the political situation would shift to favor U.S. interests.”⁵³ Winston Churchill expressed reservations in 1942 about “attempts to plan the peace before we have won the war.”⁵⁴ Military advisers were left searching to understand the political endstate of their occupation, as well as the expected means by which it would be accomplished. It was not until November 1944 that formal planning produced Operation ECLIPSE, which laid out allied plans for stabilization and governance in post-war Germany. George Marshall attempted to keep Americans mindful of the “conception of world responsibility and what it demands of us”⁵⁵ in the months after VE-day and VJ-day in 1945. Certain that “definite measures must be taken immediately to determine at least the basic principles for our post-war military policy,”⁵⁶ he pressed Congress to fund European reconstruction, minimize the effects of a major post-war military demobilization, and win support for the U.N. Similar delays in planning for post-conflict military support occurred in 1989 during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, where the combatant commander failed to plan for restoration, governance, and democratization of a nation whose dictator was to be ejected.⁵⁷ General Maxwell Thurman, SOUTHCOM Commander, acknowledged our national values were not being translated into effective foreign policy as the “decapitated government initially incapable of managing basic governmental functions, a sizable refugee problem, and a widespread lapse in civil law and order all threatened to mock the attainment of the operation’s stated objectives.”⁵⁸ History has repeated itself in many costly ways, particularly in the aftershocks of war as countries attempt to win the peace without strategies to implement security, services, and democratic stability.

“THE WAYS” OF WAR AND PEACE

Military strategies, or “ways,” supporting democratization will need to be fully integrated as leaders construct a multi-pronged approach toward foreign policy. Joint Publication 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” defines the “joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commands of the Department of Defense (DoD) and

agencies of the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations.⁶⁹ The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible for interpreting the goals of the *NSS* to establish policies and objectives for all of DoD to pursue in the interagency environment. The anticipated OSD National Defense Strategy (NDS), however, remains unpublished more than two years after release of the *NSS*. OSD has issued guidance for military objectives in security cooperation and transformation planning, as two strategies for promoting American values. The recent release of the National Military Strategy (NMS) by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will be addressed in the conclusion of this paper.

Analysis of military efforts integrated with those of other U.S. agencies is seen in Mark Peceny's research of post-World War II cases. While predating OEF and OIF, Peceny found considerable evidence that "the promotion of free and fair elections during military interventions increases the likelihood that target states will become democracies."⁶⁰ Additional pro-liberalization policies that complement open elections in the establishment of democracies included support for centrist political parties and moderate interest groups and reductions in human rights abuses. Military engagement may follow nascent democratic developments, as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has since 1994. In PfP's first decade, ten Central and Eastern European countries have become NATO members. PfP programs have encouraged democratic control of the armed forces, provided joint training opportunities, and developed capabilities for peace operations.⁶¹

U.S. forces should also expect to be combined with other elements of national power when democratic movements are being fostered. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has actively financed the NGO Liberty Institute, which in turn supported a democratic opponent to Edward Shevardnadze in the country of Georgia.⁶² This political and economic influence occurred while the U.S. military was promoting security assistance through the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). Military leaders should consider how their operations, in concert with nation-building efforts by a spectrum of organizations in and outside the government, will best lead to the ends promoted in the security strategy - the increase of liberty in other nations.

It is important to note the ways to effect democratization cannot be scripted and will always be as unique as the outcome. Efforts arising from enduring principles about the worth of freedom may cultivate a more secure result. Many would argue countries like Afghanistan and Iraq were not fertile soil for democracy, and conditions such as constitutional liberalism, economic development, and climates of equal opportunity and dispersed capital should be

viewed as indispensable precursors.⁶³ In their response to criticisms of fragile democratic states, John Shattuck and F. Brian Atwood provide many examples of countries that have transitioned to democracy even while lacking the suggested building blocks. They also emphasized various mechanisms by which democracy is advanced, drawing attention to expenditures of USAID. The agency invests less than 25 percent of its democracy funds on elections⁶⁴ while also stimulating acceptance of the rule of law, advancing human rights, and defending fundamental freedoms through aid to foreign governments and NGOs.

"THE MEANS" TO FIGHT

Current efforts to provide resources and means for the establishment of democratic processes in Afghanistan are facing complex challenges. Larry Goodson's article on Afghan reconstruction discussed monetary pledges by donor-states and financial organizations, but revealed that more than 75% of these funds have already been applied to "short-term humanitarian assistance, leaving only about \$365 million for long-term projects that [President Hamid] Karzai's administration needs to accomplish if there is to be any hope for legitimacy and stability."⁶⁵ The Afghan Transitional Administration reported in April 2004 that it required \$28 billion in aid over the next seven years and would increase the country's aid utilization capacity to \$4 billion annually to deal with the drug trade and other security issues, as well as for basic services. These goals are unlikely to be met, leading Barnett Rubin to observe that "the low level of funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan remains astonishing, given the importance with which major nations claim to regard it, and the consequences of the previous neglect of that country."⁶⁶ The economics and expectations of nation-building are evolving at a rapid pace.

In addition to economic aid, the provision of military, civilian, and NGO manpower is another "means" to promote the institutions of democracy. However, personnel goals for the task of nation-building have not been achieved as NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) resists increases to the 8,000 troops⁶⁷ they have sent to Afghanistan because of the increasingly hostile situation. The U.S. has 20,000 troops in the country fighting the WOT but does not contribute many forces to ISAF.⁶⁸ On the humanitarian front, the decision by Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) to leave the country after more than two decades brings to light the risks to personnel involved with nation-building efforts and the creation of the social services that should accompany democracy.

There are similar shortfalls in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq with ample criticism of the planning assumptions and resourcing strategy used for OIF. Numerous changes to fiscal appropriations and force structure are being judged in view of the continuing instability faced in

Iraq. Circumstances of increased risk evidenced by ongoing attacks on Iraqi and Western forces reveal an imbalance in the ends, ways and means. There are many reports of unanticipated requirements for better coordination, additional resources, and, primarily, clarification of or adjustments to policy. A short-staffed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has limited the political and economic efforts, while insufficient numbers of U.S. and Coalition troops are available to address the security of the Iraqi people, contended Ken Pollack, also of the Saban Center at Brookings. He predicted it would take five to fifteen years to produce a “stable, prosperous and pluralist society,”⁶⁹ if the U.S. remains engaged in Iraq. The U.S. will also have to adjust its policies to deal with the current hostilities and to provide basic services such as electricity, fuel, and clean water. The White House continues to communicate that America *will* stay engaged in Iraq, and should stay the course in spite of these challenges because of a duty and the common calling to protect freedom’s values.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS FACING STRATEGIC LEADERS

Philosophy students and ethicists are compelled to ask the question, “How then should we live?” The significant concern for this research is “How then should a nation with unipolar military power execute what appears to be idealistic foreign policy?” Policymakers and military leaders face pivotal issues as they formulate and execute strategies supporting the *NSS*. Preemptive action in Iraq, for example, was originally based on a perceived need to limit that nation’s ability to threaten with weapons of mass destruction or provide support to terrorists. Shifting the objective toward development of a democratic nation significantly alters the ways and means needed to meet such a far-reaching end. The capabilities required of American military power to operate under moral auspices create scholarly and practical arguments with the potential to define doctrine, resourcing, and even tactical implementation.

The elements of a values-based strategy aimed at increasing liberty abroad appear in stark contrast with policies operating according to interests alone. Even so, the U.S. looks unwilling to abide by rigid IR labels, such as idealism and realism, and is striving to unite components of each philosophy into one, viable formulation that supports both national values and interests. Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, ascertained that “ideals and self-interests are both generally considered necessary ingredients of the national interest”⁷⁰ in today’s political environment. He traced the rise of ethics in foreign policy and the events and figures leading to a system of international law and global morality concerning war, suffrage, and democracy. In their critiques of the Bush Administration’s methodology for foreign policy, Ikenberry and Krauthammer have submitted views on ways to

capture a synthesis of moral values and interests. They recommend “Liberal Realism”⁷¹ and “Democratic Realism,”⁷² respectively, and while these theories appear to parallel one another, they take divergent courses. Each suggests less ambitious ends, seeks globally legitimized ways, and addresses increasingly capable, yet limited, means. In effect, the open dialogue on power and a continual search for balanced fulfillment of its purpose are vital attributes of the democratic order advocated throughout the *NSS*.

Principal in the values versus interests dilemma for America is the realpolitik acceptance of the status quo with undemocratic allies while committing in general to “help make the world not just safer, but better.”⁷³ There are several contemporary examples where the dilemma is evident. Husain Haqqani described the bizarre contradiction of America’s alliance with a military ruler in Pakistan as these nations focus on regional stability through establishment of a democratic society in neighboring Afghanistan.⁷⁴ In 2000, a bill extending Permanent Normal Trade Relations between the U.S. and China was adopted as law, and included measures establishing a commission to monitor human rights, labor standards, and religious freedom in China.⁷⁵ Egypt has surpassed Israel as the nation receiving the most financial assistance through the USAID’s Economic Support Fund⁷⁶ while the Egyptian People’s Assembly extended the national state of emergency for the thirteenth time since 1981. Human rights groups have criticized the Egyptian government for prolonging the Emergency Law’s exceptional measures through 2006.⁷⁷ The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important economic and military ally in the region but received the lowest possible rating in the “Freedom in the World 2005” report for political and civil rights and the “Not Free” designation, as did Pakistan, China, and Egypt.⁷⁸ Strategic leaders will face the perception that credibility and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are wholly dependent upon consistency. Liberal realists and practical idealists⁷⁹ will undoubtedly play the strategic national interest card even while the call for a coherent, quantifiable and globally-applicable policy toward democratization gets louder. Overcoming the dilemma of differing policies for different regions will depend on judicious diplomacy and strategic choices.

The compromises of foreign policy will involve, in many cases, the art of war. Strategic military leaders of campaigns in the first half of the 20th century may have excused themselves or been excluded from attending to matters of policy, but the armed forces of the U.S. have time and again been engaged in MOOTW since the occupations of Germany and Japan. Doctrine for MOOTW and Peace Operations (PO) has been codified in joint publications (JP) addressing the challenges associated with the employment of military power “in support of diplomatic efforts.”⁸⁰ Interpreting scant political guidance and generating suitable military objectives will be among the Joint Force Commander’s most challenging tasks. Individual actions by soldiers fighting in

the complex urban environment and the abuse of OIF detainees during interrogations offer proof that legitimacy and credibility are also at stake on the highly televised battlespace. From combatant commander to squad leader, prudent use of forces in PO and disciplined attention to Rules of Engagement should be foremost in every warfighter's mind, as each one endeavors to match enacted behavior with espoused values. It may be that America's war in Vietnam will always be a touchstone as strategic leaders consider their willingness to undertake future peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations that may escalate into combat. Preemptive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and PO in Bosnia and Somalia, provide lessons on protracted application of military power in support of national purposes.

The impact of ethical questions surrounding jus ad bellum and jus in bellum is noticeably evident in the expanded call for legal counsel and civil affairs units for OIF. The malleability of "just war theory" to address the NSS' declared need for preemptive military action, potentially upon non-state actors, is currently being studied.⁸¹ The NSS commands development of integrated intelligence capabilities, coordination with allies and transformation of forces to achieve decisive results in support of preemptive options.⁸² The military's assessment of threats to national security and responsibility for preventing adversaries from prosecuting hostile acts places it at the center of anticipatory action. Strategic military leaders must be equipped to engage senior civilians in logical as well as ethical debate over policy goals, objectives and execution. Using "professional astuteness," as defined by Leonard Wong in a study of strategic leadership competencies, leaders "have the insight to do what is best for the profession and the Nation"⁸³ and must attain political proficiency. Wong obliges officers to learn and practice "cross-cultural savvy" to ensure they are "grounded in National and Army values, but [are] also able to anticipate and understand the values, assumptions, and norms of other groups, organizations, and nations."⁸⁴ The dynamic nature of asymmetric warfare in the 21st century demands more soldier-statesmen who will champion the philosophy and practices indispensable to national security.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. is compelled, in light of its heightened influence, to engage in a continuous struggle for a more peaceful, stable, and democratic world. Our national values are appropriately enshrined in the NSS and should be noticeably assimilated in the supporting strategic documents from agencies representing the elements of national power. The operative *National Military Strategy* and USAID's 2002 report entitled "Foreign Aid in the National Interest," however, have not achieved clarity in this effort. These documents thoroughly point

out many practical ways for each department to fulfill its functions, but should also communicate justifications for the ethical ends that substantiate and inspire the work of democratization. A positive example of interagency cooperation for promotion of American values is found in the 2004-2009 Strategic Plan published jointly by the U.S. Department of State and USAID. A mission statement for 21st century American diplomacy "based on fundamental beliefs"⁸⁵ follows clear definition of national core values. Support for national values and ways and means to accomplish these are emphasized throughout the document. The defense and expansion of democracy is an essential part of U.S. foreign policy because it is a worthwhile effort that can lead to great rewards for the people of the world and our nation. The global community has every right to ask if the rewards sought by the U.S. are power and resources, or the more valuable, if intangible, qualities of security and promotion of values respecting human dignity. The *NSS* states America does "not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty."⁸⁶ Military and civilian leaders can look to these words for vision and direction that will enable fulfillment of the grand ideals that birthed our nation. Well-equipped leaders will have a full understanding of national values as elemental for the advancement of democracy and will appropriate them in strategic plans.

WORD COUNT= 5,981

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September, 2002), 2.

² George W. Bush, "Second Inaugural Address," 20 January 2005; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2005.

³ The elements of national power affected by the *NSS* are not restricted to those specifically mentioned in the text. I have chosen not to utilize an acronym such as DIME or PMESII since Appendix A of JP 1-02 (Amended through 7 October 2004) does not offer one. For more information on DIME and PMESII, see USJFCOM glossary website, available from <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#ONA>>. The listing under Operational Net Assessment defines "adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) war-making capabilities" and "the full range of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions" as two models of summarizing the elements of national power.

⁴ George Washington, "First Inaugural Address," 30 April 1789; available from <<http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres13.html>>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

⁵ Department of National Security and Strategy Directive, "Course 2 Overview," (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, August 2004), 3.

⁶ Anthony Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 136. John Harmon McElroy also identifies consistent themes of the American value system and calls them "super beliefs" in his 1999 book *American Beliefs*, published by Ivan R. Dee, Chicago. See the summary chapter (10) on page 220.

⁷ Philip H. Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision," *Survival* 45 (Spring 2003): 155.

⁸ Michael Novak, "Sacred Honor: Religious Principles in the American Founding," in *The Enduring Principles of the American Founding*, ed. Matthew Spalding (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2001), 21.

⁹ George Washington, "Farewell Address," 19 September 1796; available from <<http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/washbye.html>>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

¹⁰ Abraham Lincoln, "The Gettysburg Address," 19 November 1863; available from <<http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/4403.html>>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

¹¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Thanksgiving Day Proclamation," 9 November 1940; available from <<http://www.pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1940.htm>>; Internet; accessed 5 January 2005.

¹² *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*, *U.S. Code*, Title 22, sec. 6401 (27 January 1998); available from <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ292.105.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2004.

¹³ U.S. Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom website, available from <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/>>; accessed 20 December 2004.

¹⁴ Samuel Huntington, "Religious Persecution and Religious Relevance in Today's World," in *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Elliot Abrams (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 60.

¹⁵ Don E. Eberly, ed. *The Content of America's Character: Recovering Civic Virtue* (Lanham, MD.: Madison Books, 1995), xi.

¹⁶ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security," *National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003): 21.

¹⁹ Stephen Kull and Doug Miller, *Global Public Opinion on the U.S. Presidential Election and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 8 September 2004; available from <http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Pres_Election_04/Report09_08_04.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004.

²⁰ "Liberalism is a political current embracing several historical and present-day ideologies that claim defense of individual liberty as the purpose of government. It typically favors the right to dissent from orthodox tenets or established authorities in political or religious matters. In this respect, it is sometimes held in contrast to conservatism. Since liberalism also focuses on the ability of individuals to structure a society, it is almost always opposed to totalitarianism, and often to collectivist ideologies, particularly communism and, in some cases, socialism." Available from <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism>>; Internet; accessed 7 January 2005.

²¹ John Kane, "American Values or Human Rights? U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fractured Myth of Virtuous Power," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33 (December 2003): 773.

²² Kane, 774.

²³ Walter R. Mead, "Hamilton's Way," *World Policy Journal* 13 (Fall 1996): 91.

²⁴ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 17.

²⁵ Thomas Jefferson, "Comments to J. Correa De Serra," Oct 1820; available from <<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/foleydate-browse?id=1820>>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

²⁶ Louise Marie Turreau, "Letter to Talleyrand," July 9, 1805, cited in Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903) 85; quoted in Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 69, (Spring 1990), 141.

²⁷ John M. Murrin, "The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism," *Journal of the Early Republic* 20 (Spring 2000): 2.

²⁸ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), 186. Mead offers Ambassador George Kennan as an example of a 20th Century foreign policy intellectual shaped by Jeffersonian concerns. See page 215.

²⁹ Jerald A. Combs, "Review of *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*," *Journal of American History* 89 (Dec 2002): 1147.

³⁰ Mead, "Hamilton's Way," 89.

³¹ "Globalization (or globalisation) in its literal sense is a social change, an increased connectivity among societies and their elements due to transculturation; the explosive evolution of transport and communication technologies to facilitate international cultural and economic exchange." Available from <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization>>; Internet, accessed 27 January 2005.

³² David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 11.

³³ G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Liberal Realism," *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 38.

³⁴ Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 16.

³⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 45.

³⁶ George W. Bush, "Remarks to 59th United Nations General Assembly," 21 September 2004; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Sep/21-660695.html>>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2004.

³⁷ Bush, "Remarks to 59th United Nations General Assembly."

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 6.

³⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 4.

⁴⁰ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2005 Report;" available from <<http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/charts2005.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2005.

⁴¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) "Issues" website on democracy; available from <<http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/democracy/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 Jan 2005.

⁴² Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 3, 4.

⁴³ John Winthrop, *The Winthrop Papers, Volume II*, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1931) 295; quoted in Peter Marshall and David Manuel, *The Light and the Glory* (Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 1977), 162.

⁴⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, 30.

⁴⁵ Hartle, 141.

⁴⁶ Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (Nov/Dec 1997), 22.

⁴⁷ Mary Ellen Fischer, ed. *Establishing Democracies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 3.

⁴⁸ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 1.

⁴⁹ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Winter 1990-1991), 23.

⁵⁰ Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Joseph Priestly (ME10:324)," 1802; available from <<http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0600.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.

⁵¹ Ralph Barton Perry, *Realms of Value* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 285; quoted in Anthony Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, 137.

⁵² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), II-1.

⁵³ Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 86. (Bib 85-94)

⁵⁴ Michael D. Pearlman, *Warmaking and American Democracy: the Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to Present* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 9.

⁵⁵ George C. Marshall, "Speech to the New York Herald Tribune Forum," in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, "The Finest Soldier," January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947*, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 338.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 108.

⁵⁸ James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," *Parameters* 23 (Summer 1993): 42.

⁵⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996), i.

⁶⁰ Mark Peceny, "Forcing Them To Be Free," *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (September 1999): 553.

⁶¹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," 28 July 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040628-5.html>>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2004.

⁶² Jacob Levich, "When NGOs Attack: Implications of the Coup in Georgia," *Counterpunch*, 6/7 (December 2003); available from <<http://www.counterpunch.org/levich12062003.html>>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.

⁶³ Zakaria, 28, 36, 41.

⁶⁴ John Shattuck and F. Brian Atwood, "Defending Democracy: Why Democrats Trump Autocrats," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (Mar/Apr 1998): 168.

⁶⁵ Larry Goodson, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (January 2003): 88.

⁶⁶ Paul Richter, "The World; Donors Pledge to Keep Up Afghan Aid; Nations offer more than \$4.4 billion for reconstruction but stop short of the long-term commitments being sought by Kabul," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 April 2004, sec. A, p. 3.

⁶⁷ International Security Assistance Force Headquarters Press Office, "ISAF Structure," 20 September 2004; available from <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_structure.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2004. Goals for ISAF force structure stand at 10,000 troops, and were under review as of January 2005.

⁶⁸ Thalif Deen, "Politics: Annan says Better Security is Needed for Afghan Vote," *Global Information Network*, 20 August 2004: 1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 6 October 2004.

⁶⁹ Kenneth M. Pollack, "After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq," [foreignaffairs.org](http://www.foreignaffairs.org), January 12, 2004 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040109faupdate83175/kenneth-m-pollack/after-saddam-assessing-the-reconstruction-of-iraq.html>>; Internet; accessed 7 October 2004.

⁷⁰ Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, "The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (May/June 2003): 2.

⁷¹ Ikenberry and Kupchan, 38.

⁷² Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," 15.

⁷³ Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 20 May 2004; available from <http://www.of.tosd.mil/library/library_files/document_377_National%20Military%20Strategy%2013%20May%202004.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2004.

⁷⁴ Husain Haqqani, "Beating the Retreat on Democracy," *Indian Express*, 13 December 2004; available from

<http://www.indianexpress.com/columnists/full_column.php?content_id=60706>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2004.

⁷⁵ Congressional-Executive Commission on China website; available from <<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/general/faqs.php>>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2004.

⁷⁶ House of Representatives Committee on the Budget, Appropriations Update, "Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2005 – H.R. 4818," 14 July 2004; available from <<http://www.house.gov/budget/foreignopsau071404.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004.

⁷⁷ Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "The Effect of the Emergency Law on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt: 1992-2002," February 2003; available from <<http://www.eohr.org/report/2003/emergency.HTM>>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004.

⁷⁸ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2005, Table of Independent Countries;" available from <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2004.

⁷⁹ I offer these labels to describe the centrists or moderates operating in opposite camps of international relations theory. Those who espouse realism or idealism will often find both restraints and constraints upon the strategies they develop. In today's political climate realists cannot avoid placing some emphasis on human rights and universal values, and idealists cannot avoid tempering their efforts to promote rights and values because of limited resources. See President George W. Bush's 20 January 2005 Inaugural Address at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/>>; "The great objective of ending tyranny is the concentrated work of generations. The difficulty of the task is no excuse for avoiding it. America's influence is not unlimited, but fortunately for the oppressed, America's influence is considerable, and we will use it confidently in freedom's cause."

⁸⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, GL-4.

⁸¹ Franklin E. Wester, "Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq," *Parameters* 34 (Winter 2004/2005): 20.

⁸² Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 16.

⁸³ Leonard Wong, et al., *Strategic Leadership Competencies*. Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, September 2003), 10.

⁸⁴ Wong, 7.

⁸⁵ Colin L. Powell and Andrew S. Natsios, *Department of State/United States Agency for International Development, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, Publication 11084, August 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/>>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2004.

⁸⁶ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, iii.

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