PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
WITHOUT A GRAND STRATEGY

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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### Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Without a Grand Strategy

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**Distribution/Availability Statement:**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Security Classification:**
- Report: Unclassified
- Abstract: Unclassified
- This Page: Unclassified

**Limitation of Absorption:**
29

See attached.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Alan F Mangan, USMCR
TITLE: Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 4 March 2005 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

All efforts presently underway in the United States Government (USG) to plan, organize, and resource for future stabilization and reconstruction operations are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy.

The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the USG, several more intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states in order to rebuild those states’ institutions of civil governance.

All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with – and links together – the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results.

Not only should the USG plans be linked, but also the participation with the USG in these and similar operations of allies & partners and intergovernmental & nongovernmental organizations needs to be addressed with sufficient specificity to guide investment in U.S. capacity as a measurable subset of global capacity.

Absent grand strategy, which presumably accomplishes the above and more, planning and resourcing for stabilization and reconstruction operations amounts to pre-planning responses to anticipated crises on a case-by-case basis.
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This paper came about as the result of four converging events in my personal experience in 2004. Firstly, the media attention and criticism of the U.S. Government’s purported failure to plan for post-conflict operations in Iraq led me to ask myself a series of questions… did we not plan, did we plan and were the plans shunted aside, did we plan and subsequently fail to implement the plan(s), etc. I was compelled to search for the truth behind the audible and topical stories. Secondly, as a student of the U.S. Army War College, I was exposed for the first time in my career to NSC-68, the grand strategy composed by Paul Nitze and his colleagues in 1949-1950 that established the baseline plan against which, I presume, subordinate plans among the various departments and agencies of the executive branch benchmarked themselves and competed for and were allocated resources with which to proceed. Even if this were not the case in actuality, in my understanding of the purpose of NSC-68, this result was achievable. Thirdly, my reading of NSC-68 represents a watershed event in my career. I have, I hope, comprehended what constitutes grand strategy and I have become a student and disciple, if you will, of the “wise men” of the post-World War II period who crafted the grand strategy of the United States to contain the ideology of communism. Finally, I have read Thomas P.M. Barnett’s text, The Pentagon’s New Map, and believe that Barnett has articulated a viable “operating theory of the world.” It is possible to place future interventions by the United States and its like-minded partners into a coherent context that ultimately leads to a promising future that only the USG is capable of leading our present world to achieve.

I have come to the conclusion, as a result of my research, that USG military interventions in the decade between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 were brought about entirely by a reactive process in Washington, DC that treated each event as a discreet foreign/national security policy event and that there was no guiding national strategy against which to place these interventions in context.

The purpose of grand strategy, in my understanding as an Army War College student, is to establish the national level baseline plan against which departmental and agency plans benchmark themselves. To put this in a systems perspective, without a grand strategy, each department and agency of the federal government can only sub-optimize for its particular responsibility set. The goal ought to be to optimize across the entire USG, granted at the potential expense of sub-optimizing some of the subordinate organizations. In an operation as grave as Iraq, optimization across the entire USG should override sub-optimization of DOD, as an example. I am presently an advocate of optimizing first across the USG and subsequently, at a future point in time at which it may become viable, of optimizing at the international system level, even if international system optimization entails less-than-sub-optimization at the U.S. national level. I believe that the U.S. will be better served in the final analysis by attempting to optimize this future solution for the world at large.
The international community should discard the illusion that one can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence without affecting domestic politics and without including a nation-building component. Attention must be devoted to rebuilding the institutions whose collapse helped bring on the disaster… Unless development aid and external assistance address the long-term political and economic implications of an intervention, it is doomed.

— Jeffrey Clark and Walter Herbst, 1996

The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG), several more intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states in order to rebuild those states’ institutions of civil governance. All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with – and links together – the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results. This paper focuses on stabilization and reconstruction operations as the test case to prove the above thesis by addressing:

• what the present U.S. policy is on stabilization and reconstruction;
• how the interagency has responded to present policy;
• why the United States National Security Strategy, its derivative strategic plans, and policy declarations by the President and Secretary of State do not compose a grand strategy;
• why the United States needs a new grand strategy; and,
• proposals for a way ahead.
PRESENT U.S. POLICY

An examination of the National Security Strategy (NSS) provides a starting point for an appraisal of the USG’s current policy with regard to stabilization and reconstruction. The NSS begins with a vision of an international world order built on the model of “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” and asserts that, “these values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe.” This establishes the U.S. baseline (it also transposes it to an international baseline) and from here follow these statements that describe circumferentially the objectives which stability and reconstruction operations would suitably achieve:

We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.

The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people.

...the United States will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity.

Section VII, entitled “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy” states that an effective strategy must try to expand trade, domestic capital and foreign investment. This provides an opening for reconstruction as a grand strategic concept, but it does not go on to describe how the USG will “build the infrastructure of democracy.”

Section IX, entitled “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century” is a description of the national resources the U.S. must develop in support of the security strategy and under the State Department heading describes the means of stabilization and reconstruction:

Officials trained mainly in international politics must also extend their reach to understand complex issues of domestic governance around the world, including public health, education, law enforcement, the judiciary, and public diplomacy. Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes. As humanitarian relief requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American readiness to play our part.
The above quote, taken in the context of the quotes above it, leaves open the possibility that the USG could work with or stand beside entities other than the government of the state… every person, every society, freedom-loving people, and in every corner of the world. The use of the term humanitarian catastrophes and the phrase as humanitarian relief requirements are better understood refer to manmade humanitarian crises, not natural disasters.

President George W. Bush, in his second term inaugural address of 20 January 2005, reinvigorated this subtle policy of future political intervention beneath the state level by declaring, “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” He went on to say, “Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America sees you for who you are: the future leaders of your free country.” By focusing on states whose current tyrannical governments should be removed and replaced with democratic governments, the President implicitly commits the U.S. to some unspecified role in and responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction in these future instances. Such states might be described as stable states ruled by despot – e.g. Cuba.

The National Security Strategy made it a policy, in 2002, for the State Department to prepare to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. It also declared, “We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy.” In the ends-ways-means construct, reconstructing institutions of governance and commerce is a strategic concept, one way among many possible ways. Reconstruction is one possible answer to the question “how” the USG will achieve its national objectives in political interventions such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The NSS sees the State Department as the primary means and reconstruction by invitation or intervention as a way – a strategic concept held in reserve in the NSS – to achieve the U.S. national ends of freedom, democracy and prosperity the world over. Even at this level of fidelity, however, the NSS is more a declaratory policy statement to the world at large than it is strategic planning guidance to the interagency.

The Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009 of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) lays out these organizations’ policies. The State Department will focus its diplomatic efforts on “resolving regional crises” while USAID will provide development assistance to “help ensure stability of developing and transitional countries.” The two organizations’ shared goal is “to ensure that today’s troubled countries do not become tomorrow’s failed states.” Furthermore, the emphasis will be “to support those countries that are committed to democratic governance, open economies, and wise investment in their people’s education, health, and potential.” This State Department/USAID policy seems
to contain an inherent dichotomy. At once, the U.S. will focus on countries in crisis - the worst cases - and on the countries that are committed to democracy, market economics, and human capital - the best cases.

The Millennium Challenge Account targets development assistance to those countries in the best cases category. USAID brings to bear new resources made available in the Millennium Challenge Account in those countries closest to successfully achieving the open and democratic endstate mutually established between those friendly governments and the USG. This is a strategy to deal with the best cases.

How the State Department deals with the worst cases, beyond diplomacy, remains unstated. Even the Strategic Plan’s mention of its key USG partner, the Department of Defense, contains the same dichotomy – “DOD takes the lead in any use of force and, at times, reconstruction,” i.e. in the worst cases; while DOD provides security assistance to strengthen military and alliance relationships in the best cases.9

Thomas P. M. Barnett’s proposed grand strategy for the U.S., as articulated in The Pentagon’s New Map, would pursue these two aims simultaneously.10 He advocates applying sufficient resources along both lines to succeed along both lines. DOD should be the lead in the security business necessary in the worst cases while the other elements of national power ought to lead in the best cases – principally supporting these countries with political and economic solution sets.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism links actions in the war on terrorism with stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Combating Terrorism strategy’s goal of denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists identifies four categories of states: (1) those willing and able to fight terrorism; (2) those weak but willing to fight terrorism; (3) those reluctant to fight terrorism; and, (4) those unwilling to fight terrorism.11 The strategy for the second category explicitly includes building institutions and capabilities necessary for these weak states to govern their territories and to fight terrorism within their borders. This would be political intervention and reconstruction by invitation without a preceding state-level conflict. In the fourth category, states unwilling to prosecute terrorism and those harboring terrorists, the strategy is to counter “decisively” the threats by “compelling” those states to cease their support of terrorism. This strategy implicitly contains both stability and reconstruction components in a post-conflict scenario. Afghanistan is the illustrative case in point.

The Combating Terrorism strategy’s goal of diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit ties back to the “weak” states identified in category (2) above and adds “failed” states to the set of pending interventions. This enunciates an even more explicit
requirement for stability and reconstruction operations. Partnering with the international
community, “the principal objective of our collective response [to state failure] will be the
rebuilding of a state that can look after its own people – their welfare, health, prosperity, and
freedom – and control its borders.” The means to accomplish this objective are also clearly
stated – governments, non-governmental agencies and public-private partnerships of the
civilized world all working together.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism concludes with a reminder that defeating
terrorism is a component of the nation’s overall security strategy by stating:

We understand that we cannot choose to disengage from the world because in
this globalized era, the world will engage us regardless. The choice is really
about what kind of world we want to live in... We strive to build an international
order where more [sic] countries and peoples are integrated into a world
consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners – values such
as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free
economies, and religious tolerance... This is the world we must build today. 13

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is consistent with the NSS. Building a
new world is the highest-order strategy. Defeating terrorism and reconstructing societies are
supporting concepts within that strategy. Stability operations compose an even lower-order
operating concept that supports the defeating terrorism and reconstruction strategic concepts.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) derives from both the NSS and the Combating
Terrorism strategies the objectives of denying terrorists either state support (potential win
decisively scenario) or sanctuary in a weak or failed state and assisting partners in establishing
favorable security conditions in weak or failed states. The NMS describes stability operations
as a joint operating concept that creates favorable security conditions that allow other
instruments of national and international power to achieve long-term regional stability and
sustainable development. 14

INTERAGENCY RESPONSES TO POLICY

Concurrent with the development of the NSS, the Commission on Post-Conflict
Reconstruction conducted an extensive study of U.S. capacity to address the challenges of
failed states and rebuilding countries following conflict. Most of the Commission’s 17
recommendations were drafted into Senate bills entitled the Winning the Peace Act of 2003 and
the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004. While the 2003 bill went
into committee in June 2003 and never reemerged, it is worth noting that its first finding cited the
NSS, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” and further
found that “it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to bring
conflict and humanitarian emergencies stemming from failed states to a lasting and sustainable
close.”\footnote{16} The 2004 bill captures all of the flavor and expands the scope and scale of the 2003
bill. It was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2004 and was still
pending full Senate consideration in November 2004.

The purpose of the \textit{Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004},
referred to as the Lugar-Biden bill, is “to provide for the development, as a core mission of the
Department of State and the Agency for International Development, of an effective expert
civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities in a country or
region that is in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife.” As the precept for intervention,
the bill uses, “If the President determines that it is important to the national interests of the
United States…” he may authorize it. Congress cited as its finding that the U.S. Armed Forces
have been “burdened by having to undertake stabilization and reconstruction tasks… that could
have been performed by civilians.”\footnote{17}

The Lugar-Biden bill reads, “the President should establish a new directorate of
stabilization and reconstruction activities within the National Security Council to oversee the
development of interagency contingency plans and procedures, including plans and procedures
for joint civilian-military operations, to address stabilization and reconstruction requirements in
foreign countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.” The bill
fixes responsibility for leading the USG preparations, including DOD, in the NSC and proposes
that the NSC should develop stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans. The bill goes
on to propose that the Secretary of State should establish a new office of stabilization and
reconstruction with a Coordinator at its head to be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.

Even farther-reaching than the 2004 Senate bill is the 2004 House bill on the same
subject entitled the \textit{International Security Enhancement Act of 2004}.\footnote{18} The purpose of the
House bill is to “improve the coordination of the Federal Government in identifying and
responding to weak or failing countries that endanger international security or stability, to
improve the coordination and conduct of pre-conflict stabilization operations and post-conflict
reconstruction operations, and for other purposes.” The House bill, similarly with the Senate bill,
authorizes establishment of new offices in the Department of State and the National Security
Council each with authorities to plan and coordinate future interventions. It then goes to greater
levels of specificity and authority by directing the State Department to identify and categorize
weak/failing countries into three levels of risk (risk, impending risk, and immediate risk), to
create planning and monitoring requirements for those countries and to coordinate especially
closely any possible military operations in those countries. The bill also directs geographic combatant commanders to establish joint interagency task forces to plan post-conflict reconstruction operations for all regional contingency plans. The House bill also expresses the sense of the Congress that the State Department’s new office should fund itself by reductions in extant like programs and staff itself by internal transfers of personnel from eliminated redundant functions. In effect, the House is demanding of State that State generate its own means to implement a specified set of ways that the House cites as having merit.

On 5 August 2004, the Secretary of State seized the initiative, pending future enactment of a single congressional bill, and established the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in order to enhance “our nation’s institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failed, failing, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies.” This could very well represent the first investment in the USG’s “force development strategy” to accompany its nascent post-conflict reconstruction policy. “The mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”

On 13 December 2004, Ambassador Carlos Pascual addressed a U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s (USAPKSOI) symposium and explained his approach in standing up his new office. He referred to a 2003 RAND study on American involvement in nation-building from Germany and Japan through Afghanistan and cited the statistic that in the past 15 years the United States has been involved in seven major post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations – Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He then carried forward these historical/statistical findings into his new office’s strategic plan. That is, because the United States has recently engaged in two to three stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently and because stabilization and reconstruction operations historically last five to ten years, Ambassador Pascual intends to develop a capacity to engage in two to three operations concurrently, each lasting from five to ten years.

The Department of State is forecasting future interventions based on the trend line of past interventions because there is no national strategy that addresses these operations with sufficient specificity to prepare for any alternative scenarios, nor against which to develop any alternative capacity. Likewise, the draft Executive Order, which when signed by the President will be the directive that empowers the State Department to lead the interagency in the civilian domain of this effort, makes no mention of how much capacity to develop. If past interventions
were reactive in nature, and the President has not specified that this is what he wants to do, then this methodology will produce future interventions that are also reactive.

In Condoleezza Rice’s 18 January 2005 Senate confirmation hearing for her appointment to Secretary of State, Senator Lugar asked her if she could outline her vision for taking on stabilization and reconstruction as a new core mission of the Department of State, as he had envisioned in crafting the Lugar-Biden bill. Dr. Rice’s answer went no farther in describing a vision than to restate that civilian and military expertise needs to better join together, that the Department of State ought to have the lead for post-conflict situations, and that she is going to try to ensure that the Department of State is resourced sufficiently to discharge this new responsibility. This response indicates the still nascent nature of this field of endeavor in 2005 and the necessity to tie this strategic concept of reconstruction to feasibly authorized and appropriated resources, to internationally suitable goals, and to acceptable methods of performing stability and reconstruction operations.

The Secretary of Defense similarly began his consideration of how to proceed in this area by commissioning the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct a summer study on “Transition to and from Hostilities” in 2004. The DSB report says virtually the same thing as the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the Lugar-Biden bill, and S/CRS’s organizational plan. Build a capacity that’s approximately so big and we will make future decisions about which interventions to pursue and how much force to send based on our new capacity, which will be greater than our current capacity and therefore will give us more options and more flexibility.

The DSB report recommends to the Secretary of Defense a military force structure solution achievable in the near term to be a force of “sufficient size” to achieve ambitious objectives in small operations areas and of “sufficient excellence” to achieve modest objectives elsewhere. “Decisions to embark on stabilization operations – how often, of what magnitude, and with what ambition for outcomes – would then be considered in light of the capability of this force. If the force is not adequate for the strategy, it [the force] would need to be expanded.”

It is reasonable to expect that this subject will generate a tremendous amount of attention in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and it remains to be seen what reference point DOD will use to craft its "stability operations" force development strategy. This is a clear reflection of the Secretary of Defense’s “capabilities-based” planning paradigm.

The Department of Defense is tackling the task of generating its new capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations along a four-way front. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability
Operations have the lead for crafting the Secretary’s policy guidance in a new DOD Directive on Stability Operations, which is currently in draft form and is expected to be completed and approved in 2005. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for integrating the efforts of the combatant commands and the Services through doctrine, education, training and the like. United States Joint Forces Command has crafted a joint operating concept for stability operations, also in draft at present with expected completion during 2005. The Military Departments and Services have been charged with generating forces appropriate to the task—although this is a rather superficially understood responsibility at present and as mentioned above is certain to be a major consideration of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The draft DOD Directive is at once very explicit and very broad in its declaration of DOD policy. Of the multitude of items in the draft directive, the following are worthy of special mention. Stability operations are to be a core U.S. military mission. Stability operations shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations. U.S. military forces should be prepared to develop indigenous capacities for security, freedom, a civil society, and a market economy when civilian authorities cannot. DOD will be required to leverage resources and integrate activities of the interagency, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector; and to coordinate military plans with all of the above. Perhaps most groundbreaking of all, DOD shall “amplify indigenous voices promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, and direct support to moderate political, religious, education and media figures who oppose incitement to violence and the murder of civilians.”

PRESENT PLANNING GUIDANCE ≠ GRAND STRATEGY

To begin, the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism relate themselves to one another inconsistently. The strategy for Homeland Security focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and places reconstruction operations into the context of the war on terrorism. The strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on defeating terrorist threats outside the United States and places both reconstruction operations and actions in the war on terrorism into the context of promoting a freer, more prosperous and more secure world.

The Introduction to the National Strategy for Homeland Security states that “the National Strategy for Homeland Security complements the National Security Strategy of the United States by addressing a very specific and uniquely challenging threat – terrorism in the United States.” It then goes on to state that all the other national strategies are “subsumed within the
twin concepts of national security and homeland security” and “fit into the framework established by the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which together take precedence over all other national strategies, programs, and plans.”

Juxtapose this with the Combating Terrorism strategy’s broad and higher-order statements. The U.S. is fighting terrorism for our “fundamental democratic values and way of life,” to “integrate nations and peoples into the mutually beneficial democratic relationships that protect against the forces of disorder and violence,” to “promote a freer, more prosperous, and more secure world” that will “give hope to our children and generations to come,” and again “ultimately” to “foster an international environment where our democratic interests are secure and the values of liberty are respected around the world.”

The Combating Terrorism strategy makes clear that defeating terrorism overseas is a component of the higher-order strategy articulated in the National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy’s opening statement by the President lays down the salient for the U.S. to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.” While the NSS asserts that defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government, it clearly relegates it to a component part of the overall strategy. The Homeland Security Strategy elevates the defeat of terrorism to be the highest order strategy and furthermore declares that prevention of terrorist attack in the U.S. takes precedence over all other national strategies.

The DSB study concluded that the need for skilled personnel to conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities is significant, growing and expensive. U.S. armed forces cannot and should not be expected to meet all the requirements. Personnel from the interagency, contractors, allies and partners, and even indigenous personnel must share the burden. “How the full requirement, especially for stabilization, can be met with current resources and capabilities is unclear” particularly if the U.S. maintains its current pace of stabilization operations.

The DSB states in its report’s Introduction that it did not focus on U.S. force structure, terrorism and counterterrorism in failed and failing states, weapons of mass destruction, or the doctrine of preemption. The DSB acknowledges implicitly in this disclaimer that it has not attempted to link it recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction capabilities to these other subjects. Its recommendations can now become inputs, raw material in the stabilization and reconstruction domain, to a new grand strategy.
WHY THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A NEW GRAND STRATEGY

The United States needs a new grand strategy because current strategic planning guidance does not provide direction sufficiently specific to allow the government’s strategic leaders to make investment decisions, develop effective organizing principles, and establish appropriate command relationships that are optimized for the President’s principal strategy. In effect, the President has selected all of the strategies and each of them requires new resourcing, new organizations, and new relationships among U.S. and other governments and U.S. and other non-governmental organizations to fulfill. The fact that DOD’s priority for planning future Phase IV operations is based on the Contingency Planning Guidance and that DOS’s priority for planning future stabilization and reconstruction operations is based on the National Intelligence Committee’s assessment of anticipated state failures is evidence that the two departments are not planning, organizing, and resourcing against a single principal strategy.

The U.S. also needs a new grand strategy because the documented inventory of national interests, goals and objectives articulated in the Bush administration’s various strategies and policy statements does not adequately address the full political nature of international interventions by the U.S. and its allies and friends. The nature of a mission in which stabilization and reconstruction are components is always and everywhere political intervention and the test of political intervention necessarily answers the test of international intervention. If the circumstances in another state demand extranational intervention – armed force aside in theory – then the nature of the problem must be both political and international. This context drives one to consider that a new grand strategy is significantly greater than a United States National Strategy for doing anything. Grand strategy would address alternatives for who will be responsible for interventions, what the international community is ultimately pursuing, when the circumstances in a state warrant intervention, where on the globe the international community ought to be prioritizing its efforts, and why the pursuit of certain stabilized and reconstructed states is of vital, important, or peripheral international interest and the similar pursuit in certain other states is not.

Grand strategy would allow one to derive intervention – even pre-conflict intervention – as the preferred solution, stabilization of the crisis that precipitated state failure or conflict and subsequent reconstruction of a state’s institutions of civil governance as the preferred ways, and the appropriate plans, organizations and resources as the means by which the U.S. and its partners will accomplish their ends. Grand strategy would allow the USG and its potential partners to calibrate new investments, make trade-offs among current funding streams, structure a future force, prioritize work on deliberate plans, and negotiate a share of the future
stabilization and reconstruction workload. It would benchmark how stabilization and reconstruction operations compete for limited resources within the domain of all strategic concepts.

Grand strategy would put stabilization and reconstruction operations into the context of President Bush’s strategic vision for both America’s role in world affairs and for what the affairs of the world ought to be. The President spoke to this strategic vision in his second inaugural address when he said, “We are led… to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” This is Thomas Barnett’s “reproducible” strategic vision of the “future worth creating.”

The past four years have marked tremendous progress in structural adaptation and strategic planning for the USG. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century summed up the state of affairs on 15 February 2001 as follows:

The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the Executive Branch of the government. Most troublesome is the lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. The Commission’s recommendation is that strategy should once again drive the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies. That means that the President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and that should be linked to the allocation of resources throughout the government.

THE WAY AHEAD

What now is the ubiquitous way ahead? The United States is still within a window of opportunity such as the post World War II period when the “wise men” planned the new international world order. There have been only two opportunities since then to create history. The first opportunity was missed in the early years of the post-Cold War period (1990-1994); the above block quote attests to that. The second opportunity began when the post 9/11 period began and will close at about the same time that the 2008 campaign for U.S. president begins.

In order to underwrite the 21st century’s new international world order, the USG needs to organize the efforts of the civilian components of the interagency, integrate civil-military strategic and operational planning, and engage the international community with a strategic concept for the future that is reproducible worldwide. All of these activities are underway and they are all moving generally in the direction that the President wishes, toward building capacity for spreading freedom and prosperity in the world.
Alphonso X. the Learned, King of Spain in the 13th century said, “Had I been present at
the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe.”33

Some useful hints for the better ordering of the new world order might include the following.

The war on terrorism was the beta case for USG interagency integration in the post 9/11
period. Building on lessons learned in that domain and upon the numerous studies par
excellence recently concluded and reported, the President should designate stabilization and
reconstruction as the change agent for interagency integration. While momentum is gathering
in the Departments of State and Defense to prepare for future stabilization and reconstruction
operations, there is not yet a top-down directive that drives this process. By publishing a
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on interagency integration around stabilization
and reconstruction operations, the President would direct action as only the chief executive can.
The President should also see the Lugar-Biden bill enacted into law in order to provide the legal
and financial resources that will enable the USG to move from starting this effort to sustaining it.

Civilian interagency integration should proceed first. Stabilization and reconstruction
operations are civil-military operations. Given that the U.S. military is the world’s best model for
power projection and rapid response, it is logical to expect that the civilian component of the
interagency will benchmark its desired “soft” power projection and rapid response capability
against the U.S. military. A new interagency organizing principal built around the stabilization
and reconstruction planning process becomes the change agent for civil-military integration at
the national and operational levels. Taken to greater level of specificity, the combatant
commander’s OPLAN Annex V is the link – the function – around which the civil side should
form its organization. By answering the question, how should the interagency write Annex V
with the combatant commanders, a large part of the organizing principal of the civil side of civil-
military integration is envisioned.

Civil-military integration is already afoot in the USG. It got a start with President Clinton’s
PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” but relapsed in the first Bush
administration’s lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Criticism of post-hostilities civil-military
operations has brought to a head the requirement for integration. While it is presently
progressing with a good deal of attention at the combatant commands, civil-military integration
depends on the civil side completing much of its preparatory work first, to catch-up to the
military in the field of “management discipline.”34 Understanding that the term “management
discipline” means the sum total of all the American military has done since inception to produce
the fielded force of today, a lot of progress is in front of the civilian component. The obvious
conclusion is that civilian integration and civil-military integration will have to be implemented in
parallel, with the main effort – i.e. resources authorized and appropriated – in the near term on the civilian side.

The next step would be to solidify the international community’s desire to “multilateralize interventions”\textsuperscript{35} pre-conflict. This is a strategic concept that is widely supported in principle in the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and the peacekeeping community,\textsuperscript{36} but remains without a champion – without a leader. This is an opportunity for the United States to lead in an area where the world is willing to follow. This would ground the rhetoric of *working with friends and partners* in reality. Multilateral pre-conflict intervention to prevent violence, stabilize a gathering crisis, and reconstruct a struggling nation is a reproducible strategic concept whose ends are in accord with every organization mentioned above. Bring Russia, China, and India along and it is a worldwide winner.

Congress should take the Quadrennial Defense Review concept and expand it to a Quadrennial Security Review. The Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 1997 and 2001 were conducted within the Pentagon and served as the force-generating strategies of the Military Departments of the Department of Defense. By mandating a Quadrennial Security Review, Congress would create the lever that can move the entire USG to integration. This would be the statute from which to derive the NSPD referred to above. A Security Review, not a Defense Review, would generate the intellectual capital needed to write the nation’s grand strategy.

Finally, the President should charge the National Security Council with developing a grand strategy that integrates all of the national strategies into a suitable, acceptable, and feasible plan. This base plan has to be executable and executability would be the test of its validity. The task before the NSC would be to prove that the national strategies are executable when implemented together by demonstrating how they are to be implemented together.

In conclusion, all of these proposals are merely the next rational steps to what is already underway. These proposals seek to form a whole from the parts in the expectation that the whole would exceed the sum of the parts as currently implemented. Challenges and opportunities abound. This opportunity is the best kind because it is proactive in nature, cooperative in character, and strives to achieve what is best for mankind. Right now is the opportunity to be “present at the creation”\textsuperscript{37} once again.
ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Agency for International Development, Conflict Mitigation and Management Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2005), 1. Among all research material referenced in this paper, only USAID uses the term “fragile.” All other references consistently use the terms “failing, failed, and post-conflict” in the stabilization and reconstruction context.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 23.

5 Ibid. 31.


9 Ibid. 7.


12 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 23.


28 Defense Science Board, Summer Study 2004: Transition to and from Hostilities, iv.

29 Bush, “Inaugural Address.”

30 Barnett, 5-19.


32 The term “wise men” has been and is often used to refer to Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Paul Nitze, et.al., who in the post World War II period crafted the western world’s new international world order, which remained the world’s organizing principal until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

33 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), ii.

34 Defense Science Board, Summer Study 2004: Transition to and from Hostilities, iv.

35 Pascual, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).”
See the “Charter of the United Nations” (1945), the European Union’s “European Security Strategy” (2003), and the NATO “Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (1999). See the United States Institute of Peace statement entitled, “About the Institute” (1984) for a representative statement of the peacekeeping community as a whole.

Acheson, xvii.
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