**Doctrine for Joint Operations**

**Abstract**

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**Distribution/Availability Statement**

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.
This revised edition of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, represents the latest in a series of updates to joint doctrine. It reflects the most current guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations.

This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team. Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the overarching concepts and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This comprehensive document addresses all key aspects of joint warfighting in war and military operations other than war, where many of today’s military activities are focused.

As our Nation moves briskly into the 21st Century, the guidance in this publication will enable the current and future leaders of our Armed Forces to organize, train, and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges.

I enjoin all commanders to study and understand the principles contained in this publication and to teach these principles to their subordinates. Only then will we be able to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. To that end, I request you ensure the widest possible distribution of this keystone joint publication. I further request that you actively promote the use of all joint publications at every opportunity.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Discusses the Strategic Environment Within Which Joint Operations Take Place
• Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations
• Covers Planning Guidance for War and Military Operations Other Than War
• Describes the Considerations for the Conduct of Joint Operations During War
• Provides Principles for Military Operations Other Than War
• Discusses Considerations for Multinational Operations

The Strategic Context

Contemporary threats faced by the Armed Forces of the United States are more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War.

Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions and threaten US national interests and security within their areas of responsibility. These instabilities can lead to increased levels of competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies, regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, and civil war. It is difficult to predict which nations or groups may threaten US interests and how and when such threats will emerge. Yet such predictions should be attempted, and with a process that allows for rapid dissemination of strategic estimates.

Range of Military Operations

The range of military operations stretches from war to military operations other than war.

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national
Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals.

Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace.

**Military operations other than war (MOOTW) involving the use or threat of force.** When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

**Military operations other than war not involving the use or threat of force.** Prudent use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

**National Strategic Direction**

National security strategy and national military strategy (NMS), shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. **Combatant commanders**, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations.

**Interagency Operations**

Combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations in a variety of circumstances. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all
**Executive Summary**

Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure.

**The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination**

To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving sufficient leverage to impose a lasting solution. Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state goals — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW.

**Fundamentals of Joint Operations**

Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience. It applies the principles of the fundamentals of joint warfare, and other key concepts consistent with the policies of the US Government. It seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeat an adversary in war or to conduct MOOTW. It is a doctrine that recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork and unity of effort, and the synchronization and integration of military operations in time, space, and purpose. The fundamental principle for employment of US joint forces is to commit decisive force to ensure achievement of the objectives established by the National Command Authorities (NCA) while concluding operations in the shortest time possible and on terms favorable to the United States.

**Levels of War**

The levels of war, from a doctrinal perspective, clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to both war and MOOTW. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
Executive Summary

Unified Action

The concept of unified action highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces to achieve common objectives.

Joint Warfare

The integration of all US military capabilities, often in conjunction with forces from other nations, other US agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations forces and capabilities, is required to generate decisive joint combat power. JFCs synchronize and integrate the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

Command Relationships

The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant command, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Organization of Forces

Joint forces are specifically designated, composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, and commanded by a JFC with a joint staff. The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs’ vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations.
Command and Control

Command includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

Joint Urban Operations

Urbanized areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of joint urban operations (JUO), however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants that fundamentally alters the character of combat and noncombat operations.

JUO are not analogous to jungle, desert, or mountain operations in that there are more than just terrain considerations. JUO are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing adversary forces while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of people. During JUO, joint forces may not always focus only on destruction of adversary forces but also may be required to take steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival.

Planning Joint Operations

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent. The Joint Strategic Planning System provides strategic direction; assigns missions, tasks, forces, and resources; and designates objectives and rules of engagement. It also establishes constraints and restraints and defines policies and concepts to be integrated into combatant command strategies and plans. The ultimate goal of US military forces is to accomplish the objectives.
directed by the NCA. For joint operations, this will be achieved through full spectrum dominance — the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary or dominate any situation across the full range of military operations.

**Combatant Command Strategic Planning**

Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises.

Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection and rapid transition to combat operations.

When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations, the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

**The Campaign**

A campaign is a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives.

A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Campaigns are joint in nature and serve as the focus for the conduct of war and MOOTW. Campaigns must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives.

A wartime campaign is the synchronization and integration of any necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations — as well as interagency and multinational operations — in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.

**Operational Art**

Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the adversary disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational
Executive Summary

The initial plan establishes the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and the initial tasks for subordinate units.

Key Planning Considerations

Key planning considerations include: mission, commander's intent, commander's critical items of information, concept of operations, targeting, support, air apportionment, countering air and missile threats, space support operations, concept of logistics, force protection, environmental considerations, and command, control, communications, and computer systems.

Considerations Before Combat

Actions JFCs are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations.

JFCs should prepare the operational area, which involves implementing intelligence and counterintelligence operations in order to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. JFCs should also consider isolation of the adversary, movement to attain operational reach, special operations protection, space operations, and assessment of the physical environment.

Considerations at the Outset of Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately.

JFCs seek decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve his objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Actions that JFCs take include conducting force projection, seeking dimensional superiority, attacking adversary centers of gravity, conducting special operations, and ensuring force protection.

Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations

JFCs conduct sustained operations when a quick military resolution is not possible.

JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. During a major operation, one component or major category of operations might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function. Some functions (e.g., strategic attack, interdiction, and psychological

art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.
Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, in a complementary fashion. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities.

Combatant commanders support national objectives through combatant command strategies and military operations, which translate strategic intent into operational and tactical actions. Thus, joint MOOTW involve strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. Because the Department of State is frequently the lead Federal agency and nearly always a principal player in joint MOOTW outside the continental United States, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area.

Planning considerations for MOOTW include interagency coordination, command and control, intelligence and information collection, constraints and restraints, training and education, postconflict operations, and redeployment to other contingencies.

Multinational Considerations

Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance, a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives, or coalition, an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support. Each
multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, **US forces often will be the predominant and most capable force** within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

**Considerations for multinational operations** include national goals; unity of effort; doctrine, training, and equipment; cultural differences; management of resources; and national communications. JFCs must also initiate actions and provide guidance on the protection and sharing of sensitive US information and assets. Additionally, planned operations must take into account host nation policies and restrictions, as well as participating countries specific national policies regarding the use of force by their militaries employed outside national boundaries.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint and multinational operations.
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CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

“Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series of individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in unified action. Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction

The above quote reflects the central philosophy necessary for successful joint operations. Joint team success requires unity of effort — common action throughout the joint force in pursuit of common objectives. This publication provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates for the direction, planning, execution, and support of campaigns and operations — in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW). This guidance includes:

a. The strategic context within which JFCs operate in supporting national security policies and implementing national military strategy (NMS).

b. Principles, concepts, and other general considerations that assist JFCs to integrate and synchronize operations and achieve unity of effort.

2. Security Environment

a. Contemporary threats faced by the Armed Forces of the United States are more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War. Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions and threaten US national interests and security within their areas of responsibility (AORs). These instabilities can lead to increased levels of competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies, regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, and civil war. It is difficult to predict which nations or groups may threaten US interests and how and when such threats will emerge. Yet such predictions should be attempted, and with a process that allows for rapid dissemination of strategic estimates.

b. Even in a time of relative peace, combatant commanders will be challenged by regional factions seeking to expand their influence by coercion or force. Some of these potential opponents have large, modern, conventional military forces equipped with high-quality systems comparable to those of the Armed Forces of the United States. An adversary’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ballistic and cruise missiles (fixed and mobile) systems; hard and deeply buried facilities; and viable air, land, naval, space, and special operations forces and capabilities will constantly challenge a combatant commander’s ability to deter armed conflict and, if necessary, to fight and win.
c. Regional challenges will often involve an adversary whose system of beliefs is fundamentally different to include core beliefs such as right and wrong, the value of human life, and the concept of victory and defeat. What appears to be irrational or fanatical to US forces may be completely rational to multinational partners or opponents.

d. Increasingly complex information systems are being integrated into traditional warfighting disciplines such as mobility; logistics; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). Many of these systems are designed and employed with inherent vulnerabilities that are, in many cases, the unavoidable consequences of enhanced functionality, interoperability, efficiency, and convenience to users. US dependence on information and information systems, and the resultant vulnerabilities this entails, exposes the United States to a wide range of threats. These threats include but are not limited to computer hackers, criminals, vandals, terrorists, and opposing nation states and have brought focus and compelling relevance to our vulnerabilities to emerging technologies.

For additional guidance on the use of information and information systems in offensive and defensive information operations (IO), refer to Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” and Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

3. Range of Military Operations

The United States acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic goals in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. Figure I-1 shows the range of military operations.

a. War. When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national
objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

b. Military Operations Other Than War. Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Chapter V, “Military Operations Other Than War,” discusses MOOTW in more detail.

• MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force.

• In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

• Combatant commanders, at the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), employ US forces to deter an adversary’s action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic goals. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance; for example, in the form of raids or strikes. Other such operations include peace operations (PO), combating terrorism, enforcing of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime intercept operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

• At any point when force is contemplated, those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing such action should remember Clausewitz’s dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Just as there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and MOOTW, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

• MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Prudent use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and disaster relief, nation assistance (to include security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and foreign consequence management (CM)), counterdrug operations, arms control, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or the continental United States (CONUS) or a combination of both. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat; but as recent history has shown, a humanitarian effort not involving the use
or threat of force can quickly escalate into armed conflict. Therefore, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

c. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations

- MOOTW can involve simultaneous actions within an AOR. These actions may or may not involve the use of force at times; part of the theater could also be in a wartime state. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to synchronizing and integrating the activities of forces toward a common purpose that supports attaining national, theater, and multinational strategic objectives.

- Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid — such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism — is an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes as dictated by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force. During the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE), peace enforcement operations evolved from humanitarian assistance efforts, challenging the command with multiple missions. Joint forces should endeavor to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.

4. National Strategic Direction

National security strategy and NMS, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). Figure I-2 illustrates national strategic direction.

a. National Security Strategic Content. The United States approaches its global commitments with a strategy founded on deterrence and buttressed by the capability to project power to safeguard its national interests. Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals. (See definition of national security strategy in glossary.)

b. National Military Strategy. NMS entails the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. NMS is derived from the national security strategy and attempts to promote peace, deter aggression
and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. NMS and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The NMS provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten US national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.

c. Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). The TEP is a strategic planning document intended to link a combatant commander’s regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The TEP is based on planning guidance provided in the JSCP. The TEP identifies the prioritization and integration and synchronization of peacetime military engagement activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from regional combatant command engagement activities that support national strategic objectives. For planning purposes, combatant command TEP planners use
assigned forces, those rotationally deployed to the theater, and those forces that historically have been deployed for engagement activities. Each geographic combatant commander’s TEP is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for review and integration into the global family of engagement plans.

For additional guidance on theater engagement planning, refer to CJCS Memorandum 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning.

5. Executing National Security Strategy

In war and MOOTW, combatant commanders are the vital link in the chain of command established by the NCA (the President and Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors). Directives flow from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.

a. The Total Force

- To meet future requirements, the Services, in addition to US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and under additional authority established in title 10, United States Code (USC), section 167, organize, train, and equip Active and Reserve Component forces, military retirees, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and selected host nation (HN) personnel. The Reserve and Active Components are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy.

- Spontaneous, unpredictable crises call for trained and ready forces that are either forward deployed or are rapidly and globally deployable from CONUS. These forces should be initially self-sufficient and must possess the credible combat capabilities needed to effectively act in the US national interest or signal US resolve prior to conflict. Such forces are usually drawn from the active force structure and normally are tailored and integrated into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and USSOCOM. Reserve Component (RC) individuals or forces often are required to facilitate the deployment of such forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force.

b. Military Operations as Part of a Multinational Force. Military operations in regional crises often may involve coalitions that differ from familiar, longstanding alliance structures. Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations. When assessing the strategic environment, combatant commanders consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, interoperability, cultural differences, and regional interrelationships. United Nations (UN) resolutions also may provide the basis for use of military force.
See Chapter VI, “Multinational Operations,” for more information.

c. Military Operations with Nonmilitary Organizations

• Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Such agencies and organizations often operate employing “management,” “direction,” or “coordination” rather than “command.” They may be the lead effort during many operations other than war, with military organizations providing support. Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort. In some cases, a lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.

• The interagency environment does not preclude establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian agencies of government. In some instances, military and nongovernmental or international organizations may establish short-term agreements. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding or terms of reference. Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military commanders negotiate and co-sign plans. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

• Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase in situations — primarily overseas — in which civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and security threats not previously confronted. Many organizations are drawn closer to military forces because their missions may fail without military support or protection.

• Complex operations, such as PO, may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives (such as Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations) guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unity of effort.

• US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies.

For additional guidance on interagency operations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

“Response to the challenges facing the Nation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings many diverse skills and resources of the Federal Government and other public and private organizations to bear.”

JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations
d. National Strategic Direction. The NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure the following.

- Military objectives are defined, understood, and achievable.
- Active Service forces are ready for combat and RC forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.
- Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their armed forces.
- Strategic direction is current and timely.
- Defense and other governmental agencies support the JFC’s employment of forces.
- All required CONUS-based assets and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.
- Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.
- Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the JFC’s concept of operations.

e. Combatant Commands

- With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, establishes combatant (unified or specified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands. Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of their commands and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them.
- The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The first branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Combatant commanders are therefore the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct military operations designed to achieve national strategic objectives.
- The term “combatant commander” refers to the commander in chief of both geographically and functionally organized combatant commands. The term “geographic combatant commander” refers to a combatant commander with a geographic AOR assigned by the NCA. Functional combatant commanders support (or can be supported by) geographic combatant commanders or may conduct operations in direct support of the NCA.
- Based on guidance and direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting combatant commanders and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy.
• General responsibilities for combatant commanders are established by law (title 10, USC, section 164) and expressed in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

Responsibilities, capabilities, and competencies provided to a joint force by Service component forces (including the US Coast Guard) and functional unified commands are addressed in JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

6. The Estimate Process and Strategy

a. Estimate is an analysis of a situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. The estimate assists in clarifying problems and devising integrated solutions to complex problems, thus reducing surprise and shock. A continuous estimate process provides a framework for disciplined reason even under the most trying circumstances. The estimate is the central focus for strategic, operational, and tactical analysis that needs to be maintained over time and in the face of continuing change. The first questions in any estimate are the following: What is the mission? What is the desired end state? What has changed? What are the resulting possibilities and consequences?

b. Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates based on their assigned tasks after reviewing the strategic environment, the analysis of the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and alliance strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop estimates for each theater they support.

Operations in one theater often affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater’s strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate.

c. The estimate process is continuous, with the combatant commander’s staff and the component commanders and their staffs contributing to the product. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. Where a subordinate commander’s estimate of the situation may focus on near-term decisions and influences operation plan (OPLAN) development, the combatant commander’s strategic estimate results in operational concepts and courses of action (COAs) — broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the military end state to be achieved.

d. Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. As shown in Figure I-3, combatant commanders’ plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE); establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans.

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7. The Strategic Goal and Termination of Operations

a. Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW.

• Political Considerations. There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination of the opponent’s military strength or overthrow of the opponent’s political regime — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous
The Strategic Context

Conclusion to operations requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. A nation or group needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

- Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

- The issue of termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent’s strategic objective shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational efforts need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Termination of operations should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as operations move toward advantageous termination.

• Military Considerations

- In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political goal and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand

Coalition commanders communicate war termination to Iraqi military leadership during Operation DESERT STORM.
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the overall political goal and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority when required.

Another military consideration is the follow-up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs (CA), and FHA, and requires early planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in the theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.
CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. General

   a. Joint operations doctrine should change to reflect the nature of modern warfare and the strategic requirements of the Nation. It is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience. It applies the principles of war (see Figure II-1 and Appendix A, “Principles of War”), the fundamentals of joint warfare (as developed in Chapter III, “United States Military Power,” of JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States), and other key concepts consistent with the policies of the US Government (USG). It seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeat an adversary in war or to conduct MOOTW. It is a doctrine that recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork and unity of effort, and the synchronization and integration of military operations in time, space, and purpose. The fundamental principle for employment of US joint forces is to take decisive action to ensure achievement of the objectives established by the NCA while concluding operations in the shortest time possible and on terms favorable to the United States.

   b. Advances in technology are likely to continue to increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Joint doctrine should be flexible enough to recognize the impact of emerging technologies and quickly integrate validated warfighting concepts that may provide the Armed Forces of the United States with a decisive advantage.

      • Vulnerabilities arising out of technological advances also should be identified and actions taken to protect these vulnerabilities.

      • The uneven application of fast-paced technologies, even by key allies and coalition partners, complicates integration and synchronization of HN activities and multinational campaigns.

   c. Asymmetric Environments. Many of today’s joint operations preclude conventional force-on-force operations. The JFC must ensure that forces are adequate and flexible enough to recognize the impact of emerging asymmetric threats and quickly integrate appropriate responses to those threats.
2. The Levels of War

a. General

• The levels of war, from a doctrinal perspective, clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to both war and MOOTW.

• Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types and location of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

• Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

b. The Strategic Level

• The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The NCA translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

• Combatant commanders usually participate in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant command strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived from policy, provides a framework for conducting operations.

c. The Operational Level

• The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the adversary disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

• Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to
achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

- Operational art requires **broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint, interagency, and multinational cooperation**. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces and the threat but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. **Joint operational art**, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. Operational art is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”

- Among the many operational considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.

  - What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

  - What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

  - How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

  - What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

  - What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC’s exit strategy?

- **The Tactical Level.** Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the **ordered arrangement and maneuver of units** in relation to each other and/or to the adversary in order to use their full potential. An **engagement** is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, in space, on and under the sea, or on land. A **battle** consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically **last longer; involve larger forces** such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

3. Unified Action

- **a.** Whereas the term “joint operations” is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term “unified action” has a broader connotation. **The concept of unified action** is illustrated in Figure II-2 and highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

- **b.** All JFCs are responsible for **unified actions** that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from senior authorities (i.e., NCA, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commander). **JFCs should ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces** (multinational operations) and nonmilitary
organizations (government agencies such as the Agency for International Development; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders, especially during MOOTW.

c. Combatant commanders play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions are normally present at the combatant commander’s level). Subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.

4. Joint Warfare

a. The integration of all US military capabilities — often in conjunction with forces from other nations, other US agencies, NGOs, and UN forces and capabilities — is required to generate decisive joint combat power. JFCs integrate and synchronize these capabilities and contributions in time, space, and purpose.

b. To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

c. The overarching operational concept in JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, is that JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. Campaigns reflect the
nature of the operation directed by the NCA (strategic nuclear, peacekeeping, and conventional operations, among others).

5. Command Relationships

a. General

• The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches, as shown in Figure II-3. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant command, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, each operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise the authority, direction, and control through the individual Chiefs of the Services of their forces that are not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

• The authority vested in the Military Departments in the performance of their role to “organize, train, equip, and provide” forces runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the combatant commands. This administrative control (ADCON) recognizes the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless
such responsibilities are specifically assigned by the Secretary of Defense to another component of the Department of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to combatant commands. They fulfill their responsibilities by exercising ADCON through the commanders of the Service component commands assigned to combatant commands. The responsibilities and authority exercised by the Military Departments are subject by law to the authority provided to the commanders of combatant commands in their exercise of their combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).

- **Unity of effort in joint operations is enhanced through the application of the flexible range of command relationships** identified in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Joint force command relationships are an array of options JFCs can use to adapt the organization of assigned forces to situational requirements and arrange component operations in time, space, and purpose.

b. **Combatant Command (Command Authority)**

- **COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands** by title 10, USC, section 164, or as directed by the President in the UCP, and **cannot be delegated or transferred**.

- **Basic Authority. As shown in Figure II-4, COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces** involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through the subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. **COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary** to accomplish assigned missions.

  - **Combatant commanders may exercise COCOM in the following manner.**

    - Through **Service component commanders**.
    - Through **functional component commanders**, if established for a particular purpose, such as the special operations component.
    - Through a **commander of a subordinate unified command** (unified command only).
    - Through the **commander of a joint task force (JTF)** reporting directly to the combatant commander.
    - Through a **single-Service force commander** reporting directly to the combatant commander. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. A combatant commander may establish a separate single-Service force, but normally does so only under exceptional circumstances.
- Directly over **specific operational forces** that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander.

- **Directive Authority for Logistic Matters.** Commanders of combatant commands **exercise directive authority for logistics** and may delegate directive authority for a common support capability. The combatant commander may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s assigned mission. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes **the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders**, including peacetime measures, **necessary to ensure the following**: effective execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among component commands.

- Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned and/or attached to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.
Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander’s directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, normally will be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

For additional guidance on directive authority for logistics, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

Operational Control (OPCON)

- OPCON may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of the combatant command and can be delegated. As shown in Figure II-4, OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

- OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON in and of itself does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit

The commander of an amphibious task force may exercise TACON over attached forces for specific operations.
d. Tactical Control (TACON)

- **TACON** is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. As shown in Figure II-4, TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

- **TACON** typically is exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available for tasking.

e. Support

- **Support is a command authority**. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force as shown in Figure II-4. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The NCA establish support relationships between the combatant commands for the planning and execution of joint operations. This ensures that the tasked combatant commander(s) receives the necessary support.

- **Mutual Support**. Mutual support is the action that units render each other against an adversary because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the adversary, and their inherent capabilities.

- **General Support**. General support is the action that is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

- **Direct Support**. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.

- **Close Support**. Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

- **Establishing supported and supporting relationships** between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Within a combatant command, more than one supported command may be designated simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support in different mission areas, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force special operations component may be supported simultaneously for a training. **OPCON** does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate JFCs.
direct action mission while providing support to a joint force land component for a deep operation. Similarly, a joint force maritime component may be supported simultaneously for sea control while supporting a joint force air component to achieve air superiority over the joint operational area. As defined in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), “Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.” The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take such action to fulfill them within existing capabilities and consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

- The establishing directive indicates the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include:
  - The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort;
  - The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
  - The priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force;
  - The authority, if any, of the supporting force to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and
  - The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

- The land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within the areas of operations (AOs) designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and naval force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. Within a theater and/or joint operations area (JOA), all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

- Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs.

- In coordination with the land and/or naval force commander, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs. If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or naval AO, the commander must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

f. Other Authorities

- ADCON. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate
or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

- Coordinating Authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Services, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. It will be assigned based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

- Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH). DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

For additional and more detailed guidance on command relationships, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

6. Organization of Forces

a. General

- JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of JFCs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.

- Joint forces are specifically designated, composed of significant elements (assigned or attached) of two or more
Military Departments, and commanded by a JFC with a joint staff. Joint forces include combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs. An appropriate order assigns or attaches personnel and units to joint forces.

• The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs’ vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

• Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

b. Combatant Commands

• A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

• The UCP defines geographic AORs for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Such AORs are referred to as theaters. The NCA decentralizes operations by delegating to established geographic combatant commands (theater commands), the authority to plan, prepare, and conduct military operations within that theater to the geographic combatant commander, consistent with strategic guidance and direction.

• Other combatant commanders are assigned functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, space operations, or strategic nuclear operations. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographical regions and can provide forces for assignment to other combatant commanders. These combatant commands also can conduct operations while reporting directly to the NCA.

• Combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing assigned missions.

• Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander. Such an arrangement allows the subordinate commander to control operations while the combatant commander supports the operation with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a two-tiered system, and was successfully employed in Operations JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989) and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

• The combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or
reassigned by the NCA and normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the NCA.

• The two types of combatant commands are “unified” and “specified.”

c. Unified Commands

• Unified commands are typically established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating single strategic direction or other criteria found in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) are met.

• The commanders of unified commands may establish the following.

  • Subordinate unified commands, when authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct operations on a continuing basis.

  • Functional component commands, when such a command structure enhances the overall capability to accomplish the mission of the establishing commander. Functional component commands also may be established by commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTFs.

  • JTFs, to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. JTFs also may be established by the Secretary of Defense and commanders of subordinate unified commands and existing JTFs.

• Unique Roles of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). USJFCOM has roles as the joint force trainer, integrator, and provider of assigned forces. Serving as the lead agent for joint force training, USJFCOM is responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for managing the combatant commands’ portion of the CJCS exercise program, conducting and assessing joint and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces, assisting the other combatant commanders and Service Chiefs in their preparation for joint and

US Central Command forces conducting training operations in their geographic area of responsibility.
multinational operations, and providing joint training for combatant command battlestaffs, JTF headquarters staffs, and JTF functional component commanders and their staffs. As the joint force provider of assigned CONUS-based forces, USJFCOM is also responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces in response to the requirements of supported combatant commanders. USJFCOM maintains a scheduling deconfliction role for these forces to preclude operations tempo and personnel tempo problems for the participating units.

d. Specified Commands

• Specified commands normally are composed of forces from one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.

• The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command, except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

e. Subordinate Unified Commands.

When authorized by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands, and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned JOA or functional area.

f. Joint Task Forces

• A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing JTF commander. A JTF may be established on a geographic or functional basis.

• Commanders of JTFs are responsible to the JTF-establishing authority and exercise OPCON over assigned forces and normally exercise OPCON over attached forces. JTF staffs normally are augmented with representatives from component commands of the establishing headquarters.

• JTF operations normally are operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives.

• A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

• JTF headquarters basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. JTF headquarters basing options include the following.

  - Land-based.
  - Land-based, then moves afloat while retaining control.
  - Sea-based.
  - Initially sea-based, then transitions to a different land-based staff.
• Initially sea-based, then moves ashore while retaining control.

g. Service Components

• All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint operations is provided through Service component commands. The internal structure of Service component organizations are at the discretion of the individual Services. As a minimum, the senior officer commanding each Service component should be clearly identified to the JFC. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components for conducting operations.

• Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements and memoranda of agreement or as otherwise directed by the combatant commander.

• Responsibilities of the Service component commander include the following.

  • Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.

  • Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the control of the Service component commander when such subordinate forces are dissolved.

  • Other responsibilities as discussed in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

• Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.

• The relationship between commanders of Service forces is determined by the JFC. In addition to logistic support arrangements, one component may support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships as previously described.

h. Functional Components

• The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of
Chapter II

command and effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated — it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.)

- Functional compenency can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments operate in the same dimension or medium. (A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example.) Functional component staffs should be joint, with Service representation appropriate to the level and type of support to be provided. Functional component staffs require advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

- The nature of operations, Service force with the preponderance of available specific functional component assets, command and control (C2) capabilities, and training and resources available to staff and support functional component commands are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC.

- Functional component commanders — such as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the JFLCC, the joint force maritime component commander, and the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) — have the responsibilities of both superior and subordinate commanders as described in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

- The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

- When a functional component command will employ forces and/or military capabilities from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces and/or military capability made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and the individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.

- The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capabilities that will be made available for tasking by the
functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) that the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability (e.g., a JFSOCC normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a JFACC normally is delegated TACON of the sorties or other military capabilities made available, except for land forces that provide supporting fires which normally are tasked in a direct support role). JFCs also may establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

i. Combination

• Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

• Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components normally have special operations forces (SOF) organized as a functional component. However, SOF may be assigned under the OPCON or TACON or in support of other Service or functional component commanders. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. It is essential that SOF not be used as a substitute for conventional forces, but as a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Commanders must ensure that missions identified, nominated, and selected are appropriate and compatible with SOF capabilities. Successful execution of special operations (SO) require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2; therefore, it is imperative that SOF assets are assigned or attached with the SOF chain of command intact. Organizational structures established for employment of SOF and C2 through the SOF chain of command are described in JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

• JFCs normally will designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s concept of operations.

j. Figure II-5 depicts possible components in a joint force. It is presented as an example only.

For additional and more detailed guidance on the organization of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

7. Command and Control

a. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and adversary forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. JFCs influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by performing the following.
• Defining the commander’s intent.

• Assigning missions.

• Designating the priority effort(s).

• Prioritizing and allocating resources.

• Assessing risks to be taken.

• Deciding when and how to make adjustments.

• Committing reserves.

• Staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors.

• Guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

c. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.
d. Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. JFCs exercise authority and direction through and with the assistance of a C2 system. The C2 system consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to assist in the dissemination of direction and control of units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting adversary or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

e. The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence systems, as well as inputs from surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Space-based systems provide commanders with critical support in communications, navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly improves the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally, thereby enhancing the situational awareness of commanders at all levels.

f. Effective command at varying operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to collect, transport, process, and disseminate critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. Nonetheless, command style is dictated by the commander, not by the supporting communication system.

g. Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters and should be assigned early in the planning stage of joint operations.

For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

8. Organization of an Operational Area

a. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat (illustrated in Figure II-6). Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the AOR).

- Theater of War. In time of war, the NCA or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a
theater of war within the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

- Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is a wartime measure and may not be established without the previous establishment of a theater of war. Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different adversary forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are not operational areas that may be associated with MOOTW.

- Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs). Geographic combatant commanders also may establish combat zones and COMMZs, as shown in Figure II-7. The combat
zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander’s AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.

b. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, JFCs can employ the following operational areas.

- **Joint Operations Area.** A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF
commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs also are appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

• Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of SO. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same general operational area.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

• Joint Rear Area (JRA). A JRA is a specific land area within a JFC’s operational area designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

For additional guidance on JRAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

• Amphibious Objective Area. The amphibious objective area is a geographical area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations.

For additional guidance on amphibious objective areas, refer to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

• Area of Operations. JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

For more information, refer to associated discussion of “supported and supporting relationships” in this chapter and “boundaries” in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”

• Area of Interest (AOI). JFCs at all levels can designate AOs to focus national agency support for monitoring adversary and potential adversary activities outside the operations area. An AOI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the adversary can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

9. Joint Urban Operations

Joint urban operations (JUO) are joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives on, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. The prospect of
US joint forces operating in urban areas is steadily increasing. As shown in Figure II-8, US forces have conducted military operations in urban areas more and more frequently in the recent past.

a. Urbanized areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. **The most distinguishing characteristic of JUO, however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants** that fundamentally alters the character of combat and noncombat operations.

b. JUO are not analogous to jungle, desert, or mountain operations in that there are more than just terrain considerations. JUO are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing adversary forces while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of people. During JUO, joint forces may not always focus only on destruction of adversary forces but also may be required to take steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUO may be more restrictive than for other types of operations.

c. When planning JUO, JFCs should consider the impact of military operations on noncombatants and their infrastructure, thereby approaching JUO with a concept that views the urban area as a dynamic entity — not solely as terrain.

*For additional guidance on JUO, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.*
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CHAPTER III
PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.”

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

1. General

a. Planning for employment of joint forces begins with articulating and understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved). Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs reporting directly to the NCA receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commanders review their TEPs and refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs translate this guidance and theater strategy as outlined in the appropriate TEP into clearly defined and attainable objectives and then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish these objectives.

b. JFCs issue prioritized mission-type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority and responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with the superior commander’s intent and concept of operations.

2. The Link Between National and Combatant Command Strategies

a. In peacetime, national policy, national security strategy, defense policy, and NMS are sources of guidance for combatant commanders and Chiefs of the Services. The Joint Strategic Planning System provides strategic direction; assigns missions, tasks, forces, and resources; and designates objectives and ROE. It also establishes constraints and restraints and defines policies and concepts to be integrated into combatant command strategies and plans.

b. US and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives are the basis for combatant command strategies. Combatant commanders design strategic concepts and develop plans to accomplish these objectives within their geographic or functional areas. Combatant commanders plan against specific tasks in the JSCP and also strive to anticipate additional conditions when employment of US forces may be necessary. In those cases, combatant commanders may develop and maintain the framework of plans, even in peacetime. The nature of regional instabilities, however, is such that some plans might be formulated just before or even concurrently with the employment of US forces.

3. Combatant Command Strategic Planning

a. General

- Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and
logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection and rapid transition to combat operations.

• When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations, the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

b. Determining the Strategic End State and Supporting Military Conditions

• An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action; however, combatant commanders must be prepared to carry out immediate taskings even though the end state is still being clarified. There may be a preliminary end state — described by a set of military conditions — when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic objective. There also may be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

• Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leaders.

• Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, is the critical first step in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. To clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the operation and the likely period of follow-on activities. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

• Achieving the desired military end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

c. The Strategic Estimate

• The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans. JFCs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy.
• In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they **develop and analyze COAs**. Items contained in the strategic estimate are shown in Figure III-1.

• **The result of the estimate is a visualization of the current adversary and friendly situation**, including opportunities available for exploitation. The estimate includes a visualization of what is required to accomplish the mission and a clear expression of alternatives to achieve that state. Commanders employ the estimate to consider the adversary’s likely intent and COAs and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision.

• The strategic estimate process is **continuous and based on direction from national and multinational leaders**. Estimates for the current operation often can provide the basis for estimates for future operations.

• **Combatant commanders develop strategic estimates** after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The **strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions**. Both supported and supporting combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. Combatant commanders who support other combatant commanders prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

• Appendix B, “The Estimate Process,” provides a format for the strategic estimate.

d. **Theater Strategic Concepts**

• **Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms**. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, C2 capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and
supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each COA.

- Theater strategic concepts should provide for **unity of effort** and **strategic advantage**. **Strategic advantage** is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts.

- **Combatant commanders** use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage.

- Though geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant commanders may differ, there are several common strategic considerations. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider the following.

  - **Protection** of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.
  - **Integration** of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.
  - **Adjustments** for multinational, interagency, or UN circumstances.
  - **Identification** of conflict termination criteria and postconflict objectives and measures.

- **Identification** of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.

- **Support** for security assistance or nation assistance.

- **Inputs** to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

### 4. The Campaign

#### a. General

- A campaign is a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign.

- **Campaigns are joint in nature.** They serve as the focus for the conduct of war and MOOTW. A campaign is the synchronization and integration of necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations — as well as interagency and multinational operations — in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.

- Based on strategy adopted during the crisis action planning process, combatant commanders design campaigns to accomplish national or multinational strategic military objectives. They plan and execute campaigns by applying **operational art**. How commanders apply operational art will vary with the nature of operational
THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases.

- **DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP** (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)
- **DEFENSE** (with deployment and force buildup continuing)
- **OFFENSE**
- **POSTWAR OPERATIONS** (to include redeployment)

**DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP.** While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

**DEFENSE.** While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected course of action before engaging adversary forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.
OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort—from both land and sea—against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to adversary commanders, destroy adversary forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the adversary. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES

conditions, the nature of the strategic objectives, the time and space available in the theater, and the number and type of forces involved.

- **Campaigns**, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept **simple** and **focused on clearly defined objectives**. The more complex the campaign or the more
players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

- **JFCs consider the strategic environment** during the estimate and planning process in order to determine potential constraints. Constraints may include the availability and capability of forces, sustainment, or ROE. These constraints often limit the JFC’s freedom of action and influence the timing and form of the campaign.

- **Once military operations are contemplated, planning for campaigns and major operations becomes a continuous process.** Before initiation of combat operations, commanders also must focus on future operations. During operations, commanders must refine their focus on future operations by assessing the outcome of current operations.

- **Campaigns and major operations can span a wide variety of situations,** from quick-hitting, limited-objective operations to broad-based, long-term operations. Planning and, indeed, doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures should accommodate this variety of potential scenarios and should provide JFCs a flexible range of capabilities and options from which to organize forces and plan and conduct operations.

- **Campaign planning, like all joint operation planning, is based on evolving assumptions.** It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations. Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.

**b. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans**

- **Campaign plans are unique,** with considerations that set them apart from other plans. These plans, which may be required by the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of military involvement, synchronize and integrate operations by defining objectives; establishing command relationships among subordinate commands; describing concepts of operations and sustainment; arranging operations in time, space, and purpose; assigning tasks; organizing forces; and synchronizing and integrating air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown in Figure III-2.

- **Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.** If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. The degree to which the amount of work accomplished in deliberate planning may serve as the core for a campaign plan is directly dependent on the particular theater and objectives. Based on the campaign plan, appropriate elements then are translated into the operation order format of JOPES for execution. Although not formally submitted under JOPES, campaign plans may require review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
For additional guidance on the campaign planning process, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.

c. Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework of a series of OPLANs for phases of campaigns.
Planning Joint Operations

• Subordinate Campaign Plans. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or OPLANs that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration. Subordinate campaign plans are consistent with the strategy, guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.

• Supporting Plans

  • Supporting plans are prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander’s plan. Typically, supporting commands’ plans provide augmentation forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics and communications.

  • Supporting plans address such discrete operations as nuclear operations, mobilization, deployment and redeployment operations, force protection, and Service support operations, as well as plans for generating and focusing national resources in one or more theaters.

  • When the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs a combatant command to conduct specified military operations, other combatant commands are identified to support those operations. For example, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, US Central Command was designated the supported command, with most other combatant commands providing support.

5. Operational Art

JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. The fundamental elements of operational art are shown in Figure III-3 and discussed below.

a. Synergy

  • JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and MOOTW. JFCs not only attack the adversary’s physical capabilities, but also the adversary’s morale and will. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, contains the basis for this multidimensional concept — one that describes how JFCs can apply all dimensions of joint capability to accomplish their mission.

  • When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the adversary may be thought of as symmetrical if forces, technologies, and weapons tend to be similar or asymmetric; if forces, technologies, and weapons are different; or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional ROE is the norm. As JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the
United States, indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. See the discussion of leverage.

- It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full-dimensional operations against the adversary.

- The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an adversary to exploit. JFCs are especially suited to develop and project joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available only within joint forces.

- The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. JFCs
integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. The JFC's vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the desired end state.

b. Simultaneity and Depth. The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of joint operations theory. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple adversary capabilities and adversary will to resist.

- Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization. For example, following 38 days of intensive and highly synchronized and integrated coalition air operations, land forces initiated two major, mutually supporting, offensive thrusts against defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Simultaneously, amphibious forces threatened an assault from the sea, creating confusion within the adversary leadership structure and causing several Iraqi divisions to orient on the amphibious threat. The orientation of these divisions on the sea facilitated their defeat in detail by other air and land forces striking into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, coalition air operations continued the relentless attack on deployed troops, C2 nodes, and the transportation infrastructure. The result was a swift conclusion to the Gulf War, culminated by simultaneous and integrated and synchronized operations by all elements of the coalition.

- Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operational plan. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Geographic combatant commanders integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent inter-relationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon.

- The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Airpower can maneuver at greater distances, while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an adversary sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the AOR and/or JOA, creating competing and simultaneous demands on adversary commanders and resources. The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the adversary throughout the AOR and/or JOA from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs use depth to conduct operations.
The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space (geographically), shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle.

Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying adversary potential before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

Simultaneity and depth place a premium on shared, common situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a common operational picture (COP) of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of strategic objectives.

Advances in technology positively affect simultaneity and depth by promoting enhanced situational awareness. Unfortunately, advances in technology sometimes adversely affect simultaneity and depth by presenting different and competing operational pictures to JFCs and their forces.

c. Anticipation

Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. JFCs consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational area, and allies and coalition members. JFCs avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and staff, thus forcing the adversary to react rather than plan; and by thoroughly and continuously wargaming to identify probable adversary reactions to joint force actions. JFCs also should realize the impact of operations on the adversary, multinational partners, and noncombatants and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces.
• Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities; adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and location and status of displaced persons and refugees enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving objectives.

• Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) assists JFCs in defining likely or potential adversary COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the adversary has embarked on a specific COA. As such, JIPB significantly contributes to a JFC’s ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities.

• JIPB is a process which enables JFCs and their staffs to visualize the full spectrum of capabilities and potential COAs across all dimensions of the battlespace. This process, combined with the COP, other information, and intelligence products provides the JFC with the tools necessary to achieve situational awareness. A joint force produces a COP by using many different products to include the operational pictures of lower, lateral, and higher echelons.

For additional guidance on JIPB, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

• Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information from various dimensions should be employed to assure the accuracy and relevance for use in the decisionmaking process.

d. Balance

• Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted.

• JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an adversary’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. Military deception, special operations, offensive information operations, direct attack of adversary strategic centers of gravity (COGs), interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of adversary reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one adversary force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options.

• JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.
• Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decision makers and ongoing operations.

e. Leverage

• JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, describes achieving leverage (that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions) among the forces available to JFCs as “the centerpiece of joint operational art.” JFCs gain decisive advantage over the adversary through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against adversary weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the adversary, increase the adversary’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative. Force interaction with respect to friendly force command relationships generally can be characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are discussed extensively in joint doctrine, including elsewhere in this publication. A principal JFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs, but also of their components to plan and execute.

• Force interaction with regard to adversary forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against adversary forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against adversary ground formations in convoy (the air and SOF interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval air attacks against troop transports (US air attacks against Japanese surface reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against adversary naval, air, or missile
bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of adversary capabilities.

- As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from adversary symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

- Dimensional superiority, isolation of the adversary, and attack of adversary COGs can contribute to joint force leverage and are addressed in Chapter IV, “Joint Operations in War.”

f. Timing and Tempo

- The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversary’s ability to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for instance, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than a month.

- The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating adversary commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm adversary defensive capabilities.

- Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that integrates and synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations.

- Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that integrates and synchronizes the effects of operations so the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate impact, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in an integrated and synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that objectives achieved through combat operations build toward decisive results, but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.
g. Operational Reach and Approach

• On the first page of *On War*, Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler’s sword; the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to protect each other is the dueler’s shield; and, in its broadest sense, logistics and basing are the dueler’s footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directly affects operational reach. Likewise, logistic support sustains combat operations and is a component of operational reach.

• Operational reach is the distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively. Reach may be influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It may be extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward; by increasing the range of weapon systems; by conducting aerial refueling; by maximizing use of HN and contract support; by including space support capabilities; and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and throughput.

• Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly influencing the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing often is affected directly by political and diplomatic considerations and, as such, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from adversary attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived in terms of lines of operations.

• Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the adversary. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

• A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.
• In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect. JFCs use them to focus combat power toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat adversary COGs.

h. Forces and Functions

• Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and adversary forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

• JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical adversary functions such as C2, logistics, and air and missile defense. Attack of an adversary’s functions normally is intended to destroy adversary balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical adversary functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in adversary leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of adversary capability and will. The appropriateness of functional attack as the principal design concept frequently is based on time required and available to cripple adversary critical functions as well as the adversary’s current actions and likely response to such attacks.

i. Arranging Operations

• General

  • The ultimate goal of US military forces is to accomplish the objectives directed by the NCA. For joint operations, this will be achieved through full spectrum dominance—the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary or dominate any situation across the full range of military operations. The joint force must be flexible to react to changes in the strategic environment, adversary changes, and fluid operational conditions, both in combat and noncombat situations. Joint forces must be able to conduct prompt, sustained, synchronized, and integrated operations with combinations of forces tailored for missions across the range of military operations throughout the battlespace.

  • JFCs must determine the best arrangement of major operations to achieve dimensional superiority. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to dominate and achieve the desired end state conditions, quickly, with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, force protection, logistic buildup and consumption rates, adversary reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. Critical to the success of the entire operation is timely and accurate time-phased force and deployment data.

  • The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces
complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations. During force projection, for example, a rapidly changing adversary situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

• Normally, a single battle or engagement may not attain the operational goal. Likewise, the accomplishment of a strategic goal through integrated operations with combinations of forces organized and tailored for missions across the range of military operations in all mediums — air, land, sea, and space usually requires the conduct of several major operations. Consequently, the design of a theater or subordinate campaign or a major operation normally provides for related phases implemented over time. Phases may occur simultaneously, as well as sequentially. In a campaign, each phase can represent a single or several major operations, while in a major operation a phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize a group of related operations into more manageable parts, thereby allowing for flexibility in execution while enhancing unity of effort.

• Phases

• Phasing operations is a tool commonly used by commanders to organize operations. The commander’s vision of how a campaign or major operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists the commander in framing his or her intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging campaign activities into phases, the commander can better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Campaigns are planned and executed for the full range of military operations and are successfully completed when political, strategic, and operational objectives are achieved. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. Phases are initiated as the operation evolves and terminated when the JFC determines dimensional dominance within a phase is achieved.

• Phases present options to the JFC. Actual phases used will vary with the operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, commanders establish conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plan sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases may be conducted sequentially or concurrently and may overlap. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

• Phasing is a basic tenet of campaign plan design. Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, that cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving major objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a
framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, by which plans to mitigate this risk may be developed. **Sustainment and access operations underpin the entire campaign.**

- Although the commander will determine the actual phases used during a campaign, use of the following phases provides a flexible model to arrange the full spectrum of combat and noncombat operations. The notional example at Figure III-4 reflects potential phases a combatant commander can use while planning and conducting a campaign in support of strategic and operational goals and objectives. The phases can be applied throughout the range of military operations. The text box below the

- **Deter/Engage.** This phase may be for deterring aggression or taking action against threats to national or multinational interests. Effective crisis response depends on gaining early warning of potential situations that may require military action. Early warning can best be accomplished through knowledge of conditions in the AOR and by the frequent interaction and liaison with allies,
coalition partners, and potential challengers. Actions during a deter/engage phase may require mobilization and other predeployment activities to set the terms and conditions for operations. During predeployment activities, JFCs exercise Flexible Deterrent Options and tailor forces for deployment. The mission-tailored C4I, force protection, and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the deter/engage phase in order to support the JFC concepts of operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are employed during this phase to provide real-time and near-real-time situational awareness. Additionally, when in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed (based on the JFC’s concepts of operations) assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift, airlift, and preposition capabilities are critical to JFC concepts. Combatant commanders also take actions to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for future crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with non-military organizations and other agencies assist in setting conditions for future military operations. During this phase, the combatant commander expands partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises.

Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary’s initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate

Quick and decisive deployment of combat forces may stabilize the situation and obviate actual hostilities.
destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the decisive operations phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In noncombat operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

**Decisive Operations.** The decisive operations phase continues with full spectrum employment of joint force capabilities and the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. In combat situations this phase focuses on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC. Operations in this phase depend upon overmatching force capabilities with the C2 and logistics base required to achieve the desired End State. Decisive operations focus on winning through full spectrum dominance. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion, setting the conditions for the transition phase.

**Transition.** The transition phase enables the JFC to focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law. Part of this phase may be to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself or, in noncombat situations, to ensure where possible that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental, nongovernmental, and international agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current operations on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis. During this phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify redeployment requirements as early as possible.

**Other Considerations**

**Logistics is crucial to phasing.** JFCs and joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

**Force protection also is crucial to phasing.** JFCs and joint force planners conduct JIPB and determine force vulnerabilities. Based on mission requirements during each phase, commanders should implement essential force protection measures.

**Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force.** At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.
Branches and Sequels

- Many OPLANs require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Commanders build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

- Branches. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of adversary action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

- Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

Centers of Gravity

- COGs are the foundation of capability — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends … the point at which all our energies should be directed.” They are those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. At the strategic level, COGs might include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. COGs also may exist at the operational level.

- The COGs concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of COGs, both adversary and friendly, is a continuous process throughout an operation.

- The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the adversary’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of adversary COGs is the most direct path to victory. However, COGs can change during the course of an operation and, at any given time, COGs may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the COG might concern the mass of adversary units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a COG and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

- Identification of adversary COGs requires detailed knowledge and understanding of how opponents organize, fight, and make decisions as well as their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause COGs to change and should adjust friendly operations accordingly.

- Adversary COGs frequently will be well protected, making direct attack difficult and costly. This situation may require joint operations that result in indirect attacks until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks.
• It is also important to identify friendly COGs so they can be protected. US ability to project power from CONUS or supporting theaters can represent a COG. National will also can be a COG, as it was for the United States during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.

k. Direct versus Indirect. To the extent possible, JFCs attack adversary COGs directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. For example, if the COG is a large adversary force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its air defense and indirect fire capability. When vulnerable, the adversary force can be attacked directly by appropriate elements of the joint force. In this way, JFCs will employ an integrated and synchronized combination of operations to expose and attack adversary COGs through weak or vulnerable points — seams, flanks, specific forces or military capabilities, rear areas, and even military morale and public opinion and support.

l. Decisive Points

• By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the adversary and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base and could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications and/or intelligence nodes. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points, such as attainment of air or naval superiority or commitment of the adversary’s reserve. In still other cases, decisive points may be systemic, such as C2 systems and refueling or ammunition storage capability. Decisive points are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking protected COGs.

• There normally will be more decisive points in an operational area than JFCs can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Accordingly, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points enable eventual attack of the adversary’s COGs. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

• Geographic, key event, or systemic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. They thus maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the initiative. If a defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker’s momentum and facilitate the defender’s counterattack.

m. Culmination

• Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite emergence of the adversary’s defensive culmination.
Integration and synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot generate these resources, they should rethink their concept of operations.

n. Termination

Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value- and interest-based differences.

The underlying causes of a particular war — such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic — must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict.

Ideally, national and allied or coalition decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic goals following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces. In some cases, these goals will be military strategic goals that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals. The end of World War II and the transition from war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the adversary in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate NCA political goals into strategy and operational design. They provide decision makers with critical information on adversary intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of
success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the adversary’s judgment of cost and risk, and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

- If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic goals for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces have gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political goals. Wars are successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure.

- A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of MOOTW occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions which ensure that political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.

- Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge. Working with DOD and other USG agencies, as well as nongovernmental and international organizations, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

- During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

6. Key Planning Considerations

The elements of operational art discussed above form the basis for plans and orders and set the conditions for successful battle. As shown in Figure III-5, the initial plan establishes the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and the initial tasks for subordinate units. It allows the greatest possible operational and tactical freedom for subordinate leaders. It is flexible enough to permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent with the commander’s intent, thus facilitating quick and accurate decisionmaking during operations. The initial plan not only affects the current operation, but also sets the stage for future operations. As commanders prepare to conduct military operations, they should remember that all military operations have a

**THE INITIAL PLAN**

- Commander’s intent
- Concept of operations
- Initial tasks for subordinate units
- Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

**AFFECTS**

- Current operations
- Future operations

Figure III-5. The Initial Plan
psychological effect on all parties concerned — friendly, neutral, and hostile. Supporting psychological operations (PSYOP) and other informational activities designed to induce or reinforce favorable foreign attitudes and behavior must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect.

a. **Mission.** The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows. It is the **JFC’s expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why.** Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, commanders translate these tasks into missions for their subordinates. Commanders do so by analyzing the mission statement and concept of operations, understanding the intent of senior commanders, assessing the current situation, and organizing all resources available to achieve the desired end. Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success.

b. **Commander’s Intent**

- **The commander’s intent describes the desired end state.** It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It also may include the commander’s assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

  - JFCs begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together, with the higher headquarters’ order, the **JFC’s intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process.** JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander’s estimate. The intent statement also may contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

  - **The JFC’s intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state** without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Thus, the commander’s intent **provides focus** for all subordinate elements.

  - **The intent statement is usually written**, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be **concise and clear.** The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC’s order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

c. **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements**

- The JFC should provide commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) to the joint force staff and components.

- CCIR are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affects successful mission accomplishment.

- The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements.

- CCIR result from the analysis of information requirements against a mission and the commander’s intent and are normally limited in number.

d. **Concept of Operations**
The concept of operations describes how the JFC visualizes the operation will unfold based on the selected COA. This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the adversary or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the missions assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the mission.

To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign has more than one phase). This designation is as true in the offense as it is in the defense and also applies in MOOTW. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander’s intent.

Concept of Fires. This concept describes how tactical, operational, and strategic fires are integrated and synchronized to support the concept of operations. The JFC determines the adversary’s COGs and how the application of fires can assist in their destruction or neutralization. While some fires will support operational and tactical movement and maneuver by air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces, other fires are independent of maneuver and orient on achieving specific operational and strategic effects that support the JFC’s objectives. Fires are the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint fire support is joint fires that support air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters.

For additional guidance on joint fires and joint fire support, refer to paragraph 7 below and JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

The combatant commanders should consider conducting joint strategic attacks when feasible. A joint strategic attack is a combatant commander directed offensive action against a vital target(s) whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected in order to achieve NCA or combatant commander’s strategic objectives.

e. Targeting

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law and the ROE approved by the NCA for the operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal advisors must consider the desired end state, political goals, and legal constraints when making targeting decisions.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting and prevent fratricide by different forces or different echelons within the same force.
and to integrate and synchronize the attack of those targets with other activities of the joint force.

- **Targeting and the Campaign Plan.** JFCs establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of adversary strategic and operational COGs and interdiction of adversary forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the advice of subordinate commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to JFCs how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. **Weight of effort** for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed as follows.

  - By assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.
  - In terms of percentage of total available resources.
  - As otherwise determined by the JFC.

- **Time-Sensitive Targets.** Time-sensitive targets (TSTs) include air, land, or sea based targets of such high priority to friendly forces that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, for more detailed information and guidance on TSTs.

- **Targeting Process**

  - The targeting process is cyclical. The joint targeting process has six phases: (1) Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent; (2) Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization; (3) Capabilities Analysis; (4) Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment; (5) Mission Planning and Force Execution; and (6) Combat Assessment.

  - Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on the JFC’s apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC provides targeting guidance and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

  - JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs task subordinate commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function based on the JFC’s concept of operations and the individuals’ experience, expertise, and situational awareness.

  - The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists.
The JTCB also should maintain a complete list of prohibited and restricted targets, targets deemed sensitive due to collateral damage potential, and areas where SOF are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.

- In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational targeting coordination board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board.

- JFCs normally will delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism also is needed to facilitate the process at this level. **All components normally are involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.**

> For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.

- **Component commanders make capabilities or forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance.** When directed by the JFC, component commanders make capabilities or forces available for tasking by other component commanders to achieve joint force objectives.

- **Air Apportionment.** Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. The total expected effort made available to the JFACC is determined by the JFC in consultation with component commanders based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

  - Air apportionment assists JFCs to ensure the **weight of the joint force air effort** is consistent with **campaign phases and objectives.**

  - **Given the many airpower capabilities,** its theater-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs **pay particular attention to its apportionment.** JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage of effort against assigned mission-type orders and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, maritime support, and close air support. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the air apportionment recommendation.

  - Following the JFC air apportionment decision, the **JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties** to the functions and/or missions they support.

> For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

- **Countering Air and Missile Threats**

  - **Air superiority** delivers a fundamental benefit to the joint force. It **prevents adversaries from interfering with operations of air, space, or surface forces**
and assures freedom of action and movement. Control of the air is a critical enabler for the joint force because it allows US forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using both defensive and offensive operations, the JFC employs complementary weapon systems and sensors to achieve air superiority. These operations not only protect against attack, but also ensure that US forces can strike potential threats prior to launch. Unity of effort is vital for countering threats with an engagement window of perhaps a matter of minutes. In this time-sensitive environment, the JFC must ensure that component systems are integrated and interoperable to achieve air superiority.

- The degree of control may vary from air supremacy to local air superiority, depending on the overall situation and the JFC’s concept of operations. It may be needed for different lengths of time, ranging from a few minutes to the duration of the conflict, and also vary with geographic areas. The JFC normally seeks to gain and maintain control of the air dimension as quickly as possible to allow friendly forces to operate without prohibitive interference from adversary air threats. US military forces must be capable of countering the air and missile threat from initial force projection through redeployment of friendly forces. These threats include adversary aircraft (manned or unmanned), ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles (air, land, or sea launched). The proliferation of theater missiles and advances in missile technologies, coupled with WMD, make theater missiles a particularly difficult and dangerous threat. Joint theater missile defense is an integral part of counterair operations.

- Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive and defensive operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, artillery, SOF, and elements of IO to counter the threat. Joint forces must be integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats, both before and after launch.

- Defensive Counterair. As an element of counterair, defensive counterair also contributes to force protection through detecting, identifying, intercepting, and destroying or negating enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment.

  - Active Air Defense. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. The JRA coordinator coordinates with the area air defense commander to ensure that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into air defense plans.

  - Passive Air Defense. Passive air defense includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction.
For additional guidance on air and missile defense, refer to paragraph 6 h above and JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

For additional guidance on countering air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

i. Space Operations. While once considered merely an extension of terrestrial operations (air, land, and sea operations), space power has become an integrated operational capability—a critical enabler that may be used to support all joint warfare areas. Likewise, commanders must anticipate hostile actions that attempt to deny friendly forces access to or use of space capabilities. Commanders also should anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of space capabilities and products with military utility that could be used by an adversary for hostile purposes. Space control operations are conducted by joint and allied and/or coalition forces to gain and maintain space superiority. Space superiority enables friendly access to space-based capabilities while denying adversary forces similar support. To ensure the robustness of friendly space capabilities, US Space Command (USSPACECOM) conducts space control, force enhancement, space support, and space force application. Direct in-theater space support is provided by resident theater and Service-specific space weapons officers and technicians, in addition to some augmenting space support teams from USSPACECOM.

For more information on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

j. Force Protection. Force protection includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Force protection is “full dimensional” and is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk. Elements of force protection include, but are not limited to, the following.

- **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.** NBC defense measures provide defense against attack by WMD and the capability to sustain operations in WMD environments using the principles of avoidance of NBC hazards, particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from unavoidable WMD hazards; and decontamination.

  For additional guidance on NBC defense, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

- **Antiterrorism.** Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment.
For additional guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

- **Defensive IO.** See IO guidance in paragraph 6n below.

- **Security.** Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the operational area. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

  For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, and JP 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.

- **Operations Security.** Effective operations security (OPSEC) measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of IO. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Terrorist activity is discouraged by varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

- **Law Enforcement.** Law enforcement aids in force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police program involving military and civilian and/or HN law enforcement agencies directly contributes to overall force protection.

- **Security of High-Risk Personnel.** Security of high-risk personnel (HRP) safeguards designated individuals who, by virtue of their rank, assignment, symbolic value, vulnerabilities, location, or specific threat are at a greater risk than the general population. There are two levels of HRP. Level 1 HRP are those individuals who have such a significantly high potential as terrorist or criminal targets as to warrant assignment of full-time protective services. Level 2 HRP do not warrant full-time protective services but require additional office, residential, and travel security measures. The levels of protection and types of security measures afforded to HRP are determined by threat and vulnerability assessment.

- **Personal Security.** Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment (IPE), use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

- **Planning for Force Protection**

  • JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning. All aspects of force protection must be considered
and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists.

- Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area.

- In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.


k. Concept of Logistics

- The JFC’s concept of logistics is a key part of the integration and synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. Logistic considerations are key to the commander’s estimate process, will greatly impact on the development of COAs, and may dictate COA selection.

- COCOM gives combatant commanders authoritative direction over all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish the mission. Within their commands, combatant commanders use this authority to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations and to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among Service components. In critical situations, combatant commanders may modify the normal logistic process within their commands. They may use all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission.

- Combatant commanders ensure that the concept of logistics supports the concept of operations. The logistic concept of the campaign plan does this by establishing a base of operations, opening and maintaining LOCs, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing and sustainment, and establishing priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign. The logistic concept also uses available host-nation support (HNS).

- Disposal Considerations. Defense Logistics Agency support to the Services and geographic Service component commands includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in a theater. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service element in theater establishes theater-specific procedures for the reuse, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, equipment, and supplies, to include hazardous materiel and waste.

- Environmental Considerations. Logistic support should be planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of the environment in
accordance with applicable international treaties and conventions, US environmental laws, policies, and regulations and HN agreements. Early planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate environmental reviews have been completed prior to initiating logistic support activities.

For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, JP 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

1. Environmental Considerations. While complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations, to include legal aspects. JFCs are responsible for protecting the environment in which US military forces operate to the greatest extent possible. In this regard, JFCs should be responsible for the following.

- Demonstrate proactive environmental leadership during all phases of joint operations across the range of military operations; instill an environmental ethic in subordinate commands and promote environmental awareness throughout the joint force.

- Ensure that environmental considerations are an integral part in the planning and decisionmaking processes.

- Identify specific organizational responsibilities and specific joint force environmental requirements. These responsibilities should have clearly defined goals, strategies, and measures of success.

- Ensure compliance, as far as practicable within the confines of mission accomplishment, with all applicable environmental laws and agreements, including those of the HN. The goal of compliance is to minimize potential adverse impacts on human health and the environment while maximizing readiness and operational effectiveness.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

m. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems Planning. The C4 system provides the JFC the means to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect information. The mission and structure of the joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. In turn, the information requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the C4 system. Therefore, C4 system planning needs to be integrated and synchronized with operational planning. Through effective C4 system planning, the JFC is able to maintain unity of effort to apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission success.

For additional guidance on C4 systems planning, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.

n. Other Considerations

- Disciplined Operations

  - Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws,
and **fight within restraints and constraints** specified by superior commanders. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force.

- Exercising discipline in operations includes **limiting collateral damage** — the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or adversary forces. JFCs apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory against combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury to noncombatants and damage, especially to protected or sacred sites.

- JFC use of force includes the **proper treatment** of enemy prisoners of war, civilians and other noncombatants. **Laws of war** are intended to **reduce casualties** and **enhance fair treatment** of combatants and noncombatants alike.

- **ROE**, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct MOOTW or begin or continue combat, **are promulgated by the NCA**. US forces will always comply with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). In those circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not exist, LOAC principles nevertheless may be applied as a matter of national policy. If armed conflict occurs, the actions of US forces will be governed by both the LOAC and ROE. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of unit and individual self-defense. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

*For further guidance on ROE, refer to CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*

- **Combat Identification**

  - Combat identification measures must be established early in the planning cycle.

  - Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and **not interfere** unduly with unit and individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces.

  - Combat identification considerations play an important role in force protection and must be included in planning combat identification measures.

*For additional guidance on combat identification, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*

- **Risk Management**

  - Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management assists commanders in (1) conserving lives and resources and avoiding unnecessary risk, (2) making an informed decision to execute a mission, (3) identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and (4) providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment.

  - Risk management should be applied to all levels of war and across the full
range of military operations. In addition, risk management should be applied to all phases of an operation, and should include any branches and sequels to an operation.

- In **peacetime operations**, commanders and their staffs consider a variety of risks — such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, risk to the safety and force protection of individual joint force members, loss of expensive equipment, or damage to the environment.

- In **combat or potential combat situations**, commanders and their staffs carefully identify conditions that constitute success — both for the envisioned end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. To the extent that these conditions are met, commanders reduce the risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders and their staffs identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force — by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example — or they may decide the risk is acceptable.

- Commanders and their staffs consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations. As in peacetime operations, commanders consider the risk to joint force members. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to adversary COGs, attacking adversary vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and major operations.

- Risk management does not (1) inhibit commanders’ flexibility and initiative; (2) remove risk altogether (or support a zero defects mindset); (3) require a GO/NO-GO decision; (4) sanction or justify violating the law; or (5) remove the necessity for development of standing operating procedures.

- To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission and/or AOR or JOA. Figure III-6 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 1991**

Before the beginning of the air operation, operations security (OPSEC) and deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of what the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying or disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limiting the leadership’s ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the front-line Iraqi soldier’s confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began.

**VARIOUS SOURCES**
• **Rehearsals.** Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. **Rehearsing key combat and logistics actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan.** This process assists them in orienting themselves to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in integration and synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, the JFC should identify key elements for rehearsal.

• **Information Operations.** IO are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO require the close, continuous integration of offensive and defensive capabilities and activities, as well as effective design, integration, and interaction of C2 with intelligence support.

  For further guidance on information operations, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

• **Military Deception**

  • **Military deception,** as executed by JFCs, **targets adversary decision makers (opposing commanders) through the adversary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems.** This deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their

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**Figure III-6. Risk Management Process**
On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

VARIABLE SOURCES
employment of lower-level units, although subordinate commanders may not know of the overall deception effort. It is therefore essential for commanders to coordinate their military deception plans with their senior commander to ensure overall unity of effort.

- **Military deception operations depend on intelligence** to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.

- **Military deception operations are not without cost**, but are a powerful tool in full-dimensional operations. Forces and resources must be committed to the deception effort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some aspects of the campaign. OPSEC for military deception operations may dictate that only a select group of senior commanders and staff officers in the joint force know which actions are purely deceptive in nature. This situation can cause confusion within the force and must be closely monitored by JFCs and their staffs.

For additional guidance on military deception, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

- **Psychological Operations**

  - **PSYOP are actions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences.** They are designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP have strategic, operational, and tactical applications, including support to deception operations.

  - PSYOP can contribute to all aspects of joint operations through the following five primary missions: (1) Advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding psychological actions, psychological enabling actions, and targeting restrictions to be executed by the military force; (2) Providing support to humanitarian activities that ease suffering and restore or maintain civil order; (3) Serving as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC’s intent; (4) Countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information during overseas operations to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and effect the political will of multinational partners within an operational area; and (5) Influencing foreign populations by expressing information subjectively in order to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations.

  - PSYOP forces assigned to a joint force will provide PSYOP planning and C2 for PSYOP units. They also develop PSYOP programs and products to facilitate the JFC’s mission by producing, distributing, and disseminating PSYOP media.

For additional guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

- **Operations Security**

  - **OPSEC is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain essential secrecy** about the JFC’s actual capabilities, activities, and intentions.
• History has shown the value and need for reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore vital and advantageous to deny the opposing force commanders the critical information they need (essential secrecy) and cause them to derive inaccurate, timely appreciations that influence their actions (desired appreciations).

• OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command. The JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance to the staff at the time of the commander’s decision and, subsequently, to subordinate and supporting commanders in the chain of command. By maintaining liaison and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

• Electronic Warfare (EW)

• EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering adversary systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

• The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack, electronic protection, and EW support, which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use electronic surveillance in their execution.

• EW should be employed to attack the adversary according to established principles of warfare. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign objectives, but also on the risks of possible adversary responses and other effects on the campaign effort.

• The JFC should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations, activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect. This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support.

For additional EW guidance, refer to JP 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations.

• Public Affairs (PA). JFCs conduct PA operations to communicate unclassified information about joint force activities to internal, domestic, and international audiences. When supporting deployed operations, personnel engaged in PA should be sent early into a theater in sufficient strength to begin effective operations. Dramatic media coverage at the outset of a military action can rapidly influence public and political opinion and affect strategic decisionmaking. The release of information concerning operations should be integrated into the branches, sequels, and phases of the planning effort. Without preplanning, release of information is often incomplete and too late to have an impact through
fast-acting world media organizations. Since each branch, sequel, or phase normally is based on some measurable event, PA planning should include development and subsequent delivery of media releases by spokespersons thoroughly familiar with objectives of the operations. With effective preplanning of information release, the effects of other campaign efforts may be amplified and adversary media releases may be made less effective. PA also assists commanders by providing trusted counsel; enhancing morale and readiness; fostering public trust and support; and leveraging global influence and deterrence.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

• Civil-Military Operations (CMO). CMO is a broad term used to denote the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. CMO may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations.

7. Control and Coordinating Measures

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields. Boundaries and fire support coordinating measures are discussed below.

a. Boundaries

• Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

• JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

• Theater-wide air sorties are not constrained by surface boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. In addition, delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries normally requires
coordination with the surface force commanders.

For additional airspace control guidance, refer to JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

• Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

For additional guidance on integration and synchronization of joint efforts within land and naval AOs, refer to Chapter II, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations.”

b. Joint Fire Support Coordination

• Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, C2, and attack resources. The successful application of joint fire support depends on the close coordination of these subsystems. Joint fire support must function in a coordinated and integrated manner to support the commander’s objectives. The function of joint fire support binds fire support resources together so that the multiple effects of each asset are integrated and synchronized to support the commander’s intent and concept of operation.

• Joint fire support coordination is a continuous process of planning and executing fires. Joint fire support coordination involves operational, tactical, and technical considerations and the exercise of fire support command, control, and communications. Fire support coordination includes efforts to deconflict attacks, avoid fratricide, reduce duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the battlespace. Coordination procedures must be flexible and responsive to the ever-changing dynamics of warfighting. Simplified arrangements for approval or concurrence should be established. Coordination is reflected in the concept of operations and in the sequencing and timing of actions to achieve objectives. Coordination is enhanced when fire support personnel clearly understand the commander’s intent. A very important part of the coordination process is the identification of potential fratricide situations and the necessary coordination measures to positively manage and control the attack of targets.

• Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)

• An FSCL is a fire support coordinating measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. An FSCL facilitates the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.

• The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.

• An FSCL does not divide an AO by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support (see Figure III-7).

• The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of ammunition.

• Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide.
Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse attacks on, or to the rear of, the line.

- Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.

- The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features.

- Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.

- The FSCL is not a boundary — the integration and synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.
• Placement of the FSCL should strike a balance so as not to unduly inhibit operational tempo while maximizing the effectiveness of organic and joint force interdiction assets. Establishment of the FSCL too far forward of friendly forces can limit the responsiveness of air interdiction sorties and could unduly hinder expeditious attack of adversary forces.

• To avoid fratricide, changes to the FSCL must be thoroughly coordinated and allow for sufficient time for complete dissemination.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

8. Functional Combatant Command Support

Functional combatant commands provide support to and may be supported by geographic combatant commands and other functional combatant commands as directed by higher authority, normally as indicated in the JSCP and other CJCS-level documents. The NCA may, in special circumstances, personally direct what specific support and to whom such support will be provided from functional combatant commands. When a functional combatant commander is the supported commander and operating within a geographic combatant commander’s AOR, close coordination and communication between the affected combatant commanders is paramount.

a. United States Transportation Command. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for the following.

• Provides strategic air, land, and sea transportation, including common-user terminal services, to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national objectives.

• Provides liaison officers to all geographic combatant commands to assist in coordination of strategic mobility issues that may arise.

• Oversees a global transportation planning and execution system supported by communications and computer networks and is the DOD manager of the Defense Transportation System.

• Provides a central point of contact for agencies preparing to support deployment, to include patient movement requirements.

USTRANSCOM normally will focus on the first 3 to 7 days of strategic air movement and 30 days of sea movement, including surface movement to aerial and seaports of embarkation.

For additional guidance on USTRANSCOM capabilities and requesting movement via USTRANSCOM, see JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and DOD Regulation 4500.9R, Defense Transportation Regulation.

b. United States Space Command. USSPACECOM’s responsibilities include the following.

• Supporting the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) by providing missile warning and space surveillance.

• Providing warning of missile attack on CONUS, Hawaii, Alaska, and Canada and warning assessment of space attack.
• Advocating space operations (force enhancement, space control, space support including spacelift, on-orbit operations, and force application) as well as missile warning requirements of all combatant commanders.

• Conducting space operations, including support of strategic missile defense for the United States.

• Planning and developing requirements for strategic ballistic missile defense, space-based support for tactical ballistic missile defense, and space operations.

• Providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment of space, missile, and air attacks on CONUS, Alaska, and Canada should NORAD be unable to accomplish the assessment mission.

• Serving as single point of contact for military space operational matters, to include communications in accordance with CJCSI 6250.01, Satellite Communications.

• Providing representation to US national agencies and commercial and international agencies for matters related to space operations.

• Planning and implementation of security assistance related to military space operations, in conjunction with geographic combatant commanders.

• Coordinating and conducting space operations planning.

• Providing the military point of contact for countering the proliferation of WMD in space in support of nonproliferation policies, activities, and taskings.

• Serving as military lead for computer network defense (CND) and computer network attack (CNA), to include advocating and supporting the CND and CNA requirements of all combatant commanders, conducting CND and CNA operations, and planning and developing national CND and CNA requirements.

• USSPACECOM supports JFCs by providing space products and services, to include:
  
  • **Space force enhancement**, to include ISR; tactical warning and attack assessments; command, control, and communications (C3); position, velocity, time and navigation; and environmental monitoring;
  
  • **Space support**, to include launching and deploying space vehicles; maintaining and sustaining space vehicles in-orbit; and de-orbiting and recovering space vehicles, if required; and
  
  • **Space control**, to include surveillance of space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and direct support to battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence.

  For additional guidance on USSPACECOM capabilities and coordinating support from USSPACECOM, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, and JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine; Tactics Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.

c. **United States Special Operations Command.**

• USSOCOM capabilities include direct action, special reconnaissance, FID,
unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism, PSYOP, CA, counterproliferation of WMD, and IO.

- USSOCOM provides trained and combat-ready SOF to the geographic combatant commanders and, when directed by the NCA, conducts selected SO.

- The Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command exercises COCOM of all active and reserve SOF, US Army PSYOP, and CA forces (except for Marine Corps Reserve CA Groups) stationed in CONUS.

- Most SO within a geographic combatant commander’s AOR are conducted by the designated theater SO command or a joint SO task force formed temporarily to conduct SO in a specific operational area or to accomplish a special operation or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations.


d. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

- USSTRATCOM provides the planning, targeting, and wartime employment of all US Air Force and US Navy strategic nuclear forces and/or capabilities.

- USSTRATCOM’s mission is to posture strategic forces in a manner to deter a military attack on the United States, US forces, and its allies. Should deterrence fail, strategic forces will be employed when directed by the NCA and authorized by the President.

- USSTRATCOM conducts worldwide airborne reconnaissance in support of strategic force employment, ensures effective C4I for strategic force employment, and provides support to other combatant commanders.

- Upon request, USSTRATCOM provides geographic combatant commanders with a team of advisors skilled in nuclear planning and coordination. This theater planning response cell advises and assists the geographic combatant commander in crisis action planning and acts as a liaison between the geographic combatant commander and USSTRATCOM.

For further guidance on USSTRATCOM capabilities and coordinating support from USSTRATCOM, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.
CHAPTER IV  
JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Clausewitz:  On War, 1812

1. Considerations Before Combat

Considerations before combat are shown in Figure IV-1.

a. General. Actions JFCs are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations.

b. Preparing the Operational Area

• Intelligence

  • At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPB process, JFCs, through early involvement of their Intelligence Directorates (J-2s) in the planning process, focus intelligence efforts to determine enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

  • JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency),
which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

• Organizing and Training Forces. Preparing the operational area also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with CONUS-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander’s joint mission essential task list.

• Maintaining Operational Area Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to operational areas in which they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. Supporting combatant commanders can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

• Logistic Support and Sustainment. Thorough logistic planning for deployment, distribution, and sustainment during operations is particularly critical. If possible, planning should include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces.

c. Isolating the Enemy

• With NCA guidance and approval and with national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

• The JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by PSYOP and by interdicting sources of sustaining resources and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.
d. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

- Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times, CONUS-based mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location.

- JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces might even be sufficient to stop adversary aggression or movement.

e. Special Operations. During prehostilities, SOF can provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They also can improve or relieve the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring. These advantages should be weighed against the risk of SOF exposure or capture.

f. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat. Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” provides expanded guidance on force protection.

g. Space. JFCs continue to exploit the advantages that space operations provide. Space forces are maneuvered or activated as necessary to contribute to a JFC’s accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the combatant commander or from higher authority.

h. Physical Environment. Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.

2. Considerations at the Outset of Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat (see Figure IV-2).

a. Force Projection

- The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly,
employing immediately available forward-presence forces and appropriate flexible deterrent options in order to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and forward-deployed forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

- **Force projection** usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis by forward-deployed or forward-based forces, where available. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

- **Joint forces participate in force projection in both war and MOOTW.** Force projection may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

  - **Opposed operations** require a viable forcible entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. When the adversary can limit the entry of friendly forces, initial operations may be designed to suppress these enemy anti-access capabilities. Forcible entry is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

  - **Unopposed operations** may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations.
Logistic capability may be a higher priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection.

- **During early entry operations, US forces and ports of debarkation** often will be friendly COGs that must be protected. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

- JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables **rapid force buildup** into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a C2 perspective, echelon is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

- Operations with allies and coalition members often require a **robust liaison and communications capability**. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional sufficient communications equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communications.

### b. Dimensional Superiority

- Dimensional superiority is the cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information domains that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. JFCs seek superiority in these domains to shape the battlespace and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC may have to initially focus all available joint forces on seizing the initiative. A delay at the outset of combat may lead to lost coalition support, lost credibility, and incentives for other adversaries to begin conflicts elsewhere. This initial focus will be much more effective with full dimensional superiority, but may very well have to be executed before that is achieved.
• JFCs normally strive to achieve air and sea superiority early. Air superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive interference from enemy air or missile attacks. Sea superiority facilitates rapid deployment of joint force personnel, equipment, and supplies. History has shown that the establishment of air and sea superiority can be pivotal factors to mission success. For example, air superiority (Operation POINT BLANK) and control of the English Channel were considered prerequisites to the success of the World War II Allied landings at Normandy.

• Land forces can move quickly into an area to deter the enemy from inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. Through the conduct of sustained operations, land forces can control people and land, contribute to defeat of an adversary, and establish postconflict stability.

• Early superiority in the space, electromagnetic, and information domains also is vital in joint operations. Space superiority must be achieved early to ensure freedom of action. Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications, weather, and intelligence assets while denying the enemy use of space-based resources. Gaining superiority in the electromagnetic and information domains degrades the enemy’s C2 while allowing the JFC to maximize friendly C2 capabilities. Superiority in the space, electromagnetic, and information domains also allows the JFC to better understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions and influence foreign attitudes and perceptions of the operation.

• Dimensional superiority is essential to joint force mission success. Air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information superiority are critical aspects in the conduct of decisive operations. For example, the achievement of air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, and information superiority in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM set the stage for the successful liberation of Kuwait.

c. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity

• Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against COGs. These operations may be conducted concurrently with other operations in other phases of the campaign or major operation. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to attack COGs by land, sea, air, space, or SO capabilities. All components possess capabilities to attack COGs.

• There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy’s depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

d. Special Operations. SO enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative SO can directly and indirectly attack enemy COGs that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. SO frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SO capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. SO are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.
e. Other Factors. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force.

- **Protection from the Enemy’s Fires and Maneuver.** JFCs counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and fires, including the effects of WMD. Air, space, and maritime superiority operations; defensive IO; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. **OPSEC** and **military deception** are key elements of protection.

- **Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance.** JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure that systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine.

  JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*, discusses health support for joint operations.

- **Safety.** JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. **Command interest, discipline, and training** lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

- **Prevention of Fratricide.** JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The **destructive power and range of modern weapons**, coupled with the **high intensity and rapid tempo** of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and **institute appropriate preventative measures**. The primary mechanisms for reducing fratricide are **command emphasis**, **disciplined operations**, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and **enhanced situational awareness**. Commanders should seek to minimize fratricide while not limiting boldness and initiative in combat.

3. **Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations**

JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. JFCs conduct sustained operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During **sustained operations**, **JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces**. During a major operation, joint forces provide the JFC options to effectively apply military power. The JFC may designate one component or major category of operations to be the main effort, with others providing assets in support, or the JFC may have a main effort with other components and functions performing operations in their own mission areas. When conditions change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift to another component or function. Some functions, like joint strategic attack, interdiction, and PSYOP, continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or informational advantage. These functions, when executed concurrently with other main operations, degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate their forces,
a. The Relationship Between Offense and Defense

- Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs normally will seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.

- Joint operations normally will include elements of both offense and defense. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During initial entry operations, entry forces may be required to defend while force buildup occurs. Even in sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Forces at all levels within the joint force must possess the agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.

- The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

- As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward lines of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between

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Figure IV-3. Considerations for Sustained Combat Operations
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sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

• Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations from selected bases (ashore or afloat). Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, joint forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on C4I, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

c. Air, Naval, Space, and Information Superiority. Air, naval, space, and information superiority allow JFCs additional opportunities to conduct sustained combat operations with more operational and logistics flexibility. In addition, air, naval, space, and information superiority may contribute significantly to both adequate logistic buildup and overall force protection in the AOR and/ or JOA.

d. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity. As described earlier in this chapter, JFCs seek to attack enemy COGs, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy COGs should be designed to support the JFCs’ objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

e. Maneuver

• The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the adversary in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. The focus of air, land, and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, airspace, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Air, land, and naval maneuvers are required to control population, territory, key waters, and airspace.

• There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner, land and air expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and that have the means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

• Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver also
may exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower.

• JFCs consider the contribution of SOF in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

• At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

  - At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.

  - At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander in Chief, US Central Command’s concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them. The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.

  - Once forces are deployed into the operational area, maneuver typically is considered tactical in nature.

• The concept for air, land, and naval maneuver needs to be articulated in the JFC’s concept of operations and should include timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, sustained action on land, and sustained air operations. JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on air, land, and naval maneuver.

• Forcible Entry

  - Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In some situations, forcible entry may be the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give JFCs unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy COGs and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can escalate the operation horizontally, exceeding the enemy’s capability to respond.

  - Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof.

  - Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require extensive intelligence and detailed coordination. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust C4I capabilities to move with forward elements.
OPSEC and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with SO. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval surface fire support and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from continental United States bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

VARIOUS SOURCES
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level — in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’s Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney’s air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney’s Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement” of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.
entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, and applicable Service publications.

**f. Joint Strategic Attack.** The combatant commander should consider conducting joint strategic attacks when feasible. A joint strategic attack is a combatant commander directed offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected in order to achieve NCA or combatant commander’s strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed the NCA. Additionally, these attacks may directly or indirectly achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. These targets may include but are not limited to enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct joint strategic attacks. The combatant commander’s staff and component staffs propose targets and plans for conducting joint strategic attacks for the combatant commander’s approval.

**g. Interdiction**

- Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and naval component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

- Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real-time and near-real-time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

- Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and naval forces and the conduct of counterair operations as part of the overall amphibious plan.

For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

**h. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction**

- Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and sea) provides one of the most
dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

- As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of interdiction and maneuver forces and the undesirability of fragmenting theater and/or JOA air assets. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and authority assigned and delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater and/or JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

- Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly surface forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat, which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to
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surface maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

• JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

• JFCs must synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

• All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as military deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction.

• Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly synchronize and integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

• JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater and/or JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater and/or JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the theater and/or JOA, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization and integration of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance, particularly when JFCs designate commanders to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions.

- Air, land, and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the air, land, or naval commander to achieve the JFC’s objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

- JFCs may establish land and naval force AOs to prevent interference between component operations. The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commanders’ requirements to accomplish their missions, and protect their forces. This facilitates rapid maneuver and ability to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To
facilitate this, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

• The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander’s boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

• Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders normally can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

• Joint force operations in maritime and/or littoral areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

• Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort.

• JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to a desired effect and/or time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or naval forces.

  i. Joint Fires. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. Joint fires and joint fire support may include, but are not limited to, the lethal effects of close air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support,
artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects such as EW. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force is essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” and JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

j. Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. Sustainment plays a key role in both offensive and defensive combat operations. JFCs normally seek to begin building sustainment during the earliest phases of a campaign or operation. As with achieving air and naval superiority and land dominance, sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required.

k. Combat Assessment

- With the increasing complexity of modern warfare, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. BDA is one of the principal subordinate elements of combat assessment.

- At the JFC level, the combat assessment effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC’s overall concept. The intent is to analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine: what physical and/or psychological attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary’s plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. Combat assessment requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

  • Combat assessment is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support combat assessment for all components. Normally, the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) will be responsible for coordinating combat assessment, assisted by the joint force J-2.

  • JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the combat assessment intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

4. Joint Operations in Maritime and/or Littoral Areas

a. Depending on the situation, JFCs may conduct operations in the littoral area to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations conducted in the littoral area can
facilitate the entry of other elements of the joint force through the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or air base to allow entry and movement of other elements of the joint force.

b. **Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations**, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

c. Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, **littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea**. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The **mobility of naval forces at sea**, coupled with the **ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces**, can be key to achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. **JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea**. Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and **shift that command ashore** if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC’s concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use C4I facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.

e. Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current

![](image)
operations. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. **One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages.** Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.

5. **Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction are Employed**

a. As WMD proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces increases not only in war but also in MOOTW. An enemy’s use of such weapons can quickly change the nature of a campaign, perhaps even affecting the combatant commander’s strategic objectives. **The use or threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs.** Thus, planning for the possibility of enemy use is important to campaign design.

b. It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the **strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts** of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.

c. The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. JFCs implement defensive NBC measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems.

For additional guidance on defensive NBC measures, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

d. **Multinational operations become more complicated** with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other alliance or coalition members, especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or coalition.

e. Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent’s capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these weapons. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

f. When directed by the NCA, combatant commanders plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

g. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives.

* The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such
helicopter. JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using PSYOP or other means. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and unconventional (e.g., IO and SO) forces.

- If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of nuclear weapons.

For additional guidance on employment of nuclear weapons, refer to the JP 3-12 series.

h. Force protection is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of IPE, and proper use of terrain for shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of NBC defense capabilities reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with WMD. See also “force protection” in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”

6. Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations

a. Planning for termination of operations must be ongoing during all phases of COA development, deployment of forces, and execution of operations.

b. In most cases, operations will be terminated in their own right when stated objectives have been met.

CHAPTER V
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

“Peace hath her victories — no less renowned than war.”

John Milton to Lord General Oliver Cromwell, 1652

1. General

MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities. MOOTW usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and SO forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and NGOs, in a complementary fashion. This chapter addresses key operational-level concepts and types of operations.

For detailed guidance on specific MOOTW, refer to the JP 3-07 series.

2. Role in the Strategic Security Environment

a. Combatant commanders support national objectives through combatant command strategies and military operations, which translate strategic intent into operational and tactical actions. Thus, joint MOOTW involve strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. Because the Department of State frequently is the lead Federal agency and nearly always is a principal player in joint MOOTW outside CONUS, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area.

b. Many USG agencies other than the Department of Defense can be involved in MOOTW, including the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the Disaster Assistance Response Team within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. OFDA is an office within the United States Agency for International Development. NGOs such as the American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund also are frequently involved. Examples of international organizations that can be involved in such operations include the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. These organizations may assume the lead to coordinate actions for the NGO community. These organizations may assume the lead to coordinate actions for other nongovernmental and international organizations depending on the nature of the humanitarian crisis. Military planners therefore should establish contact with lead nongovernmental and/or international organizations to ensure coordinated efforts.

c. The instruments of national power may be applied in any combination to achieve national strategic goals in MOOTW. The manner in which they are employed is determined by the nature of each situation. For MOOTW, the military instrument typically is tasked to support the diplomatic instrument and work with the economic and informational instruments.

3. Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

As shown in Figure V-1, there are six principles applicable for MOOTW.
a. Objective

- Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

- This principle of war also applies to MOOTW. A clearly defined and attainable objective — with a precise understanding of what constitutes success — is critical when the United States is involved in MOOTW.

- Military commanders should understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination, as well as those that yield failure.

- JFCs must understand the strategic goals, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these goals and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other organizations.

c. Security

- Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

- In joint MOOTW, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to US interests. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters after a natural disaster, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a WMD incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise.


- The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations. However, security requirements should be balanced with the operation’s nature and objectives. In some operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and flak vests, or using secure communications may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s legitimacy and hurt relations with the HN population.

- Some MOOTW may be short, others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired end state. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response options against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action.

- Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic goals and the restraints placed on operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them often is the requirement for success.

- This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.

- During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective IO can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

d. **Restraint**

- **Apply appropriate military capability prudently.**

- The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In MOOTW, these ROE often will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals.

- This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.

f. **Legitimacy**

- **Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.**

- This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards, as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government.

- During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective IO can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.
4. Planning Considerations

Planning considerations for MOOTW are shown in Figure V-2.

a. Interagency Coordination. Inherent in MOOTW is the need for the military to work with other agencies of the USG as well as other nations’ governments. **Consensus building** is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency’s capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal — to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission — can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

b. Command and Control. Each type of MOOTW can be unique. There is no single C2 option that works best for all such operations. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet the specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.

c. Intelligence and Information Collection. MOOTW are significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information collection. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, JFCs and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some MOOTW (such as peacekeeping), the term “information collection” is used rather than the term “intelligence” because of the sensitivity of the operation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. A commander tasked with conducting a joint MOOTW may face numerous restrictions in addition to the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important, not only because

![Figure V-2. Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War](image-url)
military forces may be used to support international sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by international organizations. As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation should be addressed by the combatant commander’s staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.

e. Training and Education

- The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to conduct joint MOOTW with very little notice. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency operations should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from other USG agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations should be invited to participate in these programs.

- Participation in and/or the operational environment of certain types of MOOTW may preclude normal mission-related training. For example, infantry units or fighter squadrons conducting certain protracted PO may not have the time, facilities, or environment in which to maintain individual or unit proficiency for traditional missions. Commanders should develop programs that enable their forces to maintain their combat skills to the maximum extent possible. Upon redeployment, such units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

f. Postconflict Operations

- Planning for postconflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the operations begin. As combat operations are nearing termination, military forces should prepare to transition to noncombat MOOTW. Refugee control, reestablishing civil order and public services, medical assistance, and other postconflict activities may be done best by military forces during this turbulent period. Postconflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.

- The military’s presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments and under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in operations normally governed by other agencies. Military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating military forces to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting postconflict activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Typical postconflict activities include, but are not limited to, the following.

  • Transition to Civil Authorities. This transaction could be to local governments or HNs after natural disasters, to a UN peacekeeping operation after peace enforcement operations, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a nongovernmental agency in support of refugees.

  • Support to Truce Negotiations. This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and
other logistic support, and linguistics for all participants.

• SOF Activities. These activities include CA support to reestablish a civil government, additional training for HN armed forces, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and intelligence gathering.

• Public Affairs Operations. These operations include command information programs, media support, and international information programs.

• Redeployment. Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of financial obligations, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Redeploying individuals or units also may require refresher training.

g. Redeployment to Other Contingencies. Forces deployed for MOOTW may be called upon to rapidly redeploy to another theater. Planners should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and intertheater airlift, and some consideration to achieving the objectives of the original contingency through other means.

5. Types of Military Operations Other Than War

The primary types of MOOTW are described briefly in the following subparagraphs and are illustrated in Figure V-3. Additional information about these types of MOOTW may be found in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, and other joint publications as indicated below.

a. Arms Control. Arms control is a concept that connotes any plan, arrangement, or process resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems.
systems, and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; may seize WMD; may escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or without the consent of the HN. All of these actions help reduce threat to regional security.

b. Combatting Terrorism. Combatting terrorism involves \textit{actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat exists}. It includes antiterrorism (\textit{defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts}) and counterterrorism (\textit{offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism}). The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries. The Department of Defense provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies.

For further guidance on combatting terrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

c. Consequence Management. CM involves \textit{planning actions and preparations} taken to \textit{identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces} and to \textit{develop and execute plans} implemented in \textit{response to radiological accidents or accidents involving WMD}, as well as the actions taken following such an accident to \textit{mitigate and recover from the effect} of the accident. CM may be planned and executed for locations \textit{within US-owned territory at home and abroad and in foreign countries as directed by the NCA}. Support for domestic CM will be provided through USJFCOM as military support to civil authorities. The Department of State is designated the lead Federal agency in foreign CM. US military support to foreign CM normally will be provided to the foreign government through the combatant command within whose AOR the incident occurs.

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

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**OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT**

As the Gulf War’s fighting ended on 28 February 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled from cities and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering from hunger and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

On 6 April 1991, Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) established Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Comfort. Initial objectives were to provide humanitarian relief by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and improving sanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included United States Air Force airlift, a special operations command, and an amphibious ready group (with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit). When it became apparent that operations would significantly increase in complexity and duration, USCINCEUR expanded the organization of the JTF, changed commanders to reflect the changed nature and increasing complexity of the operation, and established the JTF headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.
The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF ALFA, a special operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF BRAVO at Zakhu, Iraq. JTF BRAVO’s mission was to provide security in its operational area inside Iraq, build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into these camps. JTF BRAVO forces included the Marine expeditionary unit, a British Commando Brigade, a French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish Parachute Regiment, and US Army airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions as well as psychological operations and civil affairs units. Ultimately, JTF BRAVO included combat and combat support units from US and coalition member nations, including an Italian Composite Special Forces Airborne Brigade, a Dutch Marine Combat Battalion, and an Infantry Rifle Platoon from Luxembourg.

Air Force forces operated from Incirlik and established and maintained an air exclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air delivery. Army and non-US cargo helicopters were assigned operational control (OPCON) to Commander, Air Force Forces. Army forces (less those in JTF BRAVO) were also based at Incirlik. Commander, Army Forces was also designated commander of a multinational support command, with OPCON of Army, Air Force, and Marine logistic units to support its multinational force.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, and the United States contributed forces. The operation also encompassed United Nations relief assistance. The JTF became Combined Task Force Provide Comfort.

Especially in its early weeks, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The commander, joint task force and subordinate commanders used Service capabilities where they were needed. They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance; and established command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment. It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the end state and posthostilities operations.

VARIOUS SOURCES


d. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations. In counterdrug operations, the Department of Defense supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their effort to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense.

- Act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. (The US Coast Guard has the lead for maritime interdiction of illegal drugs.)

- Integrate the C3 and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the
movement of illegal drugs into the United States.

- Approve and fund State governors’ plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement agencies.

For additional guidance on DOD counterdrug operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

e. Domestic Support Operations (DSO). DSO provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and normally are taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. DSO can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of a manmade or natural disaster, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

For additional guidance on DSO, refer to JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations.

f. Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime Intercept Operations. These are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier that is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit.

g. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. These operations are conducted to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or else face continued imposition of sanctions or threat of force. The measures usually are imposed by the UN or other international bodies of which the United States is a member, but may be imposed unilaterally by the United States. Exclusion zones usually are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant violations of international law.

h. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are conducted to exercise and assert navigational freedoms and overflight rights recognized by international law. Such operations exercise freedoms of navigation and overflight on the high seas, the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, the right of transit passage through international straits, and the right of archipelagic sea lane passage through archipelagic waters.

- International law accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters.

- Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation.

i. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance.
JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.

JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate relief provided life support systems — food, water, shelter, medical supplies and services, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitution phase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control, while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land. Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medical treatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station was established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route information to assist convoys as they arrived. Four life support centers were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.
**OPERATION EASTERN EXIT**

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu's international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

**Operation EASTERN EXIT**, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the midst of the Gulf War.

**VARIOUS SOURCES**

j. **Nation Assistance.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and humanitarian and civic assistance.

*For additional guidance on nation assistance, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).*
k. **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.** These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may include citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. The **Department of State** is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The **US Ambassador or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission** is responsible for preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country.

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

1. **Peace Operations.** PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

   • **Peacekeeping Operations.** PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.

   • **Peace Enforcement Operations.** PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Examples of PEO are Operation DENY FLIGHT conducted in Bosnia from 1992-1995 and the secondary effort in Unified Task Force Somalia, 1992-1993.

UN equipment is loaded on a C-5 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bound for Kigali, Rwanda, during Operation SUPPORT HOPE peace operations.
m. **Protection of Shipping.** Protection of shipping operations involve the use of proportionate force by US warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of US flag vessels and aircraft, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons consistent with international law.

n. **Recovery Operations.** Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them, especially when conducting them in denied areas. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt.

o. **Show of Force Operations.** Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate US resolve and involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests as well as international law.

p. **Strikes and Raids**

- **Strikes** are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. Strikes may be used as a reprisal against offending nations or groups or to prevent or end violations of international law.

- **Raids** usually are small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the adversary, or destroy installations. They end with planned withdrawals upon completion of the assigned missions.

q. **Support to Counterinsurgency.** Support to counterinsurgency includes support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. Support to counterinsurgency operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales, foreign military financing program, and international military education and training program. Such support also may include FID.

For further guidance on support to counterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

r. **Support to Insurgency.** Support to insurrections involves support to organized movements aimed at the overthrow of constituted governments through use of subversion and armed conflict. US forces may provide logistics and training support, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations.
OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF AND RESTORE HOPE

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of integrating peace operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 December the President directed USCENTCOM to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US special operations forces and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the...
identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, as well as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

VARIOUS SOURCES
CHAPTER VI
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations.”

GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA
“Principles for Coalition Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

1. General

   a. US military operations often are conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives.

   b. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition.

   • An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). These alliance operations are combined operations, though in common usage combined often is used inappropriately as a synonym for all multinational operations.

   • A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action; for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

   c. Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

   d. Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition strains to function or breaks down.

   e. The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

   For additional guidance on multinational operations, refer to the following paragraphs and JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.
2. Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations

The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the control of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.

3. Considerations for Multinational Operations

Considerations for multinational operations are shown in Figure VI-1 and discussed below.

a. National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation can therefore produce differing perceptions of

![CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS](image-url)
Multinational Operations

b. Unity of Effort

- Motivations of member nations may differ, but **multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined** by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, **and supported** by each member nation. Commanders of multinational forces should carefully consider the types of missions assigned to member forces. Capabilities often will differ substantially between national forces, but sensitivity to and consideration of national honor, pride, and prestige often will be as important to final success as the contributions and capabilities of the national forces themselves. Small decisions, such as which national forces are involved in the main effort or perhaps play the lead role at the start of an offensive, can have major consequences in multinational operations.

- **Coordinated policy**, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is **required**. Coordinated planning for ROE, combat identification, military deception, force protection, public information, EW, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). **Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.**

- JFCs also may consider the use of coalition support activities. Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners and US military forces and includes training coalition partners on tactics and techniques as well as assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure. US SOF teams assigned to coalition units can provide the JFC with an accurate evaluation of capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thereby facilitating joint force C2.

- Planning often is complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek **to involve all member nations in the decisionmaking process**, consistent with the terms established at the founding of the alliance or coalition. **Member recommendations should be sought continuously** by multinational force commanders, but especially during development of COAs, ROE, and combat identification measures; assignment of missions to national forces; and establishment of priorities of effort.

- **JFCs should establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces.** A personal, direct relationship often can overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. **Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise** are essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

c. Doctrine, Training, and Equipment

- **Doctrines, operational competence** as a result of training and experience, and types and quality of equipment can...
vary substantially among the military forces of member nations.

- When the situation permits, **JFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces** through training assistance and sharing of resources consistent with US law and alliance or coalition terms of reference, such as the loan of American equipment (for example, radios, NBC protective equipment, vehicles, or weapons).

- JFCs implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate **matching missions with capabilities**.

- Where member forces have **unique or special capabilities**, they should be appropriately exploited.

- **Joint** and **multinational exercises** are key components of joint training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. **Simulation** can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces.

**d. Cultural Differences**

- **Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity** — the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly **minor differences**, such as dietary restrictions, **can have great impact**. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

- **Language differences often present the most immediate challenge.** Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be **English**. Information lost during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects.

- To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ **linguists** and **area experts**, often available within or through the Service components or from
other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage.

e. Management of Resources

• Forces of member nations must be supported either by national assets or through the alliance and/or coalition. Resource contributions will vary among members. Some may contribute logistically, while others contribute military forces. Some may be able to do both. Commanders of multinational forces should seek to ensure that member forces are appropriately supplied and that contributions of member nations are consistent with national capabilities and the terms established at the formation of the alliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCs will rely on national political leadership and representatives from such agencies as the Department of State to effect such coordination with the leadership of member nations.

• The acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is a potentially key tool for mutual exchange of logistic support and services. ACSA is a reimbursable, bilateral support program that allows reimbursable logistics-exchanges between US and foreign military forces. ACSA provide the necessary legal authority to allow mutual logistic support between the US and multinational partners. This agreement increases flexibility for operational commanders by allowing fast response when logistic support or services are requested.

f. National Communications

• JFCs should anticipate that some forces from alliance or coalition member nations will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leadership. This communications capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it also can be a source of frustration as leaders external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

• JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the NCA, provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain of command for exceptional and emergency situations. The conditions and supporting communications systems for such bypassing should be established early by the appropriate military and political leadership.

4. Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

a. Rules of Engagement

• US forces under the control of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless otherwise directed by the NCA. US forces will be under the control of a multinational force only if the NCA determine that the ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.

• When US forces operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common
ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, US forces will exercise the right and obligation of self-defense contained in CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, while seeking guidance from the appropriate combatant command. To avoid mutual interference, the multinational forces will be informed prior to US participation in the operation of the US forces’ intentions to operate under these standing ROE and to exercise unit self-defense.

• Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements (i.e., other members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party). US forces still remain bound by US treaty obligations, even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its terms.

b. The Media

• Though not directly related to the conduct of operations, JFCs seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations, consistent with requirements for OPSEC.

• This task is complicated in a multinational situation where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements. JFCs cannot hope to impose control over such efforts and, instead, should seek to work closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements to develop an open and cooperative environment. Simple ground rules should be established by the senior political and military representatives of the alliance or coalition at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.

For additional guidance on dealing with the media, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

c. Information Operations. US forces will conduct IO and related activities during multinational operations. The different practices and cultures of the nations involved may affect these operations. JFCs should seek agreement on the multinational forces’ IO objectives, themes, and methods so multinational efforts in the IO arena can be coordinated, integrated and synchronized, and deconflicted.

d. Local Law Enforcement. US forces often will not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations. Where local law enforcement organizations are present and capable, JFCs should establish systems and procedures to optimize the contributions of indigent law enforcement personnel in facilitating operations and protecting lives and property in the operational area. Where local law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, JFCs should consider deploying appropriate US forces early in the deployment flow as well as exploiting the law enforcement capabilities of other member nations.

e. Command and Control

• Successful multinational operations can center on achieving unity of effort from the outset. Participating nations need to provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force
commanders and staffs exercise their authority to **unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives**. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decisionmaking in multinational organizations.

- **Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures.** Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the **predominant nation providing the alliance force commander**. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances. Figure VI-2 provides an example of a command structure within an alliance.

- **Coalitions typically are formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force often is challenging.** It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many C2 structures can be employed, coalitions

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**Figure VI-2. Combined Structure with National Integrity**

This diagram shows a variation of the parallel combined command structure. A formal, longstanding alliance will normally form a combined command headquarters with a combined staff and a single combined commander. Subordinate national commands, however, maintain national integrity.
most often are characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

- Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with: (1) Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control and (2) Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force. Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often is the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. Figure VI-3 depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the coalition coordination, communications, and integration center (C3IC). The C3IC was established specifically to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

- Lead Nation Command. In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

- Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

- Coordination and Liaison

  - Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well.

  - Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national SOF units or naval forces.

  - Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition’s concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national forces.
commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.

- Liaison officers between multinational forces should be operationally proficient, innovative, and tenacious, but at the same time diplomatic and sensitive to the multinational forces with whom they are detailed. They should have the authority to speak for their JFCs or national force commanders.

- Plans and Procedures

- Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the operation or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the
Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Some alliance or coalition member forces may not have the planning and execution dexterity and flexibility characteristic of US forces. Accordingly, JFCs should ensure that the tempo of planning and execution does not exceed the capabilities of other member forces. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate subordinate planning and execution.

- To the extent possible, procedures should be standardized within the multinational force, especially if mistakes can result in failed missions or fratricide. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized. Where this is not possible, liaison teams should be tasked to facilitate coordination and deconflict operations. JFCs should fully exploit all capabilities available to them to coordinate operations and facilitate combat identification, including Air Force tactical air control parties.

- Commanders may elect to organize the operational area that supports the command’s organization. For example, when a parallel command structure is employed, there are advantages to assigning AOs to national forces. This assignment permits relative autonomy of operations and can significantly deconflict operations. This technique was successfully employed by JTF Bravo during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where American, British, French, and Spanish forces operated in an area approximately 170 by 70 kilometers in size.

f. Intelligence

- The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge. Alliance or coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in...
sophistication and focus. Members may not have capabilities similar to the United States to collect and process intelligence. Nonetheless, each nation’s contributions and capabilities should be appropriately incorporated and exploited. JFCs should rapidly establish a system that optimizes each nation’s contributions and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

- **JFCs, in accordance with national directives, need to determine what intelligence may be shared** with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so should be included in agreements with multinational partners that are concluded after obtaining proper negotiating authority. Any such agreements should incorporate limitations imposed by US law and/or the US national disclosure policy.

- **The National Disclosure Policy provides initial guidance.** It promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, facilitates combat identification, and is perishable.

  g. **Logistics**

- **Multinational logistics is a major challenge.** Potential problem areas, as shown in Figure VI-4, include differences in logistic doctrine; stockage levels; logistic mobility; interoperability; infrastructure; competition between Services and alliance and/or coalition members for common support; and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, **JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities** such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in the operational area. **JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections**

![Figure VI-4. Considerations in Multinational Logistics](image-url)
early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

- **Standardization of logistic systems and procedures** can ease the logistic challenges. **Interoperability of equipment**, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. Significant logistic operations include acquisition and distribution of food and water, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts; transportation; field services; and health service support.

- **Contracting.** Contracting for various types of support, especially labor, facilities, common supplies, and transportation, is a significant aspect of many military operations. Procurement of materiel and services in the joint force’s operational area is done either through contracting on the open market or when the HN offers support through specific government agencies. The HN may restrict the joint force’s contracting ability as it manages essential services for the host population. Requirements for materiel and services should be consolidated and validated as operationally required by the JFC’s staff. A determination of appropriate source for meeting the requirements should then be conducted (for example, supply system, HNS, or contracting). If contracting is deemed appropriate, JFCs should ensure that sufficient, qualified contracting officers are available from the outset to leverage the capabilities available within the operational area. A central contracting effort is necessary to ensure that scarce resources do not compete against escalating demands and that the main effort receives priority of support. When required, contracting officers should be paired with linguists and should be prepared to operate in currencies or commodities other than US dollars.

- **Host-Nation Support.** Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. JFCs can consider centralizing HNS functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations also might agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude HNS arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

- **Integration of Multinational Units.** If some level of force integration is necessary to conduct operations, planners should determine where the integration of units and headquarters needs to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment. If integration is to occur at an intermediate staging base or port of debarkation, its impact on those bases or ports can be significant and needs to be addressed and accounted for by base and/or port commanders and staffs.

*For further guidance on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.*

h. Protection

- **Protection measures** that apply to joint operations are appropriate also for multinational situations. JFCs consider, for example, theater air and missile defense, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security measures for
the multinational force. These considerations extend to NBC warning, protection, and decontamination.

- **Combat identification**, especially between member forces, is important because of its potential negative impact on alliance or coalition unity and trust between member forces. JFCs should assess carefully the risks of fratricide between member forces involved in COAs being considered and actively seek to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of operational and technological solutions and expedients.
Intentionally Blank
The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

1. Objective

   a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

   b. The objective of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support accomplishment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of a MOOTW might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

2. Offensive

   a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

   b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

   c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative.

An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

   a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.

   b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force

   a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

   b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

   a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

   b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct
and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.
APPENDIX B
THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. General

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to provide substance to the basic framework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.

• Determine specified and implied tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

• Geostrategic Context

• Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

• Characteristics of the operational area, including: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, and mobilization capacity); social conditions; and science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

• Analysis of the Adversary. Scrutiny of the opponent situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate) should include the following.

• Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.
Appendix B

- Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).
- Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.
- Possible external military support.
- COGs (strategic and operational).
- Specific operational characteristics, including strength, composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time, and space factors (including basing utilized and available); and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

- Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, commanders normally will have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and C4 estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

- Restrictions. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

- Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

- Deductions. Deductions from the above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAs development are based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following.

- Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.
- Forces required.
- C4 concept.
- Logistic concept.
- Deployment concept.
- Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
- Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities

a. Determine the probable effect of possible adversary capabilities on the success of each friendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, opponent reaction, and counterreaction.
d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; and list advantages and disadvantages of each adversary capability.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governing factors.

- Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art).

- Other critical factors (for example, political constraints).

- Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.
Intentionally Blank
The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references.


3. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.

4. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

5. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).


7. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA  23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, 1 February 1995, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
       JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
       USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

   Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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<td>center of gravity</td>
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Glossary

IO information operations
IPE individual protective equipment
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staff
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JOA joint operations area
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP joint publication
JRA joint rear area
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA joint special operations area
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
JUO joint urban operations

LOAC law of armed conflict
LOC line of communications

MOOTW military operations other than war

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA National Command Authorities
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO nongovernmental organization
NMS national military strategy
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs
PEO peace enforcement operations
PKO peacekeeping operations
PO peace operations
PSYOP psychological operations

RC Reserve Component
ROE rules of engagement
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<td>TEP</td>
<td>theater engagement plan</td>
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<td>TST</td>
<td>time-sensitive target</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent there to, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (This term and its
**battle damage assessment.** The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (JP 1-02)

**campaign.** A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

**campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

**campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 1-02)

**centers of gravity.** Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between
military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s critical information requirements.** A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s estimate of the situation.** A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate, which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

**command relationships.** The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

**common operational picture.** A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**communications zone.** Rear part of theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (JP 1-02)

**concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

**conflict.** An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**consequence management.** Those measures taken to protect public health and safety,
restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

**coup de main.** An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02)

**crisis.** An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

**culminating point.** The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**decisive point.** A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**electronic warfare.** Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving
passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.  c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

**environmental considerations.** The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or programs that may impact on, or are affected by, the planning and execution of military operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and protection of flora and fauna. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**enemy capabilities.** Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities” are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

**expeditionary force.** An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02)

**fires.** The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

**fire support coordinating measure.** A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

**fire support coordination line.** A fire support coordinating measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets
beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**information superiority.** The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 1-02)

**integration.** 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

**interdiction.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

**joint fires.** Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 1-02)

**joint fire support.** Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and
key waters. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

**joint force air component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force land component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force maritime component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent’s capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Also called JIPB. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint strategic attack. A joint strategic attack is a combatant commander directed offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected in order to achieve National Command Authorities or combatant commander’s strategic objectives. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-70.)

joint urban operations. All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. Also called JUO. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

lines of operations. Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (JP 1-02)

major operation. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or
several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**maneuver.** 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02)

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

**mission type order.** 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)
**national military strategy.** The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (JP 1-02)

**national security strategy.** The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (JP 1-02)

**objective.** 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational area.** An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational art.** The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational authority.** That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or
matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**Operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Operational reach.** The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

**Peace operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

**Physical security.** That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

**Psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**Public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

**Reconnaissance.** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02)

**Risk management.** The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission
benefits. Also called RM. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

sequel. A major operation that follows the current major operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

strategic estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
support.  1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat
elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

terms of reference. Terms of reference allude to a mutual agreement under which a command, element, or unit exercises authority or undertake specific missions or tasks relative to another command, element, or unit. Also called TORs. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater of operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (JP 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone joint operations publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRAstaffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised