A Historical Study of Operational Command: A Resource for Researchers

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ABSTRACT

This historical analysis provides an intellectual basis and a resource for informed debate on matters relating to the formation and organisation of an operational level headquarters, such as the Headquarters Joint Operational Command. The experiences gained in the formation and development of a variety of headquarters and theatre campaigns are discussed and lessons learnt are established. While the emphasis is on the experience gained in WWII, examples are drawn from earlier eras and from campaigns conducted since WWII. Other relevant matters such as definitions and the nature of command and control are addressed and unique Australian experiences gained as a partner in theatre operations are discussed.

RELEASE LIMITATION

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Executive Summary

The intention to establish a new joint collocated headquarters and introduce new operational command and control arrangements for the Australian Defence Force, including the appointment of a Chief of Joint Operations\(^1\) (CJOPS), has occasioned studies aimed at determining the best manner in which to implement operational level command. While this collocated joint headquarters\(^2\) will be unique to Australia, the concept of a joint operational level headquarters is one that not only has been implemented in the past\(^3\) but is also being continuously developed by other nations\(^4\). Although an awareness of contemporary developments is readily achieved by means of visits and exchanges, conferences and the specialist literature, there is a risk that the lessons of the past will be overlooked because of the passage of time. History abounds with lessons on the problems of conducting operational level warfare, both joint and multi-national. An awareness of these lessons can assist current work in the field by indicating the successes, failures, pitfalls and insights gained by those who have gone before.

This is mainly a historical analysis of operational level headquarters, primarily from WWII to the present time but drawing on past examples such as the British in North America in 1759 and the American Civil War. It looks at a variety of other issues such as definitions and the nature of Command and Control. The experiences gained by the major parties to WWII, namely the Western Allies, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany, form the larger part of the analysis. However, more recent operations, such as the Falklands Islands campaign in 1982 and the Gulf War in 1991, are addressed, as are Australian experiences as an element of an operational level theatre controlled by another nation. From this analysis it is possible to see the effects that personalities have on the conduct of operations at this level and on the problems of establishing cooperation not only for multi-national but also for joint operations. The effects of organisation arrangements on the conduct of operations are studied and the Australian experience with the RAAF command structure in the South West Pacific Area in WWII is a sobering example. A difference of opinions in the literature is revealed concerning the merits or otherwise of component command as against the alternative direct command model. While it is probably the least recognized area of Command and

\(^1\) Prior to the establishment of Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), operational command and control was exercised by Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST).
\(^2\) To be referred to as the Headquarters Joint Operational Command (HQJOC)
\(^3\) For example, the Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST).
\(^4\) For example, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in the United Kingdom.
Control, the impact of command arrangements on the proper functioning of operational level headquarters is shown to be significant.

This study illustrates areas to be considered in any study on the organisation of operational level headquarters. It is intended to provide an intellectual framework for discussion of this subject and a resource to inform debate. It also provides a scholarly background to other studies being undertaken in relation to the establishment of the Headquarters Joint Operational Command. As such, it is a tool to help avoid the mistakes of the past and to build on the successes experienced over the years.
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Preface

Research conducted by the Joint Command Analysis (JCA) Branch of the Command and Control (C2) Division is assisting the development of joint operational command arrangements in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This research, which aligns with the Australian Government announcements\(^1\) to establish a collocated joint headquarters and flatten the structure of operational command, is helping researchers in JCA Branch to understand high-level command concepts. The collocation initiative gives the research a clear direction as well as a practical application. The work includes investigating the internal processes within the components that make up a headquarters, determining how the components might interact in a joint environment, identifying the different types of communication and social networks that exist, determining the influence of new technology on operational effectiveness and efficiency, and assessing how collaboration can be used to enhance command effectiveness.

Bringing the different services together to form a collocated joint command headquarters is a big undertaking that offers many challenges. It also raises many questions: where should the headquarters be located, how many people should it house, what type of services should it offer, what is the optimum physical layout for most efficient performance, can or should the duplication of effort be avoided, and what backup provisions are needed in the event of a failure or an attack? It is likely that the answers to some of these questions will not be known until well after the collocated headquarters is operational and the stakeholders have had time to reflect.

But as well as considering these questions, the intention to establish the collocated headquarters has again prompted the more enduring question regarding what are the most appropriate forms for the ADF high-level command arrangements. Even though the legacy of the existing arrangements with formalised roles and responsibilities is likely to take immediate precedence and dictate the planning for collocation, it is still useful to explore this more searching question. A broad-based study that identifies the general factors that influence high-level command arrangements can help to reveal the different organisational perspectives, illustrate some of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of command, and provide a context for more directed research. The results from such a study could significantly influence the planning of future command arrangements within the ADF.

This document is a literature review that was produced as part of a general study that was designed to provide a context for other specific research activities supporting the development of the ADF joint operational command arrangements. The aim of the study was to identify the factors that influence high-level command arrangements and, if possible, to recommend alternative command structures. The study was conducted

\(^1\) DEFGRAM 136/2004
in two phases. The first phase examined the operational command arrangements associated with past military operations. Because many of these operations occurred more than 20 years ago, most of the work for this phase entailed collecting and reviewing the relevant literature. In the second phase, the intention was to examine the operational command arrangements associated with more modern conflicts. As well as a literature review, an initial set of interviews with subject matter experts, mainly serving and retired senior military officers as well as DSTO researchers, was conducted. However, due to the precedence of similar studies being held elsewhere in Defence and a change to task priorities within JCA Branch, this second phase of the study was not finished.

The literature review, which includes an extensive set of references, identifies several factors that are important to operational command. It comprises an eclectic collection of background material about command arrangements. It also includes useful definitions for terms such as Joint, Combined, Coalition, Allies, Command and Control (C2), and Multi-national. However, it is not an argued case that compares and contrasts a particular set of command arrangements or some other aspect of command; as you might find in a research thesis. But the examples used are drawn from major military operations of the past, and these help to illustrate the importance of the study of history in showing that lessons can be learned that can help commanders to avoid repeating the mistakes of others.

Although the literature review covers a wide range of topics, one theme, closely linked to successful command, repeatedly emerges: coordination. Command is largely about the coordination of forces, and historically a variety of mechanisms have been used to ensure that each force component knows what to do and how what is done relates to the work of the other components. Traditionally, two principal mechanisms have been used within the military to achieve this coordination: authority and cooperation. Commanders rely on both, but in proportions that depend on the situation and the personalities involved. Although the mix of coordination mechanisms used often depends on the type of military operation, the idea that unity of command leads to unity of effort has dominated much of the thinking about what makes successful command arrangements. But unity of effort is not always easy to achieve; particularly if the force components are distributed, or they come from different services, or different nations, or there is not a willingness of commanders to cooperate. Although most commanders understand the value of cooperation, it is not always forthcoming, and in some operations, when attempts fail to make the different components cooperate, coordination has only been able to be achieved through the use of authority. History provides lots of examples of commanders who are unable or unwilling to cooperate. This failure to cooperate is seen to be most evident in command structures where those in charge of the different force elements are of similar rank. History also provides lots of examples of commanders who have a propensity to micromanage the difficult parts of the battle space, particularly the more complex land component.
Unity of command does not necessarily mean centralised command. Distributed command, where authority and resources are delegated to separate elements, can also be effective. The decision-making for distributed command is often more timely than for centralised command, but has the disadvantage of isolating the highest levels of command from the details of the lower levels. But regardless of the type of command, commanders at all levels need to clearly understand their roles and responsibilities and be willing to cooperate. To assist coordination, good communications between the components is essential, particularly during multi-national operations where one nation is the lead. Good liaison skills, supported by reliable communications systems, are needed to build the trust and respect needed for inter-agency cooperation. The move by many countries, including Australia, towards a culture, that of necessity, embraces joint and multi-national military operations, will require effective and efficient operational command arrangements. The best way to implement these future command arrangements is still evolving.

This literature review is a tool for researchers and service personnel who have an interest in further developing their understanding of effective and efficient command arrangements. With its extensive list of references it provides a useful resource for those responsible for preparing the designs of future command arrangements.
1. Introduction

Joint and multinational military operations have existed in one form or another for much of recorded history. However, it was not until WWII that serious efforts were made to formalise the command arrangements necessary to achieve the effective use of both joint and multinational forces. This ‘…conceptual development was perhaps the significant accomplishment of the Allies during the war’ (Ballard 2001). Events following WWII indicate that the benefits to be gained by such unifying arrangements were largely forgotten with a general reversion to the more parochial thinking of the past. This was interspersed with rare exceptions to the norm such as the effective employment of joint warfare techniques by the Israelis in 1967. Ballard (2001) attributes this decline in multinational cooperation, at least, to the Cold War which divided the world into various ideological camps. Resurgence in interest and application of both joint and multinational structures came about in the 1980s and is evidenced in such developments as the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 in the US.

Currently there is a real effort being demonstrated to establish the structures necessary to ensure the effective use of the forces assigned to both joint and multinational operations. The creation of new arrangements\(^2\) to flatten the ADF operational command structure and the appointment of a Chief of Joint Operations are examples of this movement. In many countries there has been a move away from the traditional arrangement of vesting operational authority with the professional heads of each service. Over the past several decades the service chiefs have had operational authority removed from their responsibility with it being placed in the hands of some form of a unified commander leaving the service chiefs the duty to ‘raise, train, and maintain’ their forces. Operational authority over armed forces has been delegated to a separate authority, the nature of which is dependent on the constitutional arrangements of the particular government concerned.

The intent of this burgeoning process is to achieve unity of effort in military operations. This document discusses the need for joint and multinational\(^3\) operations and the way unified command is used to achieve this desire for unity of effort. It will trace the development of joint and multinational operations from WWII, through the period when the lessons of WWII were forgotten, and into the period following Operation Desert Storm where joint and multinational thinking is experiencing a renaissance. The purpose of this document is to provide a resource, in the form of an intellectual framework, for those involved in the study and possibly the re-structuring of military organisations, in particular the Headquarters Joint Operational Command (HQJOC),

\(^2\) DEFGRAM 136/2004
\(^3\) The word ‘multinational’ is used in preference to ‘combined’ as there seems to be some confusion associated with the meaning of combined. Popular use of this word is often at odds with the definition provided in official glossaries and this matter will be addressed later in this document. For the purpose of this document ‘multinational’ refers to either operations with coalition partners or with allies working under the auspices of a treaty. This meaning of ‘multinational’ is also used in JP 3-16
by showing what has happened in the past and why it failed or succeeded. This intellectual framework will provide the basis for informed debate on the development of operational level headquarters with their successes and failures. An understanding of the triumphs and failures of the past can only assist in ensuring the triumphs of the future!

2. Method

This study has relied heavily on the historical record to build up knowledge of what has been achieved in the past. From this, lessons that could have relevance to the present have been identified and further researched. However, in some cases the historical record is either not clear, or is even contradictory. This resulted in a considerable amount of iteration of the process until such time as a consistent picture could be developed. It is understood that this is not uncommon when dealing with historical evidence. Much emphasis was placed on the experience of the combatants of WWII, as it was here that multinational operations achieved a level of unified command of multinational forces rarely achieved since. Paradoxically, this era also provided some of the best examples on how not to conduct joint (as opposed to multinational) operations. While the introduction of information technology and its tools has spawned ideas such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW) or Network Enabled Warfare (NEW), there is little reason to believe that this will change the processes and principles of warfare. The underlying element is the human being and this is likely to be the case as far ahead as we can visualise. The lessons of the past are just as relevant today in the Information Age as they ever were because the lessons learnt are heavily involved with the human response to the situation faced. This is a major benefit in studying history.

3. Why Study History

A study of the history of multinational and joint operations permits the application of lessons learnt to present day situations. ‘By analysing historical command systems at work we may hope to gain a better idea of how it was done, successfully or otherwise (Van Crevel 1985, p. 15). Craven (1959) stresses the continuing relevance of history when he notes that history ‘…is always concerned with the human race, and human nature has a way of being much the same wherever one chances to meet it’. He further develops this idea when he states that ‘We can use history to lengthen the experience on which we base our judgment of contemporary problems…’. This is similar to Perry (1983) who suggested that ‘The study of Military History also provides him with an intellectual basis for the comparison of current problems with past experience, in order to make deductions for present and future use’. Allard (1990, p. 241) believes in ‘…the idea that history can teach something about modern conditions…’. Downey (1977, pp208 – 209) in arguing for the education of military officers, views the study of history
as a means to widen their perspective on the management of war. Crowl (1977) supports this concept by offering the idea of history not as a tool for prediction so much as a guide for the future by stating that ‘...the study of history will help us to ask the right questions so that we can define the problem - whatever it is’. This latter use of military history - the ability to ask the right questions - is most relevant to the purpose of this document.

Whether or not the questions asked are the right questions may depend on the circumstances surrounding the situation that we are studying. When things are going well, valuable lessons may be masked by the overall success surrounding the situation. More is probably to be gained from studying the situation when things are not going well. Lord Tedder noted (in Odgers 1957, p. 499) that:

*The campaign is immensely simplified for a commander if he knows he can count on a blank cheque. Surely it is the problems of the early stages of the war which we should study. Those are the difficult problems; those are the practical problems which we and every democratic nation have to solve. There were no big battalions or blank cheques then. Here is the real and vital test of our defence policies. It is at the outset of war that time is the supreme factor.*

Winnefeld and Johnson (1991, p. 97) express a similar notion when they note that victory at Midway in 1942 and in Desert Storm in 1991 ‘...obscured some major command and control issues’. They iterate the adage that you can learn more from defeat than from success. This supports the contention that much that is worthwhile can be learnt from the study of the arrangements put in train in haste at the commencement of WWII as this was certainly a time devoid of ‘big battalions and blank cheques’ but not devoid of defeat. Many of these lessons have had to be learnt again over the intervening period between the 1940s and now. That experience alone is justification for a historical perspective on the subject!

Ryan (2001, p. 9) notes that knowledge of military history will provide a more sophisticated understanding allowing us to ‘...operate within the complex variables of past, present, and future’. Forman (in Ryan 2001, p. 15) observes that historical analysis can lead to improved decision-making and better-informed policy. The French historian Bloch (in Ryan 2001, p. 25) observes how historical knowledge breeds intellectual flexibility so that an examination of why yesterday differed from the day before, enables us to foresee why tomorrow will differ from yesterday.

Looking at what has happened will assist in planning for the future. ‘History can teach something about modern conditions, both in laying bare the record of previous choices and making explicit the assumptions and rationales on which those choices were based’ (Allard 1990, p. 241). Maybe Van Crevald (1985, p. 15) has the last word on this matter when he says:

*Studying the past may be a matter of marginal utility only, but the past is us and it is on the past alone that all decision making is inevitably based. If systematic study of the past is taken away, only personal experience, hearsay, and intuition remain. Military history may be an inadequate tool for the commander to rely on, but a better one has yet to be designed.*
4. Terminology

4.1 Clarification of meaning

The literature makes many references to terms such as Commander-in-Chief, Supreme Commander, and unified command etc. but there is a paucity of definitions provided as to what exactly is meant by these terms. It is possible to glean meanings from the context in which the terms are used and the occasional explanation of the duties and functions assigned to particular holders of these offices. This can be augmented by the few instances of when a definition is provided from an authoritative source. An understanding of the meanings of these terms is useful when attempting to gain an appreciation of how these higher-level command positions operated in the past and insights into lessons to be learnt from their experiences. In addition, the terms often have similar meanings, sometimes only separated by degree, all of which can make their use confusing. An explanation of these meanings can dispel this potential confusion.

4.2 Commander-in-Chief

A Commander-in-Chief is a high level commander functioning at the strategic and operational levels of conflict and would be expected to be an officer of at least three star rank. It is at the strategic level that ‘Resources and priorities are assigned across all elements of national power, and military strategic end states are established’ (FLW 1998 p. 2-12). There is often a hierarchy of Commanders-in-Chief commencing at a level commensurate with the constitutional position of the President of the United States and the Governor-General of Australia as Commanders-in-Chief of their respective nation’s armed forces. The Australian Governor-General’s position as Commander-in-Chief is titular only (Stephen 1983), a view reinforced by Sir Zelman Cowen who said ‘…the title of the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief was intended to confer titular and not substantive command-in-chief’ (Cowen 2001). The situation with the US President, on the other hand, is quite the opposite with the President most definitely possessing a substantive power as Commander-in-Chief.

How far down the hierarchy a commander may still be considered a Commander-in-Chief is indicated by Eisenhower (1948, p. 312). General Montgomery asked to be made the commander of all the Allied land forces in Europe following the Normandy invasion, including retention of his post as 21st Army Group commander. Eisenhower rejected this idea as an Army Group commander had to ‘…assure direct, day-by-day battlefield direction in a specific portion of the front…’. Because of the size of the operations and the level of resources allocated to the Army Group commanders, Eisenhower was prepared to consider his Army Group commanders to be

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4 Both Sir Ninian Stephen and Sir Zelman Cowen are former Governors-General of Australia
Commanders-in-Chief. He stated that ‘...in a theatre so vast as ours each army group commander would be the ground Commander-in-Chief for his particular area; instead of one there would be three so-called Commanders-in-Chief for the ground...each...supported by his own tactical air force’ (Eisenhower 1948, p. 313). From the tone of the last passage, it seems that Eisenhower considered (possibly with some reluctance) an Army Group commander to be the lowest level at which one could reasonably be considered to be a Commander-in-Chief. More usual practice seems to be to consider theatre commanders certainly to be Commanders-in-Chief although it was often British practice to maintain officers with the title of Commanders-in-Chief below this level for each of the services involved (Eisenhower 1948, p. 313). Gallaway (2000, p. 70) reveals that General MacArthur preferred the title of Commander-in-Chief to that of Supreme Commander, as he considered the latter to be ‘...the lesser of the two titles’. He adopted the title Commander-in-Chief South West Pacific Area (CINCSWPA) without reference to the Joint Chiefs in Washington.

From this it would seem that a Commander-in-Chief is a senior officer operating at the higher levels of command and not involved with the day-to-day running of the battle. Such a commander ‘...cannot ordinarily give day-by-day and hour-by-hour supervision to any portion of the field’ (Eisenhower 1948, p. 313). Eisenhower (1948) establishes that a Commander-in-Chief has the authority, as appropriate, to assign principal objectives to formations, to regulate the strengths of major commands as their mission demands, and to arrange for the distribution of logistic and supporting forces. This indicates a considerable degree of operational authority. Ambrose (1983, p. 25) provides some indication of this level of authority when he describes the British method of running a theatre of operations. He noted how the British formed a group called the Commanders-in-Chief who actually directed the war within the theatre subject to the close supervision of their superiors in London. This is similar to Embry’s (1958, p. 281) description of the responsibility of a RAF Commander-in-Chief who had a definite responsibility for every aspect of his command including individual and collective training, discipline, administration, works’ services, technical development, supply and commissariat, the safety of flying, welfare of personnel and the assessment and recommendations on future equipment, covering every activity. General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff for much of WWII, criticised this arrangement when describing the command arrangements in the UK in 1940. He noted the large number of Commanders-in-Chief of all services in the UK, the lack of ‘...combined command over the three services’, which was ‘...a highly dangerous organisation’ (Bryant 1957, p. 201).

As well as having a hierarchy of Commanders-in-Chief, such as from (in some instances) Army Group Commander, to theatre commander, to President, there are two types of Commanders-in-Chief. One type of Commander-in-Chief is responsible for a geographic area while the other’s responsibilities are based on function. A theatre commander, such as Eisenhower in Europe or Nimitz in the Pacific, is made responsible for a region. Other Commanders-in-Chief, such as Air Chief Marshall Harris commanding RAF Bomber Command, have a responsibility based on a function
– in this case that of strategic air power. As well, not all Commanders-in-Chief are necessarily directly involved in combat operations. General Auchinleck was appointed Commander-in-Chief India Command in 1943 which was at that time a ‘…huge base and training area for SEAC (South East Asia Command)’ (Connell 1959, p. 764). Another type of Commander-in-Chief is that of the international Commander-in-Chief or Supreme Commander.

4.3 Supreme Commander

The title of Supreme Commander seems to be reserved for a Commander-in-Chief of coalition or alliance forces. Kirby (1969, p. 375) makes a distinction between unified commanders and service Commanders-in-Chief when he calls for the establishment of inter-service or joint headquarters. He states that ‘Such a headquarters should clearly be commanded by a Commander-in-Chief, rather than by a committee of Service Commanders-in-Chief’. In describing the appointment of General Wavell to ABDA\(^5\) command in 1942, Eisenhower (1948, p. 33) refers to him as ‘…the first Allied Commander-in-Chief’\(^6\). At the same time he refers to the writing of the charter for this appointment as that of ‘…writing a charter for a Supreme Commander, a charter that would insure his authority in the field but still protect the fundamental interests of each participating nation’ (Eisenhower 1948, p. 33). When referring to the period before his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord, Eisenhower (1948, p. 228) refers to President Roosevelt toying ‘…with the word “supreme” in his conversation…(to) imply the importance that Allies attached to the new venture’. If this was meant to indicate that President Roosevelt coined the title then this would be incorrect. The previous year, as a result of a meeting by the Pacific War Council on 1 April 1942, General MacArthur was ‘…designated as Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area, and of all Armed Forces which the Governments concerned have assigned or may assign to this Area’ (McCarthy 1959, p. 21).

Whereas Commanders-in-Chief per se are expected to be removed from the day-to-day affairs of fighting a battle, Supreme Commanders are further restricted through their relationships with national forces. General MacArthur’s directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, specifically stated that as a Supreme Commander ‘…you are not eligible to command directly any national force’ (Buckley 1988, p. 24). This was not the case in fact, as the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) was seen to be an American command that was forced to cooperate with the Australians due to the large number of Australian troops involved in the theatre (Horner 1978, p. 115). In a conversation between the US General Eichelberger\(^7\) and General Marshall, the latter officer

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\(^5\) American, British, Dutch, Australian (ABDA) command was established in Java in 1942 but was soon overwhelmed by the Japanese occupation of what is now Indonesia.

\(^6\) This may not be strictly correct as General Foch was proposed as the ‘Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief’ on the Western Front in 1918 (Rice, 1997, p.3)

\(^7\) General Eichelberger (1886 – 1961) was appointed to command 1st US Corps in Australia in 1942 and eventually commanded the US Amphibious 8th Army. He was known as the only senior US commander in SWPA able to maintain good relations with the Australians.
confirmed that General MacArthur was a national commander in command of US forces (Horner 1978, p. 116).

Early references to the title are to Supreme Commander but the addition of the word ‘Allied’ seems to have been made in the course of WWII. As a result there are references to Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific etc. where previously it had been to Supreme Commander only. The term still exists with the NATO appointments of Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. In the Soviet era, there was a ‘Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces’ for the Warsaw Pact nations (CWIHP). The national equivalent to this international appointment could well be that of ‘unified commander’.

4.4 Unified Command

The idea of unified command is not new. When helping establish the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942, Admiral Leahy referred to the concept as a ‘unified high command’ (DTIC). Morton (1961) provides an early reference to it as ‘…exercising command over the forces of more than one service’. ADFP 1 (1993, p. 7-6) explains it as being ‘…a single recognised command authority at all times during an operation’. While the command authority may change, such as during different phases of an operation, unity of command ensures that there is ‘…one designated commander clearly responsible for each task’ (ADFP-1 1993, p. 7-6).

While ADFP 1 (1993) is discussing unified command as a principle or as a generic form of command arrangement. In the US however the concept is being related to a specific entity with a single commander and composed of force element groups from two or more services. The US has nine unified commands that are termed ‘Unified Combatant Commands’ each commanded by a Commander-in-Chief who has operational control of the command. Collectively they are referred to as the ‘Unified Commanders-in-Chief’ (Defenselink 2001). For example, JP 1-02 (2001) defines a combatant commander as ‘A Commander-in-Chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President’. A US Unified Combatant Commander is directly answerable to the President through the Secretary of Defense.

While it may be possible to establish unified command over a national force, it is more difficult to achieve a similar level of unified command over a multinational force. Nations are loath to relinquish sovereignty over their armed forces with the result that multinational forces virtually never achieve full unity of command and must settle for something less.

4.5 Theatre

The commander of a theatre is often designated as a Commander-in-Chief. ADFP 101 defines a theatre as:
A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operations. ADFP 101 also defines a campaign as ‘A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander’s objective, normally within a given time or space’.

### 4.6 Joint and Combined operations

Confusion with the meaning for ‘combined’ is not a recent phenomenon although for the period of WWII, at least, an understanding of its intent was reached between the Allies. It was at the Arcadia conference that agreement was reached on the meaning of Joint and Combined when applied to military activities (DTIC, p. 2). Prior to that the British used the term ‘Combined’ for what is now called ‘Joint’. For example, Admiral Keyes, when appointed in late 1940 to establish a force able to mount major British operations into occupied Europe, was given the title of ‘Director of Combined Operations’ (Ziegler 1986, p. 153). There is evidence that the US also used the term ‘Combined’ for what is now called ‘Joint’. Allard (1990, p. 96) when referring to Congressional consideration given to the 1926 Bill that formed the US Army Air Corps quotes a War Office document that refers to ‘…unity of command in combined operations…’ and ‘The combined air programs of the two services…’.

ADFP-101 states that Joint ‘Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate’ and that Combined activities are those ‘Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies’. JP 1-02 (2001) provides a similar definition for combined operations as being ‘…conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission’. It would appear however that both definitions are derived from the NATO definitions in which ‘allied’ refers to NATO members. While ADFP-101 in its Foreword (p. vii) notes its use of the NATO glossary (AAP-6), there is some difference between the current versions of ADFP-101 and the 2002 edition of AAP-6 which now includes expressions such as ‘combined joint operations’. While it is suspected that the NATO definitions take for granted that references to words such as ‘nation’ are confined to NATO members, this is not specifically stated. The result of this is some uncertainty in how far these definitions can be applied to non-NATO operations. This impression that the document is meant to apply only to NATO operations and members is underlined by the curious omission of any reference at all in AAP-6 to the

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8 This is an example of the confusion associated with the use of ‘combined’ for ADFP 101 itself restricts the use of ‘combined’ to mean operations with allies, while making a clear distinction between allied forces and those of a coalition. The implication is that a coalition commander cannot, by definition, be a theatre commander and it is probable that this was not intended. This will be addressed later in this document.

9 The first of the ‘Washington’ conferences was held in Quebec City from 22 Dec 1941 to 14 Jan 1942 between Churchill and Roosevelt and was code named ‘Arcadia’.
term ‘coalition’\textsuperscript{10}. It is further underlined by inclusion of terms such as ‘national commanders’ with the implication that AAP-6 may be further restricted to forces assigned to NATO.

It is of interest to note that during the Falklands campaign of 1982, the British referred to Admiral Woodward as ‘Commander Combined Task Force’ (Clapp and Southby-Taillyour 1996, p. 74). This campaign was solely a British campaign and, as it involved elements of all forces, a more appropriate description should have been ‘Commander Joint Task Force’. However, statements such as ‘The Falklands Campaign was clearly to be a combined operation with all three services contributing...’ (Clapp et al. 1996, p. 26) indicates that even military professionals continue to use the terms loosely.

4.7 Multinational Operations

‘Multinational operations’ is a generic term used to describe operations carried out by more than one sovereign state. They can be classified in a variety of ways, such as ‘combined’ or ‘coalition’ operations or as operations supervised by an international organisation such as the United Nations.

4.8 Coalition operations

ADFP 101 defines a coalition operation as being ‘...conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission’. JP 1-02 (2001) provides the additional notion of the \textit{ad hoc} nature of coalition operations with its definition that a coalition is ‘An \textit{ad hoc} arrangement between two or more nations for common action’.

The inclusion of the statement ‘...which may not be allies’ in ADFP 101 confirms the idea that there is some formality involved in establishing who are our allies and it is not just those who may be participating alongside you on active operations. An ally is more than just a partner in a war. A partner in a war may not be an ally but is simply a coalition partner in an \textit{ad hoc} arrangement to serve a purpose – most likely a short-term purpose such as the 1991 Gulf War or INTERFET. While some of Australia’s undoubted allies participated in Op Stabilise, many others were not traditional allies and could only be considered as coalition partners. Millett and Murray (1990, p.104) add a further dimension when discussing the relationship between the UK and the Soviet Union in WWII by noting that ‘Ally may in fact be an incorrect usage of the word; co-belligerent is perhaps more appropriate’.

The US definition adds an additional factor when it refers to \textit{ad hoc} operations. This gives the impression that, to be a combined operation, the allies must be acting in accordance with some form of agreement that is at the basis of their alliance. For instance, if just Australia and the US operated together under the aegis of ANZUS then

\textsuperscript{10} The ADF continues to make a clear distinction between ‘combined’ and ‘coalition’ operations (JOCC, 2001, p. 13)
it is a combined operation. If, on the other hand just Australia and the US operated together on an ad hoc operation, such as a UN operation, then it would not be a combined but a coalition operation. On this basis, INTERFET was a coalition operation not only because it included non-allies but also because of its ad hoc nature. It still leaves the question of just who are to be considered allies for the purpose of a combined operation.

4.9 Alliances

A coalition is defined as ‘a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons, or states for joint action’ and an alliance as ‘an association to further the common interests of the members; specifically: a confederation of nations by treaty’ (Webster). Macquarie (1985) defines an ally in terms of having treaties or leagues while also stressing the temporary nature of a coalition. The definitions suggest that an alliance is a more long lasting and proscribed version of a coalition. Riscassi (1993, p. 59) alludes to this when he discusses the Western European and Korean coalitions that have had ‘…the will, time, and resources to prepare for alliance warfare’. JP 3-16 (2000, I-1) states that an ‘…alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e. treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members’. It also states that ‘Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and standardised procedures’ (JP 3-16 2000, II-8). The formalities and agreements associated with, say, NATO and ANZUS would indicate that they could be viewed as alliances while the more ephemeral and ad hoc nature of the grouping to conduct the 1991 Gulf War would make it, as far as dictionary definitions are concerned, a coalition. In the military sense, the distinction hinges on which nations are to be considered our allies.

While neither ADFP 101 nor JP 1-02 (2001) contain a definition of ‘allies’, JP 1-02 (2001) does provide a definition of ‘alliance’ that gives a guide as to what should constitute a military ally when it states that an alliance is ‘…the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members’. ADFP 9 (1999 5.4) continues this theme when it explains that there are ‘…fundamental differences between coalition and combined operations. The foremost difference lies in the level of interoperability and sharing of intelligence that may exist between alliance nations’. It then explains that interoperability is achieved through common doctrine, equipment and training and even a common language. The effort needed to achieve any significant level of interoperability implies the ‘long term’ referred to in JP 1-02 (2001). Rice (1997) notes that during WWII achieving unity of command between the Allies depended more on mutual confidence than on structures. He then notes that the association over time in organisations such as NATO (and presumably ANZUS and ABCA) have provided ideal conditions for member nations to ‘…develop the mutual understanding and confidence…the secret of true unity of command exercised through a fully integrated (and joint) staff’.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Australia considers only its ABCA\textsuperscript{11} partners as falling into this category of being allies for the purpose of combined operations. However, this does not seem to agree with ADFP 9 which gives the impression that New Zealand and the nations of the Five Powers agreement are also allies. The US seems to agree that the ABCA partners are allies when FM 3-09 refers to ‘…the US and its NATO and ABCA allies…’. If, as is expected, there is no authoritative definition of ‘allies’ for the purpose of Australian usage of ‘combined’ then it is an area that would be useful to address.

4.10 Components of a command

A component is defined as being ‘One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components’ (JP 1-02 2001). These components can be based on service or functional organisations. A ‘services component command’ consists of the ‘…Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned …or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force’ (JP 1-02 2001). On the other hand the current US Transportation Command is a component command based on functional lines. Its three components comprise an Air Mobility Command, a Sealift Command, and a land based Military Traffic Management Command. Another example may occur with multinational operations when ‘national components’ may be formed from the forces contributed by participating nations. An early example of a functional component command occurred in Malta in WWII during the siege of that island by the Germans and Italians. ‘Throughout its stay in Malta, commencing from June 1940 when Swordfish of 830 Squadron (FAA\textsuperscript{12}) first flew in to Malta, the squadrons of the FAA operated from Hal Far as land-based aircraft under the operational control of the RAF’ (Spooner 1996, p. 9). Lloyd (1949, p. 24), who was Air Officer Commanding Malta, also notes that the FAA Swordfish squadron ‘…was operating under my command’.

Commanders may opt to command their forces either directly or via component commanders or even a combination of both styles. The use of component commanders inserts a level of command (generally in the form of a headquarters) between the commander and the assigned forces and so lessens the commander’s ‘…direct involvement in the detailed direction of operations’ (ADFP 1). The reason for this lessening of the commander’s direct involvement is due to the component commander taking responsibility for ‘…the planning and conduct of a(n) …operation as part of a joint force’ (AAP-6 2002, p. 2-C-10). This is opposed to the use of the ‘direct command’ style which ADFP 1 describes as a commander directly exercising command authority over assigned units and obtaining specialised advice from either staff officers or unit commanders. The use of component commanders is seen as a means of reducing the

\textsuperscript{11} America, Britain, Canada, Australia Standardization Agreement. This programme was started in 1947 with Australia joining in 1963. It comprises the majority of the WWII Allies.

\textsuperscript{12} FAA - Fleet Air Arm
span of command when ‘...the scale and intensity of the operation increase(s) significantly...’ (ADFP 1) and direct command becomes too cumbersome.

Ankersen (1998) is critical of the use of component commanders for joint operations as it introduces ‘intermediary commanders’ to the chain of command that act as ‘...a brake on the joint train...’. He considers that component commanders, particularly service component commanders, ‘...do not foster trust’ and that ‘A truly joint force would likely have one commander, a joint one’. He is of the opinion that while ‘...single service components are introduced under the guise of reducing span of control’, directive control can better achieve the same end. In his opinion, direct command will achieve better economy of force, more unity of command, with greater simplicity. ‘Component command headquarters act like the tentacles of the services rather than purple-minded staffs of joint warfighters working cooperatively under the joint commander’ (Fautua 2000, p. 83).

General Eisenhower employed both styles at the same time when he employed the Commanders-in-Chief for his air and maritime forces as component commanders while directly commanding his Army Group Commanders. General MacArthur, on the other hand deliberately by-passed his subordinate component commanders13 by creating task forces which allowed him to command his deployed forces directly (Horner 1982, p. 206, & Horner 2000 p.4). He reached down ‘...not only to divisional commanders, but to regiments and, at times, to battalions’ (Manchester 1978, p. 400). Horner (1978, pp. 114 – 5 & 268 - 9) suggests that this arrangement was condoned by the US government as a means of ensuring that US commanders commanded US forces.

Both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz employed task forces extensively in the Pacific during WWII. JP 1-02 (2001) defines a task force as being:

1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
2. A semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task.
3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks.

It is noteworthy that this form of command was not used to any extent in the other theatres during WWII. A possible reason is that the Pacific campaign was one of ‘island hopping’ or moving from potential airbase to potential airbase leaving pockets of enemy to ‘wither on the vine’. Each action was separate in itself. The geography of the theatre generally made it difficult for the Japanese, after Midway, to bring forces to bear at will on a threatened area. By their isolation on islands throughout the Pacific, the Japanese had become particularly vulnerable to defeat in detail. The other theatres, such as Europe, North Africa, and even Burma were more continental in nature with almost continuous contact with the enemy. Australian deployments overseas since WWII tend to fall into the category of task forces and, indeed, the Army’s operational

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13 General MacArthur’s Land component commander was an Australian, General Blamey, who, while commanding the Australian forces, was never allowed to act as a land component commander.
element of its commitment to Vietnam was in the form of 1st Australian Task Force. In the late 1950s – early 1960s, the Pentropic Division was divided not into the traditional brigades but into Task Forces.

5. Administrative Authority

5.1 What is administrative authority

ADFP 101 defines administration as ‘The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management’ as well as ‘Internal management of units’. Administrative authority refers to the degree of responsibility that a commander has to carry out administration of military forces. It covers a wide range of matters such as doctrine and training, logistical support and services, force readiness and capability, personnel, and management. The latter covers issues such as pay and allowances, rationing and quartering, discipline, and finances. The extent of this responsibility would be expected to be established at the same time as the decision is made to assign forces to the commander.

5.2 Administration

5.2.1 Value of good administrative command arrangements

The emphasis placed on the operational aspects of command arrangements may sometimes obscure the vital role that these administrative arrangements play in successful operations. General Blamey, the Australian Army Commander-in-Chief in WWII noted that ‘It is impossible to separate operational and administrative command since the whole object of administrative organisation is to ensure the maximum operational capacity against the enemy’ (Odgers 1957,p.16). The confusion and ill feeling generated by a lack of resolution in clarifying the administrative as well as operational command arrangements for the RAAF in the SWPA during WWII provide an object lesson.

5.2.2 Administration and the RAAF in the Pacific

In April 1942, the operational and administrative functions of the RAAF were split. The Chief of Air Staff (CAS) was retained and had administrative control of the RAAF. Operational squadrons were grouped as RAAF Command and operational control of

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14 The US introduced the Pentomic Division organisation in the late 50s. This was a large division based on five elements instead of the traditional three i.e. five brigades of five battalions instead of three brigades of three battalions. The Australian army introduced its equivalent called the Pentropic division in the early 60s. A Colonel commanded a battalion, the first time that an officer of this rank actually was given a field command. The Pentropic division was dropped in the mid-60s.
them was delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander in the SWPA. By December 1942 it had become evident that this system was not working and it was agreed that an Air Officer Commanding–in-Chief for the RAAF was needed in order to achieve unity of command in operational and administrative matters.

A Commander-in-Chief for the RAAF was never appointed and clashes within the RAAF continued between those responsible for operational and administrative functions up until the end of the war. At one stage the CAS directed that all communications relating to ‘...supply, maintenance, personnel, works and organisation’ not be directed by RAAF Command units to RAAF Command but to RAAF Headquarters (Gillison 1962, p. 595). This lead to ‘...a disastrous dispute’ between the two most senior RAAF officers (Horner 2002, p. 13) and to the situation where:

Disputes arose over the appointment of officers, over the provision of staff for RAAF Command Headquarters, over airfield construction, training, (especially advanced operational training), fighter sector organisations, supply and other matters (Odgers 1957, pp. 18-19).

Not even a face-to-face meeting between the CAS and the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) RAAF Command in the Prime Minister’s presence could resolve the issue. While the structure of the organisation was agreed to be faulty it was also recognised that there was a personality clash between the two commanders who were both of the same rank. Gillison (1962, p. 596) notes that:

In this issue of divided command...the disagreement between Jones and Bostock had now reached a state of complete obduracy. It was this element more than any other that intensified the ill-effects of what was at best an ill-fitting system of command.

Gillison (1962, p. 597) further notes that when each of the elements of the RAAF were divided and were ‘...headed by an officer equal with the other in rank, in determination and, as it proved, in inflexibility, the complexities of command became to each of them most exasperating’. While the effect of this dispute on the RAAF’s war effort in SWPA appears arguable ‘...the acute personal tension between Jones (the CAS) and Bostock (AOC RAAF Command) was certainly a serious check on Service efficiency and the cause of a distressing division of loyalties within the RAAF’ (Gillison 1962, p. 598). Horner (1982, p. 211), while acknowledging the personal enmity between the two, also adds that:

...the main problem was that the government’s principal adviser on air matters, the CAS, had absolutely no responsibility for operations, while the chief operational officer had no access to the Prime Minister.

Command arrangements need to be cognisant of the customs and practices of military service. Placing officers of similar rank in situations as faced by Jones and Bostock can only be expected to lead to difficulty. Field Marshall von Rundstedt faced a similar situation with Field Marshall Rommel in Europe.
6. Why do we need Joint?

6.1 Several reasons

The literature indicates that there are two reasons for establishing joint forces. Firstly there are the military benefits to be gained from using a joint approach to operations. Secondly, there are perceived to be economic benefits to be gained from such an approach.

6.2 Military reasons

Military forces have traditionally been organised along functional lines with navies, armies, and more recently, air forces each devoted to the maritime, land, and air environments respectively. There are examples from history where campaigns were fought using just one of these functional elements alone such as Napoleon’s campaigns in Europe, many of the battles in the American Civil War, at Jutland in WWI, the Battle of Britain in 1940, and more recently the air war over Serbia. Similarly, there are examples from the past when much was achieved when elements of military forces from different functions were combined. For much of history, this entailed the use of joint forces such as occurred at the fall of Quebec in 1759, the American Civil War campaigns of McClellan in the Peninsula\textsuperscript{15} and Grant at the siege of Vicksburg in 1862-63, and the raid on Zeebrugge in 1918. Not all such operations were successful as evidenced by the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, the largest amphibious operation ever mounted prior to WWII. Before the advent of the aeroplane, all such operations were amphibious and involved just the navy and army. Now such operations involve airpower as well, such as the airborne landings in the Pacific and Europe in WWII and in the Gulf War in 1991.

General Eisenhower (1948, p. 230) noted that, although there are these three elements in which to wage war, ‘…there is no separate land, air, or naval war’. There is a need to combine all three elements against a common objective and unless this is done ‘…their maximum potential power cannot be realized’. This realisation that the key to successful operations was unity, co-ordination, and co-operation came about early in WWII as a result of the experience gained in the Mediterranean. However, Beaumont (1993, p. 194) in providing a comprehensive historical perspective of joint warfare from ancient to modern times makes the sobering observation that ‘…attainment of functional jointness (\textit{sic}) is likely to remain elusive and situational’. This is supported by a literature review of joint culture by Fautua (2000) suggesting that individual service cultures are still entrenched and that joint (‘purple’) culture is still an illusion.

\textsuperscript{15} Reed, R., (1993) posits the thesis that McClellan fully understood the implications and advantages of joint operations (she referred to them as combined operations) and that his plan to isolate the Confederacy, by using waterways as a means to disrupt communications, could have won the war. This is disputed but her work does put a believable case.
This certainly appeared to be the case in the period following WWII when the hard
won experience seemed to have been forgotten. However, there has been a steadily
increasing awareness over the past few decades of the value of joint operations in the
effective employment of increasingly expensive and sophisticated military assets. This
has been reflected in the establishment of Joint Warfare capabilities in military forces
around the world such as the US system of Unified Combatant Commands, the UK
Permanent Joint Headquarters, the South African Joint Operations Division, and, more
recently, the appointment within Australia of a Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) \(^\text{16}\). It
is realised in doctrinal documents such as ADFWC (1998) that refers to the
‘...imperative of truly coordinated joint operations across all three environments, not
as some theoretically desirable result but as a key operational necessity’.

The traditional grouping of military forces into functional elements has tended to
mitigate against ‘...coordinated joint operations across all three environments...’. A
method to overcome this is to provide unity in command, which is considered so
important by the US that they have included it as one of their principles of war. FM
100-5 (1994) states that:

\textit{At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power
toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command
means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander
with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.}

AFSC (1997, 102) equates the US principle of ‘Unity of Command’ with the Australian
principle of war of ‘Cooperation’ which ‘...embodies the coordination of all activities
so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole’ (ADFP 1,1993, p. 1-5).
The Australian view, expressed in ADFP 1 (1993), is that unity of command is a means
to achieving the principle of cooperation and facilitates the other Australian principle
of ‘Selection and maintenance of the aim’ as well as of coordination.

\subsection*{6.3 Economic reasons}

Economic considerations are very relevant to all defence decisions. Admiral Crowe, a
former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the need for joint thinking ‘...in
order to get the most of our finite resources’ (Barlow 1994, p. 77). The Australian
government states that decisions on defence ‘...balance two of the most powerful
imperatives on government - security and fiscal responsibility...’(Defence 2000,p. 6).
One manifestation of this ‘fiscal responsibility’ has been the financial pressure to effect
savings through adoption of a joint approach to military organisation. This is a form of
economic rationalism. Behm \textit{et al.} (2001 p. 16) observe how recent reviews of the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) ‘...were driven by the requirement to cut costs’. They
then indicate that this resulted in efforts ‘...to maximise joint approaches so as to
minimise duplication of costs and effort in the three single Services’ (Behm \textit{et al.} 2001,
p. 16). This led to solutions such as seeking cost savings through co-location,

\footnote{DEFGRAM 136/2004}
integration, and rationalisation with the ‘…ongoing budgetary pressure to co-locate the currently separate joint force headquarters…’ (Behm et al. 2001, p. 16).

While the economic reasons support the military reasons in bringing about a joint approach in the military, it is not clear if the solutions that satisfy economic criteria necessarily satisfy the military need. One may well ask if the economic pressure to co-locate facilities is in the best interests of the military requirement.

7. Unity of Effort

7.1 Purpose

Unity of effort uses the synergy obtainable from every element of the force when acting in unison to maximise the capabilities of a military force. It is an idea as old as war and is seen in the use by the Romans of the fascine as a symbol of strength through unity. Sun Tzu advised that when an enemy is united, it is necessary to divide him as a prelude to defeating him (Griffith 1971, p. 69). General Eisenhower (1948, p. 230), as previously noted, said that ‘...there is no separate land, air, or naval war’. He stated that unless all three are united against a common objective ‘...their maximum potential power cannot be realized’. Unity of effort ‘...ensures all means are directed to a common purpose’ (JP 3-07 1995, II-3). Winnefeld and Johnson (1993, p.4) describe unity of effort in terms of solidarity of purpose, effort, and command. They refer to it as the means to direct all ‘...energies, assets, and activities, physical and mental, towards desired ends’. Historically, unity of effort has been achieved through either mutual cooperation or by unity of command.

7.2 Mutual Cooperation

Military forces are comprised of elements and this has traditionally been along the service lines of naval, ground, and air forces. Cooperation amongst service commanders engaged in joint operations can work as seen with Wolf and Saunders at Quebec in 1759 and Grant and Porter at Vicksburg in 1862 - 63. ‘The victory of Wolfe was a successful “forlorn hope” only rendered possible by the steadiness of the British infantry and by the co-operation of the fleet, which distracted and misled the enemy’ (Leadam 1912, p. 467). General Grant, when speaking of Admiral Porter at Vicksburg, noted that ‘I had no more authority to command Porter than he had to command me (Allard 1990, p. 62). But this was no bar for the two commanders cooperating with each other to capture Vicksburg.

Grant was the first important commander in the Civil War to recognize the potential for army – navy cooperation...simply because someone does not report to you in the chain of command doesn’t mean you can’t do business together for mutual benefit. (Barnes 2001, p. 85).
However, such high levels of cooperation in joint operations were probably the exception rather than the rule due to inter-service rivalry and mistrust. For instance, Millett and Murray (1989, p. 49) recalls how the British Army and Navy in WWI ‘…fought their own wars (as they had planned to do long before 1914) and there was little interservice cooperation with regard to military campaigning’. They cite the Dardenelles campaign as an example and that, with the exception of the Zeebrugge raid, ‘…combined operations in both theory and practice were not a part of the British experience in the First World War’.

In the North Pacific area during the early stages of World War II, the different US service commanders ‘…showed no disposition to subordinate their individual convictions for the common good’ (Morton 1961). This lack of cooperation was not restricted to the Allies as the Axis powers during WWII also demonstrated a seemingly suicidal disregard for the common good, in spite of the fact that the first truly joint operation of the war was the German invasion of Norway. ‘Inter-service rivalry was worse in Japan than it was in America, and with a general as Prime Minister (of Japan), the Army was in the ascendancy’17 (Gallaway 2000, p. 84). Millett et al. (1990, p. 25) detail the rivalry for resources and the subsequent lack of cooperation between the Japanese Navy and Army both before and throughout WWII. Efforts were made to establish a joint High Command18 but these did not succeed and political leaders were unable to enforce unity of command and the Emperor did not intervene.19 A Japanese researcher on joint Japanese operations during this period brought the complaint about the dearth of instances to study, ‘There’s nothing much to study…It’s like a desert country, where they do not have a word for ‘umbrella’, since it never rains’ (Millett et al. 1990, p. 25). The result of this, for the Axis powers, is summed up by Boomer (1998, p. 2):

*The failure of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to develop the mechanisms to control theatre war and provide effective cooperation among the branches of their armed forces is considered an Achilles’ heel…which contributed to their final defeat*. 

The Italian armed forces in WWII also fared badly when attempting joint warfare. They commenced the war with the Army placing ‘…its trust in numbers, the Navy preparing for a Mediterranean Jutland…’ and an Air Force labouring under the effects ‘…of Douhet’s independent air warfare fantasy’20 (Millett et al. 1990, p. 150). While there was a supreme command, the Army and Navy planned and conducted their

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17 The Japanese wartime Prime Ministers were Generals Tojo (1941 – 44) and Koiso (1944 – 45), and the civilian Kantoro Suzuki (April – August 1945). Suzuki was a retired Navy officer appointed by the Emperor to effect the surrender.

18 Millet et al (1990, p 25) note that a ‘shadowy’ Imperial General Headquarters was established in 1937. While not explaining its function during the war, it seems that it had little function due to the lack of cooperation from the two armed services.

19 It has been suggested that the Emperor favoured the Navy which could only have exacerbated the situation.

20 While there is evidence that British and US air commanders had not read Douhet, they still favoured similar ideas to those espoused by him. The Combined Bomber Offensive of 1942-45 is one manifestation of this.
operations separately but excluded the Air Force from their planning, only calling upon it when needed. This is not unlike the Japanese situation where the Navy and Army ‘...visualised different enemies and fought different wars’ (Millett et al. 1990, p. 25). Reluctance by the Italian Navy to engage in joint planning with the Army is given as the reason the Italians did not launch an amphibious assault on Malta in 1940. Such an operation, if successful, could have had a dramatic effect on the outcome of operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa. While the experiences gained as the war progressed led to some improvements in joint operations and unity of effort ‘...the absence of a joint operations centre and planning staff still led to confusion, duplication of effort, and Navy complaints of insufficient air cover’ (Millett et al. 1990, p. 151).

Finch (1998), who in describing the performance of Russia’s military forces during the 1990’s Chechnya campaign, provides a more contemporary example when he states that:

…the single, overriding cause behind the Russian defeat in Chechnya was the dissension among the various levels and branches of command. This lack of unity plagued the Russian effort from day one. Discord existed at every level; from the halls of the Kremlin down to the trenches surrounding Grozny.

He further states that ‘There appears to be no concept of professional solidarity within its ranks’ as a result of the deep divisions within the Russian armed forces, the bureaucracies supporting them, and the dissension between the services and senior commanders.

Despite such experiences, cooperation has been the traditional means of achieving a level of unity of effort in multinational operations. Generally this cooperation has been closer the more imminent the common danger. When speaking of the coalition established to oppose Napoleon, Craig (1965) records that ‘The divisive factors were always held in restraint by the common danger, and the allied war plan was enabled to achieve its objective’. Riscassi (1993, p. 63) observed that ‘It is important to remember the old dictum that in coalitions the will is strongest when the perception of threat is greatest’. It was the perilous position of the Allied armies on the Western Front in 1918 that eventually brought the Allies to attempt to replace reliance on cooperation with that of a unified command. Long (1973) when describing Australia’s reaction to the Japanese advance south through the Pacific in 1941-2 noted ‘The Japanese advance southwards produced a threat so evident that the country was prepared to accept almost any government action intended to combat it.’ The result of this was the speedy granting of operational control of much of Australia’s combat forces to General MacArthur on his arrival in Melbourne in 1942. At the time, Prime Minister John Curtin was not satisfied with certain aspects of General MacArthur’s directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, especially as the Australian Government was not represented on the committees controlling strategic policy or operational strategy. However, both Curtin and MacArthur developed a singleness of purpose in pursuing their common aims so that ‘...the problems which had loomed large on paper rarely occurred in practice to disturb the close relationship which grew up between the two men’ (McCarthy 1959, p. 23).
7.3 Recognising the need for unity of command

While mutual cooperation can result in great successes such as Quebec in 1759 and Vicksburg in 1863, reliance on it can also lead to some notable failures such as at Gallipoli in 1915. The difficulty with mutual cooperation is that ‘...success often was due not so much to goodwill and common sense as to chance’ (Allard 1990, p. 62). The chance element is having commanders who have both the goodwill and the common sense to cooperate with each other. Hough and Richards (1989, p. 27) recognised this when discussing the command arrangements between the RAF Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief in the UK at the outbreak of WWII. They stated that ‘Co-operation with other commands would be achieved by mutual agreement or Air Staff directive. In practice, it would depend heavily on goodwill’. The human element involved necessitates that there will always be a need for cooperation but unity of command puts a formal structure in place making unity of effort more likely. Recognition of the need for the imposition of such structures is not new. Leadam (1912, p. 470) when discussing the British campaigns that led to the capture of Louisberg and Quebec in the mid 18th century, noted that William Pitt, the British Prime Minister had personally, ‘...organised the co-operation of the service…and given their orders to generals, admirals, and ambassadors alike’. However, such actions by strong national authorities were the exception rather than the rule but the events of 1918 on the Western Front brought about the realisation that more needed to be done in establishing unity of command not only at a national but even at an international level.

The US Army Chief of Staff General Marshall, drawing on his WWI experience, expressed his views clearly on the benefits of unified command over mutual cooperation in a speech at the 1941-42 ‘Arcadia’ conference in Quebec when he said: I express these as my personal views and not those as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans Division. As a result of what I saw in France and from following our own experience, I feel very strongly that the most important consideration is the question of unity of command. The matters being settled here are mere details which will continuously recur unless settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and between services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank and direct basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theatre - air, ground, and ships. We can not manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.

There are difficulties in arriving at a single command but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not achieve this. We never think alike - there are the opinions of those on this side of the table and of the people on the other side; but as for myself, I am willing to go the limit to accomplish this. We must decide on a line of action here and not expect it to be done out there. I favour one man being in control - but operating under a controlled directive from here. We had to come to this in the First World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we
could decide on a unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished during the World War (FDR 1941).

7.4 Evolution of the unity of command process

7.4.1 World War I

Rice (1997) provides a compact history of the development of coalition command and control from the Napoleonic era to the Gulf War in 1991, much of which is relevant to joint operations as well. He describes how the British and French commanders on the Western Front in WWI each virtually went their own ways until the need for cooperation and coordination became overwhelming in 1918, as already noted by General Marshall. It was only at the very end of the war that attempts were made to appoint a Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Western Front. Millett et al. (1989, p. 11) observed that:

*Initial relations between the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its French counterpart were marked in 1914 and 1915 by considerable formality and coldness, if not a general failure of understanding...there was no combined staff, no centralized planning, and little sharing of operational concepts.*

Up to the end of 1917, the British and French armies in France cooperated with each other under a system of ‘parallel command’. Rice (1997) explains the situation as:

*The command arrangements for much of the war were extremely loose, at best relying on cooperation and coordination among the Allies, with nations pursuing their own national goals much of the time. Today such arrangements are described as parallel command, which "exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists" It was only in 1918, when the Allies on the Western Front were staring defeat in the face, that a more thoroughly integrated command system was adopted.*

The attitude prevalent during much of this war can be seen in a directive from Field Marshall Lord Kitchener to General Sir John French, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, in December 1915 prior to the Battle of the Somme. ‘I should like you to know that your command is completely independent, and that in no case will you be placed under the orders of an Allied General’ (Joffre et al. 1927, p. 152). The British generals opposed the Commander-in-Chief in France being placed under a French Supreme Commander as they saw this as hobbling the activities of the British commander (Millett et al. 1989, p. 46). In November 1917 the British, French, and Italian national leaders met at Rapallo and established ‘...a supreme authority above all the commanders-in-chief of the Western Allies’ (Bean 1968, p. 395). The political leaders would form a Supreme War Council with a staff to ‘...initiate the Allies’ main strategy and determine to which part of the front the final reserves of troops should be sent’ (Bean 1968, p. 395). For a brief period, the British forces were placed under

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21 General Foch of France.
French command but this soon reverted to the system of ‘voluntary agreement’ between the British and French commanders (Bean 1968, p. 398).

It was only when the Allies were facing imminent defeat in 1918 that General Haig, the BEF commander, petitioned the British government to establish a unified command under General Foch of France. Even still, Foch’s position was one of persuasion and coordination rather than of command. Mutual cooperation was still a necessity as the command arrangements were such that he was not delegated the authority to command General Haig and his only real source of power was his command over the Allies’ theatre reserves. However, the lessons of this period were remembered three decades later when officers such as General Brooke of Britain and General Marshall of the US were raising and organising the Western Allies’ forces in opposition to the Axis powers.

7.4.2 World War II - Western Allies.

During WWII the Western Allies were more successful in achieving a high degree of unity of command. From the outset, the British and French agreed on the appointment of a French officer as Supreme Commander during the Battle for France in 1939-40. However, it was the later efforts of the US and UK that achieved the highest levels of unified command yet to be seen in multinational operations in what Montgomery (1960, p. 361) described as ‘…an unparalleled experience in international co-operation and understanding’. Britannica (1959, p. 277) describes how the system of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Supreme Commanders established in 1941-42 achieved the controlling organisations ‘…needed to encompass both inter-service and inter-Allied coordination’ and solved the problem of ‘…coordination and direction’. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were located in Washington and comprised the US and UK Chiefs of Staff with the intention of acting as ‘…the supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort’ (DTIC). They achieved unity of command of Allied forces through the appointment of Allied Supreme Commanders to command in the Mediterranean Theatre, the European Theatre, in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), in South East Asia Command (SEAC), and even in the battle against the U-boats in the Atlantic.

The Allies did not achieve the level of unity that they did achieve without encountering initial difficulties. Some of these difficulties involved the different approach to unity of command taken by the British and the US. Ambrose (1969, p. 25) describes how the British used single service Commanders-in-Chief to direct the war subject to close supervision from London. He gives as an advantage the fact that it avoided a general giving an order to an admiral and vice versa but also notes that it suffered from the inherent disadvantage of any committee in a crisis situation. Rice (1997, p. 4) also notes how the British ‘…regarded service chiefs within a theatre as co-equals (a committee) and Churchill required close supervision of his commanders…’. An example of the

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22 This could be interpreted as the Commanders-in-Chief being component commanders answerable to London.
committee system working well occurred during the siege of Malta during WWII. Lloyd (1949) describes the close cooperation and good working relationships between the commanders, especially during the worst days of the siege. There is little to indicate that this was not the case in other theatres but it may also have been a cultural situation peculiar to the British. Millett et al. (1989, p. 52) note how the officer corps of the WWI era British Army was like an extended family and how personal contact and patrons were all-important. It is reasonable to suspect that some at least of this attitude was still prevalent in WWII and probably still is today. Downey (1977, p. 126) interestingly enough, calls this system of command 'Joint Command', as against what he describes as Unified and Supreme commands. He considers that one of the weaknesses of this system is that any disagreements that the individual commanders cannot resolve amongst themselves, and for which they otherwise have the competence to decide on, must go for adjudication '…upwards to those who probably do not have as comprehensive a view of the situation as their warring juniors'. His other objection is that the weakness is hidden in peace-time when commanders may be prepared to accept solutions that they would not be able to accept in a wartime situation.

Morton (1961) indicates that pre-war US doctrine was to have Army and Navy commanders independent of each other and that ‘…joint operations were conducted under the principle of cooperation...’. Jablonsky (1999, p. 25) states that the Joint Board of the US Navy and Army decreed in the interwar years that ‘…the fundamental method of interservice coordination was mutual cooperation’. Thus up to the beginning of WWII at least, US doctrine was little different from that of the British and no different from that practiced by Grant and Porter at Vicksburg in the Civil War. While General Marshall was a driving force for unified command, Morton (1961) indicates that the harsh lesson of Pearl Harbour may have been the deciding factor in the US attitude. The committee investigating the Pearl Harbour attack noted that ‘The inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed’ (Jablonsky 1999, p. 25) As a result ‘…President Roosevelt ordered his military and naval advisers to establish unified commands where they were needed’ (Morton 1961).

The US view on command was one of ‘…delegation of responsibility and authority to a commander, on the principle that he should be assigned a job, given the means to do it, and held responsible for its fulfilment without scrutiny of the measures employed’ (Rice 1997, p. 4). This view supports ‘unity of command’ as command being vested in one commander as opposed to the British view of a unified commander relying on the cooperation of semi-independent Commanders-in-Chief at the theatre level. In the American view, any subordinate component commanders were just that – subordinates and not co-equals. Thompson (1969, pp. 15-16), in discussing the command arrangements in Europe in 1944-45, noted that the US view was that the Supreme Commander ‘should in some way control the assaulting army...’. On the

23 This is very well depicted in the 1953 film ‘Malta Story’, even down to the air and naval commanders sharing their living quarters as described in Lloyd (1949, p.34).

24 An unintended pun perhaps?
other hand, the British considered that he would have his hands full with strategic and political matters and with coordinating the land, sea, and air forces. As Admiral Cunningham stated in 1943, in reference to command of combined operations ‘…the American conception of a Supreme Commander is very different to ours; in their view he is really a Commander’ (Ziegler 1986, p. 239). General Marshall explained this to Admiral Pound at the Arcadia conference when he said:

…it would be impossible to choose anyone for supreme command who would have full technical knowledge of all services. He felt, however, that the matter of appointing a supreme commander would be bound up in the assumption that a man of good judgment would be selected; otherwise the whole project would be a failure. He felt that a man with good judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation. (FDR(b) 1941).

Even when a unified command was established in Europe, General Eisenhower still had his occasional difficulties with establishing unity as evidenced by the struggle to gain command of the strategic air forces to support the Normandy invasion forces. His aim was to ‘…win control by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) of all aviation…of whatever nationality, so that all would be operating at SHAEF’s bidding, according to SHAEF’s plans, to accomplish SHAEF’s goals’ (Lyon 1974, p. 271) but before this could be achieved ‘the structure of air command had to be firmly established’. The British agreed that the Supreme Commander have ‘supervision’ of the strategic air forces which the Americans queried as they thought it should be ‘command’. The disagreement and confusion reached such a stage that Eisenhower threatened to resign ‘…unless a word be adopted that leaves no doubt in anybody’s mind of my authority and responsibility for controlling air operations…during the critical period of Overlord’ (Ferrel 1981, p.115). The word ‘direction’ was finally accepted by everyone concerned.

7.4.3 Soviet Union – Eastern European Theatre

Efforts to achieve unity of command were not limited to the Western Allies. While the Allies were faced with the difficulties of unifying a multinational force, the Soviets managed to unify a joint force more successfully than perhaps any other WWII combatant. The day following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1942, Stalin created the Stavka (High Command) for the command of the Soviet armed forces. Stavka was a subordinate organisation to the State Committee of Defence (GKO) which was responsible for the political, economic, and broader military aspects of the campaign (Seaton 1971, p. 83) but Stalin retained the chairmanship of both organisations. Boomer (1998 p. 2) describes the Stavka of WWII as a unified headquarters coordinating naval, land, and air components in a theatre of operations.

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25 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham became First Sea Lord in 1943 following Pound’s death.  
26 Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, British First Sea Lord from 1939 until his death in 1943  
27 Strictly speaking, the Red Army was an allied force as it included several Polish armies and they were used extensively on the Eastern Front during the invasion of Prussia. However, although large formations, they were only a minor part of the Red Army and did not act as a national force.
Seaton (1971, p. 85) also notes how *Stavka* was both a joint service and a centralised organisation. Liddell Hart (1973, pp. 271 – 272) discusses how the fronts were distributed and how ‘...it now became the Russian practice to send a senior general and staff from General Headquarters to coordinate the several “fronts” concerned in any particular series of operations’. A WWII Soviet ‘front’, the number of which varied but was in the order of 12, was equivalent to an army group although smaller than those fielded by the Western Allies in NW Europe (Glantz and House 1995). Wilson (1999) provides an organisational chart showing *Stavka* as the ‘HQ of the Supreme High Command’ headed by Stalin under which the various fronts and fleets were distributed over the Eastern Front at the time of the Battle of Kursk. Each group of fronts is shown with its own Commander-in-Chief and in addition there is a reserve force under Stalin.

Unlike Hitler, Stalin was prepared to delegate operational matters to his commanders and to concentrate on the political situation and matters of the highest war strategy. ‘...German officers blamed Hitler’s interference and rigid control for all manner of evils, but few of them recognized that their opponents (the Soviets) were developing the very command procedures that had once made the Wehrmacht supreme’ as ‘...Stalin himself had come to trust his subordinates to an unprecedented degree’ (Glantz et al. 1995, p. 156).

Under Stalin, the Soviet armed forces from 1943 until the end of WWII, achieved a degree of unity in command and unity of effort that surpassed even the Western Allies. Contributing to this was the complete integration of the air arm into the army. ‘The Red Army aviator ‘...was a soldier, whose main task, together with the artillery, was to provide fire support for the ground forces. He was under army command...he wore army uniform’ (Seaton 1971, p. 86). ‘Right from the start the Russian Air Force had not been intended to fulfil any strategic purpose: it concentrated entirely on supporting the Army’. (Galland 1955, p. 115) This was in spite of the fact that the Soviet Air Force had the only heavy bomber fleet, and only heavy bomber, actually in existence (Millett et al. 1990, p. 300). This compares with the Allied arrangement in Europe where the 2nd Tactical Air Force and IXth US Air Force were in support of the land forces but remained under the operational command of the Allied Air Forces Commander.

### 7.5 A failure to unify

The German forces during WWII, were not good at joint warfare.28 ‘The Soviet High Command was the antithesis of Hitler’s makeshift war direction and strategy’ (Seaton 1971, p. 85). Soviet leadership was good at the top and deteriorated at lower levels, at least in the initial stages of the war, while the Germans were brilliant at the lower levels and deteriorated at the higher levels. ‘Although the overall picture of the

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28 Like the Red Army, the *Wehrmacht* was an allied force. Indeed it has more claim to this than the Red Army as Romania, Hungary, and Italy contributed national forces to aid the *Wehrmacht* on the Eastern Front in particular. As well, large formations manned by French, Croatian, and Scandinavian nationals served both in the *Wehrmacht* and *Waffen SS*. Beevor (1999) discusses the employment of these forces in some detail.
*Wehrmacht* is one of a superb instrument on the tactical and operational levels right to the end, the strategic results for the German nation were catastrophic’ (Millett et al. 1990, p. 214). That the Germans failed to achieve unity of joint command at the operational level was brought about by the command arrangements that concentrated command at the political strategic level. Unlike the Allies, the command arrangements adopted did not allow a delegation of authority from the political strategic to the operational levels.

Adolf Hitler assumed Supreme Command of the German military (*wehrmacht*) in 1938. He was not only Head of State but also Chancellor (head of government), party leader, head of the judiciary, and supreme commander. ‘Since there were no bodies such as a war cabinet or joint chiefs of staff, it was in his hands only that the threads came together’ (Millett et al. 1990, p. 182). He initially commanded through the high command (OKW) under which were the high commands of the Navy (OKM), Army (OKH), and the Air Force (*Luftwaffe*) which was designated OKL in 1944 (US Government 1946, p.2). In 1941 Hitler took direct command of the Army (OKH). Herman Goering was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the *Luftwaffe* and Admirals Raeder and Doenitz were successively appointed as the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy throughout WWII. As the war progressed, Hitler made OKW responsible for Western Europe and OKH responsible for the Eastern Front in what Millett et al. (1990, p. 182) describes as ‘…a calamitous division in strategic command’. OKW thus lost any chance of being able to coordinate the overall German military effort along joint lines. Not only was it stripped of its authority for the large forces committed to the Eastern Front, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and *Luftwaffe* continued to report directly to Hitler as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Indeed Goering not only outranked Keitel, the Commander-in-Chief of OKW, but he was also a minister in the government. As a result of this command structure the Supreme Commander, Adolf Hitler, was the only entity capable of exercising unified command but who, by the time of the Normandy invasion ‘...had no adequate machinery through which to exercise it’ (Harrison 1951 p. 135). ‘Hitler’s instruction (during the Normandy invasion) included telling von Rundstedt what types of artillery to use against specific enemy target sets’ (Dahl 1996, p. 29). This led von Rundstedt to comment ‘I did not have my way. As Commander-in-Chief in the West my only authority was to change the guards in front of my gate’ (Bauer 1966, p. 462). Millett et al. 1990, pp. 206 and 210) note that ‘In 1944 Field Marshals Gerd von Rundstedt and Walter Model were virtually reduced to the status of highly paid non-commissioned officers’ and that the OKW diarist had recorded that:

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29 The operational headquarters of OKW and OKH were located in two adjoining underground complexes at Zossen, some 50-60 kilometres south of Berlin. They were known as Maybach1 and Maybach2. “Its chief wonder was the telephone exchange, which had linked the two supreme headquarters with *Wehrmacht* units...” all over Europe (Beevor, 2003, p. 266-7). Reference is frequently made in the literature to the Bendler block, on Bendlerstrasse, in central Berlin as Wehrmacht HQ. It is suspected that Bendlerstrasse would have had a function similar to Australian Defence Headquarters and the facilities at Zossen a function similar to Headquarters Joint Operational Command.
All planning and preparation [for the Ardennes offensive] remained closely under the hand of the Führer, for he was even making the daily decisions as to the supply of vehicles and horses to the individual divisions making up the attack force (p. 206), and After the failed Ardennes offensive Hitler further narrowed the room for independent tactical initiatives when he bound even commanding generals and divisional commanders to report in good time so that he could intervene in their decisions as he thought fit (p. 210).

Wilmot (1952, p. 465), expressing the same views as already quoted from Millett et al. (1990), referred to this as ‘...an outrageous system of command’ and observes how the delays caused meant that ‘...by the time the Führer’s instructions reached the front, the facts upon which they were based had changed beyond recognition’. Bauer (1966 p. 462) supports this by stating ‘...Hitler did not appreciate the complete incompatibility between despotic, arrogant, and meddling authority, and the need to make rapid decisions...’. Dahl (1996, p. 29) observes that this led to a near paralysis in operational decision-making and that, during the Normandy campaign, ‘...the German command lost the “big” operational picture very early in the campaign’. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, adopted a similar approach during the 1991 Gulf War, which General Schwarzkopf (1992, p. 300) identified as a weakness describing it as a system of ‘...centralized command and control in which important decisions, even in the heat of battle, could only be made by Saddam personally’.

‘There was during World War II (in Germany) no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I’ (US Government 1946, p. 5). Guderian (2000, p. 459) explains that it was Hitler’s aim to keep each element of government machinery in a separate compartment and only allow the passage between elements of that which was truly essential. ‘He (Hitler) regarded it as his unique privilege to be in a position where he might form a comprehensive picture...’. In 1943 General Guderian made an unsuccessful attempt to convince senior Nazi party members that the Supreme Command should be reorganized with a view to lessening ‘...Hitler’s direct influence on military operations’ (Guderian 2000, p. 325).

It was not only the command of the Navy, Army, and Luftwaffe that demonstrated a lack of unity of command. Heinrich Himmler’s SS was also not only the controlling force for all state security agencies and the apparatus for running the concentration camps, it was also a component of the armed forces. This section of the SS, termed the Waffen SS30, at one stage comprised a force of some 40 divisions of infantry, panzer, and panzer grenadier forces. However: During WWII, Waffen-SS units operated under the military command structure of the Heer (Army) and the OKH. However, Hitler could and often did give direct orders to Waffen-SS units via the OKW. Himmler gave direct orders to Waffen-SS units or assigned them under the command of a HSSPF31. Indeed, Himmler created an incredibly complex chain of command while maintaining the right to give orders to any SS commanding officer. It is almost as if the

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30 The Waffen-SS - "Weapon-SS" or "Armed-SS", was the military wing of the SS or Schutzstaffel.
31 Hohere SS und Polizeiführer - Higher Police and SS Officers
purpose of this complexity and confusion was to give himself absolute authority rather than create efficiency in the Waffen-SS command structure (Fitzgibbon 2000).

Beevor (2003) notes the level of animosity felt by the *Wehrmacht* during most of the war, mainly because of these command arrangements, and how it came to a head during the closing stages in 1945. He too records numerous instances of Himmler personally directing the employment of Waffen SS—despite these units being under the command of Wehrmacht generals and even, in April 1945, a Wehrmacht general ordering the SS from his area of operations.

### 7.6 A renaissance for unity of command

After WWII, the expertise built up by the Allies was gradually lost, possibly because there was no pressure to maintain the effort to maintain joint and combined cooperation (Ballard 2001, p. 9). It was not until the late 1960s that there occurred the beginning ‘...of a joint renaissance’ (Ballard 2001, p. 4). This renaissance is evident around the world in the formation of the US system of Combatant and Specified unified commands resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, a Chief Joint Operations in Australia, a Commander Joint Operations for the South African National Defence Forces (Janes 2001), a Joint Staff for the Singapore Armed Forces (Huxley 2000, p. 85), the formation of a Canadian Joint Forces Operations Group, and the establishment of tri-service organisations in the UK armed forces as a result of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As well as a renaissance in joint operations, there has been a corresponding trend in multinational operations with Australia’s role during Operation Stabilise in East Timor being regarded as a definitive model (Ballard 2001, p. 8).

The renaissance in joint operations thinking is typically seen in the establishment of unified combatant commands for joint control of US military forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 now requires that US operational forces be assigned to combatant commands of which there are currently nine. They can be either unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands. While the former comprise elements of two or more services and are therefore joint, the latter would usually comprise forces from one service. At present, there are no specified combatant commands.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the combatant commands are answerable to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be placed in this chain of command if the President so directs. Of the current nine unified combatant commands, five are functional in nature, and four are geographically based. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes these combatant commands, identifies relevant geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines the commander’s authority, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of Combatant Command (COCOM). The Commanders-in-Chief are provided ‘Combatant Command’ which

...is exercised only by the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. It is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command (JCS).

8. Command Structures for Multinational Operations

8.1 Need for agreement

The efforts of Allied commanders to achieve unity of command above army group level in WWII illustrates the need to establish agreed levels of command authority not only between multinational commanders but also joint commanders. Even when the commanders speak the same language there are misunderstandings due to the often imprecise meanings of words and terminology concerned. This is exacerbated when commanders do not speak the same language.

Morton (1961) notes the difficulties and confusion brought about by Admiral Nimitz being simultaneously theatre commander without administrative authority, and Fleet and Area commander with administrative authority. His position was probably little different from that of General Stilwell in Burma who ‘...held so many appointments that at times he was able to solve problems by issuing orders to himself!’ (Odgers 1957, p. 272). ‘This fact and the failure to define precisely the relationship between Admiral Nimitz and Gen. Emmons, the Army commander in Hawaii, created much difficulty’ (Odgers 1957, p. 272). In the same vein, an Army base commander in the Pacific might report directly to the War Department, get his supplies from the San Francisco port or Australia, and take his orders for airfield construction, possibly his most important task, from General Emmons in Hawaii (Odgers 1957, p. 272).

Examples of such confusion extending into recent times persist such as the misunderstanding with the term ‘mission direction’. In 1968 the Commander-in-Chief Pacific gave the commander 7th Air Force ‘mission direction’ over US Marine aircraft in I Corps South Vietnam. Winnefeld and Johnson (1993, pp. 73 - 74) note how the term meant different things to both the Air Force and the Marines. As a result of the ‘...vagueness of the mission direction concept...’ the objective behind the decision was never achieved.

The lack of unity of command led the RAAF commander of 10 Group in the SWPA to write that the command arrangements under which he was supposed to work with were in fact ‘unworkable’. Headquarters Far East Air Force (HQFEAF) dictated his area of operation but he was answerable to the commander of 13th Air Force, a formation subordinate to HQFEAF. At the same time he was responsible to the senior RAAF officer in the area through whom operational matters were directed by HQFEAF. This was compounded by a divided command system in the RAAF itself that demanded that administrative matters went to HQ RAAF in Australia and not...
through the senior RAAF headquarters in the area. The commander 10 Group wrote that he did not ‘…relish the role of the Duke of Plaza Toro’ (Odgers 1957, p. 298).

Such problems have now been largely overcome by the adoption of standard terms that establish the various levels of command authority. They may vary from nation to nation but amongst the ABCA and NATO countries, there is good level of mutual understanding. The authority of joint and multinational commanders can generally be established without much of the confusion that occurred with General Eisenhower and command of the strategic air forces.

8.2 Command and Control

Sproles (2002a) develops the idea that the origin of the term ‘Command and Control’ was developed during WWII to describe the command arrangements made necessary by combined and joint operations. There was a need to establish what Ashworth (1987, p. 36) refers to as the authority to cross organisation boundaries. It was a problem that had been brewing for some time as modern warfare started to bring together coalitions and develop joint operations. For example, Steel (1987, p. 50) notes the Australian government’s displeasure over the court martial and execution of Lt. ‘Breaker’ Morant by the British during the Boer War. He notes that as a result, the Australian government resolved that ‘…the control of the Australian forces would never again be surrendered to absolute British control’. This resolve brought conflict with the British in WWII in both the Middle East and in Malaya. It even caused friction with the US when late in 1944, General Blamey refused to allow the 7th and 9th Australian divisions to be separately employed under US Corps commanders and this was one of several occasions when General Blamey was forced ‘…to confront MacArthur directly’ (Buchanan 1987, p. 39). Similar attitudes prevailed with all the allies such as when American public opinion reacted against US troops being commanded by British officers in Europe and when differences of opinions between limits of control to be exerted by one service over another occurred during joint operations. While some of these originated from parochial viewpoints, there were also more practical considerations involved.

32 The Duke of Plaza Toro was a character in Gilbert and Sullivan’s ‘The Gondoliers’. "My child, the Duke of Plaza Toro does not follow fashions - he leads them. He always leads everybody. When he was in the army he led his regiment. He occasionally led them into action. He invariably led them out of it."

33 Subsequent to the publication of this journal article, two pre-WWII documents have been found that make specific reference to ‘Command and Control’. The earlier document (General Staff, 1909) is a British handbook on the land forces of Australia. Appendix B of this document refers to the ‘System of Command and Control’ and provides an outline diagram of the command arrangements between the Minister, the various Boards, and Military Districts. The other document (Artillery Training, 1938) is a British Army training pamphlet that refers to ‘Command and Control’ in the context of providing command authority to those artillery officers who had the physical means of controlling the assigned artillery units. They are of interest due to their age but it is suggested that they do not adversely affect the thrust of the journal article.
The result was that commanders did not have the full operational authority and associated responsibility that they may have expected when compared to, say, their experience with single service commands. In referring to command relationships in the Pacific area during WWII, Manuel and Cochran (1996) observed that the ‘...underdeveloped state of joint doctrine, for instance, led to arguments over command relations that impeded planning and execution’. It therefore became necessary to determine limits to operational authority that acted as constraints on command, especially for joint and combined. These have been progressively developed from WWII experience until today where they establish the limits of operational authority for both joint and coalition operations. This is effected through a range of standards that are sometimes peculiar to one jurisdiction but are sometimes internationally agreed.

8.3 Degrees of operational authority – Australia

8.3.1 Background

A reading of Manchester (1978) indicates that General MacArthur had a clear idea of the constraints placed upon him as an international commander in dealing with the Allied forces in his command. McGeoch (1996, pp. 112-113) describes how Admiral Mountbatten managed to develop a similar understanding between the UK and US commanders in the Burma theatre. He notes that:

...they enshrined a seminal development of military staff doctrine in the application of subsidiarity (sic) to command relationships. Many years later, in NATO, the differing functions and status of full command, operational command, and operational control were codified, introduced and utilised with good effect.

Australia has since adopted definitions for these command relationships that are largely, but not necessarily universally, similar to those adopted by NATO.

8.3.2 Full command

Section 8 of the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act) vests ‘...the general control and administration of the Defence Force...’ in the Minister and states that the powers exercised by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), service chiefs, and the Secretary ‘...shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with any directions of the Minister’. Operational and administrative authorities within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) therefore flow from the Minister.

Section 9 of the Defence Act 1903 provides for the appointment by the Governor General of the CDF. It then goes on to state that, subject to Section 8, the CDF ‘...shall

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34 Operational authority is used by Australia but US practice seems to favour the term ‘command authority’. In other places in the literature, ‘command arrangements’ is also used.

35 Sir Ninian Stephen (Stephen, 1983) explains how the constitution requires that the Governor General may only act on the Minister’s advice.
command the Defence Force...’ and that the service chiefs shall command their respective services. What exactly is meant by ‘command’ in this instance needs to be carefully considered. As far as the CDF is concerned, this level of command is what JOCC (2001, p. 4) refers to as Full Command which ‘...equates to ownership and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and liability’. The role of the service chiefs to ‘raise, train, and sustain’ their forces does not give them the operational authority that they once held. This operational authority is now exercised through CJOPS. As well, the Defence Act 1903 states that the CDF and Secretary share administrative authority, a situation that Forbes (2002, p. 30) posits can lead to confusion. However, full command can only apply within a national force. The CJOPS may delegate ‘operational authority’ to the Deputy Chief Joint Operations (DCJOPS) or to a component commander. In the US system, the equivalent is the authority emanating from the National Command Authority, which comprises the President and Secretary of Defense.

8.3.3 Degrees of operational authority

There are three degrees of operational authority namely:

- Operational command;
- Operational control; and
- Tactical control.

Operational command is the highest form of operational authority permitting a commander to reassign forces, specify missions, assign separate employment to components of the force, and to delegate operational control to a subordinate. General Blamey, as Commander-in-Chief Australian Army in WWII, could most probably be considered as having had operational command of the Army. He was able to assign and reassign forces to the SWPA command of General MacArthur. Operational control is inherent in operational command but is more limited. For instance, it does not allow for assets to be employed on tasks other than those for which they were allocated. General Blamey as Commander-in-Chief Australian Army delegated operational control to General MacArthur who, incidentally, would have delegated it in turn to General Blamey in his capacity as Allied Land Force Commander! The Australian Task Force (1ATF) in Vietnam was under the operational control of the commander of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV but better known as ‘Two Field Force Victor’). He could not therefore deploy 1ATF outside its assigned area of responsibility without the prior approval of the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam or the Australian government. In that General Eisenhower was able to ‘...direct the big bombers to do as he chose’ (Lyon 1974, p. 273), it is likely that he would now be deemed to have had operational control of the strategic air forces. He would not have had operational command, as he could not assign them to areas other than the invasion area. Tactical control is more limited still and pertains to local and immediate direction of the forces. The Commander 1ATF had tactical control over 1ATF.
Clapp et al. (1996, p. 74) illustrates the structure of command authority established by the British for the force assigned to re-take the Falkland Islands in 1982. The Minister delegated the operational command of the entire force to the Commander Task Force, Admiral Fieldhouse. Commodore Clapp was delegated operational control of the amphibious force and Brigadier Thompson was delegated tactical control of his enhanced brigade once it was ‘…established ashore’.

The definitions provided for Australian use in documents such as ADFP 101 and JOCC (2001) are similar to those employed by other ABCA as well as NATO countries.

8.3.4 Theatre Command

Prior to the introduction into the ADF of the new command and control arrangements36, Theatre Command (TCOMD) was the operational authority delegated from the CDF to the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST)37. Treloar38 (2000) describes TCOMD as providing COMAST ‘…the authority to re-assign and dispatch assigned forces, and to assign tasks to subordinate commanders…in the context of an operation or campaign’. COMAST had, under TCOMD, the responsibility for planning and conducting joint and coalition campaigns and other tasks as directed by CDF as well as acting as the principal military adviser to CDF on ADF operations. It also gave COMAST authority to ‘…assign priorities and issue directives to Commander Joint Logistics…’ (JOCC 2001, p. 10) for logistic support to the theatre as well as defining the relationships between COMAST and the three environmental commanders. The establishment of these latter relationships added a peculiar Australian flavour to what is basically operational command. There is no closely comparable command authority in the US although Combatant Command may come close. One significant difference was that TCOMD put the senior service officer between COMAST and the Minister whereas Combatant Command bypasses the senior military officer giving the commander direct access to the National Command Authority.

8.4 Alliance Command Structures

In WWII ‘…there were generally held to be two models a Supreme Commander could follow: that of Eisenhower or that of MacArthur. Unfortunately, this dichotomy meant different things to different people’ (Ziegler 1986, p. 230). One of these two meanings was that the Supreme Commander reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as was the case with Eisenhower or to one of the National Chiefs of Staff as was the case with MacArthur. The other meaning, and the one more relevant to this discussion, was that the commander could have three semi-independent Commanders-in-Chief i.e. component commanders, each with their own planning staffs or have force commanders controlled by an integrated planning staff. General Eisenhower tended to

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36 DEFGRAM 136/2004
37 Under the new arrangements COMAST becomes Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCJOPS). The Theatre Command (TCOMD) functions of COMAST have been transferred to DCJOPS.
38 Air Vice Marshal Treloar was COMAST until September 2001.
follow the first model while General MacArthur firmly adhered to the latter. When discussing Admiral Mountbatten’s choice of command arrangements in Burma, McGeoch (1996) confirms that the commonly accepted choice at the time was either that of General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean or General MacArthur in the Pacific ‘…who had his own planning staff and made sure that his sea, land and air commanders were formally subordinated to him.’ The significant point is the act of ‘formally’ subordinating the commanders, which in Admiral Mountbatten’s case, was not done39.

General Eisenhower modified his model in Europe in 1944-5 by directly commanding his army group commanders without an intervening Allied Expeditionary Force Land commander while retaining the semi-independent Commanders-in-Chief for the air and naval forces. General Eisenhower’s opposite number in Europe, Field Marshall von Rundstedt, also chose to deal directly with his two army group commanders instead of placing an intervening headquarters between them.

Ziegler (1986, p. 231) describes the MacArthur model as ‘…force commanders controlled by an integrated40 central staff’. For example, during Operation Cartwheel to secure Papua in 1943, MacArthur established four task forces namely:
- New Guinea force commanded by Australian General Blamey and comprising mainly Australian forces;
- New Britain force commanded by US General Krueger;
- Allied Naval Forces; and
- Allied Air Forces (Horner 2000).

Admiral Nimitz, who commanded the northern wing of the Allied advance across the Central Pacific, could also be said to have used the MacArthur model as he based his operations solely on task forces whose commanders reported directly to him. For example, he used two task forces built around his aircraft carriers to operate north of Midway in the decisive battle between the Japanese and American fleets in late 1942. A similar approach using joint amphibious task forces was used in the capture of the islands in the Central Pacific area. He was forced by circumstances to use a subordinate commander, Admiral Halsey, in the South Pacific early in the war but did not make any efforts to repeat this model in his later campaigns.

Since WWII, more experience has been gained in structuring multinational operations. JP 3-16 (2000) discusses the range of possible command structures now felt as being applicable to either alliances or coalitions. The purpose of each structure is to achieve unity of effort in all cases and at times even to achieve some degree of unity of

39 This issue is discussed in paragraph 11.4
40 While requested by General Marshall to include Australian officers on his staff, MacArthur’s staff was exclusively US despite Australia providing the bulk of the forces to the theatre in the early stages of the war.
command. The nature of these structures serves to illustrate the sometimes fine distinction between alliances and coalitions.

8.4.1 Integrated command

The key element of an integrated command for an alliance occurs when a single commander is appointed from one of the allied nations with a multinational make-up of the subordinate commanders and staffs. These staffs will be fully integrated i.e. `A staff in which one officer only is appointed to each post on the establishment of the headquarters, irrespective of nationality and Service' (JP 1-02 2001). Both Admiral Mountbatten’s command in Burma and General Eisenhower’s command in Europe were integrated allied commands as is NATO today. The NATO Standing Naval Forces provide an example of an integrated command. The SAC Atlantic has operational command of a multi-national group of ships which may be placed under the operational control of commanders in any one of three subordinate areas. While the SAC is an US officer, the subordinate commanders and their staffs can be drawn from any of the NATO countries. Ryan (2000, pp. 82 – 86) discusses the possibility that the Operation Stabilise HQ should have been an integrated HQ.

8.4.2 Lead nation

A lead nation command structure occurs when all participating nations put their forces under the command of one nation. This is probably appropriate when one nation provides the bulk of the resources to the operation. It is likely that the command and staff arrangements will be those of the dominant nation but it does not necessarily rule out an integrated staff or even rotation of commanders between nations. Coalition operations against Iraq in 2003 provide an example of a lead nation command structure with an integrated staff, albeit the level of integration was minimal. General MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area Command in WWII was a lead nation command with the US being the dominant nation and Australia the junior partner. Similarly, Germany could be considered the lead nation for the Axis operations on the Eastern Front against the Red Army. Interesting parallels can be drawn between the attitudes of the lead nations towards their junior allies, in both cases, due to their dominance.

8.5 Coalition Command Structures

8.5.1 Parallel command

In a parallel command structure, no single commander is appointed and means must be developed in order to achieve coordination to achieve unity of effort. The Allied nations fighting on the Western Front in WWI operated under such a structure.

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41 It is unlikely that full unity of command will ever be achieved in multi-national operations, but they are possible (and even desirable) with national forces.
8.5.2 Lead nation

This is similar to the lead nation structure for allied nations but is difficult to achieve due to nations being unwilling to forgo their sovereignty in putting their forces under the command of another nation. The integration of staff, as mentioned in the description of this structure for alliances, is an important factor in achieving this type of structure. Australia established a lead nation command structure for a coalition operation with INTERFET in East Timor.

8.5.3 Hybrid

One way of overcoming the disadvantages of parallel command and accessing the advantages of lead nation command is a form of hybrid command structure utilising both systems. In this case, two or more nations control the mix of international participants but one leads in the operational control of the force. The Gulf War in 1991 utilised such a command structure with the control of Islamic and Western participants being shared by Saudi Arabia and the US respectively.

9. Australian experience in WWII

9.1 Operational control passed to General MacArthur

In April 1942 the Australian Prime Minister assigned ‘...all combat sections of the Australian Defence Forces’ to General MacArthur effectively giving him operational control of these forces. The Prime Minister, who also was Minister for Defence Coordination and so held full command authority, stated that ‘...all orders and instructions issued by you (General MacArthur) in conformity with your directive will be considered...as emanating from the Commonwealth Government’ (McCarthy 1959, p. 27). Yet even with such a sweeping directive, some matters were retained by the Australian commanders and government. Administrative control of the forces was retained by the Australian government as were limitations concerning the employment of non-volunteer forces and the need to keep RAAF formations together.

9.2 Army

The military board was disbanded in March 1942 and General Blamey was appointed Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces (AMF). As Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey had full military operational and administrative command over the Army with direct access to the Prime Minister ‘...but all matters of administration were to be dealt with by the Minister for the Army’ (Horner 1978, p. 67). While there were instances of personality clashes amongst senior officers42, this arrangement worked well and was not changed throughout the war.

42 Horner (1978) details in chapter 4 ‘Restructuring the Command System 7 December 1941 – 17 April 1942’ the history, manoeuvrings, and considerations involved in arriving at this solution plus some views
9.3 Navy

At the beginning of the war, the RAN was placed at the disposal of Britain as a component of the RN. When war broke out with Japan, units of the RAN serving with the RN were brought back to Australia to fight in the Pacific under the command of the Naval Commander SWPA. There are no indications to be found in the literature that this was anything but a satisfactory arrangement that worked well.

9.4 Air Force

The effects of divided operational and administrative command on the RAAF in the SWPA has already been noted at paragraph 5.2.2. While the official Australian war histories for WWII do not contain any reference to problems associated with command arrangements for the RAN, and only passing reference to the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for the Army, there is literally page upon page devoted to the problems that the RAAF had to face. The experience of the RAAF in this period represents a salutary object lesson for any attempt at establishing command arrangements for the ADF.

10. Examples of theatre commands

10.1 Overlord – Allied unified command

Operation Overlord was the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944 for which a theatre command, called Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), was established answerable direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (see Appendix A). General Eisenhower commanded the theatre and had British component commanders for the sea and air forces. He had operational command of these forces as well as the US and British strategic air forces and the logistic resources of the US European Theatre of Operations. Eisenhower’s great strength was his ability and commitment to achieving Allied unity and co-operation. Hufford (1973) notes that the primary objective of the SHAEF staff was to ‘...utilize the resources of two great nations...with the decisiveness of a single authority’ and that:

The Supreme Allied Command in Europe would never have worked without Eisenhower for he virtually invented the concept of Allied unity of command and persuaded the British to accept it in lieu of the committee system to which they were accustomed.

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43 His command of the strategic air forces commenced on 14 April 1944 in order to effect ‘Operation Transportation’ so as to isolate the landing beaches. After the invasion the command of the strategic air forces would have reverted to their own Commanders-in-Chief.
While General Eisenhower had air and sea component commanders, each with his own headquarters and staff, he kept the direction of the land forces to himself and did not appoint a separate Land component commander. It seems apparent that he used his own headquarters to command not only the theatre but also the land component. He did appoint General Montgomery to the temporary command of the land forces during the invasion but took over command of the land forces on 1 September 1944. SHAEF was therefore an example of an integrated allied command using a mixture of the component and direct command systems.

10.2 Pacific Areas – two theatres born of rivalry

Morton (1961) provides a detailed description of the development of the command structures in the Pacific region during WWII (see Appendix B). In spite of the desires of both President Roosevelt and General Marshall for a unified command, inter-service rivalries between the Army and the Navy prevented this. It was the Navy view that the Pacific was sensibly a naval war and that this should be recognised just as they recognised without dissension that the European theatre was an army war. There had been antipathy towards General MacArthur dating back to the time when he was Army Chief of Staff. In any event the Navy was not going to agree on an Army officer having any control over the Pacific Fleet. Complicating the choice was the fact that General MacArthur was by far the most senior officer in the Pacific region while none of the naval officers, such as Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, or Spruance had yet become household names. ‘The Navy thought that MacArthur “would probably use his naval force…in the wrong manner, since he had shown clear unfamiliarity with proper naval and air functions” in the past’ (Barlow 1994, p. 78). Galloway (2000, p. 140) notes that, although President Roosevelt had the authority to ensure a unified command in the Pacific, General MacArthur’s public profile was such that President Roosevelt did not have the political will to make an issue of it.

The decision reached by 30 March 1942 was to divide the Pacific into the SWPA and the Pacific Oceans Area under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz respectively. General MacArthur referred to this as one of the most unexplainable decisions of the war and that it ‘…resulted in divided effort, the waste of diffusion and duplication of forces, and the consequent extension the war with added casualties and cost’ (Barlow 1994, p. 79).

The Pacific Oceans Area was a joint command subdivided into three areas for the North, Central, and South Pacific with Admiral Nimitz directly commanding the North and Central Pacific and commanding the South Pacific through a subordinate commander. It was in the South Pacific that activity was initially undertaken with Admiral Ghormly and then Admiral Halsey in charge. The South Pacific commander had not only operational but also a degree of administrative control over the naval forces. The headquarters were not only manned by naval officers but combined both operational and administrative responsibilities. As a result of the naval commander exerting administrative control over the Army forces, particularly details associated
with Air Corps training, an Army Air Corps officer, General Harmon, was appointed to command United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA) reporting to the South Pacific Area commander. A similar situation was to develop later in the Central Pacific area leading to the appointment of another Army officer as commander United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA).

Although General Harmon had strong ideas on the use of air power, he recognised that he did not have a mandate to pursue this and was now serving under a navy commander. ‘With wisdom perhaps rare in such circumstances he therefore refrained quite deliberately from engaging in debate…’ with his naval superiors. He saw the situation as one demanding a maximum effort and complete cooperation in order to defeat the Japanese. ‘This sensible and realistic attitude set a high standard of command behaviour that was maintained throughout one of the most crucial and from the command viewpoint most frustrating campaigns in the war against Japan’ (Gillison 1962, p. 585). Winnefeld and Johnson (1993, pp. 33-34) note that the air campaign in the Solomons was to be ‘…the high water mark in jointness (sic) and unity of effort in air operations until the Persian Gulf War in 1991’. They put this down to a subordination of service doctrine and biases and the emergence of a truly joint organisation ‘…survival and the desire to win when the issue is in doubt are major incentives to put lesser concerns aside’. If the commanders wish the system to work and are seen to be trying to make it work then their subordinates will follow their lead.

The selflessness of officers of all services, particularly at the junior and intermediate command echelons, in putting service and doctrinal interests aside greatly contributed to the ultimate success of the campaign. (Winnefeld et al. 1993, p. 34). This is echoed in a later era when Brigadier Leahy said of Exercise Tandem Thrust ‘97:

*It (the US- Australian alliance) works because those of us in the trenches are given a solid basis and left to make it work. There are no needless rules and regulations* (Leahy 1997, p. 90).

When discussing the INTERFET operations in East Timor, Taylor (2001), noted:

*…the words of one senior ADF officer (concerning) an often overlooked aspect of interoperability – “personal relationships make things work”.*

As well as being a theatre commander and commander of two subordinate areas, Admiral Nimitz was also Pacific Fleet commander. If he was made a unified theatre commander for the entire Pacific region, he would have taken operational command of the fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) who was loathe to give up this authority. As the CNO was also a member of the Joint Chiefs, he had a motive, additional to just inter-service rivalry, for not supporting a truly unified command in the region.

These command arrangements led to several disputes during the progress of the Pacific campaign especially when forces from both Areas were needed to cooperate during operations on the fringes of their areas of operations. This occurred when plans were being drawn up for the capture of Rabaul, and at the Philippine landings at Leyte and Lingayen Gulf. They are suggested to be factors for General MacArthur’s pre-

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44 Brigadier Leahy is currently Chief of Army
emptive strike (a ‘reconnaissance in force’) in the Admiralties so as to prevent Admiral Nimitz’s forces achieving a political advantage. The arrangements also forced the Joint Chiefs to be involved in matters that they need not have been involved in. Odgers (1957, p. 234) in describing the need to interchange assets between General MacArthur’s and Admiral Nimitz’s commands, describes how the Joint Chiefs ‘…retained control of the shipping which supported both commanders to ensure that the maximum interchange was achieved’. Winnefeld et al. (1991, p. 78) also notes how the divided command arrangements led to duplication of effort and competition for resources. As a result, the Joint Chiefs became ‘…the directing headquarters for operations in the Pacific’ forcing the Joint Chiefs in making decisions ‘…that could well have been resolved by lesser officials’. In the final stages of the war as the Allied forces closed in on Japan, this command structure again came under examination, as it was not suitable for the invasion of Japan.

The final solution agreed on 3 April 1945 was for General MacArthur to have operational and administrative command of all US army forces45 in the Pacific and to be named Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC). All naval forces in the Pacific region were then placed under Admiral Nimitz. General MacArthur’s command did not include the 20th Air Force which, along with the 8th Air Force, became the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force for the Pacific. This Air Force represented a separate command in the Pacific under General Spaatz with almost equal status to the other two commands. In addition, General MacArthur retained his position as the Allied Commander-in-Chief SWPA46 with operational control over the Australian forces and command of the Far East Air Force.

All land forces were under one commander, all naval forces were under another, and a substantial proportion of the air forces under a third commander. It was proposed that the commanders report directly to the Joint Chiefs and have the authority to establish joint task forces as and when they deemed it necessary. This was the command structure proposed for the planned invasion of Japan! The Joint Chiefs remained the coordinating headquarters for the Pacific when good sense dictated that an overall commander was the appropriate decision. Thus all efforts to place Allied forces in the Pacific under a single commander, as had happened in Europe, had failed and even the attempts at unified command established in 1942 were reversed.

An important lesson to be drawn is that no commander is indispensable. It was suggested at the time that General MacArthur should have been dismissed from his post thus removing the problem of his popularity and that President Roosevelt should then have appointed one officer to command the entire Pacific campaign (Barlow 1994,

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45 At that time, air forces were part of the US Army. General MacArthur retained command of General Kenney’s Far East Air Force. This would have included the operational control of RAAF Command.
46 General MacArthur’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief US Army forces would make him a national commander, which seems at odds with his original directive as SAC SWPA of not being permitted to command national forces (paragraph 4.3 also refers).
p. 80). This would have enabled the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on their proper task
and remove the situation where:

Seemingly all decisions the Joint Chiefs made had to be weighed foremost against the
consequences of offending either a personality or his “service” (Barlow 1994, p. 81).

Perhaps Millett (1990, p. 297) sums it up best as:

...had the army and navy not insisted on maintaining separate shares in the enterprise, and had
a less conspicuous figure than General Douglas MacArthur held the command in the subsidiary
theatre, the conduct of the war in the Pacific could have been a model in economy of effort. As it
was, American strategy in the Pacific defeated Japan more expeditiously than the combined
strategy in Europe defeated Germany.

10.3 SW Pacific – Allied lead command

General MacArthur’s SWPA Command was one of several theatre commands in the
Pacific area (see Appendix B). Unlike SHAEF, General MacArthur reported directly to
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although he was urged by General Marshall to establish
an integrated headquarters using Australian officers (Horner 1982, p. 206), he failed to
do so. The General Headquarters (GHQ) that General MacArthur established had
three nominal component commanders for the Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces but,
as noted in paragraph 4.10, he divided his forces into task forces that he directly
commanded.

GHQ was not a joint headquarters as ‘...there was no strong naval representation, and
the American air force had not yet been separated from control by the army’ (Horner
1982, p. 207) and he ‘...had an Army staff instead of a joint staff’ (Kropf 1990). Nor was
it a multinational headquarters as US officers filled all staff positions. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army, while nominally the Land Force
Commander, was not given the opportunity to serve in this capacity. Horner (1982)
suggests that the motive for this decision was to ensure that Australians did not
command US forces.

Over time General Kenney, a US Army Air Corps officer and the Allied air force
commander, was able to gain General MacArthur’s trust to the extent that he
established himself as the air component commander. ‘In Kenney he (General
MacArthur) found an air commander whom he trusted and left alone to run the air
campaign’ (Kropf 1990). This theatre was an example of a lead nation, nominally allied,
theatre headquarters using a hybrid direct command/component system. General
MacArthur continued with this approach to theatre command in Korea where the
theatre headquarters remained essentially an Army staffed headquarters with
commanders reporting directly to General Headquarters. There was not a ground
component command until 1952 when General Mark Clark assumed command.
General MacArthur, following the practice he developed in SWPA, kept command of
the ground forces raised for the Inchon landings⁴⁷, separate from the forces fighting

⁴⁷ X Corps
around Pusan\textsuperscript{48}. While General Clark took steps to form a ground component command and as well as a true joint staff at Far East Command, he still acted as his own ground component commander.

\textbf{10.4 German Western European Theatre – Joint command disaster}

The German Western European theatre was established in 1941 to control and defend Western Europe and it was this theatre against which the Allied invasion of Europe was directed (see Appendix C). It was commanded by \textit{Oberbefehlshaber West}, (OB West) or Commander-in-Chief West who, at the time of the Normandy invasion in June 1944 was Field Marshal von Rundstedt. The lack of a unified command for the \textit{wehrmacht} has been noted in paragraph 7.5. Pipes (2001, p.1) notes that this lack of unified command was the most serious weakness in the German defences of the West.

While von Rundstedt was charged with the full responsibility for the defence of the West, he did not have the powers associated with that responsibility. Although he reported to Hitler through OKW, that organisation did not have the powers to effect true joint cooperation. Unlike his opponent, General Eisenhower, von Runstedt was far from being a Supreme Commander. His naval and air forces did not report to him and those Waffen SS units in his theatre reported to Himmler and not to OB West. His anti-aircraft defences, and \textit{Luftwaffe} infantry divisions, reported to OKL and not to OB West. Many of his coastal batteries reported to the navy and jurisdiction did not pass to OB West until the land battle commenced, i.e. after the Allies had landed! In essence, this put the use of the vital coastal batteries in the hands of local commanders (Pipes 2001, p. 1). Von Rundstedt was in disagreement with his subordinate, Rommel, over the manner to deploy his defences. ‘…the chain of command between von Rundstedt and Rommel was muddled by the quasi-independent nature of Rommel’s command and by their fundamental disagreement over the appropriate strategy to repel the expected invasion’ (Pierce 1996). However Rommel was of equal rank to von Runstedt and on occasions, exercised his right as a Field Marshal to bypass von Runstedt and deal directly with Hitler\textsuperscript{49}. The theatre reserves of four panzer divisions were placed under command of OKW subject to release by Hitler personally.

This lack of unified command meant that there was an emphasis on informal cooperation and liaison between, generally, local commanders. There was no effort to coordinate the various elements of the German fighting machine into a cohesive fighting force under a Joint Commander.

It is of interest to record that a similar situation existed for Axis forces in the Mediterranean theatre as well. Spooner (1996, p. 60) noted that Kesselring was appointed as Commander-in-Chief Axis forces in the Mediterranean, however, Mussolini remained in charge of Italian forces and both he and Marshal Cavallero

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} 88\textsuperscript{th} Army
\item \textsuperscript{49} German field marshals had ‘…a prerogative of direct communication with Hitler, a prerogative enjoyed by all field marshals…’ Grolier on line ‘Recovery of France’
\end{itemize}
retained some control still over the Italian Army. Hitler, in issuing his directive to Kesselring, stipulated that Rommel would report directly to Hitler and this was complicated by Rommel also being subordinate to Cavallero due to his commanding Italian forces in Italian colonies! Millett et al. (1989, p. 11) note that the Axis powers possessed virtually none of the characteristics of a serious alliance: "Mussolini characterized the Italian effort in 1940 as a ‘parallel war’. The failures in coordination, the lack of a grand strategy, and the arrogant disregard of overall alliance strategy culminated in the ill-considered and disastrous Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940. In a real sense the combination of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany represented an alliance where the whole was less than the sum of its parts."

10.5 Falklands War (Operation Corporate) – Joint command

In their 1982 campaign to regain the Falkland Islands from Argentina, the UK ‘...integrated nearly every tool in the kit bag to mount their operation rapidly and win at the knife’s edge of culmination’ (Ballard 2001, p. 5). To achieve this, a Joint Operations Commander was established at Northwood in the UK. This appointment was given to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse who became the ‘...operational commander of all land, air, surface vessel, and submarine force in the South Atlantic so that ‘...the detailed conduct of operations was placed in the hands of the service most involved’50, in this case the Royal Navy’ (Middlebrook 2001, pp. 92 – 94). Admiral Fieldhouse had reporting to him five tactical commanders (see Appendix D), one each for the:

1. Carrier Battle Task Group;
2. Amphibious Task Group;
3. Landing Force Task Group;
4. South Georgia Task Group; and
5. Submarine Task Group.

This is an example of a task force being established with a functional grouping with each element being directly commanded by Admiral Fieldhouse, the Commander Task Force 317 (CTF). Several elements were joint in nature: the carrier force had both air force and navy elements. Once ashore, the landing force also became a joint force, eventually comprising army, marine, and special forces.

Operation Corporate included the retaking of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island as separate missions. As well, the submarine forces did not operate directly with the land and other sea forces. Thompson51 (1992, pp. 16-17) puts a case for a senior officer to be placed between the CTF and the three groups (those listed at paras 10.5 1 - 3) involved in the regaining of the Falkland Islands. He points out that the

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50 Middlebrook (2001, p. 95) discusses the possible replacement of Admiral Woodward, a submariner, with an ‘air admiral’. This did not occur and some commentators reported favourably on this as it ensured ‘...he viewed his command in overall terms and was not ‘blinded by the aviators’.

51 Brigadier Thompson RM commanded 3 Commando Brigade (which was reinforced with two Parachute Regiment battalions) during the initial stages of the Falklands campaign.
commander of the Carrier Task Group, Admiral Woodward, was ‘...often incorrectly described as the Task Force Commander’ who took upon himself ‘...as senior naval officer present, the job of being in overall command’. All group commanders reported directly back to the CTF in the UK but this action by Admiral Woodward as a ‘primus inter pares’ caused friction. It was Thompson’s view that this could have been avoided by the appointment of a senior operational commander responsible to the CTF for all three groups. The situation as it stood was ‘...an uncomfortable compromise, leaving much to personalities, requiring a degree of tolerance and understanding all round; two characteristics which are often in short supply under stress’ (Thomson 1992, pp. 16-17). Such an operational commander would be able to maintain a presence in the operational area, decided on priorities, removed the friction, and ‘...most useful of all, he could have taken the responsibility for speaking direct to Northwood off the backs of the busy group commanders’ (Thomson 1992, pp. 16-17).

Clapp et al. (1996), offers a chronology of events that may have led Thompson to believe that Woodward was attempting to assume command of the amphibious and land forces. The initial command arrangements are outlined and illustrated by a diagram at pp. 31-2 of Clapp et al. (1996). Admiral Woodward is shown as commanding a Task Group, under which there are three Task Units comprised of the carrier battle group, the amphibious, and the land forces. In Navy parlance, a Group is superior to a unit. The hierarchy is Force-Group-Unit-Element. On p. 38 it is noted by Clapp et al. (1996) that the command structure placed both Thompson and Clapp under Woodward and that it was a command structure ‘...based on rank rather than role...’ On p. 50 Clapp et al. (1996) record that a new command structure had been issued making each of the five commanders of equal status as Group commanders. The same diagram is provided by Thompson (1992, p.16) to illustrate the command structure. But at p.60, Clapp et al. (1996) observe how Woodward gives the impression that he is still acting under the original command structure much to Thompson’s discomfort. At p. 60 Clapp et al. (1996) states that ‘As though to emphasize our perceived position in the command chain, I found it extremely difficult to have an interview with CTF’. Here he was assured that the command arrangements were as outlined by Clapp et al. (1996) at p. 50. This is reinforced by a statement from the CTF at p. 69 but an ‘outline plan’ for the landing of forces on the Falklands seemingly reverted to the original command structure by giving operational control of the force back to Woodward as ‘Commander Combined Task Force’ (Clapp et al. 1996, p. 74).

The conclusion is that there was considerable confusion amongst not only the staff concerned but also the senior commanders concerned as to the command arrangements for the operation. It is possible that this could be put down to the speed at which this operation was put together.

Difficulties in command arrangements and with the rank of commanders were not peculiar to the British forces. Middlebrook (2001, pp. 88 -89) describes the Argentinean position. Brigadier General Menendez was appointed as both the Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Under him were the three service component commanders
‘...but inter-service rivalry in Argentina continues at Stanley and the services operated on severely separate lines; there was little concept of a joint command’ (Middlebrook 2001, p. 88). The Army chain of command ran from Menendez, through the component commander, to two brigade commanders all of whom were brigadiers. Of the four, Menendez was the youngest. Instead of appointing a Major General to take command of the situation ‘...four brigadier-generals were left to sort out a command situation never clarified by Army Headquarters in Buenos Aires...’ (Middlebrook 2001, p. 89). Compounding the difficulties was the steady rise in influence of Brigadier-General Joffre who was ‘in favour’ with Buenos Aires52.

10.6 Gulf war – Hybrid coalition command

A unified command structure was not achieved for the Gulf War and a hybrid form of command was adopted instead (see Appendix E). The US commanded the forces of the western nations while Saudi Arabia commanded the forces from the Arab and other Muslim nations. Rice (1997, p. 7) refers to it as being both parallel and lead nation but ‘...it was abundantly clear to all that the United States was in the lead for both campaign plan development and conduct of the campaign once hostilities began’. Schwarzkopf (1992, p. 373) in discussing the question of who would command the force stated ‘... should military operations commence, a joint command as currently exists will continue; however, the commander of the US forces will have final approval authority for all military operations’. In this manner, Saudi sovereignty was respected by ensuring that Schwarzkopf and the Saudi commander (Lieutenant General Prince Khalid) would be seen to be equals as Joint Commanders but still enabling the US to ‘...keep the offensive planning on track’.

In a situation reminiscent of Churchill’s observation that the biggest cross he had to bear during WWII was the Cross of Lorraine, the French posed particular problems in establishing unity of effort during the Gulf War. The French initially refused to come under coalition command preferring instead to report only to the French President. They also indicated that if the Iraqis attacked, then they would report to the Saudis (Cohen et al. 1992, p. 219 & Schwarzkopf 1992, p. 390)53. In the event, they eventually came under the tactical control of the commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps54. As well, the presence of Syria as a coalition partner made Schwarzkopf feel uneasy as ‘Syria had long been a Soviet arms client and was on the State Department’s list of

52 A loose parallel can be drawn between Menendez and Joffre on one hand and the AOC Middle East and AOC Malta in WWII on the other hand. ‘...when a dynamic personality controlled RAF (and FAA) operations from Malta, the RAF in Malta was very much fighting its own war.’ (Spooner 1996, p. 20).
53 “Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion”. Norman Schwarzkopf.
54 The issue with the French was political. The French Minister of Defence, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, opposed the French forces subordination to the US and this was only resolved following his resignation and subsequent replacement by another minister (Swain, 1994, p. 93). “Part of their dilemma had to do with conflicting commercial interests: France was a major seller of arms to both Saudi Arabia and Iraq” (Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 390).
countries that sponsored terrorism’ (Schwarzkopf 1992, p. 391). Swain (1994) also makes several references to the lack of trust by the US of the Syrians’ intentions. The result was that Schwarzkopf had doubts about the Syrians’ performance if they were called upon to fight the Iraqis. This campaign was an example of the complexity of modern multinational operations. ‘Schwarzkopf was presented with the strategic and diplomatic challenge of fashioning a unified force from this disparate bunch, a task…more complex than that of General Eisenhower during World War II’ (Cohen and Gatti 1992, p. 218).

One aspect of Desert Storm that does not seem to attract much attention is General Schwarzkopf’s retention of the role of Land Component Commander and retaining the option of bypassing the service component commanders and dealing with tactical commanders himself (McCarthy and Medlin 2000, p. 93), (Swain 1994, pp. 144-5). He did not place a commander between himself and the field commanders, either coalition, US Army or US Marines. This was in spite of General Schwarzkopf finding himself ‘…mired in administrative chores: briefing congressional delegations, giving press interviews, heading off cultural problems with the Saudis, and fielding bureaucratic questions from Washington’ (Schwarzkopf 1992, p. 363). In this, he was in a similar position of General Eisenhower after the outbreak from the Normandy bridgehead which lead to the dispute between himself and General Montgomery on the issue of the appointment of a Land Commander (Montgomery 1960, p. 327). McCarthy et al. (2000, p.92) note how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, ‘…suggested (General Schwarzkopf) establish an overall commander for ground forces, fearing that the land offensive was consuming too much time and energy on the part of the CINCENT’. The reasons given by General Schwarzkopf are reminiscent of those given by General Eisenhower in the same situation. He was reluctant for political reasons to put US forces under Arab command (and the Arabs were similarly reluctant to come under US command) and was loath to create another intermediate level headquarters. This view is supported by Swain55 (1994, p. 330) who is of the opinion that:

The organization of the command by departmental components, instead of creating a unified or joint ground component command comparable to the joint air component, does not appear to have had a significant effect on the outcome. It was unlikely that a single unified high command was politically desirable, given very legitimate Saudi sensitivities. In that case, forming a joint task force headquarters to provide a single ground component for U.S. land forces (over Army and Marine Corps elements), separated by the Joint Forces Command North into two simultaneous but largely distinct operations, does not seem likely to have added much but an additional senior headquarters between the CINC and his troops.

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55 Swain was the official historian attached to Third Army, the formation most likely to be given the task of land component headquarters, during Desert Shield/Storm.
On the other hand, and drawing on the lessons of Desert Shield/Storm, McCarthy et al. (2000, p.98), bring out several consequences of the Joint Force Commander also being the Land Component Commander\(^{56}\). They note that:

- There is a difficulty in the commander dividing his attention between the battle and the other matters of military and national strategy that must be considered;
- The staff do not know if they must concentrate on the Land Component commander’s task or the Joint Force Commander’s tasks; and
- In situations such as Desert Storm, where there was an Air Component Commander, the land commanders are placed in a subordinate position. Instead of the staff of one component commander being able to resolve issues with their counterparts on the other component commander staff, matters must be referred to the Joint Commander that normally need not be so referred\(^{57}\).

A result of this latter point is that if a Land Component commander was appointed then ‘…the Army may have felt that it had a stronger voice in the prioritisation of the air effort and the design and conduct of the overall campaign during Desert Storm’ (McCarthy et al. 2000, p. 98). This is not dissimilar to the situation noted by General Brooke and his observations on the lack of combined command of the British forces in July 1940. The Naval Commanders-in-Chief had such a preponderance in numbers that he considered it gave them an unfair advantage (Bryant 1957, p. 201).

Both Central Command and Third Army were formations without assigned units immediately prior to Desert Storm/Shield. Many staff positions were to be filled by reserve officers whenever the headquarters were to be committed to active service. The story of how both these headquarters became activated and the problems that they faced as they coped with bringing themselves up to strength both in manpower and training should be relevant to any study of Australian operational command arrangements. This is dealt with in depth in Swain (1994) in his study of the Third US Army in 1990-1. His observations on the need for peacetime training and practice are also relevant.

### 11. The Organisation of Theatre Commands

#### 11.1 Structuring an organisation

Mintzberg’s (1993) discussion on the design of organisations provides useful insights into the reasons why theatre commanders have acted as they did in the past.

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\(^{56}\) Commanders who have retained the Land component command themselves include Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, Rommel, Taylor, and Schwarzkopf.

\(^{57}\) On the other hand, both the Army and Marine component commanders were of the same rank as the air component commander and the Army component commander (Lt. Gen. Yeosock, CG Third Army) shared his quarters with him. Swain (1994) chronicles Yeosock’s many dealings with the Commander-in-Chief and did not indicate anything to support this view.
Organisations are established to provide a division of labour and the means to coordinate these divisions. The means used for coordination may be considered to be the glue of an organisation and there seems to be five such mechanisms for achieving this namely mutual adjustment; direct supervision; standardisation of work processes; standardisation of output; and standardisation of skills. Laying at the heart of Mintzberg’s (1993) work is the concept that there are five basic parts to an organisation namely the Strategic Apex; the Middle Line; the Operation Core; the Techno-structure; and the Support Staff. The equivalents in a military organisation would be the commander; any subordinate component commanders; the force itself; the various staffs; and facilities such as logistics, medical etc. respectively. Within a military organisation there is formal authority which travels vertically through the organisation and is represented in the commander’s delegation of authority to subordinates. There is also informal authority which travels horizontally such as that exercised by the staff and support services.

The jobs created as a result of the division of labour are specialised in a horizontal continuum based on the scope of the tasks and in a vertical continuum representing the amount of control that the person has over the work done. Specialisation by scope is the predominant form of job specialisation and can range from that of a medical general practitioner to the very specialised work of a cranio-facial surgeon. With the other continuum, that of the amount of control that a worker has over work performed, control may range from that of a motor mechanic being allocated the vehicles on which to work to that of a CEO deciding on prices, product lines, expansion, etc. In the military, the breadth or scope of the task may range from a tank driver to the captain of a ship, and the level of control from that of a radar operator to a Commander-in-Chief.

Drucker (1977, p. 450) provides another view of the process of structuring an organisation. When establishing the building blocks of an organisation, he posits that a key question is ‘In what areas could malfunction seriously affect us. In what areas do we have major vulnerabilities’? Drucker (1977 p. 451) also lists four major activity classifications of:

1. Result producing activities that can be directly or indirectly related to the performance of the enterprise;
2. Support activities which, although essential, do not in themselves produce results but only ‘outputs’ used by other components of the enterprise;
3. Housekeeping activities; and
4. Top-management activities.

### 11.2 Coordination in the organisation

The most commonly considered bases for coordinating work in an organisation is by grouping of:

1. knowledge and skills;
2. work processes and functions;
3. time;
4. output;
5. clients; and
6. place (Mintzberg 1993, p. 48).

The groupings employed amongst theatres are generally by functions (2) and by place (6). For example, the US Unified Commands are organised by place e.g. Pacific and European Commands or by function e.g. Transportation Command and Strategic Command. All the WWII theatres were grouped by place or geographic area. The groups within these theatres seem to have been predominantly grouped by functions e.g. General Eisenhower grouped his forces by functions of air, land, and sea forces. The 1982 British task force in the Falklands campaign was grouped by functions as amphibious, land, and aircraft carrier groups. It is suggested that the multinational forces employed in Desert Storm and East Timor were grouped by client i.e. as national groups. This is probably a feature of multinational forces as grouping by function could be seen as a diminution of sovereignty.

The chief weakness of the functional structure is that it places an emphasis on specialisation to the potential detriment of the force as a whole. It encourages a reductionist as against a holistic view and a move to bureaucratic processes. This hinders cooperation and coordination resulting in only the managers at the top of the hierarchy possessing a holistic view of the entire organisation. This leads to a need to augment the structure by adding means of coordination such as liaison cells or liaison officers as used by Generals Montgomery in WWII, Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War, and Cosgrove in East Timor.

11.3 Centralised or decentralised organisations

Adherence to the principle of unity of command means that military organisations are hierarchical organisations instead of, say, matrix type organisations. Some hierarchical organisations concentrate power with an individual, others distribute power to lower levels by means of delegation, and others choose a combination of the two. Mintzberg (1993, pp. 95-96) suggests that the primary needs for centralisation, other than a lust for power, is the need to achieve coordination. He suggests that a major fault with centralisation is that the top managers see themselves as the only ones capable of coordination or of being able to avoid mistakes. This can lead to ‘information overload’. It is further suggested that decentralisation becomes necessary when it is realised that it is not possible for one person to absorb or understand all that is involved in the organisation. Not only will this avoid information overload but it will also allow a quicker response to local conditions and provide motivation to subordinates. Alberts (2002, p. 33) anticipates this in his discussion on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) when he states that in an information age C2 system ‘...the edge is empowered to make decisions based upon command intent and high quality situation awareness’.
When an organisation is decentralised, Mintzberg (1993, p. 99) posits that two things occur. There is:

- a dispersal of formal authority down the command chain which he terms ‘vertical decentralisation’. In a military organisation this is achieved by means of delegation of command authority; and

- transfer of power to make decisions to people not necessarily in the command chain. This he terms ‘horizontal decentralisation’ or the ‘...extent to which non-managers control decision processes’. In a military organisation this occurs when, say, subordinate commanders act without referral in pursuance of their commander’s intent i.e. when they exercise their initiative. This concept is central to the idea of NCW or network enabled warfare. Horrocks (1977, p. 30) describes one such instance when a young officer commanding eight tanks seized an unexpected opportunity and captured Mt Pincon following the British landings at Normandy. This feature was ‘...the most formidable feature...and...the cornerstone of the enemy defences in Normandy’. This transfer of decision-making power is suggested as being the norm for NCW.

Mintzberg (1993) further notes that it is not necessary for an organisation to be either centralised in totality or decentralised in totality. Authority may be decentralised or delegated to various levels within the organisation, giving rise to varying amounts of authority residing at different levels in the command chain. ‘Finding the balancing point between the mix of centrifugal and centripetal forces needs to be the goal’, and ‘...severing the ties that bind people together in work may be as damaging as binding them together more tightly’ (Brown and Duguid 2002, p. 75).

Paterson (1969, p.18) divides the decision process into several steps that Mintzberg (1993, p. 100) has modified to five steps:

1. collection of information;
2. advising on what should be done as a result of this information;
3. making a choice;
4. authorising action; and
5. executing the action.

The level of control that one has over each step dictates the type and amount of formal and informal authority that an individual possesses within an organisation. It is suggested that 1, 2, and 5 represent more informal than formal authority and steps 3 and 4 represent more formal than informal authority. If an individual has control over all five steps, then that individual has centralised control over the organisation into one place. The less control that one individual has over the five steps then the more decentralised is the organisation. Mintzberg (1993, p. 101) suggests that an organisation has reached the point of most decentralisation when the decision maker at step 3 has only a level of control over the decision such that if it was reduced in any way then that person could no longer be considered a decision maker.
11.4 Theatres of command as organisations

Applying organisation principles to the structure of various theatres can provide useful insights into why particular structures came about. They can go at least part of the way into explaining why commanders attempt to ‘micro manage’ elements of their force. This phenomenon occurs with Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Schwartzkopf, particularly in relation to the command of land forces, and even Admiral Mountbatten at one stage considered directly commanding his land forces.

While General Eisenhower did not give this as his reason for taking direct command of the Allied land forces, it is suggested that he saw as a major vulnerability the threat to the coalition posed by the nationality of a Land Force commander. The Allied Land Commander-in-Chief would have to have been British and this almost certainly meant the appointment of General Montgomery. While General Eisenhower was prepared to appoint General Montgomery to command the invasion forces, US public opinion indicated that this was not acceptable as a long-term situation. Eisenhower overcame this by not making the appointment of an Allied Land Commander-in-Chief and instead carried out the functions himself. Of Drucker’s (1977) four activities, the land operations in Europe would fall into category 1 (see para.11.1). It was the land forces that would close with the enemy and liberate Europe. The air and naval forces fell into category 2. For example, the tactical air forces were essential to victory but could not of themselves obtain victory. There is tacit acceptance in the importance of the land war in the actual and potential disputes seen in public debate and the feelings expressed about the nationality of any Land Force commander. It is interesting to reflect that the US public was prepared to have British Commanders-in-Chief over US air and naval formations in this theatre but not over the land formations – they too seem to have recognised where the main activity was.

Having noted his major organisational vulnerability and his major activity, General Eisenhower then established a selectively decentralised organisation by which to exercise his command. He used the argument that he was the only one able to coordinate supply, operations, and allocation of forces in the theatre (Eisenhower 1948, p. 313).

Admiral Mountbatten, once things had settled down in SEAC, did not have the political problems faced by General Eisenhower. However, on being appointed to his theatre he did wish to take a more active role in actually commanding the theatre and this was opposed by his Commanders-in-Chief. He determined the major vulnerability in the organisation was the lack of clarification of his powers as Supreme Commander. ‘…no one knew precisely - or, it sometimes seemed, even approximately - what a Supreme Commander was supposed to do, or how he was supposed to do it (Ziegler 1986, p. 230). McGeoch (1996, p. 104) puts the situation more forcefully when he notes ‘Unfortunately, ether from negligence or pusillanimity, they (Combined Chiefs of Staff) did not place the respective Commanders-in-Chief of the sea, land, and air forces in the
theatre formally under the command of SACSEA\textsuperscript{58} (see Appendix F). It was only on the advice of the Director of Plans at the Admiralty that Mountbatten adopted what could be called a parallel decentralised organisation (a component command system) and used this as a base for gradually establishing his command authority. It is of interest that Admiral Mountbatten dismissed his Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces in mid-1944 and ‘...played with the idea of dispensing with an Army Commander-in-Chief and doing the job himself...’ (Ziegler 1986, p. 286) but did not persist with the idea. He did on several occasions involve himself in the details of the land war only on each occasion to be taken to task by successive chiefs of staff (Generals Pownall and ‘Boy’ Browning) (Ziegler 1986, p. 270).

This can be construed as indicating Mountbatten’s recognition of the land operations as falling into Drucker’s (1977) category 1. The interesting point is that, while he did not take over the land command, he still felt the urge to directly control it himself. That he was a naval officer probably would not have deterred him, as he was also an honorary Lieutenant General (and Air Marshal)!

General MacArthur used the selectively decentralised model in that he had subordinate commanders commanding his naval and air forces while he commanded the land forces directly. For example, General Kenney was Allied Air Commander commanding both the 5th US Air Force and the RAAF Command, and General Blamey was the Land Force Commander. In that General Eisenhower (post 1943) and General MacArthur both used a hybrid of direct and indirect command, it can be said that their models are virtually the same.

In MacArthur’s case we are dealing with a strong personality who saw his mission as leading a US force back into the Philippines. There was also the problem of US unwillingness to serve under a non-US Land Force commander. While the US contribution to the land forces in the SWPA in the beginning was less than the Australian contribution, it was inevitable that the scales would soon swing the other way. The maintenance of an Australian Land Force commander was thus perceived as a threat to the smooth running of what would soon become an essentially US operation and so the situation had to be circumvented. General MacArthur’s was a complex personality making it difficult to positively identify his motives. However, it is within the realms of possibility that he saw this as a major threat to the organisation justifying attempts to arrange his command so as this threat was eliminated. He did this by removing US land forces from Australian control into Alamo Force and establishing task forces to carry out the campaign. Again, the land forces were seen to be the major activity worthy of the Supreme Commander’s personal attention with the air and naval forces in the SWPA falling into category 2. In a letter to the Australian government in 1944, General MacArthur noted that ‘The Commander-in-Chief exercises personal and direct command of assault forces co-ordinating the actions of the three principal

\textsuperscript{58} In paragraph 8.4 it was noted that General MacArthur had arranged that his commanders were formally subordinated to him. This, as well as his undisputed seniority, ensured that he did not have any of the problems experienced by Admiral Mountbatten.
subordinates’ (Horner 1982, p. 393). He then lists the subordinates as the Commanders Allied Naval and Air Forces and a Task Force commander ‘…whose organisation is specifically prescribed’. General MacArthur continued with this concept of direct command instead of using component commanders for land operations at least. General MacArthur’s command arrangements prior to and during the Korean War allowed for Navy and Air Force component commanders but he ‘…retained direct command of Army components, wearing a second hat as Commanding General, Army Forces Far East’ (Cole et al.1995, p. 21).

As already indicated in paragraph 10.2, Admiral Nimitz, along with the US Navy Chief of Operations, recognised the major vulnerability of the organisation as the possibility of an Army officer (particularly General MacArthur) being made Commander-in-Chief of the entire Pacific region. The organisation eventually established in the Pacific region ensured that this would not occur by splitting the region into the SWPA and the Pacific Areas. The main activities in the Pacific Areas were amphibious operations and Admiral Nimitz used a method similar to that of General MacArthur by employing a selective decentralisation into task forces although the nature of the campaigns militated against his having such a tight control as General MacArthur on operations.

11.5 When to establish Theatre commands

General Eisenhower (1948, p. 230) noted how the command organisation used for the invasion of North Africa in 1942 proved inadequate and had to be revised. He stated that the lesson was plain that major revision of command structures ‘in the midst of battle’ was to be avoided. Instead, the force should go into battle with an organisation that ‘…would meet any probable eventuality in combat’. Lord Killearn, the British ambassador in Cairo throughout WWII, noted that while unified command was correct ‘…to introduce it after war had broken out was a tardy measure of improvisation’ and he argued for the system to be put in place during peacetime (Kirby 1969, p. 371). Kirby (1969, p. 374) argues for the provision of adequate joint service headquarters to be provided in peacetime and echoes the British experience with Operation Corporate (paragraph 10.5) when he records that: Experience in the Second World War showed that it is impossible to set up an efficient headquarters in a hurry, and very difficult to decide on a place where it can function in security and be provided with the necessary means of communication with the forces under its command.

11.6 Collocating Headquarters

There does seem to be military merit in having commanders in at least close proximity to each other. One problem that Gen Sir Ian Hamilton had in planning the Gallipoli campaign was that his naval opposite number was 500 miles away bombarding the Turks in the Dardanelles (Carlyon 2001, p. 25). The taking of Quebec and the siege of Vicksburg were two very successful joint operations for which there were no specific indications that the commanders were collocated. However, as they were both riverine
operations, it can be surmised that the commanders were within easy reach of each other. Horner (1978, p. 124) notes General Rowell’s views in New Guinea in 1942 that his headquarters should be in ‘…close touch with the naval and air commanders and reasonably placed to visit the 7th Division. The same author (Horner, 1982, p. 207) makes reference to the difficulties in liaison between General Blamey’s staff at Land Headquarters SWPA and General MacArthur’s GHQ. He noted that it did not help that the air and naval commanders were in the same building in Brisbane as GHQ but that Land Headquarters was 12 km away.

Sanderson (1989, p.64), while not substantiating this proposition, stated that the collocation of headquarters functions was a facilitator of the joint process. Indeed, collocation was only justified in the terms of reference given to Sanderson as a means to ‘…reduce the number of senior Service officers…to generate resources which will facilitate salary restructuring…’ (Sanderson 1989, p. 1). The 1994 Australian Defence White Paper (1994, p. 37) stated that collocation of the existing joint headquarters would provide for ‘…more effective command at the operational level…’. Again, the reasoning behind this statement is not explained.

However, not everyone is agreed that collocation is necessary. Ambrose (1983) notes how Eisenhower had separate headquarters from his component commanders in the period before the Normandy invasion. Eisenhower moved from London to Bushy Park while Admiral Ramsay was at Portsmouth and General Montgomery remained at his old school in London although all commanders used Southwick House as an operational headquarters on the day of the invasion (Lyon 1974, p. 287). In a discussion with Mountbatten, Eisenhower stated that the senior sea, ground, and air commanders ‘…must each have a great degree of independence’ for ‘without a great degree of decentralization no allied command can be made to work’ (Lyon 1974, p. 267). Maybe Mountbatten had this advice in mind when, on arriving in India as Supreme Commander SEAC, his first action was to evict his Naval and Army Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs from his headquarters building (Ziegler 1986, p. 227)! Later, in April 1944, Admiral Mountbatten moved his headquarters to Kandy in (then) Ceylon. His naval headquarters were at Trincomalee, ‘…Army Group headquarters was to be four miles north-east of Kandy, Air Command four miles north-west’ yet, ‘Kandy was an efficient headquarters’ (Ziegler 1986, pp. 279-80). The continued improvement in means of communication and increase in the power of computers may make collocation even more problematical. In discussing future possibilities Scholz (2000) predicts ‘…the virtualisation of military force, where sensors, decision makers and weapons no longer need to inhabit a common space, within a ship or an aircraft, to project combat force. A network-enabled force may harness the power of the virtual to change the fundamental conduct of war. Warfare can become de-territorialised’ and collocation may be unnecessary.

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59 A Network-Enabled Force could be described as a scaled down or not so complete system as a Network Centric Force (NCF) and is a term seemingly preferred by the ADF, whereas NCW is favoured by the US.
## 12. Theatre staff

Both Van Creveld (1985, pp. 27 – 40), and Gabriel and Metz (1992, Chapter 3) detail the evolution of military staffs from ancient Egyptian to modern times. It appears that, up to the latter part of the 19th century, military staffs were more involved with administrative tasks than with operational matters such as intelligence and planning. However, with the increased capability of modern communications and mobility of military forces, this has changed so that the staff has an important role in supporting the commander in all operational matters.

The importance of the staff for successful joint and multinational operations is illustrated by General Marshall’s view that liaison between commanders was not as effective as having a joint or integrated staff. ‘Higher commanders talk things over in generalities. Staff officers plan in intimacy over long periods’ (Morton 1961). Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry (1958, p.283), when allied air forces commander central Europe, stated:

> I told the staff that they must realise that unity and trust would be brought about by the way they conducted their daily business and liaison with the land forces. It was the spirit in which they approached their various tasks that would create the understanding and confidence I was so anxious to promote.

The staff attitude to their joint and multinational commanders is also influenced by the attitudes of their commanders. ‘It is more difficult for staff officers to squabble if they see their bosses working well together and this will filter down the lowest ranks, inevitably with enormous benefits’ (Clapp et al. 1996, p. 60). Examples of this can be seen with the successful integration of Allied staffs in Europe during WWII due mainly to General Eisenhower’s insistence that all members of the staff cooperate with each other. Conversely, in the SWPA, there was a complete absence of integration between Allies due to General MacArthur’s attitude towards forces not from the US. Horner (1982, p. 206) notes that:

> MacArthur also resisted Marshall’s efforts to ensure the General Headquarters (GHQ) South-West Pacific Area was a truly allied headquarters…of the eleven senior positions on MacArthur’s headquarters staff, all were filled by American Army officers….

The appropriate size of the staff assigned to a commander is uncertain. The Germans were apparently successful in keeping staff numbers low, possibly the result of superior training and doctrine. Fraser (1993, p. 274) notes that Rommel, when commanding the German Afrika Korps in 1942 had a staff of only 21 officers to command his force of ten divisions distributed into three Corps. He was provided with this staff as a unit. It was established and trained as such and Rommel was issued with his staff unit in a manner little different in principle from his being issued with a panzer division! One can imagine this group, already established and trained as an Army commander’s staff, whiling away their time in a personnel depot in Germany awaiting eventual allocation to an Army somewhere! Their Italian allies, on the other hand, were not quite so frugal in the size of their staffs. Millett et al. (1990, p. 152) state...
that Italian corps staffs ‘...such as that of the Italian expeditionary force in the Ukraine were immobile, weighted down with as many as 150 officers’.

Allied commanders were not without condemnation for the size of their staff. Admiral Mountbatten drew criticism because of the size of the staff he built in SEAC: Mountbatten’s most vulnerable point was the size of the organization which he was creating...I do wish you could stop Dick (Mountbatten) collecting staff in this crazy way. I have implored him not to make the same mistake as he made as CCO60. (Ziegler 1986, pp. 233-4).

Michel (1975, p. 615) notes that:
Eisenhower’s joint general staff (SHAEF) reached considerable dimensions...In July 1944 it numbered 4,914 people; by February 1, 1945 there were 16,000 of whom 2,700 were officers; at the end of the war it had 30,000 soldiers and civilians - of whom 996 were accredited Allied war correspondents.

The size of the staff is not necessarily directly related to the importance of the position as shown by Ballard who, when writing about General Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, noted that General Foch ‘...was able to achieve only a coordination role, since his staff was smaller than that of a brigade61’ (Rice,1997, p.3). Hart (1931, p. 284) speaks of Foch setting up his headquarters following his appointment on 28 March 1918:
That evening Foch established his headquarters in the town hall at Beauvais. Only two rooms were required – for this new organ of strategic control was as small in size as it was personal in nature.

13. Why is this so?

Why do individuals fail to cooperate? Stewart (2000, chap 5-7) points out that evolution favours those who pursue their own interests and that people will not cooperate unless there is an advantage in it for them. He indicates that people will therefore be choosy about those with whom they cooperate and will be more comfortable with those whom they feel are more likely to share the benefits of cooperation. As a result, there is a degree of wariness about cooperating with strangers who, because they are unknown, could prove to be thieves or ‘free riders’. That is, others could reap the benefits of cooperation at the expense of those who do cooperate. This self-interest stands in the way of cooperation despite the benefits to the community as a whole that cooperation amongst its members brings.

The way around this dilemma is for an individual to ensure that all those who do cooperate receive the benefits of their cooperation. To be able to do this, the individual

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60 CCO – Chief of Combined Operations.
61 This interpretation by Ballard is open to debate. Hart (1931) demonstrates that Foch’s coordination role was brought about by the command arrangements imposed by the Allied Supreme War Council and, to an extent, also by Foch’s personality and his reliance on persuasion rather than direct command.
would need both the power and authority to do so. This can be achieved either by agreement amongst the group or by coercion. Stewart (2000) refers to this individual as a manager who ‘...must have the capacity to take from the group whatever resources it needs to carry out its tasks. And it must be able to punish others without risk to itself’.

14. Culture

Organisations possess a culture that may be defined as a set of shared values. Schein (1985, p. 433) develops this further by describing culture as a deep and complex phenomenon arising from a set of basic assumptions and beliefs shared by the members of the organisation. The values and artefacts of an organisation ‘...are manifestations or surface levels of the culture but not the essence of the culture’ (Schein 1985, p. 432). There is not necessarily an organisation wide culture as the organisation may comprise of sub elements or groups all of which may also share their own culture.

The military, as an organisation, has a unique culture. In a study of the US Army, Beitz and Hook (1998) demonstrated the different cultures to be found within a large headquarters as well as field and training units. The surface levels of this culture are evidenced in items such as the different uniforms used by different services, and the equipment peculiar to the functional environment of each service e.g. aircraft for the Air Force, ships for the Navy etc. The basic assumptions can be illustrated by beliefs such as air power being able to win wars or that nothing has been achieved unless an infantryman has put his boot on the ground or that anything below the low tide mark is a Navy responsibility.

The surface levels of this military culture are important and contribute to the esprit de corps of the services and units within each service. The Australian Army wears its slouch hat with pride as does the Air Force with its unique ‘RAAF blue’ uniform. These denote strong traditions and ties with the deeds of the past. However, the deeper level assumptions held by members of each service can hinder a close working relationship between individual services and these need to be addressed in order to produce a strong ‘glue’ to hold together the structures of Joint and Combined operations. As Beaumont (1993, p. 190) noted “...formal obedience to edict may not be matched in essence’. Identifying and altering those deep cultural assumptions that prevent inter service cooperation will contribute to the effectiveness of the structures set in place to achieve unity of effort and command.

62 Spooner (1996, p. 110) records an instance during the siege of Malta that illustrates the absurd lengths that inter-service rivalry can sometimes reach. Lt Ellis, a Royal Navy pilot, was awarded the DFC but at that time the RN would not permit its personnel to display RAF awards. Later when Lt Ellis was being presented with a DSC by King George VI, the King asked where was the DFC. When given the explanation, the King ordered him to display his DFC.
Schein (1985, p. 430) notes that it is the leaders who create culture and it is the leaders who can destroy culture. Indeed, ‘…one of the most decisive functions of leadership may well be the creation, the management, and…the destruction of culture’ (Schein 1985, p. 430). One approach to destruction of existing cultures is to force change by saying in effect ‘Shape up or ship out’. General Eisenhower sometimes took this approach and Ambrose (1983, p. 186) provides several examples of General Eisenhower sacking officers, demoting then, and having them returned to the US for failure to act correctly in a combined operations environment. Trice and Beyer (1993, p. 481) refer to such actions as ‘rites of degradation’ and as being useful ‘…when a jolt would be desirable to signal that quick change is imperative…’ However, such a loss of trained senior people is not always desirable and there are other approaches to ensuring cultural changes to support the development of cooperation for joint and combined operations. Trice et al. (1993, pp. 479-482) provide examples of such methods as the use of metaphors, creation of myths, rites and ceremonials, uniform embellishments63, and initial enculturation of recruits. While it is not intended to discuss the means of cultural change in detail, it is of note that leadership is seen to be of paramount importance and that ‘General resocialization efforts usually begin at the top levels of large organizations and work downwards...’ (Trice et al. 1993).

15. Conclusions

The conclusions that may be drawn are:

- There is a difference in opinion amongst the proponents for component and direct command of military forces. While there are many examples from the literature of component commands being established formally, there are also numerous examples where the commander on the ground sought to assume direct command of at least some of these forces. This results in a hybrid of component and direct command;

- The personalities of the appointed commanders will have a significant effect on the way an organization works, at times in spite of the organization. Conflicts between commanders, such as subordinate officers having the same rank as their commander, can make even the best organisation become unworkable. If senior officers do not agree with organisational arrangements, they will attempt to ignore them;

- The choice of the right individual to command is a key to success in achieving unity of effort in coalition operations. Mutual confidence is often more important than structures or organisation;

63 A recent example is the use of the INTERFET brassard in East Timor. A similar concept, or even badges and medals, could be used to denote periods of service in joint units and headquarters. There is a precedent as the Australian Army once employed arm bands in the national colours to denote service in a headquarters. The Indonesians issued yellow brassards to both Indonesian and Australian personnel employed on the combined mapping operations (Garling, Gendarawasih, and Pattimurra) in Indonesia in the 1970s – 1980s.
• Cooperation within an organisation is very much dependent on the commanders’ attitudes both towards each other and the example they provide subordinates;
• The level of cooperation to be achieved within an organisation is directly proportional to the threat;
• While reliance on mutual cooperation may produce satisfactory results, a formal set of command arrangements provides an imperative for the commanders to cooperate. Formal command arrangements may contribute or detract from unity of effort but they do provide a statutory basis for remedying any problems; and
• Command arrangements established in haste can cause confusion. There is merit in establishing the command arrangements well beforehand and exercising them to find their strengths and weaknesses and appropriate remedies.
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Appendix B: Pacific Ocean Areas and SWPA
Appendix C: German C in C West 1944
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Appendix F: South East Asia Command 1945
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DSTO-GD-0430

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## Abstract

This historical analysis provides an intellectual basis and a resource for informed debate on matters relating to the formation and organisation of an operational level headquarters, such as the Headquarters Joint Operational Command. The experiences gained in the formation and development of a variety of headquarters and theatre campaigns are discussed and lessons learnt are established. While the emphasis is on the experience gained in WWII, examples are drawn from earlier eras and from campaigns conducted since WWII. Other relevant matters such as definitions and the nature of command and control are addressed and unique Australian experiences gained as a partner in theatre operations are discussed.