USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN INTERAGENCY REFORM ACT:
PREPARING FOR POST-CONFLICT
OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Colonel John A. Lucynski II
United States Army

Doctor Louis J. Nigro, Jr.
Project Advisor

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Today’s rapidly changing security environment differs significantly from that which existed
during the Cold War, when national security policies and procedures were driven by the Soviet
threat. During that period, the United States Government (USG) focused primarily on containing
the Soviet Union and on arms control issues – but not on complex contingency and post-conflict
operations. Today’s security environment is fraught with much greater uncertainty about
potential adversaries, threats, and attacks that face us. These diverse threats that have evolved
over the past 25 years have become exceedingly more complex and demanding. In the current
environment, the USG must act quickly and decisively with unprecedented integration of all the
elements of national power, while garnering greater cooperation among our allies, coalition
partners, and nongovernmental agencies. The current national security structure and
interagency processes are not adequate to meet these challenges. To overcome resistance to
change, agency biases, and cultural differences, we must resist the temptation to adapt minor
evolutionary changes rather than the needed revolutionary changes. Many of the problems in
the interagency process are similar to those experienced by the Department of Defense (DoD)
prior to Congress passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 (GNA). This strategic research paper will first trace the evolution of DoD through the
GNA, discuss the evolution of the interagency process, and show how the efforts to improve
interagency cooperation during the 1990’s have fallen short of expectations. It will then proceed
to highlight some current initiatives to improve the interagency process, identify problems with
the current structure, and make a recommendation to enact legislation that mandates
interagency cooperation similar to the GNA, which mandated jointness among the various
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AN INTERAGENCY REFORM ACT: PREPARING FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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created as we work with other agencies, because we don't know how to work
with them."

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ongoing initiatives to improve the interagency process, much remains to be done to realize the
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differences, we must resist the temptation to adopt minor evolutionary changes rather than the
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Many of the problems in the current interagency process are similar to those experienced
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EVOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The management of our post-World War II national security affairs begins with the
National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47), which created the National Military Establishment and
initiated a trend toward unification of the armed forces that continued throughout the remainder of the century. Starting in 1979, however, a series of military operational failures gave impetus to U.S. armed forces reform.

In 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis rescue attempt was "joint", in that the rescue force included elements of the various services. But it was not a unified effort. It lacked unity of command and no joint training was conducted prior to the operation. The outcome was unfortunate, but predictable, given the lack of joint planning and training, reliance on equipment that was not designed to operate in a joint environment, and lack of unity of command.² The failed attempt raised concern in Congress about the ability of the U.S. armed forces to plan, coordinate, lead, and conduct successful military operations involving more than one service.³

Two other operations in the early 1980s also revealed shortcomings in the way the U.S. armed services were led, trained, and equipped, and how they conducted operations. In 1983, the U.S. armed forces were involved in a joint and multinational mission to maintain the peace in Beirut, Lebanon. During this operation, the Marine headquarters building was bombed, which resulted in significant U.S. casualties. Congress subsequently initiated an investigation and confirmed that the operation did not have a clear chain of command, that there was inadequate intelligence support and sharing among the various services, and that there was inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of information caused by inadequate joint processes.⁴

Shortly after the Beirut bombing, but before the Congressional investigation was completed, the U.S. conducted Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada. The mission of this operation was to rescue American citizens, restore a legitimate government, eliminate a perceived threat to the stability of the Caribbean region, and maintain American strategic interests in the region. With the failed attempt to rescue the hostages from Iran in recent memory, the U.S. acted quickly when it became evident that Americans might again become hostages.⁵ The operation was a success in that the stated military mission was accomplished. However, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. reported in his monograph The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: Improving the Department through Centralization and Integration that many problems surfaced during the operation that revealed a lack of coordination and interoperability among the various branches of the armed services. Lovelace cited an inability to communicate between services, a lack of accurate and up-to-date maps, a lack of intelligence, and U.S. casualties resulting from friendly fire incidents.⁶

The evident deficiencies in these operations indicated a need for military reform that alarmed many members of Congress. In June 1983, Congress directed the Senate Committee on the Armed Forces to prepare a study of the organizational and decision-making procedures
within DoD. This study was later expanded to address a wide range of issues affecting DoD’s performance. In October 1985, the staff report *Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change* was finally submitted to the Committee on Armed Services in the U.S. Senate. This staff study was critical of the organization and decision-making processes in DoD; it cited systemic problems that had persisted throughout much of this century.  

The outcome of the study was the GNA, which significantly changed the way the armed forces would operate in peacetime and wartime. GNA transferred operational authority from the service chiefs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and designated the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC). It also accelerated “jointness” within the armed services by fundamentally redesigning how they were organized, trained, commanded, equipped, and employed. Many attribute the prestige the U.S. military enjoys today and its military achievements in recent operations to the results of this legislation. The progress made within the armed services to improve planning and conduct of operations was not accompanied, however, by similar improvement in interagency coordination between DoD and other agencies of the USG.

GNA offers significant lessons that could be applied to the legislative process for improving interagency coordination.

- Congress concluded that to overcome service parochialism and realize meaningful change, a substantial organizational and cultural change was needed. It took almost five years of studies and debate prior to final passage of GNA.  

- It took almost 20 years for the full impact of GNA to be realized on the battlefield. Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the nation’s first truly joint major combat operation characterized by true joint interdependence, rather than mere deconfliction.

- Service-specific agendas continued to surface. While a certain amount of interagency or interdepartmental rivalry is healthy, too much in-fighting or parochialism can lead to ambiguity in planning and execution, as well as wasted resources. General Tommy Franks wrote in *American Soldier* that the Departments of Defense and State debated who should lead Iraq in post-conflict operations up to the point that “Iraq’s new leadership would have to be identified on the fly, even as military liberation was under way.”

THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

The term “interagency process” describes the interaction of various government agencies, each with a different culture, a different planning process, and a different perspective on what is
best for the nation.\(^1\) NSA 47 created the NSC as the framework to administer the interagency process for national security matters and emphasized the need for integration of agency policy to improve the overall effectiveness of maintaining national security: "The function of the Council shall be to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."\(^1\) Originally designed to "advise the president" and coordinate interagency efforts, the NSC has continued to evolve since its inception and has taken on a number of roles and missions reflecting the policies of successive administrations. Although the NSC was designed to coordinate political and military actions, it is now apparent that it primarily serves the president. Additionally, it has evolved from an organization that fosters harmony among the various departments to an organization that seeks to control and manage competing departments.\(^2\)

President Truman’s NSC, the first after NSA 47 was passed, was dominated by the Department of State, while President Eisenhower’s NSC was dominated by an elaborate NSC staff that coordinated and monitored policy implementation. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson preferred a less formal NSC system; they worked primarily through ad hoc groups and trusted friends. Presidents Nixon and Ford returned to a more structured NSC, with the National Security Advisor coordinating the interagency effort to gather and analyze information, while identifying viable courses of action for the President. President Carter saw the National Security Advisor as the primary source of foreign policy ideas, so his NSC staff supported this role. President Reagan minimized the National Security Advisor’s role and elevated the role of his Chief of Staff. Conflicts between the departments and the NSC staff emerged and collegial relations suffered. President George H. Bush, based on his extensive foreign policy experience, reorganized the NSC staff to include the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordinating Committees. He also developed and insisted on professional working relationships among the various departments. President Clinton continued to emphasize a collegial relationship between departments while expanding the NSC to include the Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. representative to the United Nations, the President’s Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.\(^3\)

Presidents have used the NSA 47’s leeway and flexibility to use and structure the NSC to fit their leadership styles and to execute their defense and foreign policies. While not originally designed to execute interagency coordination, the NSC clearly has taken on a variety of roles in either defining policy or coordinating implementation of policy. Since the NSC was originally
conceived and designed to “advise” the President, it lacks the capability to integrate the interagency effort and monitor its implementation.\textsuperscript{14}

**EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION DURING THE 1990’S**

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new world order emerged, one in which peacekeeping and complex contingency operations became the norm. One of the first efforts to address interagency coordination occurred in May 1994 when President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 – *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*. PDD 25 did not address all the interagency requirements during peace operations; rather it called for an interagency review of the nation’s peacekeeping policies and provided a framework designed for the post-Cold War era. Specifically, it attempted to improve the way the USG managed peace operations and advocated a new “shared responsibility” approach to peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1997 President Clinton signed PDD 56 – *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, which further attempted to improve the interagency process. This PDD responded to a growing awareness that future conflicts could involve multinational forces, regional organizations, or ad hoc arrangements requiring a multidimensional approach, while employing one or several elements of our national power. The PDD directed U.S. agencies:

- To capture and document lessons learned from past and future experiences and continue to improve the planning and management of complex contingency operations.
- To develop a political-military implementation plan (or “pol-mil plan”) as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in complex contingency operations.
- To establish a Deputies Committee to bring together interagency working groups to assist in planning policy development and to execute complex contingency operations.
- To enable the NSC to work with appropriate USG educational institutions to develop an interagency training program to train mid-level managers in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans for complex operations.\textsuperscript{16}

Responding to PDD 56, in 1997 the NSC designated the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. as the lead agent for establishing a program of education and training that focused on multi-agency coordination and planning for complex operations. NDU responded by developing an educational program for government employees in the area of multi-agency and departmental planning and coordination for overseas emergencies.\textsuperscript{17}
Between the time PDD 25 and PDD 56 were published, Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations was published to:

- Outline the interagency process and identify potential participants.
- Explain the evolving role of the U.S. armed forces within the interagency process.
- Describe interagency coordination.
- Explain the role of the NSC System.
- Discuss organizing for interagency operations at the operational level.
- Outline joint task force roles and responsibilities.¹⁹

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FALL SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS

The underlying problems for interagency coordination have existed for much of this century. However, these problems became more pressing with the emergence of complex contingency operations in the 1980s. The Clinton Administration’s efforts to generate greater interagency cooperation offered a good start, but more needs to be done in this area. This nation needs greater interagency cooperation to achieve better information sharing and to conduct more effective collaborative planning to bring all elements of national power to bear on an adversary or issue.

Achieving national objectives in any campaign requires a successful post-conflict operation. It is possible to win the operational aspect of a campaign (the battle), but not to achieve the national strategic objectives (the war) without a detailed plan for post-conflict operations. Retired General Anthony Zinni, a previous CENTCOM Combatant Commander, emphasized that the U.S. military does a superb job in winning battles and is without peer on the battlefield; the nation, however, has not done equally well at winning the wars. He observed, “We are great at dealing with the tactical problems – the killing and the breaking. We are lousy at solving the strategic problems; having a strategic plan, understanding about regional and global security and what it takes to weld that and shape it and to move it forward.”¹⁹ The strategic plan must include a vision and an interagency plan that enables us to win the war. General Zinni’s remarks are very similar to the findings in the Center for Strategic and International Studies report - Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: “Because the U.S. military will rarely operate outside the interagency and coalition contexts, its unmatched capabilities to win wars will be squandered if the United States and the international community more broadly do not also develop the capabilities needed to win the peace.”²⁵
Operation Just Cause in Panama offers an example. While the military operations have been regarded as highly successful, the post-conflict planning and preparation has been criticized. Planning for the military phase of the operation began over a year before the conflict began. Planning for post-conflict operations, however, was not given the same priority. So when the military phase of the operation began, the plan for post-conflict operations was not complete. To make matters even worse, the interagency process was doomed to fail from the very beginning because many agencies were excluded in the planning process. The result was a highly successful military operation, but no plan to transfer authority to the civilian authorities. In fact, no civilian authority was identified to head up post-conflict activities.\footnote{1}

The interagency planning process for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 was more successful. Again, the lead time before operations actually commenced was fairly long and lessons learned from Somalia and Panama prompted DoD to conduct extensive interagency planning. This included a plan for providing security, training a security force, restoring and running public services, and conducting humanitarian relief efforts.\footnote{2}

Another example of interagency failure occurred during Desert Storm. The commander of Third U.S. Army, who was responsible for post-conflict issues, complained that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted to deal with, and he was unable to garner the requisite support.\footnote{3} In the final analysis, an inadequate post-conflict plan undermined the efforts of supporting agencies to provide the necessary support.

Interagency planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) may be the best example of a need for revolutionary interagency reform. DoD, lead agency for OIF, began campaign planning over a year before the war began. Starting in August 2002, the director of the NSC staff for defense led the Executive Steering Group for interagency coordination for Iraq, reporting to the Deputies Committee. However, he reported that, because of poor communications within DoD between the civilian and military sides and “chaos” within the interagency process, he had to meet each week with the National Security Advisor to outline problems.\footnote{4}

In November 2002, just months before the start of OIF and well after the military planning for OIF was underway, the Deputies Committee began to consider post-conflict operations and the post-war plan. On 20 January 2003, just three months before combat operations began, National Security Presidential Directive # 24 directed DoD to stand up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), assigning it the responsibility for planning and implementing USG tasks in post-war IRAQ.\footnote{5} General Tommy Franks noted that standing up ORHA and naming its leader was a good first step. Much remained to be done, however, such as providing the administration’s policy and resourcing the organization.\footnote{6}
Franks stated that the ORHA operated without a clear mission, was severely understaffed, under funded, and well behind the power curve in planning. Instead of receiving the required staff and resources, ORHA leader Jay Garner “spent weeks walking the corridors of Washington, hat in hand.”

It became evident during the months following the war that the interagency process in Iraq was not working. In October 2003, in order to ensure a greater balance between the Departments of Defense and State, the President provided the National Security Advisor with additional authority and responsibility for stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq – the second major shift of interagency responsibility within the year. General Franks lamented these shortcomings and wished the Departments of State and Defense would have worked closely together.

These failures in executing complex contingency operations and post-conflict operations led to a number of studies and reports that highlighted the need to improve the interagency process and a lack of compliance with guidance and policy. An article in the Joint Forces Quarterly described the interagency process as dysfunctional, with the degree of dysfunction varying by agency. Additionally, various agency members, including members of the Deputies Committee, indicated widespread dissatisfaction with the process.

More recently, a past Deputy Secretary of State, one of the key players on the NSC Deputies Committee, called the foreign policy-making system dysfunctional and charged that the Deputies Committee was not carrying its load.

A 1999 study conducted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that PDD 56’s mandate to train government personnel in complex operations had not been carried out. The study criticized the NSC because it did not assume the leadership role it was given and it had failed to collect interagency lessons learned from previous operations. In 2001, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, and the United States Army co-sponsored a high-level conference to consider ways to more effectively focus U.S. instruments of national power on the full range of security challenges confronting America. The members unanimously agreed that measures were required to enhance information-sharing and interagency cooperation to meet the security requirements of this era. Increased interagency cooperation among all levels and branches of the government was the most frequently cited requirement.

Most recently, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in its 2004 report Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, identified the interagency...
process as a weakness. The report cites significant problems in post-conflict reconstruction operations in Somalia, in the former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. The report is especially critical in reporting that the DoD and USG are ill-prepared and poorly equipped to deal with the urgent requirements of nation building.\textsuperscript{34}

**CURRENT INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS**

National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1), *Organization of the National Security Council System*, the first NSDP of the current President Bush administration, superseded all existing presidential guidance on the organization of the NSC system. NSPD 1 directs that the NSC Principals Committee will continue as the senior interagency forum for national security policy issues; it designates the NSC Deputies Committee as the senior sub-cabinet interagency forum for policy issues affecting national security. NSPD 1 states that one of the six regional Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) or eleven functional PCCs will conduct the day-to-day management of the development and implementation of national security policies involving multiple agencies. While none of the PCCs deal with post-conflict operations specifically, NSPD 1 directs the appropriate regional PCC to provide oversight of on-going missions assigned to PDD-56.\textsuperscript{35}

Congress moved in the right direction when Senators Lugar and Biden introduced the *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act*. This bill, which has bipartisan support, provides for the development, as a core mission of the State Department, of an effective civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. The purpose of the act is to:

- Strengthen the civilian element of U.S. joint civilian-military operations.
- Create a rapid response corps of civilian experts to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities by establishing a new system of planning, organization, personnel policies, and education and training.
- Encourage the international community and non-governmental organizations to participate in planning and organizing stabilization and reconstruction activities.
- Recommend that the President establish a new directorate of stabilization and reconstruction within the NSC to oversee the development of interagency contingency plans and procedures.
- Establish a personnel exchange program among Department of State (including United States Agency for International Development [USAID]) and DoD (including regional commands and the Joint Staff).\textsuperscript{36}
In response to the proposed legislation, the State Department moved to create an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to enhance our nation’s institutional capability to respond to crises involving failed, failing, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies. The Office has the following functions:

- Facilitate USG decision-making concerning states and regions at risk.
- Coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and implementation of programs across agencies.
- Develop a robust lessons-learned component to learn from recent operations and incorporate those lessons into functional changes in training, planning, and exercises.
- Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources.
- Work with international and non-governmental organizations to increase interoperability.  

The DoD also has several ongoing initiatives to improve interagency cooperation. One DoD effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), which Paul Mayberry, Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness, described as a concept based upon four pillars, one of which is the seamless accommodation of both interagency and coalition requirements. JNTC expands the traditional bounds of training and advocates programs beyond inter-service training – including intergovernmental, interagency, and coalition training. Although this training focuses on the tactical and operational levels, JNTC training could have strategic implications during post-conflict operations.

Another DoD effort, spearheaded by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG concept seeks to establish operational connections among various agencies to improve planning and coordination within the government. According to USJFCOM, JIACG should serve as an integral member of the combatant commander’s staff, performing the following functions:

- Participate in combatant command staff planning and assessment.
- Advise the Combatant Commander on civilian agency campaign planning.
- Work civilian-military campaign issues.
- Provide vital links to Washington and key civilian regional and international contacts. Several Combatant Commanders have already established a JIACG-type staff element.

The NDU training program for individuals involved in interagency work is another ongoing DoD initiative. This three-to-five day training program for individuals who will serve in positions involving interagency coordination was initially designed for strategic level policy-makers within the Capital area, but it has been broadened to address specific regional requirements. The first
training at this level occurred in March 2004 when NDU conducted an educational program for U.S. Northern Command's JIACG. To ensure that the course remains relevant, NDU has developed a methodology to gather and incorporate lessons learned from complex contingencies into their training curriculum.

**PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND STRUCTURE**

Complex contingency operations require the traditional interagency partners — State, Defense, CIA, and NSC Staff — to work together closely and demand that other agencies — Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Transportation and others — join the process as well. Evolutionary changes, minor incremental changes within the current structure, are insufficient to genuinely improve the interagency process.

Under the current system, no single agency is responsible for executing post-conflict planning and coordination. The two leaders in interagency planning for post-conflict operations are the Departments of State and Defense. The State Department has expertise and experience in governmental transition and applications of the diplomatic and informational elements of national power. State's sister agency, USAID, provides the lead for USG humanitarian assistance and economic and social reconstruction operations. DoD has the expertise and experience in maintaining security and performing a multitude of other military tasks associated with post-conflict operations. As currently structured, however, both Departments lack the required expertise and resources to lead true interagency planning team efforts in post-conflict operations and seldom synchronize their planning efforts from the very beginning.

To further complicate the interagency process, every time the presidency changes, new procedures are established to conduct interagency coordination. While that may benefit the sitting president by allowing him to adapt procedures to meet his leadership style, it does little to foster an institutional culture. With each presidential administration change, and to a lesser degree at the mid-point of a two-term president, political appointees and professional governmental employees must develop and adapt to new policies — all of which leads to a high personnel turnover rate and a loss of institutional knowledge. With each change come new Presidential Decision Directives/National Security Presidential Directives specifying new processes and requirements, which require the previous administration’s procedures to be rewritten and relearned. Consider the Clinton Presidential Decision Memorandum 56, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. PDD 56, a result of lessons learned from failed efforts to conduct complex contingency operations in the
1990s, significantly defined the government's role in managing complex contingency operations and sought to change the culture in various agencies. However, PDD 56 was not mandated by law or legislated. So when the new administration came into office in 2001, it superseded PDD 56 with NSPD 1. However, NSPD 1 did not capture all the salient points of PDD 56 and thus failed to capitalize on past post-conflict lessons learned.

Some may argue that a permanent structural change is not needed if effective leadership at the highest levels is sufficient to direct, coordinate, and monitor post-conflict operations. However, 25 years of post-conflict failures clearly indicates that a change to the current process is required. Leadership of an ad-hoc group with traditional service parochialisms and without a budget, which only coerces interagency cooperation, is insufficient. By using ad hoc non-permanent interagency planning cells, new standard procedures must be developed for each operation; personnel need to become familiar with the unique processes and culture of each agency; and they must learn the personalities, strengths, and weaknesses of the various members of the team. In a Parameters article, David Tucker makes some very insightful observations: As early as 1961, the Joint Staff recognized it is difficult to achieve interagency planning because the various agencies don't understand the planning processes of various other agencies involved, and the each agency has its own process – some more deliberate and some more flexible. He also highlights an Army After Next report that finds that "the diversity of the interagency, with each agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives, makes unity of effort difficult."

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

If the United States is to effectively prosecute the war on terror and conduct successful post-conflict operations, it will need unprecedented integration of all the elements of national power. Relying on the current interagency structure and process is not an option, even though some may argue that genuine interagency cooperation is too expensive or too difficult. Inaction will place future complex contingencies and post-conflict operations at risk. The USG will not realize the full potential and synergistic effects of interagency coordination and harness the potential of all the relevant talented individuals who work in the government if revolutionary changes in interagency structure and process are not effected.

If the passage of the GNA was revolutionary, then a similar revolution needs to occur for true interagency reform. In 1986, following a series of military operational failures, DoD underwent a comprehensive outside review that led to the GNA. The protracted legislative discussions and debate prior to passage of GNA took almost five years, and then full realization
of GNA benefits took an additional twenty years. This revolutionary legislation offers an excellent example of the deliberate legislative process. A similar approach should be followed to reform interagency structure and process. The NSC interagency process and structure has not undergone a thorough outside review since the NSA 47. Based on U.S. performances during recent post-conflict operations and to better prepare for post-conflict operations in the 21st century, Congress should direct a comprehensive review to examine the interagency structure and process, and review the manner in which the various government agencies fail to work together. The resulting report should identify requirements and shortfalls, should recommend changes, should suggest desirable implementation, and should identify a lead agency. Such study and deliberation should be accomplished as soon as possible – because improvements will take time.

Only with the support of Congress and corresponding legislation will reform be possible. The current procedures for coordinating interagency effort are not clearly defined by law and are open to broad interpretation by each presidential administration. Legislation will ensure a coherent, long-term interagency structure and process from administration to administration. Such legislation should not be viewed as usurpation of presidential power and authority, but as a means to institutionalize the interagency process. Presidents would have the prerogative to review the procedures upon assuming office and then to provide guidance; however, the overall structure would remain in place. It is also imperative that the recommended revolutionary changes have bi-partisan support in order to attain significant institutional and cultural change. After passing the legislation, Congress must remain active by continually assessing the effectiveness of the interagency process in terms of training, equipping, funding, planning, and personnel management.

The identified lead agency should be provided with a clear vision of effective interagency action, with clear authority to limit agency parochialism and to resolve disagreements among various agencies, and with a sufficient degree of budgetary control to provide unity of purpose. It would consolidate capabilities, direct a robust planning process, and foster a common culture built upon trust, professionalism, and mutual respect. It would assure that all agencies likely involved in post-conflict operations are permanently represented in this organization by individuals with demonstrated expertise in the required functional areas. Agencies’ representatives will report to and represent their parent organization in the interagency organization, but the majority of the background work may be conducted in the various planning cells of the respective agencies. The lead agency would mandate that interagency personnel participate in a professional development program to understand the roles, culture, capabilities,
and strengths and weaknesses of the various agencies. Additionally, agency representatives should serve for a period of time in a different agency or overseas to expand their perspectives prior to reaching a certain career level – just as GNA mandated joint training and assignments for military officers prior to selection to flag officer.

The Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established by the State Department in 2004, is ideally suited for post-conflict planning. Legislation should empower this office to do just that. This Office will lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife and report directly to the Secretary of State. It will include staff detailed from relevant U.S. agencies to fill the key gaps of joint civilian-military planning, the civilian capacity to deploy with military units to support stabilization operations, and the unclear transfer from military to civilian responsibilities. This will require a critical infusion of people (force structure), funding, and resources for planning, exercises, training for USG civilian agencies, and integrated civilian and military planning. DoD should lead the effort to support State’s new office with personnel, funds, and resources. The Defense Science Board Study on Transition to and from Hostilities recommends that DoD “kick start” this initiative because of its extensive expertise in crisis and deliberate planning. This contribution would be relatively minor, considering resources allocated to DoD; however, the potential for return is enormous. To ensure executive oversight, the National Security Council should remain to provide oversight and guidance.

In the interim, before legislation is passed, agencies should continue to develop ongoing initiatives to facilitate and improve interagency coordination. Congress should pass the Lugar-Biden Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act in 2005. While this legislation focuses only on specific aspects of interagency coordination, it does address many critical needs for establishing a process for interagency cooperation during stability and reconstruction efforts. The State Department should continue to develop the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability. DoD should adapt many of the Defense Science Board’s recommendations in Transition to and from Hostilities. Specifically it should be proactive in post-conflict planning and accept post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions with the same seriousness as it does combat missions. It should integrate post-conflict operations into the services’ training programs and encourage participation by students from other agencies and departments. DoD should update doctrinal publications such as JP 3-08. It should expand NDU’s interagency training and education efforts to create a cadre of professionals familiar with the integrated planning process, while continuing to gather lessons learned to serve
as the catalyst for change at educational institutions. It should further develop and experiment with the JIACG and JNTC concepts. The JIACG concept is especially critical because it establishes a team at the regional combatant command level to focus on a full spectrum of actions including peacetime engagement, crisis prevention, and stabilization operations. This will fill needs identified in a report for the Center for the Study of the Presidency – *Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, The State Department, and Other Agencies*. The report proposes strengthening the ability of military and State Department leaders to operate regionally. It also proposes establishing a regional interagency contingency planning center for each Regional Combatant Commander region to synergize long-term contingency planning among the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the international development communities.

The United States is the most powerful nation in the world. To maintain this status and meet the challenges of the new security environment, it must develop a comprehensive strategy focused on synchronizing and employing all elements of national power to achieve a synergistic effect. GNA fundamentally changed the way DoD conducts operations and enabled it to achieve a level of jointness that was not thought possible. We need to expand this "jointness" further to include other USG agencies through radical interagency reform of post-conflict operations. The process must begin now because history has shown it takes time to implement true governmental reform. A combination of presidential leadership, legislation, a change of mindset, and a cultural change among the various agencies is necessary to harness the nation's interagency potential to support our National Security Strategy. Ad hoc coordination, the traditional means to conduct interagency operations, has not proven effective in planning recent post-conflict operations.

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ENDNOTES


7 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 16 October 1985, III-IV.

8 James R. Locher, Victory on the Potomac (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), Forward, 11.


13 Ibid., 2-4.


20 Murdock, 61.

21 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 3-5.

22 Ibid., 6-7. There were problems with post-conflict operations; however, the military generally received high marks for its planning (and leading the interagency effort) and execution of post-conflict operations.

23 John J. Yeosock, What We Should have Done Differently, Part II of In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), 25; referenced in Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 2.

24 Ibid., 322.

25 Ibid., 321.

26 Franks, 424.

27 Ibid., 525.


29 Franks, 544.

31 Ibid., 414.

32 Roman Scarborough, “Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” The Washington Times, December 06, 1999, Part A, Pg A1. However, the report is not entirely accurate because efforts were underway at NDU to meet the intent of the directive.


34 Murdock, 19, 60.


37 Department of State, Creation of New Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Cable 208383, 27 September 2004.


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