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This paper provides a brief overview of Sudan since gaining its independence in 1953. Tragically, Sudan has been involved in civil war for all but 10 years of its existence. In 1993, the United States listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Sudan is a country in crisis, but not without hope.

On January 9, 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed by the two conflicting parties. However, this peace agreement is at risk because of the attacks on civilian population in Darfur. On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility – and that genocide may still be occurring." The United States has been applying pressure to end the conflict.

This paper focuses on Sudan's future challenges, United States interests in the region, and engagement options to foster peace, stability, prosperity, and health. Three engagement options are examined: status quo, moderate engagement, or robust engagement. The paper recommends robust engagement by the United States and others is essential to ending the conflicts in Sudan.
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The United States clearly has emerged as the world's single superpower following the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, with the disintegration of strategic relationships between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, stability around the world has decreased, to include many of the weak undeveloped African countries. Sudan was one of the pawns the super powers played on the chess-board of cold war politics. The end of the cold war has not resolved Africa's security concerns but simply altered them. After the fall of the Berlin Wall there have been periods of improvement. But many describe the path of improvement in Sudan as moving one step forward, followed by two steps back. Overall, the people of Sudan are less well-off than anytime prior to the country being granted independence in 1956 by British-Egyptian Administration. Why is this? Should the United States even care about the plight of the people of Sudan? What are the United States security interests in Sudan? Have past and current U.S. foreign policies with Sudan been effective? What level of engagement should the U.S. maintain with Sudan? These questions will be discussed in the following pages.

Sudan, a Brief History

Sudan is the largest nation in Africa, covering an area of almost one million square miles and has a population of approximately 38 million people. It is also one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Sudan was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and principalities from the beginning of the Christian era until 1820-21, when Egypt unified the northern portion of the country. Although Egypt claimed all of the present Sudan during most of the 19th century, it was unable to establish effective control over southern Sudan, which remained an area of fragmented tribes subject to frequent attacks by slave raiders.

In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad ibn Abdalla proclaimed himself the Mahdi, or the "expected one," and began a religious crusade to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took on the name "Ansars" (the followers), which they continue to use today; they are associated with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party, led by the
descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi. Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdi died shortly thereafter, but his state survived until overwhelmed by an Anglo-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898. Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration Sudan. While maintaining the appearance of joint administration, the British Empire formulated policies and supplied most of the top administrators. Sudan was granted its independence on January 1, 1956. Since gaining independence, Sudan has painfully suffered through one civil war after another. And on February 13, 2005, Parade magazine listed Sudan's Chief of State, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir as the world's worst dictator. Sudan's capital city is in Khartoum.

On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA) signed a comprehensive peace agreement, formally ending over four decades of civil war in Sudan. Today, a power-sharing agreement allows for the creation of a separate government of “Southern Sudan,” which will receive a “significant devolution of powers” from the Sudanese government in Khartoum. Following a six-year interim period, there will be an internationally-monitored referendum in southern Sudan that will allow southern Sudanese to confirm Sudan's unity or vote for succession.

However, new conflicts have emerged in the northern regions of Sudan. In Darfur, Muslims are waging war against Muslims partly in protest against the distribution of economic resources. This conflict has resulted in tens of thousands killed in the past two years and approximately two million others forced from their homes.

CULTURE

Sudan has two distinct major cultures—Arab and black African—with hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups, which makes effective collaboration among them a major problem. The northern states cover most of the Sudan and include most of the urban centers. Most of the 22 million Sudanese who live in this region are Arabic-speaking.

The vast cultural diversities that reside within Sudan help explain Sudan's continuing history of political instability and internal conflict. The conflicts are primarily between the predominantly Arab, Muslim north and the Christian and animist African south. The Arab/Muslim north controls Sudan's national government. The SPLA is supported by the Christian and animist south.

The southern region has a population of around 6 million and a predominantly rural. Here the Sudanese practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although Christian missionaries
have converted some. The south also contains many tribal groups and many more languages are used than in the north. The Dinka--whose population is estimated at more than 1 million--is the largest of the many black African tribes of the Sudan.12

Sudan straddles ancient boundaries between northern Muslims and black peoples they have raided for slaves.13 During British colonization, the administrative borders in each colony were drawn without regard to ethnic or tribal identities. The colonial powers often found it useful to divide up ethnic or tribal groups in order to complicate the emergence of a unified opposition to imperial rule.14 Sudan’s cultural diversities continue to fuel political instability and conflict.15 For Sudan to succeed, it must find its own identity.

RELIGIONS

The relationship between religion and state is perhaps the most controversial of all the forces driving conflict in Sudan.16 Islamists have dominated the current government since it came to power.17 Non-Muslims are treated as second-class citizens and religious minority rights are not protected.18

This has at times made the divergence between the interests of the government and the secular-minded SPLA appears irreconcilable.19 According to the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, Sudan is one of the worst oppressors of religious freedoms in the world. Apostasy, or conversion of Muslims to another religion, is punishable by death.20 Sharia, or Islamic law, is inconsistently enforced with severe and degrading punishments.21 The government refuses to allow Roman Catholic churches to be built and permits its security forces to bomb and attack Christian churches, schools, hospitals and missions throughout the Nuba Mountains and the south, as well as mosques in opposition areas of eastern Sudan.22

SUDAN INDEPENDENCE

In February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked years of civil war.23
CIVIL WAR

Tragically, this nation has been engaged in civil war for 38 of its 48 years of existence. Civil war in Sudan has been the norm rather than the exception. The principle factors behind Sudan's civil wars are disputes over religion, resources, governance, and self-determination. Concentration of power in a small group of competing elites that has not granted the majority of Sudanese broader economic and political rights has deepened the country's considerable geographic, religious, cultural, and ethnic divisions.

Sudan's civil war has been prosecuted with stark brutality, principally by government forces. The government has unleashed indiscriminate aerial attacks, used famine as a weapon of war, forcibly displaced civilians and supported paramilitary forces engaging in the slave trade. The opposition SPLA and its allied militias have indiscriminately attacked civilian populations, diverted relief supplies and forcibly recruited soldiers, including children.

Direct, large scale combat is not the norm. More often, government forces attack civilian targets as part of an effort to weaken support for the insurgents, and the SPLA relies on guerrilla tactics against government supply lines and oil infrastructure.

A rebellion broke out in Darfur, in western Sudan, in 2003, led by two rebel groups--the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In seeking to defeat the rebel movements, the Government of Sudan armed and supported local tribal and other militias, which have come to be known as the "Jingaheit." Attacks on the civilian population by the Jingaheit, often with the direct support of Government of Sudan forces, has led to the death of tens of thousands of persons in Darfur. Some 1.5 million persons have been internally displaced in Darfur; an additional 201,000 have sought refuge from the conflict in neighboring Chad.

A cease-fire between the parties was signed in N'djamena, Chad, on April 8, 2004; despite the deployment of an African Union observer force to monitor implementation of the cease-fire and investigate violations, violence has continued. The United States, United Nations, and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been applying political pressure to the GOS to end the civil war.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

Until just recently, the main warring parties - the Islamist government and opposition SPLA – have shown little interest in a serious peace process. In September 2001, former Senator John Danforth was designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan. His role was to explore the prospects that the U.S. could play a useful catalytic role in the search for a
just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that could help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war-related effects. The Danforth appointment represents the highest-level commitment to supporting peace in the Sudan that any administration in Washington has made.

In July 2002, the GOS and the SPLA reached a historic agreement on the role of state and religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. This agreement, known as the Machakos Protocol and named after the town in Kenya where the peace talks were held, concluded the first round of talks sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The effort was mediated by Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo.

On November 19, 2004, the GOS and the SPLA signed a declaration committing them to conclude a final comprehensive peace agreement by December 31, 2004, in the context of a special session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Nairobi, Kenya. At this session, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1574, which welcomed the commitment of the government and the SPLM to achieve agreement by the end of 2004, and underscored the international community’s intention to assist the Sudanese people and support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. It also demanded that the Government of Sudan and the SLA/M and JEM halt all violence in Darfur.

In keeping with their commitment to the Security Council, the GOS and the SPLA initialed the final elements of the comprehensive agreement on December 31, 2004. The two parties formally signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005. The United States and the international community have welcomed this decisive step forward for peace in Sudan.

ECONOMY

In 2003, the Sudan's mostly agricultural economy continued to be crippled by the civil war, destruction of infrastructure, economic mismanagement, and the existence of more than 4 million internally displaced persons and refugees. The country continued taking some steps toward transitioning from a socialist to a market-based economy; however, the government and governing party supporters remained heavily involved in the economy.

Sudan’s primary resources are agricultural, but oil production and export are taking on greater importance since October 2000. Although the country is trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton and gum arabic remain its major agricultural exports. Grain sorghum (dura) is the principal food crop, and wheat is grown for domestic consumption. Sesame seeds and peanuts are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. Livestock production has
vast potential, and many animals, particularly camels and sheep, are exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. However, Sudan remains a net importer of food. Problems of irrigation and transportation remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy.\(^3\)

Sudan’s transportation facilities, industrial development and electrical capacity is limited.\(^4\)

Various projects are proposed to expand hydropower, thermal generation, and other sources of energy, but so far the government has had difficulty arranging sufficient financing.\(^5\)

Historically, the U.S., the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have supplied most of Sudan’s economic assistance. Sudan’s role as an economic link between Arab and African countries is reflected by the presence in Khartoum of the Arab Bank for African development. The World Bank had been the largest source of development loans.\(^6\)

Sudan will require extraordinary levels of program assistance and debt relief to manage a foreign debt exceeding $21 billion, more than the country’s entire annual gross domestic product (GDP).\(^7\) The government fell out of compliance with an International Monetary Fund standby program and accumulated substantial arrearages on repurchase obligations.\(^8\)

Exports other than oil are largely stagnant. With the small industrial sector is in a depression, spending in support of civil conflicts continues to preempt other social investments, and Sudan’s inadequate and declining infrastructure inhibits economic growth.\(^9\)

**U.S. INTERESTS**

Americans find it hard to agree or identify a specific set of U.S. interests for Sub-Saharan Africa, let alone for the country of Sudan. However, as result of Sudan’s past relationship with Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist organizations, Sudan’s harboring of terrorists must be considered a vital threat against U.S. national security.\(^10\) Other American interests in Sudan that have been identified by various U.S. agencies and other organizations include the spread of democracy, access to oil, AIDS, freedom of religion, and champion the aspirations for human dignity (i.e., addressing the humanitarian crisis in Sudan). All of these interests are outlined in President Bush’s National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002).\(^11\)

**TERRORISM**

The United States currently lists six state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan.\(^12\) Osama Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 and established a complex set of intertwined businesses and terrorist enterprises.\(^13\) In the early and mid-1990s,
Carlos the Jackal, Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, and other terrorist leaders resided in Khartoum. Sudan’s role in the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in a number of draw-downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the early-mid 1990s. Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan’s 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a 1996 suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum and a radical reduction in American Embassy and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staff.

The U.S. added Sudan to its terrorism list in 1993 because Sudan was a safe haven for Islamic terrorist groups and because Sudan supported insurrections and/or radicals in Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Uganda. Following its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, relations with Sudan plummeted and have only made a modest recovery to date.

In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan. In August 1998, in the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched retaliatory cruise missile strikes against Khartoum. The last U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carney, departed post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since.

The U.S. and Sudan entered into a bilateral dialogue on counter-terrorism in May 2000, and Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11, 2001, terrorism strikes on New York and Washington. However, though Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U.S. strikes in that country and opposed a widening of the effort against international terrorism to other countries. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list.

DEMOCRACY

The United States aims to promote democracy throughout the world. This goal is stated in several U.S. policy documents and repeated in the President’s messages to the world. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush stated:

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.
Sudan is currently run by an authoritarian regime. The regime’s leader is President Omar Hassan al-BASHIR. As previously mentioned, he has been listed as the world’s worst dictator for engaging in ethnic and religious persecution. It has been reported that his government is responsible for the aerial bombing of villages and enslavement of women and children. It would be a grave mistake for the international community to overlook the importance of a restoration of democracy as a key element of any comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, as well as any sustainable counter-terrorism policy. Peace will only be viable if democratic principles take root. While much international assistance will continue to focus on the most pressing humanitarian needs, support for democracy and pro-democracy elements could have an important impact over time.

OIL

There are indications of significant potential reserves of oil and natural gas in southern Sudan, the Kordofan region, and the Red Sea province. In 2003, Sudan produced about 312,000 barrels of oil per day, which brought in about $1.9 billion, providing an estimated 70 percent of the country’s total export earnings. The oil production is expected to reach 500,000 barrels in 2005.

The U.S. imposed sanctions against Sudan restricts American corporations from accessing their oil. The United States is not dependant on Sudan’s oil nor is it considered a vital U.S. interest. However, revenues oil generates for the GOS has complicated previous peace efforts. The report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy titled, “U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War,” concluded:

Oil is fundamentally changing Sudan’s war. It is shifting the balance of military power in favor of Khartoum. It has prompted Khartoum to focus its military efforts, including forced mass displacements of civilians, on oil fields and the pipeline. Oil has also become an integral element of Khartoum’s external partnerships with states and corporations. At the same time, however, the internal coherence and strength of the government in Khartoum remains uncertain and Sudan remains poor. Any Bush administration strategy has to take full account of these realities.

Transparency of oil revenues along with wealth sharing between the components of the North and South Sudanese Government will be critical to sustain peace and end conflict in Sudan. In the future, as Sudan becomes a medium-scale oil exporter, oil could shift from fueling conflict, to rebuilding Sudan, and building energy-market integration in the region. Eventually, Sudan might prove to an additional source of oil for the United States. For this reason Sudan’s oil should be considered an important U.S. interest.
AIDS

The HIV-infection rate is Sudan, according to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), is already considered an epidemic, making Sudan the country with the highest infection rate in North Africa and the Middle East region. The infection rates are particularly high among vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. There is great concern that when Sudanese return to their homes from countries where the HIV/AIDS prevalence is very high, they will in all likelihood facilitate the further spread of the epidemic. Escalating HIV-infection rates in Sudan can lead to further destabilization of the country threatening the peace. AIDS in Sudan should be considered peripheral threat to U.S. interests.

HUMAN DIGNITY

The U.S. National Security Strategy defines our interests in human dignity as the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. The U.S. should be concerned in Sudan because it is one of the worst oppressors of religious freedom in the world and is also enduring of the worst humanitarian crisis on the African continent.

The U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom has identified Sudan as the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese government’s genocidal atrocities against civilian populations in the South and in the Nuba Mountains.

The GOS continues severely and systematically to violate the religious freedom of Christians and followers of traditional African religions, as well as of Muslims who are associated with opposition groups or who dissent from the government’s interpretation of Islam. Public religious expression and persuasion of non-Muslims by Muslims is allowed in government-controlled areas, but that of Muslims by non-Muslims is forbidden. Conversion from Islam is regarded as apostasy, a crime punishable by death. In practice, suspected converts are reportedly subjected to intense scrutiny, intimidation, and torture by government security personnel.

Religious organizations must be registered by the government to operate legally. Unregistered communities cannot build places of worship or meet in public. Approval can be difficult to obtain, and even registered groups face difficulties. Although permits are routinely granted to build mosques, permission to build churches is routinely denied. For over 30 years, the government has denied permission to construct Roman Catholic churches in areas under its control.
In addition to gross violations of Sudanese religious freedoms its people are also suffering through a humanitarian crisis. On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the GOS and the Jingaweit bear responsibility—and that genocide may still be occurring."65

The U.S. invested heavily in Sudan’s humanitarian crisis by providing assistance throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s.66 Since 1983, the U.S. has spent almost $2 billion in humanitarian assistance there, predominately in the south.67 This is a testament to the support for southern Sudan within consecutive U.S. administrations, Congress, and among numerous interest groups focused on issues such as hunger, human rights, the oppression of Christians, and slavery.68

In late 2003 and early 2004, just as the North-South war appeared to be ending, more than one million people fled systematic killings, the burning of villages and other human rights violations in the Darfur region of Sudan. Some fled to Chad but, the vast majority remains in Darfur, crowded into more than 100 settlements scattered across an area the size of France. The relationship between religion and the state and the ongoing humanitarian crisis is a significant force driving the conflict in Sudan.69 Islamists have dominated the current government since it came to power. Driving a divergence between interests of the GOS and the secular minded SPLA.70 The U.S. must consider violations of human dignity in Sudan important.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICIES IN SUDAN

There seem to be a number of Christopher Columbus’ setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. It’s been there a long time.71

Sub-Sahara Africa has almost always been the backwater of U.S. foreign policy and may be the easiest case to make for neo-isolationism.72 President George W. Bush in his foreign policy debate with presidential candidate Albert Gore clearly signaled that the United States had no vital national interests in Africa.73 Ironically, after George W. Bush was elected President, one of his first priorities was to establish objectives to bring peace to the Sudan.

The weaknesses in institutional memory that derive from our lack of a colonial era presence in Africa are understandable.74 Less defensible is the low priority given to institutional memory in the “clean slate” approach that, more often than not, characterizes the changes that take place in the policy making systems when presidential power is transferred from one party to another in Washington.75
U.S. foreign policy in Africa is unsteady and reactive, allowing events and crises to drive policy. U.S. administrations struggle with Africa policy because of the inconsistent attention paid to the continent by senior policymakers and their failure to regularly consult with a broad range of African leaders. This failure, in turn, compromises the focus, sophistication, and potential for success of efforts to secure U.S. regional interests. U.S. policymakers have not been able to develop a coherent national security strategy for the region, one that clearly identifies regional interests and then specific appropriate ways and means to secure them. As a result, regional uses of the instruments of U.S. power — such as diplomacy, military assistance, and economic aid — are not often well coordinated.

PAST FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SUDAN

The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war (1945-89) contributed to the construction and maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Africa. The global contest for geo-strategic spheres of influence led both superpowers into alliances with Sudanese governments, who became skilled at winning external support by declaring ideological affinity with an international patron or threatening to cross over to a rival camp. As a result, Sudan alternated its alliances between the United States and the former Soviet Union during this period.

In the 1980's, the U.S. worked with the Sudanese Government to upgrade its military. Special emphasis was placed on building airlift capacity and logistics. All U.S. military assistance was terminated following the military of 1989. Today, oil revenues have allowed the GOS to purchase modern weapons systems, including helicopters, medium bombers, MiG 23 fighter aircraft, mobile artillery pieces, and light assault weapons. Sudan now receives most of its military equipment from China, Russia, and Libya.

The end of the Cold War had significant implications for the foreign policies of the Western powers. Once the Soviet threat faded, the United States “lost the urge to intervene in African conflicts.”

The Sudanese military regime earned the strong denunciations of the Bush (Herbert) administration due to Bashir’s strict enforcement of sharia (Islamic law) and, most important, his apparent decision to allow for the creation of an Iranian-sponsored bases reportedly designed to train Islamic militants for “terrorist” actions throughout Africa.

Throughout the 1990s, Washington supported the southern insurgents while isolating the northern government in the hope that Khartoum would eventually fall. This policy was justified by reference to the Sudanese government's habit of violating the human rights of its citizens, its
destabilization of the region, and its support for international terrorism. But Washington’s approach did little to end the fighting.  

Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan’s 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan.  

The Clinton Administration adopted a posture that identified Sudan as a “rogue state” and supported Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda as “front-line states” to contain Sudan. Human rights issues, notably slavery and religious persecution, became highly salient to a variety of U.S. advocacy groups, making Sudanese policy closely scrutinized in Washington. In its final years, the Clinton administration began loosening up on Sudan, sending low-profile missions to Khartoum and appointing a special envoy to look into the faltering peace talks and review the general situation.  

U.S. CURRENT POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SUDAN

President George W. Bush made bringing peace to Sudan a priority for his administration. In 2001, the President emphasized his strong interest in Sudan when he appointed former Senator John Danforth as Presidential Envoy for Peace. Earlier, the President had named USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan. This administration has laid down the broad outlines of a policy to promote a negotiated, just peace in Sudan, but doubts remain as to whether this approach can attract sustained support from Congress and interest groups, particularly hard-line elements that strongly preferred a policy of containing and pressuring Khartoum while committing lethal and non-lethal support to the southern opposition.  

The President has three policy objectives in Sudan. (1) To establish a comprehensive, just peace settlement. Ending the conflict in Sudan will contribute to regional stability in the strategic Horn of Africa, and will send positive message to the people of the Middle East that event the most intractable conflicts can be resolved. (2) Make clear to the Sudanese government that the U.S. expects it to cooperate fully against terrorism. Sudan is listed on the “sponsors of terrorism” maintained by the United States. Bringing about a peace settlement with a bill of rights which protects the fundamental freedoms of all Sudanese will contribute to the evolution of a more moderate Sudanese government, and complement the efforts to obtain cooperation against terrorism. (3) Ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided to all
needy populations in the country. Achieving peace will help end massive human rights, particularly by addressing the legitimate grievances of southerners. It is the U.S. Government’s conviction that a united Sudan will be stronger economically, and more politically viable as a pluralistic, democratic state. A unified Sudan will help promote regional stability and will send a strong example to the rest of Africa and to the Middle East that even the most intractable conflicts can be resolved.

OBSTACLES TO IMPROVING U.S.-SUDAN FOREIGN POLICY

In Thomas Barnett’s book, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, he describes how Africa comes last because Africa offers least. Sub-Saharan Africa is important to the United States, and our security interests in Sudan are vital. However, with that said, it is still ranked lower than other regions of the world most notably Iraq, Korea, Iran, the Americas, Middle East, and China. Beyond this reality, there are several other obstacles in the way to improving U.S.-Sudan foreign policy. Three are briefly covered below.

First, the size of the diplomatic corps in Sudan is too small to monitor the peace in the and to fully use diplomacy as a tool to effectively engage Africa and the Sudan. Second, the United States splits the continent of Africa between two separate combatant commands (U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command). As a result, some strategists claim there is friction between the seams defining areas of responsibility (AOR) in Africa. Sudan and its neighboring states are evenly split between the two combatant command’s AOR’s. Third, there is poor coordination between the various U.S. agencies that develop policy or provide assistance to Sudan.

SUDAN’S FUTURE CHALLENGES

Sudan’s neighbors – particularly Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and Kenya – have too often been willing to stoke the conflict. Deep distrust, disputes, oil, water and land, and long running concerns about religion, secessionism and military adventurism create an environment of antagonism.

With new found oil revenue, the Sudanese government can now afford to buy weapons from China to supply Khartoum with a wide variety of basic combat systems. These weapons have given the Sudanese government a strong advantage in its combat with the insurgent forces in the south; human rights advocates believe that the GOS have used them in a deliberate scorched-earth policy aimed at driving hostile tribes from oil-producing zones in the Bentiu area.
There is growing pressure being applied to the GOS to settle its conflicts and inhumane treatment of its own people. If the GOS does not make progress, other countries may consider imposing sanctions on Sudan.

**U. S. ENGAGEMENT OPTIONS**

The following section discussed three possible engagement options that the United States could employ on Sudan. These options include continuing the status quo, moderate engagement, and robust engagement.

**STATUS QUO**

The U.S. has made it clear to the GOS that it strongly objects to the atrocities being committed against the Sudanese people. This has been accomplished by sponsoring a number of United Nations resolutions condemning the civil war and the recent crisis in Darfur. Our objections have been reinforced by unilaterally imposing sanctions against Sudan. The status quo option includes continuing these sanctions that restrict U.S. foreign assistance; ban on defense exports and sales; impose certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

Through diplomatic channels the U.S. has made known to Sudan what it must do to be removed from the list of State Sponsors of terrorism. It must meet all conditions in order to have these sanctions lifted and qualify for other U.S. aid or loans and resume trade. While unilateral sanctions have limited success as an instrument of national power, the GOS has expressed a desire to have the U.S. sanctions lifted. This is an indicator that these sanctions may provide the U.S. leverage in future negotiations with Sudan.

**MODERATE ENGAGEMENT**

This option includes continuing the unilateral sanctions under status quo and working with willing partners of the United States to impose multilateral sanctions against the GOS. In addition, the U.S. military will conduct various exercises with African Union (AU); providing military assistance to train AU soldiers for peace keeping operations as authorized by the recent Naivasha Agreement (comprehensive peace agreement between the GOS and the SPLA signed by both parties on January 9, 2005). Performance metrics would be clearly communicated to the GOS so it understands how any imposed sanctions could be lifted. Through continued support of U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives, Sudan could eventually be removed from the state sponsor of terrorism list.
ROBUST ENGAGEMENT

This option will require the U.S. to fully mobilize the inter-agency to leverage resources, leadership, expertise, and the political resolve of the African Union, Europe, and the Arab community. The robust engagement option is a synchronized multi-lateral effort led by the U.S. to provide strategic carrots and sticks to guide the North and South governments of Sudan to stick to maintain peace in Sudan. In addition, this option calls for gaining acceptance from Uganda and the African Union to establish a detachment of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Northern Uganda. The detachment's primary responsibility will be to monitor the implementation of Naivasha Agreement, providing logistical assistance to UN, AU, other non-government organizations, assist displaced Sudanese refugees returning back to their homelands, and develop demobilization programs for both the North and South Sudanese armed forces, to include incentives to turn-in or dispose of weapons. This detachment should also stand ready to move conduct operations in Southern Sudan if invited by both the North and South Governments. Other detachment responsibilities would fall under the traditional CJTF-HOA mission structure to include: counter terrorism activities, country analysis, host nation training, and U.S. State Department liaison activities.

The carrots of this option include the vast resources the multi-lateral effort could bring to Sudanese people and to re-build capacity, such as: roads, schools, hospitals, power plants, etc. In addition, the U.S. could accelerate the timetable for removing Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list if they continue to cooperate in counter-terrorism efforts. Removal from the state sponsor of terrorism list would allow current sanctions to be lifted.

The sticks would include the close the capability of the CJTF-HOA detachment to deploy Chapter VII peace keeping troops to enforce the peace and stop any conflicts that may flare-up. Another "stick" could be the promise of multi-lateral sanctions against Northern Sudan or Southern Sudan or both.

ENGAGEMENT RECOMMENDATION

Because both China and Russia oppose sanctions, it is unlikely the U.S. and her allies could pass a U.N. resolution imposing international sanctions against Sudan. However U.S. leadership may generate a group of states target sanctions against Sudan. To date, U.S. sanctions do not appear to have influenced the GOS to change its tactics in handing internal conflicts. U.S. sanction policies also hurt U.S. businesses that could profit from trading with the GOS. Therefore, status quo or moderate engagement options will not likely be effective to bring peace, stability, prosperity, and health to the Sudan.
The recommended option is for robust engagement. This means providing financial, logistical, and at times military support for peacekeeping and nation building efforts. Because the U.S. cannot afford the political or economic costs of “going it alone” these efforts should be multi-lateral. If progress is made in implementing the Naivasha Agreement, the U.S. should be prepared to execute the numerous waivers and amendments to its sanction provisions that would prohibit assistance to the new unity government. Although the issue of removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism will be controversial politically, the Bush administration should begin working with Congress as soon as possible on the necessity and mechanics of doing so, assuming that Sudan’s government meet the criteria for removal of the list. Similarly, the administration should work with Congress to address the myriad other sanctions – related to human rights concerns, religious persecution, debt, and the war – that limit U.S. assistance to Sudan. The U.S. must also standby to suggest additional penalties against the new unity government if provisions of the Naivasha Agreement are broken.

The CJTF-HOA detachment will assist Sudanese fighters from both sides. They will need to integrate into joint military units to defend Sudan’s borders and build capacity to deal with internal rogue elements. A robust United Nations Chapter VII-mandated international security presence, along with carefully conditioned security assistance and effective demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs, will be a key part of achieving those aims.

The U.S. should upgrade the Sudan charge d’ affaires position to ambassadorial rank. In order to monitor the peace and to fully use diplomacy, the United States should substantially increase their embassy staff levels in Sudan and open additional consular offices in the south as soon as security permits. The Sudan Program Office staff in Washington, D.C., should not be disestablished until an expanded embassy team is in place.

In an increasingly globalized world, the United States cannot afford to ignore Africa’s problems. The U.S. should intervene militarily in Africa where U.S. vital interests are threatened, but it cannot police the continent by sending in ground forces to all its numerous trouble spots. Instead, the U.S. should explore establishing a command that can focus more closely on Africa’s problems and lend assistance to African militaries so that they can tackle their own problems better, build up the ability of regional superpowers to better resolve regional problems. In the end, the establishment of such a U.S. Africa command can reduce the need for Washington to intervene in the continent. In Sudan, U.S. policy should focus explicitly on the single overriding objective of ending the war, a goal that offers the best means to see positive changes in areas where key U.S. interests are at stake.
Isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy all implicitly deal with strong states. Africa has mostly weak states. Each of these approaches leans heavily on state-to-state relationships. Only multilateralism with robust engagement offers the necessary conceptual tools to deal with weak states and to go beyond state-to-state relationships. Therefore, the United States in partnership with our allies and the African Union should lead a multilateral effort to bring peace, prosperity, and health to the Sudan.
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