THE WAR ON TERRORISM:
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence A. Meade
United States Army

Mr. William O. Waddell
Project Advisor

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In the three short years since the United States officially began its global war against terrorism, in response of the savage terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon the positive outpouring of global compassion and care initially expressed toward the United States Government (USG) by the nations of the international community, has proven to be a short-lived. What caused this rapid change of heart towards America? Does the change of heart threaten our national security? This paper will examine the rapid and apparently total breakdown of the USG public diplomacy for the global war on terrorism (WOT) and the role this failure may have played in this reversal of opinion. It will review the past and current USG public diplomacy at the strategic level in an attempt to ascertain the causes, if any, for this failure and its apparent threat to our national security. Further, the paper presents several recommendations for improving the USG Public Diplomacy posture in our current global war on terrorism.
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THE WAR ON TERRORISM: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Lasting victory in the war on terrorism will come only through a consolidated effort of like-minded people and nations providing positive global support.¹

It has been three short years since the United States officially launched its global war against terrorism in response to the savage terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon. In the aftermath of the attacks there was an initial outpouring of global compassion and care expressed toward the United States Government (USG) by the nations of the international community, but that emotional support has proven to be short-lived. What caused this rapid change of heart towards America? Is our perceived unilateralism a threat to our national security? According to Peter Peterman, one possible cause for the negative attitude among Middle Easterners toward the United States and its policies is simply that many of them do not trust what we say. He further claims that they also find that our words contradict our policies, particularly our tolerance of autocratic regimes in their region.² Negative attitudes about U.S. policy are also pervasive in front-line regions of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia in the war on terrorism and among our closest allies, according to the findings of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.³ This Strategy Research Project (SRP) will examines the past and current U.S. public diplomacy, and recommends several potential corrective courses of action that could get the government back on the path of regaining global public support for the war on terrorism (WOT).

BACKGROUND

During the Cold War years the United States enjoyed an abundance of international public support in its efforts to contain the spread of Communism. In those days, the reason for losing international public support was simple to pinpoint. Either you were with the U.S. and a free Democratic society or for the Soviet Union and a Communist socialist society. To counter and possibly change the minds and hearts of the global populace opposed to our lifestyle and values during the Cold War era, the USG used various capabilities known as the elements of national power to convince the non-supporters that a society based on a democratic governmental system was the best for them. The application of the elements of national power, known then by the acronym DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments of power) is today referred to as MIDLIFE to represent the addition of three new categories of Legal, Intelligence, and Finance to the elements of national power.⁴ These elements, when used in different combinations, have different degrees of influence on a target audience. A grouping of the elements that includes military combat forces is generally referred to as hard power, while
establishing combinations without the use of combat military force is referred to as soft power. An example of this combination is the use of Information, Diplomatic, Economic and Finance to achieve a national objective without using force on force military actions. The remainder of this paper focuses on the use of soft power.

In the Cold War years, the U.S. was very successful at utilizing the elements of national power for explaining USG policies to a global audience and achieving our national objectives. Proof of this is evident in the end of the Cold War and the demise of our despised bi-polar hegemonic partner, the Soviet Union, without a major military war between the two super powers. However, at the conclusion of the Cold War the USG decided to transform the agency most responsible for the Informational and Diplomatic elements of national power during that era by the use of a series of integrations and reorganization. The agency responsible for the USG’s diplomatic efforts during this period was known as the United States Information Agency (USIA). For just about fifty years, USIA successfully accomplished its mission of public outreach by means of cultural and educational programs that advanced America’s values and interests around the world. However, USIA’s long history of success wasn’t enough to justify its continued existence as an independent agency. Under the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act during President Clinton’s administration the United States Information Agency was integrated into the Department of State (DoS), with the goal of strengthening the USG’s public diplomacy through its integration into the policy process. But the Clinton administration failed to anticipate the second-and third-order effects that this merger would have on the interagency relationships regarding public Diplomacy (PD). USIA was very effective in serving as a coordinator of interagency activity due to relationships formed through its role as the Chair of the International Information Committee and Vice Chair of the Political Committee, position granted during the Regan administration in National Security Decision Directive Number 77 (NSDD-77). With its lead role in these two committees, along with the requirement to coordinate its activities with Public Affairs and International Broadcasting Committees, USIA controlled the Ends (firsthand knowledge of the national objectives), Ways (clear understanding of the concepts of how, what, and where), and Means (properly sized, trained and resourced staff) necessary for routinely presenting consolidated public diplomacy messages from the USG to a global audience. The second-and third-order effects of USIA’s integration into the DoS surfaced during the Haiti uprising and the Kosovo war of 1999. No single USG organization then existed with sufficient ends, ways, means or empowerment to coordinate USG public diplomacy to a global audience or to counter disinformation. To compensate for this shortfall, President Clinton issued PDD 68, which directed the Departments of Defense, Department of
State (DoS), Department of Justice (DOJ), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to establish an International Public Information (IPI) core group with the overall task of assisting USG efforts to coordinate its PD for the purpose of providing a synchronized USG message to the world. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the DoS was designated ordered to chair this group. This was a positive step toward correcting some of the damage created by the assimilation of USIA into the DoS.

Shortly after assuming office in January 2001, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSDP-1) which, in theory, officially cancelled the Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) issued during the Clinton administration. However, many of the functions performed under the old PDD 68 remained in effect under Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) with new names as opposed to the old interagency working groups. But, this was not the case with the IPI core group; it was ignored and allowed to fade away.

Today many cite this transformation of USIA under the Clinton administration, which resulted in a significant decrease in the quality of the USG’s informational public diplomacy efforts, as a major contributor factor to current global Anti-Americanism. Jamie F. Metzl offered the following observations in a July/August 2001 article on public diplomacy:

In the nearly two years since reorganization, however, no new vision has been put forward for American diplomacy, and not nearly enough has been done to bring State’s mission into the information age. No long-term strategic plan has been adopted that would allow public diplomacy experts to project future flash points or nascent major issues and begin the necessary proactive public diplomacy efforts to stem potential future crises. Although a Clinton administration presidential directive, PDD-68, ordered greater interagency coordination, not enough has been done to bring together the international information programs of the various U.S. agencies maintaining overseas presences. No public diplomacy framework has been established for more systematically reaching out to NGOs and other non-state actors.

Likewise, in the July/August 2003 issue of Foreign Policy, Newt Gingrich claimed that "Anti-American sentiment is rising unabated around the globe because the U.S. State Department has abdicated values and principles in favor of accommodation and passivity. Only a top-to-bottom reform and culture shock will enable the State Department to effectively spread U.S. values and carry out President George W. Bush’s foreign policy." The fact that the USG still has problems in public diplomacy was reconfirmed by a report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications in a second study released in September 2004.
WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

There are many schools of thought on the definition of public diplomacy. Below are a few that illustrate the variety and nature of the differences of opinions on a common public diplomacy (PD) definition. Some synics believe that PD is nothing more than a form of propaganda, while others argue that it is not. According to The Edward Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, “Public Diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.” 9 The planning group that integrated USIA into the DoS worked under the assumption that “Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.”10 The former leader of USIA, in testimony to a Congressional Committee, offered this characterization of PD: “American traditions and American ethics require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” 11 The Department of Defense defines PD as “those overt information activities of the USG designed to promote united foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadcasting the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.”12

No matter how PD is defined, the form of Public Diplomacy that the USG practices today differs from that of the earlier years. Today its messages and programs, by design, are primarily intended for the foreign public, and their governments. This is in contrast to the traditional method that focused, for the most part, on the senior political figures and government officials. An example of traditional PD is the practice of sending demarches to another nation’s government for a hypothetical incident with which the USG has issues. This demarche would work its way through USG official channels to its destination, more than likely via the ambassador of the affected nation. Today this same practice, applies but with one significant difference: The initiating nation, in addition to sending the demarche via official government channels, also would report it to the media, broadcast it via USG assets, and post it on their official website for public information. This is a key point. Since the information technology is readily available today to most government personnel, non-governmental organizations’ personnel and civilians, the practice of PD very simple and cost-effective in most cases. This practice is generally unregulated for non-government agencies and citizens of the U.S., since we are a democratic society. In short, recent information technology enables any individual or organization to practice public diplomacy. In the past, USIA had a monopoly on PD messages.
Now the USG must compete with many other sources to get its PD messages to the right audiences.

**WHY IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IMPORTANT TO THE WOT?**

In its current WOT, the USG must use all of its national powers in order to achieve success in this effort. The Diplomatic element of national power is vital: It can present the combined efforts of “coalitions of like-minded nations” to achieve success. Public Diplomacy will play a key role in keeping our current partners in the WOT convinced that our endeavor is a worthy cause. It will also play a major role in recruiting other like-minded nations to join in our global WOT campaign. The USG has many agencies, departments, and committees that participate in some aspect of PD at the strategic level; all of them have some global reach that can influence WOT efforts. The following section will examine roles and missions of some higher-level USG organizations with PD responsibilities.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

The Department of State (DoS) is the agency most responsible for running the current USG public diplomacy programs. DoS has the mission of ensuring that the explanations of the nation’s foreign policy matters are consistent with USG’s security strategies and policies. Within the DoS Patricia Harrison, the acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is responsible conducting USG PD programs. Her official mission is to help ensure that public diplomacy (engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences) is practiced in coordination with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional diplomacy to advance U.S. national interests and security, and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.”

Harrison represents the Secretary of State on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the non-partisan independent board that supervises all civilian, non-military international broadcasting funded by the U.S. government, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti). The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs also co-chairs the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC). The National Security Council Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations is the other Chair of this Committee. Established in September 2002, this committee is charged with ensuring that all USG agencies work together to develop and disseminate the nation’s coordinated PD message across the globe. The SCPCC has a mandate that is very similar to that given to the IPI core under the Clinton administration in PDD 68.
In July 2004, Harrison opened an Office of Policy, Planning and Resources (OPPR) in response to Secretary of State Powell request for her to “reinvigorate this essential function.” It is envisioned that this tiny office with a very large task will initiate the process of providing oversight and coordination of PD resources and programs within DoS. In addition to this task, OPPR is responsible for the development of methods for measuring the effectiveness of DoS’s PD efforts. This office, consisting four personnel, should certainly be integrated into any organization with the lead mission for future USG PD activities.

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is made up of three departments; the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), Public Affairs (PA) and International Information Programs (IIP). A short explanation of each follows.

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS BUREAU

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) is responsible for fostering mutual understanding between the United States and other countries through international educational and training programs. ECA accomplishes this mission by promoting personal, professional, and institutional ties between private citizens and organizations in the United States and abroad, as well as by presenting U.S. history, society, art and culture in all of its diversity to overseas audiences. The activities of this office are significant in the development of long term PD engagement. The relationships and understanding shared by those domestic and foreign students selected to participate in programs provided by the Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau often produce future national leaders with a better understanding of the U.S. and its people. This ECA is often viewed by many outside DoS as a non-player in the overall PD and strategic communications process, quite possibly because the long-term benefits of this bureau are not evident.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS BUREAU

The Bureau of Public Affairs’ (PA) mission is to carry out the Secretary’s directive to help Americans understand the importance of foreign affairs. Under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary, who also serves as Department spokesman, the PA department informs the domestic audience with truthful messages and relays the public’s comments back to the USG’s policymakers. Within the Bureau of Public Affairs, the PA’s Office of Strategic Communications and Planning provides short-and long-range strategic planning to generate public support of U.S. foreign policy. It coordinate with internal DoS staffs, including the PD offices, and externally with OGC, DoD, and other agencies with foreign affairs interests. It accomplishes this in a variety of ways:
- Conducting press briefings for domestic and foreign press corps;
- Pursuing media outreach, enabling Americans everywhere to hear directly from key Department officials through local, regional and national media interviews;
- Managing the State Department's web site at state.gov and developing web pages with up-to-date information about U.S. foreign policy.

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) is the principal international strategic communications service for the foreign affairs community. IIP designs, develops, and implements a variety of information initiatives and strategic communications programs, including Internet and print publications, on-site and electronically transmitted speaker programs, and information resource services that reach the general public in more than 140 countries around the world. The IIP uses advanced technology to improve its effectiveness. It distributes its products and services via numerous means, to include websites and other Internet services, electronic journals, speaker programs, print publications, and CD-ROMs. These unique products are designed to support the DoS's programs, as well as those of other U.S. foreign policy organizations. IIP also manages Information Resource Centers overseas and offers reach-back to stateside reference specialists to answer focused information queries from abroad. IIP is the smallest division in the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, with approximately 20 fulltime personnel assigned in the D.C area.

OFFICE OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

On 21 January 2003, President George W. Bush issued executive order 13283 establishing the Office of Global Communications (OGC). This office, under the leadership of the Deputy Assistant to the President for Global Communications, was established to advise the President and members of his Executive Office, heads of executive departments, and other agencies on the best method for them to communicate USG positions effectively to a global audience. The Coalition Information Center (CIC), used during Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) is the model upon which the OGC is designed. The OGC has five major functions assigned in its initial charter:
- Assess the USG strategies and methods used to inform foreign audiences;
- Develop and coordinate strategic communications and set priorities of the United States.
• Develop a strategy that informs foreign audiences of USG priorities, people and culture, in partnership with foreign governments (with proper approval) as required.

• Develop an interagency global deployable communication team for short-term assignment;

• Serve as a new media and technology user and encourage their use by others:
  Inform the USG of new means and method for disseminating information.

Several aspects of the OGC mission and functions overlap those of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In reality the OGC has not yet fully performed the mission and functions assigned in its original charter. To date they have primarily focused on supporting the president and his Executive Officers. They have achieved little noticeable success in the development of a strategic communication strategy or at establishing priorities for USG global messages.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense (DoD) is not, nor should it be, the lead for establishing any of the USG’s public diplomacy at the strategic level. However, DoD possesses some means and resources that could support the nation’s public diplomacy efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, if required. The DoD’s robust Public Affairs apparatus, down to the operational level, is already engaged in the process of producing and reporting stories that support National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The DoD accomplishes this by using many of the same means and methods employed by the DoS and OGC public affairs staff. DoD PA members, as a whole, perform the task of truthfully reporting new events to their domestic and foreign audiences. DoD PA, just as the DoS PA or any civilian news agency reporting staff, acknowledge that they live and die by their reputations. To be effective in their business they must be trustworthy and truthful when reporting the news, providing interviews, etc. The associations of PA personnel with known untrustworthy elements will surely have a negative impact upon their reputations and effectiveness to convey DoD’s truthful messages.

On the other hand, DoD’s Information Operations (IO) encompass the core capabilities of Computer Network Defense, Computer Network Attack, Electronic Warfare, Military Deceptions, Psychological Operations, and Operational Security. They can assist USG public diplomacy with little impact to their reputations. DoD uses IO to influence, disrupt, and corrupt an adversary’s decision making while protecting our own.
ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROBLEM

The USG is seeking to counter anti-American trends and the lessening of support for the U.S. efforts in the WOT through public diplomacy. Even so, an article in The Heritage Foundation indicates that the U.S. still has a problem with public diplomacy, even after the establishment of the Office of Global Communications (OGC) January 2003, by President Bush. The article asserts that “the U.S. is losing its voice before foreign audiences and needs to get it back.” It further states that USG must be more proactive in countering disinformation that is running unchecked in many Middle East countries. Additionally, a GAO and a U.S. Advisory Commission report on Public Diplomacy (USAC-PD) recently submitted to Congress again confirmed the weakness of the government’s public diplomacy strategy.

Additional possible causes for ineffective U.S. public diplomacy are the continuing practice of transmitting conflicting messages to world audiences and the lack of an interagency public diplomacy strategy for the execution of the global public diplomacy plan. Currently the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), OGC, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and other federal agencies and departments all execute uncoordinated public diplomacy efforts in support of the war on terrorism based upon their own interpretations of guidance provided to them from the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), and in Presidential speeches. Today’s information technology rich world does not afford the USG PD professional the latitude of misinterpretation of any of the guidance provided to them. Uncoordinated messages or actions of USG officials and organizations that run counter to those of the nation’s leader will receive global attention via either the broadcast, print or Internet based media sources. Uncoordinated press releases or sharing of bad information present the very real possibility of countering some of the USG’s efforts in support of the NSS, NSCT and Presidential speeches; so they can jeopardize our national security. In our current WOT many believe that the USG is simultaneously engaged in an information war that is being fought on a daily basis in the information domain for the control of public opinion. This information war is consists of offensive and defensive maneuvers; it is being waged on a global scale without a lead agency or an apparent campaign plan. If a similar situation existed in military planning at the strategic level, the services could be fighting and winning numerous engagements with the opposing forces but without an overall campaign plan to ascertain that each engagement supports the Combatant Commanders’ and national objectives. In short, our uncoordinated, non-strategic execution of the information war threatens our national security. This poor
execution is allowing enemies of democracy to isolate the United States from potential global allies in the WOT.

Further complicating the ineffectiveness of public diplomacy is the lack of funding to the DoS to support an increase in their global public diplomatic efforts in Muslim countries. Currently the DoS is under-funded to perform its public diplomacy mission effectively on a global scale. Studies conducted by the GAO and an Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World both cited funding shortfalls. For example, of the $600 million allocated to the DoS for public diplomacy in 2003, approximately $150 million was spent on efforts in Muslim countries. The majority of the $150 million was used on exchange programs and salaries of those supporting those programs. Both studies found that Muslim countries' public diplomacy outreach programs only received $25 million of the original $150 million allocated. Because of budgetary constraints, the DoS conducted essentially very little public diplomacy in the national capitals of Muslim countries. This is but one example of the funding problems of public diplomacy programming.

Another impediment to the formation of an effective diplomatic strategy is the lack of personnel adequately trained in linguistic and cultural skills. This shortfall seriously hampers efforts to improve our public diplomacy. Military, embassy and other USG personnel in the public diplomacy field face cultural communication challenges every day. It takes only one misplaced image or phrase to cause an unintended offense. According to the September 2003 GAO report on U.S. public diplomacy, "21 percent of the 322 Foreign Service officers filling language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas did not meet foreign language speaking requirements for their positions. Foreign Service officers stationed at overseas locations acknowledged to the GAO team that fluency in the host country's language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy." In several media reports during November 2004, senior military members echoed the criticality of having personnel trained in language skills and the culture of the region where they are assigned. The need for assignment of personnel to U.S. Central Command with this skill set routinely ranks high in the command's Integrated Priority List. This ranking validates the significance that the Commander, U.S. Central Command places on having linguistically qualified personnel within his command and the important role that it plays in the public diplomacy, especially in regard to engaging and informing the civilian, government, and non-government populace of his region.

Traditionally public diplomacy is the responsibility of the Department of State, with the specific goal of increasing understanding of American values, policies, and initiatives to create an amenable international environment. The Department of State, in partnership with the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), currently utilizes a three-dimensional public diplomacy strategy: understanding regional and cultural environments and their openness toward USG policies; the engagement of the American public on the importance of relations with other nations; and the widespread use of technologies and the Internet to engage a younger and wider Middle East audience. However, the three issues previously cited — lack of coordination among various agencies, lack of funding to effectively accomplish the mission, and lack of adequately trained diplomatic personnel—have impeded the DoS's attempts to institute an effective public diplomacy strategy. Given the proper tools, resources, and authority, DoS can establish an effective PD strategy. Ultimately, the fulfillment of the DoS's strategy will assist the war on terrorism by establishing multiple means through which the DoS, in conjunction with DOD and other USG agencies, can disseminate accurate, coordinated information about American values and interests. This coordinated and mutually supportive effort of engaging and informing a global audience via organic capabilities under the control of the International Information Programs (IIP)-working closely with the Broadcasting Board of Governors-DoD and civilian media- will enable the USG to achieve short- and long-term positive results. It will also give the DoS a means of quickly countering disinformation disseminated by hostile media and those unfriendly to the USG and its Allies with a bigger global reach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the shortage of personnel resources and policies to support the DoS's public diplomacy mission, it is clear the ends, ways, and means of current U.S. public diplomacy are not balanced for mission success. The lack of a functioning interagency strategy and properly trained personnel is alarming. Furthermore, the continued ineffectiveness of the USG's public diplomacy efforts in support of the WOT, along with the continued growth of global anti-American sentiment, constitutes a grave and persistent threat to U.S. national security. Insomuch as the continued unchecked negative propaganda and misinformation disseminated to a global audience by all forms of Information Technology regarding the USG and its policies and actions is akin to letting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) grow unregulated. The U.S. can implement several alternative actions to eliminate its public diplomacy weaknesses. The following two general recommendations covering multiple subcategories are designed to turn the tide of the information war in favor of the United States and its allies in the GWOT.

1ST RECOMMENDATION

The lack of a comprehensive strategic communication strategy remains at the center of the strategic communications problem that the USG Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and
Information Operations communities are now facing. Practitioners in each of these disciplines have been struggling to develop and coordinate strategic communications themes, messages, and activities that support the USG and the WOT without a comprehensive strategic communications strategy or a common definition of strategic communications. Development of an interagency strategy would focus all of the USG’s Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and Information Operations assets on the same issue with coordinated and mutually supporting themes, messages, and activities. To date, the most effective interagency coordination efforts are ad-hoc, initiated by USG professionals well-versed in the art of public diplomacy, public affairs and information operations. To fix this problem, the government must first designate the overall lead for public diplomacy, with sufficient authority to obtain compliance in the interagency environment. This organization could be a renewed Office of Global Communications with full tasking and budgetary authority over all elements of the USG’s public diplomacy community regardless of their agency or departmental affiliations. Empowerment of this lead PD organization must be anchored in Congressional legislation supported by a bi-partisan mandate. This organization must work for the President to optimally execute its PD mission. The Defense Science Board recommended the development of a similar organization to perform strategic communications. Their solution calls for standing up a Strategic Communication Committee within the National Security Council (NSC), under the leadership of a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications. Committees serve well for hands-off operations; however, that is not what the USG needs for its PD activities at this time. PD requires an organization that can both lead and plan a USG PD campaign in support of our WOT. Second, this new USG lead agency for PD, working with representatives from DoS, DoD, DOJ, and NSC, must develop an interagency strategy. This strategy is critical to the overall effectiveness of the USG’s PD. Ultimately, it could assume victory in the war on terrorism. This strategy would set guidelines for all governmental agencies engaging in of public diplomacy, public affairs, and Information Operations. Simply put, this strategy must describe the ends, ways, and means for assisting the USG in achieving its national interests as detailed in national policies, the NSSE, and other Presidential policy guidance. This strategy must specify national objectives in PD. It must provide direction, in the form of national level concepts, to those government agencies that participate in PD, PA, and IO efforts, explaining how the national strategic communication plan is to be implemented. These concepts should contain general guidance on when, where, and who can achieve them. Lastly, this strategy must identify the resources required to ensure that it is successfully implemented.
2ND RECOMMENDATION

The USG must develop a training and strategic studies institute for public diplomacy and make it available to all federal employees within the public diplomacy field. A GAO study—along with other sources—indicates that the DoS lacks sufficient personnel with needed linguistic proficiencies to accomplish their public diplomacy mission. This shortfall, along with the fact that most of the Ambassadors receive only a short orientation on PD prior to assuming their posts, is a recipe for a PD failure. Effective accomplishment of PD requires personnel trained in the language and culture of the targeted audiences within their regions in order for them to practice effective public diplomacy. The development of a training and strategic studies institute would ensure that all USG public diplomacy professionals can receive the same PD core competency training. In the long term, by developing programs and assigning personnel to work on the issues in conjunction with the private sector this institute could serve to eliminate many of the cultural, linguistic, and recruiting shortfalls faced by the public diplomacy community today. This institute’s curriculum could be quickly developed by utilizing and consolidating existing USG elements, such as those provided by the DoS’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and private sector programs that satisfy its requirements. With this kind of initiative, an interim program could be underway within a year. As it matures, the training institute could serve as Executive Agent for the public diplomacy field, with a key mission of championing any PD strategy or policy changes necessary for improving the overall PD performance. Funding of this mission could be accomplished through the elimination of similar but separately run and funded programs and the reprogramming of the funds earmarked for them to one centrally managed interagency training institute for PD. But this institute should not be an operational analysis center. Instead, the USG should develop an institute that is dedicated to the training of PD and assisting with strategy and policy development. The DSBs’ recommendation that the USG develop and fund an independent non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication Institute (CSCI) to perform research and analysis does not meet the requirements for a training institute for PD personnel. Many of the recommendations in the final DSB report are sound. But DSB’s recommend CSCI should not be considered as this SRP’s recommendation for a training institute. Further, the creation of an institute to perform USG operational tasks is not an acceptable recommendation.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the state of the USG’s current efforts in the war on terrorism and the growing anti-American sentiment towards U.S. values and policies, the foregoing recommendations provide
the framework to enable the USG to reclaim its voice in the world of public diplomacy. Reassigning the lead for public diplomacy from the DoS to the reworked OGC with National Security Council-level authority to operate effectively in the interagency community on all public diplomacy matters is a must. This renewed OGC, coupled with the development of a public diplomacy strategy detailing the overall short-, mid- and long-term objectives of the USG PD will allow the USG to provide better support to the WOT by ensuring that all agencies of the government are putting out mutually supporting messages, and that all public diplomacy efforts are coordinated. Furthermore, the establishment of an overall PD strategy and new leadership is the critical launch point for developing successful training programs and personnel recruitment actions. The USG’s current bureaucratic interagency process will never produce effective PD to provide the most effective support in the WOT. The current process lacks unity of effort, adequate budgetary control and support, and central tasking authority. Any corrective action short of these overall recommendations runs the risk of creating second-order effects that could prolong the WOT and jeopardize our success.
ENDNOTES

1 The ideas in the sentence in based upon the remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.


7 Newt Gingrich, “Rouge State Department,” Foreign Policy 137(Jul/Aug 2003), 1.


9 Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Library, 1987), 85.


11 ibid


17 ibid

18 ibid
19 ibid.


22 Ibid, 2.


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