ARMY RESERVES: TRANSFORMING WHILE AT WAR

by

Colonel Jonathan Guy Ives
United States Army Reserves

Professor Dallas D. Owens
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 MAR 2005</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve Transforming While at War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Ives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Army Reserves are serving a Nation at War while managing a unique set of variables that impede the path to transformation. The Nation moved into a War time footing immediately following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. While the Army continues with transformation, the Reserves battle complexities that impede transformation; the on-going ad hoc mobilizations, the divestiture of force structure, and the application of Active models to Reserve formations, if disjointedly applied, will negatively impact retention.

The crisis of 9/11 forged a policy to mobilize the Selected Reserve in ad hoc teams in support of the Global War on Terrorism. As the force flow for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom continued, so did the ad hoc unit deployments; this committed the reserves to a cross-leveling plan that degraded nearly every assigned unit, and created management by individuals vice units.

The Army acknowledged the “Total Force” policies of the 1980’s created the hollow force structure that prevents Selected Reserve units from full manning. A 2002 initiative approved the divestiture of the hollow portion of the Selected Reserve force to improve unit personnel readiness; however the divestiture process will take until 2011.

While the Army Reserves wait to divest structure, transformation planning guidance has been issued regardless of the current state. As such, the basic building block for transformation models is a unit, not an individual. The implementation of the models without addressing the impacts of mobilization and force structure will affect retention, and viability of Reserves.

This project seeks to provide a framework that improves the capacity of the reserves to meet the mobilization mission while transforming, by reassigning mobilizing units, increasing volunteerism, and restructuring for resource allocation. This initiative, if implemented would demonstrate the Army’s commitment to the Reserves and reestablish unit based values.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- **ABSTRACT** ................................................................................................................................. iii
- **TABLE OF CONTENTS** .................................................................................................................. v
- **LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS** .......................................................................................................... vii
- **ARMY RESERVES, TRANSFORMING WHILE AT WAR** ................................................................. 1
  - **THE FIRST DOMINO; AUTHORIZATIONS** .............................................................................. 1
  - **THE REQUIRED RESERVES** ................................................................................................... 3
  - **FORCE STRUCTURE** ............................................................................................................... 3
  - **STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK** .................................................................................................... 5
  - **UNIT PREDICTABILITY** ........................................................................................................... 6
  - **AC MODELS FOR RC UNITS** .................................................................................................. 7
  - **A MODEST PROPOSAL** ........................................................................................................... 10
  - **FORCE STRUCTURE** ............................................................................................................. 11
  - **STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK** ................................................................................................... 12
  - **UNIT PREDICTABILITY** .......................................................................................................... 14
  - **CONCLUSION** ....................................................................................................................... 16
- **ENDNOTES** ............................................................................................................................... 17
- **BIBLIOGRAPHY** ........................................................................................................................ 19
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 - FEDERAL RESERVE RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE – READINESS EQUATION 7
FIGURE 2 - ARMY CAMPAIGN PLAN (BEFORE “ACCELERATION”) .............................................8
FIGURE 3 - ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL ..................................................................9
FIGURE 4 - FOUR “TOTAL ARMY” COMPONENTS .................................................................12
FIGURE 5 - PROPOSED EXPEDITIONARY RESERVE FORCE MODEL ..................................15
ARMY RESERVES, TRANSFORMING WHILE AT WAR

THE FIRST DOMINO; AUTHORIZATIONS

Over the coming decade, we’ll deploy a more agile and more flexible force, which means more of our troops will be stationed and deployed from here at home. We’ll move some of our troops and capabilities to new locations, so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. We’ll take advantage of 21st century military technologies to rapidly deploy increased combat power.

- President George W. Bush, addressing VFW Convention, 16 Aug 04

The phrase “transforming while at war” seems innocuous. Yet the Army Reserves (AR) are feeling its teeth – teeth that are chewing up the cohesiveness of units and gnawing at idyllic beliefs in past competencies for force projection. Indeed LTG Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, recently declared to the Army Chief of Staff. “This memorandum is to inform you of the Army Reserve’s inability … to meet mission requirements associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and to reset and regenerate its forces for follow on and future missions.” LTG Helmly thus acknowledges the debilitating effects of managing conflicting and overlapping demands of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI), of Modularity transformation, of developing cyclical schedules of the Army Force Generation Model (AFGM), of organizing training for Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces (AREF), of resetting units from deployments, of meeting the mobilization demands for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and of daily readiness missions.

To meet mobilization requirements from 1995-2000, Reserve staffs have developed top-down by-name cross-leveling management processes through the use of personnel reporting databases. This process has worked for identifying critical skills for units moving into theater, specifically in medical specialties, where there is only one qualified surgeon serving in the Reserves. However, as the large numbers of post 9/11 mobilizations evolved, the cross-leveling process generated unanticipated second-order effects on units and soldiers. Notably, donor units began to report degraded readiness. But other effects surfaced such as soldier’s lack of confidence in their units’ readiness. Their uncertainty about units’ readiness reduced predictability of mobilization, because follow-on call-ups subjected donor units to fill individual needs of previously scheduled units’ requirements for mobilization. Results were, more and more Reserve soldiers were plucked out of their units to cross-level units that were mobilizing.

A complete restructuring of reserve organizational systems prior to the GWOT commitments would have prevented such raids on donor units. Reserve force structure has
been hollowed by empty placeholders for the abandoned “two-simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTW)” force-sizing construct of the 1980’s. The restructuring plan was presented and approved in 2003 as one of six initiatives in the FRRI. The current force structure’s imbalance between the Force Structure Authorization (FSA) and the End Strength (ES) identified approximately 14,000 required but not authorized positions in units. Add these manning shortages to unit vacancies caused by recent individual mobilizations to cross-level hard-to-find, hard-to-fill, Military Occupational Specialties for GWOT, and the results are that many Reserve units are training with less than 40% available soldiers.

The Reserve’s long-term “objective force” calls for restructuring to meet the modularity requirements to fill out Units of Action (UA) and Units of Employment (UEx) with Maneuver Enhancement or Sustainment modules. These modules will allow Regional Combatant Commander to design larger formations with expeditionary capabilities to swiftly defeat the enemy through the use of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). The Reserves have always been an expeditionary force but were never considered rapidly mobile. To effectively improve their mobilization capabilities, the Reserves must transition from the Cold War “Alert-Mobilize-Train-Deploy” paradigm to a “Train-Alert-Mobilize-Deploy” paradigm. Validating training readiness prior to units’ alert phase is a significant undertaking for the Reserves. Units must be fully manned and trained in the years prior to mobilization in order to be validated for rapid mobilization.

The Secretary of the Defense announced three principal objectives for the Army Reserves: First, to restructure the Reserve force and to provide a one-out-of-six-year rotation cycle; second, to establish a more rigorous validation of Reserve units to assume their readiness for mobilization; and third, to make the mobilization and demobilization processes more efficient. The Secretary of the Army then submitted the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Force Generation Model to address the Secretary of Defense’s requirements. The preface in the 2005 Army Game Plan states that modularity, rebalancing, and stabilization will be achieved through the implementation of the Army’s Force Generation and Campaign Plan. These plans focused on reaching the objective force, but they do not address the Reserve forces’ manning shortage because they are framed from the perspective of the Active Component.

This SRP recommends amending the Army plan to improve mobilization, to focus resources, and to create a volunteer framework that provides the Reserves with time to transform while at war and still meeting their OIF rotations. The first section, “The Required Reserves,” describes problems that were exposed during OIF rotations and that continue to

THE REQUIRED RESERVES

The “Total Force” concept, crafted by the post-Vietnam legacy military, was designed to require the mobilization of the Reserves for future conflicts. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird then asked an interesting question: “If ordered, will they (Reserves) show up?” But current cultural icons reflect the Total Force: “One Army” and “The Army” symbolize the expectation of the American people that the Army Reserve and National Guard have earned the position, as a true part of the nation’s Armed Forces. The required Reserves have assumed the solemn obligation to fulfill the Abrams Doctrine of effectively expanding the Army and bringing the spirit of the American people to every contingency operation.

The required Reserves are now undeniably an essential part of the “The Army.” Even so, current stresses from the continuous mobilizations of the GWOT have exposed weaknesses in force structure, in our strategic framework and predictability of Reserve units’ readiness and call-ups. Yes, since the Vietnam conflict, the reserves have showed up. But will the Reserves units be ready and able to continue showing up?

FORCE STRUCTURE

I have trouble seeing why we have to have reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in conflict. It simply tips off the fact that is what we are going to do months before we are able to do it.

  - Donald Rumsfeld, memo to Dr. Chu, 30 December 2002

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (SECDEF) recognizes that integration of the Reserve forces within the “Total Force” has caused problems. Before launching a major military operation, we must call up some Reserve units needed for the operation. This takes time, and it alerts our enemy of an impending operation. But the real problem is not the AC/RC force mix. The real problem is the hollow force remaining from the two Major Theatre of Wars (18 division) construct. In truth, that force never fully existed, so changing the force mix does nothing for Reserves readiness. When a non-existent force is re-mixed to form a new force, that new Reserve side of that force will still have some ready made problems.

The Army Reserve has never been authorized to fill its ranks. Recently, these undermanned units have been further depleted when individual soldiers have been mobilized to
fill the ranks of mobilized units in the cross-leveling process. The problem worsens when the donor unit replaces the departed trained soldier with an untrained soldier. To fix the reserves problem, Army leaders must determine the number of and kinds of Reserve units required for the Total Army. Then army leaders should authorize completely filling these units, to adjust FSA to equal ES, and second assign those units to modularity building blocks.

Cross-leveling for OIF became the norm, for example, the 971 MC Team (Movement Control) from the 70th RRC was alerted for mobilization for OIF2. But no soldiers were assigned to the 971 MC Team. So 16 soldiers were quickly cross-leveled to the 971 MC Team from other units. Their first face-to-face meeting took place at the mobilization station. In order to provide the Total Army quickly with trained, reliable modular Reserve units, the Reserve must be able to build and maintain these units at full strength prior to call-ups.

But resolving the imbalance between the Reserve Force Allocation Authorization (FSA) and End Strength (ES) will require time. Presently, as a first step, the Army is identifying unneeded Reserve units for divesture. These units will be identified in the 2006 Modular Force Support Analysis (MFSA) previously called the Total Army Analysis (TAA1). This has been conducted in the effort to align the FSA to the ES without consideration for the degrading effects of continuous operations. The results of the bargaining for units between the AC and RC planners for appropriate force mix identified unit shortages, termed as buys. Excess units will fall under divesture phased in concurrently with buys over the next 5 years. An example of the buy is that the Reserves must obtain are an estimated eight Forward Surgical Units, projected to be recruited and trained by FY11. The units need to find surgeons to fill these new Army units. This will prove to be a difficult task, especially when surgeon peers read about the 915 Forward Surgical Team, from Vancouver, Washington, awarding Purple Hearts to more than 50% of its compliment, including the surgeon that received injuries to his hands.

However, the MFSA is based on the yet unapproved UEy configuration. In fact two Reserve configurations conform to the UEy modular functional design: First, the Reserve End Strength (ES) is based on the total unit manning, and second the Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) will be configured to reflect modularity concepts. As the modular functional design for the UEy for Sustainment and Maneuver (mostly Reserve units) is being completed, the Army Reserves has pushed forward to configure the AREP 1 through 4 based on OIF 4 and OIF 5 force projection requirements, not on modularity. As a result, there is some likelihood that some of these units may return from OIF 4 and 5 rotations to be disbanded.

Reserve force structure thus hinges on the balance of critical resources, specifically time and personnel. Meeting the requirements of the Army Campaign Plan and configuring the
AREP 1-4 prior to the approval of the UEy functional design consumes resources without gain. In addition, the formulation of the remaining AREP 5-10, which are supposed to initiate the Army Force Generation Model cycle, puts AREP 5 and 6 at year three of the five year training plan. Again, if the UEy configuration is amended, the Reserves may be expending resources without improving the mobilization process.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

I think we are going to have to find a way to take all of the responsibility for activating the Guard and the Reserve from the services, the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in one location.

- Donald Rumsfeld, Memo to Gen Myers 21 December 2002.

The GWOT is becoming an endurance test. Requiring the highest operational pace since Vietnam, it has exposed every weakness in the Reserve mobilization process. The Army has resorted to crisis management that prevented following any set contingency plan and to cross-leveling to fill mobilized reserve units. For whatever reason, multiple small-unit mobilizations have displaced many soldiers and placed them in smaller derivative units. Then the Army has been unable to track soldiers in and out of theater or in or out of Regional Readiness Commands (RRC). In the worst cases, the Army has been unable to provide the RRC with progress or locations of soldiers medically evacuated out of theater. The Reserve Forces Policy Board cited this as one of their most significant issues. So a key 2002 recommendation was for a central headquarters to manage the flow of soldiers and track information for the Joint Staff and Service Secretaries.

The lack of an overarching headquarters prevents the Reserves from exploiting existing headquarters competencies to compensate for reduced staffing. A Reserve Regional Readiness Command (RRC) and subordinate headquarters went to war with their normal complement of peace time staff, which is not capable of managing multiple simultaneous missions without activating sufficient Reservists. An AC battalion headquarters company, manned to 180-200 full time soldiers, is significantly more capable of managing multiple “Transforming while at War” missions than their Reserve counterpart, which has potentially ten full-time staff. At every level the Reserve structure is focused for readiness of units in a peace-time environment. Added complications of restructuring and transformation will always become subordinate priorities to soldier readiness.
The strength of the Reserves is in their separate headquarters’ competencies, as described by their mission statements. So future gains in improving effectiveness of the mobilization processes will be achieved by reducing the overlapping functions of the headquarters. In a particular instance, the Training Support Brigade reviewing units’ Combat Life Saver certificates invalidated nearly twenty soldiers’ certificates because the issuing TRADOC instructor had not included the number of hours on the certificates. Each headquarters managed to create additional hurdles when the units came under their authority each step of the way. A single headquarters to track personnel, with overarching ability to control and coordinate efforts would expedite unit mobilization.

UNIT PREDICTABILITY

The Army prioritizes its units, and lower-priority units generally need extra training and preparation time prior to deploying. However, a number of lower-priority units were mobilized with relatively little advanced notice.

- Government Accountability Report

As cross-leveling for OIF became the norm, units had experiences similar to those of the 321st Engineer Battalion which was stripped in OIF1 of approximately 30 soldiers to fill the 671st Engineer Company. Subsequent rotations required the 321st Engineer Battalion, now a “donor” unit, to cross-level soldiers to a sister Engineer Battalion which was at an even lower readiness status. The message was clear: readiness was immaterial. Cross-leveling soldiers to fill undermanned units have had three compounding affects on reserves. Without an increase in volunteerism, these effects will continue to degenerate the force through 2011.

First, incremental cross-leveling out of units, resulted in contributing units being designated as donor units, which were than raided with impunity by commanders of mobilizing units. This controlled cannibalization led to irreversible degradation of units, including demoralized leadership, and total loss of soldiers’ camaraderie.

Second, cross-leveling breaks “contracts.” Unquestionably, Reservists understand the impact and requirement of involuntary activation for major mobilizations. They prepare themselves by balancing family, employment, and community obligations for the possible activation. However, the use of the reserves as a customizable force, for OEF and OIF, destroyed that balance. Most soldiers felt disenfranchised from their unit when cross-leveled to another command. This displacement broke the unwritten contract assuming that soldiers can expect to deploy with their home units. An initial survey of returning Reserve OIF1 soldiers

6
revealed that 80% planned to leave the Army at their Expiration of Term of Service. Their negative responses indicate that they think the Army did not uphold its part of the contract.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, cross-leveling is jeopardizing recruiter referrals and retention. For the Reserves, recruitment of Non-Prior Service (NPS) and Prior Service (PS) soldiers is directly related to referrals. PS referrals contributed 53% of 2002 Selected Reserve Accessions. But soldiers leaving active duty because of instability in the active army are unlikely to be attracted to an unstable Reserve.\textsuperscript{18} The National Guard is now falling short of its recruiting goals.\textsuperscript{19}

AC MODELS FOR RC UNITS

Three main problems confront the Reserves mobilization process in the effort to transition to a rapid deployment cycle or a Train-Alert-Mobilize-Deploy model. The problems are the force structure, strategic framework, and unit predictability. The Army has developed five programs to address these problems; FRRI, Modularity, Army Campaign Plan (ACP), Global Force Management (GFM), and the Army Force Generation Model (AFGM).

![The Readiness Equation](image)

**FIGURE 1 - FEDERAL RESERVE RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE – READINESS EQUATION**

FRRI and Modularity have been designed to address Reserve organizational structure, but both are only in development stages. Although the ACP and AFGM are touted by the Secretary of the Army as the answer to unit predictability, they will fail for the Reserves.\textsuperscript{20} But they could succeed with the full implementation of the “Readiness Equation” initiative, the
approved configuration of the UEy for Maneuver and Sustainment, and the nomination for OIF rotations to FY2011.

The “The Readiness Equation,” proposed in FRRI, could strengthen Reserve unit management and allow for successful implementation of the Army Campaign Plan in the Reserves. The FRRI and the ACP are both designed to enhance predictability by improving readiness. As the Army develops a “brigade based” structure and increases end strength by 30,000, the Army Reserve is manning units by reducing the force, divesting approximately 34,000 Reserve positions (from MTOE and TDA) to zero-balance the difference between FSA and the ES. Present cross-leveling practices will continue to degrade units and prevent the implementation of the ACP’s formation of the AREPs with the expectation that they are prepared thereafter for modular employment. The designation of a Reserve unit on the ACP does not prevent it from being a donor unit to any unit that precedes it is mobilization.

Figure 2 graphically depicts the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), by unit patch, the Army plan for rotational depth and expeditionary transformation. This presentation is the culmination of brigade UA transformation reconfiguration planning; it projects the four-brigade division restructuring, essentially a transformation synch-matrix to brigade based posture (from 33 to 43 Bdes by FY2006). Under the “RESERVE” line, the ACP introduces the timeline for formation of

![Figure 2 - Army Campaign Plan (Before “Acceleration”)](image)

FIGURE 2 - ARMY CAMPAIGN PLAN (BEFORE “ACCELERATION”)
Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) 1-5. To meet the requirement, the Army Reserves have used the CENTCOM bound units for OIF4 and 5 for AREP 1-4 instead of the future modularity configurations of the UEy, because it is not yet available.\(^\text{22}\)

The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) commits Reserves to form AREPs, but it does nothing to improve their readiness until they are under alert orders which then provides “stop loss” and initiates cross-leveling into the unit.\(^\text{23}\) Without FRRI, the AREP still requires cross-leveling of soldiers, and does not enhance the units training readiness prior to alert status.

The second failure of the ACP is that the AREP packages being directed by USARC have no relationship to modularity and have only nominal value in relation to CENTCOM rotations. Even so, the units have been assigned by USARC to their presumed place in line for AREP 05-10.\(^\text{24}\) But these assignments did not consider the readiness of the unit. If they have been degraded by the previous OEF and OIF rotations, as donor units, they can train only hollowed-out units. If the AREP 1-4 units are not fully manned, then cross-leveling will reach into the AREP 5-10 units. If the AREP 5-10 units are then forced out of sequence for CENTCOM operations, this will require reordering the units, thus undermining any predictability of the ACP.

\[\text{FIGURE 3 - ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL}\]
The Army Force Generation Model (AFGM) provides the “The Army” model for the Active and Reserve operational deployment cycle, based on Secretary Defense Rumsfeld’s directive. The AFGM assumes that units will be fully resourced and manned as they migrate into the next higher level of training, because there is no time allotted for repeating the previous years' endeavors. This assumption is based on cohort manned units.

The cohort premise for AREP 5-10 is invalid from the start because selected units have been donor units for the previous four OIF rotations. A further assumption is that the AFGM cohort migrates fully manned into the next year. The AFGM assumes, as with AC units, that a replacement battalion is feeding recruits and that the cohort does not have an 18% annual personnel turnover (pre-OIF annual average for a Reserve unit).

Assume that in year two (see the ARNG and RC wheel below) the unit focuses on “re-bluing” soldiers’ skills with a goal of being at the low end of a T-3 training readiness by year end. Assume further that the unit, like typical Reserve units, is manned at 70% of authorized strength. With predicted turnover, only approximately 50% of the unit’s personnel would be properly trained to move into the year three and conduct multi-echelon and tactical training with a goal to attain a high T-3 or even a T-2, end of year readiness assessment. In fact, there is currently insufficient manning and cohesion in Reserve units to sustain the cohort premise on which AREPS 5-10 readiness preparedness is based.

The Army Force Generation Model (AFGM) and the Army Campaign Plan can solve issues of stability and predictability only after the Reserves have shifted their institutional thinking and culture from Alert-Mobilize-Train-Deploy to Train-Alert-Mobilize-Deploy in support of the RDO concept. However, the lack of a completed FRRI manning initiative will thwart the cohort manning and training expectation. The three most notable current shortfalls are the existing state of manning caused by cross-leveling, the continual degradation of existing units, and the failure to expedite the divesture of the “Readiness Equation’s” 37,000 positions. Since these problems will not be quickly solved, the following recommendations are formulated to ease the transition during the execution of the GWOT missions.

**A ‘MODEST’ PROPOSAL**

In contrast to Jonathan Swift's modest proposal, this one is designed to prevent the premature loss of first-term recruits. The present situation has undermanned units, with failing retention and increasing recruiting challenges, being scheduled for FY06-10 rotations. This will lead to transfers of those that know the system, leaving the newest soldiers, recruited since FY02, to prepare units for deployment. Without changes, the mobilization cycle will not provide
any additional soldiers to the unit until the alert order has been issued. Some of these units will become donor units prior to their scheduled mobilization and soldiers will transfer to them if they want to avoid being mobilized.

To reverse the degradation of Reserve units and to shape the future force, the Reserves must accept the ACP and OIF rotations, which mean increased volunteerism. The ACP provides a milestone calendar for OIF rotations that must be locked in through FY07, and then expanded as a planning document out to FY11. The units designated for deployment in FY05-07 must be filled internally by the component tasked to provide the unit. For FY08 and beyond, units should be nominated in accord with this recommendation, with vacant positions opened to volunteers across all of the components - Active, Guard and Reserves. The volunteers can be soldiers that have deployed or not; they can be offered the opportunities for MOS reclassification as needed.

Filling unit vacancies by encouraging volunteers, rather than involuntary cross-leveling, along with the following training recommendation, will bridge the existing gap in Reserve transformation, provide reasonable predictability, and tilt the Reserves toward the TRAIN-ALERT-MOB process. Until the Army has identified the requirements for homeland defense, transformation modular capabilities configuration, and force structure authorizations, to support overseas rotations, the following five-step recommendation creates a neutral ground to collectively meet the immediate needs of OIF and OEF mobilizations while enabling Reserve restructuring.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The first step is to categorize all Active, ARNG, and USAR units, by Units Identification Code (UIC), into four functional components based on mission. Functional-component one (F-COMPO 1) would consist of units that are deployed or are ready for deployment within 30 days for Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). Functional-component two (F-COMPO 2) units are designated for homeland defense with a 4-24 hours response posture in support of State and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) for crisis response. Functional-component three (F-COMPO 3) designates the expeditionary UA, UE, or AREF units that are within a three year rotational window, including all AC combat units not in F-COMPO 1. Finally, Functional-component four (F-COMPO 4) are CONUS support units, Garrison Support, Army Hospitals, and Individual Training Divisions, along with all remaining RC units not within a three-year window; F-COMPO4 units are available for State and DSCA missions. The classifications do
not indicate permanent status; they migrate based on the unit’s posture at a given time, for a given mission.

The benefit of this force structure unit classification system over the existing system is its value for resource allocation and retention. The F-COMPO designation could qualify units to receive resources, at a time of increased resource constraints, needed in order to reset the force. Additionally, equipment in the F-COMPO 4 units would be limited to minimum equipment essential for training (MEET), and Reserve sets for F-COMPO 3 would be pre-positioned at the appropriate training installations. This system could also benefit soldiers’ long-term career progression and retention by allowing the individual soldier the choice of assignment based on the relative stability offered by a particular F-COMPO. If there is illness in the soldier’s family or a soldier’s parents were in need of support the soldier could elect to be assigned to a CONUS based F-COMPO 4 unit. On the other hand, the boards would view successful service in F-COMPO 1, and F-COMPO 2 as criteria for faster promotions; likewise reenlistment contracts to serve in these units would offer higher bonuses.

![Figure 4 - Four "Total Army" Components](image)

**STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK**

Second, create a central headquarters for mobilization coordination and control. During the Operation Iraqi Freedom, mobilizations were conducted under two distinct chains of command: One went through NORTHCOM to First and Fifth Armies, to the Training Support
Division (TSD) that validated training readiness, which was the single largest time-consumer for mobilizing units. The second chain of command went through FORSCOM, to United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), and then to the Regional Readiness Command (RRC), which exercised mostly logistical and personnel readiness oversight. However, the TSDs were seldom committed to training readiness until units were within days of the mobilization station—a totally illogical situation. For the future, the Army should establish a Joint Task Force for Training Readiness (JTF-TR) focused on RC/NG F-COMPO 3 preparation, from the First and Fifth Army, National Guard Bureau, and Army Reserves staffs to control and coordinate all training readiness. JTF-TR, designated and commanded by the receiving Combatant Commander, will have OPCON of these Training Support Divisions that are not committed to Homeland Security support missions.29

Third, place nominated Guard and Reserve designated FCOMPO-3 units under operational control (OPCON) of the Training Support Divisions (TSD) assigned to the JTF-TR. This exploits the Training Divisions' expertise in training units and allows the RRC and TAG headquarters to focus on preparing follow-on units, while resetting those returning. Utilization of the TSDs during the Extreme Preparation (X-Prep) and Combined Training Center (CTC) training years will develop a warrior/expeditionary mindset in the soldiers and prevent peacetime commands’ interference through inappropriate taskings.

The TSD's responsibilities will begin during the nominative year, when they should detail teams to assess training readiness in coordination with the respective peacetime headquarters' Readiness Teams. These Readiness Teams will ensure that the RRC or ARNG HQ staff brings the newly designated F-COMPO 3 unit to ALO 1 for personnel, supply, and equipment readiness. A small cadre of four TSD “unit assistors” will be assigned to support the unit to develop a two-year training plan.

Personnel support will be developed by the unit's peacetime HQ. Leadership selection will be conducted through open competition for critical positions, to include Commander, First and Platoon Sergeants, and key leadership roles. Selected leaders will serve for three full years (two training, one deployed). The designated F-COMPO 3 unit's flag, while associated to a geographically located battle assembly center and a core of soldiers, will receive necessary fills from an open 'all army' recruiting of AC, RC, and NG (not to exceeding 20% AC). Due to the geographical dispersion of the soldiers the unit would actually interact through electronic collaborative venues and come together for collective training in a TDY status, at a designated major training installation. Any AC volunteers would remain assigned to their present post, performing their F-COMPO 3 unit duties in a reverse reservist fashion, after hours and on
weekends. The AC members would commute TDY to attend a battle assembly duty and train with the unit until the alert notification, when they will become permanently assigned.

The strategic framework use of a JTF-TR developed in steps two and three, link the centralized headquarters with the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and receiving CCDR to track units' progress. Further, JTF oversight of training readiness of all their OPCON Reserve F-COMPO 3 units allows the JTF to coordinate Active and Reserve units into NTC-type facilities concurrently; this joint training develops an affiliation prior to arrival in theater, familiarizing all soldiers with standing operating procedures, with communications processes, and intelligence distribution with the deploying AC Division or Brigade HQ. The biggest benefit from a shortened two-year training cycle is that it encourages volunteers from any component (AC, ARNG, and RC) to fill positions on a volunteer basis, while providing increased cross-pollination of competence to the RC unit. Also unit leaders are assigned from nomination through deployment.

UNIT PREDICTABILITY

The fourth step (TRAIN-ALERT cycle) is the two-year training cycle. The training plan for the X-Prep year will include an intensive tactical and technical task regime (similar to the AFGM Year 4) which expands typical Reserve training parameters. This X-Prep year increases the soldiers' contributions to 24 MUTAs (12 days) and 32 Annual Training days, for an actual additional reserve commitment of six days (38 vs. 44 days per year). The training structure includes - one day per month of distance learning classroom training when leader- and soldier-skills training is conducted by an on-line collaboration from home or reserve centers. The Annual Training (AT) days will be divided into two 16 day training events from Saturday of week one to the Sunday of week two. These semi-annual training events will be conducted at major training centers or Amy installations, externally evaluated and structured by the TSD with pre-staged unit equipment sets. All annual training orders will require volunteer soldiers to travel and train with their units.

The training plan for the second year (CTC training year) will include an increase in Reserve commitment of an additional 14 days from the present system (38 vs. 52 days per year). This training evolution will include 24 MUTA, one day per month, and two 20-day Annual Training (AT) periods, one at major training installations and one as a rotation to a CTC facility, Joint Readiness Training Center or National Training Center, in preparation for deployment to the anticipated theater. The most significant difference in this training year is that the TSD will
conduct an external formal validation of the unit during the CTC rotation, supported by CTC staff, in preparation for mobilization.

**FIGURE 5 - PROPOSED EXPEDITIONARY RESERVE FORCE MODEL**

The fifth step is employment and redeployment. The alerted unit will assemble at the prescribed Power Projection Platform (PPP) for mobilization to conduct final Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) and to confirm the unit has met the training readiness standards. Upon mobilization and throughout the entire process, the JTF will provide updates on the units’ status to the combatant commander, joint staff, and DA headquarters. Upon redeployment the unit will close out the mobilization with the JTF to ensure that all personnel are accounted for and all personnel issues are documented.

Steps four and five assume that the units are fully manned and that they have developed unit cohesiveness through the training cycles and the continuity of command. The two AT periods allow soldiers to continue civilian employment while providing a transition from traditional Reserve commitment to an enhanced commitment to mobilization. Finally, units’ closure of deployments completes the requirements considered critical to the Reserve Force Policy Board.
CONCLUSION

Given the realities of OIF support and the urgencies of transformation, the Reserves must adapt to increasing demands. The answer is not to increase involuntary mobilizations, leading to the potential loss of the all-volunteer force, but to increase volunteerism through innovative approaches. Recommendations in this SRP foster increased volunteerism under the control of an active joint task force headquarters. The combination of coordination and soldier care provided by a centralized command would send a clear message that the military is concerned for soldiers, for Reservists’ employers, for their families, and for the future relevancy of the force.

The consequences of not acting immediately to redress the imbalance of force authorization to end strength will continue to spiral the selected Reserves into a “broken force,” as LTG Helmly has warned. Indeed the capabilities of the Reserves force have never been so vital to the nation. Clausewitz refers to the center of gravity as the source of power through which the military derives its will to fight. With no peer military in the world, our center of gravity remains the public’s support of the US Armed Forces and the all-volunteer force. A strong transformed community-based Army Reserve, transformed beyond cold war organizations and policies, will foster a healthy national security based on an all-volunteer force.

WORD COUNT = 5505
ENDNOTES


8 The incident in this paragraph was witnessed by the author while mobilizing the 971MC Team, after numerous conversations with USARC and FORSCOM to confirm the intent to mobilize this unit in January 2004, while he was serving as the Commander of the 654 Area Support Group, 70 RRC, Seattle WA.

9 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 2004 Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), 89.


11 Ibid., 2.

12 The incident in this paragraph was witnessed by the author while mobilizing the 737 TC, 907 FF, and 909 PS units at Ft. Lewis, WA in January 2004, while he was serving as the Commander of the 654 Area Support Group, 70 RRC, Seattle WA.


14 The incident in this paragraph was witnessed by the author from November 2002 to January 2004, while he was serving as the Commander of the 654 Area Support Group, 70 RRC, Seattle WA.


17 James R. Helmly, “Army Reserve Released From Active Duty Survey (REFRAD) Results.”


21 James R. Helmly, “Profound Change While Fighting the War,” 110.


30 James R. Helmly, “Readiness of the United States Army Reserves.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY


