FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM – ARE THERE
LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR?

by

Colonel Paul Calbos
United States Army

Colonel George Doran
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Report Documentation Page**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 MAR 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting the Global War on Terrorism Are There Lessons From the Cold War?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Calbos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
In the years immediately following WWII, America began a new struggle for survival and dominance. Faced with the threat of monolithic communism, U.S. government policy makers brilliantly crafted a new national security strategy based on opposing communism through containment. This successful strategy served as a guide for almost fifty years, helping successive administrations navigate the difficult and complex terrain of the Cold War. It was the centerpiece of America's growth and resulting hegemony. Now America is engaged in another struggle that threatens its very foundation and security. U.S. leaders are again being called to craft a national security strategy for this new kind of global environment, with the threat of destructive terrorism at the center. This paper will examine the post-WWII Cold War environment -- the origins of the "war on communism," and apply some of the more significant lessons learned to America's present Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). I will apply the Strategy Formulation Model in addressing vision, national policy, and the ends, ways, means of a national strategy for the GWOT, and suggest ways in which America can use its national power to influence the significant forces and trends of the global and domestic environments.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ................................................................................................................................................ iii  
**FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM – ARE THERE LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR? ...1**  
**BACKGROUND AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT** ......................................................................................... 2  
**ROADMAP FOR THE GWOT; AFFECTING NATIONAL PURPOSE** .................................................... 4  
**STRATEGIC VISION AND APPROACH** ............................................................................................... 4  
**STRATEGIC IDEOLOGY: PRAGMATISM VS REALISM** ........................................................................ 5  
**MORAL EQUIVALENCY** ....................................................................................................................... 7  
**RISK AND NATIONAL WILL** .................................................................................................................. 8  
**IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM AND THREAT; DEFINE THE ENEMY** ................................................... 9  
**NATIONAL ELEMENTS OF POWER AND THE STRATEGY FORMULATION MODEL ...10**  
**D – I – M – E** ....................................................................................................................................... 12  
**DIPLOMATIC** ......................................................................................................................................... 13  
**ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS** ........................................................................................................... 13  
**INFORMATION** ........................................................................................................................................ 16  
**ECONOMIC** ........................................................................................................................................... 19  
**CONCLUSION** ........................................................................................................................................ 21  
**ENDNOTES** ........................................................................................................................................... 25  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ...................................................................................................................................... 29  

v
FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM – ARE THERE LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR?

In the President’s inaugural address of 2001, in the historic May 2002 policy setting speech to the graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, and most recently in his 2005 inaugural address, President George W. Bush strikes a comparison between the present Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and America’s past war on communism. The President’s repetition of Cold War comparisons when talking about the GWOT gives readers and listeners the sense that there is a larger message intended for the audience; that possibly there are positive lessons to be learned from the Cold War example. In June of 2004, then Secretary of State Colin Powell was interviewed by the periodical “The Atlantic Monthly,” and when asked of the parallels between the beginning of the Cold War and the beginning of the war on terrorism, stated “I think there’s something to that;.....a dawning recognition of a new kind of threat ....... and not a temporary aberration that’s going to go away.....it took the Cold War forty years.” Powell made further reference to the Cold War later in the same interview commenting: “...if you look at the experiences of WWII and the Cold War, there was a great deal of trial and error.....” Although these allusions to the Cold War are somewhat lost in the superficial media reactions to those speeches and interviews, the comparison is significant, and provides us with a possible road map, or at least a starting point for this new kind of war.

The Cold War consumed America’s efforts and resources for close to fifty years – a half century, and almost two generations – and drove U.S. Government national security strategy in a way that altered the world. It would simply be unconscionable at best and unforgivable at worst if those responsible for setting our policy and strategy for the GWOT do not pause to ponder the lessons from that successful anticommunist campaign. A consideration of lessons learned would only be prudent, and should be a necessary first step to formulating policy and strategy for the next fifty years, or for the duration of the current fight against terrorism. U.S. prosecution of the war against communism, while not flawless, was a model of execution over time of complex grand strategy. American policy planners would do well to learn from past experiences – both successes and failures, and apply the same logic to the GWOT. In referring to the war one senior Bush administration staffer recently admitted: “I think that execution and implementation are undervalued, and we need to do better.”

Measured against almost any yardstick, today America is faced with a threat as and equally ambiguous as that of the Cold War fight against communism. In order to meet the challenge of global terrorism, the U.S. must dedicate the necessary resources and expend the effort required for a long, drawn out campaign that will be characterized by an even more
complex and uncertain world than that of the Cold War. In prosecuting the GWOT, it may be useful to look to the past, especially to the post-WWII era, to study frameworks or models that were successful in America's global crusade against communism. Dr. Leonard Wong of the Strategic Studies Institute recently wrote, "Americans want the single minded resolve that characterized the fight against communism."\(^4\)

This paper will address the question of whether America can benefit from the lessons learned from the application of Cold War strategy, and whether they may be applicable in America's present Global War on Terrorism. I will present a brief timeline of the early Cold War period as a prelude to comparing and contrasting the present GWOT strategy. Further, I will explore present U.S. strategy, offering a critique and suggesting changes to policy options using the Strategic Formulation Model of *Ends, Ways, and Means* as a basis, breaking it down into the four major categories of the Elements of National Power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME). This paper will not focus on a set of individual countries or regions; rather it will offer a general strategic approach to the GWOT guided by a few DIME considerations that are most important and critical to winning the war. America's war on terror has been waged successfully in a strict military sense, but policy maker neglect has been cause for the lack of success in the other three DIME categories. In a talk at the U.S. Army War College a prominent military leader confirmed this neglect commenting: "We have failed to harness all the assets available to us; we are not using all elements of our national power; we cannot use only the military to win this war; we are losing on the diplomatic and informational front; tactically we kick butt; operationally we are fighting to a draw; and strategically we are getting beat every day."\(^5\)

**BACKGROUND AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

"The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate....in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."

George F. Kennan, JULY 1947

As World War II came to an end and America secured total victory in both the European and Pacific theaters, the United States assumed a new role as the reigning world hegemon. It had the most powerful military in the world, and it possessed the atomic bomb. Focused on the difficult postwar task of rebuilding Europe and Japan, the US Government at first viewed the threat of monolithic communism as only a distant concern. This brief interlude was short-lived
however, as the United States began contending with a growing Soviet menace. At its genesis, the threat of global communism was marked by unclear conditions set against a backdrop of complex strategic issues. This complicated strategic environment was framed by the two great powers to emerge from the war, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As the U.S. began to formulate a strategy of response to Soviet agitation, the ambiguous international environment began to take shape, pulling the growing U.S. – Soviet conflict into sharper focus. At this point U.S. government leaders realized that cooperation with the Soviet Union would not be possible, and the Cold War became reality. Over a forty-five year Cold War period, the United States displayed an unwavering persistence and drive that spanned almost eleven presidential administrations and two generations of its people, in order to successfully counter communist aggression. As historians study and write about the Cold War, several successful strategic maneuvers emerge that were central to America’s eventual victory and the spread of representative democracy and a free market system around the world.

Guided along by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from Moscow, America entered the Cold War age. In a significant follow-on piece printed in *Foreign Affairs* magazine and now famous as the “X – Article,” Kennan clearly identified the Soviet communist regime as the threat, and eloquently articulated the aggressive, expansionist policies of the Soviet empire. Subsequent to the 1946 “X – Article” there were a series of international incidents that many in the U.S. Government policy making establishment believed painted a picture of a clear and present danger of communist expansion. Immediately following the March 1947 British retreat from the Eastern Mediterranean and the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Europe experienced communist insurgency and civil war in Greece from 1946 to 1949, the rapid Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and the year long Berlin Blockade. Farther east, the Chinese communist government was victorious in the Chinese Civil War, Russia detonated its own atomic bomb establishing it as an atomic nation, and North Korea attacked across the 38th Parallel opening the Korean War.

All of these events served to further refine, focus, and more clearly define the threat for U.S. policy planners who sought a strategy to contain soviet communism and counter the Soviet enterprise to eventually convert the international community to communism. Responding to Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, and the belief that they would soon begin encroaching on the territories of Western Europe to force a change in the status quo, U.S. policy makers drafted the March 1947 Truman Doctrine, and in June 1947 the government offered a huge aid package known as the Marshall Plan for Economic Recovery.
Plan had far-reaching impact, and are still judged as momentous policy decisions that altered the course of history.

Additionally, against this backdrop of both cold and hot war, and in an effort to deter the Soviets and defend Western Europe, America joined eleven other European nations in a North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, forming NATO in mid 1949 and establishing the first alliance in response to the communist threat. In the years following the establishment of NATO, America worked to secure several other treaties, agreements, and regional pacts, thus creating a system of worldwide regional alliances which formed the principal bulwark against the spread of communism for the greater part of forty-five years of Cold War.9

Within three years after WWII, two more very important strategic studies were written that also significantly contributed to America’s nascent anti-communist strategy. The first, also written by George Kennan, was a document that became known as “NSC 20/4,” which advocated a policy approach similar to his previous “X Article.”10 Kennan’s reports are now considered to be the lightening rods for America’s Cold War strategy objective (ends) of containment. The third essay, completing the triad of early U.S. national security strategic policies, was the voluminous “NSC 68” paper which finally obliged the United States to begin a rearmament program in response to the communist threat. NSC-68, drafted by a junior Department of State foreign affairs specialist named Paul Nitze, further enumerated the danger posed by communism, but added stronger emphasis, calling for a force buildup and a more aggressive response to the Soviets.11 By 1950 America was fully committed to a strategy of “containment” of Soviet communism, responding to what the United States Government believed were bold and calculated Soviet maneuvers to alter the status quo demonstrated on Cold War battlefields from Korea to Europe.12

ROADMAP FOR THE GWOT; AFFECTING NATIONAL PURPOSE

“America confronted imperial communism in many different ways – diplomatic, economic and military. Yet moral clarity was essential to our victory in the Cold War.”

President George Bush, West Point, 1 June 2002

STRATEGIC VISION AND APPROACH

Current U.S. strategy for the GWOT does not flow from a clear expression of a vision. For any grand strategy to be successful, it must have a focus which is derived from a vision. The vision for America’s present strategy must provide clear direction on where we want to go with our response to terrorism. Are we simply reacting to the 9-11 terrorist strike while defending and safeguarding our interests at home and overseas, or is there more to our strategy? Although the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) attempts to explain U.S. strategic
requirements, the NSS not provide a clear, concise vision. A clear vision statement would help lay the groundwork for a successful strategy by focusing strategic objectives, concepts, and methods. In the three and a half years since the 9-11 attack, U.S. strategic unity of effort and clear direction have been lacking, thus support for the GWOT has waxed and waned, producing somewhat lackluster results. Only very recently -- in the 2005 inaugural address -- has the President been more specific in calling for a visionary “universal democracy” and a “war against tyranny.” The current administration would do well to more closely study the Truman presidency and its creation of a post WWII strategic vision.

The vision that guided U.S. strategy and policy for the Cold War insured a unified response and a unity of effort was present across the spectrum of government. Reacting to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, Russian probes in Iran, and a building crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean where Russia tried to revise the Montreux Convention giving it control of the Dardanelle Straits, the Truman administration policy response took shape rapidly. American officials viewed these Soviet moves as the culmination of a long effort by Moscow to lock in additional satellite states, secure the oilfields of the Middle East, and establish a naval presence in Turkey from which it could threaten the remainder of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and ultimately the Persian Gulf. Domestically, the Soviet threat was brought sharply into focus by the March 1946 'Iron Curtain' speech delivered by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, Kennan's February 1946 'X-Article' in Foreign Affairs magazine, Secretary of State Byrnes dialogue questioning Soviet threat of force, and finally by Senator Vandenberg’s words to the Senate criticizing the timidity of U.S. foreign policy. The result was that by the summer of 1946 – one year after the end of WWII – there was a U.S. strategic vision: active opposition to the spread of communism. American officials then went to work crafting a strategy, and persuading a hesitant public that the communist threat was real.

STRATEGIC IDEALOGY: PRAGMATISM VS REALISM

In the expression of strategic vision U.S. policy planners should look to strike a careful balance between the idealism of Woodrow Wilson and the realism of Ronald Reagan in creating the security policies and strategy for the 21st century. It is not necessary to force a distinction between the two. In the words of prominent historian John Lewis Gaddis, there is now a compelling reason to “…make the world safe for democracy, because otherwise democracy will not be safe in the world.” Borrowing the words of 17th century Massachusetts Bay governor John Winthrop, the realist Ronald Reagan described America as the “Shining City Upon a Hill,” in explaining America’s great responsibility as a beacon, example, and hope for the world.
The tense argument between the idealist and realist camps that separate U.S. Government reaction into an either / or proposition is not necessary, and only serves to detract from the unity of effort. In truth, America's security strategy has always been guided by both – a vigorous idealism infused with a realistic appraisal of America's interests and security needs. The Bush administration has tried to bridge this philosophical gap, insisting the two are not mutually exclusive. The President has tried to merge idealism, that “Shining city on the hill” example with the necessary pragmatic power that will be necessary to advance it beyond our borders. President Bush states so in his second Inaugural address to the nation: “We are led by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.”19

The president has managed to fuse both our values and beliefs as a nation with our pragmatic goals of national self interest and self preservation. Further describing this new fusion of U.S. policy, the administration’s recently selected national security advisor Stephen Hadley asserts that the analysts are wrong to see tension between idealists and realists. Hadley argues that “Our interests are reflected in our principles, and a world that increasingly reflects our principles is going to be a world which is increasingly in our interests.”20 The major challenge now is for the administration to convince Congress, the American public, and the international community of this sincerity of effort.

Like the present GWOT, the Cold War was a conflict that at its roots lay major ideological differences. In fact Cold War author Gaddis, the man known as the ‘dean of American diplomatic historians, believes that the Cold War was indeed an ideological conflict; it was not just a conflict of power and interests. Leaders on both sides were guided by their ideas and beliefs about good and evil, the direction of history, and how preferred ends should be achieved (ways and means). Decisions made by western Cold War leaders were unavoidably framed by their beliefs and dispositions. What Gaddis calls a “democratic realism” was second nature to those leaders of a society bred on humane and democratic ideals. That is not to say that shrewd calculations based on ‘realpolitik’ were not central to U.S. balance of power politics practiced for most of the Cold War, only that the purveyors of such policy were also guided by democratic habits.”21 Finally, as former military officer turned writer Ralph Peters says it: “A world in which men and women live freely and enjoy secure rights is the world in which our own greatness is likely to endure.”22 This same ideological force – a combination of pragmatism and idealism -- must be present in the U.S. approach to its GWOT strategy,
MORAL EQUIVALENCY

At the very heart of ideology is the argument of “moral equivalency.” If America is to triumph in the long struggle against global terrorism, it must stay on message in its strategic objective of spreading democracy. To entertain the moral equivalency argument – that is to say moral relativism – which declares that America is as immoral in its relentless pursuit of world domination and hegemony as are its enemies, is to lose sight of, and confidence in, the ways and means of our objective to secure the nation by spreading democracy, free markets, and open societies. For many years of the Cold War America was beleaguered with the revisionist theory of moral equivalency, which preyed on the collective will of the nation and challenged its ability to stay the course until the end. The idea that the Cold War was a battle between two superpowers bent on empire was a constant refrain from those that believed America to be equally amoral as its enemy in its quest – the ways and means to the objective (ends) of defeating communism and supporting the growth of democracy. Of course the antithesis of the law of moral equivalency is the belief that right and wrong are not set to a sliding scale, that morality can be measured in the number of degrees of distance from a certain mark, and that standards of conduct do exist. In his editorial “The New Warrior Class,” Ralph Peters asks the question:

What of all that self-hobbling rhetoric about the moral equivalency of all cultures? Isn’t it possible that a culture (or religion or form of government) that provides a functional combination of individual and collective security with personal liberties really does deserve to be taken more seriously than and emulated above a culture that glorifies corruption, persecutes nonbelievers, lets gunmen rule, and enslaves its women? Is all human life truly sacred, no matter what crimes the individual or his collective may commit?

Peters seems to suggest that American leaders must not apologize for the advancing wave of history and human progress in whatever form it takes, especially that of globalization, and certainly should not apologize for the role America plays in this progress.

The morality of America’s national purpose – beliefs, ethics, and values, drives the national security strategy, and the country can ill afford the debilitating effect of self doubt or self-reflection on the righteousness of its purpose. The national security goals of political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity help to focus the ways or concepts of the U.S. approach to applying its power, and help to identify the tool or means to use when targeting those concepts. During the years of the Cold War, the national strategy was also marked by much self-critique, finally reaching its zenith even while all of Eastern Europe was turning its back on communism and the Soviet empire was in a death spiral. As the Economist magazine points out, the flood of recently released Cold War files from
Soviet archives tend to now undermine the self-flagellation arguments of many of the Western revisionist historians. American policy planners and leaders must confidently strive to advance the national purpose in the war on terror, and recognize the fact that the country is involved in a race—a race to destroy the immediate physical threat of terrorism before it is unleashed again, and to reverse the social, political, and economic inequities across the Middle East that give rise to fundamentalist Islam and terrorism in the Islamic world.

RISK AND NATIONAL WILL

Concurrently, effort must be expended on the home front to prepare the American people for a long, drawn out struggle requiring will and determination. A first step in this direction should be a realization that America’s defeat is possible. As many of the nation’s leaders have stated, Al Qaeda must hit its target only one in a hundred—or one in a thousand—times to be successful. If a terrorist strike produces a high number of casualties, severely damages U.S. infrastructure, and ruins financial systems, there is always a risk that American ‘will’ could be diminished to the point where the American people accede to the terrorists’ demands. The U.S. cannot afford to merely maintain the status quo, withdrawing into isolation and protecting the homeland only. Failure to change the status quo in such trouble spots as the Middle East equals defeat for America, and could be catastrophic for the nation. The choice, as it was during the early years of the Cold War, is to “act with energy or lose by default.”

The U.S. must harness all the instruments at its disposal to prosecute an offensive campaign, the purpose of which is to destroy the networks of terrorism, and the “networks of networks” that seek to undermine the West. In order to accomplish this, America will eventually have to transform the Middle East—its repressive governments, its economics, its political systems, and its reliance on fundamentalist Islam as a method of controlling the masses. This transformation will not happen in two or five, or even 15 years. It will not be possible to transform the region without investing the time needed for real change to take effect. The lessons of the Cold War provide a logical timetable for the GWOT that is more on the order of twenty to thirty years. The examples are many, but an excellent comparison from the years of the Cold War is the story of Greece. It took more than thirty years for the tiny nation of Greece (around 9 million population at the time, and an area roughly the size of the state of Pennsylvania) to fully democratize and escape the conditions that contributed to its instability. To accomplish this, it took a full fledged civil war, deep U.S. government penetration of every facet of the Greek government and its agencies, and the equivalent in today’s dollars of over
$150 billion of aid. The example of Greece, the first successful U.S. effort to counter communism, should be analyzed as a case study for the present GWOT. There are other examples of America’s anti-communist efforts: Korea, Eastern Europe, and the tiny nations of Central America to name a few.

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM AND THREAT; DEFINE THE ENEMY

As the strategy of containment emerged in the early years of the Cold War, President Harry Truman made it clear that the U.S. had given up any hope for cooperation with the Soviet Union. In his Truman Doctrine speech of March 1947, the President bluntly characterized a world divided by “two ways of life” that were incompatible. Truman correctly identified the problem as communism, and the enemy as communists that threatened to expand their influence and system to the West, and eventually throughout the world. Truman and his policy advisors addressed the problem by creating a national strategy objective of containment, supported by a multifaceted approach of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. The clarity of a ‘Truman Doctrine’ is currently missing from America’s Grand Strategy, and because of it, unity of effort has faltered. For America to be effective in the GWOT U.S. leaders must reach consensus about the nature of the problem we are facing, and have a clear definition of the threat. Before the U.S. can devise a successful long term strategy to the war on terror, it is fundamental that the leadership clearly identify the problem and define the enemy; national objectives will follow from a clear definition of the enemy.

U.S. leadership must avoid the temptation to widen the focus of the war by targeting all terror groups, all governments that resist democracy, or those countries defined as the “axis of evil.” The enemy should simply be defined as al Qaeda, the terrorist allies of al Qaeda, and those countries or groups that harbor and support the terror groups. U.S. policy planners should concentrate efforts on terrorist ‘networks’ and the ‘network of networks’ that allow the terrorists to operate. These ‘network of networks’ are comprised of the systems of narco-terrorism, illegal financial rings, fundamentalist Islamic foundations or mosques operating under cover, totalitarian figures or bands ruling tyrannical regimes, or failed or near failed states, and warlords operating in the vast areas of ungoverned spaces across the globe. The ways and means of U.S. strategy should include all those objectives and tools that support the destruction of the terror groups, and the system in which they operate. The tools should be carefully selected to address all the concepts (ways) of the war; those military tools that will help kill terrorists and destroy their power base, and those tools that target the underlying causes of fundamentalist Islamic terror -- the totalitarian, repressive governments of the Middle East that
are the root cause of the disenfranchisement and disillusionment of large numbers of people. Their failure to deliver sound economic progress, or political enlightenment, and their own lack of accountability in helping to broker a peaceful solution to the Palestinian -- Israeli problem are major contributing factors to the conditions within which the terrorist networks have been able to grow and flourish. The source of fundamentalist Islamic hatred of America and the West comes from societies that exist under these conditions.

NATIONAL ELEMENTS OF POWER AND THE STRATEGY FORMULATION MODEL

The Strategic Formulation Model provides national security strategists with an organized, integrated, and dovetailed approach to address complex national security issues. Assisted by this model, policymakers identify national purpose and interests, craft a supporting strategic vision, and formulate policies to support that vision by way of a balanced appraisal of objectives or goals (ends), concepts of power application (ways), and tools of national power (means). Conducting a strategic appraisal requires a careful consideration of multiple forces and trends that impact on the model such as desired endstate, the domestic environment, international organizations, national agencies, economic conditions, interest groups, media and a host of other influences that shape strategy formulation. (See Figure 1) The tools used in response to strategic problems, and those employed to influence the global environment and shape the strategic landscape are known as the Elements of National Power. These elements are categorized into specific skill sets under the acronym D-I-M-E: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. While all are important, Grand Strategy practitioners make it clear that strategic application of the D-I-M-E must be a balanced approach, and in the long-term especially, must not rely exclusively on the military aspect of power. While necessary for effective defense, deterrence, and compellence, the military tool is many times misused, or overused.

At his second Inaugural address in January 2005 President Bush stated that “...ending tyranny in our world...is not primarily the task of arms...” His statement seemed to be a sincere attempt to redirect American foreign policy, using the speech to focus attention on the other means of national power in order to affect the ends, ways, and means of our national security strategy. More recently, in a candid talk to senior service college students and officers a high ranking military leader with a connection to the interagency community commented that other agencies must do more to pull their weight and harness the other means of national power, and that “...the military cannot do this alone.” Moreover he stated that the GWOT
could not be successful without the overwhelming application of the diplomatic, information, and economic elements of national power.

The post-WWII Truman administration built a strategy that with few azimuth corrections carried the United States through the Cold War. The administration was able to quickly focus its efforts in support of a security strategy derived from several important strategic documents drafted in the years immediately following WWII. Emerging from WWII with a well defined national purpose, the U.S. realigned its interests in the post war world to reflect the goals of defending democracy and expanding a free market economic system. America built a strategic vision centered on opposing communism, and created a national strategy based on the objective (ends) of containing the Soviet threat. The strategic concepts (ways) that followed from the objective included a myriad of approaches and ideas: the “long haul” military buildup, a freeze of the status quo in Europe, cooperative action with friends and allies through the creation of multiple alliances to counter the Soviet Warsaw Pact, the advancement of global economic growth through liberal economic policies and open markets, opposition to communist expansion by the use of both direct and indirect military force, and a very liberal program of aid to support needy countries.32

Although it has been almost four years since the attacks of 9-11, U.S. efforts have so far been less organized, and less productive than America’s Cold War origins. The delta seems to be more prevalent and noticeable at the lower end of the Strategic Formulation Model where national power must be applied through certain means to affect the national security strategy. While generally successful with the military tool of power, America has not used the other elements wisely in prosecuting its strategy, resulting in what some believe to be a backwards slide since 9-11 in worldwide acceptance and legitimacy of our strategy.
"America cannot impose this vision – yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.

President George Bush, West Point, 1 June 2002
Although it may take years to reshape the more broken pieces of the D-I-M-E tool set, there are several quick fixes that can be managed in the short-term to insure America makes the necessary course corrections in its prosecution of the GWOT. The following review of the Diplomatic, Information, and Economic categories -- the 'Military' function will not be covered since it has been the most successful -- will address several tools that can have the greatest effect on U.S. ends, ways, and means. It is not in any way meant to be a comprehensive list of all the tools available for the elements of national power, but only those that are most significant, and those that are most easily accomplished. A full discussion of the Strategy Formulation Model and all the Elements of National Power is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following paragraphs will briefly highlight some observations drawn from research.

**DIPLOMATIC**

**ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS**

“We must have broad international coalitions to increase the pressure for peace. We must build strong and great power relations when times are good; to help manage crisis when times are bad. America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble struggle.”

President George Bush, West Point, 1 June 2002

The best examples of a regional alliance model are those that were created and took shape in the years following WWII. During the years of Cold War, alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the shorter duration accords of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Australia-New Zealand-United States pact (ANZUS), and even the more loosely defined security agreements of the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all generally proved their worth in responding to the Soviet communist threat. These alliances were significant as much for their recognition and demonstration of a common purpose and like minded agreement in checking communism, as they were for their actual practical security cooperation. Although NATO was by far the most important and most powerful alliance, the many post-war constructs were important in that they served as positive examples of American global engagement as a counter force to communism. The history of American grand strategy during the Cold War is most remarkable for the infrequency with which the United States acted unilaterally.

Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) contain many references to a multilateral approach for America’s security strategy, and both provide guidance on how U.S. representative agencies and the armed forces should craft a
multilateral approach to strategy. The current problem with multilateralism in America’s current strategy is not that the defining documents fail to account for alliance building, but it is in how we prosecute the plan for alliance building. This is a function of practice, not a lack of planning guidance. The NSS and the NMS definitively account for a multilateral approach to America’s national strategy policy. The most recent September 2002 NSS dedicates four chapters to the topic of multilateralism, using the terms “alliance building,” “partner nations,” and “allies and friends” to describe relationships associated with the multilateral philosophy of America’s strategic engagement. Additionally, a full paragraph in the President’s introduction to the NSS is devoted to alliance building:

> We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances.

The 2004 NMS is also replete with similar references to “partner nations,” “friends and allies,” “regional alliances,” and other terms that describe a multilateral approach to America’s military strategy, and in fact, the NMS uses one of these associated terms over fourteen times throughout the twenty-three page document. In the NMS paragraph on Enhancing Overseas Presence Posture, it refers to “.....strengthening and expanding the United State’s network of partnerships.” and further states: “Strengthening regional alliances and coalitions helps to create favorable regional balances of power that help bring pressure to bear on hostile or uncooperative regimes. Multinational partnerships expand opportunities for coalition building through combined training, experimentation and transformation.” It is clear from both the NSS and the NMS that the present administration values alliance building in theory, but the proof must be in execution. U.S. government leaders must retain and prioritize coalition and alliance building as a major pillar of America’s strategy. This diplomatic and military tool will be critically important in the GWOT as a means to advance U.S. military supremacy, gain legitimacy and support for U.S. actions, and to create a larger and wider base of nations from which to launch its message of democracy and free market economics.

The regional alliance design, rather than a single global alliance remains the most acceptable, viable, and feasible alternative. American interests can best be served through regional engagement, where the issues are more common and less complex – where even terrorism is local, and where America can help other nations help themselves by addressing their needs, while at the same time benefiting from a true partnership. Regionally, this can hopefully be accomplished without the heavy-handed tactics sometimes necessary to compel
nations to act. By addressing global terrorism from a regional perspective, America will achieve
global legitimacy one region at a time, avoiding the pitfalls of a “philosophical schism” that many
times results in constructs that encompass vastly different regions, cultures, and peoples. The
differences of culture, religion, language, living standards, and traditions are factors that
contribute to a lack of alliance cohesion, thus trying to construct an inter-regional alliance
becomes infinitely more difficult.\footnote{141}

This regional alliance concept must be reformed however, and will only be effective after
certain changes, updates, and revitalization. Past balance of power security arrangements
centered primarily on a military strategy to counter the Soviet threat and nation state enemies,
are no longer relevant, or effective. To counter 21\textsuperscript{st} century terrorism, America’s strategy should
rely on a collective security concept based on regional alliances harnessing all the elements of
national power. In Ambassador Robert Hunter’s words: “It is time to move beyond older and
simpler definitions of alliances and understand the need for the United States and its partners to
integrate and bring to bear the full range of their instruments of power.”\footnote{142} Hunter stresses the
need for the other elements of national power to emerge as tools of these revitalized alliances,
instead of relying on purely military means alone. In this way, these alliances will reflect the
dynamics of the new generation of threats and be value added in the war on terror.

The first step in transforming America’s regional alliances is to focus on a new purpose
common to all partners. ‘Defeating terrorists, terrorist networks, and the correcting the
conditions that source terrorism’ provides that common objective or \textit{ends}, and the ways and\textit{means} to deterring terrorism and actively countering the terrorist threat must furthered be
examined in the context of regional alliances to formulate a successful global strategy.

By changing its regional relationships to reflect not only the military aspects, but the entire
range of national elements of power, the U.S. can affect the ways of the purpose, or objective.
In this way these alliances can more effectively apply measures to combat the full spectrum of
terrorist threats: conventional but asymmetric attacks; proliferation, transit, and terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the perception of America and the West as decadent
(the seeds of terrorism) throughout the pan-Arab and Islamic world. The \textit{means} to an alliance
strategy concept encompasses a commitment by all partner nations to share the long-term
burden of the GWOT, to include restructuring their armed forces for the fight, agreeing to deploy
those forces to counter regional terrorism wherever and whenever necessary, allowing
prearranged basing rights for GWOT operations, agreeing to share intelligence regarding
regional terrorism, and participating in exercises and show of force operations in support of the
GWOT.
Not all of America’s global alliances have achieved the success of NATO, but all were important pieces of the Cold War global security strategy, contributing to the security of the West, and serving as an obstacle to Soviet hegemony. The post-war strategy of alliance building and containment was a huge success. The means of alliance building was a catalyst for the creation of a community of democratic nations, it provided a framework for common regional security, and it established the basis for a world economy that spread prosperity to most parts of the globe. The United States would be wise to keep the framework of these earlier alliances, transforming them into new regional security agreements for the War on Terror. America desperately needs the international legitimacy that its friends and alliance partners can provide. It must take a fresh look at these alliances and re-evaluate them not only in terms of America’s national interest, but also in terms of region specific interests. The U.S. should account for the interests of its partner nations when developing alliance strategy. As there is no reversing globalization, there is no alternative to internationalism. America must seek consensus wherever possible, and compromise whenever possible, while always maintaining the prerogative to act alone only when absolutely necessary.

The postwar alliance model offers positive and tangible security, economic, and diplomatic benefits for both the United States and its allies. These advantages were derived from a sound model and a robust application that took years of diplomatic effort, military employment, and heavy expenditure. The central challenge for America is to now update the foundations of the regional alliance system for the 21st century so that it can win the war on terror.

INFORMATION

The proverb “A picture is worth a thousand words” does much to explain the informational power of communications, and in no other category has the United States more disastrously missed the mark in the GWOT than in the critical area of strategic communications. The U.S. lack of success in the “war of words” is systemic, and risks undermining the military successes of the last three years. The persistent failure of the current administration to explain to the Middle East countries the purpose and linkages of the broader war on terrorism is just one example of this systemic failure. The question that must be asked is how did the worldwide perception of America become so negative? How did America fall so far behind in the battle for hearts and minds? To take it one step further, how can the U.S. now recover and impact the ways and means of a strategic communications policy by crafting a positive picture of itself and exporting it to the international community? The information tool of national power is identified as the art of strategic communications and is generally divided into three categories: public
diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations. Public diplomacy has long been the responsibility of primarily the Department of State, public affairs exist across all agencies and at all levels to include the media, and information operations is a new form of communications management generally practiced by the Department of Defense (DOD), incorporating psychological operations, computer network operations, and electronic warfare. Thus far in the GWOT America’s strategic communications efforts have been plagued by lack of effort, lack of funding, lack of a strategy and coherent message, and a lack of organization at all levels and across all agencies. The Cold War practitioners realized how important strategic communications were, and designed an offensive campaign along a multi-pronged front consisting of a mixed bag of tools (means) with overlapping responsibilities and targets all loosely falling under the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). These “agents of information” included U.S. Information Service (USIS), Department of State’s Public Affairs Office, the Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Free Europe. This Cold War Strategic Communications offensive succeeded in broadcasting America’s message through various programs including overseas libraries, translation texts and services, cultural exchanges of art and music, American movie showings, and exhibitions, among other mediums. USIA also had its share of notable personalities such as movie stars, sports figures, academics and university professors, and government officials. In 1961 at the height of the Cold War, President Kennedy selected the most famous journalist in America Edward R. Murrow to run the USIA. The relentless pursuit of this theme insured that the U.S. signal was constantly in the “send” mode.

Suffering from budget cutbacks and the lack of a long-term strategic communications plan since the end of the Cold War, present U.S. attempts at strategic communications and public diplomacy have fallen woefully short of the Cold War efforts. As the Cold War wound down, successive administrations and congress cut support and funding to the U.S. Information Agency, described by some, to include former President Clinton, as “a Cold War relic.” Finally the agency was dismantled in 1999, and a few of its components, namely the public affairs office, was subsumed under the State Department. A significant fact is that even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the U.S. spent a paltry $150 million on public diplomacy in Islamic countries in 2002. Public diplomacy expenditure by the U.S. on average, is equal to Britain or France, countries one-fifth the size. America was caught sleeping at a time when the world was experiencing an explosion of communication means brought on by the computer and internet. There can be no excuse for the fact that the first Gulf War was fought almost 15
years ago, yet the DOS is just now planning and organizing its communications campaign. It was June 2003 when the DOS finally commissioned an advisory group to study “Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World,” and 1 October 2003 when the report was finally released. As the report itself proclaimed, public diplomacy and the promotion of national interest must be sustained for decades, not stopped and started as situations change in the world.

Following the President’s guidance of fighting this war with all elements of national power, the U.S. must engage in the battle of ideas by eroding support for the Islamic terrorists in the Islamic world through an offensive strategic communications plan incorporating public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations. The U.S. must impress on both Islamic and non-Islamic nations that they must assist in this effort by appealing to Muslims to denounce the intolerance and violence of the terrorists conducted in the name of Islam. America must seek out prominent Muslim leaders and countries, enlisting their help to take the lead in a communications campaign aimed at isolating the fundamentalists, and unifying like-minded nations against the radicals. The U.S. cannot do this alone; it cannot be the first tier effort in the Middle East. Because of the tough operating environment and the negative view most have on America, only Muslims and the Islamic nations can carry this message to the people. In addition, at this time the U.S. does not even have VOA broadcasts in the Arabic language. America must create VOA programs – in Arabic – and run by Muslim natives to get its message across and affect public diplomacy and the information element of power in the GWOT.

Additionally, America’s international media representation and coverage is actually shrinking. It is a two-part problem: America’s information services must engage overseas, and the information coverage of international stories must increase. By mid 2003, two years after 9-11, the mainstream television news corporations – ABC, NBC, and CBS – each had only five to six overseas bureaus staffed with full time correspondents. In 1989 datelined evening newscast coverage from other countries from those three mainstream television corporations totaled 4032 minutes; by the year 2000 that had dropped to 1382 minutes. Another astounding factoid is that news coverage of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict received only 284 total minutes of coverage, and Afghanistan only 80 minutes (from all three networks combined) for all of 2003. Just when it should be growing, U.S. information services and coverage overseas are at their all time low. Official U.S. government information agencies must negotiate with major media organizations for more representation overseas, and the stations must increase their coverage of international news. The U.S. cannot allow “Al Jazeera” to tell America’s story overseas, nor can it allow European media hostility to control the story in Europe.
One important piece of the strategic communications paradigm connected to public diplomacy is in the field of international exchange programs. Also a part of the ‘diplomatic’ toolkit, exchange programs fall within the rubric of public diplomacy, and during the Cold War used to account for possibly the biggest bang for the buck in the U.S. arsenal of D-I-M-E weapons. There are many programs in the system, cutting across many different agencies of the government. Several of the more successful programs in history are: the Fulbright grants (1946 congressional legislation sponsored by Senator J. William Fulbright; funded from surplus WWII military equipment); the International Visitor Program (which brought young foreign leaders for an extended tour of the U.S.); American Field Service (AFS) (which sent American high school students abroad, and brought foreign students to America); the Individual and Military Exchange and Training (IMET) (this training and schools program brings officers from foreign militaries to the U.S. for training at U.S. military schools); and various journalist and media exchanges.

Since 1954, over 200 participants from around the world that visited America as part of the International Visitors Program later became heads of state (Hamid Karzai, presently the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, was a little known Kabul journalist when he came to the U.S. in 1987). Less than one-quarter of the military budget, America can afford to invest much more in its Strategic Communications budget. With the end of the Cold War, USIA overseas exchange programs were cut back by one-third, DOD military officer exchange programs were reduced by one-quarter, and overseas agency offices once created to manage the programs and add to the presence in-country were all closed. The cutbacks have had devastating effects on America’s ‘message’ to the world.

The exchange programs allowed youth from foreign countries to experience America, and take a little of American style democracy back to their country, and dollar for dollar, was the very best public diplomacy available. It would be wise for the U.S. to resurrect the informational efforts and effects that were such an overwhelming success in the Cold War. The U.S. government must once again prioritize funding for training, schools, and exchange programs. Spreading the ‘message’ of democracy from a grass roots level is a means to affect the GWOT over the long-term, and it must start now.

**ECONOMIC**

The second half of the GWOT is perhaps the most difficult and the hardest – that of transforming the societies that produce the militant terrorist networks that continue to attack America and the West. Two years after the 9-11 attacks, just a bit over half of one cent of each federal dollar was being applied to economic aid classified purely as foreign aid. The annual
foreign aid budget has been increased by only $66 million in new dollars, while the U.S. spends over $1 billion every month to fight the war in Iraq. This budget imbalance may well have been necessary at the outset of the GWOT to fund the offensive actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but America now must shift to a Phase IV concept of rebuilding, and investment in political, social, and economic reform. In short, American should initiate a new “Marshall Plan” for the 21st century as an antidote — a means -- for the poverty, despair, and hopelessness that breeds the networks of terror and spawns the terrorists that aim to destroy America and the West.

Arguably the two initiatives most responsible for U.S. security in the Cold War, and in fact the final dissolution of communism, were the Marshall Plan, and a short time later the Alliance for Progress. In both cases the U.S. embraced large-scale aid commitments as a result of tying poverty and limited development to security threats at home. The fear that poverty stricken environments would breed communism was the motivating factor for these huge aid packages. Similarly, poverty, lack of education, and lack of development in the Middle East and third world has threatened America’s security again. It is past time for major investment. Economic instability and lack of progress in the terrorist prone states is now affecting U.S. security, and will continue to do so until it is arrested.

Additionally, if handled wisely, the U.S. can capitalize on the positive public affairs aspects of a “Marshall Plan” for the GWOT. Much of the war budget supplementals, foreign aid, and in-kind donations that are now committed in the GWOT should be wrapped in the cloak of a “Marshall Plan II.” Just as the first Marshall Plan, this current aid package should be accompanied by a media campaign to sell it to the target countries and the greater Middle East. Much of the initial expenditure of the Marshall Plan was for military assistance to Greece in 1947 so that country could rid itself of the communist insurgency that threatened its existence. The same is currently being done. The $87 billion supplemental first authorized for the war in Iraq could have just as easily been tagged “Marshall Plan II” money. Add to that redevelopment aid, reconstruction assistance, and political reform money, and America’s current efforts would have a good start on a “total package” of aid. It would only be missing a name.

As a former Agency for International Development director recently said, “We are constructing a defense against terrorism but shortchanging the most important elements of the offense, which are diplomacy and development.” America cannot control terrorism by fighting and winning the tactical battle against al Qaeda and insurgent terrorists on the ground, but avoiding long-term investment in the vital areas of development and reconstruction in Middle Eastern countries. If the U.S. fails to fight the GWOT on the economic front -- targeting the roots of terror -- with the same vigor that it wages war militarily, America will be stuck in a never
ending battle against countless jihadists that have been groomed by ignorance, hopelessness, and despair, and who will go to great lengths to blame and attack the West for their plight in life.

CONCLUSION

"They were pioneering, the state of the world being, as Acheson said, wholly novel within the experience of those who had to deal with it."

The Cold War architects were brilliant in the execution of the national security strategy of containment. They were 'pioneering' in the sense that they were not working off of a blueprint. This was grass roots level strategy formulation, and using the tools of national power with much expertise, U.S. policy makers navigated through the Cold War, eventually rolling back communism not through the military aspect of national power, but actually by deemphasizing military power to a small 'm' and overemphasizing diplomatic, information, and economic elements. Despite the initial absence of a roadmap and the occasional excesses carried out in its name, the postwar grand strategy of containment generally served America and the world well. It helped build a community of democratic nations, provided a framework for common security, and established the political and diplomatic underpinnings for a world economy that spread middle-class prosperity to North America, Europe, and parts of East Asia. It is a lesson American should heed as the country embarks on what may be a long-term global struggle against terrorism and terrorist networks, fundamentalist Islamic hatred, and worldwide discontent that threatens to initiate a ‘clash of ideologies and civilizations.’

Cold War U.S. strategy was a careful balance of the diverse national elements of power – Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic -- arrayed and employed at critical times for the greatest affect. By most any metric, containment was a successful strategy. Even those revisionist historians who argue the idea of “American Empire” must now at least admit that it was an empire by invitation and free choice, not by coercion as was the Soviet communist model. The strategic azimuth followed by Truman’s administration and those subsequent to it did indeed calculate and employ the tools of national power to affect the ways and means for the objective of containment, and in the end communism collapsed from the employment of large ‘D’, ‘I’, and ‘E’ aspects, and a small ‘m’. Now however, there is growing concern that the present U.S. government has failed to make adequate use of three of the four tools of national security. Those opposed to the President’s policies for fighting the GWOT predict that a reliance on a doctrine of “muscular dominance” only threatens to divide America from the West, and embroil the nation into a growing number of Islamic or Middle Eastern civil wars which will
eventually exhaust the United States politically and economically. America must continue to stress all elements of national power, but as we advance in this war the U.S. government should decrease emphasis on the military ways and means, and rely more often on the Diplomatic, Economic, and Informational tools at our disposal. Military power will secure the nation in the short-term, and may even be a catalyst for change, but only through engagement on diplomatic, economic, and public diplomacy fronts can we ever hope to truly spread the seeds that will put an end to autocratic regimes that sow so much discontent among their people.

Once Islamic constituents begin to experience real economic growth and democratic reform throughout the world, many more will ask the inevitable question: why them and not us? When they witness American commitment to truly assist societies in the Middle East in their march forward – economically, politically, democratically, and in the area of human rights, they will realize that Islam is not the enemy America is pursuing. A recent editorial in the New York Times explained, “It is now critically important for the world to realize that the rules have changed, and that new possibilities have opened up.” Just as the people in Eastern Europe finally had the opportunity to ask the question – “Why not here?” after 45 years of Cold War and repression, those Middle Eastern countries now controlled by autocratic rulers will begin to ask the same.

America does not face a threat from a nation state as it did in the Cold War. But much like the Cold War, it will most likely be a threat we must “manage” over the long-term with peaks and valleys in the level of violence and the level of focus. There may never be an identifiable end to this war where we no longer face a threat from fundamentalist Islamism and the terrorism it engenders, but via a sound national strategy and energetic application of the D-I-m-E, the U.S. can reduce the threat to a nuisance. Perhaps that is what President Bush meant to say when he misspoke by saying the war on terror is not winnable. On the home front not every citizen will be directly involved in this conflict. The President spoke soon after 9-11 encouraging each citizen to return to their daily lives, and to not be ruled by fear. His efforts were aimed at convincing Americans that the best thing they could do was to continue to spend, further strengthening the economy and proving to the enemy that we will not be controlled by fear. The downside of this will be that as America returns to a normal life and the longer the war on terrorism lasts, support for the military and the high cost of diplomatic engagement will diminish unless our leaders are able to convince the nation that these efforts are absolutely necessary for America's security. To accomplish this, the government and military must remain connected to the nation, and must provide domestic security that is effective. Officials must expend more effort in getting the message across to the public that the nation is at war, that the threat is real,
and that the nation must have the support of all individuals, communities, and the whole of society if it is to prevail. America will return to a normal life relative to the conditions we now have, but it must also remain engaged in the public debate over how to prosecute and how to support this war.
ENDNOTES


5 This quotation is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandants Lecture Series, and is covered by the U.S. Army War College non-attribution policy.

6 Dr. Louis J. Nigro Jr./ DNSS, <louis.nigro@carlisle.army.mil>, “Kennon’s Long Telegram,” electronic mail message to COL Ron Stimeare, <ronald.stimeare@carlisle.army.mil>, 18 September 2004. This email contains the original, verbatim, and full text of Kennan’s secret telegram from Moscow to the U.S. Secretary of State, dated February 22, 1946 – 9 p.m., and is cited because it was used as the actual source for this paper.


9 Ibid.


12 Jablonsky, 425-426; and May, 435.


16 Ibid., 294, 305, 313.


18 Lafeber, 26.

19 Bush, "President Sworn-In to Second Term, Inauguration 2005."


24 Peters, “The New Warrior Class,” *Parameters*, Summer 1994: 25 [Database on-line]; available from Parameters Cumulative Article Index; copy of article was given in class at the Army War College, October 2004.


31 This quotation is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandants Lecture Series, and is covered by the U.S. Army War College non-attribution policy.

32 Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History; and Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, 57-63.


37 Ibid., 1, 5, 9, 13, 25.

38 Ibid., introduction.


40 Ibid., 22-23.


43 Schwenninger, 26.

44 Ibid.


50 Ibid.

51 Seib, 71.

52 Dizard, 41.


54 Ibid.

55 McCullough, 555.


57 Ibid., 2.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*.


Hadley, Guy. "CENTO, the forgotten alliance: a study of the Central Treaty Organization."


30


Nigro, Dr. Louis J. Jr./ DNSS, <louis.nigro@carlisle.army.mil>. "Kennon’s Long Telegram." electronic mail message to COL Ron Stimeare <ronald.stimeare@carlisle.army.mil>. 18 September 2004.


