USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP
TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Expanding NATO Membership to Israel and the Middle East

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ABSTRACT

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This paper proposes a new Middle East initiative to expand permanent North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) membership to the States of Israel and Jordan and the establishment of NATO protectorate status for an interim Palestinian government. The death of Yasser Arafat provides an opportunity for a completely new approach to address the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict is the single biggest source of anti-American moral support for Islamic extremists in the Muslim world and foreign policy discontent among traditional US friends and allies. Reversing the growing anti-Americanism trend is necessary to win the war on terrorism. The US challenge is to orchestrate an end to the conflict between Israel and an interim Palestinian government while at the same time maintaining Israel's long term security needs. In much the same way that post-World War II France and Germany and Cold War Greece and Turkey were bound together through NATO membership, Israel, Jordan and potentially Palestine in the future would be bound together through permanent and probationary membership to NATO. Expanding NATO membership to the region would be difficult and require NATO members to commit actual forces to the establishment of an interim Palestinian state and a long term presence in defense of Israel proper. Israeli acceptance of NATO membership would require acceptance of a sovereign Palestinian State, a substantial West Bank withdrawal, and a change to Israel’s long standing policy of not relying on others for its internal defense. NATO expansion would be an effective counter to Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation. This NATO defense umbrella would provide an overwhelming deterrence to region conflict and Iranian nuclear ambitions. The end state would be a stabilized Middle East acquired through NATO co-binding.
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EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Alliances are formed not just between like-minded states that fear an outside threat. They are also mechanisms for overcoming insecurity — and potential strategic rivalry — between states within the alliance. By binding potentially threatening states together, the insecurity and security dilemmas that would otherwise led the states toward conflict is reduced. ¹

— Dr. G. John Ikenberry

The Middle East is one of the most volatile and at the same time critical regions of the world. It is the birthplace of three of the world’s major religions and is or was center stage in many of history’s ancient, middle and modern age conflicts. It remains crucial to the economic well being of both the industrialized and developing world and is at the epicenter in the United States war against terrorism. For the United States recent Middle East history has primarily been shaped by the Arab-Israeli conflict, the region’s vast oil and natural gas resources, the Iraq wars which include the Iran-Iraq war, the first gulf war, and the most recent Operation IRAQI FREEDOM war, and perhaps the most important issue dominating the region today, the rise of radical Islamic extremism. These past issues coalesce into a difficult obstacle to exploring new ways to achieve Middle East security and stability. Yet within these areas it is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that stands at the core of the broader Middle East conflict and acts as the constant backdrop to the region’s geopolitical future. ²

This strategy research paper proposes that in order for the United States to win the war on terrorism it must address what Newsweek International author and editor Faheem Zakaria terms the Politics of Rage. ³ This must be done in concert with and balancing a litany of United States vital and important interests. This paper advocates reversing the prevalent Middle East anti-American attitude as an action critical to the war on terrorism, and at the same time attending to the long term security needs of Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Europe by binding these dissimilar states and quasi-states together through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership.

FIGURE 1. THE MIDDLE EAST CORE ⁴
VITAL INTERESTS

To properly frame the issue it is necessary to clearly identify vital and important regional United States interest. Today there are essentially five interests vital to the United States. They are the war on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation, regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, regional access to oil, and the security of Israel.\(^5\) While it can be argued that regime change in Afghanistan is but a by-product of the first interest, and regime change in Iraq is linked to both WMD nonproliferation and the war on terrorism, there can be no question that both of these meet the vital interest threshold in terms of national power committed.\(^6\) It remains to be seen whether spreading democracy will be elevated to the status of US vital interest. Most recently President George W. Bush’s 2005 State of the Union address, calling for political, social, and economic Middle East reforms, may be the start of a policy change, one in which the United States is willing to commit significant time, resources, and power towards achieving.\(^7\) If so, NATO membership and the institutional order, security, and stability it entails becomes especially attractive.

Examining important regional is necessary because it identifies a distinct regional paradox. The United States has a number of vital and important interests that at times are at odds with each other. These interests include the preservation of friendly and moderate Arab regimes, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and prevention of a Persian Gulf hegemonic power.\(^8\) The war on terrorism changes this paradox. Ending the Arab-Israeli conflict or at least dramatically altering its nature becomes a necessary prerequisite for winning the war.

From an ends, ways, and means perspective, there are two ends desired. The first and most pressing is achieving victory in the war on terrorism. Part of the strategy for victory must include a plan for countering Muslim rage, an anger which inevitably includes but is not limited too Israel and Palestine. The way towards achieving this end is by eliminating the single biggest Arab grievance against the United States, namely establishing a secure Palestinian homeland through NATO. It must be clear that while taking this action will not in and of itself end the war on terrorism, it must be taken to end it in the long term. The second desired end is long-term security in both Europe and the Middle East. The security of Israel, Jordan and Palestine cannot be separated and Europe’s long-term security is directly tied to the war on terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The ways and means to achieving the second end are the same as the first.
UNDERSTANDING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

THE CENTER OF GRAVITY

The intent of this paper is not to undertake an in-depth center of gravity analysis of Al-Qaeda and the war on terrorism, but merely to identify the main thoughts on the strategic source of strength of Al-Qaeda's and its like minded affiliates. Noted New York Times columnist and Pulitzer prize winner Thomas Friedman describes the war on terrorism as a war of ideas within the Muslim world and, distinctly not a war with the Muslim religion, as Osama Bin Laden argues, but rather a war against a violent "fascist" Muslim minority. Friedman authored a string of no less than six New York Times opinion editorials on the Middle East and the war on terrorism each titled The War of Ideas, Parts 1-6. His message throughout the series is the West's imperative to "strengthen the moderates in the Arab-Muslim world to fight the war of ideas against the forces of intolerance within their civilization — which is where the real war on terrorism will either be won or lost."

A number of recent studies at the United States Army War College analyzed Al-Qaeda's center of gravity. Dr. Stephen Biddle, a noted Research Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, postulated the "enemy was not terrorism" but rather Al-Qaeda's radical ideology. In his study he warned against military action which would undermine the Muslim world's center of gravity, "the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims."

This was reiterated to a degree by students in the following years. Three distinct strategy research papers remarkable arrived at the exact same conclusion. Lieutenant Colonel James Reilly in 2002, and Lieutenant Colonels Stephen W. Davis and Joseph P. Schweitzer in 2003 conducted extensive research on Al-Qaeda's center of gravity with all deriving radical Islamist ideology as Al-Qaeda's strategic level center of gravity. To some degree each study commented on the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Unfortunately, this radical minority draws enormous support from the anti-Americanism prevalent in the Muslim community. Understanding the major causes and countering this attitude are essential to fighting the war of ideas.

THE GROWING ANTI-AMERICAN EFFECT

Unfortunately, America's varied national interests make developing policy choices that much more difficult. Given the many diplomatic failures in the region, why is it necessary to attempt yet another initiative for regional stability? Again the simple answer is the United States needs such an initiative to win the global war on terrorism. The United States continues to face increasing anti-Americanism in the war on terrorism. This expanding global anti-Americanism is negatively effecting United States strategic options and at the same time fueling Islamic
extremist support throughout the Muslim world. The United States is widely seen as the
exclusive champion of Israeli rights without a corresponding and balanced approach towards a
Palestinian independence. The evidence is overwhelming. In 2001, only a few months after the
9/11 attacks a Congressional Quarterly Research paper best summarized Muslim feelings.
Perhaps more than any other issue, U.S. support for Israel – which was carved out of the
homeland of millions of Palestinians in 1948 – fuels the deepest Muslim anti-U.S. resentment
and frustration.13
Carl W. Ford, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in his
2002 statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describing current and
projected threats to the United States National Security stated:
Though fundamentally a struggle over the establishment of national boundaries,
the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is in a class by itself. No single dispute touches
the emotions of so many other nations as the Israeli-Palestinian issue and, we
believe, no other conflict could spark trouble so widely or so quickly.14

It is important to note that the unsaid negative emotions Secretary Ford refers to are
equally prevalent in the United States NATO allies and in Europe as a whole. Over time
European support has slowly moved away from Israel towards the Palestinians’ ambitions for
statehood, creating a regional rift between European and American interests. Europe’s growing
Muslim population and its traditional preference for championing social, in this case Palestinian,
issues have steadily contributed to the rise of European anti-American sentiment.15 European
antipathy towards Israel and the United States are now at an all time high. In 2003 Vice Admiral
Jacoby, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, submitted written testimony to the 108th
Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence emphasizing the growing anti-Americanism
danger.
The prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict is furthering anti-American sentiment,
increasing the likelihood of terrorism directed at U.S. interests, increasing the
pressure on moderate Middle East regimes, and carries with it the potential for
wider regional conflict.16

Again and almost exactly one year later, Vice Admiral Jacoby’s statement to the same
committee, even more clearly identifies the pressures in the Islamic World and the challenge to
prosecuting the war on terrorism, namely, reducing the moral and actual support given to radical
Islamists.
The process of sorting through competing visions of what it means to be a
Muslim state in the modern era continues. As stated earlier in my testimony, we
are particularly concerned over the stability of many of our Arab partners
because of their poor economic conditions, ineffective government institutions
and “youth bulge.” Arab public sentiment is increasingly opposed to US policies
according to recent polls, increasing pressures on governments who support the US. Support for the war on terrorism is low, ranging from 56 percent in Kuwait to 2 percent among Jordanians and Palestinians. Support for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable ratings in Morocco declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in spring of last year and in Jordan from 25 percent in 2002 to only 1 percent in May 2003. The percentage of Saudi’s expressing confidence in the United States dropped from 63% in May of 2000 to 11% in October 2003. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington’s perceived pro-Israeli bias, was cited in some polls as a leading reason for anti-US sentiment. These conditions and increasing anti-US sentiment provide sustenance for radical political Islam at the expense of moderate elements.¹⁷

The tremendous youth bulge is a major concern for the future with over fifty percent of the Muslim world now under the age of twenty.¹⁸ This demographic growth combined with an uneven economic potential will remain a major source of Middle East instability. The trend is obvious and alarming. As the war on terrorism will most likely be a war spanning multiple generations, it is imperative the United States take action to stabilize the conflict that stands at the core of the broader Middle East. Seriously promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace represents the best option for diffusing anti-American sentiment in the world and reestablishing United States global leadership.

OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

While the United States support for Israel may be the single greatest source of anti-Americanism there is more to understanding Muslim support for radical extremism than this. Again the evidence is overwhelming to the factors contributing to American animosity. Fareed Zakaria’s The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us? is perhaps most representative of this evidence. In it, he lays out the numerous conditions in a series of failed Muslim societies that combined with failed western policies that have produced a generation if not many generations of Islamic fanatics.

The daily exposure to Israel’s iron-fisted rule over the occupied territories has turned this into the great cause of the Arab — and indeed the broader Islamic — world. Elsewhere, they look at American policy in the region as cynically geared to America’s oil interests, supporting thugs and tyrants without any hesitation. Finally, the bombing and isolation of Iraq have become fodder for daily attacks on the United States.¹⁹

Widely repeated and certainly a by-product of the Cold War is United States “support for authoritarianism in the Muslim world in the name of stability or material interests such as ensuring the flow of oil, routine U.S. backing of Israeli policies, and Washington’s failure to press for democratic political processes out of fear that they might bring Islamist groups to power.”²⁰
Bernard Lewis echoes this sentiment in his article *The Roots of Muslim Rage* attributing anti-American feelings to “American support for hated regimes”, seen as “reactionary”, “impious”, “corrupt and tyrannical.” Thomas Friedman, arguably one of the most read and most experienced columnists of how the United States should relate to the Middle East, points out the recurring theme concerning the lack of free and accountable Muslim governments as an underlying cause for much of the mainstream support for radical terrorism.

I believe the tensions between us and the Muslim world stem primarily from the conditions under which many Muslims live, not what we do. I believe free people, living under freely elected governments, with a free press and with economies and education systems that enable their young people to achieve their full potential, don’t spend a lot of time thinking about whom to hate, whom to blame, and whom to lash out at. Free countries don’t have leaders who use their media and state-owned “intellectuals” to deflect all of their people’s anger away from them and onto America.

The United States as the world’s leading diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military power by default is widely perceived as the guarantor of the status quo. This is not to say the call for reform is not without support within the Arab world. Amr Musa, the secretary-general of the Arab League in Cairo repeated the sentiment of many Middle East intellectuals during an Aljazeera interview when he spoke of the need for “reform in Arab societies, as well as the [Arab] league.” Unfortunately it is rhetoric with little real action behind it. Understanding the *Politics of Rage* is crucial to understanding and countering the support Islamic extremists draw from it. It is an area in which Americans as a whole are deficient in knowledge and one the reasons for this paper. A Middle East scholar could easily point out a supposed American bias in this very proposal evidenced in the title Expanding NATO membership to Israel first and the Middle East second. It is all the more reason that any proposal to counter global anti-Americanism must address these major sources of discontent and include the measures to tie together the regional actors.

**CO-BINDING AND THE THEORY BEHIND IT**

The idea of expanding NATO into the Middle East is primarily based upon Dr. G. John Ikenberry’s theory of co-binding. The end of the Cold War brought a new realization and understanding of what the American alliance did for the West and the potential this alliance holds for the future. The NATO alliance is the best known and most successful of the American alliance concept. While the security, stability, and ultimate success of NATO are now taken as a foregone conclusions, the idea that forming alliances as mechanisms for achieving security and stability in the absence of an opposing nation or bloc of nations is a post-Cold War concept.
The so-called traditionalist view of alliances was associated with the notion of balancing power, in that one alliance forms to balance the power of another. New alliances will then reform once one bloc achieves ascendancy over the other. The best historical examples of this traditionalist view are the European balance of power alliances formed during the Napoleonic Wars through World War I. Post World War II changed this in two fundamental ways: first, the opposing alliances revolved around the two new superpowers and second, the western or American alliance as Eikenberry calls it, established a framework for “a community of states with stable governments, liberal societies, and advanced market economies” that were “tied together by security alliances, economic interdependence, and a variety of multilateral governance institutions.”

Unlike past decades where a new bloc of nations might be expected to form to counter United States hegemony after the fall of the Soviet Union, the American alliance, because of its multiple and institutional security, governmental and economic ties continue to stand at the core of world order. The United States built this system with its partners in an open manner that both intertwined and softened American power. These alliances served to bind Asia, primarily Japan, Western Europe, principally through NATO, with the United States that reduced conflict and provided a “structure of commitments, restraints, and mechanisms of reassurance between alliance partners.”

Arguably this institutional bargain has been at the heart of the postwar Western order – and the security alliances lie at the heart of this heart. After World War II, the United States launched history’s most ambitious era of institution building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT, NATO, and other institutions that emerged provided the most rule-based structure for political and economic relations in world history.

Alliance and institution building has been a staple of American presidential policy making since World War II. The post-Cold War period continued this trend focusing on institution building through new trade pacts and security partnerships. The Clinton administration in pushing for NATO expansion into Eastern Europe offered three arguments in support of enlargement. The first argument was for the alliance to expand the area of Europe where “wars do not happen.” The second argument was that expansion would make NATO stronger and more cohesive, and third and most important was that expansion would provide “an institutional framework to stabilize and encourage democracy and market reforms in reforming [Eastern European] countries.” To a large degree these same arguments can be applied towards expansion into the Middle East. NATO expansion can be used to widen the area where wars do not occur, especially in the case of Israel and Palestine warring with one another. Within NATO at both the national and individual level the norms are clear NATO member states may have
disagreements, but they do not fight among themselves. Transferring the second argument is less clear-cut. In one sense NATO would be less cohesive if one means cohesive to mean European- or Western-like. This does not take into account that Israel is already European-like and that Europe itself is in the midst of a significant demographic change with Muslims making up a growing percentage of the population. Looking at the third reason, just as in Eastern European expansion, NATO membership provides the institutional framework for security and stability. The platform for addressing issues short of warfare is readily available for use. Unlike the United Nations, it is a platform with a proven track record of success and backed up with the member states diplomatic, economic, and military power, particularly American.

This same alliance, in binding past enemies together, has been remarkably successful at ending historical animosities that often led to war. France and Germany shared a rich history of three major wars going back to the Franco-Prussian war where at each war’s end the conditions were repeatedly set for the next war’s beginning. These past enemies were able to break this cycle and achieve unprecedented peace, stability and prosperity under an American alliance and leadership system manifested through NATO. “Germany also took advantage of European and Atlantic institutions to reassure its neighbors that a unified and more powerful Germany would not threaten its neighbors.” Ultimately, German reunification in 1990 did not disrupt this relationship.

Another and perhaps more relevant example is that of Turkey and Greece. These two nations have been “natural enemies since the 1820s, when Greek nationalists rebelled against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which then controlled much of southeastern Europe. In modern times, Cyprus has been the issue that symbolized age-old grievances.” While the 1974 Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus brought these powers close to conflict, it was this mutual NATO binding that kept them from going to war over it. Over time, this same institutional system has diminished and diffused this potential flash point among alliance partners to the point that Cyprus recently held a vote on reunification. The message is clear, “institutions can both project and restrain state power.” In the same way that post-World War II France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, were bound together and achieved lasting peace through NATO membership, Israel, Jordan and Palestine would be bound together through permanent and probationary NATO membership.

EXPECTATIONS

The idea of co-binding these Middle East parties together is a complex concept designed to address a number of outstanding and future challenges. There exists a sort of Middle East
dilemma to the issue. Europeans express consternation over United States non-involvement in
the peace process and would prefer an up-front American led peacekeeping effort. The
Palestinians and Jordanians are distrustful of any US led effort given long term Israeli support,
and Israel has little to no confidence in any institution or nation except the United States. The
United States in turn is reluctant to forcefully engage on its own. NATO is the one
organization with members trusted by all parties. NATO membership alone will not
automatically engineer Israeli-Palestinian friendship and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
will not alone win the war on terrorism. However, formally allying Israel, Jordan, Palestine,
Europe and the United States through NATO can establish the basis for long term security and
governmental reform. It is a proposal which has the potential to meet each of these parties’
expectations, but only once they are tied together. For the United States, it is a bold move that
reaffirms American global leadership and resolve, and extends the American alliance system of
security and stability. It addresses and mitigates the number one source of discontent and
American disillusionment in the Arab world which in turn undercuts support for Islamic
extremism. Additionally, it does not compromise one of America’s vital Interests, the security of
Israel. It draws Europe into active participation using a mechanism which moderates American
power while maintaining American leadership. European participation becomes politically
possible under NATO and complements the growing support for Palestinian causes. Ideally
Israel achieves a vastly improved security and economic situation and moves away from
international isolation. Jordan benefits from both a security, social and economic standpoint.
This same proposal can be the vehicle to realize Palestinian independence, security and
democracy, and for both Israelis and Arabs serve as the physical and psychological foundation
for peace. Of paramount importance must be the perception a just peace by Palestinians and
the Arab world at large. Both Jordan and Palestinian would have to be convinced of the security
and economic benefits of joining the alliance as a means towards greater European Union
involvement. Overall, it reaffirms the West commitment to dampening the region’s festering
clash zone and expanding the arc of stability.

Another potential by-product is the counter NATO’s move into the Middle East would be to
Iranian nuclear ambitions. These new NATO member states would immediately fall under the
NATO, primarily the United States’, nuclear umbrella. Because of this Israel might be
persuaded to store or even eliminate its own as yet undeclared nuclear capability under some
sort of NATO monitoring arrangement. Such a move completely undercuts Iranian or other
regional actors’ argument for weapons of mass destruction development and acquisition, and
better enables the international isolation of those states that choose to proceed. Nuclear
deterrence remains assured and European, Middle East and American concerns of unilateral Israeli action are mollified.

COSTS AND RISKS

The potential benefits cannot be discussed without discussing the potential costs associated with them. The most immediate risks in this proposal are perhaps to American prestige and power. Only the United States can undertake such a proposal. Almost certainly the United States would have to provide substantial resources to build momentum to achieve success. This is in addition to that already being committed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Expanding NATO membership would be difficult and would required NATO member states to commit actual forces to the establishment of an interim Palestinian state and a long term presence in defense of Israel proper. Israel's acceptance requires full consensus of the existing NATO member states which could only come with the acceptance of an independent Palestinian state. Both Jordan and Palestine would have to commit towards open and accountable governmental reforms, and any Palestinian government would have to vigorously oppose terrorist forces in the same way that Israel would have to oppose its own extremist elements. Physical presence would be necessary to reinforce, reassure and bind parties' together. In the same way that during the Cold War United States forces were stationed throughout Europe, thereby providing both a physical and psychology commitment to its allies, NATO members would have to station forces inside one another's boundaries to achieve the same commitment, expectation, and comfort. It would be paramount for both European and American forces to be forward stationed in Israel, Palestine and Jordan as well as having some degree of Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian integration into on-going NATO Balkans and Afghanistan efforts. Forward stationing would further serve as an economic boost to the region. However, NATO could find itself having to secure an interim Palestinian government against Hamas and other terrorist like groups and potentially enter into long term counterinsurgency. Equally important, NATO would have to avoid the look of colonial occupation but rather reinforce the underpinning for governmental legitimacy. These are just some of the costs required to achieve the institutional co-binding necessary for success.

WHY NATO

PAST EXPANSION – A MODEL FOR SUCCESS

There are a number of answers to the question of why NATO vice the United Nations or some other institution. First, is the issue of legitimacy. NATO brings its own legitimacy and as
an institution has a proven record for promoting strategic consensus among its members, particularly in the security and stability arenas among weaker states. Further, it is the only organization containing parties trusted by both Palestinians (Europe) and Israelis (United States) with substantial capabilities. Second, NATO and the whole of Europe’s future threats are or will originate from the Middle East. Third, NATO is undergoing a period of doubt. There is great question over the alliance’s future. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder at a recent NATO summit declared the 56-year-old alliance was outdated and in need of a revamp, further citing that NATO was no longer the “primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.”

NATO must transform with the ability to project power outside of Europe or face the real possibility of becoming obsolete. NATO has the “potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its security umbrella that could make a valuable contribution to the overall confrontation with international terrorists.”

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General (Ret) Joseph Ralston recently wrote an article published in the London Financial Times outlining the need for direct Middle East involvement, in it, he argues for NATO playing a critical role to bringing stability by providing security forces in support of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Such an agreement hinges on
security assurances. The Alliance's past expansion and Partnership for Peace initiative provide models for success. Undoubtedly the alliance would be both transformed and strengthened.

The Balkans, where NATO peacekeepers have made remarkable progress over the past 10 years, serves as useful roadmap. As in the Middle East, the populations of Bosnia and Kosovo are of different ethnicities, religions and histories going back centuries.

NATO'S FUTURE THREAT

There is growing recognition within the European portion of NATO that the alliance must better prepare for threats arising out of Islamic extremism. While Europeans have plenty of experience with radical terrorism, 9/11 and the Madrid bombing have sharpened the concern. NATO's secretary general recently spoke on the need for Europeans to move closer to the American point of view with regards to terrorism and the need to overcome the perception gap between the two. The future direction of NATO is ultimate tied to the question as to how far the alliance is willing to expand its security umbrella over the world. In the Balkans it successfully met the challenge and reshaped the alliance's purpose. It expanded but is still struggling with its role in Afghanistan.

The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. The world does not have the luxury of choosing the challenges that it faces. Terrorism, poverty, endemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, and protracted conflicts are complex and interrelated. The future success of NATO will be determined by its ability to deepen and expand cooperation in intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian action, especially in the Greater Middle East.

SINE QUA NON OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

There are a number of essential conditions required before NATO integration can occur. NATO would have to make allowances in a key criterion of its own membership, the resolution of all conflicts. In this case it would have to accept and help implement an Israeli and Palestine settlement and would assist in resolving disputes between Israel and Syria. European members will have to risk angering other Arab states, particularly those they are dependent upon for oil and natural gas supplies. Jordanian membership will mitigate this and demonstrate the commitment to long-term regional stability and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. Overcoming European cultural reluctance to deploying forces outside of their own territorial boundaries will be the most difficult obstacle facing Europe's NATO members.
Israel’s challenges may be the most daunting. Israel must be convinced that joining NATO is in their long term best interest. “Israel sought membership in NATO in the 1950s but was rejected. Today, however, Israel is only interested in limited involvement with NATO because it is hesitant to be tied down by formal military alliances with an organization of 26 Western nations.” This requires Israel redrawing some of its “red lines,” namely the withdrawal of settlers and the acceptance of NATO’s security assurances, to include WMD deterrence and the stationing of NATO troops on Israeli territory. Most significantly it would have to acquiesce to full Palestinian statehood and use NATO as the means for addressing the most difficult issues, such as Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, United Nations Security Resolution 242, and the Right of Return.

An interim Palestinian state would have accept the same conditions facing Israel in addition to building governmental institutions, judicial, police and military forces capable of self rule and free of terrorist influence. In the near term it would be purposely dependent upon NATO for external security both to prevent new conflict with Israel. Any Palestinian issues directly affect Jordan as well. An estimated 70 percent of all Jordanians are Palestinian.43 Jordan becomes a test case for NATO expansion into a fundamentally stable Arab government.

ON THE RIGHT TRACK

NATO is a great alliance and a great alliance should be able to undertake great things... the will of the nation’s drives what we do.” —General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Regardless of the challenges required to bind NATO and the Middle East together, there is an opportunity now. This opportunity began to shape itself in 2001 when for the first time a United States President had delivered speech before the United Nations General Assembly committing to the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel.45

General (Ret) Tony Zinni, the former commander of United States Central Command was asked in September 2001 to serve as a special advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell for the Middle East. He came to the realization during his attempts to mediate Israeli-Palestinian talks that Arafat was an obstacle to progress.

It became increasingly evident to me, as Yasser Arafat and I met again and again over the next weeks and months, that this wily old revolutionary could never really bring himself to make compromises that would lead to a lasting resolution of the conflict.46
The death of Yasser Arafat opened the possibilities, as Arafat was long considered to be the primary obstacle to peace by Israel and the United States. In 2004 President Bush at the urging of Prime Minister Tony Blair set a goal of ensuring the creation of a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel before leaving office in 2009. More recently, President Bush “called for justice and dignity and a viable, independent, and democratic state for the Palestinian people….and announced that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would travel to Israel and the West Bank to work with our partners to build the institutions of a peaceful, independent, democratic state.” Coupled with this was a request to Congress for “$350 million to support needed Palestinian reforms.” While promising it is much like past policy approaches which focus around the theme let them work it out first. As stated earlier the war on terrorism requires much more forceful engagement, one that binds the parties together.

NATO began its own hesitant steps into the Middle East when it asked Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to strengthen military ties and become NATO’s partners in what is called the Mediterranean Dialogue. The program will be modeled on NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the plan that helped incorporate several former Soviet bloc states into NATO. However, the Mediterranean Dialogue and its not intended of being a pathway towards NATO membership. The dialog is intended to be a forum for intelligence sharing, technology transfer and integration and increased military assistance, and to further military to military ties. It falls short of addressing the core Middle East Israeli-Palestinian conflict and does less towards reducing popular rage.

General Zinni’s 2001 mission to the region was unsuccessful, as most are. Yasser Arafat’s intransigence aside he determined that the Palestinians would have extreme difficulty implementing any sort of peace agreement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad committed to Israel’s destruction. Confronting these elements would mean a Palestinian civil war. He advised against the sort of small special envoy type approach and instead recommended “lighting a thousand fires instead of one fuse with one match.”

What we need to do instead is put a large delegation on the ground, with a political component, a security component, an economic component, and a monitoring component. The delegation should come form the United States, the Quad, and any others for the international community that we can interest in the process…the Palestinian Authority must be reformed. This can only come from tangible US support for them and from serious negotiations with them by the Israeli leadership.

Such an effort could best be done through NATO under US leadership. There is a new opportunity. The new Palestinian Prime Minister appears to be taking concrete steps towards peace and Israel has announced its intention to remove West Bank settlers. However, much
remains to be done. Expanding NATO membership to Israel and Jordan and establishing a
NATO protected interim Palestinian government accomplishes four things: it reverses the
growing anti-Americanism trend necessary to win the war on terrorism, it ends the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict or worst case, dramatically alters and changes the conflict to provide a
foundation for new hope, it secures Israel’s, Jordan’s and Europe’s long term security needs
and provides an effective counter to Iranian WMD nuclear ambitions, and it sets the conditions
for Mediterranean expansion and long term regional peace and stability.

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ENDNOTES

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12 James Reilly, A Strategic Level Center of Gravity Analysis on the Global War on Terrorism, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 9; Stephen W. Davis, Center of Gravity and the War on Terrorism, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 2003), 19; Joseph P. Schweitzer, Al-Qaeda: Center of Gravity and Decisive Points, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 2003), iii. Each of these officers wrote center of gravity analyses research papers arriving at the same conclusion using different methodologies.


18 Goodson.

19 Zakaria.


23 Ford.


25 Ikenberry, 3.

26 Ibid., 7.

27 Ibid., 6.

28 Ibid., 10.

30 Goodson.


33 Ikenberry, 17.

34 European diplomat, interview by author, 23 February 2005, Washington D.C. Adhering to the Army War College non-attribution policy this person’s name is not given.


39 Ibid.


46 Zinni, 383.


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52 Zinni, 383.

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