JOINT LOGISTICS CANNOT WORK WITHOUT
LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 10,
AND THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT AND
LOGISTICS REORGANIZATION

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Joint Logistics Cannot Work Without Legislative Enforcement of Title 10 and the Goldwater Nichols Act and Logistics Reorganization

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ABSTRACT

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The contributions of logistics have been widely recognized as being the key to a successful military operation, or when executed poorly, a primary reason for failure. For the modern United States military, the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) changed years of standard practice as to how the Services conducted military operations and empowered the Combatant Commanders to operate as Joint Task Forces.

DOD logistics support for the Combatant Commanders lies with the Services. Title 10 requires the Services be responsible for their logistics functions (supplying, equipping, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, and maintaining). Therefore, neither the Combatant Commander as an individual or the Services as a whole can meet Title 10 obligations and GNA objectives effectively – especially when it comes to the support and distribution of logistics to the warfighter.

The establishment of a Unified Logistics Agency (ULA) and Joint Logistics Commands (JLCs) by the Department of Defense (DOD) would provide the Combatant Commanders the necessary command and control, planning, and training, therefore, DOD would have the necessary logistics capabilities to support joint logistics. This paper will propose an alternative to sustain the Combatant Commander’s logistical capability in an operational environment in accordance with his Title 10 and GNA requirements.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ iii
JOINT LOGISTICS CANNOT WORK WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 10, AND THE
GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT AND LOGISTICS REORGANIZATION .................................................. 1
HISTORY OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE AND GNA ........................................................................... 2
WHY GNA AND TITLE 10 MAKES JOINT LOGISTICS DIFFICULT ........................................... 4
JOINT LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS ........................................................................ 7
RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................. 10
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 13
ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................................. 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 18
We need to change the logistics systems. Logistics has always been central to the military. But it’s also been a drag on what the military can do. And right now, it’s a drag on the transformation because so much money and so many people are absorbed in logistics processes that we need to reach for new constructs.  

- Arthur Cebrowski, February 2004

For decades, the United States has served as the world’s model for how to plan and execute military logistics, but it is clear that the growing demands of global deployments and rapid-response operations call for changes in how the nation supports and sustains its forces. The Bush administration’s strategy for transformation and winning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to shape the military’s behavior and thinking. The joint nature of current military operations means the Services must not only bring “jointness” into their warfighting concepts and acquisition programs, but also into their logistics operations.

General James McCarthy, USAF (Ret.), who led the Department of Defense (DOD) Transformation Review Panel, presented recommendations on June 12, 2001 that highlighted the concept of multi-service early-entry “Global Joint Response Forces”. These forces would combine units from different services as tailorable force modules that train and exercise together and would use common building blocks: command and control (C2) systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; space-based assets, and joint logistics capabilities. McCarthy stressed, “We are not talking about a new force, but rather, how to organize, exercise, and train the existing forces and what capabilities to give them. Service Title 10 functions would be modified to focus exclusively on organizing, training, and equipping for specific joint roles and missions versus current service missions. Each service would provide Joint Task Force (JTF) building blocks or force modules based on its core competencies.”

When asked about transformation initiatives during testimony in Congress in June 2001, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald H. Rumsfeld also mentioned “rapidly deployable standing joint forces” as part of a new approach to handling military operations in both the near and long term. If implemented, JTFs would become the order of the day with modular organizations making up the Combatant Commanders force capabilities.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), revolutionized how the U.S. military jointly operates on today’s battlefield. Given the Combatant Commanders requirement to be a Joint warfighter, can Service supported logistics work without legislative enforcement of the GNA and Title 10? Joint logistics operations...
necessary to support a Combatant Commander will not work unless he has the requisite authority, resources, and management capability during the planning and course of action development. The Combatant Commander requires a permanently assigned, tailorable Joint Logistics Command (JLC) to ensure the planning and execution of logistics operations that support his operational requirements, and to provide the foundation for the integration of warfighting capabilities and logistics assets. The purpose of this paper is to show how policy reform and Title 10 legislation impacts the Combatant Commander. It will also detail why it is necessary to reorganize and establish JLC's for each Combatant Commander to ensure his warfighting capabilities are joint and continue to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the DOD Transformation Roadmap. This paper reviews the history of Title 10 and the GNA, and explores why joint military logistics challenges and influences the Combatant Commanders’ warfighting capabilities. I will propose a concept for restructuring the national and theater level logistics organizations to ensure logistics support to the Combatant Commander enhances not hinders his military strategy.

HISTORY OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE AND GNA

The United States Code (USC) is the official compilation of the Federal laws of a general and permanent nature, which Congress enforces. In accordance with section 285b of Title 2 of the USC, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the United States House of Representatives compiles the Code. Title 10 USC gives the Armed Services the authority to organize, train, supply, equip, and maintain their particular Department of Armed Service. The law has not changed to ensure the Services support the joint functions required by Combatant Commander.

Chapter 6, Title 10, USC pertains to the Combatant Commanders’ responsibilities and requirements to support the DOD. Combatant Commanders’ directive authority to subordinate commands includes:

- Directive authority over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Prescribing the chain of command, subordinate commanders, selecting Combatant Command staff.
- Organizing the command and employing his forces as necessary.
- Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders and employing forces, as he considers necessary.
- Coordinating administration support and convening courts-martial.
In order to understand why programmatic problems exist in DOD logistics structures (and thus the execution of logistics operations); one must also understand the history of the GNA. The GNA is part of a continuum of congressional interests, proposals, and acts dating from 1921-1945 that combine or unify military departments under a single executive agency. However, no legislative action resulted from these proposals due largely to opposition from the War and Navy Departments. 7

World War II (WWII) required the strategic planning, movement, and sustainment of numerous ground, air, and sea-based operations. Additionally, the evolution of air support by the Army Air Corps and the Navy amplified the interoperability issues among the Armed Forces, which further demanded an enormous unity of effort among the Service Chiefs. In 1945, because of interoperability and command and control (C2) issues, General George C. Marshall proposed to the President and Congress the establishment of a Unified Defense Department. After two years of Congressional debate, his proposal became the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. Though the NSA established the DOD and the SecDef, it did not give directive authority to the SecDef to provide and enforce unity of effort by the Service Secretaries. The 1949 amendment to the NSA did provide that authority and made the SecDef the principle assistant to the President for all DOD matters, thereby reducing the military Services (Departments) power. From 1953-1958, President Eisenhower sought further reforms to enhance the authority of the SecDef and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as well as strengthen the military’s civilian control and military chains of command. However, despite his insistence, no major defense reform legislated.

However, in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, the failures of Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw, the loss of 241 Marines in Beirut, and Operation Urgent Fury again revealed a lack of unity of command to execute the command and control (C2) of joint forces. Many key military leaders and staffs did not have the general knowledge of how to integrate planning, training, and or the sustainment separate Services into joint warfighting forces. With these failed operations fueling the fires for a joint and unified approach to warfighting, Congress proposed additional DOD reform, which led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

The GNA clarified responsibilities given to the Combatant Commanders for the accomplishment of their missions.8 Under the GNA, the centralization of operational authority is through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as opposed to the Service Chiefs. The Chairman is designated the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and SecDef. The act established the position of Vice-Chairman of the Joint

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[8] The GNA clarified responsibilities given to the Combatant Commanders for the accomplishment of their missions.
Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President through the SecDef to the Combatant Commanders.\(^8\)

The intent of the GNA was to formulate the balance of Joint and Service interests, not to frustrate Service prerogatives. The Services were and would remain the most important elements of the Department of Defense. The nine objectives of the GNA are still the foundations on which everything else has to been resourced and structured in today’s DOD. One aim of GNA was to ensure that those responsible for national security on the strategic and operational levels had commensurate authority to implement their decisions; hence, the furor over making certain that the Combatant Commanders had sufficient command authority over the forces assigned to them.

The GNA requires the assignment of forces under the jurisdiction of the Services to the Combatant Commands based upon their geographic area of responsibility, except as otherwise directed by the SecDef. The exceptions include forces assigned to perform the specific missions of the Service (e.g., recruit, supply, equip, maintain).\(^9\) The Services are budgeted in their Program Objective Memorandums (POM’s) the responsibility for the deployment, planning, execution, and readiness requirements of their respective units and resources to sustain the Combatant Commander’s forces throughout the military campaign. The GNA and Title 10 prescribe directive authority for logistics to the Combatant Commander upon assignment to his command. This includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures: effective execution of approved operation plans, effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.\(^11\)

**WHY GNA AND TITLE 10 MAKES JOINT LOGISTICS DIFFICULT**

GNA made tremendous changes in the way DOD currently employs its Armed Forces. In a *Parameters* magazine article by Michael Noonan and Mark Lewis, they said “at its core, the GNA legislation empowered the Combatant Commanders with command and control responsibility for their geographic area, strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and made joint assignments a prerequisite for selection to general or flag officer rank. The logic was simple enough: a chain of command staffed by officers experienced in working with their counterparts from the other Services would increase the operational effectiveness of the U.S. military writ large. Reality, however, often trumps logic”.\(^12\)

Operations in the Arabian Gulf, Zaire, Haiti, Bosnia, Desert Storm, and now in the GWOT have demonstrated the “jointness” of the U.S. military that has made it the world’s most capable
military force. Joint operations are the way the military is legislatively budgeted and structured to make certain the Combatant Commander has the force required to support the NMS. So why does GNA and Title 10 make it difficult for the Combatant Commander to do joint logistics?

The process of joint logistics begins with the Services and ends in the foxhole of the joint warfighter. In accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 4.0, "the science of logistics is the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within a theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic Combatant Commander". Those logistics functions include supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and additional services such as procurement, contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition and disposal. The linchpin for DOD logistics support for the Combatant Commander rests with the Service Chiefs Title 10 responsibilities for logistics functions. However, as outlined in Title 10, Chapter 6, section 161, paragraph C, the Combatant Commander has the same responsibility when he employs forces, so there is duplication in nature that continues to effect logistics support requirements.

At the strategic level, DOD has no single-centralized joint manager for defense logistics or logistics network for full integration and prioritization of logistics assets that would provide the effective use and employment of joint logistics capabilities. Joint theater logistics generates and supports the combat power required to implement a Combatant Commander’s plan. It requires the immediate balancing of objectives, scheme of maneuver, and operational timing by the Services and the Combatant Commander during the planning and preparation of military operations. Unfortunately, the Combatant Commander and his staff may not know what and where many of his critical logistics assets are or of any shortfalls in supporting his requirements until the logistics operators and their equipment arrive in his theater of operations.

As the Service Chiefs struggle to balance their Title 10 logistics responsibilities to provide forces and capabilities to Combatant Commanders, any disparity between responsibility and authority at the Combatant Commander or Service Chief level clearly degrades the outcome of their respective efforts. Some legislators, senior military civilians, and officers claim that the GNA resolved the apparent conflict of interest caused by the simultaneous responsibilities of individual Service Chiefs for raising and equipping their individual Services and for providing joint logistics capability and advice at the same time. Recent GWOT operations for example, indicate that Service-provided logistics still challenge the Combatant Commander’s operational movement, readiness, and ability to maintain optimal tactical combat effectiveness simply.
because he lacks the joint integration and a single organization to manage and oversee all logistics functions.

The Combatant Commander loses unity of effort and synergy because his directive authority takes effect only when the logistics assets and resources arrive in his theater of operation. The lack of integration of sustainment and logistics planning causes tremendous duplication of effort by the Services. The lack of joint logistics planning and execution makes logistics unnecessarily complex, which creates inefficiencies in distribution, sustainment, and interoperable logistics automation systems – not to mention a lack of theater asset visibility. The Services continue to build “Iron Mountains” that influence the flow of combat forces and capabilities available for the Combatant Commander’s use. In the end, logistics may dictate or change the Combatant Commander’s operational plan, scheme of maneuver, and exit strategy.

The largest military logistics sustainment effort the U.S. has undertaken since WWII is the current logistics support to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). An example of the logistical issues faced by the USCENTCOM Combatant Commander is in a 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study. The 2003 study revealed that during “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the $28.1 billion that the DOD obligated for the Services and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for logistics- $14.2 billion was for operation costs and $4.9 billion was for transportation costs. However, it estimated that over $1.2 billion worth of supplies went missing and not accounted for by USCENTCOM.” Although major combat operations were successful, they noted substantial logistics problems that hindered USCENTCOM operations and suggested major logistics changes by USCENTCOM and the Services.

The GAO study concluded USCENTCOM still has shortfalls in transportation, asset visibility, as well as the necessary equipment and supplies -- all that greatly affect the USCENTCOM Commanders force readiness, availability, and operational employment of its forces. More importantly, the study indicated “an insufficient and ineffective distribution capability in the theater due to the delay in inadequate transportation assets. Cargo trucks and materiel handling equipment were simply not available within the theater of operations when needed. Moreover, to add to the delays in supply distribution, cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets were repackaged multiple times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. The Services had failed to comply with DOD’s requirement to tag all cargo with the automation identification technology (AIT) tags. In addition, DOD’s lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation assets. According to the study, one of the major causes of distribution problems during OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and equipment did not deploy to the
theater until after combat troops arrived. In fact, most Army logistics personnel did not arrive until after major combat operations were underway, and when they did arrive, they arrived without adequate training in various logistics functions – from operating material handling equipment to managing theater distribution centers.\textsuperscript{16}

To achieve unity of effort in logistics, there must be legislative enforcement of Title 10 responsibilities that require the Services to provide joint interoperable logistics capabilities to the Combatant Commander. Such legislation would also allow him to meet his Title 10 and GNA obligations more easily. Our military strategy demands simultaneous deployment of units (force deployment/projection), replacement personnel (redeployment) and sustainment across multiple theaters and the constant reprioritization and shifting of resources in response to the Combatant Commanders rapidly changing operational demands. MG John R. Wood, Director of Joint Experimentation, J9, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), presented an overview of USJFCOM’s role in the transformation process and indicated “two key issues that must be pursued to improve warfighting performance are intelligence and logistics. Current sustainment capabilities do not match the future employment concepts. Joint logistics management must be developed to eliminate the seams in theater logistics that result from service Title 10 responsibilities. Specific recommendations included the Deployment and Distribution Center (DDOC) and the Army’s Theater Support Command.”\textsuperscript{17}

In September 2003, the USTRANSCOM became the integration agency for the distribution of logistics. Federal law now designates USTRANSCOM as the keeper of the transportation pipeline, controlling the simultaneous movement of forces and sustainment to and from throughout the theater of operations. However, there is still a need to empower a lead DOD Agency and a Joint Logistics Command to C2 the integration of Service provided logistics to make them joint support to the warfighters.

**JOINT LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS**

Focused Logistics is the fusion of logistics information and transportation technologies for rapid crisis response, deployment and sustainment, the ability to track and shift units, equipment and supplies even while en route, and delivery of tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly to the warfighter.\textsuperscript{18}

\- LTG John J. Cusick, Director for Logistics
  The Joint Staff, 1996-1998

In simple terms, nation states prepare their militaries for the future by reworking, reequipping, and redesigning their forces to meet their security needs, develop decisive means, or ensure their competitive lead in military capabilities. The evolution of the GNA has further
created that all military operations have joint logistics capabilities have motivated the logistics transformation efforts in the DOD. According to Noonan and Lewis, “the invasion of Panama in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 are exemplars of joint operations following the passage of the GNA legislation”. The revolution in military affairs that began fifteen years ago accelerated under the dual pressures of war and the dogged determination of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The challenge is that Service parochialisms hinder the optimal use of the Services supported logistics, even after sixteen years of the inter-Service cooperation and jointness created by the GNA. As General Tommy Franks, USCENTCOM Commander for the GWOT noted, “For the first time, we had reliant operations, where one service is reliant on the performance of another. I believe that is transformational. As effective as those forces were, to maximize their potential, these concepts require concurrent organizational structure change.” The Army is shifting to smaller and more agile units, the Air Force is learning to better support ground forces, and the Navy is swapping crews to allow fewer ships greater global coverage. The Marine Corps, long the most innovative of the Services, is striding toward greater flexibility and utility, ensuring its place as America’s emergency force.

The Transformation Planning Guidance defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position.” The military’s transformation initiative, Focused Logistics, outlined in the Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) document, is the fundamental campaign to enable logistics to be joint in all future military operations. It mandates that the DOD break down the Service “stovepipe” interoperable systems, which today create problems for the Combatant Commanders’ logistics system.

The Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC) is a pillar of the JCS’s new family of Joint Operations Concepts. It recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of tomorrow’s combat environment and the adaptive nature of potential adversaries. It establishes a framework for the armed forces to transition from the industrial age to the information age in order to better harness human and organizational capabilities, better target our adversaries’ critical nodes, and place the U.S. in greater harmony with the realities of the modern battlespace. It addresses the challenges of conducting large-scale military actions in a distributed, collaborative environment against a militarily capable regional nation state with significant anti-access capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. The central theme of the MCO JOC is to achieve decisive conclusions to combat operations and set the conditions for
decisive conclusion of the confrontation -- using a joint, interdependent force at all points of action necessary.\(^{22}\)

JV 2020 encompasses four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics as shown in Figure 1.

![Joint Vision 2020 Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 1: JOINT VISION 2020**

The development of information superiority and technological innovation will enable these operational concepts. Each warfighting capability will contribute to achieving full spectrum dominance as outlined in the 2020 strategic document. JV 2020 emphasizes that future logistics capability must use all viable assets and resources more effectively, as well as integrate technologies (rather than Service-centric concepts) to conduct military actions intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.\(^{23}\)

JV 2020 demands more than immediate change to the logistics footprint and streamlined logistics, it requires the following to six elements to support DOD Transformation:

- Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution
- Multinational Logistics
- Agile Infrastructure
- Force Health Protection
- Information Fusion
- Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control (C²).\(^{24}\)
These focused logistics requirements cannot be met working with in the current parameters of Service-centric paradigms. The transformation of joint logistics cannot fully change or be implemented unless DOD changes the logistics infrastructure and gives the Combatant Commander the requisite resources and authority to C2, train, service, sustain, and maintain his joint logistics forces and their capabilities as directed by the GNA.

The best place to push these changes to support joint theater logistics requirements for the Combatant Commander is in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is a product of the senior civilian and military leadership of the DOD. It benefits from extensive consultation with the President by DOD and Congress. It is "top down" in that the decisions taken on will change the President's military strategy, its forces, and warfighting capabilities. The current strategy, only modestly affected by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, aimed at fighting and beating peer competitors' post-Cold War capabilities. The 2005 version of this critical defense guidance will be the first action that can shape our successes for our current and future fight against the GWOT and will ensure the Services adhere to joint theater logistics mandates outlined in focused logistics. The 2005 QDR must recognize that U.S. logistics forces — and their organization, training and deployment — require reshaping in order to handle complex joint logistics operations. My recommendations for reform will propose a future joint logistics support structure that is more efficient and effective to meet the Combatant Commander's Joint warfighting requirements and will support the Joint logistics transformation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful."

- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
  U.S. Navy, WWII

Focusing on logistics as a Joint business practice provides the warfighting Commander with the right logistics to accomplish his objectives. I propose the four following recommendations to enhance the DOD logistics operations capabilities and support the Combatant Commander's requirements.

My first recommendation requires legislative enforcement of Title 10 by the Services to support the Combatant Commander obligations to provide joint capabilities and directive authority for logistics. Such enforcement will allow the Combatant Commander to train, sustain, and fight as a joint force. Legislative enforcement of the Services POMs would mandate
allocation of funds directly to the organizing, training, and equipping of each branch of service for specific joint Combatant Commanders roles and missions. Although the GNA was supposed to address the problem many Service centric systems still do not provide the jointness required by the NMS to the joint commanders; therefore, as stated earlier, enormous resources continue to go to waste. Services must work together to tailor and draw from each other their respective core logistics capabilities in order to plan, train, and support the Combatant Commander’s requirements.

Currently, there is no one Commander in charge of the entire logistics process. Joint missions require joint planning and support at the Strategic and Combatant Commander levels. Joint logistics planning is a command function performed at all levels of war. Unity of effort must start at the top of the logistics scale. My second recommendation is that the DOD establish a Unified Logistics Agency (ULA) that is responsible for projecting and sustaining its military forces. The establishment of a ULA will leverage the transformation and help provide the seamless logistics support required to the Combatant Commander. At the national level, one agency providing DOD with the unity of effort necessary to affect the outcomes at both the operational and tactical levels will enforce joint logistics policies, doctrine and operations at the strategic and operational levels. Currently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics USD (AT&L) manages DOD logistics. By taking the logistics management requirement from the USD (AT&L) and making logistics a separate and equal agency at the strategic level, all levels of logistics will become more efficient and have less redundant capabilities.

The aforementioned USCENTCOM GAO study indicated how costly the inefficiencies and redundancies are for the Service-centric logistics support to the joint warfighter for the ongoing GWOT operations. Expert logistician and writer, Mr. Larry Harman stated in a recent article in the Army Logistician that “there needs to be one person in charge for all global logistics functions to include deployment, sustainment, and be the distribution process owner of the logistics spectrum. The Agency Director would report directly to the SecDef.” Responsive to the SecDef, Agency would provide the worldwide lead for the nation’s defense logistics requirements. Currently, DOD has the DLA and the USTRANSCOM, not to mention that each Service has its own material command working these requirements creating redundancy. The existing USTRANSCOM and DLA, as well as portions of the Services’ logistics and support structures would make up the DOD Unified Logistics Agency. Based on strategic and theater priorities, this agency would project required military capabilities for its logistics mission areas worldwide.
USTRANSCOM, as the distribution process owner (DPO), has become the real keeper of the pipeline to balance customer requirements from factory to foxhole. Balancing these factors is critical to ensuring that sustainment and normal peacetime logistics gets to where it is required when it is required. The DPO’s span of influence encompasses only the distribution system. Working with USJFCOM as the joint deployment process owner (JDPO) and our national logistics industry partners, the ULA will bring together all players throughout the logistics spectrum to optimize and create an integrated, interoperable logistics system. Linking the talents of the of all logistics agencies under one Command will also leverage ongoing transformation initiatives. The ULA will be better able to forecast requirements, synchronize the sources of supply with in conjunction with the DPO, identify modes of transportation, and expeditiously respond to the customer.

A balance between logistics and combat forces at the beginning of hostilities is imperative. Fully trained and equipped logistics elements on the ground are critical to deployment forces throughout the mission. The Combatant Commander currently has assigned to his organization a tailorable J4 staff organized to respond to his mission. The Services augment the J4 staff when two or more Services are supporting the Commander with both active and reserve component personnel. In accordance with Joint Publication 5.00.2, there are over 66 tasks required of the JTF J4 staff covering a wide range of responsibilities from logistics estimates to graves registration operations.

A main point of concern is that a typical J4 staff is an ad hoc organization made of active duty personnel and reserve component officers. Because of Title 10, the responsibility for theater logistics is given to the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to support many of the logistics functions on land-based operations. However, as with the JTF J4, the backbone to the ASCC’s structure is also ad hoc and lacks the depth of knowledge, commitment, and authority to support the logistics obligations and responsibilities of a Logistics Commander.

My final recommendation is to establish Joint Logistics Commands (JLCs) for the Combatant Commanders. Unity of command is vital to the DOD’s NMS and its transformation campaign. Often there may be little time to shift from a peacetime organization to a wartime organization. Today, when a direct response is required, a Combatant Commander has the option of delegating the authority necessary to a subordinate commander. The establishment of JLC’s enables the joint implementation of plans, and provides the Combatant Commanders with the capabilities required to enforce the management and directive authority of his logistics. The permanent establishment of JLC’s for each Combatant Commander will provide the base for the continuity for the planning and execution of joint and, as required, combined logistics
operations, thereby providing the Combatant Commander the ability to synchronize logistics to support his campaign plan. The JLC will also put into practice the joint, mutually supporting logistics forces at all points of action as outlined in the aforementioned JOC MCO and would bridge the gap between the strategic logistics planners and the operational Commanders. The Combatant Commander could delegate his directive authority for logistics to the JLC Commander, therefore, affording the Combatant Commander to maximize his warfighting efforts on his warfighting tasks. The JLC throughout the campaign will ensure efficient use of all resources and eliminates redundancies or duplication of efforts by the Services. Because logistics is the foundation of combat power, joint logistics must adjust to the requirements of supported units and be able to forecast and satisfy fluctuating demands. Requisite joint training, interoperability, and future readiness of the Combatant Command can be planned, exercised, reset, and achieved throughout the operational campaign; therefore, ensuring logistics supports his missions and objectives. Eliminating the Service-centric planning and execution done today in the DOD provides the Combatant Commanders, in accordance with the GNA, the best use of the limited logistics resources available. The JLC, in accordance the GNA, will provide both joint duty positions for logisticians and the necessary training and future development of our military officer corps lending to more effective logistics at all levels of DOD.

CONCLUSION

Where there is unity, there is always victory.  
- Publilius Syrus (First Century BC)

Logistics transformation, in conjunction with development of new strategic and joint logistics organizations, would eliminate barriers that currently inhibit joint capabilities of our forces. The re-examination of old concepts in the development of our new systems and capabilities will guarantee that DOD has the logistics flexibility to respond to any crisis. I have determined that the provisions of the GNA have significantly improved the ability of the Combatant Commander to conduct joint military operation in support of the NMS. Military actions over the last 13 years have evolved to perform as Joint warfighters on the battlefield; however, Service-centric logistic stovepipes still create numerous inefficiencies and limits the Combatant Commander’s plan and execution of his mission on the battlefield.

I have found that in order to support USC Title 10 and GNA policies, as well as any future transformations in how the Services carry out logistical operations, there must be two fundamental changes. Legislative enforcement of Title 10 and a spirit of “jointness” must be cultivated at the Service level, as well as within the individual Combatant Commander’s
logistical staff. Because there is no single point of command in charge of joint logistics at the National level, a lack of synchronization and unity of effort forces the Commander on the ground to bear the brunt of the resulting problems. Logistics for the Combatant Commander becomes, unfortunately, another obstacle in the theater rather than an enabler that adds to his fighting capabilities.

Established properly, with ample joint training and exercise, habitual relationships, confidence, and standard operating procedures, a DOD Unified Logistics Agency and the Joint Logistics Commands would allow for unity of effort across the entire logistics spectrum enabling a key ingredient to support the Combatant Commander’s responsibilities outlined in Title 10 and the GNA. A more unified logistics support arm will allow the nation to continue to achieve its wartime and peacetime goals and respond quickly to its military obligations.
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